Anti-Aircraft Journal - Feb 1952

8/6/2019 Anti-Aircraft Journal - Feb 1952

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151h AAA AW BN (SPI

Sgl. Robert C. Turner

21.1 AAA AW BN (SPI1st LI. Richord Y. Pork

1.1 Lt. Poul S. Vonture2nd LI. Leland D. Bray2nd LI. Jo.eph W. WeeksSic. Jome. T. PottersonSic. Bu.ter W. StrosserSgl. Woodrow McKinnon

SOLDIER'S jlIEDALS

Cpl. Herbert Stoffel

Pic. Richard E. Blume

82nd AAA AW BN

Capl. Jame. H. Tyree

21s1 AAA AW BN (SPI

1st LI. Robert C. Morri.on

8651h AAA AW BN

1st LI. Jo.eph M. Solari

DISTINGUISIIED UNIT CITATION21.1 AAA AW BN ISPI

Bottery B, 1st & 2nd Plotoon.

BRONZE STAR l\iEDAL AWARDS

PURPLE I-IEART AWARDS

3rd AAA AW BN

Sic. Dalla. N. Norman

15th AAA AW BN (SPI

Sgl. Billy G. LeweySgt. Roy W. Reynold.Cpl. Matthew KuzoPvl. Gerold L. Hurles

21st AAA AW BN (SPI

Major David C. Miss (1 OlC)Copl. Thoma. R. Armstrong 1 1 OlC)Copt. Richard S. Craig (V )Copt. Billy G. Strong (3 OLC)Capl. William E. Steinmann1st Lt. Karl F. Bennett (V)1st Lt. Homer J. Lockey (V )

3rd AAA AW BN

Copl. Richard PrideCpl. Gerold R. Elli.Cpl. Roy J. English

151h AAA AW BN ISPI

1st LI. George E. MitchellCpl. Earnest Cathey

Sic. Shirley E. Bosse (VI

Sic. Rulu. M. Gib.on (V )Sic. Daniel R. Schmidl (V )Sgl. Fronci. W. Doyle (V )Sgl. Arthur R. Gideon. (V )Sgl. Kenneth F. Mystrom (V )Sgt. Dexter W. Packard (VICpl. Kenneth V. Bailey (V)Cpl. Jo.eph B. Frye (VICpl. Zeb L. Hand IV)Cpl. Robert P. John.ton (VICpl. John Walker (V)Cpl. Roy W. Willis (VI Cpl. George T. Woodby (V )Pic. William F. Chenault (V )Pic. Anselmo J. H. Ontalon (V )Pic. Felix S. Selas (V )

Pvl. Jo.eph Castenguay (V )

e ,,1 .Wallace H. PhillipsCpl. Jerry L. Searle.Cpl. Harry O. SmithCpl. Robert WeyantPic. Clayton DeasePic. Jame. M. Frederick

Pic. Raymond L. Janu"hPic. Allred R. TreioPic. Wilbur H. RussellPic. Willie J. Thorpe

78th AAA GUN BN

LI. Col. John B. ParrottCopl. Rolph R. CocchiottiCopt. David W. MeyerCopt. Kenneth G. Ring1st LI. Glennis A. Amburgey (L OlC)Sgt. Harry M. Bukky

82nd AAA AW BN

Lt. Col. Robert H. Johnston (V )Major John E. Clark IV }Copt. Jock L. Woltz (V )Copt. Duncombe M. Woodbury IV)1st Lt. Clyde B. Cobb, Jr., (V )Sic. Donald J. EskewSgt. Martin M. Margetich (V )Sgt. Edward J. Sypek Sgt. Carl G. Thomas (V)Sgl. Andrew M. Wimberly (V )PIc. James D. Ketchum (V )

Pvl. William J. Charle.Pvl. Joseph N. Dennis

21s1 AAA AW BN (SPI

Sic. Jerry S. Ingram

Sic. Jock F. ThurnerCpl. Sylvester L. GuszregenPvl. Michael HolovochPvl. J. B. Thoma.

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\\ I I I0~ ~ \ ~ \ '--' L... .... '-' ..... L... . ~FOUNDED in 1892

Published from 1892 until 1922 asTHE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERY

Published from 1922 until 1948 as theCOAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

L1'. GEN. LEl'..OY LUTESPRESIDENT

THE UNITED STATES

ANTIAIRCRAFT

ASSOCIATION

OFFICERS

i\IAJ. GEN. WILLAl'..D W. mVINE"ICE-PRESIDEl'o'T VOL. LXXXXV JANUARY.FEBRUARY,1952 No.1

COL. CHAl'..LES S. HAl'..HISSECRETARY-TREASURER CONTENTS

bli8hed bimonthly by the United States Antiaircraft Association. Editorial and executi'\"e offices, 631 Penn~yl'\"ania Avenue, X.'V.,a~hington 4, D. C. Terms: $3.00 per )'ear. Foreign subscriptions. $4.00 per year. Single copies. 75c. Entered as second.class matter~'~8hin"ton. D. C.; additional entr)" at Ri.hmond, Va., under the Act of ~areb 3. 18.9. Copyright. 1952. by the United States

ntiaIrcraft Association.

ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE

EXECUTIVE COUNCILBRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT W. CRICHLOW, JR.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES G. SAGE

COLONEL THOMAS F. MULLANEY, JR.

COLONEL NORMAN E. HARTMAN

lIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANCIS X. BRADLEY

lIEUTENANT COLONEL H. GLEN WOOD

MAJOR JAMES E. CALKINS

The purpose of the AJIociation Jhall be to promote the efficiency of the A11tiaircraft

Artillery by mai,rtaining its JtandardJ and tra.ditio'lJ, by diJseminating profeJIional knou'l-edge, by inJpiring greater effort tou'ard theimprovement of materiel and methodJ of training and by fOJtering mutual underHand.ing, reJpect and cooperation among all armJ,branchn and componentl of the Regular Army, National Guard, Organized Reser/'el,and Reserl'e Officer$' Training CorpJ.

Th. JOURNAL prints artidu on 8ubj ts of pro(~ssional and general interest to personnel of the Antiaircraft Artillery in order to stimulatethought and provoke discussion. However.opinions expressed and conclusions drawn inarticles are in no sense official. They do not re-Bect the opinions or conclusions of any officialor branch of the Department of the Army.

The JOURNAL does not ... arry paid advertisinl(_Th. JOURNAL pay. for ori"inal artidu uponpublication. Manuscript should be addreRlled toth. Editor. Th. JOURNAL i. not rupon.ibl.for manu8cripts unarrompanied by returnposta are.

PUBLICATION DATE: F.bruary I. 195%

COVER: Once antiaircraft, always antiaircraft: After ten months of ground combat in Korea; an unidentined plane arrests attentionof Sgt. Howard Schae/fer, Btry D, 21st AAA AW Bn.

ANTIAIHCl'..Arl' Al'..TILLERY IN KOREA. By Major Gel/eral \VilliaJl/ F. Marquat 2

GEi\'El'..AL LUTES RETlP..ES 6IN SUPPOl'..T OF TI-IE INFANTl'..Y. By Lt. Co/. Charles E. Hel/ry 9SUPPLY FOH. THE SELF Pl'..OPELLED BATTALION.

By Capt. Hobert E. Eielding IIBAKEl'..BATTEl'..Y SUPPOl'..TS THE WOLFHOUNDS.

By Capt. John Popovics 12865TH AAA AW BATTALION (SP) 14SELF Pl'..OPELLED BATTALION IN GROUND SUPPOl'..T.

By Capt. Ballard B. Small 1524TH DIVISION AAA. By Corporal John S. Aaron 18SELF Pl'..OPELLED ANTIAlP..Cl'..AFf IN KOl'..EA.

By 1st Lieut. Edmund A. Krekorian 20OPEl'..ATION Ol'..PHAN. By Captain William F. Hawcliffe 23KOl'..EAN MUD HELPS TO SAVE MAHINE FLYEH. 24Al'..i\lY AA COMMAND ACTIVITIES 25A THIAL SHOT FOR VT FUZES. By Co/. Arthur H. Bender 27POINTS IN Pl'..EPAHING GUN FIl'..E 28SHOOTING AT AN IDEA. By Lt. Co/. James M. Edmunds 3034TH AAA BRIGADE SPONSOl'..S YOUTH CENTEl'...

By Major Theodore Wycoff 32BlP..DS OF MARS. By Jonathan Norton Leonard 33HONOR ROLL 38IMPRESSIONS OF LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

By Alan G. Kirk 39CANAL ZONE TRAINING. By Sfc Don Hatt 42

ANTIAIHCRAFr AIHLIFf. By Sgt. William J. Tobin 43AA AND GM CENTEH. ACTIVITIES 44WITH THE 38TH AAA Bl'..IGADE. By Major Robert J. RutIJeTford .. 46COi\lBAT PAy 47THE INVISIBLE STEEL CORE. By A. T. Lawson 4878TH AAA GUN BATTALION IN AlP.. DEFENSE 49EDITORIAL-ECONOMY 50BOOK l'..EVIEWS 51NE\VS & COMMENT 53Al'..TILLEl'..Y ORDERS 55

COLONEL CHARLES S. HARRIS. EditorLIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD W. OWEN, Associate Editor

M Sgt Fred A. Baker, Business Manager ISgt lei Ralph No Charleston, Cir, ~lgr.

Sgt lei James E. Moore, Jr., Editorial Assistant


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THE second winter of the KoreanvVar dominates the situation as this, theeighth report, is submitted to the ANTl- AIHCRAFT JOURNAL.

On Christmas Day the conRict enteredits nineteenth month amid the low sing-ing of carols, field services by the ever-loyal chaplains featured by a special for-ward area Catholic Mass by (-(is Emi-nence Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, and the usual fabulous holi-day turkey dinner-all in an atmosphereof fervent hope that the cease fire nego-tiations would finally break the over-extended impasse and result in an armis-tice agreement.

After this brief emotional interludethe combat area reverted to normalcywhich may be interpreted to mean thatmembers of the combat and service unitsreturned to the employment of all knownartifices to defeat the ravages of bitterwinter and a cunning and persistent-though chastened-enemy. Regardless of whether there has or has not been a ces-sation in actual hostilities at the time this

appears in print, it can be assumed thatthose grand fighting men of the UnitedNations Force are confidently awaitingthe next step, whether it be a permanentpeace or a return to war, with an air of assurance that they are masters of thesituation and capable of overcoming allodds no matter how great they may be.There is no way to explain battlefieldmorale in finite terms, but when wit-

CoJ. Edmunds i s Chief of the l ight AAASection, Department of Gunnery AA & GMBr. TAS. Captain A. M. Kolesar, Project TestOfficer of AFF Board No.4, consulted and ad-vised the author in the prepara tion of thisarticle. Photos by AFF Boord No.4.

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nessing conditions such as just described,one is carried away with the firm convic-tion that it is divinely inspired.

That invaluable and incomparablequality of experience manifests itself intwo ways on the Korean battlefields of the 1951-52 winter. In the first place theimproved "know how" on the part of thesoldier permits him to resist the sub-zerotemperatures and reduces their effectupon his activities from major obstaclesto mere inconveniences. This, of course,is largely possible through the develop-ment of highly effective equipment bythe supply services after thorough re-search and scientific development. Thefive-man tent, with oil stoves, is infinitelysuperior to former models and \vilI per-mit comfort under the most trying con-ditions. New types of winter clothingenhance combat efficiency and the ever-present good food always can overcomean otherwise dismal outlook. The re-maining veterans of the last winter cam-paign have "wised up" the replacementson methodology that they had to learn

the hard way.The second contribution of experience

is measured in terms of knowledge of how to resist vastly superior numbers of the enemy through the application of those two standbys of military tactics-firepower and maneuver. There was atime when overpowering hosts of Chi-nese Reds could control certain situations-but that time has disappeared. ,",Vhilethe disparity of forces may be evengreater than at some of the former timeperiods involved, the UN troops find nodifficulty at the moment in containingoffensive efforts of the Reds or in retak-ing areas temporarily abandoned for im-provement of the tactical situation.

The antiaircraft artillery psychology of

the moment is the increased awareness of the mounting possibility of hostile airattack. There are evidences of far

greater air power having been amassedby the enemy and of feverish activity tobuild airhelds within striking distance of friendly installations and forces. TheUN Air Force is taking care of bothissues quite satisfactorily but in the midstof extreme boredom at not having anylive targets to shoot at, the antiaircraft-men are conscious of the dangers of re-laxed vigilance. They are on the job andprepared for any eventuality.

WI-IILE the infantry is mostly en-gaged in light patrolling, the Rak wagonunits have less opportunity to distinguishthemselves. It is quite different from thedays when our troop masses were movingforward through prepared successive de-fense positions, road blocks, counterat-tacks and similar formations or, con-versely when divisions and corps 'wereengaged in orderly large scale retire-

ments that had to be covered by auto-matic weapons through various types of employment. The infantry patrols of thepresent period, however, have learnedthe advantage of Rak wagon support andthey call for them at all times. There isno doubt that a single automatic weap-ons mobile unit adds a lot of firepower toa light patrol and when integrated intopatrol tactics they afford a most effectivesupport.

Perhaps the most significant tribute tothe effectiveness of the self-propelledunits in support of surface action, is thedevelopment by the Communists of aspecial defense against their activities. Of recent date our patrols, accompanied byantiaircraft automatic weapons, have

ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL


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poral Howard T. Peters, Sergeant JohnPetrak and Privates First Class EarlGrant and -Arthur King distinguishedthemselves in the action as the automaticweapons units covered the advance of

friendly infantry, silenced the hostileartillery, and shot out defensive positionsstrongly held by the.enemy.

In a similar type of operation a platoonof Captain Richard D. Pride's D Battery,with 1st Lieut. Robert C. Steelman as

several hectic skirmishes with the enemy.In one attack, to capture a hill, a B Bat-tery platoon under 1st Lieut. vVilliam F.Branigan was hit by hostile artillery asthe infantry was passing through the an-

tiaircraft artillery position. The infantryplatoon leader was struck by shrapneland was evacuated by Captain Furr. Pri-vate Gerald Davis performed heroic featsin removing other wounded in the areawhile under heavy artillery fire. Cor-

been confronted with artillery and anti-ank weapons. This poses a new prob-em, but you may depend upon its

being solved promptly by the ingeniousground-air artillerymen.

Lieut. Colonel John F. Goettl 's 3rdAAA AW Battalion has been active withts infantry division in supporting limited

objective attacks and in patrol action.Captain James H. Furr's B Battery

supported the 15th Infantry Regiment in

This aerial photograph, taken at Taechon Airfield (YE 1319) shows two types of antiaircraft position areas used by the Com-munists in North Korea. The position near the center of the photo is an 8-gun, radar controlled heavy antiaircraft battery.The guns are Soviet 85mm AAA guns, controlled by a Soviet Puazo 3 or 4 director and a gun-laying radar. The positionn the upper right portion of the photo is a 5-gun antiaircraft automatic weapons position. The weapons are Soviet 37mm

automatic guns, aimed with an on-carriage computing antiaircraft sight.


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platoon leader, co\'ered infantry attackson a hill for fi\'e days. In one phase of the action the platoon destroved fortvbunkers, three machine gun' emplac~-ments and one trench mortar. Thirtyenemy were killed in this action. Ser-geants First Class i\liller F. Downey andCharles E. Grandy, Sergeant Page andCorporal Andrew Kom were outstand-109.

Lieutenants Joseph E. i\Iarkee andLee C. Snidow of Battery A and Cor-porals Howard Biller and Theodore Mil-ler of Battery B distinguished themselveson other occasions. The two corporalswere with an M39 personnel carrierwhen ambushed by a squad of enemyarmed with automatic weapons. Theydispersed the enemy squad with ma-chine gun and riRe fire, evacuated thewounded and then proceeded on their

mission without interference.During a period when the 3rd Infan-

try Division was in reserve, the 3rd A \V Battalion reverted to an antiaircraft de-fense role in protection of commandposts, troop areas and air strips for liaisonplanes. No hostile aircraft threatenedany of the division installations; so thebattalion utilized this time training re-placements, placing armor plate shieldson its weapons, and correcting wear andtear defects in its equipment. Duringinactive periods the antiaircraft battalionvehicles serve well in the capacity of sup-ply vehicles and special troop transport.

THE 15th AAA AW Battalion, underLieut. Colonel James VV. Moore, sup-porting the 7th U. S. Infantry Division,also found the M39 personnel carrier andcrew extremely effective in evacuatingwounded and moving supplies to troops

under fire. Sergeant John Finnigan of Whitestone, Long Island, New York,and his crew consisting of Private Frank-lin R. Kuhn of Gardners, Pennsylvania,Corporal Samuel A. Strangin of McKees-port, Pennsylvania, Private Michael J.Ryan of New York, and Private AlbertKalanan of Philadelphia performed he-roically in an action by the First Battal-ion, 31st U, S. Infantry Regiment. Afterbringing up a load of reserve ammuni-tion, the crew rescued wounded underfire, shot out sniper positions and took aposition in a nearby ravine to performhandy man operations whenever andwherever required by the doughboys.

The famous "Battery X" of this anti-

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Co!. Riley E. McGarraugh from GHQFEC congratulates Lt. Co!. Thomas \X'.Ackert upon being awarded the Legionof Merit. The presentation took placeat 10th AAA Group Headquarters, 28

October 1951.

aircraft artillery battalion, commanded byFirst Lieut. Floyd V. Lewis, establisheditself as a special supply unit of the com-mand and is proving remarkably effective

in cross-country" actions where the fulland half track vehicles can follow the in-fantry while wheel vehicles find it im-practicable.

During one encounter Privates Ryanand Kalafian brought their single mountcaliber .50 weapons so effectively on amachine gun nest that two CommunistChinese surrendered after two others hadbeen killed in this two minute action.

In ground support of infantry the bat-talion elements have been using directand indirect fire with excellent effect.The antiaircraft elements have beendrawing riRe, automatic weapons andmortar fire but the effect of enemy firehas not been such as to defeat the sup-port missions of the friendly automaticweapons. In the current type of action,where our infantry is engaged in takingfirmly held positions to improve thefriendly lines, our troops run up againstwell dug-in enemy troops behind protec-

tive wire and land mines. The 15th AWBattalion is using protective Rak vestswith excellent results under these condi-tions of exceptional exposure.

The 21st AW Battalion, under Lieut.Colonel Charles E. Henry, has beenactive with the 25th Division task forcesand patrols and continues to be inte-grated with armor and infantry to pro-duce excellent results.

A platoon of Battery C under FirstLieut. Homer Lackey has been account-ing for enemy killed regularly in raiderpatrol action from time to time. Anotherplatoon under Lieut. \V. 0, Keeling, Jr.has been similarly engaged. Some of thecombat action has been recorded by U, S.

motion picture companies for use innews reels and future cut-ins for warpictures. Lieut. Jack Vanderbleek andLieut. Paul S. Vanture have supportedRCT actions with outstanding results bytheir respecti\'e platoons.

Colonel Henry, as commander of therear area defense command, in his divi-sion, located a group of subversive Com.munists who were performing acts of violence during the night and holing upin a small village during the daytime.Henry led a raiding party against thisgroup and captured twenty-four of theoffenders. Guerrilla activities have Raredup of late but methodical search by in-fantry and antiaircraft troops is rapidlydiscouraging the underground opera-tions.

AWARDS to the 21st AAA AWBattalion thus far include nineteen silverstars, forty-six bro,nze stars for valor,thirty bronze stars for meritorious service,two commendation ribbons and onehundred thirty-eight purple hearts.

First Lieut. Addison L. Lewis with the3rd platoon of Battery B participated ina tank-infantry-quad .50 action in whichthree enemy were killed and a machinegun knocked out while the platoon wasunder heavy mortar fire in support of theinfantry and tank advance. The FirstPlatoon of Battery B under First Lieut.Robert G. j'vlorrison engaged in a similarpatrol action at close range" against anenemy using riRe fire, hand grenades andmachine guns. The platoon is creditedwith having killed twenty-three enemy,shot out two machine gun nests and as-sisted the infantry group in accomplish-ing its mission of capturing the hostileposition.

Light patrol action featured the mostrecent employment of the di,-ision. TheSecond Platoon of Battery B, com-manded by First Lieut. Joseph W.Weeks, and the Third Platoon of Batter,-B, commanded by First Lie~Jt. Joseph R Pirkel, both performed in stalwart fash-ion in combat patrol action.

Colonel \V. H. I-lennig, veteran com-mander of the lath AAA Group, is busykeeping his air defense units on the alertfor possible air assaults by the enemy,conducting tr~ining of replacements forhis own and divisional units, and per-forming many other tasks essential to suc-cess in the Korean operation. Only a fewineffective low level attacks by obsolete



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ostile aircraft have been recorded in ther defense areas. The planes keep out of

anoe of the defense weapons, and con-o

equently are unable to hit anything of military value.

i\lajor General Paik Sun Yup of theRepublic of Korea Army presented a setf Korean colors to the lath AAA Group

Headquarters for its service as Division

rtillery command during the early cam-aigns of the South Korean Army.

The group project to provide shelteror Korean orphans during the coming

winter has progressed most satisfactorily,upported by contributions from the per-onnel of the headquarters and battalionsf the group.

Command of the 50th AAA AW Bat-alion has been transferred from Lt. Col.awrence J. Lesperance to Lt. Col.

Werner L. Larson. This battalion is as-igned to the Eighth Army, attached tohe 10th AAA Group and is under opera-onal control of the Fifth Air Force.The Presidential unit citation of the

Republic of Korea was tendered to the0th AAA AW Battalion. Acceptance isending official approval.

The battalion is deployed to protect airtrips, supply establishments and denies.

Many alerts have been sounded but as

JANUARY - FEBRUARY, 1952

yet no hostile planes ha\'e venturedwithin striking range of the weapons.

THE 78th Gun Battalion, Lt. Col.John B. Parrott commanding, nred onnve enemy aircraft during one month.The enemy planes are careful not toenter the area of air defense antiaircraft

artillery fire but fly along the fringe of the effective gunfire range. It is evidentthat they know of the defenses and avoidany open challenge of the U. S. antiair-craft gun effectiveness.

Maintenance, training of replacementsand winterizing of housing occupy thespare hours of this battalion.

The 68th AAA Gun Battalion, underLt. Col. George B. Webster, is likewisein air defense positions. \Vebster re-placed Lt. Col. Raymond C. Cheal whocommanded this battalion from the earlydays in Korea.

A single nuisance raid was recordedduring which Battery D fired twelverounds. The bursts appeared on targetin the scopes of two batteries and theenemy plane lost altitude quickly and,disappeared. It is listed as probably de-stroyed.

J\!lorale has been stimulated by effec-

tive rotation schedules. The enlisted menare relieved at a satisfactory rate, but theofficer replacements have been slow incoming, resulting in delays of officer ro-tation.

Major William H. Lambert, Execu-tive, Major Edward J. Hooten, S-3, andCaptain rrederick Johnston, AssistantS-2, have recently arrived in the battal-

ion.The I & E enrollment in this battalion

is extremely high. The men have time tocomplete courses in spite of alerts, train-ing and normal combat readiness duties.

T HE 865th AAA A \\1 Battalion, com-manded by Lt. Col. Arthur G. May,continues in air defense positions. Nofiring at actual targets has been recordedrecently, although alerts are frequent.The battalion has been engaging inpractice ground alerts "just in case."

The 933rd AAA AW Battalion, underLt. Col. Charles E. Roden and the 1stl\llarine Gun Battalion under Lt. Col.C. \V. May, the 26th AAA AW Battal-ion under Lt. Col. Roy A. Tate, the 76thAAA A\V Battalion under Lt. Col. For-rest L. Martz and the 82nd AAA A'vVBattalion under Major Howard A. Ged-dis report business as usual.in their re-

spective assignments.Since submission of the last report a

GHQ inspection team headed by ColonelRiley E. McGarraugh, inspected unitsattached to the 10th AAA Group. Be-sides Colonel McGarraugh, the teamconsisted of Colonel Clarence A. Lang-ford and Thomas M. Met.z, Lt. Cols.Richard H. Anderson, Niram L. Saulsand Sidney D. Frampton, l\llajor J. M.Turner, Captain Thomas E. Rogers, 1stLt. Lawson R. Hillman and \VarrantOfficers Ogd.en L. McRae, John J. Kingand Edgar T. Wood. For their work theteam was divided into five groups.

The inspection reports indicate a highstandard oP operation throughout thelath AAA Group. Everywhere the AAAtroops demonstrated their ability to im-provise and take care of themselves un-der unfavorable conditions.

With an eye to the future and hopesfor an early termination of the incident

that turned out to be a full scale war, theAAA troops in Korea continue to coverthemselves with great credit whenevercalled upon to meet the enemy in any of their various capacities as air defense orground force supporting elements.

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G E N E R A L L U T E S R E T I R E S

Lieut. Gen. and Mrs. Lutes in their quarters at Fort Sam Houston.

A DISTINGUISHED army career,covering nearly 35 years, ended on Janu-ary the 31st for Lieutenant GeneralLeRoy Lutes,.Commanding General of the Fourth Army since October, 1949,

and President of the United States Anti-aircraft Association since January, 1945.As a result of his annual physical exami-nation in October he retired for physicaldisability.

During \Vorld \Var II and since, Gen-eral Lutes was the confidential assistantand friend to many leading officials suchas Secretaries of \Var Stimson, Patterson,and Royall, Secretary of the Army Gor-don Gray, Secretary of Defense Forrestal,as well as Generals Marshall, Eisen-hower, and Somervell.

General Lutes is best known for hiscontributions and vast knowledge in thehighly specialized field of general logis-tics and supply during \Vorld War II.As director of Plans and Operations,Army Service Forces, he was chargedwith the tremendous task of planningand supervising the system of supply dis-tribution to eleven million under arms insix combat zones throughout the world.

He later became Deputy and Chief of Staff to General Somervell and suc-ceeded General Somervell as Com-

mander of the Army Service Forces. Hewas rated by both General Eisenhowerand General Somervell as the outstand-ing logistical officer of the Army inWorld War II.

On i\larch 9, 1942, he joined the staff of General Brehon Somervell as Directorof Operations, Headquarters Services of Supply on the recommendation of Gen-eral Eisenhower whose assistant Chief of Staff, G4, he had been during theLouisiana maneuvers of 1940. For hisoutstanding work in the supply field dur-ing the Louisiana maneuvers, GeneralLutes was promoted from lieutenant colo-nel to brigadier general in 1941 to com-mand the 37th AAA Brigade in LosAngeles.

Under General Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces, General Lutesdealt with all logistical problems in atotal war that posed completely new andconstantly changing supply difficulties.In his new position, Lutes prepared theOverseas Supply Plan, put it into opera-tion, and directed its successful con-t.inuation.

To accomplish these assignments he

went into the field regularly to insuretheir execution and has a wartime recordof eleven transatlantic and five trans-

pacific crossings by air. For two years htraveled to every corner of the globe atrouble-shooter, advisor, and planner tinsure an all-out supply effort for outroops. In addition to the problem 0

transporting millions of troops, he helposts of authority and responsibility ian organization which handled morthan $100 billion in supplies during thcourse of the war.

On his first flight to the British Islin 1942, General Lutes initiated planassuring adequate supply support foAmerican forces shortly to be based ithe United Kingdom. Later in the samyear he covered thousands of miles in thSouth and Southwest Pacific, playing aimportant part in coordinating suppl.and logistical operations in supportArmy and Navy operational plans. Hwas instrumental in establishing the fir. joint Army-Navy Logistical Board in thSouth Pacific area.

It was on this duty tour that he anCaptain Eddie Rickenbacker were guestof Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons at dinnein Honolulu. General Lutes inviteRickenbacker to continue to their nexstop in his plane, but the latter decideto Hy in the same plane in which he hastarted his Pacific Hight. General Luteplane reached Canton Island on schedule. Rickenbacker's aircraft, leavinHonolulu fifteen minutes later, crasheat sea. \Vhen word reached the generalhe ordered his plane into the air tlaunch a search which continued all thanight and the next day until ten searc~planes took over the hunt, locating Cap!tain Rickenbacker and his party adrift o~

life rafts days later.

IN August,' 1943, he again Hew to thjPacific Theater to bolster the supply prjgram for the combat operations of Ne\lGeorgia, Buna, Salamaua, and Ne\\

. Guinea. After attending the Cairo Conference of Allied Governments and Allied Staffs in November, 1943, he inspected the supply functions of the I

Corps Area in Italy, from front-line unijto rear headquarters. He extended hipersonal study to the supply base at Orain North Africa, then flew from Oran theadquarters of the China-Burma-Indi


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cretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr., and Lieut. Gen. Lutes accompanied by Maj. Gen. John T. Lewis, Brig. Gen. Frederick L. Hayden and Brig. Gen. L. E. Simon salute as departing honors are rendered at a review at Fort Bliss.

heater at New Delhi, India. There herveyed and helped solve logistical prob-ms at bases from there to Assam, con-

ued through the Ledo Road bases for S. Forces in Burma, then Hew the

Hump" to China to coordinate supplyerations between that country anddia.In preparation for the invasion of Nor-

andy early in 1944, General Lutes waslled to General Eisenhower's head-arters at London to review the logis-al plans and advise on supply andgistical support of the cross channelsault. He was instrumental in expe-ting action that delivered critical itemsy air and water to meet the invasionadline and spent two months assistingperfecting the invasion logistical sup-

rt.General Lutes again went on duey

A NU A RY- FE B RU A RY, 1 9 52

with headquarters of the Allied Expedi-tionary Forces in the winter of 1944-45for several months to assist in logistical

operations at the front and in vital sup-ply areas throughout France. He was as-sisting in coordinating these operationsthere at the time of the Battle of theBulge.

In March, 1946, General Lutes ac-companied the Under Secretary of Waron a global Hight to examine the world-wide Army surplus-property situation.Later in the same year he made a Hightto Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to in-spect supply installations in the AlaskanCommand.

Upon the passage of the UnificationAct in 1947, he was selected by Secretaryof Defense James V. Forrestal as the firstDirector of the Staff of the MunitionsBoard where until shortly after Mr. For-

restal's death he was charged with allmatters pertaining to industrial mobiliza-tion and the coordination of require-

ments for Army, Navy and Air Force.Upon this appointment General Eisen-hower paid this tribute to Lutes: "Neverhas the Army produced, in the wholelogistical field, an officer of greater bril-liance or one more outstanding thanyourself."

THROUGHOUT his wartime ca-reer, General Lutes has held the esteemof superiors and subordinates alike. InJanuary, 1947, General Thomas T.Handy, then Deputy Chief of Staff, rec-ommended him as "a general officerwhose broad experience and sound judg-ment, especially in the field of logistics,are of the highest value to the service."

7


10/60

Lieut. Gen. Lutes and Col. Eustis L. Poland, Deputy Post Commander, break ground for the Fort Sam Houston new elementary school.

In February, 1943, then Lt. GenBrehon Somervell, at that time Com-manding General, Services of Supply,described him as "one of the most ableand best qualified officers in the Armyin the field of logistics. He is a real ex-pert and his untiring energy, his broadknowledge and experience and his sound judgment are, to a large extent, respon-sible for the very satisfactory supplysituation throughout the United Statesand in our foreign theaters of operation."

Among the decorations awarded to theGeneral are: Bronze Star Medal, Janu-ary, 1945; Legion of Merit, September,1945; Distinguished Service Medal, Oc-tober, 1945; Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of

a second DSM, July, 1946; Most Excel-lent Order of the British Empire, degreeof Honorary Commander, by His Maj-esty the King of England, August, 1946.He also holds the United States TyphusCommission Medal, awarded in April,1947, by the Typhus Commission for hisservices in instituting extensive typhus

8

control programs in all theaters of war.General Lutes was born in Cairo, 111.,

October 4, 1890. His first service was inthe original Coast Artillery Regiment of the \Vashington Guard in the PugetSound area in 1906. He later attendedthe vVentworth Military Academy andwas the honor graduate in 1908. He wascommissioned a second lieutenant in theIlIinois National Guard in 1914 and re-ceived a Regular Army commission as asecond lieutenant March 26, 1917.

BETWEEN the wars he served withthe Coast Artillery in the States, Pan-ama, and Hawaii, establishing himself as

an artilleryman while commanding andfiring in service practices, antiaircraft,submarine mine and seacoast batteriesfrom 3-inch up to 16-inch batteries. Hislast battery manned both the 16-inch sea-coast and the antiaircraft battery at FortWeaver, Hawaii. During the same timehe was achieving reputation as a sound

administrator. After graduation from thArmy vVar College in 1935 he was assigned to duty with the National GuarBureau.

In 1937-38 General Lutes was yenaggressive in promoting a new prografor procuring antiaircraft weapons fothe National Guard. At that time therwere only a few skeleton antiaircraf regiments in the Regular Army and thehad but few modem weapons. The National Guard had ten regiments but, imany instances, had but one gun pebattalion. He pointed out to the Chieof Coast Artillery and General Staff thawith the rate of procurement then undeway, it would take ninety years to equithe few regiments then in existence. Athat time, the Civil vVar was under wa,

in Spain and new antiaircraft equipme~made in Germany was demonstratinthat moving airplanes could be shodown or badly damaged by ground fireUnable to get vigorous support from thRegular Army for an increased prograof procurement, he turned to the Nationa I Guard, and with their. support waable to engineer the lirst large procmment program for antiaircraft equipmentThe budget for antiaircraft equipmenfor the first time was over $20,000,000and the equipment procured then wa.largely that which was used in the bginning of World War II.

Throughout his service General Lut )1has been an enthusiastic antiaircraft Officer with a profound interest in the efficiency and welfare of the officers anmen. Immediately after World War IIthe antiaircraft artillery was draStiCalllreduced with resultant lowering of thmorale of the junior officers. As Presi

dent of the Coast Artillery Association"General Lutes took strong action to hol~the Association together and continu~to publish the ANTIAIRCRAFTJOURNALaJa medium for encouraging the youngef.officers of the antiaircraft artillery to stallwith their branch and work toward i t tbetterment.

ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURN~~


11/60

IN SUPPORT OF THE INFANTBy Lt. Col. Charles E. Henry

21st AAA A\.v Battalion (SP)

9

General MacArthur and General Ridgway in the 25th Infantry Division area.

I hunted up Gen. Barth again at theair strip, who spoke to the division com-mander, who in turn spoke to ColonelKelleher and the half-tracks of C Batterywere again on their way to the 35thInfantry. General Ridgway had spoken.

The other regiment of the 25th Divi-sion, the 24th Infantry, was in corpsreserve, defending the MSR, andcouldn't utilize half-tracks on a tactical

mission at that time. We set up a grounddefense of the air strip instead, anddidn't attach D Battery to them untillater. Battery A joined the TurkishBrigade the same afternoon. Col. (nowBrigadier General) "lVlike" Michaelisthen commanding the 27th Infantry, re-ceived B Battery with open arms,' al-though he wasn't quite sure how hewould use them at the time. This at firstmarked the attitude of the doughboys.How are we going to use this monster?Time has changed all that.

The next day as I was driving downthe road toward the Turkish sector Isaw a jeep with the star of a brigadiergeneral following me. After about twoor three miles of this I began to feel

lery against ground attack. The place: afield artillery battalion emplaced in fir-ing position in a frozen rice paddy acrossthe road from Suwon Air Strip. Theoccasion: Gen Ridgway was at the air-strip to meet Gen. MacArthur who wasto land there, and had observed theM 16's of C Battery emplaced on theartillery battalion perimeter.

This occurrence was reported to me at

once by the battery commander. I, inturn, consulted Brig. Gen. George B.Barth, Divarty Commander, who wasalso at the airstrip.

The result: within an hour, C Batterywas on its way to join the 35th Infantry;B Battery was on its way to join the 27thInfantry; and I was conferring withColonel Kelleher, the CO of the 35thInfantry, trying to persuade him to useD Battery in addition to C Battery. "Get'em all out of here," he yelled, "I can'tuse 'em, you'll block up the road andGeneral MacArthur's on his way to myCP." I departed posthaste, and on theway out, I heard Colonel Kelleher say,"Don't go away mad, come on back tomorrow and we'll talk this over."

NUARY - FEBRUARY, 1952

INTRODUCTIONDear Henry:

The purpose of this article is to pro-voke discussion. It is recognized thatto date the 25th Division has had noair opposition to challenge the pri-mary role of the AAA. The Divisionhas had the opportunity to demon-strate the tremendous importanceand assistance AAA can be in the

ground support role. It is not neces-sary here to make a citation of whatthe doughboys in this division think about AAA support. It is apparentthat they are sold completely.

Thanks for letting me comment.BRADLEYM A J G EN(MOG

l ieut. Col. Henry trained the 21st AAA AWBattalion at Fort Bliss and commanded it incombat. In Korea he received a battlefieldpromotion to his present grade. From Januaryta September his battalion was credited with9,007 enemy casualties, including 56 POW.He has recently been reassigned to Fort Bliss.

AT's that scrap iron doing back

~? - That's all it is when you don't firescrap iron." "It's defending the a~til-y, Sir," was the answer. "Defendingagainst what?" was the next explosivemment "You want to kill some Chi-se,don't you, Captain? Then get yourns up with the infantry where they1ong. Go back and tell your divisionmmander to do something about this."This was the conversation betweenneral Ridgway, then 8th Army Com-ander, and one of my battery com-nders. The date: 26 January 1951,

day the 8th Armv started its "lim-d offensive" after ' two and a half nths of steady withdrawals. It waso the day that the 21st AAA AW Bat-on (SP) joined the 25th Division,ere according to the book and time-nored custom, they were assigned thession of defending the Division Artil-


12/60

uneasy and decided to stop on the side of the road and let it pass. It didn't. Itstopped and the assistant division com-mander, Brig. Gen. Bradley, stepped outand introduced himself to me. He toldme to circulate in the division and talk tothe infantry battalion commanders andsell them on the capabilities of the half-tracks. After talking to me for a few

minutes, he made me feel at home andlike a member of the first team.

I EXPLAINED the capabilities of thetracks to the infantry battalion com-manders in get-acquai~ted talks duringthe next few davs. After thev observedthem in action, i had the job ~f explain-ing ther limitations, as the doughboyscouldn't get enough of them.

On arrival at the division my battalionwas attached to Divarty. 1 further at-tached for operational control only, onebattery to each regimental combat teamand the other battery jointly to grounddefense of the division air strip andground defense of the general supportbattalion of Divarty. This last assignmentserved as sort of a rest cure for the bat-teries with the infantry. 1 rotated thebattery with the air strip and artilleryapproximately once a month to replaceone of the batteries with the infantn., toallow them to perform necessary mainte-nance, train emplacements for evacuatedwounded personnel, and rest. l11e ironyof this situation was that after about aweek of rest, the rested were restless andto a man wanted to "get back to theline."

1 want to compare our method of op-eration with those of the other battalionsin the Korean Theater. First, we are all

aware that our ground support for theinfantry would be far less effective if wewere opposed by armor or direct fire artil-lery. It is further conceded that shouldthe division be attacked from the air thatthe AAA should be fulfilling its primarymission. However, 1 feel that in theabsence of these threats the A\V batteriesshould be attached to the infantry. Inthis belief 1 appear to have little supportfrom most of the AAI\ battalion com-manders in .Korea. There is no doubtthat batteries who operate as part of atrained team full time will be more ef-fective than those who are on a part-timestatus and subject to call. This battalionhas the same personnel with each infan-try battalion 24 hours a day. It is included

10

Sgts. Rufus Gibson and Antonio Garzaof the 21st pose proudly with the QuadLightning name their battalion has

earned in Korea.

in all their planning and is a part of every attack. \Vhat is more important, .our platoons work with the same tank platoons daily. \Ve have found it veryimportant that the tanks and half-trackswork together, often for mutual protec-tion, always for coordination of fi~e withthe attacking or withdrawing infantry.It is apparent that a trained team of thistype which knows exactly what the nextmove of the other members of the team isgoing to be, will be more effective thanone which doesn't work together con-stantly.

Furthermore, the infantry either at-tacks or defends every day and night. \Vhy should the tremendous amount of fire'power represented by 64-M 16s sitback with the artillery idly awaiting at-tack. If an attack against the artillery isto be stopped, why not stop it, or assist instopping it, on the l\IILR, instead of wait-ing for a break-through? During the firstsix months of the Korean war the lineswere not as strongly held as at the timeof the Ridgway limited offensive in Janu-arx, and it was possible, fqr a \vholeNorth Korean company tp,infiltrate.q.ur

lines unobserved, with the mission of destroying our artillery with suicidalattacks. There have been no break-throughs in this division in any strengthsince January. 1 think as this conditionbecame apparent, the employment andcontrol of the AI\A should have changedwith the situation.

\Ve hear the argument advanced by I\AA commanders, "You can't turn 'emover to the infantry, you wouldn't haveany control over them." \Vhy not? \Vhois more capable of planning the part amachine gun plays than the infantry bat-talion commander? The 7\116 is nothino < >more than a mobile base of fire. \\Thenan AAA officer higher than a platoonleader attempts to control his outfit tac-

ticall~' while supporting the infantryhe's throwing a monkey wrench intosmoothly operating machine. If an)should fear that the infantrv commandelmight needlessly expose them, it is b ecause they fail to appreciate the care anprofessional skill of the infantry baualiorcommander.

It is further argued that they can't Ileft with the infantry at night on thmain line of resistance, that thev woulbe overrun. During darkness is ~he timwhen they are needed. Chinese attack nearly always occur at night and an M 1is an ideal weapon for mowing domhuman waves. The AI\A troops have thwill to fight and the means of doing it, anthey should be trained and indoctrinate,for it. Certainly some of them are gointo become casualties, but we can't win

war without casualties. If withdramroutes are properly reconnoitered thershould be little danger of losing a haltrack. This battalion lost five tracks ione night but the number of lives savemore than compensated for this loss.

ON the n ight of 23 April 1951 tmain effort of the first CCF spring offesive hit the 25th Division. The rigregiment withdrew through our Dog batery which laid down withering fire. Ttanks preceded us and in the ensuindu~t and darkness two of our tracks Iethe narrow road. They were under healenemy fire so it was impossible to recovthem. Accordingly they were demilitrized and destroyed by thermite grenadand burning gasoline. On the same nigjand at the same time, the left regimewas hit. The unit on their Rank hgiven way and allowed the CCF to ~

them from three sides. The reserve btalion commander immediatelv formia tank-half track team which blastedway out for an orderly withdrawal. T~battalion commander afterwards remared, "I don't think we would have mait without the ack-ack." \Ve lost thradditional tracks during this action bwhen the yeoman service which thtracks rendered that night is considerfive half tracks was a small price to pfor it.

That's the. tactical side; now for lactics. An A \V SP battalion is not equipto haul gasoline and ammunition at trate which a unit with the infantry u.them. \Ve have fired over 2,000,rounds of caliber .50 ammunition alo

"ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURN


13/60

five months in action in Korea. Yetme battalions are attempting to supplyeir units using only their organic trans-rtation. Instead we have attached 2

Y.!-tontrucks from our ammunition traineach firing battery, as well as a jeepm the inactive AAAIS. The infantry

giment is responsible for the supply of ss I, III, & V supplies and happy to do

Each track carries 12,000 rounds in bed and on the guns, while the in-

ntry regiment holds 100,000 rounds fore battery at the regimental ASP.For those who may think I have lost

mv function as a battalion commanderlet me emphasize that I ha\'e never beenbusier in my life, nor ha\'e I had such asense of having accomplished somethinguseful in an efficient manner. The divi-sion commander has made it very cleMthat although the infantry commanderswill tell my 1\116 units what to do tacti-cally, it is my responsibility to train them

beforehand to do it. Remember. the bat-talion is still under mv control adminis-tratively and for training. It's a full-time

job to check on the manner in whichthese batteries are performing their as-

signed missions. 1 must prepare them forcombat and keep the state of morale anddiscipline such that they are an effectivefighting unit. For the battalion com-mander who wants to lead his men incombat, let him roll up his sleeping bagand spend some time on the line with hisplatoons. I have done it many times, andit helps the morale of the men and en-ables the commander to better under-stand their problems.

\Ve realize that this subject is contro-versial; however, this is our story and weare quite ready to hear the other side.

Supply For The Self-Propelled BattalionBy Capt. Robert E. Eichling

trammg at Fort Bliss had usanning the sky, but in Korea we startedking on the ground, hillsides and inlages for our targets. Our principalget became enemy personnel. To bee to operate efficiently with the tanksd infantrymen we had to readjust ourhicle load. This meant getting rid of

m e of our bulky, unused equipment, making room for other equipment

culiar to our new duty in Korea.We left Fort Bliss with most of thequipment as listed for a divisional typeW (SP) Battalion. We picked up the at the port, or in our staging area in

pan. The battalion commander, Lt.1 .Henry, consulted with the Com-nding General, Japan Logistical Com-

d, Major General Walter vVeible, with ce, EUSAK. As a result wened in our N1l5's and were issuedrty-two more MI6's. \\lith a total of y-four M 16's we had firepower to

are. Still, we had the same cargo capac-. The people who figured out the

O&E for a self-propelled battalionst have tried out the equipment fore, and d~cided th~re was just enoughgo carrymg capaCIty.n Pusan we wangled enough squad

Captain Robert E, Eichling entered the mili.tory service from Arkansas in 1941. He hasserved as 54 of the 21st AAA AW Battalionfor the past two years,

NUARY - FEBRUARY, 1952

tents to house the battalion. But the tentsand stoves had to be transported, andthat required readjustment. On thethree-day march overland to join our di-vision at Chonan, we learned that wecould successfully make longer trips thanwe had ever dreamed of with our typesof vehicles. There we began to learn ina hurry, what our new mission would be.Three of the batteries were attached tothe three ~RCT's for operational control.The fourtn battery provided security forthe medium artillery battalion, and thedivision air strip.

When attached to an RCT (regi-mental combat te~rn), we arranged tohave our units dc;pendent on the regi-ment for Class I, III, and V supplies.

Our ammunition section couldn't oper-ate as a section because of the wide-spread area over which our platoons weredeployed and the tremendous amount of ammunition expended. To compensatefor this, two 2~-ton trucks, driv~rs andassistants were sent to each battery.These vehicles were used to transportsupplies and principally ammunition,from the regimental supply points to ourunits on line. The regimental ASP's hadto carry a much larger supply of caliber.50 ammo in stock, as they were not ac-customed to resupplying so much fire-power. Now that our AAA units are partof the team, their resupply of Class I, III,& V is effected automatically from theregimental supply points.

The battalion supply section furnishesClass II & IV support for all units, andI, III, & V for headquarters and any unitthat is in a temporary reserve status.

Soon after we joined the division, andstarted in with a ground support role, werealized that we had far too much equip-ment. The T /O&E had provided us withequipment that we would never use, andit was taking up valuable cargo space.Our combat vehicles could not supportthe infantry and pull their one-ton trail-ers. The type of terrain over which weoperated plus the lack of room on the]\,ILH precluded this. So, to be able tomove with the tanks and infantry, whichwas constantly, the trailers were parkedat the battery CP's. The battery CP's

were usually located near the headquar-ters of the supported regiment. The bat-tery CP moved as often as regimentmoved, sometimes two or three times aweek. That left twentv trailers for thebattery headquarters to shuttle forwardwith about five towing vehicles. Allequipment not needed for the missionand the unused equipment mentionedbefore were stored in these trailers. Thisshuttle operation proved to be a nuisance;so we turned in our one-ton trailers toreduce the number to five per line bat-tery. That meant that each combat ve-hicle would have to carry the necessaryitems of equipment, clothing and equip-ment for all crew members, and ammu-nition. \\le were mobile.

11


14/60

A CHANGE to the T /O&E helpedus a lot by reducing some items of equip-ment, but we went even further to getdown to bare fighting necessities. Thisequipment was turned in to the appro-priate technical services. i\lany itemsthey were glad to get for other units;other items they had to e\'acuate.

Some of the items turned in were ourdrafting sets for line batteries, demolitionequipment sets, 3.5" rocket launchers,i\l63 AA 1\IG i\lounts and our small de-tachment cooking outfits.

Having operated since early May withthis reduced cargo space and reducedequipment, we feel that we could go intoan antiaircraft mission and still not suf-fer from the loss. We know that we canstill shoot at aerial targets as the battalionfired, a platoon at a time, at aerial targets

on the EUSAK firing range, as did allother AAA units in Korea.

In early September this battalion re-ceived twelve additional M 16's. Thisaqditional allocation was directed byCINCFE to each infantry division. I~our division it has been integrated intoour unit instead of the infantry regi-

ments, as in the other divisions, andhelps us meet the demand for more quadfifties for infantry support.

The battalion commander has justmade arrangements with the divisioncommander to receive an additional six1\116's, making a total of 82 of theseweapons in the battalion. \Ve have alsobeen authorized additional personnel toman them. This additional armamentputs a heavy load on our maintenance

section but we've just finished a technicalsen.iceability inspection of our vehicland are rated at the top of the division.

I might add that our supply sectiohas proven to have an adequate numbeof personnel, as provided by currenT /0, to operate efficiently in our grounsupport role. Part of the ammunition see

tion was sent out to augment the additional transportation requirements of ouline units. The remainder of the ammunition section was used to handle Classand III supplies. All in all, we can sa)the S4 section has "no sweat."

Right now the winter clothing anequipment is being issued which is welahead of last year's schedule. \Ve arset for the winter ahead.

Come what may, the 21st is ready!

Baker Battery Supports The~~Wolfhounds"By Capt. John Popovics

WHEN the 21st AAA AvV Battalion(SP) joined the 25th Division in Koreain January, 1951, the 2nd Platoon of B Battery found itself attached to twobatteries of the 8th FA Battalion in shortorder and deployed in perimeter defense.We didn't stay there long. General Ridg-way, noting our position on an inspectiontour, remarked rather pointedly that webelonged up in the front line with theinfantry. So in even shorter order wefound ourselves with the 3rd Battalion

of the 27th (Wolfhound) Infantry, thenin the vicinity of Osan.The infantry battalion commander

was hesitant in using the quads, as hehadn't had any previous experience inusing them to support his men. I-Iewasn't sure of their capabilities or theirlimitations; so he used them in guardingthe rear CP and assuming rear blockingpositions.

Capta in Popovics , Infantry, entered theservice from Proctor, Vermont in February

1943, and received a battlefield commissionin 1945. Serving with the 21st AAA AW Bn inKorea, he has been awarded a cluster to thePurple Heart and the Silver Star for gallantryin action.

12

D Btry of the 21st finds rough gOingwith half tracks.

The 2nd Platoon of quads came intotheir own on February 5th when the27th Infantry had an objective to take(hill 431) but were pinned down. Airand artillery came to their support but tono avail; the enemy remained dug-in andheld up the advance. The quads werethen called upon to take their positionon a hill 1000 yards from the objective.This was as close as the quads could getand still cover the entire enemv area. I

placed five tracks on the hill which wasactually a razor-backed ridge.

At 0900 hours the "Quad Lightnings"began to fire at the ridge lines and at tar-gets of opportunity. Their fire was soeffective that the battalion commander

said later that there was only one tron the hill (431) that the quads had n

hit. He was so impressed with the firpower of the quads that he used theafter this at every opportunity to rendboth defilading and overhead support Ihis advancing infantrymen.

During the battle when I took a trardown to get more ammo, I found that tterrain was such that I couldn't getback. To this day, I am unable to eplain how we got the tracks on the toof that hill. The positions had been tak during the night and all were dumfounded later as to how the quads hamade the terrific slope to the top.

By 1700 hours the infantry was able 1take their objective. The 2nd Platoohad fired 75,000 rounds of ammoranges from 1000 to 1800 yards. Tquads' firing was so effective that tinfantry captured hill 431 with fecasualties. From here until the HRiver crossing, the 2nd Platoon of Bak Battery was used in aiding task forces .

feeling out and probing enemy strengtThere was a steady advance of U,Forces to the now historic crossing of tHan River. This crossing gave the etire Battalion an opportunity to demstrate the murderous fire power of t

ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURN


15/60

Stc Charles H ..Moudy, mess sergeant or U btry, receives the Bronze Star for Valorfrom Gen. Bradley. Sfc Paul McRoberts, rigbt, received the Bronze Star for the

same action in which he was awarded the Purple Heart.

116's. The 1st Platoon, commanded byt. Bob Morrison, my platoon, the Sec-nd, and the Third Platoon, under Lt.ohn Gronsky, all of Battery B, sup-orted the operation. The briefinghowed that the infantry had to cross thever and a wide flat beach and field.he half tracks went into positions un-er the cover of darkness on the bank of

he river in the opening. The quads andrtillery laid down such a barrage Of firehat it seemed as though the very heav-ns were raining fire on the enemy. At

H hour the artillery ceased and the in-antry pushed off, crossing the river withcover of fire of caliber .50 machine gunullets from the M 16's.

THE part played by Baker Battery of he 21st AAA AW BN CSP), com-

manded by Captain Mike Kaminski, canest be told by the Unit Citation which

was awarded them for their participationn the battle. It reads as follows: Therd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regimentnd Battery B, 21st AAA AW Battalion,ttached:

are cited for outstanding performance of duty andxtraordinary heroism in action against the enemy in

pearheading an amphibious assault across the Honiver in Korea on 7 March 1951. Following an in-

ense artil lery bombardment by friendly forces on

he enemy positions on the other side of the river, theeading elements crossed the river in assault boatsnd moved rapidly and aggressively toward their as-gned objectives. These leading elements were forced

a cross an exposed beachhead of 700 yards, com-letely devoid of any natural cover, which was under

devastating barrage of artillery, mortar, mochine-un and small-arms fire from a well-entrenched andetermined enemy, estimated at regimental strength.he friendly troops pressed the attack with such zealnd unrelenting fury that the enemy after sufleringeavy casualties fled in panic and disorder, abandon.ng large quant it ies of equipment , weapons and am-

munition. Possessed of a high degree of spirit andudacity from this recent victory, the battalion andttached units moved on to the next objectives. Thenemy posit ions were now more formidably and fa-

atically defended, but the hostile forces, unwillinglynd stubbornly, were forced to give ground underhe tremendous onslaught of the battalion and at-ached units. Finally, with resolute persistence andourageous demeanor I the friendly troops succeeded

n battering the hostile regiment until i t could noonger muster an attock and was considered neutral.

zed. The 3d Battalion and attached units, by theireroic deeds , breached the Han River line andpened an avenue for fur ther pursuit of the enemy to

he north. The 3rd Battalion and attached units dis-layed such gallantry, determination and esprit de

orps in accomplishing their missions under extremely

ifficult and hazardous' conditions as to set themport and above other units participating in the cam-

aign. The heroism, audacity and courage exhibitedy the members of these uni ts in denying to the

nemy a vital s trategic vantoge orea ref lect greatredi t on themselves , their organizat ions, and the

military service of the United States."

After the break through at the HanRiver, UN forces advanced against de-ermined enemy fire. The advance at

JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1952

one point slowed to a standstill when theenemy used a railroad tunnel as a roadblock. Here again the quads showedtheir ability to adapt themselves to themethod of support needed. A quad was

backed up the railroad tracks toward thetunnel, firing as it came. In spite of heavy counterfire, the tunnel was clearedby the blistering death spit out by thequad 50's.

Just south of the Imjin River on the3rd of April the UN forces were movingnorth. Lt. Gronsky and I went on a footreconnaissance to plot out a line of ad-vance for our MI6's. We found that theonly way we could give the necessarysupport to the advancing infantrymenwas to place the tracks in front of theMLR. The quads not only were in frontfor the jump off, but also advanced withthe troops until their objective was se-cured. Here the M16's took to highground and stood guard in order that theflanks of the advancing infantry couldcatch up and consolidate the lines.

Of course this wasn't done without re-sistance from the enemy who opened upwith small arms, automatic weapons and

mortar fire. One of the M 16's was lostdue to an enemy mine, and during thefight nine of the 21st men were woundedin action. For this the enemy received40,000 rounds of fire from the quads.Baker Battery was accredited with 200

enemy killed in action and with takingtwo prisoners of war.

Then came the action at the ImjimRiver. Foot reconnaissance was carriedout and a plan of attack was laid on with

the Wolfhound 3rd Battalion officers.The reconnaissance had shown newlydug-in positions of the enemy but nosight of the enemy himself. However,he was there, for when the quads cameout of a draw and rounded the hill theenemy opened up with small arms, auto-matic weapons and mortar fire. Duringthe early part of this encounter Lt. Gron-sky was wounded and evacuated, leavingme in command of two provisional pla-toons of quads.

The battle became so intense that or-ders couldn't be heard on the radios andsome of the radios on the tracks had beenhit by enemy fire and put out of commis-sion. In order to coordinate the move-ments of the vehicles and the fire supportfor the infantry, contact had to be doneby personal means. This led to elevenmore of the 21st AAA men beingwounded.

For "extraordinary bravery" during

this battle, both lieutenants, three ser-geants, three corporals and one Pfc weredecorated by the Infantry.

On the 22nd of April the enemy ap-parently had had enough of beingpushed back, for they attacked with such

13


16/60

fury and in such numbers the UN forceswere forced to give ground. Baker Bat-tery and the 3rd Battalion of the 27thInfantry suddenly found themsekes indanger of being flanked. \Ve executedan orderly, planned withdrawal. To helpstem the tide of battle a company of rangers was called into action to assumeblocking positions along with a platoon

of tanks and the Second Platoon of Baker Batten'. This was done to oiye

, 0

the infantry sufficient time to assume arear blocking position. The hordes fromthe north still came on and rapidly oc-cupied UN positions as they were va-cated. This necessitated the withdrawal

of the rangers who rode on the tanks andwith our platoon as a rear guard as wewithdrew to the south. The.M 16's firedupon the enemy while on the mm'e tothe rear and accounted for fifty to onehundred enemy KIA. By leapfroggingother blocking units a previously pre-pared line was reached. Here the enemygave up any idea of further attack as this

line was too heavilv fortified.The UN Forces dug in and waited for

approximately a month and then struck back. The spearhead of our attack wasthe Doh'in Task Force. This was com-posed of the 3rd Battalion of the Wolf-hounds, the 89th Tank Battalion and our

2nd platoon of Baker Battery. This hardhitting task force kept pushing theenemy back until they again reached the38th parallel. A perimeter defense wasthen set up interlocking the quads, thetanks and the infantry. The defense lineswere set up on the ridge lines and heldfor three days and three nights againstenemy fire and attack. The success of

Task Force Doh'in made it possible forthe 25th Division to establish their i\ILRroughly along the 38th parallel.

The task force was relieved by theBritish, and the 2nd Platoon of BakerBattery, ACK-ACK, went back into re-sef\'e for a well earned rest.

865th AAA AW BATTALIONT I-IE 865th AAA AW Battalion (SP)was activated and trained in Hawaii dur-ing the early part of \Vorld vVar II. Afterseeing action on j'v1akin and SaipanIslands during the \Var, the battalionwas stationed at Kimpo Air Force Basein Korea where it assumed an occupationmission from December 1946 to Septem-ber 1948. During this period the battal-ion was the sole AAA unit in Korea.Occupation duties in Korea included thefurnishing of security guard personnelfor Kimpo Air Force Base and the main-tenance of a mobile reserve force for thecontrol of civil disturbances.

In 1948 the battalion moved to Japan.In ]950, after being brought up tostrength and undergoing an intensivetraining program, the battalion was as-signed to the defense of Misawa AirForce Base.

In July, 1950, B'attery D was detachedto Korea where it was one of the firstarmy units to arrive after the outbreak of hostilities. There under the command of Capt. George VV. Eiseman it was soonemployed in air defense and in ground

14

Lt. Co!. Arthur G. May and MajorJames 1. Smith, Jr.

combat with task forces within the PusanPerimeter. Later it advanced far to thenorth where it was the last Americanunit to withdraw from Pyongyang whenthe Chinese hordes forced United Na-

tions troops to fall back.In the summer of 195] the remainder

of the battalion arrived and is now em-ployed in the air defense of an importantair strip.

Since arriving in Korea the battalion

has not actually engaged any hostile air-craft; however, there have been severalalerts all of which have been duringhours of darkness. The battalion oper-ates several AA type searchlights whichwere secured from the Air Force. Battal-Iion headquarters is established in the olddependent housing area near by. Thehouses had been damaged during. thefighting in this area, but all personnelpitched in and repaired enough of thehouses to make them habitable.

The battalion AAOC was establishedon the base near the vVing tactical C.P.Later both were combined to form an airdefense C.P. The combined C.P. is verydesirable in that it makes it possible forvery close cooperation between the AAAand the Air Force. Se\'eral OP's havebeen established and are tied into theearly warning system for the base. In

several cases gun sections and OP's areattached to neighboring Air Force instal-lations for rations and quarters.

In addidon to the tactical mission theBatteries are actively engaged in a train-ing program.



17/60

SELF PROPELLED BATTALIOIN GROUND SUPPORT

By Cap ta in Ba lla rd B . Small

l'oCluer banallOn commander Maj. Roben H. Johnston inspects posmon of tirry. C.

THE 82nd AAA AW Battalion (SP),nder command of Major Howard A.

Geddis, continues its role with the 2ndDivision. Recently both the M 19 andM16 units have been employed oftenwith tank-infantry task forces in probingttacks against the enemy on highround to our front. In this they haveper~ted in forward positions where they

were subjected to all types of enemyounterfire. However, the missions haveeen executed successfully in all casesnd with minimum casualties.

Along with this activity the battalionmaintains a continual training programlanted particularly to integrate theewly arrived officers and men into theombat teams, and also always to stress

he maintenance of our weapons, motorransportation, and other equipment.The recent increase in enemy air activ-

ty has necessitated much more attentiono the antiaircraft defense. Although .noostile acts were committed within ourrea of protective responsibility, the alertsn the adjacent sectors provided the op-ortunity for the evaluation of our ownlert system. Through practice alerts andumerous actual alerts from other sec-

ors, the battalion has been able totrengthen its own alert system to wheret is capable of providing the requiredntiaircraft protection for divisional ele-

ments. This means not only training forOur own personnel, but also liaison withdjacent sectors, cooperation with Airorce warning services, and improve-

ment in communications.From our experiences during the past

ear we have reached our own conclu-

For material assistance in preparing thisarticle the author is indebted to other officersin the ba tta lion, as fol lows: Major John E.Clark, Executive; Major Roland D. Appleton,53; and Captain Francis J. Cronin, Asst. 53,formerly CO of Battery D.

ANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1952

821ldAAA A \;\1BattaliOIl

sions about the capabilities and limita-tions of our present weapons and someideas on proper tactical employment inground support. They are set forth be-low. They are in some cases in conflictwith accepted doctrine, and are oftenpeculiar to the conditions here in Korea.The comments cannot be defended byreference to any military documents, butare submitted as our sincere convictionsbased on our own experience here.

PATROLLING

Often in Korea, the A\V firing unitshave been used in lieu of tanks or otherarmored vehicles, or they have been usedwith armored patrols interspersed amongthe tanks. AAA units have been calledupon to furnish added fire support totank operations. In Korea, these tasks

have been found to be unsuitable for AAA weapons and are not recom-mended. In placing AAA weapons insituations normally covered by armoredvehicles, the dispa:ity in armor usuallypermits the tanks to receive mortar and

small arms fire with little damage whilethe thin armor and open fighting com-partments of the 1\'116 and MI9 arechoice targets for any type of counterfire.Tanks can button up and push throughgrenades, small arms, mortar and lightautomatic fire, while the AAA vehicle isliable to serious damage from any of these.

In the case of tank-infantry operations,the accompanying infantry can dismountif enemy action makes this advisable.The AAA crew has no choice but to re-main in their exposed position in orderto accomplish their part of the mission.In the event of enemy opposition, thedamage resulting usually is severe andout of proportion to the effect accom-plished by the AAA vehicle's inclusionin the task force. Since most operations

with tanks involve passage throughmined areas, the relative lightness of theM 16 makes it very possible that completedestruction of vehicle and serious in- juries to personnel result upon striking amine. Usually a tank will suffer only

15


18/60


19/60

here infiltrators are active and quicklysperse them. Usually, no special organi-tion was made for this type operation,

ut sections or squads simply dispatchedthe affected area when requested.

AAA units have been effectively used the relief of cut off units before the

nemy had time to get. well organized.M has also been used to interdictpproach avenues used by infiltrators.

oain, the AAA vehicle should have in-ntry support if follow-up and clean-up

f infiltrators is to be accomplished.

SUPPORTING FIRES

Whether with the infantry or the ar-llery, any supporting fires must fallithin the range capabilities of the AAAeapons. Field artillery positions usu-ly prohibit the concurrent use of AAA

n supporting fires, principally becausef the terrain difficulties here in Korea.

With the infantry, the AAA can deliverood support' at distances of 500-1000ards from the ol;>jectives. More targets,ider observation, and more rapid trans-

ers across the objective are available if he AAA unit is sited at such ranges.he shift from target to target is shorter

nd more rapid, and larger areas of thebjective can be covered. Firing at 500-000yards also gives the best dispersiont the target.

ASSAULT OF BUNKERS

The M 16 is negatively effectivegainst the bunkers encountered in Ko-ea. Lucky shots into the embrasures areII that can be expected. Even the M 19hould get within 1000 yards distancerom bunkers to get consistent hits. Toeduce a bunker with 40mm fire, it isecessary to get HE rounds inside and

then not so much to.destroy the bunker,but to drive out the personnel inside.The 40rnm has been used for pinpointfiring into bunkers for this anti-personneleffect, but even at very short ranges, theaperture is a very small target and theend result is usually simply harassing orperhaps a temporary neutralization only.In this respect, the orientation of themachine guns of the 1\'116has been con-

sidered to have some effect on the effec-tiveness of fire at the target, and onseveral occasions where this weapon hasbeen used for firing at bunkers, it hasbeen reoriented on the specific targetwith the hope that all fire be concen-trated at that point. After the roughusage that the gun~ have received here,such fine orientation has not been possi-ble because of the looseness and play inthe mounts. Also, the fact that part of the guns must be out of action at a time

when they might be required, has causedthis to be not recommended as a usualpractice. The results have not been suffi-ciently important to justify its continu-ance.

The superquick fuze of the 40mm HEround causes bursts to be relatively harm-less to the basic bunker structure. The40mm and quadruple .50's are nonethe-less extremely effective against the com-munication trenches and foxholes which

are always a part of the bunker organiza-tion. These can be made unusable so asto isolate bunkers for assault by closerweapons.

RELIEF OF FRONT LINE UNITS

vVhere artillery is being relieved AAAprovides sections for both AAA andground protection during withdrawal,

displacement and moves into new posi-tions. AAA is usually the last weaponsout in retrograde moves.

vVith the infantry AAA can delivercovering fires during relief and set up aseries of defensive points along the routeof withdrawal around which the infan-try can assemble, organize and then con-tinue to the rear. A1\A has been used tosecure the line during relief. For exam-

ple, holding the edges of hill positionswhile the infantry assembles behind thehill; the infantry mortars covering theimmediate front of the hill and assistingin the Rank coverage. 1\1\A can also pro-tect assembly areas and other criticalpoints along the infantry march.

SUMMARY

The reader may be interested to knowthat, to date, the 82nd AAA 1\W Bn(SP) has fired at only one enemy air-plane in Korea. This airplane was shot"up" rather than "down" since it wassurprised on the ground along with 200Chinese troops in January 1951. The82nd's activity has been concerned pri-marily with the ground role. Based uponthis experience, the most serious de-ficiency apparent in current AAA weap-ons, is the lack of armor protection forthe M 16 and M 19, and its relative lack of Rotation in comparison to tanks andother full-tracked vehicles. The devel-opment of some type of weapon with fulltracks and bullet-proof blister turretscapable of the present tracking rates soarranged that visibility is not seriouslyaffected, is the greatest advance whichcould be made in AAA vehicles andmounts which are to be used in divisionalAAA missions.

AAA Association Annual Election

17

With the close of balloting on December 31, the slate of officers nomi-nated to fill vacancies created by expiration of term of office weredeclared elected.

Major General Willard W. Irvine, Commanding General Army Anti-aircraft Command, was elected to replace Major Gene~al Lyman L.Lemnitzer whose two-year term as Vice-President expired at the year'send .. The four members of the Executive Council who were elected to serve

for two-year terms were:Brig. Gen. Robert W. Chrichlow, Jr., R&D Board, Dept. of Defense.

Colonel Norman E. Hartman, Chief AA Sec., Career Management,AGO.

Lt. Colonel Francis X. Bradley, Ass't See'y General Staff, OCSA.Major James E. Calkins, Asst. G1, 8600 ASU.

ANUARY-FEBRUARY,1952


20/60

24th DIVISION AAAB y Corporal John S. Aaron

26th AAA AW Battalion

FOR the first hard-fought months of the Korean campaign the 24th InfantryDivision had only one Antiaircraft bat-tery and this was Battery A, 26th AAAA\V Bn (SP). Speaking now to the fewold timers who remain with the battery,one learns that at first they were aloneand felt alone. The battery learnedcombat the hard way, but it rapidly be-came a seasoned outfit of determinedlighters. It had to.

Under Captain Charles \V. Harrisonthe battery was alerted in Japan on 30] une, 1950, and landed at Pusan on 5July. On 10 July it arrived in Taejon onHat cars to join the division on the battle-field. 1st Lieut. Daniel J. Garvey wasthe executive and ~TOJG Athos W.Brannon, the unit administrator.

The 2nd Platoon, under 2nd Lieuts.Frank S. Mikulski and Douglas W. Bla-lock was left in Taejon to protect thedivision CP and installations. The 1st

Platoon under 1st Lieut. John R. Grimes,with elements attached to both the 21stand 34th Infantry, met the enemy onJuly the 12th west of Songdong-ni. Intheir first ground lighting they were alsostrafed by Yak lighter planes. The menheld up under their first baptism of firein magnificent fashion, but the goingwas rough and getting rougher.

The Kum River defense line wasstarted on 16 July, but the 1st platoonhad to be removed from action with threehalf tracks and other vehicles completelydestroyed. The 2nd platoon was attachedto the 34th Infantry and engaged theenemy on 19 July near Yusong-mya.There they broke into ground combatand also shot down three Yak fighterplanes during the action. The enemy'ssuperior numerical forces cracked the24th Division defense line, however, andthe division was forced to withdraw.Pulling back along the route west of

Taejon, the battery ran into an enemyroadblock where it lost three half-tracks,three trucks, seven men wounded, andnine men missing in action.

Reorganizing at Ahwa-ni, the battery

18

An enemy land mine put this track of DBattery, 26th AAA A \'{T BN out of ac-

tion in October.

was loaded on Hat cars enroute to i\lasan.During the first ten days of August thebatten' was in constant contact with theenemy and suffered the loss of threemore half-~racks. The unit was finally

withdrawn to Kyongsang to pick upmuch needed equipment and replace-ments.

During these early weeks, supply, ad-ministration, and maintenance of vehi-cles was a critical and difficult problem.Repair operation often had to be donewhile the vehicles were in position andunder enemy fire. Every man had a key job and all of them performed heroically.Supply sergeants Charles Greer and An-drew Shimko did an excellent job in ob-taining supplies from whatever sourceswere available at the time. Platoon ser-geants, M/Sgt. Clifford Nelson and Sfc.Fred Jorgensen were constantly in thethick of the fighting encouraging andhelping their men. Sgt. Richard Gunnproved to be a shark in maintaining com-munications by his alertness and deter-mination.

The battery had to perform for itself the normal battalion functions. Accord-

ingly, a battalion headquarters section of six men was operating. M/Sgt. \Valterl\lorehouse was the S3, M/Sgt. GeorgeH. Trout was the S2. Thev were bothconstantly busy reconnoitering and plan-

ning for the frequent movements anmaneuvers so necessary to keep thtenemy off balance. Much of it had to h done at night and all of it with acumetto outsmart the infiltrating guerrillas anenemy snipers.

ON 24 August when the battery hacompleted its reorganization and habeen inspected by Brigadier General HD. Meyer, commanding the 24th lnfantry Division Artillery, the headquartersection was attached to the headquarterof Division Artillery. The 1st Platwas attached to the 13th FA Battalioand the 2nd Platoon to the 52nd FA Batalion. By this time the United Natioforces had withdrawn and formed thNaktong perimeter defense arounPusan with the left Hank at Masan anthe right Hank in the east coast cityPohang. This was a critical period

action and the 24th Infantry Divisiwas used as a maneuver unit to close anpenetration made by the enemy into 0lines. The job of the Battery A was tprotect the field artillery from enemy ifiltrators. The battery moved from potions at Taegu to Pohang to Masawithin a period of twelve days.

The perimeter was successfully dfended against fanatical attacks by tenemy and huge losses were inflictupon him. Then on 15 September, 195the 24th Division in conjunction withe other U. N. forces was able to brethrough and begin an offensive that wto lead part of Battery A to within sigof the Yalu River.

The route north was familiar to tmembers of battery A. Here and ththey spotted some of the old equipmeof their organization with bumper mar'ings still discernible. It was a hapmove northward and morale was hig

Making a number of halts, setting ,perimeter defense, and taking 19 poners during the interval, the batt 'made a triumphant entry into Taejon20 September, 1950.

ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURN


21/60

i\lo\'ing on rapidly, Battery A enteredeoul on 7 October and drove across the8th parallel shortly thereafter. Victoryppeared to be in sight when the batteryntered Kusong, far to the north, on I

No\'ember and saw the broad Yalutretching before it.

This illusion was short-lived, how-ver, as Chinese Communist forces en-ered the war, and a new chapter of the

Korean conflict began. On 26 November,950,the U.N. troops turned their backs

o the Yalu River and the victory thateemed so near as the Chinese Commu-ist Forces struck in overwhelmingtrength.

This withdrawal continued in Korea'sitter winter weather for six weeks untilhe 24th Division had fallen back southf Seoul.

In the Uijongbu sector where Battery

A supported both the 5th and 19th In-antry Sfc Neal M. Morris, Macon,

Georgia, distinguished himself by ex-raordinary heroism and was posthu-

mously awarded the Distinguished Serv-ce Cross. The half-track in his command

was overrun by enemy infiltrators dur-ng the night, and with the driver of theehicle killed he was forced to abandonhe track and withdraw on foot. Reor-anizing his crew, he led them in aounterattack against far superior num-ers. Advancing with his crew memberso within a hundred yards he continuedo proceed alone when the advance wasinned down. He gained the possessionf the vehicle once more only to belown off mortally wounded as a grenade

was thrown directly on the track.

DURING the withdrawal the expan-ion of the divisional antiaircraft to a full

trength 26th AAA A W Battalion begano take shape when Hq and Hq Battery,2nd AAA AW Battalion joined the di-ision in Inchon late in December underommand of Lieut. Col. Roy A. Tate.

Key members of the staff included Cap-ains Robert E. Broomfield, executive;ert Baray, S3; and lvlelvin Johnson,4. It had been activated at Fort Lewis,

Vashington, at reduced strength withersonnel from the II th AAA A\V Bat-alion. Eventually this headquarters unit\'as to be redesignated as Hq and Hq

Battery, 26th AAA A\V Battalion.Meanwhile it received its division code

arne, "Defender," which was promptlydopted as the battalion motto. Battery

ANUARY-FEBRUARY,1952

A, 26th AAA became "Defender Able."

Shortly thereafter Battery A, 21st AAAA\V Battalion under Capt. Dan \\T.Williams joined the Divisional AAA. Itbecame "Defender Baker" and was ear-marked for redesignation as a part of the26th.

J\leanwhile the battalion began tofunction with the two batteries and to

participate in offensive action to thenorth.

Defender Able moved to Sinwang-niwhere its platoons were attached to task forces for close supporting fires. All of the old MI5 and TI9 weapons werereplaced with the M 16's.

As rotation began in April CaptainJohn J. Harvey became the battery com-mander as the battery, moving to thenorth, crossed the 38th parallel for thethird time.

Battery A took up a position and re-mained in Chipo-ri until the morning of 23 April when it was compelled to with-draw. At this time the battery was givingprotection to the 555 FA Battalion and asthe long convoy moved south andthrough a very narrow pass the enemystruck from ambush in regimentalstrength in what many have termed thetoughest roadblock ever encountered.

Zeroed-in mortars knocked out somevehicles with the first round. A direct hiton one M 16 half track injured all of thecrew members except the driver, Cor-poral Thomas Wolset. Wolset sensingthe situation immediately lowered him-self in the gunner's turret and, directingnearby infantrymen to come up and actas cannoneers, he opened fire on theenemy.

During the five hour engagement eachvehicle was under constant small arms,

machine gun, and mortar fire. One of the lead vehicles in the column com-manded by Sergeant Kenneth F. Bunt-ing received two mortar hits woundingtwo crewmen and setting the vehicle onfire. \Vhen ordered to abandon the ve-hicle Sergeant Bunting assisted thewounded to safe ground and then re-turned to get the Caliber .30 machinegun off its tripod, carrying it to a nearbyhill. l\'ianually holding and operatingthe light machine gun without the aidof a tripod he helped repulse the enemyattack on his position. Both SergeantBunting and Corporal \Volset receivedthe Bronze Star lvledal for Valor.

Acting as gunner on the vehicle com-

manded by Bunting was Corporal Eu-gene C. l\'litchell. Firing his individualweapon after the quad caliber .50 turretceased operating, he remained coolly onthe burning vehicle until told to abandonit. Pfc. Franklin D. \Vinev was cannon-eer on the same track and was the thirdmember of the crew to receive the BronzeStar Award. He carried his injured com-rade to safe ground and then repulsedthe attack on his position firing his indi-vidual weapon.

Recipient of the Purple Heart duringthe battle was Corporal John \\T. Yocum,who noted that the gunner on his MI6was injured and trapped in the burningturret. Corporal Yocum freed the in-

jured man receiving painful burns him-self.

I NJune Battery C, 26th AAA AWBattalion was activated in the battle areawith Capt. Thomas E. Kavanaugh incommand. In July the activation of Bat-tery D under Capt. Alvin P. Labsingerbrought the battalion to full strength.Personnel and equipment from existingbatteries were used to form the new bat-teries, and supplemented to equip eachwith sixteen 1\1I6's.

With so many new replacements Colo-nel Tate arranged to give each battery abrief intensive training period. Duringthis all gun crews got target practice bothat aerial targets at Inchon and at groundtargets in the combat area.

Defender Dog received its initial com-bat experience in the IX Corps offensivein October 1951. The newly formed bat-tery fired the staggering amount of

'nearly one million rounds of caliber .50ammunition during this action in whichit gave close support to the 19th Infantry

and protection to the 13th FA Battalion.They

Documents

Anti-Aircraft Journal - Feb 1952