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SISA Report no. 16 -‐ 2014
Deeper than the Indian Ocean?
An Analysis of Pakistan-‐China
Relations
Qandeel Siddique
Oslo, February 2014
Centre for International and Strategic Analysis © SISA 2014 All views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the author. Queries can be directed to: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Phone: (+47) 932 49 083 E-‐mail: [email protected] Internet: www.strategiskanalyse.no
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Executive Summary
The leadership of both Pakistan and China often celebrate their mutual relationship in
ebulliently congenial fashion. This report investigates Sino-‐Pak friendship and
partnership by examining the nature and extent of cooperation within the diplomatic,
economic, and defense spheres. Amid civil and military circles, as well as the general
Pakistani public, China is viewed favorably. Sino-‐Pak relations are strongest in
diplomatic and defense collaboration, rooted in overlapping geo-‐strategic interest and
threat perceptions. Focus now is on bringing to par economic cooperation and people-‐
to-‐people contact by strongly endorsing aspects of this alliance.
Compared to the US, China is viewed by Islamabad as a reliable, “all-‐weather”, non-‐
interfering, supportive strategic partner. While the US is looked on with suspicion,
Beijing is treated as a time-‐tested trusted friend – this confidence centers on the transfer
of defense technology. The undercurrent of common interests and objectives implies
that Pakistan and China face the same friends and foes. One common adversary, in
particular – namely, India – united China and Pakistan, and arguably this remains the
germane reason for Sino-‐Pak alliance. In fact, China and Pakistan continue to create
partnerships based on countering the possible rise in influence of other powers in the
region, including India, Russia and the United States. The role of Gwadar port is
expedient in this regard. Attacks on Chinese persons inside Pakistan, and violent
extremism in Xinjiang province that has been linked to safe havens inside Pakistan,
remain thorny issues in an otherwise rosy alliance. However, there appears to be a tacit
understanding that “outside involvement” (including but not limited to the US and India)
aimed at containing Pakistan-‐China collaboration is a likely source of disturbance.
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Contents Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
Diplomatic Relations .................................................................................................................................... 8
Cultural exchange ........................................................................................................................................ 14
How Pakistan Sees China ......................................................................................................................... 15
Post 2013 Election developments ........................................................................................................ 17
How China sees Pakistan ......................................................................................................................... 18
Pak role: offsetting/exploiting US-‐China rivalry ........................................................................... 20
Is India still relevant? ................................................................................................................................ 21
Terrorism/Counter-‐Terrorism ............................................................................................................. 24
Outside involvement .................................................................................................................................. 26
Economic Relations .................................................................................................................................... 27
Gwadar: game-‐changer? ........................................................................................................................... 34
Defense Relations ........................................................................................................................................ 35
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 42
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Introduction
“Over the past 62 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the seed of China-‐
Pakistan friendship sowed by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and other leaders of
the older generation, has grown into a towering tree thanks to tendering by several generations
of Chinese and Pakistanis.”1
Broadly speaking, three subject matters in Pakistan can claim to enjoy near-‐unanimous,
nationwide support. Namely:
• Kashmir,
• Nuclear bomb, and
• China.
With a 90% favorability rating inside Pakistan as per a 2012 PEW survey, China’s
popularity in Pakistan appears to cut across all segments of the Pakistani populace.
Within the political and military circles, as well as civil society and the general public,
the attitude towards China is seemingly and exceptionally positive.
Islamabad’s benevolent disposition towards Beijing can be gleaned from watching state-‐
owned channel, Pakistan Television or PTV. PTV daily broadcasts a song about Pakistan-‐
China friendship (or “Pak-‐Chin dosti”); the lyrics are a combination of Urdu and Chinese,
1 Statement by Chinese premier Li Keqiang; “Full Text of Premier Li’s Interview with Pakistani Media”, Global Times, 23 May 2013.
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repeating the chorus: “Long Live Sino-‐Pak Friendship” in both languages. In the 1970s,
too, PTV routinely played a Pakistan-‐China friendship song. Pakistan has not extended
such gestures to any other country.
Another action signifying the importance of China to Pakistan is the maiden visit to
China made by Prime Minister-‐elect, Nawaz Sharif. On 4 July Sharif made China the first
destination of his overseas trip. This came as a surprise to many who expected Sharif to
turn to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s erstwhile financier and also a personal ally to Sharif;
after being deposed in a military coup in 1999 (during his last premiership). Sharif had
benefited from the hospitality of Saudi Arabia where he took refuge for eight years.
Choosing Beijing over Riyadh as his first port of call, then, magnifies the relevance and
import of China.
Sino-‐Pak diplomatic relations can be traced back to the early 1950s. On 9 January 1950
Pakistan recognized the newly established Peoples Republic of China and diplomatic ties
between Pakistan and China were forged in 1951 when Pakistan opened its mission in
Beijing. Relations are thought to have fizzled when Pakistan was seen backing the United
States against seating the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations.2 After its
partition from India in 1947, the newly found Pakistan allied itself with the capitalist US
coalition and at a time when India and China were allies. In a convoluted step, under
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Pakistan also built closer ties with communist
countries, including Soviet Union and China.
Pakistan was one of the first countries, and the first Muslim country, to recognize the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), thus providing China with a corridor into the non-‐
communist world. This was reciprocated with a continual stream of no-‐strings-‐attached
military hardware and defense-‐related assistance from Beijing. While defense
cooperation remains a lynchpin in their partnership, economy and energy are emerging
as the new hot topics. They are of imperative importance to Islamabad who is engaged
in concerted efforts to persuade Beijing to bring economic and commercial ties between
the two countries at par with the duo’s defense dealings.
2 Ziad Haider, “Could Pakistan Bridge the U.S.-‐China Divide?” Foreign Policy, 25 March 2013.
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China’s rise as a strong economic and military power and kingmaker with growing
political clout is increasingly challenging American hegemony. While China’s friendship
with a number of countries has waxed and waned over the decades, Sino-‐Pak
relationship can be said to have withstood the vicissitudes of larger international
politics as well as changes in regional and domestic currents. The close ties between
China and Pakistan remained steadfast in defiance of the differences in language,
culture, history, and ideology. The connection is often noted for its relative uniformity
based on a geo-‐strategic interests common to both China and Pakistan and has been well
preserved over time.
One of the possible bones of contention in an otherwise amiable relationship is the
unstable security situation in Pakistan and the threat to Chinese workers/personnel.
Beijing needs a stable and peaceful Pakistan in order to realize its economic endeavors
in the area. While the killing of Chinese nationals in Pakistan severely impairs the image
of Pakistan in China, it does not appear to necessarily cause a rift in state-‐to-‐state
relationship; while China encourages Pakistan to counter its prevalent terrorist trends,
there is also a tacit understanding between the two nations that “outside forces” are at
play in the region, interested in counter-‐weighing Sino-‐Pak partnership.3
China is heavily invested in South Asia; this arguably bears ramification for the US as a
superpower who would be interested in countering Chinese influence. There appears to
be little doubt in Islamabad that, despite verbal assurances from the US that it does not
have a problem with Sino-‐Pak friendship, the US is “intervening” in this regard.4 In real
terms, Pakistan receives greater investment and assistance from the US and the balance
of trade between US and Pakistan is in the latter’s favor. This is attributed to the United
States status as a superpower versus that of China that remains as yet shy of “the
category of countries to provide immense assistance”.5 Yet, since China has shown to
evolve over the years with economic growth and increased political clout, Islamabad
expects to continue reaping rewards of its close alliance with Beijing.
3 Interviews with defense analysts and journalists, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.
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However, it is possible that while bilateral cooperation remains robust in the Sino-‐Pak
partnership. Especially from the Chinese perspective, it may not be as important as it
once was – that is, it is now more cordial than considerable. Firstly, a thaw in Sino-‐Indo
relations starting in the late 1980s signaled a declination in Chinese interests vis-‐à-‐vis
Pakistan. China arguably feels less contested by India today; China boasts a GDP 4 times
higher than India, and military budget 3 times as large. Trade between China and India is
six times greater than that between China and Pakistan. Furthermore for Beijing, threats
posed by India, while important, are not as important as those it faces in the east – that
is, other regional issues and challenges, chiefly those emanating from the East Asian
Littoral.
Secondly, the security crisis in Pakistan (endangering the lives of the 13,000 Chinese
workers in the country) and the Uighur dissent in China’s Xinjiang province (perceived
to be further inflamed by the spread of militancy in Pakistan) have led Beijing to
question the stability and security Pakistan can offer to advance Chinese economic
interests, and also engenders mistrust where Pakistan is seen incapable or unwilling to
manage terrorist trends that affect China.
Diplomatic Relations
By most accounts the flattering clichés often exchanged between Islamabad and Beijing
in praise of their friendship is not an entire exaggeration.6 Leaders of both countries
have typically been effusive and often poetic in describing their relationship.7 Since the
inception of bilateral ties in May 1951 China and Pakistan have had relatively smooth
diplomatic relations.
The hyperbolic jargon use to describe the Sino-‐Pak relationship is almost always used by
top tier officials on both sides, pointing at the preeminence of diplomatic relations. This
is chiefly because: 1) China is considered an all-‐weather friendship; in that it will not
abandon Pakistan as the US is known to have done; 2) self-‐reliance; it offers a chance for
6 Ibid. 7 For example: “Lush tree with deep roots and thick foliage, full of vigour and vitality”; “Higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel”; and most recently during the Chinese premier’s visit to Pakistan in May 2013, he said: “The tree of China-‐Pakistan friendship … is now exuberant with abundant fruits”; “Chinese Premier in Pakistan, Praising Ties”, Dawn,
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Pakistan to stand on its own feet via transfer of technology, 3) counterpoise India, and 4)
joint counter terrorism efforts.8
The blueprint of Sino-‐Pak relationship precedes the present government in Islamabad;
there is a deep understanding that no matter what government is in power, the
relationship with China is deemed paramount.9 Every Pakistani government -‐ civilian or
military -‐ has supported strong and friendly ties with China.
Despite that Pakistan was tied to the US-‐led western bloc through its membership of
various military alliances, like CENTO and SEATO – which were arguably aimed at
containing China – relations were forged between Pakistan and China, most notably at
the 1954 Bandung Conference (a forerunner to the Non-‐Aligned Movement) in
Indonesia. Bandung provided an interface for initiating Pak-‐China dialogue, where
Islamabad assured its Chinese counterpart that it had joined SEATO to protect itself and
not as a containment strategy or maneuvers against China.10
During this period China was reeling a revolution; it struggled with under-‐development
and a relative isolation from the world community at large. Pakistan played a pivotal
role in entering China to world politics and forming a bridge between China and US.
Islamabad prides itself in leading the campaign for the restoration of China’s legitimate
right in UN. In China, Pakistan is remembered as “the bridge with which it crossed the
river”.11 Pakistan bolstered China’s diplomatic position; President Ayub Khan supported
China in UNSC. Pakistan at the time had British learning to impart and include China to
the rest of the world.12
In 1971, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger officially visited Pakistan; during the trip,
the latter facilitated Kissinger’s secret visit to China. This laid the foundation for a
subsequent visit by President Nixon and the “opening up” of the Peoples Republic of
China to the world. In the mindset of the Pakistani establishment, the event in Sino-‐Pak
history to have congealed Chinese trust and friendship is the role played by the latter in 8 Amb Arif Kamal, interview, Islamabad, June 2013. 22 May 2013. 9 Ibid. 10 Fazlur Rehman, interview, 4 July 2013. 11 Amb Khalid Mahmood, interview, 2 July 2013. 12 Fazlur Rehman, Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad (SSII), interview, Islamabad, 4 July 2013.
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enabling mainland China to be recognized by the US and the world community. China it
is frequently said has “not forgotten” the help provided by Pakistan in this regard.13
At Bandung, Pakistan had also communicated to China the threat India posed.14 While
during the 50s, Indo-‐China relationship had been hailed under the slogan of Hindi Cheeni
bhai bhai (“Hindu and Chinese are brothers”), the 1962 border conflict between India
and China invited Islamabad with an opportunity to water the seeds of the friendship
planted at Bandung. India was effectively catapulted as the main overlapping regional
interest to adjoin Beijing and Islamabad. The relationship sprouted further with the
emergence of the Non-‐Aligned Movement (NAM), an organization formed in Belgrade in
1961 consisting of groups of states not formally aligned with or against any power bloc,
and by the prevailing Sino-‐Soviet schism that was accompanied by an Indo-‐Soviet
alliance.15
Convergence of threat perceptions, strategic interests, and shared approach to major
regional and global developments drives Sino-‐Pak diplomatic liaison. In this context, the
Agreement to establish Annual Meeting Mechanism at the leadership and Dialogue
Mechanism at the Foreign Ministers level is of strategic significance. There could be said
to exist a genuine and mutual appreciation, understanding and respect, especially at the
state-‐to-‐state level. Strict fidelity to the Five Principles of Peaceful Existence is often
hailed as the hallmark of this unique union.
The Five Principles of Peaceful Existence was first formally codified in a treaty between
China and India in 1954 and pivoted on the following 5 tenets:
1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-‐aggression
3. Mutual non-‐interference in each other’s internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-‐existence
13 Academics and former diplomats, interviews, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 14 Ibid. 15 Statement by Amb Khalid Mahmood, Seminar on “Strategic Environment and Its Fallout on Regional Security and Economic Development” at National Defense University, Islamabad, 3-‐4 April 2012.
11
China itself often associates itself closely with the Five Principles.16 As China and India
lapsed on the agreement, entering into conflicts, Pakistan’s adherence to the Principles
was highlighted. 17 While China has warred with or continues to experience
confrontations with many of its 22 geographic neighbors – including Korea, Japan,
Russia, Vietnam, India – Pakistan remains one of the few neighbors with whom Beijing
has not clashed.
Territory in Kashmir held the potential of a border dispute between China-‐Pakistan, as
demarcations were not clear. Yet in 1963, Pakistan quietly handed over 5,180 square
kilometers of Kashmir to China.18 However, according to some experts and despite what
is often presumed in Pakistan, it was China that ceded territory to Pakistan. 19
Nevertheless, the issue was amicably resolved, reflecting and further solidifying Sino-‐
Pak bonds. The reason for no serious contention having sparked is buttressed largely in
the fact that Sino-‐Pak security concerns do not clash.20
Indeed Islamabad lends support to all major political issues pertinent to China, including
the latter’s right to Taiwan and its claim over other contested territories in the region,
supporting the “One China” policy.21 In turn, China – a rising global player -‐ upholds a
record of defending Pakistan in world bodies and international forums and
promulgating Pakistani interests. At the United Nations Security Council, for instance,
China used its veto power at Bangladesh’s request to join United Nations, imposing the
condition that Pakistani Prisoners of War (POWs) are returned first.
A source of dissonance threatening to jangle Sino-‐Pak friendship was/is the threats
springing from terrorism and instability in Pakistan. However, despite the seriousness
of the issue of Uighur militancy that China faces, and one that has been interlinked to
terrorist havens in Pakistan, state-‐to-‐state relations remain resolute. Instead, there
16 “Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence”, Xinhuanet. 8 April 2005. 17 Fazl-‐ur Rehman, “Pakistan-‐China Relations at 60”, China.org.cn, 20 May 2011; Amb. Khalid Mahmood, NDU seminar, April 2012. 18 “India-‐China Border Dispute”, GlobalSecurity.org, 19 Fazlur Rehman, interview, 4 July 2013; “Sino-‐Pakistan Boundary”, Dawn, 9 January 2010. 20 Defense analysts, interview, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 21 China is particular about its history and remembers its friends and allies; “The 100 years of humiliation during the opium war is infused in Chinese psyche” Fazlur Rehman, SSII, interview.
12
prevails a tacit understanding that anti-‐Pakistan “hidden hands” 22 interested in
sabotaging the security of the region and derailing Sino-‐Pak cooperation are at work.
In fact China has displayed considerable sympathy for Pakistan despite the latter being
referred to as a “terrorist” or “failing” state by vast sections of the international
community. Beijing has – in contrast to the United States – largely braced Pakistani
counter-‐terrorism efforts. Over the years China has countered US dissatisfaction with
Pakistan for “not doing enough” to fight terrorism. Further, in response to the US drone
attacks on Pakistan, China has stressed its support for Pakistani sovereignty. Chinese
premier Li Keqian encapsulates all this in a recent statement:
We recognize the positive contribution Pakistan has made to maintain peace and stability, combat terrorism and promote development in South Asia as well as the huge pressure from various sides on it. The international community should give Pakistan full understanding, recognition and necessary support. On behalf of the Chinese government, I wish to reiterate solemnly China’s continued firms support to Pakistan in its efforts to uphold independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and achieve national stability and development.23
The stern and public support for Islamabad by Beijing in the aftermath of United States
raid on bin Laden’s compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad in May 2011 is
indicative of China’s timely assurance of strong solidarity with Pakistan. The gesture
was/is largely viewed as symbolic of the two nations continued strategic congruence,
from the bilateral to global level.24 Similarly, after the Mumbai attack in November
2008, the Pakistani Foreign Office “immediately turned to China”25, possibly to solicit
help – indicating the level of trust between the two countries. More recently, when
foreigners – including Chinese – were attacked and killed in Gilgit-‐Baltistan in mid-‐2013
– Pakistani officials personally flew to Beijing to discuss the matter and ensure the
future safety of Chinese persons in Pakistan, making it a priority to curtail any adverse
22 “Conspiracy: ‘Hidden Hands’ Involved in Attack on Foreign Tourists”, The Express Tribune, 23 June 2013. 23 “Full Text of Chinese Premier´s Interview With Pakistani Media,” Xinhuanet, 22 May 2013. 24 Government officials, interviews, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 25 Ibid.
13
affects of the incident on ongoing Pak-‐China’s developments/projects.26 These actions
reflect the continued close cooperation and support shared between the two countries.
Other occasions marking this bonhomie includes the 100,000 pieces of commemorative
coins bearing flags of both countries and inscriptions reading “Sixty years celebrations
of the Independence of the Jamhoria China” and “Long live Pak-‐China friendship”27 that
were issued by the State Bank in Pakistan in 2009 in an endeavor to express its
solidarity with the People’s Republic of China on the occasion of the latter’s 60th
anniversary. Another example is “Year of China-‐Pakistan Friendship”; 2011 was
designated thus in order to celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations
between the two countries.
Some academics posit that the kernel of Sino-‐Pak partnership lies in national interests
alone: “there are no friends or foes in international relations”.28 China’s “brotherly”
(Hindi Cheeni Bhai Bhai) closeness to Pakistan’s archrival India in the 1950s intimates
how associations are driven by strategic/political expediencies of the time. The
argument presumes that owing to important differences in the religious, cultural and
social makeup of the Pakistani and Chinese states, a “genuine affiliation” between them
is not possible.29
Conversely, it could be argued that maintaining good ties over an extended period of
time and in spite of religious/cultural differences is a testimony of a solid friendship.
The two nations can boast a history of being “friends in need”.30 Pakistan facilitated
People’s Republic China to gain international legitimacy, handed part of its territory to
China, and backs Chinese ambitions in the region. China supports Pakistan in world
forums, muscles its defense capability, and has – overtly or through backdoor diplomacy
– helped Pakistan during Indo-‐Pak wars.
26 Ibid. 27 “Celebrating 60th Anniversary of China,” Pakistan Textile Journal, September 2009. 28 Dr. Brig. Mohd. Khan, NDU Islamabad, interview, July 2013. 29 Ibid. 30 Amb Khalid Mahmood, interview, Islamabad, July 2013.
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Cultural exchange
A perceived lacuna in Sino-‐Pak friendship is the lack of people-‐to-‐people contact.
Addressing this “deficiency” and promoting people-‐to-‐people exchange – including
between students, scholars, workers and media -‐ is increasingly voiced as a priority in
future Sino-‐Pak relations.31 That is not to say that there is a dearth in activity; Chinese
students and workers continue to come to Pakistan and numerous Pakistanis go to
China for work or jobs. As of 2013, about 8,000 Pakistanis are studying in China; PRC is
gradually emerging as “the new West” for the South Asian audience – that is, a more
attractive university destination as compared to United States and United Kingdom.32
This evolution is likely due to the easier access to China as well as its relatively cheaper
costs; thus inviting not only the elite of Pakistani society but also the middle – and lower
classes. Reports also show a growing number of Pakistani students in the country are
inclined to learn Chinese.33 In addition, there exists a number of Chinese expats in
Pakistani universities, such as Islamic University and the National University of Modern
Languages that constitutes a Confucius Centre.34 There are an estimated 15,000 Chinese
technicians in Pakistan. Nevertheless, Islamabad’s ambition is to expand this area of
cooperation as it is deemed underdeveloped compared to other nodes of bilateral
cooperation.
Official cultural exchanges between China and Pakistan date back to March 1965 when
representatives from both governments first inked a cultural agreement. Under the
Cooperative Educational Program, students selected by the Pakistan Higher Education
Council are sent to China for doctoral studies. An aspect of this exchange centers on
Sino-‐Pakistani cooperation in science and technology – an agreement that was signed in
1976 – and has matured over the years to form the joint committee of science and
technology.
Construction of the Pak-‐China Friendship Centre in Islamabad is seen as an icon of both
countries’ commitment to enhancing cultural ties. Chinese officials have emphasized the
vitality of this “friendship”. According to Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Liu Jian: 31 Amb Khalid Mahmood, NDU seminar, April 2012; PTV News, June/July 2013 32 “Pakistan’s Middle Class Fixes Sights on China,” The Express Tribune, 8 March 2013; “For Many Pakistanis, China is ‘The New West’,” Dawn, 8 March 2013. 33 Pakistan-‐China Institute, interview, 1 July 2013. 34 Ibid.
15
“China and Pakistan enjoy a long-‐standing friendship. This year China and Pakistan have
very important domestic political changes, yet no matter how our domestic situations
may evolve our friendship will remain unchanged.”35
A separate and relatively new centre called Pakistan-‐China Institute in Islamabad and
headed by Senator Mushahid Hussain aims to promote people-‐to-‐people exchange
between Pakistan and China. It is the first institute of its kind to implement Chinese
language in school curricula; initially targeting the Roots school system in Pakistan, and
now expanding to other schools. It claims that about 3,000 students are currently
learning Chinese.36 This reflects the current political climate and efforts to endorse
closer cultural ties between the countries.
Despite marginal people-‐to-‐people contact between Chinese and Pakistani nationals,
goodwill between the two nations is immense: Pakistanis are generally welcomed with
open-‐arms in China and “treated like kings”.37 Having been the underdog for many
years, Islamabad invariably appreciates such friendly overtures, and is keenly aware of
the benefits of siding with an increasingly influential nation.
How Pakistan Sees China
For Pakistan, China is a powerful neighbor, defense partner, and economic partner, as
well as important for the new issues related to connectivity and furthering commercial
interests. Pakistan appreciates the bonhomie it receives from its Chinese friends. Some
refer to this as a Chinese tactic to “smother the barbarian with love”.38 Pakistan feels
victimized by the world community as the global “black sheep”, harboring bin Laden and
selling nuclear technology to countries like North Korea, among other allegations. It
therefore enjoys Beijing’s friendly overtures and the bond is thickened. As China is
growing to be an incrementally more powerful world leader, and it is in Pakistan’s
interest to side with it and capitalize on the relationship. In contrast, the US is seen as
“ordering” Pakistan to do its bidding.
35 “Enhancing Cultural Ties Between China and Pakistan”, CNTV English, 24 May 2013. 36 Pakistan-‐China Institute Islamabad, interview, 1 July 2013. 37 Ex-‐officials interviews, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 38 Ibid.
16
The impetus guiding Islamabad to turn to and strengthen its relationship with Beijing is
broad based. Firstly, China is a powerful ally to have. From Islamabad’s perspective,
China is a rising superpower and a close friendship with it can provide Pakistan with the
leverage it needs in the world community – for instance, China holds veto right in the
UN. China is also a member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, something that is also
relevant for Pakistan given US-‐India nuclear ties and Pakistan's status as a non-‐
signatory of the Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (along with India, Israel and North Korea).
Pakistan also needs to revive itself economically, and in this context solicits Chinese
assistance.39 The strategic deep-‐sea maritime port at Gwadar (financed/operated by
China) provides Pakistan with an invaluable opportunity to intensify commercial
relations with the energy-‐rich Central Asian Republics. Gwadar also effectively reduces
distances by 500kmbetween Pakistan and Central Asia; by facilitating transfer of oil and
gas resources from Central Asia to the world market, Pakistan opens the possibility of
significant transit fees. 40
Further, in order to mitigate Indian influence in the region, the Sino-‐Pak alliance is
deemed as crucial. The alliance is also important for raising the Pakistani profile
amongst other geographical actors/neighbors. Pakistan is the only country that
according to a PEW survey conducted in 2012 can boast a near 90% favorability rating
towards China. China is popular amongst Pakistanis, and this friendly view appears to be
comprehensive – cutting across the different sections of society.
As mentioned previously, a lynchpin in Sino-‐Pak relations has been the defense
industrial complex: In particular the “transfer of technology” is vastly viewed as a
veritable sign of China’s good intentions towards Pakistan. China is the only country
known to transfer technology to Pakistan, thereby encouraging its military self-‐reliance,
as well as significantly bolstering the “indigenous-‐isation” of Pakistan’s defense
capability.41 Within Pakistani civilian and military leadership there is a consensus to
prioritize good relations with China.
39 This is discussed in greater depth in a later chapter on Economic Relations. 40 Zahid Ali Khan (2012) ”China’s Gwadar and India’s Chahbahar”, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. 41 Ibid.
17
Post 2013 Election developments
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif won general elections in Pakistan in May 2013. Sharif hails
from the business community and China practices a strict business policy; on paper this
resonates of a harmonious union. Sharif further has a history of good relations with
India and the West. Sharif, like other politicians in this election campaign, has risen on a
wave of anti-‐Americanism. His brother Shahbaz Sharif, former chief minister of Punjab,
had stopped all projects by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in
Punjab province as a mark of anger against Washington’s policies and use of drones on
Pakistani soil.42 Recently, in November 2013, Imran Khan’s political party in the KPK
province stopped NATO trucks from passing into Afghanistan in protest against the US
drone campaign in the country.
Despite the relative low favorability ratings, Pakistan appears to figure highly on China’s
foreign policy agenda; this was reflected in the Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s two-‐day
visit to Pakistan starting 22 May 2013. It came quick on the heels of a general election in
Pakistan, and during an interim government set-‐up when foreign visitors – especially,
high profile dignitaries – rarely visit a country. It was Keqiang’s first overseas tour as
premier. During this visit, outgoing President Asif Ali Zardari reiterated the importance
of China to Pakistan: “Friendship with China is a cornerstone of our foreign policy”.43
Keqiang held talks with Zardari as well as the caretaker prime minister and the
incoming prime minister, Nawaz Sharif.
The visit centered on boosting trade ties with the incoming government, and it came on
the heels of a similar stop to neighboring India, where bilateral trade was also discussed.
Tariq Fatemi, former Pakistani ambassador to the US, suggested that China saw the visit
at this stage as “necessary” and key to drawing an economic roadmap for the incoming
government.44 Nawaz Sharif won the elections on his slogan and promise of a “Strong
Economy – Strong Pakistan”. Along with tackling violent extremism, revitalizing the
country’s ailing economy is the foremost issue facing the new administration. China’s
role in bolstering the economy is therefore seen as crucial.
42 Ahmed Rashid, “What Nawaz Sharif’s Win Means for Pakistan’s Neighbours,” BBC, 12 May 2013. 43 “Chinese Premier Visits Pakistan, Praises Ties,” Times of India, 22 May 2013. 44 “Chinese Premier Begins Pakistan Visit,” Al-‐Jazeera English, 22 May 2013.
18
How China sees Pakistan
China retains a high favorability rating in Pakistan: according to Pew Research Centre as
of 2012, nine-‐in-‐ten Pakistanis considered China to be a partner.45 However, only about
one-‐third (31%) of the Chinese population viewed Pakistan favorably. In comparison,
23% viewed India positively, and 43% held a favorable view of the US.46 The lower
popularity ratings in China (towards Pakistan) are possibly due to the negative overall
Pakistani image throughout the world today and news reports of Chinese nationals
killed in Pakistan – e.g. a Chinese woman was killed in Peshawar last year.
Defying the popular opinion that Pakistan “needs” China more than vice versa, there
apparently prevail canons of thought in China who insist that: “China needs Pakistan
more”, according to observers familiar with these dynamics.47 It is possible that parity
between Pakistan and China exists where both countries can offer something to the
other in equal measure. Firstly, the containment of India through Pakistan is important
for China.48 India is arguably a perennial issue and important for both countries.
As a rising power, China aims to primarily create a network of friends in the region; it is
debatable whether it harbors any hegemonic interests, however it appears to strengthen
its presence across South Asia. These interests appear to be guided by two key
concerns: Security and energy.
Firstly, security: China appears keen to ensure peace in its own backyard. Seeking to
solidify its economic hold, China’s outlook for the coming decades pivots on achieving its
economic goals that, in return, require stability in the region. Regionally, China is
actively promoting the ethos that “economy is the new currency of security”.49 To this
end, China attempts to ensure that even Pakistan-‐India relations remain stable.
Pakistan’s unstable political situation and shortage of energy adversely impacts foreign
direct investment (FDI). As stated by Chinese officials in the past, ”As the political
situation stabilizes and the economy keeps growing, there will be increased potential for 45 “Pakistan Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.” Pew Research Centre, 27 June 2012. 46 “Growing Concerns in China About Inequality,” Pew Research Centre, 16 October 2012. 47 S. M. Hali & Javed Akhtar, interview, Islamabad, June 2013. 48Defense analysts, interview, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 49 S. M. Hali & Javed Akhtar, June 2013.
19
investment, and Pakistan’s exports will gradually pick up.”50 China is interested in
turning the region into an economic hub. This can be traced to reform policies initiated
by Deng Xiaoping in 1983; converting a small fishing village of Shenzhen city -‐ then
population 70,000 – to a bustling 7 million (average age of 29) metropolis. China’s
priority in the next 20-‐30 years remains economy-‐oriented.
Secondly, energy: In order to meet its growing energy requirements, China seeks new
and expedient routes. The aforementioned security dimension provides China with safe
passages. Therefore China appears geared to putting Gwadar on the fast track where
expanding road links to the city is underway and establishing a railway network has
been discussed. In the 1980s, Chinese industry was established in China’s western
province of Xinjiang of which Kashgar is a main city. As “China needs more energy and
needs to diversify its sources”51, Gwadar offers crucial access to sea routes to the Indian
Ocean from Xinjiang.
The geopolitics of Pakistan is important to China; 50% of China oil imports come from
the Middle East and 20% from Africa. Presently this oil is mostly passing through the
Strait of Malacca; a sea-‐borne supply route that can be easily interrupted by foreign
powers. Indian and American military bases are omnipresent in this area, potentially
causing havoc to the Chinese economy in case of conflict: They can interrupt shipments
in sea borne oil under the PSI (proliferation security initiative).52
As the current Gulf of Aden route is lined with US military bases, China’s strategic
military goals – running through to 2025 – includes expanding the role of its Navy in
order to mitigate this potential threat – its presence in Gwadar is therefore strategically
important. There is ongoing academic debate about whether Gwadar port is intended to
50 Quoted in Ding Qingfen, “Pakistan Seeks Investment Lift,” China Daily, 20 May 2011. 51 Tim Arango and Clifford Klauss, “China is Reaping Biggest Benefits of Iraq Oil Boom”, The New York Times, 2 June 2013. 52 Launched in 2003 and with over 100 states endorsing it, the Proliferation Security Initiative is a “multinational response to the challenge posed by the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”. Endorsers of the PSI also “cooperate with any state whose ships, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-‐state actors of proliferation concern”: www.psi-‐online.info
20
serve as part of China’s “String of Pearls” strategy along its sea-‐lanes .53 In 2005 it was
reported that Beijing had already set up “electronic eavesdropping posts” at Gwadar
that monitor “ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea”.54
Specifically with regards to Pakistan, China aims to create a more secure atmosphere by
raising pro-‐China sentiment and suppressing anti-‐China voices, including those
emanating from militant groups with bases in, or links to, Pakistan’s tribal areas55.
China is also interested in using Islamabad’s good relations with Muslim countries,
specifically Middle Eastern nations.
China is possibly rendered uneasy by American economic and military engagement in its
backyard: Including the stationing of US troops at Darwin, Australia, the heightened
Trans-‐Pacific Partnership that excludes China and the support to countries that are in
territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea. In this context, on 26 November
2013, in defiance of Beijing’s newly expanded Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),
the US flew two unarmed planes over the contested islands in East China Sea (claimed
by both Japan and China). The US further hinted that more military flights into China-‐
claimed defense zone could be expected.56 Divergence in approach to North Korean
nuclear and missile program has also added to tensions in US-‐China relations.
In such a climate, Beijing is likely to protect its partnership with regional allies, like
Islamabad -‐ who has consistently backed Chinese interests and political position in the
region -‐ in order to countervail American advances.
Pak role: offsetting/exploiting US-‐China rivalry
According to some observers it is likely that Pakistan may continue to play a role in
offsetting Sino-‐US rivalry as during the early 70s when it facilitated the US recognition of
the Peoples Republic of China. 57 Fearing a Chinese expansion, the US is interested in
53 A 2004 Pentagon report states that China is adopting a “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic relations “along the sea lanes from Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives”: “China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes”, The Washington Times, 17 January 2005. 54 “China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes”, The Washington Times, 17 January 2005. 55 Journalists, interview, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 56 “US Reassures Japan Over China Dispute”, Al-‐Jazeera English, 27 November 2013. 57 S. M. Hali & Javed Akhtar, interview, Islamabad, June 2013.
21
containing Chinese influence in the region. As Pakistan maintains close ties to both the
US and China, it can potentially play a middleman’s role.
The US appears engaged in maneuvers that show its interest in the containment of
China,58 and could possibly lead to friction. The US encourages a more proactive Indian
role in the region (e.g. Hilary Clinton’s Madras speech), and its more recent involvement
in the contested territories of East China Sea. At the same time, the US is under resource
constraint and indebted to China. Some claim the US has therefore created local
warlords or “regional influentials”, such as India, to meet its interests.59
However, others maintain that it is unlikely Pakistan can play any role to offset US-‐China
rivalry; the argument here is that China arguably now maintains relatively normal
relations with the US, as compared to the past when Pakistan’s role as mediator was
necessary, that it renders any intermediary role by Pakistan redundant.60 Especially
where it concerns India and its relations with the US, it is unclear whether Pakistan
could act as a neutralizer, since it would conflict with China-‐Pak goals. Further, China
typically employs highly diplomatic language, appearing reluctant to pursue any the line
of aggression, verbal or otherwise, and conversely, advocates peace. In the aftermath of
9/11 when Pakistan allied with the US war on terror, China did not object and is not
known to put Islamabad under any compulsion to resist.
Is India still relevant?
A mainstay of Sino-‐Pak relations and China’s high favorability index in Pakistan is India.
While relationship between China and India is not as strenuous as before, China
continues its unstinting support to Pakistan vis-‐à-‐vis India.
This cooperation dates back to at least the 1960s when China threatened intervention in
the 1965 Indo-‐Pak war. In fact both countries have fought wars with India: three Indo-‐
Pak wars to take place in 1947, 1965, 1971, one “incident” in 1999 and one Sino-‐Indo
border conflict in 1962. The joint enmity towards India provided the initial thrust to a
58 This is the dominant view of Chinese security establishment: Arvind Gupta, “America’s Asia Strategy in Obama’s Second Term”, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 21 Mars 2013. 59 Ex-‐government officials, interview, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 60 Ibid.
22
burgeoning Sino-‐Pak friendship. As mentioned above, under the 1963 China-‐Pakistan
Boundary Agreement – that came quick on the heels of the China-‐India border conflict in
’62 – Pakistan ceded swathes of Kashmiri territory under its control to China. In the
1971 Indo-‐Pak war, China came to Pakistan’s assistance when the West imposed arms
embargo on Pakistan.
Pakistan’s disillusionment with the West for refraining from providing security to the
country during its conflicts with India further propelled Islamabad to Beijing’s direction.
Pakistan utilized the opportunity to arise with the onset of Non-‐Aligned Movement
(NAM), and subsequently managed to create a balance between two opposing blocs.
However, given recent developments it is possible that while a uniform and forceful
factor, the India-‐centrism is arguably no longer the major impetus it once was in driving
Sino-‐Pak relations. The reasons for this are multiple: firstly, China has ambitions of
becoming a stronger economic power, and therefore emphasizes regional cooperation,
peace and stability. So while a strategic understanding between Pakistan and China vis-‐
à-‐vis India remains, the main focus is on economic security. Since at least 2008 and
following the Mumbai terrorist act, China has emerged as a crisis-‐manager in the region,
engaged itself in easing tensions between Pakistan and India.
Also, due to its economy-‐focused policies and political stance, China has in the past -‐ and
is likely to in the future -‐ to refuse Pakistani requests to interfere in Indo-‐Pak military
standoffs. Similarly, during times of serious troughs in the oscillating Pak-‐US
relationship, China voices a cautious diplomatic stance, refraining to take sides, thus not
speaking against US or India.
In fact China continues to advise Pakistan on developing its economy by fostering good
relations, including bilateral trade, with India.61 China maintains that core contentions
61 See, for example, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, “The Limits of Pakistan-‐China Relations”, The Heritage Foundation, 19 January
2012. Nawaz Sharif is in fact continuing the strand of policy initiated by President Zardari of normalizing relations with India; The
list (restrictions) of items to be traded no longer exists; Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) converted positive list of import from
India to negative list. It is expected that Sharif’s government will make greater strides in continuing this trend. Bilateral trade
between India and Pakistan lies at $2.6bn. This amount was only $200mn in 2004. There is also undocumented trade via Dubai that
is not official and beneficial to 3rd party. Also, porous border allows for smuggling. Trade target for 2015 is $6bn, even though the
23
between India and Pakistan, such as the Kashmir flashpoint, can be settled or abated
through the pursuit of commercial interests. China itself appears to follow this principle
vis-‐à-‐vis Taiwan. In this vein Beijing has suggested Pakistan to shelf Kashmir as a border
dispute and to instead concentrate on correcting the ailing Pakistani economy. With
numerous Chinese workers operating in Azad Kashmir, and talks of opening the region
to greater commercial projects, Pakistan is under pressure to be stable for the sake of
furthering developments along the Sino-‐Pak economic corridor.
The notion that India as a common adversary to bind Pak-‐China friendship may carry
greater weight for Pakistan than for China. Indo-‐Chinese trade far exceeds that of Pak-‐
China; despite the border issues India and China can be said to enjoy relatively more
stable relations than before. Sino-‐Indian trade is significant and projected to rise to
100bn USD by 2015. China’s economic development is also relatively premature at this
stage, and the country is largely preoccupied with a peaceful rise of its stature. Beijing’s
ethos dictates working within the parameters of an economic interdependence model;
so while India features high on its priority list, it is not so pronounced.
China is considerably more powerful than India than during previous conflicts, hence
reducing the Chinese threat perception of India. Also, while the US attempts to supplant
India as its major South Asia ally and use it as a proxy to counter-‐weigh China, Indians
are arguably not fully on board, further diluting the threat perception.
Regardless of Chinese focus, it is not given that a political détente follows economic
interdependence. The realistic threat of India gaining more influence in the region looms
overhead, and China still has bones to pick with the country. China reconciled most of its
border issues with myriad countries in the region -‐ e.g. Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and so on
– however, its border disputes with India, like Himachal Pradesh, still remain a burning
topic. China is ostensibly keen to ensure that any Indian ambitions of achieving regional
hegemony in the subcontinent remain at bay; and its array of ports that Beijing is setting
up in countries around the Indian Ocean, including naval facilities in countries like
potential is greater. With such amounts, the potential costs of an Indo-‐Pakistani war are raised. The most favored nation status to
India is also in the offing.
24
Burma, Bangladesh, Seychelles, Sri Lanka is arguably to this end.62 From the Pakistani
perspective, regional policy remains largely pivoted on India; it therefore requires
Chinese friendship and economic/political support and military hardware from the US,
to counter the perceived Indian threat.
Terrorism/Counter-‐Terrorism
While the “enviable” 60-‐year history of mutual trust, cooperation and solidarity is
ritually hailed by Pakistan and China, Islamabad remains cognizant of the menaces of
terrorism, separatism, and drug trafficking, among other cross-‐border crimes. It
repeatedly assures Beijing of its concerted effort to tackle these problems from its side;
for the most part Beijing is said to respect Pakistani efforts on these fronts.63 A July 2010
Joint Statement affirmed the two countries resolve to together counter forces of
militancy and separatism; China has aided in capacity building in this regard and joint
counter terrorism military exercises have been held between the Pakistan Army and
People’s Liberation Army.
China remains worried because militant Uighur Muslims from the Chinese province of
Xinjiang are still receiving training in Pakistan. To an extent China relies on Pakistani
support to counter the Uighur separatist movement; Xinjiang borders Pakistan’s
northwest region and is home to about 9 million Uighurs in whom separatist sentiment
runs deep.
Uighur militants remain among groups of foreign militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas and
Kashmir. A stronger alliance between al-‐Qaeda, Tehrik-‐e-‐Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and
Uighur extremists has meant greater financial support and military strength for
Turkistani mujahideen.
Media propaganda by Turkistani mujahideen, namely Uighur East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) as well as video releases by al-‐Qaeda leaders and Urdu jihadi
magazines highlighting the “plight” of Muslims in China and endorsing support for the
62 Ishaan Tharoor, “After Fighting Over Mountains, India and China Locks Horns in the Indian Ocean”, Time, 16 May 2013. 63 Amb Khalid Mahmood, NDU seminar, April 2012.
25
Turkistani mujahideen in China, is readily available online.64 A key ideological drive of
al-‐Qaeda and TTP is to spread global jihad with the aim of rescuing “oppressed” Muslims
in foreign lands and return states deemed historically Islamic back to their “true”
identity.
Al-‐Qaeda appears likely to contract Turkistani mujahideen in a symbiotic relationship
similar to that observed in Pakistan between al-‐Qaeda and Pakistan-‐based sectarian
group Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi (LeJ), that was co-‐opted by al-‐Qaeda to further its agenda in
Pakistan by targeting US interests while providing LeJ activities with al-‐Qaeda-‐inspired
vigor (manifested in the rise in mass-‐casualty sectarian violence across Pakistan). While
LeJ drives hatred along religious lines, ETIM incites violence among Han and Uygur
ethnic groups. ETIM was responsible for a series of bombings in Xinjiang and the group
also claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in several Chinese cities, including bus
explosions in Shanghai and Kunming.
Training and financial support from the al-‐Qaeda network across Pakistan and Central
Asia to ETIM/TIP militants increases the risks to Chinese economic – and strategic
interests, as well as potentially undermining Sino-‐Pak relations. However, compared to
other countries and topics, China does not feature so prominently in jihadi media.65
As terrorist attacks have increased in recent years, counterterrorism cooperation
between Pakistan and China is likely to remain. Despite linking Uigur separatist groups
in Xinjiang to al-‐Qaeda and jihadi training camps in Pakistan66 China has remained mild
in its reproach and relationship between Pakistan and China is considered very close on
the counterterrorism front; any Uighur militants caught in Pakistan are delivered to
China. 67 In 2003 Pakistani killed the chief, Hassan Mahsum, of the ETIM, leading to a
drop in protests in Xinjiang. Joint military exercises and boosting the Pakistani Army’s
capacity in the field are conducted in order to ensure that adequate measures are taken
to eradicate terrorist threat. There is also an ongoing debate in Pakistan regarding the
64 Hittin Magazin, “China: Friend or Foe?” December 2009. 65 This is based on the author’s familiarity with available Urdu jihadi literature/videos. 66 Preeti Bhatacharji, “Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region”, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 May 2013. 67 Government officials, interviews, Islamabad, June/July 2013.
26
need to vamp up security and protect Chinese workers, not only by employing police but
also special security forces personnel.68
Signs thus far indicate that Beijing is confident in Islamabad’s intentions to help China in
countering the terrorist threat. Pakistani officials allegedly flew to China after a recent
act of terrorism that claimed many Chinese lives, among others, and compensated
families of those affected69 – convincing Beijing of Pakistan’s seriousness in dealing with
militancy.
It is likely that due to the “regular sharing of information about the ETIM” between the
Pakistani intelligence services and their Chinese counterparts70and Chinese satisfaction
with Pakistani efforts at countering jihadi threats against China/Chinese, Pakistan’s
inherent instability and jihadi havens do not so far appear to deter China from forming
deep relations with the country.
Befriending China appears to cut across the diverse political arena; the affinity amongst
religious parties like Jamaat-‐e-‐Islami and China also lessens the likelihood of China
functioning as a key enemy for Pakistan-‐based extremist groups.
Outside involvement Another reason why the impact of Pakistani-‐borne extremism on China has not damaged
Sino-‐Pak relations is the commonly held belief that “outside involvement” is fuelling
anti-‐China groups emanating from the area.
There appears to be a tacit understanding that the US and India are engaged in activities
aimed at sabotaging Pak-‐China relations by Chinese personnel in Pakistan.71 The 2013
incident in Nanga Parbat was received by many as being promulgated by US-‐India
backing, especially as it closely preceded the Prime Minister’s maiden visit to China
where talks on the economic corridor were to progress. Similarly, the killing of three
Chinese in Pakistan preceded former President Musharraf’s visit to China in 2006,
68 PTV News, 4 July 2013. 69 Ibid. 70 “China Urges Pakistan to Expel Uighur Islamic Militants”, BBC, 31 May 2012 71 Journalists and government officials, interview, Islamabad, June/July 2013.
27
primarily undertaken to promote investor-‐friendly policies. Such incidents are viewed
as part of a concerted, “outside” effort to thwart Sino-‐Pak relations. Hindering the
Gwadar project and viability of the economic corridor is thought to be of particular
interest as it can potentially offset growing Chinese influence in the region. Anti-‐states
groups are widely perceived as being financially strong with advanced weaponry and
high salaries, hinting at either Indian or western funded/backed.72 India, in particular,
has long been accused by Pakistan for meddling in its Balochistan province, as well as
other anti-‐state groups operating in Pakistan, such as the Pakistani Taliban, stoking anti-‐
Pakistan elements and fomenting violence in the country.73 US Secretary of Defense,
Chuck Hagel, in a 2011 speech claimed India had “over the years financed problems for
Pakistan”, sponsoring terrorist activity against Pakistan in Afghanistan.74 Hagel’s speech
resonated across large segments of the Pakistani population and featured highly in
domestic media.75
It is naturally difficult if not impossible to validate such claims that point to US, Indian or
even Saudi and UAE interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. However, it may be
important to note that such allegations are rife and shared amid upper echelons of the
establishment; possible reflecting a deep understanding of regional dynamics that is
guiding policy-‐making.
Economic Relations
“We hope to create a giant economic corridor that would not only enhance China’s strategic significance but would also help in restoring peace and stability to Asia.”76
In 2012 trade volume between the China and Pakistan surpassed US$12 billion with
Pakistani exports increasing by 48% (2011-‐2012)77, and Chinese investment touched
72 Pakistani officials regularly blame India, Afghanistan, as well as Israel, for arming and promoting anti-‐state insurgencies in Pakistan. See “Pak Pamphlets Allege India, Israel Funding Taliban”, NDTV, 3 March 2010; “’US, not Taliban, Attacked my Convoy’: Qazi”, Geo TV, 19 November 2012; 73 However, no evidence has hitherto been provided by Pakistan of India’s alleged engagement. 74 “Chuck Hagel’s Indian Problem”, Washington Free Beacon, 25 February 2013. 75 “’India Financed Problems for Pakistan from Afghanistan’: Chuck Hagel”, The Express Tribune, 26 February 2013; “India Sponsored Terror Attacks in Pakistan: Hagel”, The Nation Pakistan, 27 February 2013. 76 Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, during a two-‐day visit to Pakistan, 22 May 2013; Syed Fazl-‐e-‐Haider, “Chin’s Premier Li Keqiang in Pakistan”, Asia Times Online, 23 May 2013. 77 Trade Between Pakistan and Consular Districts, Consulate General of Pakistan, Shanghai website, http://www.pakconsulateshanghai.org.cn/en/about_consulate/detail1.asp?newsid=3
28
the figure of $2 billion. While Sino-‐Pak trade may exceed that of Pak-‐US, Pakistan’s
exports to the US are greater than exports to China. That is, the total trade volume
between the Pakistan and China significantly tilts in the latter’s favor. Some argue that
this imbalance is not necessarily a bad sign, since China’s trade balance with most
countries (India, included) is tilted in its favor.78
Under an increasingly comprehensive framework Pakistan and China have bilateral
economic cooperation in the form of Joint Economic Commission, Economic Cooperation
Group, Joint Energy Working Group and a Joint Investment Company, in addition to
other mechanisms. Frameworks to better economic cooperation exist -‐ namely,
Framework Agreement on Expanding and Deepening Bilateral Economic and Trade
Cooperation (signed February 2006), Free Trade Agreement (November 2006) and the
extended Joint Five Year Economic Plan are also in place.
The year 2006 saw the signing of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA)79 and the 5-‐
year Development Program on Economic and Trade Cooperation – directed at
accelerating bilateral trade between Pakistan and China. They were put to force the
following year in 2007. It set a trade target of $15b by 2010; while this target was not
achieved, bilateral trade – that stood at ca. $7b in 2006 – rose to $12b by 2012, which
was also a 17.6% increase on the previous year.80 In 2006 China was Pakistan’s 3rd
largest trading partner, accounting for 9.8% of Pakistan’s imports. It ranked 11th (3%)
for Pakistan’s exports. In comparison, Pakistan was Chinas 54th largest trading partner
(0.13% of China’s imports) and 33rd largest for exports (0.44%).81 By 2013, China was
Pakistan’s 2nd largest trading partner. From 2004 – 2008 exports from China to Pakistan
increased on average 55% per annum while exports from Pakistan to China rose by 35%
(see table below).
The Development Program was renewed in late 2010and included 36 different projects
– covering education, health care, energy, water, environment and information and
78 Journalists, interview, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 79 The FTA remains controversial in Pakistan since it is not as beneficial to Pakistan as China; imports far exceed exports. In comparison, Pakistan’s trade with the US and EU is in Pakistani favor. 80 Pu Zhendong (2013) “Pakistani Ambassador Urges Much More Trade,” China Daily, 25 March 2013. 81 Free Trade Agreement Between China and Pakistan (Goods), World Trade Organization, 1 December 2008.
29
communications technology. 82 The two countries again set to pursue a trade target of
$15bn, this time by the year 2015. Most likely due to Pakistan’s long ailing economy,
Pakistani officials have been more expressive in pushing for greater investment trade
between the two countries, eagerly pursuing the $15b target and inviting and
encouraging China to explore more and more economic opportunities in Pakistan.83
Presently, Pakistan is the only country in South Asia with a free trade agreement and
currency swap agreement with China. The Agreement contained annexes that included
the elimination of import custom duties; tariff reduction or elimination was set to
complete within a five-‐year period, effectively by January 2012.84 In May 2013 China
stated it will “step up consultation with Pakistan on second phase tax reduction
negotiations.”85 To stimulate trade growth, on 7 May 2013, State Bank of Pakistan and
People’s Bank of China (PBoC) agreed on a currency swap arrangement (CSA)86;
implying the two countries can now trade directly without the use of US dollars as the
intermediary trade currency.
However, amid political and economic corridors there is therefore a salient recognition
that the trade potential between Pak-‐China has not been fully realized. Bilateral
economic cooperation and trade, along with people-‐to-‐people contact, is frequently
identified as “weak points” in Pak-‐China relations.87
The trade imbalance is one of Islamabad’s concerns and measures to lessen the gap are
frequently discussed and calculated efforts are being made to raise export levels to
China. To bring economic cooperation on par with political and defense cooperation is
now on the front burner Islamabad’s policy vis-‐à-‐vis China.88 Pakistan, takes this
imbalance seriously and there is pressure on the Pakistani government, in particular the
82 Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2010), Embassy of PR China in IR Pakistan website, http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/, 21 December 2010. 83 See for example: “Pakistan-‐China Trade Reaches US$ 10.6 Billion,” Associated Press of Pakistan, 31 January 2012; Pu Zhendong (2013) “Pakistani Ambassador Urges Much More Trade,” China Daily, 25 March 2013; Ding Qingfen (2011), “Pakistan Seeks Investment Lift,” China Daily, 20 May 2011. 84 Free Trade Agreement Between China and Pakistan (Goods), World Trade Organization, 1 December 2008. 85 “Full Text of Chinese Premier´s Interview with Pakistani Media,” Xinhuanet, 22 May 2013. 86 Erum Zaidi, “Pak-‐China currency swap accord implemented,” The News, 8 May 2013. 87 Amb Khalid Mahmood, NDU seminar, April 2012; PTV News June/July 2013. 88 Amb Khalid Mahmood, interview, Islamabad, July 2013.
30
Punjab Board of Trade and Investment, to overcome any/all obstacles to greater trade.89
Officials from the Pakistan Ministry of Commerce have called on the need for a
comprehensive database on all items that can be traded to China; for Pakistan to
improve its business practices; better linkages; as well as overcome the language barrier
and contribute to cross border exhibitions and so on.90 Emphasis lies on materializing
and providing security to the land route connecting the two countries, so that people-‐to-‐
people contact can increase, thus strengthening the bond the two nations.
The discourse in Islamabad centers on increasing Pakistani “exportables” and the need
for the government to step up diversification efforts. A priority is to work towards
export-‐oriented development – including raw materials, building factories, improving
structural design and range, value added – geared towards China, and then “fast track”
the process.91
The conventional wisdom in Islamabad appears to be that it should endeavor to take
more advantage of China’s rapidly growing demand for imports of foreign goods
(standing at $1.78 trillion import trade volume as of February 2013). If Pakistan could
receive only a slight slice of this amount, the country’s economy would benefit
significantly. China is to help Pakistan with the latter’s power crisis by building/running
Basha and Bunji dams.
Figure 1 shows the exchange in trade volume between Pakistan and China from 2006-‐
2012:
Year Imports from
China $
Exports to China
$
Total trade vol.
$
2006 4,239 1,007 5,2406
2007 5,708 1,105 6,885
2008 5,974 1,006 6,980
2009 5,515 1,258 6,775
2010 6,935 1,729 8,664
89 PTV News, 4 July 2013. 90 PTV News, 4 July 2013. 91 PTV News, 4 July 2013.
31
2011 8,480 2,120 10,600
2012 9,200 3,140 12,400
Figure 1 Sino-‐Pak trade92
In March 2013, Pakistani ambassador to China, Masood Khalid, encouraged the Chinese
business community to further explore opportunities and diversify cooperation between
the two countries; in particular he encouraged improving “connectivity” between
China’s Xinjiang Uygur region that borders Pakistan’s Northern Areas.93 In fact the
Pakistani government is known to invite and even persuade Chinese investors by
offering assistance and special incentives. “Pakistan’s business environment is very
liberal, with all sector open to investment and no limitations on foreign equity. (…)
Chinese entrepreneurs can invest in special economic zones and our embassy will
provide assistance”.94 Previously Pakistan had provided China with its first Overseas
Economic and Trade Cooperation Area (OETCA) – the Haier-‐Ruba Economic Zone
(HRZ).95
There are an estimated 10,000 Chinese people and more than 120 Chinese companies in
Pakistan, many working on infrastructure and energy projects. Orient Group has
invested more than $700m in energy in Pakistan, and was hailed by President Zardari in
2012 for leading Chinese investment in Pakistan.96 Zardari further encouraged the
Group to explore and invest in other projects: “We look forward to benefit from Orient
Group’s expertise in port development, financial services, banking and investment”.97
In return, China voiced that it will cooperate with Pakistan in “all” fields and support the
latter in its efforts to create “national stability and promote economic and social
development”.98 Earlier, in May 2013 China asserted that it takes its trade imbalance
with Pakistan seriously and is taking measures to address the issue. The Chinese
premier’s visit to Pakistan in May 2013 shortly after Pakistani parliamentary elections 92 The table is based on official trade figures retrieved by author. 93 Pu Zhendong (2013) “Pakistani Ambassador Urges Much More Trade,” China Daily, 25 March 2013. 94 Ibid. 95 “Celebrating 60th Anniversary of China,” Pakistan Textile Journal, September 2009. 96 “Zardari Appreciated Orient Group for Leading Investment in Pakistan,” Daily Times, 8 May 2012. 97 Ibid. 98 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on June 6, 2013” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China website, 7 June 2013.
32
where Nawaz Sharif’s PML-‐N won a majority, was hailed by both nations for congealing
an important agreement centered on the building of an economic corridor.99 This visit is
seen as pivotal where China announced/made official the plan of constructing such an
economic corridor. The Chinese premier’s visit is also symbolic, occurring during a time
of a Pakistani interim government. It offered little substantiated in terms of deals.100
To prepare for the visit, a task force led by the Pakistani Minister for Planning and
Development visited China 24-‐26 June. On 4 July 2013 newly elected Prime Minister,
Nawaz Sharif, visited China; this was his first overseas destination as head of state. China
is usually prioritized as a top port of call for civilian government or Army.101 The PM’s
engagements included meetings with leaders of Chinese financial and corporate sectors
and visits to major industrial centers and Special Economic Zones. It is worth noting that
Balochistan chief minister was part of the Pakistani delegation visiting China.102
Executives of Chinas big banks met with the delegation. The meeting aimed not only to
finalize key economic, but also regional issues.103 China has recently given green light to
several projects; task forces on either sides, energy and infrastructure projects.
China has had an imprint in the fields of heavy industry, energy (including nuclear) and
infrastructure, promoting Pakistani self-‐sufficiency on different fronts. Chinese projects
inside Pakistan total $19.87 billion as of 2012.104 Future cooperation is geared at
coordination in space science and technology, maritime security, climate change, UN
reform, and, most critically, in overcoming Pakistan’s energy crisis. An Energy
Cooperation Mechanism is in place to promote collaboration in conventional, renewable
and civil nuclear energy.
99 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on June 6, 2013” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China website, 7 June 2013. 100 Fazalur Rehman, Strategic Studies Institute, Islamabad, interview, 4 July 2013. 101 Ibid. 102 The strategic port of Gwadar is located in Balochistan province where the security situation remains finicky with sectarian violence, separatist movement, and the presence of Quetta Shura. Balochs have long maintained resentment against the government for being politically and economically marginalized; including Baloch CM in the delegation signals that Islamabad is serious about Gwadar and ensuring security in the area. 103 PTV News, 4 July 2013. 104 Amb Khalid Mahmood, NDU seminar.
33
Over 120 Chinese companies are presently engaged in Pakistan. Mineral Resources
Development are underway to help Pakistan with its energy needs and explore
alternative energy sources; examples include the Saindak Copper and Gold Mine Project;
Duda lead-‐zinc mine project; and Thal coal mining project. Within communications it
also has a strong presence; e.g. China Mobile invested more than $700m in
communication in Pakistan. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) has opened
branches in Islamabad and Karachi. China offers help with regards to Forex, keeping it at
a point that enables better exchange rates. However, in response to news of immense
Chinese foreign exchange reserves going to South American and African countries,
Pakistanis argue that they should receive a larger share.105
It is in Chinese interests, too, to strengthen economic ties with Pakistan. China has for
the large part been preoccupied with its eastern region, while central and western China
have been relatively ignored and remain under-‐developed. 106 According to some
experts, Gwadar presents an opportunity to remedy this: China stands to save a lot by
rerouting trade from Urumqi to Gwadar. That route to the Persian Gulf is 2,500km long,
as opposed to the currently used eastern channel that is 10,000km and where tankers
are vulnerable as the naval route is lined with US bases. Gwadar route then offers a safer
and shorter alternative, and one from which China can benefit commercially,
communication wise as well as meet its energy needs.107
Land trade between China and Pakistan has been growing steadily in recent years,
reaching about $400mn as of 2013108 and there are talks of expanding road linkages.
The Khunjerab pass connects Pakistan to China is built on the Chinese side but not the
Pakistani side: Currently, the road is being widened around the Sust checkpoint area
(expanding to include 4 lanes).
Karakoram Highways are notorious for their rough terrain and high altitude; there is
therefore skepticism in certain quarters that the economic corridor is a “gimmick” –
implying that the inhospitable terrain renders it impossible to connect all the cities in 105 PTV News, July 2013. 106 Amb. Khalid Mahmood, interview, Islamabad, July 2013. 107 Defence analysts, interview, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 108 “Increasing Trade: $15 Billion Trade Target With China Achievable Says Envoy,” The Express Tribune, 16 April 2013.
34
the area.109 However, others argue the project is considered feasible when considering
Chinese feats in constructing rail networks in possibly even more difficult terrains.
China has already proven capable to build high elevation railway from Qinghai to Tibet
that supposedly has far trickier terrain than the potential China to Pakistan route.110
All the above reflects China’s broader goal to “further expand cooperative areas” with
South Asian nations111; given Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s focus on economy and
China’s economically driven foreign policies, future collaboration and fortification and
on this front is expected.
Gwadar: game-‐changer? Gwadar is often termed a “game-‐changer” in Pakistan. China and Pakistan are committed
to the economic corridor that is likely to materialize in the coming 3-‐5 years. While
China needs the alternative route from an economic and energy perspective, Pakistan
needs the opportunities and cash generated by Gwadar port. There is a broad consensus
across Pakistani Army, civilian government and civilian society for the Gwadar project to
be realized.
China financed the construction of the Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province
that was inaugurated in 2008; China took over its operational control last year.112 After
being operated by a Singaporean company, PSA International, for many years, the
Gwadar port was succeeded to state-‐run Chinese Overseas Port Holdings (COPHC) in
February 2013.
Pakistan’s geographic importance centers on its lying astride China, South Asia, Central
Asia, West Asia and at the mouth of the Persian Gulf -‐ thus, having the potential to
become a hub of trade, transportation and a energy corridor linking these regions.
Gwadar is a port city in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which borders Iran. It lies at the
apex of the Arabian Peninsula and is close (180 nautical miles) to the Strait of Hormuz.
109 Ex-‐government official, interviews, Islamabad, June/July 2013. 110 Amb. Khalid Mahmood, interview, Islamabad, July 2013. 111 Xinhuanet, 11 June 2013. 112 Xu Tianrah, “China Takes Over Gwadar Port”, Global Times, 19 February 2013.
35
The Strait of Hormuz gateway accounts for up to 35 % of the world’s sea bound oil.113
Distance between Xinjiang province and Karachi or Gwadar is 2500 km compared to
4500 from China’s eastern seaboard.
In 2009, China became the second largest consumer of oil after the United States, and its
consumption is likely to double by 2030, which would make it the world’s largest oil
consumer. About 80% of oil imports to China arrive via sea routes from the Middle East
and Africa, and this dependence on imported oil is likely to increase.114
With changing geopolitics and US presence, China has a growing need for land-‐based
trade routes.115 For Pakistan, the benefits of Gwadar would chiefly be that of a transit
country and a trading partner. Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics (CARs) will also
find outlet in Pakistan. The wider thinking is that Gwadar will act as a key player of
Sino-‐Pakistani bilateral relations as well as impacting the region as a whole; not only can
it serve as a commercial hub benefitting Pakistani and Chinese but also as a possible
strategic naval centre for the latter to counter American influence (aforementioned
“string of pearls” theory).
While Gwadar offers military/strategic possibilities, its main purpose is seen as
economic hub, as Pakistan direly needs the cash and the future map of the region
appears to be drawn on economic inter-‐dependence. However, to ensure the viability of
and reap profits of Gwadar, it is increasingly important for Pakistan to secure the
provision of to the roughly 7,000 Chinese engineers and workers engaged in about 250
projects in Pakistan.
Defense Relations
“Pakistan is our Israel.”116
113 P. Mieglo, F. Portero, G. del Caz Esteso. “Geopolitical Consequences of the United States’ Energy Independence”, Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis, 6 September 2013. 114 “Walking Between the Raindrops”, The Economist, 27 May 2010. 115 Fazlur Rehman, SSII, interview, July 2013. 116 Sarcastic remark by a Chinese diplomat in response to criticism by a US delegation regarding Beijing’s unstinting defense support to Pakistan; Al-‐Jazeera English, 28 October 2010.
36
The most “time-‐tested” aspect of Sino-‐Pak relationship remains within the defense
sector. China is known to provide material support to Pakistan’s Army, Navy and Air
Force. A few current facts reflect this notion; in 2013, Pakistan emerged as the largest
recipient of Chinese arms export. Pakistan is also thought to benefit from China’s
plutonium-‐based nuclear program. It is widely held that support from China contributed
to Pakistan being nuclear-‐capable.117 China remains a vital source of military and
nuclear technology for Pakistan. Stemming from the forum of Defense and Security Talks
instituted in 2002, Pakistan and China signed a landmark agreement in December 2008
to escalate bilateral military cooperation.118 Sino-‐Pak military cooperation has been a
source of worry for other regional rising regional powers, such as India. The Indian
Defense Minister in November 2009 stated: “The increasing nexus between China and
Pakistan in the military sphere remains an area of serious concern.”119
In the period 2008-‐2012 China’s arms exports grew by 162% compared to the previous
5-‐year period, and its share in the global arms exports increased from 2% to 5% –
thereby replacing United Kingdom as the 5th largest international exporter of arms.120 It
was also the first time in 20 years a shift was observed in the list of the top five arms
exporters.121
According to head of SIPRI Arms Transfers Program: “China’s rise has been driven
primarily by large scale arms acquisition by Pakistan”.122 Indeed over half of China’s
arms exports – namely, 55% – in the 2008-‐2012 period were to Pakistan.123 In the same
time period, Pakistan ranked 3rd in the top five arms importers list, covering 5% of the
global imports, and following India (12%) and China (6%).124
117 “Proliferation: Threat and Response:, Department of Defense Report, January 2001. 118 Dr. Monika Chansoria, “China’s Arms Sales to Pakistan Unsettling for South Asian Security”, Indian Defense Review, Vol. 25:4, Oct-‐Dec 2010. 119 “China-‐Pakistan Military Links Upset India”, Financial Times, 27 November 2009. 120 “China Replaces UK as the Worlds Fifth Largest Arms Exporter,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 March 2013. 121 The top-‐five list of global arms exporters was hitherto dominated by the United States, Russia, Germany, France and United Kingdom. 122 “China Replaces UK as the Worlds Fifth Largest Arms Exporter,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 March 2013. 123 “Pakistan Buys 55% of China’s Arms Exports,” Hindustan Times, 19 March 2013. 124 SIPRI, 18 March 2013.
37
Moreover, while world military expenditure fell by 0.5% from 2011-‐2012, countries
such as Russia and China were seen to increase their spending: China was the second
largest spender in 2012 (increasing expenditure by 7.8%) and Russia was the third
largest (increase by 16%).125
It remains unclear whether Pakistan receives the lion share of its defense equipment
from China. However, the Pakistani military maintains that China is “one of its biggest
partners [along with France and the US]”.126 There is little indication that China will stop
selling arms to Pakistan and lose a major source of income. The United States remains
the key partner in terms of supplying defense hardware and military programs.127
However it is more cost-‐effective to acquire defense equipment from China vs. the US.
Strong links to China, however, cannot be denied. Declassified CIA records in April 2013
suggested that China was exporting nuclear materials to Third World countries,
including Pakistan, without safeguards. China is believed to facilitate Islamabad’s
nuclear weapons capability: main developments herein include “verbal consent [in
1974] to help Pakistan develop a “nuclear blast” capability, “hedged and conditional
commitment” in 1976 to provide nuclear weapons technology, and unspecified excised
information that raised the “possibility that China has provided a fairly comprehensive
package of proven nuclear weapon design information.”128 The documents made it
probable also that the exchange was two-‐way where Pakistan likely shared gas
centrifuge technology with the Chinese.129
China built two nuclear power plants in Pakistan in the 1990s and signed a deal in 2009
to build two more -‐ a deal to which it continues to adhere on the grounds that it was
“grandfathered” in 1986, prior to Chinese membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Groups
(NSG). Pakistan Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHANUPP) marked the first nuclear
power plant imported from China.
125 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 15 April 2013. 126 “Pakistan Buys 55% of China’s Arms Exports,” Hindustan Times, 19 March 2013. 127 “Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001”, CRS, March 2013 128 The Nuclear Vault, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 423, The George Washington University, 23 April 2013. 129 Ibid.
38
Although Indo-‐US strategic relationship is believed to face conflicts on several fronts,
further developments in Indo-‐US nuclear/defense deals are nevertheless worrying for
both Pakistan and China. China’s dealings with Pakistan have traditionally been
conducted with an eye on India. As such, both countries are interested in
counterbalancing nuclear deals between India and the United States.
Although India has refused to sign the Non-‐Proliferation Treaty, in 2005, the US made a
controversial deal with the country to help develop its nuclear program. India is
strategically important to the United States as a counterweight to China. Cultivating
closer ties to India is a key component of US (and most Western countries) foreign
policy agenda vis-‐à-‐vis South Asia that views India as a more favorable and beneficial
ally than Pakistan.
This Indo-‐American nuclear agreement led China to oppose it on the grounds that it was
not equitable, and favored a similar Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)130 exemption for
Pakistan. Similarly, US vouching for Indian membership to the NSG have ruffled feathers
in Beijing and Islamabad; for it made India the only country outside the Nuclear Non-‐
Proliferation Treaty to penetrate the group.
Cornerstones of Sino-‐Pak military cooperation is the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex,
located near the Punjabi city of Chashma; Chashma Nuclear Power Plant 1 (CHASNUPP-‐
1, or Chashma 1) and Chashma Nuclear Power Plant 2 (Chashma 2) have been
constructed with Chinese assistance, while Chashma 3 and 4 are underway131 and
scheduled to be completed by 2016 and 2017, respectively. In the international
community, news of such deals has been met with skepticism and controversy prevails.
Earlier, agreements signed by China in 2009 for Chashma 3 and 4 came at the heels of
China’s membership at the NSG,
130 The NSG is a 46-‐member body that prohibits the sale of technology to countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 131 Zafar Bhutta, “Government to Kick Off Work on 1,100 MG Nuclear Power Plant”, The Express Tribune, 7 June 2013
39
However, Beijing argued the “grandfather clause”132: namely, that reactors 3 and 4 were
penned as part of earlier deals (for Chashma 1 and 2) which China had already declared
as part of its commitments when it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This may hold
water since it was in 1986 that China and Pakistan signed The Comprehensive Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement that stated that China would by 2011 construct four nuclear
reactors in Pakistan.
The issue ruffles the feathers of other powers, such as India and the United States. India
for its part had to seek a waiver from NSG before its civilian deal with the US
materialized any further. The US has repeatedly urged China to seek a waiver if it aims
to continue its assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program. However, the ramifications of
putting pressure on China to seek such a waiver can be adverse and felt worldwide;
more than half the world’s reactors are currently under construction in China, and it has
become “the world’s living laboratory for new nuclear reactor designs”.133
Sino-‐Pakistani civilian nuclear cooperation continues unhindered. Last year saw talks to
export another 1,000 MW reactor to Pakistan, either to Chashma or to the Karachi
Nuclear Power Plant complex. In March 2013, China and Pakistan allegedly agreed to
build an additional reactor at the Complex -‐ namely, Chashama 5.134 In June 2013, the
Pakistani government announced the go-‐ahead for the Karachi Coastal Power Project,
1,100-‐megawatt nuclear power plant in Karachi with Chinese assistance. The project is
scheduled to start from the next financial year.
In order to tackle Pakistan’s pertinent energy crisis, it was further reported that the
Pakistani government was in discussion with China regarding the construction of two
other nuclear power plants with a combined capacity of 2,000MW; which will be utilized
for setting up Karachi Nuclear Power Plant-‐2 (Kanupp-‐2) and Kanupp-‐3.135 The Karachi
Coastal Power Project was inaugurated by Nawaz Sharif on 26 November 2013, where
132 The “grandfather clause” refers to the agreement to construct two nuclear reactors in Pakistan before China joined the NSG in 2004. 133 David Bello, “China’s Nuclear Power Plans Unfazed by Fukushima Disaster”, Yale Environment 360, 8 August 2011 134 “China, Pakistan Signed Deal on 1,000 MW Reactor”, The Hindu, 26 March 2013. 135 Zafar Bhutta, “Government to Kick Off Work on 1,100 MG Nuclear Power Plant”, The Express Tribune, 7 June 2013.
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the PM vowed that 6 more nuclear power plants would be constructed to curb the
problem of electricity shortage in the country -‐ producing 40,000MW of electricity by
2050.136
Beijing has insisted that any future nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is directed solely
at meeting the urgent and vast civilian energy shortages in the country. It further argues
that the plants do not violate NSG norms and will remain under the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) watchdog. Islamabad has also stated that the proposed reactors
are crucial to its efforts to generate 8,800MW of nuclear energy by 2030.137
There prevails a “thin line” between civilian and military nuclear collaboration; despite
IAEA-‐aegis, peaceful nuclear cooperation is un-‐checked for weaponry proclivity. While
Chinese technology transferred to Pakistan is supervised by the IAEA, the UN agency is
not allowed to inspect sites or plants that fall under the purview of the military.
The Joint Fighter 17, or JF-‐17, is an example of China’s proven willingness to build
Pakistan’s domestic defense industry. The JF-‐17 is a low-‐cost, single engine multirole
aircraft developed jointly by Pakistan and China in the late 1990s. The JF-‐17’s initial
purpose was to provide Pakistan’s Air Force with a cheap alternative to Western fighter
jets, especially at the time when western countries had imposed sanctions on the
country following the nuclear tests of 1998. Recently, Pakistan started to manufacture
the fighter domestically; in 2010 it inducted its first indigenous JF-‐Thunder squadron.138
In October, Pakistan announced plans to start the sale of the JF-‐17 to other countries
next year (2014).139 The Ministry of Defense Production said as many as 42 JF-‐17
Thunder planes have been developed so far under joint venture with China. Despite
China’s dialogue with other countries on the subject, Pakistan is thus far the only
country to have purchased this weapons system from China.
136 “Karachi Operations to Continue Until Objectives Met”, Dawn, 26 November 2013. 137 : Chris Schneidmiller, “IAEA Board Sets Plan for Monitoring New Pakistani Nuclear Reactors”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 9 March 2011. 138 Zackery Keck, “Pakistan to Begin Exporting JF-‐17 Thunder Fighter Jets”, The Diplomat, 30 October 2013. 139 “Sale of JF Thunder Jets to Start Next Year”, The Nation, 25 October 2013.
41
An illustration of the close defense cooperation may be gleaned from the fact that in the
aftermath of the US raid on Bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad in May 2011, the
wreckage of the US stealth helicopter parts procured by Pakistan intelligence services
allegedly allowed Chinese military engineers to examine the wreckage.140
In spite of international incrimination against Pakistan for counter-‐terrorism shortfalls
and for “harboring” bin Laden, Beijing has backed Islamabad and endorsed the
importance of Pakistani sovereignty. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao reportedly
said:
“We support Pakistan’s response [to the situation. We acknowledge that Pakistan has made great sacrifices and important contributions in the global fight against terror. I wish to stress here that no matter what changes might take place in the international landscape, China and Pakistan will remain forever-‐good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good brothers. No country has any right to intervene in Pakistan”.141
The Chinese government allegedly also sent a delegation to Washington, urging the US
to publicly acknowledge Pakistan’s role in the global war against terrorism and avoid
excessive criticism.142
All this contributes to Islamabad’s reliance on its powerful regional ally so to mitigate US
pressure and, at times, interference, inside Pakistan. The bin Laden raid also led China,
for the first time, to take a forbidding stance on Pakistan’s behalf, manifested in its
indirect reprimanding of the US. Beijing appears interested in maintaining its strategic
friendship with Pakistan in order to contain both Indian and American presence in the
region.
Compared to Sino-‐Pak relations, Pak-‐US relations have been turbulent and marked with
suspicion and distrust on either side. Unlike China who does not impose any strings
attached nor is forceful, the US is seen to make Pakistan act under duress. Further, Pak-‐
US relationship is not nuclear based, although the US is one of the major suppliers of
140 Mark Mazetti, “US Aides Believe China Examined Stealth Copter”, The New York Times, 11 August 2011. 141 “China Endorses Pakistan’s Response to US Raid: PM”, The Express Tribune, 19 May 2011. 142 Ibid.
42
arms. Neither does the US pave way for transfer of technology, or defense production, to
Pakistan. Also, while US presence in Afghanistan encouraged high levels of cooperation
between the countries’ militaries, this situation is likely to end once the US troops scale
back operations in Afghanistan from 2014.
Conclusion
Sino-‐Pak relationship is often touted as being “all-‐weathered” and “time-‐tested”, and,
labeled with lavish hyperboles categorically exchanged between leaders of the two
countries, such as “higher than the Himalayas” and sweeter than honey”. A closer
examination of this much-‐lauded bond reveals that it is true to a marked and meaningful
extent. The consistency and depth of the bonhomie is weaved into the stable,
surrounding factors that govern region politics – the key of which is, simply, geography.
A fixed and deep geo-‐political strategic alliance rooted in realism embalms the
seemingly unbridled “love affair” between Pakistan and China. The geographic dynamics
can be said to breed a natural coalition, dominating the strategic ambitions of both
Beijing and Islamabad. In this context the influence of India as well as United States, in
addition to other actors such as Russia, in the region is of important relevance. The
nuances within this geographic matrix then determine priorities of Sino-‐Pak
relationship while keeping intact a similar and entrenched cohesive outlook to most
regional/global issues.
Lately, there is an emerging shift in focus within the Sino-‐Pak partnership wherein
boosting economic cooperation is being given precedence; enabling greater connectivity
and trade and inviting greater Chinese investment appear to top the agenda. This
cooperation may ultimately evolve to become a keystone of their relationship; however,
as it stands, collaboration on this front is not as substantial so as to define it in any way.
While there prevails a comprehensive cooperation between Pakistan and China,
covering myriad different domains, strong diplomatic and defense bonds make up the
basic DNA mapping of Pakistan-‐China relationship. Pakistani defense requirements
were met by China as early as the 1950s, and China is believed to have played a key role
in creating a credible defense for Pakistan. A lion share of Pakistani defense comes from
43
China. This relationship grew from defense/strategic cooperation to collaboration on
inter-‐connectivity, the highlight of which was the Karakoram highway. Beyond this,
there is a widespread understanding of an “emotive attachment” between Pak-‐China.143
Historically, Sino-‐Pak relations has been unaffected by the changing governments in
Pakistan over the decades. However, the partnership agenda, or primacy of a certain
sphere of cooperation over another, may depend on who sits in Islamabad – e.g. military
versus civilian leadership. Prime Minister-‐elect Nawaz Sharif hails from a business
background and won the May 2013 parliamentary elections on the ticket of
strengthening Pakistani economy. Thus a focus on furthering connections with China in
the commercial area is expected. Sharif’s agenda ties in neatly with China’s short/long
term economic – and strategic policies in the region.
While Islamabad and Beijing notable share a large set of common regional interests,
there remain a few points of dissension; for instance, vis-‐à-‐vis Afghanistan, the two
countries arguably have different concerns. It remains to be seen whether or to what
extent these differences impact the close cooperation between the two. Looking beyond
2014 when the US scales back its presence from Afghanistan and the post-‐9/11 tension
in US-‐Pak relations potentially subsides, Pakistan’s interests are best served by
maintaining good relations with both countries and, especially, by focusing more on the
quality of its economic relations with them.144
Of particular interest to both Islamabad and Beijing is the future of India’s footprint in
Afghanistan, which both parties are interested in reversing. Pakistan has and continues
to push for a settlement in Afghanistan that enjoys consensus from all stakeholders,
including the Taliban. This will increase Islamabad’s chance of regaining influence in
Kabul, which it perceives as having been increasingly overtaken by New Delhi since
2001 (toppling of Taliban). Further developments in the Afghan reconciliation process
will invariably affect activities of jihadi groups in the area, as well as guide Islamabad’s
future strategic agenda and its relations to other regional actors. As it stands, the post-‐
2014 situation is fraught with uncertainty and insecurity.
143 Fazlur Rehman, SSII, interview, July 2013. 144 Ziad Haider, personal communication, May 2013.
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In the context of Sino-‐Pak relations, it can be forecasted that their entente cordiale will
continue. Despite differences in culture and religion – and the threat posed to China’s
domestic security, as well as Chinese personnel in Pakistan, by violent extremist
elements in Pakistan’s tribal area – a dedicated bonhomie prevails between the two
countries. Moreover, past and current trends in the spheres of diplomatic, economic and
defense cooperation – along with a staunch affinity rooted in common and consistent
geo-‐strategic interests – point to a strong and strengthening relationship.
