CALIFORNIA’S GAMBLETHE EFFECTS OF INDIAN GAMING ON CRIME RATES

AND LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES FROM 1998-2004

BY

STEPHANIE K. NEIDIG

A junior paper submitted to the Department of Politics

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts

Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey

JANUARY 9, 2007

Indian gaming in California has grown dramatically since 1998 when voters

passed Proposition 5, the Tribal Government Gaming and Economic Self-Sufficiency

Act.

“According to the Los Angeles Times, Indian gambling is now

‘California’s principal growth industry’…Palm Springs and the

Coachella Valley, 120 miles east of L.A., is in the throes of a

mega-resort makeover that will make it another Vegas. San Diego

already has more tribal casinos than any region in the country, and

six more tribes are seeking compacts. Northern California has

experienced similar growth, with tribal casinos increasingly

moving into urban areas via reservation shopping.”1

With the increasing number of casinos comes opposition against them, and many

perceive the social, political, and moral costs to be too high to justify the revenue they

generate. Critics of Indian gaming argue that Indian casinos are a negative influence on

both the state and local communities because they dramatically increase crime rates in the

casino locations and their surrounding area. It is for this reason that opposition groups

claim voters should not be blinded by the potential economic gains of casino

development, but rather should understand the harsh reality that Indian gaming inflicts

more harm than good on the state. Representative Frank Wolf of Virginia articulated this

sentiment in a letter to President Bush in which he warned,

“Casino gambling…is now coming to cities and

even small towns across America and bringing with it all its

social ills, like higher crime and suicide rates, increased

personal bankruptcies, and the breakup of families. In

communities from Connecticut to California, residents are 1 Jan Golab, “Arnold Schwarzenenegger Girds for Indian War” The American Enterprise 15, no. 1 (2004):37.

2

being left with eroding tax bases and increased municipal

and social costs.”2

The claims made by critics of Indian gaming raise the question of whether casinos

are, as they declare, a negative influence on local communities. Specifically, do casinos

really increase the crime rates and “social ills” in the counties in which they are located?

While this argument at first glance appears to be sound in that one could imagine how

casinos could potentially raise crime rates, in actuality there is little evidence to support

this assertion. An analysis of crime rates in California counties both with and without

casinos before and after the rise of gaming to “Nevada-style” scale proves that crime

rates do not increase in counties with casinos. Opponents of Indian gaming urge

communities with casinos to protect themselves against the inevitable vices that they

claim will result with the expansion of gambling. Yet, an analysis of the outcomes of

recent California propositions reveals that communities with casinos are not more likely

to oppose pro Indian gaming legislation, but rather are slightly more supportive of it than

counties without casinos, illustrating that casino communities do not feel especially

damaged by casino growth. Finally, because there is no apparent trend of increased crime

rates in casino counties there is no relationship between crime rates and legislative

outcomes. An analysis of crime rates and then of legislative outcomes will prove that

opponents of California Indian gaming are incorrect in believing that casinos increase

crime rates and breed citizen discontent.

2Indian Gaming in California, Institute of Governmental Studies-University of California http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/htIndianGaming.htm

3

Background Information on Indian Sovereignty and Origins of Indian Casinos

“In the 1980s, if someone said ‘Indian,’ people would think

of a picture of a guy with a tear running down his face,

caring for the environment. If you say Indian now, they

think of casinos.”

-Peter Gass, attorney for Upstate Citizens for

Equality3

Although Indian gaming and the legislation that resulted in its legal justification is

a product of the 1980s, its political framework can be traced back to the 1800s. The

federal government’s persecution of Indians during the 1830s (most notably robbing

them of tribal lands, culture, and self-governing practices) prompted lawmakers to

compensate for the unjust treatment by returning sovereignty status to the Indians. Still,

Indians felt the federal government denied them the federal aid they felt entitled to and

demanded increased financial assistance so that their reservations could cope with the

economic hardships they blamed the federal government for causing in the late 1800s.

The Indian’s response to a lack of federal resources resulted in their first major political

mobilization, the creation of the National Congress of American Indians in 1945, the first

pan-Indian lobbyist organization. From this point in history on Indians had a prominent

voice in national politics. Thus, “these conflicts, while often immobilizing and long lived,

nevertheless galvanized many lethargic reservation communities, as groups and factions

organized themselves for political action in tribal governments.”4

3 Ellen Barry, “Lineage Questions Linger as Gambling Wealth Grows,” Boston Globe, December 12, 2000. 4 George Castile, Taking Charge Native American Self Determination and Federal Indian Policy (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2006), 12.

4

It was during the 1960s, the culture of the civil rights movement and Lyndon

Johnson’s Great Society Programs, that Indians finally began to achieve lasting progress

and the framework was established to obtain the political rights they wanted most, federal

funding without federal control, thus complete self-determination. After much debate and

the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, in 1975 Congress passed the

Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, signed into law by President

Gerald Ford. It was “an act to provide maximum Indian participation in the Government

and education of Indian people that declared the establishment of a meaningful Indian

self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from federal domination

of programs for and services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the

Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and

services.”5

“The courts have long held that Indians have the right

under the Constitution to govern ourselves. But having that

right without adequate economic resources is a hollow

dream.”

-Anthony R. Pico, chair of the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay

Indians6

Although in this stage in the history of Indian legislation it appeared that the

Indians had won the battle against the federal government in gaining self-determination,

hardship followed because with this independence came the need for economic self

sufficiency, something the Indians both at that time and in the past had great difficulty

5 Castile, 16. 6 John M. Broder, “More Slot Machines for Tribes, and $1 billion for California,” New York Times, June 22, 2004.

5

achieving. A few tribes attempted to combat the poverty on their reservations by opening

small-scale card clubs and bingo halls. This venture quickly gained popularity with

hundreds of tribes and soon Indians united in the belief that the easiest and most

profitable way of increasing tribal revenue and achieve economic self sufficiency would

be to dramatically create and expand gaming venues and aggressively market them to the

general public. As sites increased in both size and quantity state lawmakers objected to

the development of these “gaming halls” in states with laws that prohibited gambling.

This resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court case California v. Cabazon Band of Mission

Indians which formally acknowledged tribes’ sovereign right to manage gaming

establishments. The Court determined that, because of the rights Indians held under the

conditions of tribal sovereignty, states did not have the authority to regulate tribal

gaming.

This victory caused great paranoia and fear of rapid unregulated casino-type

gambling throughout all states with Indian reservations. Central to this concern was the

question of the state’s role in Indian affairs, and a balance had to be obtained between

Indian sovereignty and the state’s powers and jurisdiction in relation to Indian lands and

reservations. The end result, Congress’ reaction to the great victory Indians achieved

from California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, was the Indian Gaming Regulatory

Act (IGRA) of 1988. This legislation formed a “political compromise between state and

non-Indian gaming interests in controlling the spread of gambling on the one hand, and

tribal and federal interests in effectuating reservation economic development on the

other.”7 Under this law Indian gaming was now subjected to the regulation of three

7 Kathryn R.L. Rand and Steven Andrew Light, Indian Gaming Law and Policy (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 7.

6

distinct groups: a federal independent regulatory agency designated especially for Indian

gaming, states, and tribes. The premise of this relationship is “’tribal-state compacts,’ in

which a state and tribe would negotiate the regulatory structure for casino-style gaming

on the tribe’s reservation.”8 The other important component of the IGRA was its

classification of three different types of gaming: Class I, or communal or traditional tribal

games; Class II, or bingo and comparable games; and Class III, or casino-style games.

This complex relationship has resulted in both states and tribes constantly challenging the

constitutionality of the law, producing never-ending state specific revisions and additions

of further complexities. California has arguably been a state in which the majority of this

conflict has occurred. A discussion of California’s most significant Indian gaming

propositions will illustrate that the tug of war between tribes and opponents of Indian

gaming is a constant process and is far from completion.

Analysis of California Indian Gaming Legislation from 1998-2004

“[The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] was a fragile

compromise, at that time, and is still a fragile

compromise.”9

-U.S. senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.)

California tribes qualified Proposition 5, the “Tribal Government Gaming and

Economic Self-Sufficiency Act of 1998 ” for the November 1998 ballot as a response to

Governor Wilson’s negotiations with tribes in which he strictly controlled the type and

scale of gaming in Indian casinos in order to limit their operations, most specifically 8 Steven Andrew Light and Kathryn R.L Rand, Indian Gaming and Tribal Sovereignty: The Casino Compromise (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 43. 9 Harry Reid, Commentary, “The Indian Gaming Act and the Political Process,” in William R. Eadington, ed., Indian Gaming and the Law, 2d ed. (Reno: Institute for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming, 1998), 19.

7

restrict the number of slot machines and casino expansion. The initiative passed (with

62.4% of the vote) and required the governor to approve any tribal casino proposals,

placed no limits on the number of casinos or their operations and facilities, lowered the

gambling age to 18, and officially declared the tribal casinos to be self-regulated and

exempt from state or local control. 10

Proposition 5 is undeniably the most important Indian gaming initiative in

California’s history because it called for the legalization of the transformation of the

industry from small scale ventures to extremely profitable corporation style gaming

facilities. While Proposition 5 was important in that it significantly increased the scope of

Indian gaming, it was also revolutionary because the campaign to qualify and pass it was

the most expensive in California’s history, costing an estimated $90 million. In addition,

during this election Indians “spent another $5 million backing political candidates

including Governor Gray Davis, Attorney General Bill Lockyer, and Assemblyman Tony

Cardenas, who became chair of the Assembly Budget Committee.”11 But, despite this,

the California Supreme Count repealed Proposition 5 on August 24, 1999 on the basis

that the proposition violated the 1984 state Lottery Act, which banned casino-style

gambling in California. Although Proposition 5 was overturned less than a year after

California voters passed it, it is of great importance to California’s history of Indian

gaming and the future conflicts over the industry because it was at this point in time that

the dispute became subjected to increased controversy and debate amongst both

increasingly passionate supporters as well as opposition groups.

10 Proposition 5, League of Women Voters of California Education Fund http://www.smartvoter.org/1998nov/ca/state/prop/5/ 11 Indian Gaming in California, Institute of Governmental Studies-University of California http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/htIndianGaming.htm

8

The next important initiative that increased the Indian’s gaming operations and

further amplified the California casino debate was Proposition 1A, an initiative on the

March 7, 2000 ballot that was approved by 64.4% of the vote. As a result of the repealed

Proposition 5 Governor Gray Davis negotiated new tribal-state compacts that were

contingent on the passage of 1A. These compacts, and thus the voter’s support of the

initiative, allowed the expansion of gaming practices to include the operation of slot

machines, lottery games, and other casino-like gaming. Proposition 1A resulted in the

expansion of California gaming, permanently legalizing the creation of extremely

profitable corporation style gaming facilities.

As casinos multiplied and revenues soared so too did their opposition. As the

industry grew Californians became increasingly cynical about the Indian’s actions and

believed that their casinos should contribute more of their revenue to the state to aid

California with its massive budgetary crisis. Especially concerned were non-Indian

California card clubs and racetracks who believed it was unfair that Indians were not only

allowed to operate casinos which housed slot machines and other games they were

prohibited from operating, but also that in addition to having these perks their casinos had

significantly lower tax rates. As a result, eleven prominent card clubs and five racetracks

qualified an initiative for the November 2004 ballot, Proposition 68 the “Gambling

Revenue Act of 2004” which, if it passed, would have required the tribes to pay 25% of

their net slot machine revenue to the state. Refusal to do this would result in the

racetracks and card clubs being allowed to operate slot machines.

To combat this measure California tribes qualified an opposing measure,

Proposition 70, the “Indian Gaming Fair-Share Revenue Act of 2004.” With this initiative

9

the Indians proposed that they would instead pay 8.84% a year in taxes and, by doing

this, California would in turn eliminate all restrictions on the gaming venues tribes could

opperate at their casinos. Governor Schwarzenegger disagreed with both measures and

proposed an alternative that would ensure Indians the exclusive right to casino-style

gambling yet require the tribes to make a payment of $1 billion to the state. He also

agreed to raise the limit on the number of slot machines a tribe could operate if Indians

agreed to pay a higher tax rate. Finally, under Schwarzenegger’s proposed compacts

tribes must agree to uphold a variety of labor, environmental and building safety

conditions. Voters rejected both Proposition 68 and 70, and they received only 16.2% and

23.7% of the vote. In the end, the state legislature approved Governor Schwarzenegger’s

proposed alternative compact.

Arguments against Indian Gaming

Indian gaming’s opposition bases their argument largely on the conclusion that

casinos corrupt local communities because of the immoral nature of gambling. They

believe potential vices include: personal bankruptcy, the break up of families,

pathological gambling and, of greatest concern to them, the increase of crime rates that

result. The opposition’s perception of casinos is that,

“there is a strong tendency of casinos to be associated with

lawbreaking and political corruption, and with infiltration

by organized crime…increased lawbreaking takes place

even with legal casinos because the need of some

customers for gambling money to stay ‘in action’ will lead

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to theft, embezzlement, or other illegal activities, as well as

create markets for loan-sharking…”12

Jerome Skolnick, in his book House of Cards: The Legalization and Control of Casino

Gambling observed that people are against gaming largely because the industry is

stigmatized as a ‘pariah’ industry’ “…it was the leper of industries-in its legalized form it

was to be quarantined geographically, isolated from population centers to restrict access

and thus contain the social contagion…[kept] on the periphery of society.”13 This

description explains the basis of the attitudes against casinos and the general assumption

of its opposition that gaming is responsible for an increase of all types of crime and vice.

Also articulated is the conclusion that communities deem casinos undesirable businesses

and are critical of their presence because of the possible negative consequences that can

result.

The opposition argues that crime is the end result of Indian casino development

because, when the ventures are not as successful as anticipated, communities experience

more devastation than productive advancements. These controversies and reason for

casinos’ negative impacts include: disputes between Indians and non-Indians who are

jealous of Native American successes, crooked outsiders managing the casinos,

disagreement over whether gaming is economically beneficial, and disputes over issues

12 William Eadington, “Casino Gaming-Origins, Trends, and Impacts,” in Klaus Meyer-Arendt and Rudi Hartmann, (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York:Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), 10. 13 Charles Stansfield, “From East Coast Monopoly to Destination Report: The Geographic Context of Atlantic City’s Transformation,” in Klaus Meyer-Arendt and Rudi Hartmann, (eds.) (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), 42.

11

of political sovereignty.14 Opponents of Indian gaming claim that Indians are incapable

of operating casinos and that government regulations and laws are too lenient and fail to

protect consumers, thus harming locals and their communities. James Davis and Samuel

Otterstrom discuss the potential flaws of Indian gaming in their article Growth of Indian

Gaming in the United States,

“Most tribes also lack the expertise necessary to operate

casinos. Few individuals living on the reservations have the

education or skills necessary to establish and operate a

large gambling enterprise…many tribes have been forced

to hire management companies to run the day-to-day

gaming operations. These firms are paid a percentage of the

revenues, which further reduces tribal income.”15

Compounded with this alleged ineptitude is the fact that, even if Indians sought the

proper training and business practices necessary to establish themselves legitimately in

the gaming industry, they are not held under a federal obligation to comply with state

regulations. Because state and local laws do not apply on Indian lands, the jobs casinos

create are not expected to meet minimum state standards and thus the only jobs casinos

create are undesirable “low wage, high turnover positions” that makes the industry a

social burden on local communities.16 This claim serves as a rebuttal to gaming

supporters’ argument that casinos are a positive influence because of the economic

booms and job creation that results. The opposition instead identifies that these promised

14 James Davis and Samuel Otterstrom, “Growth of Indian Gaming in the United States,” in Klaus Meyer-Arendt and Rudi Hartmann, (eds.) (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), 51. 15Davis and Otterstrom, 62. 16 Don Baur, Jena Maclean and Guy Martin, “The Impact of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on Gambling in the United States and the Role for State and Local Governments” Perkins Coie LLP, (13 Oct. 2003): 10.

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“favorable economic conditions” actually cause more of a loss than a gain because

increased poverty conditions result in rising crime rates. Thus, they counter that not only

do the casinos and gambling alone bring more crime, but the effects are multiplied when

one factors in the negative economic impacts on locals. This aspect of the industry and

the Indian’s perceived management difficulties serve as proof to the opposition that tribal

casinos are a bad influence on locals. They explain that this lack of government control

gives tribes and its casino managers the ability to turn every small town community into a

Las Vegas style operation. It is for this reason that opponents warn locals to become

fearful that their neighborhoods will become, just as Las Vegas has, Sin City. When

deploying this tactical argument opposition groups easily convert citizens’ pity for

Indians and their economic troubles into hate of greedy corporation who infect

communities with crime as a consequence of turning a profit.

Arguments in Support of Indian Gaming

Supporters of Indian gaming counter the opposition’s arguments and defend the

industry by both citing the potential positives of casino development as well as the many

misconceptions and flaws in the opposition’s claims. First, they explain how necessary

gaming is to impoverished tribes and argue,

“This growth has also created tremendous economic

opportunities for those positioned to take advantage of the

changes in the legal status of gambling…some Indian tribes

moved from poverty to unbelievable wealth with their

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gaming operations, whereas many others achieved a

comfortable level of economic performance.”17

Advocates of Indian gaming and Indian rights cite the dismal statistics that

Indians living on reservations “…have by far the lowest education levels, lowest

incomes, highest unemployment rates, highest poverty rates, and lowest life expectancy

of any other group in the United States.” 18 It is for this reason, they advocate, that the

United States government owes it to the Indians to let them work in an industry that will

not only help the tribes and a race of people historically marginalized by the federal

government, but will also benefit local communities and non-reservation inhabitants as

well. Most often these supporters use the most successful Indian gaming operation,

Foxwoods Resort Casino, founded by the Mashantucket Pequot Indians in Ledyard,

Connecticut, as an example to prove the immense benefits casinos offer local

communities. The “spending by casino employees within the region has provided a

stimulus to the local economy. Every new Foxwoods job supports an additional 1.107

additional noncasino jobs…”19 In citing this evidence they disagree with the opposition’s

claims and instead determine that locals do in fact want casinos in their communities

because not only is it a way to help Indians, but the industry growth helps all citizens.

Indian gaming’s supporters counter the opposition’s claim that casinos increase

crime rates by identifying that,

17 William Eadington, “Casino Management in the 1990s: Concepts and Challenges,” in Klaus Meyer-Arendt and Rudi Hartmann, (eds.) (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), 17. 18 Davis and Otterstrom, 54. 19 Barbara Carmichael, “Foxwoods Resort Casino, Connecticut- A Mega-Attraction: Who Wants It? Who Benefits?,” in Klaus Meyer-Arendt and Rudi Hartmann, (eds.) (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), 70.

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‘There has been political corruption and organized crime

linked to casino gaming in the past…however, such

activities are more common in environments where casinos

are prohibited or unregulated than where they are permitted

and where serious regulation is in place…as legal casinos

have become more accepted and more common, and as

regulation has become more professional, opportunities for

corruption and for organized crime have diminished.”20

It is their opinion that communities are increasingly supportive of Indian gaming because

they are beginning to understand the benefits they gain as a result of their presence.

Gambling “in the past 30 years has moved from a sinful activity indulged by a behavioral

minority to a mainstream participatory activity”21 and supporters assert that, what they

refer to as a moral backlash, has receded with the growth of Indian gaming and it is there

conclusion that as people are increasingly exposed to gaming they will become

progressively more supportive of the industry and the Indian’s livelihood.

Methodology and Findings

The debate over the potential benefits and costs of Indian gaming raises the

inevitable question of which side is correct. Is the opposition correct that crime rates

increase and as a result citizens are against the development of Indian casinos in their

communities? Or, are the supporters of Indian gaming correct in claiming that crime rates

do not increase and that communities benefit so greatly from casino development that

20 Eadington, 11. 21 William Eadington, “Public policy considerations and challenges and the spread of commercial gambling” in William Eadington and J. Cornelius (eds.) Gambling and public policy: International perspectives (Reno: Institute for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming, 1991), 3.

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counties with casinos are more likely to be supportive of the industry? The analysis

below of crime rates and Indian gaming legislation outcomes tests the validity of the two

sides’ claims and ultimately disproves the argument that the casinos increase crime rates

and are unpopular with local residents.

To calculate the crime rates in California counties uniform crime reports from

1994 to 2004 were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social

Research (ICPSR) database. Each dataset had detailed arrest and offense numbers

grouped by type of crime for each county. The crime report was then refined to only

include arrest and offense data specific to casino related incidents. Specifically, the type

of crimes which were used to compose the refined number of crimes per county per year

were: aggravated assaults, other assaults, fraud, embezzlement, stolen property,

vandalism, prostitution and commercial vices, sex offenses, drug abuse violations, drug

abuse sale and manufacturing, opium/cocaine sale and manufacturing, marijuana sale and

manufacturing, synthetic drug sale and manufacturing, drug possession, opium/cocaine

possession, marijuana possession, synthetic narcotics possession, other drug possession,

gambling, bookmaking, horse and sport crimes, numbers and lottery, all other gambling

offenses, driving under the influence, liquor law violations, drunkenness, disorderly

conduct, vagrancy, suspicion and curfew/ loitering violations. After pairing down the

crime reports to include only crimes relevant to casinos the per capita rate was calculated

using population estimates obtained from the United States Census Bureau. The crime

rates per capita from 1994 to 2004 were divided in two categories, counties with casinos

and counties without casinos, and then graphed accordingly in Figure 1.

16

CASINO VS. NO CASINO CRIME RATES

0

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

YEAR

CR

IME

PER

CA

PITA

COUNTIES WITHOUTCASINOS

COUNTIES WITH CASINOS

Figure 1: A comparison of crime rates per capita in counties with and without casinos

from 1994-2004.

Central to the argument against Indian gaming is the claim that casinos increase

crime rates in the counties in which they are located. Opponents of California gaming cite

specifically that the passage of Proposition 5 in 1998 and then Proposition 1A in 2000,

and the Nevada-style gaming that resulted, marked a peak in crime rates for counties that

have casinos. To the contrary, Figure 1 illustrates that instead crime rates in counties with

and without casinos stayed fairly constant with each other and that there actually was not

a peak in crime rates in counties with casinos. Figure 1 shows that crimes rates actually

decreased from 1998 to 2002, the height of casino expansion. Also important to note is

the fact that crime rates for counties with casinos were higher even before the expansion

of gaming from 1998 to 2000. When opposition groups claim that the crime rates are

higher in counties with casinos than those without them it is evident that, if they

examined crime rates before 1998, they would realize that this is in fact not the case

because, as the graph depicts, the rates were higher to begin with. Thus, it can be

17

concluded that the expansion of casino operations from 1998 to 2000 did not have a

significant effect on county crime rates.

Of greatest importance when assessing the public opinion of Indian gaming is an

examination of legislative outcomes. The percentage of the vote in support of the three

propositions, Propositions 5, 1A, and 70, was obtained from the California Secretary of

State’s election results webpage. Similarly to the crime rate analysis, this information was

divided in two categories, counties with casinos and counties without them, and then

graphed accordingly in order to determine: how counties without casinos opinion of

Indian gaming changed, how the counties with casinos opinion of Indian gaming

changed, and the degree of difference in opinion between the two groups.

% OF VOTE CAST IN SUPPORT OF INDIAN GAMING

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

COUNTIES WITHOUTCASINOS

COUNTIES WITHCASINOS

COUNTY ATTITUDE

% O

F VO

TE F

OR

PR

O

1998 PROP 5

2000 PROP 1A

2004 PROP 70

Figure 2: A graph displaying the percentage of the vote cast in support of Indian gaming

from 1998-2004 in counties with and without casinos.

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% OF VOTE CAST IN SUPPORT OF INDIAN GAMING

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1998 PROP 5 2000 PROP 1A 2004 PROP 70

LEGISLATION (1998-2004)

% O

F VO

TE C

AST

FO

R P

RO

COUNTIES WITHOUTCASINOS

COUNTIES WITHCASINOS

Figure 3: Also a graph of the percentage of the vote cast in support of Indian gaming

from 1998-2004 in counties with and without casinos. Note: The information in this

graph is the same as in Figure 2, but is displayed differently.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that, although there was not a significant difference in

opinion in counties without casinos versus counties with casinos, counties with casinos

were slightly more supportive of pro Indian gaming legislation than counties without

casinos. This difference is very slight and is not great enough to conclude that counties

with and without casinos have a considerably different opinion of Indian gaming.

Instead, it is evident that the percentage of the vote is fairly uniform between the two

different sets of counties. Also important to recognize is the distribution of the different

propositions, specifically that Proposition 1A in 2000 was the most popular, next was

Proposition 5 in 1998, and lastly was Proposition 70 in 2004 which, unlike 5 and 1A did

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not pass and received only 23.7% of the vote in its favor.22 The distribution fails to show

the presence of a public opinion trend from 1998 to 2004. Once can conclude, though,

that given the increased support for Proposition 1A in relation to Proposition 5, it is

evident that the majority of their public disagreed with the California state legislature

when it overturned Proposition 5 in 1999 and by and large supported the Indian’s

aspirations to increase the scope and scale of their gaming operations.

It is difficult to conclude definitively why there was such a sizeable drop in

support of the expansion of gaming and the resulting defeat of Proposition 70 in 2004.

The absence of state initiatives after 2004 makes it difficult to be certain if the public

opinion of Indian gaming is becoming increasingly negative, or if that particular

proposition was especially controversial and, for whatever reason, extremely unpopular

with voters. The drop in public support can largely be explained when one considers the

contentious and chaotic circumstance surrounding the 2004 election. Unlike other

elections in which voters had the choice of voting either in favor or against a single

proposition, in 2004 there were three different alternatives. One of these options was

another proposition, Proposition 68 or the “Gaming Revenue Act” which threatened the

Indian’s gaming monopoly and proposed that the state tax Indians more heavily, and the

other was a heavily advertised campaign lead by Governor Schwarzenenegger in which

he urged voters to reject both propositions and instead allow him to enter separate

compacts with the Indians and strike a compromise between the two initiatives. This

complex situation surrounding the election can easily explain the large drop of support

for the pro Indian gaming legislation in 2004 and inability to determine whether the lack

22Proposition 68 , League of Women Voters of California Education Fund http://www.smartvoter.org/2004/11/02/ca/state/prop/68/

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of support of Proposition 70 was a reflection of the voters’ negative opinion of Indian

gaming or actually the result of divided support of the three different alternatives.

Lack of Correlation between Crime Rates and Legislative Outcomes

Because of the absence of apparent significant trends in either crime rates or

legislative outcomes, it comes as no surprise that there is no clear, detectible relationship

between crime rates and legislative outcomes.

CHANGE IN CRIME RATES IN RELATION TO CHANGE IN % OF VOTE FOR GAMING

2004 Prop 68

2000 Prop 1A

1998 Prop 5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0.045 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.05 0.051

CRIME RATE PER CAPITA

% O

F V

OTE

Propositions

Figure 4: A graph of crime rates in comparison with percent of the vote for Indian

gaming propositions from 1998 to 2004.

Figure 4 illustrates the absence of a relationship, depicting what appears to be

nothing more than a random scatter of points which form a jagged line. It is interesting to

note that the percentage of the vote has much more extreme variation than the crime rates

do. This can be explained by the nature of the two different variables. One expects crime

rates to remain relatively consistent from year to year whereas it seems natural for there

to be more fluctuation in relation to legislative outcomes because, while every

proposition is similar in that it is related to the expansion of Indian gaming, there is more

21

room for variation. Some examples of this variation include: wording of the propositions,

political climate, state of the economy, amount of money Indians spend to lobby

politicians, and countless other possible lurking factors.

Supporting Evidence from a Similar Study

In their report, The National Evidence on the Socioeconomic Impacts of American

Indian Gaming on Non-Indian Communities, Jonathan Taylor, Matthew Krepps, and

Patrick Wang sampled 100 communities across the United States to determine the

socioeconomic circumstances of communities with and without Indian gaming. Their

findings support the above conclusions, and thus Indian gaming supporter’s claims, that

local communities are not against pro Indian gaming legislation (and are actually slightly

more supportive of it) and that casino expansion does not increase crime rates. Their

statistical analysis showed no evidence of negative economic or social impacts due to

Indian casino introduction based upon the 30 measures of economic and social conditions

they used to evaluate their data. From their examination of county crime rates they found

that Indian casinos in more rural and depressed communities have a net positive impact

on their surroundings and are not, as their opposition claims, a great socioeconomic

burden.

Instead, “Gross incomes rise and certain crime rates fall

when Indian casinos are introduced near non-Indian

communities…no detectable increase in social pathology is

visible…Thus, this evidence would tend to allay the policy

concern that, while Indian gaming may be a boom to tribes,

it could come at the expense of the surrounding

communities. Indeed, it suggests exactly the opposite, i.e.,

22

that Indian gaming is not only a development tool that

poorer-than-average tribes have used to pull ahead in their

cohort, it is a tool of development by which tribes have

improved the economic lot of their non-Indian neighbors as

well.”23

These findings support the above analysis of California crime rates and legislative

outcomes and the conclusion that there is no apparent relationship between casino

growth, increased crime, and public disapproval of Indian gaming. It is for this reason

that Indian gaming opposition’s claim that Indian casinos are a detriment to communities

is false.

Conclusion

Indians often refer to tribal casinos as their “New Buffalo”24 and believe that, as

the buffalo provided the basic sustenance necessary for their tribe’s survival in the past,

the Indian’s future depends greatly on their gaming industry. Since the 1800s Indians

have been engaged in a constant battle with the federal government. Throughout history

they have yearned for the basic right of sustainability, first in the 1830s when their tribal

lands were taken from them and now in the modern era when defending their casino

industry and the economic relief it provides impoverished reservation communities.

While their right to operate casinos has provoked great debate and increased scrutiny of

their industry, the growth of tribal gaming proves that little can or has been done to

23 Matthew Krepps, Jonathan Taylor and Patrick Wang, “The National Evidence on the Socioeconomic Impacts of American Indian Gaming on Non-Indian Communities” Lexecon (2000): 30. 24 Donald Berg, “The New Buffalo: Tribal Casino Expansion in the Dakotas,” in Klaus Meyer-Arendt and Rudi Hartmann, (eds.) (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York:Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), 76.

23

challenge their sovereign status. Indian gaming’s opposition is great, but their central

argument, that Indian casinos increase crime rates and breed civil discontent, is not valid.

The vast increase of the size and scale of Indian gaming compounded with the

inability of its opposition to identify a sound, viable argument, has transformed the

American Indians from a group of marginalized nomads into one of the most powerful

racial group in the United States. As Jan Golab describes the political climate in

California, “the wild rise of Indian gambling has turned a relatively tiny number of

individuals into millionaires, political rainmakers, and ‘sovereign nation’ moguls

untouchable by everyday law.”25 With casino expansion, revenues soaring to over $5

billion per year, and lobbying costs higher than ever, it is clear that gaming is in fact the

Indian’s “New Buffalo” in all ways but one; until its opposition can vastly improve its

arguments and gather convincing evidence, unlike the buffalo, Indian gaming will not be

threatened by extinction.

25 Golab, 37.

24

Works Cited

Barry, Ellen. “Lineage Questions Linger as Gambling Wealth Grows,” Boston Globe, ggggggDecember 12, 2000. Baur, Don, Maclean, Jena and Martin, Guy. The Impact of the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act on Gambling in the United States and the Role for State and Local Governments. 68th Annual Conference International Municipal Lawyers' Association, 13 Oct. 2003, Perkins Coie LLP. Washington: Perkins Coie LLP, 2003.

Berg, Donald. “The New Buffalo: Tribal Casino Expansion in the Dakotas,” in Meyer-gggggArendt, Klaus and Hartmann, Rudi. (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, gggggTrends, and Impacts (New York:Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998). Broder, John M. “More Slot Machines for Tribes, and $1 billion for California,” New gggggYork Times, June 22, 2004. Carmichael, Barbara. “Foxwoods Resort Casino, Connecticut- A Mega-Attraction: Who gggggWants It? Who Benefits?,” in Meyer-Arendt, Klaus and Hartmann, Rudi. (eds.) gggggCasino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York:Cognizant gggggCommunication Corporation, 1998). Castile, George P. Taking Charge Native American Self-Determination and Federal

Indian Policy, 1975-1993. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2006. Davis, James and Otterstrom, Samuel. “Growth of Indian Gaming in the United States,” ggggggin Meyer-Arendt, Klaus and Hartmann, Rudi (eds.) Casino Gambling in gggggAmerica: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York:Cognizant Communication gggggCorporation, 1998). Eadington, William. “Casino Gaming-Origins, Trends, and Impacts,” in Meyer-Arendt, gggggKlaus and Hartmann, Rudi. (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, gggggand Impacts (New York:Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998). Eadington, William. “Casino Management in the 1990s: Concepts and Challenges,” in gggggMeyer-Arendt, Klaus and Hartmann, Rudi. (eds.) Casino Gambling in gggggAmerica: Origins, Trends, and Impacts (New York:Cognizant Communication gggggCorporation, 1998). Eadington, William. “Public policy considerations and challenges and the spread of gggggcommercial gambling” in Eadington, William and Cornelius, J. (eds.) Gambling

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gggggand public policy: International perspectives (Reno: Institute for the Study of gggggGambling and Commercial Gaming, 1991). Golab, Jan. "Arnold Schwarzenenegger Girds for Indian War." The American Enterprise

15 (2004). Krepps, Matthew B., Taylor, Jonathan B. and Wang, Patrick. "The National Evidence on

the Socioeconomic Impacts of American Indian Gaming on Non-Indian Communities." Lexecon (2000).

Light, Steven A., and Rand, Kathryn R.. Tribal Gaming and Indian Sovereignty the

Casino Compromise. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. Rand, Kathryn R., and Light, Steven A. Indian Gaming Law and Policy. Durham:

Carolina Academic Press, 2006. Reid, Harry. Commentary, “The Indian Gaming Act and the Political Process,” in ggggggEadington, William R. ed., Indian Gaming and the Law, 2d ed. (Reno: Institute ggggggfor the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming, 1998). Stansfield, Charles. “From East Coast Monopoly to Destination Report: The Geographic ggggggContext of Atlantic City’s Transformation,” in Meyer-Arendt, Klaus and ggggggHartmann, Rudi. (eds.) Casino Gambling in America: Origins, Trends, and ggggggImpacts (New York:Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998).

Indian Gaming in California, Institute of Governmental Studies-University of

California http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/htIndianGaming.htm Proposition 5, League of Women Voters of California Education Fund

http://www.smartvoter.org/1998nov/ca/state/prop/5/

Other Sources:

Anderson, Terry L., Benson, Bruce L. and Flanagan, Thomas E. eds. Self-

Determination the Other Path for Native Americans. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2006. Fromson, Brett D. Hitting the Jackpot the Inside Story of the Richest Indian Tribe in

History. New York: Atlantic Monthly P, 2003. Gonzales, Angela. "Gaming and Displacement: Winners and Losers in American Indian

Casino Development." UNESCO (Published by Blackwell Publishing) (2003): 123-133.

26

Kamper, David, and Mullis, Angela. eds. Indian Gaming: Who Wins? Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2000.

Meister, Alan. Indian Gaming Industry Report. Newton: Casino City P, 2005. Meyer-Arendt, Klaus, and Hartmann, Rudi. eds. Casino Gambling in America: Origins,

Trends, and Impacts. New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998. Napoli, Maria. "Native Wellness for the New Millennium: the Impact of Gaming."

Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 1 (2002). Pombo, Richard, et al., United States. Cong. House. Discussion Draft Bill Regarding

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Simmons, Charlene W. California. Assistant Director. California Research Bureau.

Gambling in the Golden State 1998 Forward. Sacramento: California Research Bureau, 2006.

Tribal Casinos and Their Impacts on a California Community. Research Department of ggggggThe Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union. Los Angeles: ggggggHotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, 2003. 1-25. Crime Reports: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING ggggggPROGRAM DATA [UNITED STATES]: COUNTY-LEVEL DETAILED ggggggARREST AND OFFENSE DATA, 1994-2004 [Computer file]. 3rd ICPSR ed. ggggggAnn Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research gggggg[producer and distributor], 2005. Population Estimates: Table CO-EST2001-12-06 - Time Series of California Intercensal Population Estimates gggggggby County: April 1, 1990 to April 1, 2000 Source: Population Division, U.S. gggggggCensus Bureau Release Date: April 17, 2002. Table CO-EST2001-12-06 - Time Series of California Intercensal Population Estimates gggggggby County: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2004 (CO-EST2004-01-06) Source: gggggggPopulation Division, U.S. Census Bureau Release Date: April 14, 2005. Voter Returns: California Secretary of State Website, Primary and General Statewide Election Results, ggggggghttp://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm

27

A

Data: FIGURE 1: CASINO VS. NO CASINO CRIME RATES

(Crime Rates Per Capita) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

COUNTIES WITHOUT CASINOS 0.043378 0.049508 0.049907 0.049286 0.046661COUNTIES WITH CASINOS 0.051014 0.054637 0.051967 0.051715 0.050407

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003COUNTIES WITHOUT CASINOS 0.043432 0.040494 0.039464 0.038972 0.03986COUNTIES WITH CASINOS 0.048295 0.046847 0.045719 0.046125 0.045927

2004COUNTIES WITHOUT CASINOS 0.040216COUNTIES WITH CASINOS 0.046788

FIGURES 2 & 3: % OF VOTE CAST IN SUPPORT OF INDIAN GAMING

Legislation that is pro Indian gaming (a "yes" vote supports Indian Gaming) (Note: numbers are %that voted "yes")

1998 PROP 5 2000 PROP 1 2004 PROP 68COUNTIES WITHOUT CASINOS 54.61 60.38 14.7COUNTIES WITH CASINOS 54.94 61.82 14.9

FIGURE 4: CHANGE IN CRIME RATES IN RELATION TO CHANGE IN % OF VOTE FOR GAMING

Year % of Vote Crime Rate 1998 54.94 0.0504071999 0.0482952000 61.82 0.0468472001 0.0457192002 0.0461252003 0.0459272004 14.9 0.046788