An Islamic Theodicy

AN ISLAMIC THEODICY: IBN TAYMIYYA ON THE WISE PURPOSE OF GOD, HUMAN AGENCY, AND PROBLEMS OF EVIL AND JUSTICE

byJON R. HOOVER

A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Theology School of Historical Studies The University of Birmingham May 2002

ABSTRACTA theodicy maintains that God is rational in creating a world containing evil. This thesis shows that the Muslim Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) theodicy of optimism or a best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy in which presents a God wills all existents from eternity for the wise purpose or cause of establishing His perfection and right to worship. God's all-encompassing creation precludes

libertarian freedom. Nonetheless, Ibn Taymiyya asserts human responsibility by focusing on divine command, the `reality' human agency, and secondary of

causality. Evil is miniscule and harmful relative only to humans, and it is good by virtue of the divine wise purpose and its educational and religious benefits. Ibn Taymiyya maintains a semblance of divine retributive justice by attributing evil deeds to humans or tracing them to nonexistence. However, God's justice is

fundamentally His goodness in creation, and He creates the best of all possible worlds out of the necessity of His perfection. acknowledge rational difficulties. Ibn Taymiyya is reticent to

This, and the character of his theodicy as a

whole, is explained by his apologetic intention to elicit religious devotion through interpretation of God's ultimately unknowable attributes by reference to revealed tradition and rational notions of perfection-especially ethical utilitarianism.

TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI wish to extend my deepest gratitude to the many people who have made this

study possible. David Thomas has gently guided and encouragedmy researchthrough many a blind alley. His interest in my work and his patient trust that

something would come of it in due time has been a constant source of inspiration. The staff and my fellow students at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations in the University of Birmingham have provided

friendship and much stimulating dialogue. The librarians at the Orchard steadyLearning Resources Centre have been most gracious in locating obscure items for me. Yahya Michot in Oxford has given very generously of his time and his Michael Shelley in Cairo

numerous translations of Ibn Taymiyya's writings.

graciously read through penultimate drafts of the text and saved me from many infelicities of language. Staff members at Dar Comboni Arabic Studies Institute in Cairo have offered freely of their friendship and hospitality, also providing temporary office space at a crucial point in my writing. I am deeply grateful to

my parents to whom this study is dedicated and to the numerous people of vision in the Mennonite churches of the United States and Canada for making this in so many different ways. I also owe a great debt to my wife research possible and children for bearing with me through the grueling process of study and granting me the daily joy and warmth of life in family. Last, but certainly not

least, I give thanks to God who in love and mercy has seen me through thisproject.

TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTIONTheodicy in Islamic thought and the significance of Ibn Taymiyya........... I 6 Ibn Taymiyya's theodicean writings ............................................... 13 Method of analysis and presentation ............................................. 18 Notes to the Introduction ........................................................... CHAPTER ONE IBN TAYMIYYA

ON BACKGROUND

ISSUES IN THEODICY

1.1 An overview of the backgroundissues ............................................

28

29 1.2 Ibn Taymiyya on the correspondence reasonand revelation of ................1.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.3.4 1.4 1.4.1 1.4.2 1.4.3 1.4.4 1.5 Ibn Taymiyya on knowledge of God's existence and ethical value........... 32 Cosmological proof for the existence of God in the necessity of reason.... 32 Rationalist utilitarian ethics and the divine command 34 .......................... The natural constitution (ftra) and its perfection through prophecy.......... 39 45 Concluding notes on God's existence and ethical value ........................ Ibn Taymiyya on knowledge of God's attributes ................................ Agnostic affirmation of God's attributes in the revealed tradition............ The meanings of the revealed attributes in human language ................... The a fortiori argument for rationally delineating God's attributes........... God's attributes of perfection establish His right to worship ................. Conclusion: Ibn Taymiyya establishing God's right to worship .............. 47 48 52 56 63 70

Notes to ChapterOne ................................................................CHAPTER TWO WISE PURPOSE AND CAUSALITY 2.1

72

IN THE WILL OF GOD

Kalm theology's objections to wise purpose/causality in the will of God.. 81 84 84 86 86 87 89

2.2 Ibn Taymiyya's defense of divine wise purpose in Minhj .................... denial of causality in the acts of God........ 2.2.1 Preparing to refute the AshWari 2.2.2 God has been acting, creating, and willing in time from eternity ............. 2.2.2. a An endless chain of causes into the future and into the past ................ 2.2.2. b An eternal complete cause implies that nothing originates in time......... 2.2.2. c Temporal origination requires a temporally originated cause ...............

2.2.2. d The temporality of God's will ................................................... 2.2.2. e God in His perfection acts, wills, and creates perpetually .................. 2.2.2. g Refutation of Kalm arguments against an infinite regress ............... 2.2.2. h Wrap-up on God's perpetual acting, creating, and willing ................. 2.2.3 God needs no help in perfecting Himself through His creation ............. 2.2.4 God's temporally originated wise purposes subsist in His essence ......... 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.4 2.5 Ibn Taymiyya's defense of divine wise purpose in Irda .................... Four views on causality and wise purpose in the divine will ................ Purposive activity yields a judgement for which God is praiseworthy..... God acts for wise purposes to establish His perfection ....................... On hikma as Ibn Taymiyya's preferred term for divine purpose ............ Conclusion .......................................................................... .............................................................

91 95

2.2.2.f The temporally originated world ..............................................

96 ..

101 104 105 106 108 108 109 111 113 115 117

Notes to Chapter Two

CHAPTER THREE GOD'S CREATION AND GOD'S COMMAND3.1 3.2. 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.3 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.6 The problem of creation and command in Ibn Taymiyya's thought........ 123 Ibn Taymiyya's classification of errors in creation and command.......... 124 124 A typology of errors ............................................................... 126 Qadaris and Muctazilis: Compromising creation .............................. Sufi antinomians, Jabris, and AshWaris:Compromising command.......... 128 Free-thinkers and poets: Impugning God's wise purpose and justice...... 132 Ibn Taymiyya: Analogy is the cause of error in creation and command... 135 Modes of expressing creation and command in Ibn Taymiyya's thought.. 140 Creation and command in the Wsitiyya creed 140 ................................. Lordship and divinity 142 ...................................................... ...... Generation and legislation 145 ........................................................ Generative will and legislative will 148 ............................................. Ibn Taymiyya on possible resolution of creation and command 152 ............ God may be acting for His own benefit in not helping others obey I-Iim... 153 God may create things He hates for a wise purpose that He loves.......... 156 Excursus on God's eternal love as the final cause of His acts 158 ............... Conclusion .......................................................................... ............................................................ 160 163

Notes to Chapter Three

CHAPTER FOUR

DIVINE CREATION OF ACTS IN THE HUMAN AGENT4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 4.3.4 4.3.5 4.4 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.4.3 4.4.4 4.4.5 Prior research on Ibn Taymiyya's view of the human act .................... The human act in Kalm theology ............................................... 171 173

Ibn Taymiyya on the compatibility of divine creation and human action.. 179 God is the Creator, Originator, and Preponderator of the human act....... 179 182 Human determining power and legislative power ............................. 184 Imprecision in the human will ................................................... 187 Reconciling the Jabris and the Qadaris with compatibilist freedom ........ The substrate principle: Humans are the agents of their acts in reality..... 189 Ibn Taymiyya's view of divine creation by means of secondary causes... 192 192 An overview of secondary causality ............................................. 194 Polemic on secondary causality .................................................. Secondary causality from the divine perspective is instrumental............ 196 199 Secondary causality from the human perspective is natural .................. 201 Conclusion on secondary causality ..............................................

4.5 Ibn Taymiyya on controversial terms relating to human agency............ 202 4.5.1 No Ashcari acquisition (kasb) and no independent efficacy (ta'thir)....... 202 4.5.2 No divine òbligation of what one is not able' (taklif m la yutq)......... 204 207 4.5.3 No divine compulsion (jabr) ...................................................... 4.6 Conclusion .......................................................................... ............................................................. 211 214

Notes to Chapter Four

CHAPTER FIVE GOD'S WISE PURPOSEAND THE ORIGIN OF EVIL 5.1 222 Backgroundon the explanationof evil in Islamic theodicies ................224 224 225 227 233 237

5.2. Ibn Taymiyya's evil attribution typology ....................................... 5.2.1 Attributing evil to the generality, secondary cause, or elided agent......... 5.2.2 The attribution of evil illustrated from the Qur'an ............................. 5.2.3 Evil is good in the divine wise purpose and only evil for creatures......... 5.2.4 The relation of the divine names to evil ........................................ 5.3 Ibn Taymiyya on God's wise purposes in the creation of evil ...............

5.4 Ibn Taymiyya's location of the origin of evil in nonexistence ('acdnn)....244 5.4.1 Exclusive divine goodness and the origin of evil deeds in Hasana......... 245 5.4.1.a Interpreting Q. 4: 78-9: everything is from God; evil is from the soul... 245

5.4.1. b All good comes from God's unmerited blessing 248 ............................ 5.4.1. c The source of evil deeds is ignorance, which is a nonexistent............ 250 5.4.1. d Punishment is for the lack of the deeds for which one was created....... 254 257 5.4.1. e Worship God alone because He is the sole source of good ................ 258 5.4.2 The origin of evil in human imperfection and lack in Fdtiha ................ 5.5 Conclusion .......................................................................... ............................................................. 262 264

Notes to Chapter Five

CHAPTER SIX THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS 6.1 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.3 6.4 6.5 Introduction ......................................................................... 270 271 271 277 280

Ibn Taymiyya's three-fold typology on views of God's justice ('ad! )...... Muctazilis: God's obligation to retributive justice ............................. Ashcaris: God's voluntaristic justice ............................................. Ibn Taymiyya: God's self-obligation to put things in their places..........

A passage from Ibn Taymiyya's cAdil: God necessarily does the best...... 284 Ibn Taymiyya on al-Ghazli's best of all possible worlds .................... Conclusion .......................................................................... ............................................................... 287 290 292

Notes to Chapter Six

CONCLUSION

............................................................................ ...........................................................

295 308

Notes to the Conclusion

BIBLIOGRAPHY Ibn Taymiyya's Writings ......................................................... Other Arabic and Western Language Sources .................................

310 318

CITATION

AND TECHNICAL

NOTES

This study cites works by Ibn Taymiyya with short titles (e.g. Irda,

Nubuwwt, Dar') whose full referencesare located in the Bibliography under ÌbnTaymiyya's Writings'. Abbreviations referring to collections of his works (e. g.

MF, MRM, MRK) are also found there. Very short texts have not been given a

title and are cited only by their location in their respectivecollections. shortMinhj, the full critical edition of Ibn Taymiyya's Minhj al-sunna al-

is not yet widely available in libraries or in the marketplace, whereas nabativiyya, the old Blq edition (short title Minhjl3) has been used almost universally for Thus, volume and page citations to Minhj in the notes are previous research. followed by a slash and the equivalent volume and page reference in the old B15q in order to facilitate cross checking. edition Dates are given in the Islamic lunar calendar followed by a slash and the

Common Era equivalent. Single dates given without a slash and marked ÀH'(Anno Hegirae) follow the Islamic calendar. Otherwise, single dates given are

Common Era only.References to the Qur'an follow the verse numbering of the 1923 Cairo the Arabic text. Renderings of quranic texts into English are my own, edition of I have made constant reference to Muhammad Tagi-ud-Din al-I-Iilzli and although Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Interpretation of the Meanings of the Noble Qur'n in the English Language, 4th ed. (Riyadh: Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 1994), as well as to Arberry and occasionally Pickthall. Except for modernizing English style, I

have sometimes followed one or the other of them very closely.

At times,

however, I have strayed from these interpretations in order to bring out Ibn Taymiyya's understanding and interpretation of particular texts and to maintain in translating key terms. consistency Due to the many different hadith collections on the market, I have not given information for any collection. References are given only to the name publishing (Bukhri, Muslim, Ibn Mjah, etc.) Hadith numbering follows the of the collector

the cAlamiyya company (targim al-c1amiyya) used on the CD-ROM, system ofMaws'at al-hadith al-sharif, Version 2.0 (Cairo: Sakhr, 1997). For additional in locating assistance references in hadith collections not following this

I have also given the `Kitb' and `Bib' for the first collection numbering system,(usually Bukhri or Muslim) in which the hadith has been found. Occasionally, I the `Kitb' and `Bab' for a second collection if the hadith related by Ibn give Taymiyya is not found in the first collection in its entirety. Translations of hadith In the many cases where there are differences (usually slight) reports are my own. between the way a hadith appears in an authoritative collection and in Ibn Taymiyya's writings, I follow Ibn Taymiyya's text. It is beyond the scope of this to note and trace textual variations in hadith reports. study The primary authorities for names, death dates, and basic biographical information for figures mentioned in the text are The Encyclopedia of Islam, New [hereafter E12] (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960-), and Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli, ed. Ac1am: Qmas larjim li-ashhar al-rijl u'a al-nis' Al-

min al-carab it'a al-

[A'lm], 8 vols. (Beirut: Dr al cilm li-l-mallyln, musta'ribin wa al-mustashriqin 1997). In view of the facts that there are various editions of Adlm, that the

E12 differs between the French and English editions, and that a new pagination of EI will soon be underway, I have not given exact citations for basic edition of information. Instead, I have given full names (at least first name, father's name,

honorifics) so as to facilitate location of these figures not only in E12 and common and A'lm but also in other reference works as well. This study is written in American English. Although it is now common

in English not to capitalize the pronoun `he' in reference to God, I have practice

taken the liberty of doing so becauseit remainswidespreadin Islamic studiesand because it may clarify the sense of often pronoun-laden Arabic sentencesintranslation. I have used inclusive language wherever possible except when I have judged it to extend beyond the spirit and structure of the texts with which I am Most of Ibn Taymiyya's illustrations and arguments are cast in the third working. singular, and I usually follow suit. person masculine Transliteration of Arabic terms and phrases has been supplied using Semitic Transliterator for Windows produced by Linguist's Software, Inc., Edmonds, WA,

USA.

ARABIC TRANSLITERATIONThe Arabic transliteration table below follows the Library of Congress found in Bulletin 91, Arabic Romanization (Washington, D. C.: Library of system Congress Processing Department, 1970), with some minor simplifications. Some

Sufi, Qur'an, hadith, jihad, fatwa, Damascus, Cairo, and words and names such as Mecca, which appear in unabridged dictionaries such as Webster s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Gramercy, 1996) are not transliterated from their Arabic equivalents. usually

Consonants hamza -' b' t' th' jim h' -b -t th -j -h dl dhl r' z' sin shin -d dh -r -z -s - sh dd t' z' Cayn -d -t -z -c keif leim mim nn h' w1w -k -1 - in -n -h -w

ghayn - gh f' -f

kh'

kh -

sad

-s

qfi

-q

y:i'

-y

Long Vowels: Short Vowels: Dipthongs:

(for alif and alif magsilra) aiu aw ay iyy (final form i)

(final form ) uww

Definite article: al- (no sun letters). No initial hamza. Ti? marbfita: -a (-at in construct as in majmcat al-ras'il , and -h following alif as in saldh and quddh)

ABBREVIATIONSMaktabat al-'aqd'id wa al-milal. CD ROM. Version 1.5.

ACD AH Ar. ca.

Amman: Markaz al-turth li-abbath al-hsib at-51I,1420/1999.Anno Hegirae Arabic text circa

d.ed. E12 ET FT n.

diededition, edited by editor(s), The Encyclopedia of Islam. New edition. Leiden: E. J. Brill,

1960-.English translation French translation note

n.d.n.p.

no dateno publisher

n.pl.p. pp. Q. rev. sg. trans.

no place of publicationpage number page numbers Qur'an revised, revised by singular (as opposed to plural) translator(s), translation, translated by

1

INTRODUCTION

Theodicy in Islamic thought and the significance of Ibn Taymiyya In the Islamic tradition, which confesses that one God createsthe universeby His will, the existence of disobedience, unbelief, injustice, and pain may be to present `problems of evil', that is, questions of why the Creator wills to seen create a world in which this or that evil exists. ' However, the divine

`voluntarism' of AshcanKalm theology precludessuch questionsby appealingtothe higher values of God's unfettered will, metaphysical self-sufficiency, to determine all things. exclusive power and

God is not limited or bound by any

of reason, and He has no need for deliberation, rational motives, or necessityThus, God's creation of evils such as unbelief and injustice are external causes. not susceptible to any explanation except that God wills 2 them.

The philosophical alternative to divine voluntarism is `theodicy', a term by Gottfried Leibniz (d. 1716) from the Greek theos (God) and dike coined (justice). Although Leibniz does not define the term, the issues that it typically

may be observedin the title of his major work: Theodicy: Essayson encompassesGod, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. 3 Immanuel the Goodness of Kant (d. 1804) supplies a classic definition of the term: "By `theodicy' we the defense of the highest wisdom of the creator against the charge understand brings against it for whatever is counterpurposive in the world. s4 which reason More simply, a theodicy argues that God's will is governed by some kind of in creating a world in which there are evils. 5 rationality

2

Perhaps the best known Islamic theodicy is that of the Multazili

Kalm

In general, the Muctazilis, like the AshWaris,seek to uphold God's theologians. freedom from need. However, they also emphasize the higher self-sufficiency and divine creation. In the Mu'tazili theodicy, God creates human good of purposive beings not out of His own need but for the benefit of humans themselves, which is to work for reward in the retributive order of obligations that God has imposed. Within this order God must do what is `best' (aslah) for all creatures in matters to religion, and even in matters of this world according to some pertaining Muctazilis. In order to protect God from the injustice of creating and then

disobedience, humans must be free to create their own punishing unbelief and deeds, and this leads the Muctazilis to sacrifice God's exclusive power in 6 In the the Muctazilis parlance of anglophone philosophers of religion, creation. `free will' theodicy in which humans have `libertarian freedom' to cause present a their own acts apart from external determinants.? The free will approach is not the only philosophically possible theodicy. A kind, often associated with Leibniz and going back to Neoplatonism, is second òptimism' or the `best-of-all-possible-worlds' theodicy in which God creates and determines all contingent existents for rational ends that make this world the best There is no `gratuitous' or `counterpurposive' evil since every evil is possible. higher good. 8 The determinism of this theodicy, explained as necessary to some that of divine voluntarism, appears to nullify human responsibility. as well as Contemporary philosophers of religion have given the label `compatibilism' or

`compatibilist freedom' to viewpoints that try to give significance to human action without libertarian freedom. granting Humans with compatibilist freedom

3

paradoxically

that they have free choice and are thereby morally perceive

for their deeds even though external causes fully determine their wills. responsible In the western Christian tradition, compatibilism has been attributed to Leibniz (d. 1274).9 more controversially, to Thomas Aquinas and, In the Islamic tradition, a `best-of-all-possible-worlds' theodicy is found in

(d. 428/1037), 1 who explains in al-Shims' that divine the philosophy of Ibn Sind ((inaya) means that the First (i. e. God) is the source of the best providence It is "a cause in Itself of good and perfection inasmuch as that is possible order. (bi-hasab al-imkn). "11 Evil for the philosopher is a privation of being or possible and it is a necessary consequence of and a means to the greater good existence, in creation. 12 Ibn Sind also insists that human beings that God providentially wills have free will, although this is clearly in a compatibilist rather than a libertarian he maintains that all contingent existents are necessary by virtue of sense since 13 external causes. The Sufis do not necessarily speculate over whether this world is the best but they do typically affirm that God creates evil as an instrument of possible, discipline on the spiritual path. Annemarie Schimmel sums up this perspective: "The mystic can understand that God's wrath is mercy in disguise, and that the that He inflicts upon those who love Him are necessary for pain and punishment their spiritual growth just for the sick. ", 4 The as bitter medicine is necessary

Sufi theodicy receives fuller philosophical expression in a best-of-all-possibleworlds tradition (d. 505/1111), 15 which will stemming from al-Ghazal! be

discussed further in Chapter Six of this study (6.4), and in the writings of the Sufi (d. 638/1240). 16 theosophist Ibn CArabi

4

Additionally,

Henri Laoust has identified òptimism' in the subject of the

'7 In the Damascene Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). present study, his still unsurpassed and encyclopedic 1939 Essai sur les doctrines sociales et de Taki-d-Din Ahmad b. Taimiya, Laoust makes the following brief politiques comments concerning the shaykh's perspective on evil. God is essentially providence. Evil is without real existence in the world. All that God has willed can only conform to a sovereign justice and an infinite goodness, provided, however, that it is envisaged from the point of the totality and not from that of the fragmentary and imperfect view of knowledge that His creatures have of these things... Ibn Taymiyya's . theodicy marks the advent in Sunni dogmatics of an optimism of Platonic inspiration which will be more amply and more literarily developed in the Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. 8 oeuvre of

Laoust's claim that optimism entered `Sunni dogmatics' with Ibn Taymiyya in light of further research. Apart from the tradition of requires qualificationderiving from al-Ghaz51i that has been noted above, a kind of optimism optimism (d. 333/944). 19 in the central Asian Sunni Kalm theologian al-Mturidi also exists

J. Meric Pessagnoshows that for al-Mturidi God creates all things, including in conformity to His wisdom. In its own peculiar way, evil shows the evil, of the creation and thus its need for the Creator. Evil is createdas a contingencylead human beings to knowledge of God. 20 In view of tool of divine wisdom to Ibn Taymiyya does not mark the àdvent' of a best-ofal-Ghaz51i and al-Mturidi, theodicy into Sunni theology. If, however, Laoust's synopsis all-possible-worlds Ibn Taymiyya's theodicy is correct in its essentials-and of that it is-the shaykh does present a significant, this study will show not entirely

although

instanceof optimism in the history of Islamic theology. unprecedented,

5

Ibn Taymiyya's

best-of-all-possible-worlds

perspective derives particular In general, the shaykh

interest from its impact on subsequent Islamic thought.

21 deeply influenced his close disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), and both the shaykh and his disciple were important sources for the the writings of Wahhbi movement in Arabia and modern reformers such as eighteenth century Rid (d. 1935).22 In the realm of theodicy specifically, Laoust correctly Rashid in the quotation given above that Ibn al-Qayyim provides a more fully notes 23 In recent times, the direct developed optimism than does Ibn Taymiyya himself. influence of their optimism is easily detected in such diverse places as the work of Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) and a detailed volume on good and evil published in by Muhammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynid. 24 The full extent to which the Egypt of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim have shaped subsequent reflection writings of evil in Islamic thought requires a separate investigation. on problems I hope

Ibn Taymiyya alone will provide a firmer foundation than has that this study on been available for research of that kind. previously

Apart from Laoust, a number of scholars, most notably Joseph Bell andDaniel Gimaret, have investigated issues related to Ibn Taymiyya's theodicy, and discussed at relevant places in the present work. 25 However, their findings will be the shaykh's theodicean writings as such have not yet received sustained attention, be noted in the next section of this Introduction, scholars working in and, as will languages have not previously taken note of several pertinent texts. western The central concerns of this study are describing, analyzing, and sometimes Ibn Taymiyya's theodicean writings and evaluating how he copes with translating difficulties inherent in his best-of-all-possible-worlds approach, particularly those

6

relating to rationality in the will of God, the compatibility of divine determination

human freedom, and problems of evil andjustice. Beyond this, I also hope withto shed light on why Ibn Taymiyya breaks with the Multazili perspectives and why he adopts a best-of-all-possible-worlds and Ashcari theodicy.

Answering these questions may provide clues to why Ibn Taymiyya's theodicean thought has been attractive to some Muslims in modern times.

Ibn Taymiyya's

theodicean writings

Ibn Taymiyya wrote voluminously and often polemically on a wide rangeofissues in an effort to purge Islam of various innovations that he believed it to have suffered and to illumine the pure religion of the Qur'an, the Sunna, and the Salaf Muslims). 26 His output as a scholar was complemented and (i. e. the pious early shaped by his vocation as a prominent religious activist in the Bahri Mamlk sultanate of Egypt and Syria (648-784/1250-1382). The shaykh called for jihad

against Mongol incursions from the east that threatened Mamlk sovereignty in Syria, and, although he probably was a Sufi himself, he actively opposed Sufi and

religious practicesthat he believed to be in violation of the sacredLaw. popular Refusal to compromise on his allegedly anthropomorphic doctrine of God'sbrought him public trials, imprisonment, and a seven-year stay in Egypt attributes (705-712/1306-1313). Ibn Taymiyya spent his last two years of life (726-8/1326-

8) imprisoned in the citadel of Damascus for his criticism of tomb visitation and

27 the cult of saints.Certain difficulties attend research into Ibn Taymiyya's theodicean writings. In comparison to the full didactic style of his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim, Irmeli Perho

7

aptly observes that "Ibn Taymiyya wrote very sparse prose and expressed his

doctrinal views with a minimum of elaboration. Thus, it is not always readily "28apparent what the shaykh intends to say. Moreover, he does not devote a single full and definitive work to theodicy. Instead, he deals with theodicean questions in fatwas, commentaries, and refutations of widely varying length and

completeness that, furthermore, approach the relevant issues from a number of different angles. In view of the spare and diffuse nature of Ibn Taymiyya's

reflection on theodicy, I have ranged widely in the shaykh's corpus in searchof applicable texts in order to provide a reasonablyfull picture of his thought on thesubject. The remainder of this section describes Ibn Taymiyya's major theodicean texts located for this study in order to facilitate further discussion and reference. The texts are dated where possible. Numerous shorter writings, as well as

in larger works, beyond those listed here will be briefly introduced as passages they are employed in later chapters or will be cited only in the notes. following section of this Introduction attends to the methodological The issues

involved in reconstructing the shaykh's theodicy from these respective texts. 29 I have identified texts relevant to this study in three ways. First, I have

the major texts identified in the secondary literature as touching on employed theodicy and related issues, most notably Minhj al-sunna al-nabativiyya

[hereafter Minhj], Irda, and Abis Dharr, which are described below. Second, I examined the most comprehensive printed collection of the shaykh's writings, the thirty-seven volume Majm' fataw [hereafter MF]. devoted to divine `determination' (qadar), Especially Volume Eight, index on

and the matching

8

`determination' in Volume Thirty-Six

turned up many texts and passages that

30 in previous research. Theseinclude the treatisesKasb, Jabr, have not beenused Hasana, and Fdtiha describedbelow. Third, I found a few more items of interest by consulting the tables of contents in many of the books and collections notfound in MF. The treatise'Adil, which will be noted below, was identified in this No search was made among manuscripts because it appears that most of Ibn way. Taymiyya's have been published 31 However, there are some extant works .

lost works that would probably have been of interest to this study, apparently Ibn Taymiyya's commentaries on the Muhassa132and Arbadin33 of the especially 3 Apart from these Ashcari Kalm theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Rzi (d. 606/1209). lacunae, the body of texts identified should constitute a sufficiently upon which to base an inquiry representative sample theodicy. Much of the first and third volumes of Ibn Taymiyya's eight-volume Minhj issues.35 Minhj is a refutation of Minhaj al-karama, a tract deals with theodicean of anti-Sunni polemic composed by "Allma Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hill! (d. large and

into Ibn Taymiyya's

36a Twelver Shidi scholar who lived in the Mongol Ilkhnid empire of 726/1325), Iraq and Persia that rivaled the MamlUk sultanate. The Ilkhnid ruler Oljeitu (d. 716/1316) converted from Sunnism to Twelver Shi9ism in 709/1310, possibly through al-Hilli's efforts, and al-Milli wrote Minhaj al-karma at the ruler's

37 The date of Minhj, Ibn Taymiyya's response, is no behest sometime thereafter. than 713/1313 because it includes several mentions of Dar' ta'rud al-'aql earlier [hereafter Dar'], a tome which its editor Muhammad Rashd Slim has wa al-nagl

9

dated to sometime between 713/1313 and 717/1317.38 Given the great size of both Dar' and Minhj, it is likely that Minhj was written well after 713/1313. Henri Laoust speculates that it might have arisen from Ibn Taymiyya's

involvement in a conflict over Sh9 policy in Mecca in 716/1317.39 Among the many domains in which al-Hilli takes Sunnis to task in Minhj is theodicy. Drawing on the Muctazili polemical tradition, which had al-karama permeated Shi9i theology, he imputes Ashcan voluntarism to all Sunnis and doctrine of God with numerous problems of moral evil. 40 For attacks this example, he charges that this God is unjust because He determines that some should not believe, does not create in them the power to believe, and then for not believing. 41 punishes them Also, this God is foolish because He believe. 42 that they

commands unbelievers to believe but does not will

Unbelievers are actually obeying God because they are doing what God wills. 43 Moreover, since the voluntarist God does not act rationally for a purpose, He may Prophet for obeying Him and reward Iblis for disobeying Him. 44 even chastise the Ibn Taymiyya's line-by-line refutation of al-Hilli's attack is rambling and

repetitious, but the dominant strands of thought consistently follow the lines of a best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy in which human accountability is somehow

compatible with divine determination. First, the shaykh affirms that God acts on account of wise purposes, and he deals with the peculiar problems of necessity imperfection that subjection to rational purpose poses for divine freedom at and length in Volume One of Minhj. Second, and especially in Volume Three, Ibn

Taymiyya distinguishes God's will to create from God's will of command, and he explains that God has a wise purpose in willing to create some things that He

10

Third, the shaykh resists the charge that determinism obliterates human prohibits. accountability. Human beings are the agents of their acts and therefore

for them even though God creates them. The details of these three responsible lines of argument will be discussed below in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, respectively. The lengthy fatwa Irada departs from an inquiry on whether the goodness of God's will implies that He creates for a cause. Ibn Taymiyya opens the fatwa in God's will, but he does with a typology of views on causality and wise purpose defend the divine rationality against the Ashcari objection that this implies not in God until the end. In the intervening pages, he presents a typology of need that evil is attributed so as not to attribute it directly to God, an account of ways in divine creation and command, and a discussion of human agency that errors 45 The opening lines of Irda, includes considerations of secondary causality. by a copyist, tell us that Ibn Taymiyya received the request for apparently added this fatwa from Egypt in Shawwal 714/January-February 1315. Presumably, the from Damascus soon thereafter. 46 shaykh responded

Ibn Taymiyya's Tadmuriyya creed is perhaps one of the shaykh's mostdoctrine. 47 The first part deals systematic, although not complete, presentations of God's attributes while the second takes up God's relationship to the world. with Among other things, this latter part discusses secondary causality and God's it includes typologies of error in these realms. creation and command, and Two medium-length fatwas deal with the apparent incompatibility of human divine compulsion (jabr). accountability and In Kasb the inquirer asks whether The

humans have any efficacy (ta'thir) in bringing their acts into existence.

11

questioner argues that if someone does have efficacy then he becomes an

associate with the Creator in the creation of his act. This threatens God'smonopoly on creation. Conversely, if the human has no efficacy, this leads to divine compulsion, and there is no longer any basis for human accountability to the Law. The inquirer closes asking for clarification that will "release minds from "48 The questioner in the this bond and heal hearts of this distressing disease. fatwa, Jahr, asks in poetic verse, "How is it that the servant chooses his second

" the servant in acts is compelled? The inquirer infers that one who is acts, and compelled is forced and such a personis excused. He endsby noting that he hadbecome ill with longing to come to see Ibn Taymiyya, but divine determinations (magdir) had prevented him. 49 Jabr opens with a lengthy treatment of doctrine and error in the divine creation and the divine command. Then, in both Kasb and Jabr, Ibn Taymiyya attempts to maintain the compatibility of divine determination

(qadar) with human agency-focusing especially on the dynamics of secondaryin Kasb-in causality order to retain human accountability. He also maintains

that God has a wise purposein the creation of all things in order to amelioratethe in divine creation of all human acts. Towards the end of both fatwas he severitygives brief typologies on ways evil is attributed, and Jabr also includes a typology of views on definitions of God's justice. Two major treatises deal extensively with God's justice. Abis Dharr is a

commentary on the divine saying found in the hadith collection of Muslim, "0

My servants! I have forbidden injustice to Myself... "50 At issuein the early partthis treatise is the conflict between the divine freedom afforded by voluntarism of and the necessary obligation on God imposed by rational justice. In an attempt to

12

two extremes, Ibn Taymiyya interprets this hadith to mean that divine avoid these justice is self-imposed rather than imposed by the necessity of independent 51 The treatise'Adil gives two successive typologies of positions on God's reason.

justice and then presentsa discussionof evil and God's punishmentof bad deedsthat focuses on the goodness of all that God creates. The treatise closes with a brief discussion of al-Ghazli's statement that this is the best of all possible 52 The heading of 'Adil, apparently added by an early copyist, notes that worlds. is "among the things [Ibn Taymiyya] composed in his final detention this treatise in the citadel in Damascus.s53 This dates it to the last two years of his life, between 726/1326 and 728/1328. sometime Hasana, an exegetical work of nearly 200 pages on Q. 4: 78-9, includes one Ibn Taymiyya's longest discussions of a problem of evil. The difficulty is that of the contradiction between, "Everything is from God" (Q. 4: 78), and, of resolving "Any thing that comes to you is from yourself' evil (Q. 4: 79). How can

be from God if some things, namely, evil things, come from the everything individual himself? Ibn Taymiyya explains that everything God creates is good wise purpose, and he attempts to resolve the

of His divine on account

by locating the cause of evil in nonexistenceand the failure of contradictionhumans to do that for which they were created. The latter part of Hasana builds this interpretation by arguing that none should be worshipped but God and that on intercession should be sought only from whom He authorizes because God does evil and He is the sole source of good. no 54

Ftiha, a commentary on the first sura of the Qur'an, discusses the worship (cibda) and asking for help (isti'na) that derive from this sura's fifth verse,

13

"You alone we worship, and You alone we ask for help. " It also explores various

metaphysicaland ethical aspects the relationship betweenGod and His servants ofHim. 55 As in Hasana, this text attributes the cause who were created to worship of evil ultimately to nonexistence. The comparatively formal character of

Ftiha's presentation of evil and its other contents suggests that it may come from late in Ibn Taymiyya's life.

Method of analysis and presentation

A diachronic analysis of the major theodiceantexts describedabove mightprovide clues to evolution in the shaykh's thought. It would especially clarify

whether his use of the conceptof evil as nonexistencein Hasana and Ftiha, butin other texts, was a later development or just an irregularity of habit. These not kinds of questions can only be answered with certainty on the basis of a the relevant texts. However, most of the major treatises do not chronology of indicate their dates, and they also do not mention other dateable works that would

56 1 also have not found by which to date terminus a quo. external evidence set a the remaining treatises. Moreover, even if the major theodiceantreatisescould be into chronological sequence,there would remain the problem of integrating setdateless writings into the scheme. numerous other shorter and Since reliable diachronic analysis of the texts is not possible, some kind of analysis must be employed. synchronic A rigorously empirical methodology

that at least the major theodicean treatises described above receive might urge separate exposition and analysis. This would respect the unique character of each treatise, but limitations of space would preclude adequate consideration of each

14

text. A text-by-text examination would also entail extensive repetition of similar

ideas in scatteredparts of the presentation. Even though the major theodiceantexts described above have diverse points of departure, they usually broach several of the same theodicean issues and employ fairly consistent patterns of response. Ibn Taymiyya, for example, sets out similar three-fold typologies of divine justice in 'Adil, Jabr and Abis Dharr. 57 He contrasts two of the views on views on justice-the Ashcans' and his own-in similar analyses in Minhdj58 and

in his major work on prophecy Nubuwwt. 59 In another example, the shaykh presents a consistent three-fold typology on the attribution of evil in nine different including Irda, Kasb, Jabr, Ftiha, Hasana, and Minhdj. 60 places This repetition of certain basic issues suggests a thematic presentation in which the material relevant to a particular idea or question is discussed in one drawing from both the major theodicean texts and from other shorter and place, scattered passages. This also permits direct comparison of differing responses to similar questions. A thematic presentation, however, necessarily obscures the Occasional translation and the brief

unique character of each individual text.

descriptions of the major texts given above compensate for this to some degree. A thematic presentation also risks imposing more coherence and consistency on the texts than they may rightly bear. I try to reduce these difficulties by pointing out inconsistencies where they occur. When diversity warrants, I also treat passages to a particular question in succession instead of synthesizing them into relevant one account. The major questions related to theodicy are covered in Chapters Two through Six of this study. Chapter Two deals with Ibn Taymiyya's response to the

15

Ashcari challenges to wise purpose in the divine will.

I begin with this issue for

two reasons. First, establishing the very possibility of divine rationality is key for theodicy in Ibn Taymiyya's context of a strong tradition of Ashcari voluntarism.

Second,the shaykhhimself devotesconsiderableattention to this very early in his work Minhj, and this is the question that prompts his important fatwa majorIrda. The subsequent four chapters of this study examine major clusters of ideas

and rational difficulties in the divine-human relation. Chapter Three surveys thevaried terminology with which Ibn Taymiyya discusses God's creation of all things and God's command, and it notes the shaykh's use of divine wise purpose in creation to soften the contradiction between creation and command. Chapter Four investigates ways in which the shaykh attempts to maintain the compatibility of the divine creation of human acts with human agency and accountability. This

includes discussion of secondary causality. Chapter Five considers evil, looking especially at ends for which God wills it and its sources in human agents and The last chapter looks at Ibn Taymiyya's concept of divine justice, nonexistence. it closes with the shaykh's view that God creates the best of all possible and worlds.

It remains to explain the function of ChapterOne. Addressing problems ofis a dialectical enterprise involving controversial presuppositions concerning evil reason, value theory, God's existence, and the referentiality of theological

language that are often established outside the domain of theodicy itself. 61 Chapter One examines what Ibn Taymiyya has to say on these respective topics in order to provide background for the subsequent chapters on theodicy. The

Chapter One is reconstructedfrom the secondary literature and presentation of

16

texts employed by this literature, as well as from passages found through casual in the shaykh's works, random scans of indexes and tables of contents, reading

CD ROM searches.This chapteris basedon a much less thorough and occasionalinvestigation of the potentially relevant texts than the later five chapters on it is also more highly synthetic than those chapters in theodicy proper, and drawing from a sampling of the shaykh's works to exemplify a point. Ibn

Taymiyya's views on the respective issues require much more research. Despite these limitations, Chapter One provides clues to the shaykh's wider theological

againstwhich to view his theodicy. ethical perspectives andIn providing this background, I am assuming that there is some degree of unity of intention between Ibn Taymiyya's theodicean discourse coherence and his wider outlook. Given the typically contentious and ad homincm character and Kalm theology, as well as Ibn Taymiyya's reputation as a polemist, this of may appear gratuitous, and it prompts the question of what the shaykh assumption

do in his theological writings.62 was trying toAs Joseph Bell and Thomas Michel both explain in their studies on Ibn Taymiyya, the Hanbali tradition, of which the shaykh was a part, was often hostile

to Kalm theology. Some Ijanbalis like al-Barbahri (d. 329/941)63and IbnQudma (d. 620/1223)64 were completely opposed to any discussion of

theological matters and confined themselves to repetition of the data of revelation. The Hanbalis Ab Yac1(d. 458/1066)65 and his disciple Ibn cAgil (d. 513/1119)66 in Kalm, but Ibn cAgil was forced to recant for Muctazili sympathies. engaged Ibn Taymiyya, however, broke with the traditional Ijanbali reserve toward

17

in Kalm himself, calling it instead `the rational argumentation and engaged principles of religion' (usii1 al-din). 67

As for why the Hanbali shaykh took up theological argument, Bell explains Mongol invasions, the spread of popular Sufism, the diffusion of the that the Ibn cArabi, and the increasingly philosophical nature of Ashcan theosophy of Kalm "required that the Ijanbalites defend their doctrinal positions in a language the respect of their opponents and their hesitant and style which could command ,68 The presence of strong rivals definitely played a role in Ibn sympathizers. Taymiyya's adoption of dialectics. However, Henri Laoust in his Essai suggests a more specifically ethical intention in the shaykh's theological writings that

beyond the mere foiling of opponents that is often the aim of Kalm. extends Laoust writes in summary comments on the shaykh's views of God and the Law, "It thus appears that Ibn Taymiyya's whole theology tends toward only one sole foundation to his ethics, and consequently, to all his juridical aim: that of giving a "69 Laoust reiterates this point in his general conclusion to and social philosophy. thought in Essai, remarking that the purpose of Ibn Taymiyya's the shaykh's God. 70 theology is to undergird worship of In this study, I provide evidence from one realm of theology, namely, theodicy, to confirm and deepen Laoust's finding that Ibn Taymiyya's theology has a specifically or we might say `religious', ethical, aim. Even though

competing ideas take up a substantial undermining rivals and clearing away discourse, these are not his sole objectives in writing. portion of the shaykh's Taymiyya's best-of-all-possible-worlds Ibn

theodicy appears to be part of a wider

to give the theological data of revelation a rationality that positively shapes effort

18

what comes to mind when human beings mention God so that they will judge God worthy of exclusive praise and worship.

Notes to the IntroductionI will be introducing a few terms and concepts found in anglophone philosophy of religion to facilitate discussion. I occasionally use èvil' in a generic sense to denote whatever ostensibly ought not to be. In this sense, èvils' appear variously in an Islamic context as disobedience (mdsiyya), bad deeds (sg. qabih), unbelief (k: fr), pain (alam), injustice (zulm), imperfection (nags), death, and even rational contradiction (tacarud), as well as èvil deeds' (sayyi'dt) and èvil' (sharr) in the specifically metaphysical and dysteleological senses that sharr often carries in Arabic. Philosophical `problems of evil' arise when it is asked why God wills or allows these various evils. For an overview of problems of evil as discussed in contemporary English-language philosophy of religion, see Michael L. Peterson, God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998). There are several general treatments of problems of evil in Islam. John Bowker gives a detailed survey of problems of suffering in the Qur'an and some general comments on the subsequent Islamic tradition in Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World (Cambridge, UK: Other general discussions include Ùmar Austin, Cambridge University, 1970), 99-136. "Suffering in Muslim Religious Thought, " The Islamic Quarterly 26.1 (1982): 27-39; Brian Hebblethwaite, Evil, Suffering and Religion, rev. ed. (London: SPCK, 2000), passim; G. E. von Grunebaum, "Observations on the Muslim Concept of Evil, " Studia Islamica 31 (1970): 117-134; Hermann Stieglecker, "Die islamische Lehre vom Guten und Bsen," Orientalia 4 (1935): 239245; W. Montgomery Watt, "Suffering in Sunnite Islam, " Studia Islamica 50 (1979): 5-19; and M. J. L. Young, "The Treatment of the Principle of Evil in the Qur'an, " Islamic Studies 5 (1966): 275281. Also of interest is Jean-Francois Legrain, "Variations musulmanes sur le theme de Job," Bulletin d'etudes orientales 37-8 (1985-6): 51-114. More extensive and more specialized studies dealing with problems of evil in the Islamic tradition will be cited in several of the following notes. 2 For the Ashcari position, see below 2.1 and 2.2.1, and Peter Antes, "The First AM'arites' Conception of Evil and the Devil, " in Melanges offerts Henry Corbin, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Tehran: McGill University, Montreal Canada, Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran Branch, 1977), 177-189; Mohammed Yusoff Hussain, "Al-AshWari's Discussion of the Problem of Evil, " Islamic Culture 64: 1 (1990): 25-38; and G. Legenhausen, "Notes towards an Ashlarite Theodicy, " Religious Studies 24 (1988): 257-266. 3 G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, ET E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951). The title of the present study, An Islamic Theodicy: Ibn Taymiyya on the Wise Purpose of God, Human Agency, and Problems of Evil and Justice, has been inspired by Leibniz's title in the sequence of subjects noted. Immanuel Kant, "On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy, " ET George di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology, ET and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), 19-37, as excerpted in Mark Larrimore, The Problem of Evil: A Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2001), 224-233 (quote on p. 224). 5 The way I understand the definition of `theodicy' appears to differ from that of Peter Berger in The Sacred Canopy (New York: Doubleday, 1967). Berger speaks of a theodicy as any religious explanation of phenomena that appear to lie outside the order or nomos of the respective religion. He notes that this need not involve a complex theory, and he explains that an illiterate peasant who attributes a child's death to the will of God is providing a theodicy just as much as is the theologian (pp. 53-4, as quoted and discussed in Peterson, God and Evil, 6-7). The point that even illiterate peasants engage in theodicy is well made, but I limit the term `theodicy' to giving reasons

19

Notes to the Introduction

continued

God and evil coexist beyond the mere attribution of evil to God's sheer will. If Berger's why that God willed the child's death for a reason that was beyond her peasant said that she trusted be a theodicy in my understanding of the term. It would not be a comprehension, this would still if the peasant said that God took the child's life because God just wills what He wills theodicy without reason. In the interest of economy I am glossing over a distinction often made in contemporary between `defenses' and `theodicies'. In God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand philosophy of religion Rapids, MI: Eermands, 1974), 28, Alvin Plantings defines a `defense' as giving a `possible' reason God might allow evil and a `theodicy' as an àctual' reason God allows evil. As Plantinga sees it, defense is basically a dialectical `for the sake of argument' attempt to show that a theistic a is not necessarily incoherent whereas a theodicy proposes to know what God's reasons position It would seem to be the rare theologian or philosopher who claims to know much of really are. God definitively, especially when it comes to the divine reasons for evil. anything about Moreover, it is disputed whether Plantinga's sense of `theodicy' represents the historical meaning the term. In The Problem of Evil: A Reader, 191, Larrimore submits that Leibniz was actually of in what Plantings calls a `defense'. Richard Swinburne, in Providence and the Problem engaging Evil (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1998), 15, claims much the same for his own use of the of `theodicy'. Swinburne clarifies that his theodicy differs somewhat from Plantinga's defense, word but he says that it still refers to God's possible or probable reasons rather than God's actual reasons for allowing evil. 6 D. Gimaret, "Multazila, " E12 7:783-793 (at 789-791). For further discussion of the Mu'tazili doctrine of justice, see Margaretha T. Heemskerk, Suffering in M: 6tazilite Theology: 'Abd a! Jabbr's Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 142-191; and Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward with Dwi S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 1997), Part I, passim. For the Multazilis' doctrine of justice in Shi1i theology, see Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of aland Shaikh al-Mufid (d. 413/1022) (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1978), 71-82,155-187,341-352; Sabine Schmidtke, The Theology of al-'Allama al-Hilli (d. 726/1325) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1991), 104-135. On the doctrine of aslalz see Robert Brunschvig, "Muctazilisme et Optimum (al" Studia Islamica 39 (1974): 5-23. aslah), For a discussion of free will theodicies in the western Christian tradition, see Marilyn McCord Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1999), 32Adams, 55. For `libertarianism' as set over against `compatibilism' and `determinism', which will be discussed below, see Thomas P. Flint, "Providence and predestination, " in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1997), 569-576. Richard Swinburne also draws the libertarian/compatibilist distinction in Providence Problem of Evil, 33-5. Some philosophers use different terms to refer to libertarian and the freedom. Plantings speaks of `significant' freedom in God, Freedom, and Evil, 30, while Adams ìncompatibilist' freedom in Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, 178. speaks of 8 Adams draws a distinction between `free will' and `best-of-all-possible-worlds' theodicies in Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, 17-20,179, and 190. For a brief description of On theodicy, see Peterson, God and Evil, 92-4. Leibniz's best-of-all-possible-worlds Neoplatonism and the use of its theodicean ideas in western thought, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1936). 9 On compatibilism and determinism see Flint, "Providence and predestination, " 569-576. Compatibilism has also been ascribed to the Protestant Reformer John Calvin (d. 1564), but Calvin does not articulate a `best-of-all-possible-worlds' theodicy. His outlook is much closer to that of AshWaris. He condemns all speculation into reasons for God's acts, and, although he speaks of the God's `secret counsel', he also asserts that God's will does not have a cause outside His very will. On Calvin see Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 4, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984), 217-232.

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continued

Neo-Thomists are particularly concerned to configure the compatibilist divine-human to make room for some kind of àuthentic' freedom. For a sketch of recent attempts relation so as by David B. Burrell and Katherine Tanner, see Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, 66-9. Burrell wrestles with this problem at length in dialogue with the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religious traditions in Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1993).

10 Al-Husayn b. cAbd Allah b. Sind, Abo 'Ali." Ibn Sind, Al-Ship': Al-Ildhiyyt (2), ed. Muhammad Ysuf Musa, et al. (Cairo: Al-llay'a alcamma li-shu'n al-matabic al-amiriyya, 1380/1960), 415. My translation differs somewhat from that of Majid Fakhry who translates the whole of the section on `providence' from al-Shit', 414422, in Ethical Theories in Islam, 2d ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 219-226. 12Ibn Sind, Al-Shy': Al-Ildhiyyt (2), 414-422. The `best-of-all-possible-worlds' character of Ibn Sind's thought is unfortunately not made clear in Shams C. Inati's The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sind's Theodicy (Binghamton, NY: Global Publications, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, 2000). 13On this, see Inati, The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sind's Theodicy, 153-167. Inati argues that Ibn Sind's insistence on human free will is completely negated by the philosopher's determinism in acts arise necessarily from external causes. Inati presupposes that human freedom can only which However, lbn Sind's notion of human freedom may be called be of the libertarian kind. `compatibilist', and it may be seen as an attempt to portray the relationship of human agency to divine agency as paradoxically both contingent and necessary. A best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy is also found in the philosophical novel of Ibn alNails ('Ala' al-Din cAli b. CAb al-llaram, d. 687/1288), who leaves little doubt that history is the necessity. This accomplished doctor of the Mamlk Sultan Baybars (d. product of providential 676/1277) explains that God "must necessarily take the greatest care of everything, for otherwise would not be in its best possible condition. " In the novel Ibn al-Nails portrays the everything of Muhammad, the Islamic religion, the Mongol invasion of eastern Islamic lands, prophethood the very characteristics of Baybars himself as the products of providential inevitability. See and Max Meyerhof and Joseph Schacht, eds, The Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Naffs (Oxford, Remke Kruk examines the UK: Oxford University, 1968), quote on 44 (ET) and 9 (Ar). political legitimization functions of this novel in "History and Apocalypse: Ibn alapocalyptic and Nafis' Justification of Mamluk Rule, " Der Islam 72 (1995): 324-337. 14Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of /slam (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 198. Louis Massignon provides evidence of the instrumental role of in Sufism in The Passion of al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of /slam, ET Herbert Mason suffering (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1982) 3: 111-121. 15 Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Muhammad, Abli Hamid al-Ghazli al-Ttusi. Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over al-Ghazli's "Best of all Possible Worlds" (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984), has studied a controversy lasting several centuries that statements that al-Ghazli made indicating that this is the best of all possible emerged out of some Ormsby's work will be surveyed at the end of Chapter Six of this study. For a detailed worlds. of optimism in al-Ghazli's works themselves, see Richard M. Frank, Creation and the analysis Cosmic System: Al-Ghazdli and Avicenna (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universittsverlag, 1992), 4782. Frank concludes that al-Ghazli adopts the optimism and natural necessitarianism of Ibn Sind despite incompleteness in his theology and his rejection of numerous "inconsequential" theses of the philosopher (p. 86). 16Muhammad b. 'Ali b. Muhammad b. al=Arabi, Muhyi al-Din Ab Àbd Allah al-Hatimi al-TS'i. For some of Ibn CArabi's ideas on evil, see William C. Chittick, The S1f Path of Knowledge: Ibn Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), al-'Arabi's 289-301. For Ibn 'Arabi's explicit affirmations that this is the best of all possible worlds, see Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought, 103-7.

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continued

" Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Halim b. cAbd al-Salm,Tagi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, known also as al-Imam Shaykh al-Islam. In lieu of excessiverepetition of the name Ìbn Taymiyya' I also refer to and him as the `shaykh'.

18Henri Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Talei-d-Din Ahmad b. Taimiya, hanbalite n6 b Harrdn en 661/1262, mors a Damas en 728/1328 [hereafter Essai] (Cairo: canoniste de l'institut frangais d'archeologie orientale, 1939), 169. In this text, I have translated Imprimerie French `theodicee' literally as `theodicy'. However, Laoust typically employs `thdodicee' to the denote the general doctrine of God, which is a much wider sense than that used in this study. A is Laoust's, "Quelques opinions sur la theodicee d'Ibn Taimiya, " Melanges good example of this Maspero, Vol. 3, Orient Islamique (Cairo: Imprimerie de l'institut francais d'archeologie orientate, 1935-40), 431-8. In this article, Laoust discusses the question of anthropomorphism and the status human knowledge of the divine attributes in general, but not problems of evil in particular. of 19Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Mahmd, Abo Mansur al-Maturidi al-Saniarqandi. Al-Maturidi's is the Kitb al-tawhid, ed. Fath Allah Khulayf (Alexandria: Dar al jmict main work of theology al-miriyya, n. d.) 20J. Meric Pessagno, "The uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought, " Studia Islamica 60 (1984): 59-82. links his notion of divine wisdom with the Muctazili notion of God's doing the Al-Mturidi also best (aslah). On this and al-Mturidi's view of human action, see Mustafa Ceric, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abii Mansilr al-Mturidi (d. 333/944) (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), 139-141,208223; and J. Meric Pessagno, "Irda, Ikhtiyr, Qudra, Kasb: The View of Ab Mansur AlMdturidi, " Journal of the American Oriental Society 104 (1984): 177-191.

21Muhammadb. Abo Bakr b. Ayb, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.22 For Ibn Taymiyya's influence generally from his death through to early twentieth century Egyptian reform movements, see Laoust, Essai, 477-575; and Henri Laoust, "L'influence d'IbnTaymiyya, " in Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge, ed. Alford T. Welch and Pierre Cachia (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1979), 15-33. Ibn Taymiyya has also become notorious inspiration to modern Muslim radicals who use his anti-Mongol fatwas to justify armed as an On this, see Emmanuel Sivan, "Ibn Taymiyya: Father of the Islamic Revolution: revolution. Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, " Encounter 60, No. 5 (May 1983): 41-50; and Johannes J. G. Jansen, "Ibn Taymiyyah and the Thirteenth Century: A Formative Period of Modern Muslim " Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5-6 (1987-88): 391-6. References to Ibn Taymiyya in the Radicalism, literature on modem and contemporary Islamic movements are frequent. 23A major source for Ibn al-Qayyim's theodicy is Shy' al-lalil fi mas'il al-gad' wa al-qadar wa Mubammad al-Sayyid and Said Mal3mad (Cairo: Dar alal-hikma wa al-ta'lil, ed. al-Sayyid Hadith, 1414/1994). Irmeli Perho, "Man Chooses his Destiny: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's view on " Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12 (2001): 61-70, provides the best access predestination, the basic ideas found in this work, but the scope of her article does not extend to the to several of in the divine will. Chapters Seven through Twelve and questions of wise purpose and causality Chapter Seventeen out of the thirty chapters in the Shy' al-'alit are translated into French by A. de Vlieger, Kitb al qadr: Materiaux pour servir a /'etude de la doctrine de la predestination daps la theologie musulmane (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1903), 116-169. These selections deal primarily with divine determination. The material on divine purpose and evil come later in lbn al-Qayyim's book. Also of interest for Ibn al-Qayyim is Joseph Normant Bell, Love Theory in Later Ilanbalite Islam (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1979), 92-181; Moshe Perlmann, "Ibn Qayyim the Devil, " in Studi Orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida, vol. 2 (Rome: Istituto and l'oriente, 1956), 330-7; and Francis T. Cooke, "Ibn al-Qaiyim's Kitb al-Rir, " The Moslem per World 25 (1935): 129-144. 24 In Islam, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979), 113-4, Fazlur Rahman notes inaccurately in the case of Mturidism, that "Ibn Taymiya reinstates into approvingly, although Muslim theology the doctrine of the purposiveness of the Divine behaviour, a doctrine so denied by Ash'arism, Mturidism and 7hirism as compromising the omnipotence of strenuously

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God's will and His dissimilarity to His creation. " See the index for Rahman's numerous mentions of Ibn Taymiyya more generally. Muhammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynid, Qa(liyyat al-khayr wa alal-tatbigiyya, Dirsa 'ilmiyya lisharr fi al-ftkr al-islami: Ust-tfuha al-nazariyyajawnibuha mas'iiliyyat al-inseln fi al-Islam, 2d Printing (Cairo: Matbalat al-Halabi, 1981), provides a study of the Muctazili and Ashlari Kalm traditions on good and evil, evaluating both with the help of and borrowings from Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim. See, for example, numerous references pages 108-114, which draw heavily upon Ibn Taymiyya's Nasana and Ibn al-Qayyim's Shy al'ali!. Al-Julaynid's other uses of the shaykh and his disciple may be found on pages 134,177-18 1, 205-213,234-242,261-2,278-9,298-303, and 320-1. 'Umar Sulayman al-Ashgar, 'Alain al jinn wa al-shayytin, (Cairo: Bayt al-Hikma, 1413/1992), 155-167, borrows directly from Ibn alQayyim's Shy' al-'alil to explain God's wise purpose in the creation of Satan. This work also exists in English: Umar Sulaiman al-Ashqar, The World of the Jinn and Devils, ET Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo, (Boulder, CO: Al-Basheer, 1998). For the influence of Ibn Taymiyya's notion of divine determination (qadar) on Muhammad Rashid Rid, see Christian van Nispen Tot Sevenaer, Activite Humaine et Agir de Dieu: Le Concept de 'Sunan de Dieu' dans le commentaire coranique du Manar (Beyouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1996), 264-5,483-4. Rashid Rid also edited Majmi"t'at a! ras'il wa al-mas'il [hereafter MRMJ (Cairo: Matbalat al-manr, 1341-1349/1922-1930), a five part collection of Ibn Taymiyya's treatises which includes the important theodicean fatwa Irdda MRM 5: 113-70. The edition oflrda used for this study, however, is found in MF 8: 81-158. 25Bell, Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam, 46-91; Daniel Gimaret, "Theories de l'acte humain dans l'ecole 1-lanbalite," Bulletin d'etudes orientales 29 (1977): 156-178. 26 Extensive lists of Ibn Taymiyya's works were compiled soon after his death by his primary disciple Shams al-Din Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), Asm' mu'allafa-t Ibn Taynuyya, ed. $alab al-Din al-Munajjid (Damascus: Malb

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