Addressing Analytic Pitfalls Regarding Russia’s Future

By Damian Niolet

Introduction

U.S. accounts of world history contend that the “Cold War,” during which the U.S. was in

a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and a war of which the U.S. does not hesitate to

proclaim itself the victor, lasted for 44 years. It is no wonder, therefore, that many U.S. analysts

are devoted to solving the enigma that is today’s Russia – despite such a decisive victory over

the former ardent foe – the Cold War was 44 years of conditioning, after all. Tensions between

the two countries, upon the Soviet Union’s collapse right up to this day, have remained. Those

tensions have subsided over time thanks in part to certain reforms Russian leaders have

“initiated,” which the U.S. smiled upon initially; however, the U.S. has since deemed those

reforms to be stagnant, that recent developments demonstrate a reversal of those initiatives and

in some instances a reprisal of Soviet governance, causing renewed tensions.

The tidal nature of these tensions is disconcerting to U.S. policymakers, who want to

understand the future of Russia so as to best orient their relationship with the country towards a

strategic end. Whether that strategy involves positioning the U.S. defensively against a

reemerging Soviet Union or positioning the U.S. as a supportive equal to a truly Federated

Russia depends on the analysis of U.S. analysts. In order to provide U.S. policymakers with the

information they need so as to choose the appropriate course of action, the majority of U.S.

analysts are focusing on the top leaders of the country – President Dmitri Medvedev and to a

greater extent Prime Minister Vladimir Putin – believing that Russia’s future can be channeled

out of an examination of said leaders. This analytic method is rife with problems. The method is

stifling true analysis because it is plagued by overwhelming assumptions, which act as anchoring

biases. The fact is one cannot begin to understand Russia’s future until one understands the

guiding and ruling ideology of the entire country.

The Analytic Pitfalls Associated with Analyses of Russia

It should first and foremost be caveated that this paper will examine open source material

while pursuing a review of the prevailing sentiments regarding Russia and the country’s future.

The reason for this is because U.S. analysts (and policymakers by extension) rely more on open

source material for constructing their worldview of international affairs than on classified

reporting. If one wants to learn about the general perception of policymakers regarding a topic,

one need only listen to NPR reporting on that topic in recent times. In addition, the

overwhelming attitude of journalists toward Russia pervades and colors any sort of analysis that

occurs behind closed doors and thus must be taken into account first. There are bestsellers that

are viewed as more authoritative than any classified report. For purposes of this paper, analysts

and journalists will be grouped together and simply referred to as analysts.

Conducting research on predictions of Russia’s future reveals a striking reality – U.S.

analysts are mesmerized by Putin. It would be too daunting a task to statistically encapsulate this

view. Suffice it to say that from the personal experience of this author, having read many a

report on Russia, very little serious analysis concerning Russia’s future exists that does not begin

with or lean heavily upon an examination of Vladimir Putin. A good deal of these reports cite

Putin’s former affiliations with the now defunct KGB and/or the now thriving FSB and hint at a

certainty that these affiliations are the primary factors that influenced Putin’s political

governance paradigm.1 Other reports utilize and sensationalize what little evidence there is that

1 Adi Ignatius, “A Tsar is Born,” Time, December 31, 2007, 57.

points to Putin having ties to organized crime and suggests that there is no doubt that he does,

thus casting the whole of Russia into the same lot as nothing but a den of thieves.2

Likewise, U.S. analysts treat Medvedev in the same manner; since, in their eyes Medvedev

was a handpicked successor of Putin and likely merely a puppet. Analysts with this mindset are

certain that Medvedev can do nothing apart from Putin. The fact that Medvedev appointed Putin

as the Prime Minister (Russia’s 2nd in command) only affirms their claim, or so they believe.

Most U.S. analysts believe this despite glaring evidence to the contrary. It is easier for U.S.

analysts to arrive at such far-fetched conclusions, even making them assumptions from which to

conduct further analysis, than to accept that Russia is whole-heartedly committed to reforms.

More important, it is easier for analysts to continue to vilify Russia than to reevaluate their

paradigms of the Cold War foe.

Conducting analysis in this vein entails concurrence with certain assumptions, which this

paper intends to underline and subsequently compel analysts’ to erase from their thinking about

Russia. First, suggesting that a country’s future is highly dependent on its top leader assumes

that there are no other sources of power, neither vertically nor laterally. This assumption may

only ever be acceptable when analyzing absolute dictatorships. The assumption cannot be

applied to even nominally free democracies like Russia. Second, suggesting that a country’s

future is highly dependent on its top leader assumes that the specified top leader is directly

responsible for every occurrence in the country and that each was precisely intended. No one

can be in that much control, not even Putin. Third, suggesting that a country’s future is highly

dependent on its top leader assumes that there is no carry over effects from the actions of

previous leaders. There is never a scenario where this assumption is applicable.

2 Catherine Belton, “Putin's Name Surfaces in German Probe,” Moscow Times, May 19, 2003.

A Different Way of Looking at Russia

This paper will now seek to highlight the more common assumptions and analytic pitfalls

that reside in most analytic studies on Russia. Those assumptions that relate to Putin will be

looked at first. As explained above, most analysts are prone to emphasize Putin’s tenure as a

member of the siloviki (the secret police). They will recount recent efforts to bolster the FSB’s

strength and reach.3 They will relate a number of events associated with the increased muzzling

of opposition groups such as newly formed political parties or media outlets.4 In the mind of the

analyst who sees Putin as a communist Tsar reincarnate, all of these bits of information

corroborate each other. Unfortunately, they forget that not even the Tsars were completely in

control of Russia, hence recurrent coups and revolutions.

There is another way of looking at the Russia/Putin dynamic. Addressing the first

assumption introduced above, it is completely possible that there are powers apart from Russia’s

political apparatus that have assisted in creating the state of affairs in today’s Russia. Further, it

is possible that Putin has no purview over these powers. Considering the fact that a large number

of former KGB operatives found themselves in a market economy after the collapse of the Soviet

Union and eventually in charge of significant corporations or elements of organized crime,5 it is

possible that they wished to retain the status quo and prevent Putin’s loss of the Presidential

office. It is well known that there was tampering involved in Russia’s last two Presidential

elections, but it is not certain who the perpetrator was. It is assumed that Putin was the

3 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Russia’s New Nobility,” Foreign Affairs 89, no 5 (September/October 2010): 80.

4 Ignatius, 57-58.

5 Soldatov and Borogan, 81.

perpetrator because it “happened on his watch,” a view which correlates with the second

assumption above.6 This line of reasoning is error upon error.

Now this paper will take a look at Putin’s successor - Medvedev. Most analysts will

contend fervently that Medvedev is nothing more than a puppet of Putin; after all, Medvedev was

handpicked by Putin and Medvedev later “returned the favor” by appointing Putin Prime

Minister. Most analysts thusly overlook that fact that Medvedev was elected into office. This

fact is overlooked because the previous assumption is still fresh in their minds – those elections

were rigged by Putin. Since most analysts were certain that Putin would find a way to

circumvent Russia’s meager constitution, they see Medvedev’s appointing Putin as Prime

Minister as an interim step to regaining power, a step orchestrated by Putin naturally.

There is another way of looking at the Medvedev/Putin dynamic. Again, other sources of

power in Russia could have acted on behave of Medvedev’s and Putin’s party, United Russia,

unbeknownst to the leaders, believing United Russia’s policies would more accurately aligned

with the economic endeavors of the hidden powers. It is also possible that the only reason

Medvedev appointed Putin to be the Prime Minister was to garner more legitimacy for his

particular brand of governance. It would provide instant credibility to have Putin by his side. It

is also possible, and once the evidence is objectively assessed, very likely that Medvedev is

striving to take Russia in a different direction than Putin, albeit only slightly, nonetheless

different. Medvedev has shown on a number of occasions that he does not always concur with

his compatriot, even overturning some of the reforms Putin initiated.7

6 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution, (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 61.7 Eberhard Schneider, "Split in the Russian Political Tandem Putin-Medvedev?" Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA) 3 (Spring 2009): 222 - 224.

Lastly this paper will suggest that the last assumption, which says that a previous leader’s

actions do not overlap terms of service, is completely false. Further, analysts should assume the

exact opposite – there will most certainly be overlap; the effects of the previous leader’s actions

can greatly impact the predecessor’s time in office. Even if there is truth in the notion that Putin

had a direct hand in incidences such as the election debacle or the gagging of opposition groups,

there is no logic in instantly attributing the continued occurrence of such incidences to

Medvedev. Those types of operations would be difficult to rein in once loosed. Some analysts

would propose that Medvedev is not only allowing it through inaction, but allowing it through

decisive action. They would cite Medvedev’s closing down of the organized crime and terrorism

branch of the FSB as evidence, neglecting to mention that a new office was stood up in its place

that more precisely aligns with a trend occurring internationally.8

It’s About the Ideologies Stupid

When U.S. analysts aim to predict Russia’s future, it would be far wiser to focus on the

ideologies that the top leaders embody, but that span all of Russia. It is the ideologies that not

only the President and Prime Minister of Russia will struggle to adhere to, but also any other

sources of power, which act on behalf of Russia, as well. Ideologies are likely to span the

vertical and horizontals of power when it comes to the future of Russia. When one begins to

look for trends in the prevailing ideologies of the last decade it becomes clear that Russia has

veered little from the course set since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Over all Russia is fixated on

maintaining its position as a world power so as to be able to assert its particular ideals. 9 From

8 Louise Shelley, “Crime, Organized Crime, and Corruption,” in After Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 194.

9 Andrew C. Kuchins, “Why Russia is so Russian,” Current History, (October 2009): 323.

the populaces’ perspective, perhaps a better way of looking at it, Russians are intent on proving

that their unyielding since of nationalism is not misplaced.

Democracy and Capitalism remain key aspects of the strategy to maintain world power

status, otherwise there would have been an utter dismissal of those institutions. U.S. analysts

and policymakers get exacerbated when Russia’s form of Democracy and Capitalism are

inconsistent with the U.S.’s and decree the onset of the resurrection of the Soviet Union, but to

expect Russia’s forms of Democracy and Capitalism to mirror the U.S.’s is lunacy. One cannot

expect a country to have a carbon copy democracy of another when said country has a

completely different governmental structure, geography, demographic, etc., not to mention less

than 20 years of working at it.

What unsettles analysts and policymakers are the measures the Kremlin will seemingly

take to attain the above described ideologies. It is the measures the Kremlin will take to achieve

the overarching ideologies that become the Presidents’ platforms. Taking the platforms of the

last two Russian Presidents into account stands as further evidence that Russia is being very

forthwith about their desired future. Putin’s platform promise was “stability.” Perhaps Putin

forced stability on Russia by creating a near police state, but perhaps that was exactly what

Russia needed. Gorbachev himself thinks as much.10 Putin ensured that the atmospheric

conditions conducive for further coups or revolutions was minimal, to the extent that the

conditions have been absent through Medvedev’s time in office as well.

Russia needed and continues to need time to show everyone that the system can work.

Even slight upheavals like changing from one party to another party with basically the same

views could derail Russia. Putin may have guaranteed no such derailment would occur, allowing

Medvedev to continue where Putin left off. While the overall ideology is the same, Medvedev’s

10 Ignatius, 60.

platform is “modernization.” Now that the political atmosphere has been subdued, Medvedev

has time and room to grow Russia, to show just how well the system is working. As the system

begins to bare more fruit, Medvedev can begin to loosen the Kremlin’s grip on “civil society.”

For example, whereas Putin heightened restrictions on the formation of political movements,

Medvedev is relaxing those restrictions.11

Conclusion

The manner in which U.S. analysts conduct studies of Russia and the country’s future is

akin to how inexperienced and emotional people in the U.S. invest their money. Inexperienced

and emotional investors are quick to withdraw their investments at the first sign of trouble. The

best example would be Apple Inc. Inexperienced and emotional investors believe that the future

of that company rides on Steve Jobs. When there were concerns over Steve Jobs’ health, the

company’s stock dropped dramatically. Had these investors remained faithful to Apple Inc. and

let their investments be, they would likely have far more return on their investment. While Steve

Jobs has been integral in making Apple Inc. what it is, at this point, the company has a strong

enough mission and vision (ideology) to be able to sustain itself and even grow no matter who is

in charge in the future.

U.S. analysts must begin to consider more of the forces at work in Russia other than the

leaders in charge when diagnosing Russia’s future. There a myriad of forces and powers within

Russia, all vying for control of the country’s steering mechanism. Right now, Putin may very

well be the individual with his hand on that mechanism; however, there is no credible certainty

of this, and as such, the idea should not be turned into an assumption from which to base further

analysis of the country. There is in fact more to substantiate the idea that the country as a whole

is whole-heartedly committed to reforms, albeit, reforms as Russia requires them. At the end of

11 Schneider, 224.

the day, one must begin an analysis of Russia’s future by considering Russia’s guiding ideology,

the visions that permeate all of Russia’s citizenry. Then one can begin to understand Russia’s

leaders’ methods for arriving at that goal. The methods may not be like our own, but that does

not necessitate that disparagements be cast on the leaders, country, or their futures.

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