AP EURO CHAPTER 25

8/10/2019 AP EURO CHAPTER 25

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THE AGE OF NATIONALISM, 1850-1914 823

The revolutions of 1848 closed one era and opened another. Urban industrial society began to

take a strong hold on the continent and in the young United States, as it already had in Great

Britain. nternationally, the repressive peace and diplo!atic stability of "etternich#s ti!e $erereplaced by a period of $ar and rapid change. n thought and culture, e%uberant ro!anticis!

gave $ay to hardheaded realis!. n the &tlantic econo!y, the hard years of the 184's $ere

follo$ed by good ti!es and prosperity throughout !ost of the 18( )s and 18*)s. +erhaps !ost

i!portant of all, estern society progressively found, for better or $orse, a ne$ and effectiveorgani-ing principle capable of coping $ith the !anysided challenge of the dual revolution and

the e!erging urban civili-ation. That principle $as nationalis!/dedication to an identification

$ith the nationstate.The triu!ph of nationalis! is an enor!ously significant historical develop!ent that $as by no

!eans co!pletely predictable. &fter all, nationalis! had been a po$erful force since at least

108. 2et it had repeatedly failed to reali-e its goals, !ost spectacularly so in 1848.3 hy, then, did nationalis! beco!e in one $ay or another an al!ost universal faith in urope

and in the United States bet$een 18(' and 1145

3 "ore specifically, ho$ did nationalis! evolve so that it appealed not only to predo!inately!iddle class liberals but also to the broad !asses of society5

These are the 6uestions this chapter $ill seek to ans$er.

NAPOLEON III IN FRANCE

arly nationalis! $as generally liberal and idealistic and often de!ocratic and radical as $ell.

The ideas of nationhood and popular sovereignty posed a fearful revolutionary threat to

conservatives like "etternich. 2et fro! the vantage point of the t$entieth century, it is clear thatnationalis! $ears !any !asks7 it !ay be narro$ly liberal or de!ocratic and radical, as it $as

for "a--ini and "ichelet, but it can also flourish in dictatorial states, $hich !ay be

conservative, fascist, or co!!unist. apoleon #s 9rance had already co!bined nationaldevotion $ith authoritarian rule. Significantly, it $as apoleon#s nephe$, :ouis apoleon, $ho

revived and e%tended this !erger. ;e sho$ed ho$ govern!ents could reconcile popular and

conservative forces in an authoritarian nationalis!. n doing so, he provided a !odel for politicalleaders else$here.

The Secon Re!"#$%c &n Lo"%' N&!o$eon

&lthough :ouis apoleon Bonaparte had played no part in 9rench politics before 1848,

universal !ale suffrage gave hi! three ti!es as !any votes as the four other presidentialcandidates co!bined in the 9rench presidential election of


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people by direct de!ocracy, his sovereignty uncorrupted by politicians and legislative bodies.

These political ideas $ent hand in hand $ith :ouis apoleon#s vision of national unity andsocial progress. Aather than doing nothing or providing only te!porary relief for the a$ful

poverty of the poor, the state and its leader had a sacred duty to provide obs and sti!ulate the

econo!y. &ll classes $ould benefit by such action.:ouis apoleon#s political and social ideas $ere at least vaguely understood by large nu!bers of

9rench peasants and $orkers in


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the defeat of the opposition $as the key to roads, ta% rebates, and a thousand other local

concerns.n 18(0 and again in 18*, :ouis apoleon#s syste! $orked brilliantly and produced

over$hel!ing electoral victories. 2et in the 18*'s, apoleon #s electoral syste! gradually

disintegrated. & sincere nationalist, apoleon had $anted to reorgani-e urope on the principleof nationality and gain influence and territory for 9rance and hi!self in the process. nstead,

proble!s in taly and the rising po$er of +russia led to increasing criticis! at ho!e fro! his

Catholic and nationalist supporters. ith increasing effectiveness, the !iddleclass liberals $ho

had al$ays $anted a less authoritarian regi!e continued to denounce his rule.apoleon $as al$ays sensitive to the public !ood. +ublic opinion, he once said, al$ays

$ins the last victory. Thus in the 18*'s, he progressively liberali-ed his e!pire. ;e gave the

&sse!bly greater po$ers and the opposition candidates greater freedo!, $hich they used togood advantage. n 18* the opposition, consisting of republicans, !onarchists, and liberals,

polled al!ost 4( percent of the vote.

The ne%t year, a sick and $eary :ouis apoleon again granted 9rance a ne$ constitution,$hich co!bined a basically parlia!entary regi!e $ith a hereditary e!peror as chief of state. n

a final great plebiscite on the eve of the disastrous $ar $ith +russia, 0.( !illion 9rench!en

voted in favor of the ne$ constitution, and only 1.( !illion opposed it. apoleon #s atte!pt toreconcile a strong national state $ith universal !ale suffrage $as still evolving and $as doing so

in a de!ocratic direction.

NATION +ILING IN ITAL. AN GERMAN.

:ouis apoleon#s triu!ph in 1848 and his authoritarian rule in the 18('s provided the old ruling

classes of urope $ith a ne$ !odel in politics. To $hat e%tent !ight the e%panding urban

!iddle classes and even portions of the gro$ing $orking classes rally to a strong and essentiallyconservative national state5 This $as one of the great political 6uestions in the 18('s and 18*'s.

n central urope, a resounding ans$er ca!e $ith the national unification of taly and Ger!any.

I/&$ /o 1850

taly had never been united prior to 18('. +art of Ao!e#s great e!pire in ancient ti!es, the

talian peninsula $as divided in the "iddle &ges into co!peting citystates, $hich led theco!!ercial and cultural revival of the est $ith a!a-ing creativity. & battleground for great

po$ers after 144, taly $as reorgani-ed in 181( at the Congress of Dienna. The rich northern

provinces of :o!bardy and Denetia $ere taken by "etternich#s &ustria. Sardinia and +ied!ont

$ere under the rule of an talian !onarch, and Tuscany, $ith its fa!ous capital 9lorence, sharednorthcentral taly $ith several s!aller states. Central taly and Ao!e $ere ruled by the papacy,

$hich had al$ays considered an independent political e%istence necessary to fulfill its spiritual

!ission. aples and Sicily $ere ruled, as they had been for al!ost a hundred years, by a branchof the Bourbons. "etternich $as not $rong in dis!issing taly as ?a geographical e%pression@

F"ap =(.1H.

Bet$een 181( and 1848, the goal of a unified talian nation captured the i!aginations of

!any talians. There $ere three basic approaches. The first $as the radical progra! of theidealistic patriot Giuseppe "a--ini, $ho preached a centrali-ed de!ocratic republic based on

universal !ale suffrage and the $ill of the people Fsee page 0*=H. The second $as that of

Dincen-o Gioberti, a Catholic priest $ho called for a federation of e%isting states under thepresidency of a progressive pope. The third $as the progra! of those $ho looked for leadership

to the autocratic kingdo! of Sardinia +ied!ont, !uch as !any Ger!ans looked to +russia.

The third alternative $as strengthened by the failures of 1848, $hen &ustria s!ashed "a--ini#srepublicanis!. &l!ost by accident, Sardinia#s !onarch, Dictor !!anuel, retained the liberal

constitution granted under duress in "arch 1848. This constitution provided for a fair degree of

civil liberties and real parlia!entary govern!ent, $ith deputies elected on the basis of a narro$franchise li!ited to the nobility and the co!fortable !iddle class. To the talian !iddle classes,


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Sardinia appeared to be a liberal, progressive state ideally suited to achieve the goal of national

unification. By contrast, the !iddleclass elite and its allies in the liberal aristocracy distrusted"a--ini#s vision of de!ocratic republicanis!. They feared it !ight lead to rene$ed upheaval,

social revolution, and intervention by 9rance or &ustria. ationalists in the lo$er !iddle class

and on the left usually continued to support a republican taly.&s for the papacy, the initial cautious support by +ius I Fr. 184*/1 808H for unification

had given $ay to fear and hostility after he $as te!porarily driven fro! Ao!e during the

upheavals of 1848. 9or a long generation, the papacy $ould stand resolutely opposed not only to

national unification but also to !ost !odern trends. n 18*4 in the Syllabus of rrors, +ius Istrongly denounced rationalis!, socialis!, separation of church and state, and religious liberty,

denying that ?the Ao!an pontiff can and ought to reconcile and align hi!self $ith progress,

liberalis!, and !odern civili-ation.@

C&o"* &n G&*%#&$% %n I/&$

Sardinia had the good fortune of being led by a brilliant states!an, Count Ca!illo Benso diCavour, the do!inant figure in the Sardinian govern!ent fro! 18(' until his death in 18*1.

ndicative of the co!ing tacit alliance bet$een the aristocracy and the solid !iddle class under

the banner of the strong nationstate, Cavour ca!e fro! a noble fa!ily and e!braced theecono!ic doctrines and business activities associated $ith the prosperous !iddle class. Before

entering politics, he !ade a substantial fortune in sugar !ills, stea!ships, banks, and railroads.Cavour#s national goals $ere li!ited and realistic. Until 18( he sought unity only for the states

of northern and perhaps central taly in a greatly e%panded kingdo! of Sardinia. ;e did not seekto incorporate the +apal States or the kingdo! of the T$o Sicilies, $ith their very different

cultures and govern!ents, into an taly of all the talians.

n the 18('s, Cavour $orked to consolidate Sardinia as a liberal constitutional statecapable of leading northern taly. ;is progra! of high$ays and railroads, of civil liberties and

opposition to clerical privilege, increased support for Sardinia throughout northern taly. 2et

Cavour reali-ed that Sardinia could not drive &ustria out of :o!bardy and Denetia and unifynorthern taly under Dictor !!anuel $ithout the help of a po$erful ally. ;e sought that ally in

the person of apoleon , $ho believed in national consolidation, especially if it could be

co!bined $ith !odest e%pansion for 9rance.n a co!plicated series of diplo!atic !aneuvers, Cavour $orked for a secret diplo!atic

alliance $ith apoleon against &ustria. 9inally, in July 18(8 he succeeded and goaded &ustria

into attacking Sardinia in 18(. apoleon ca!e to Sardinia#s defense. Then after the victory

of the co!bined 9rancoSardinian forces, apoleon did a sudden aboutface.


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9or super patriots such as Giuseppe Garibaldi F18'0188=H, the ob of unification $as still only

half done. The son of a poor sailor, Garibaldi had long personified the ro!antic, revolutionarynationalis! of "a--ini and 1848. FSee the feature ?ndividuals in Society7 Garibaldi, ;ero of the

+eople.@H &ll his life, he had fought and plotted $ars of national liberation. n the early 18*'s

Garibaldi, ever a radical !an of action, devised a bold plan to use a private ar!y of patrioticvolunteers to ?liberate@ the kingdo! of the T$o Sicilies. Cavour opposed the invasion, but he

dared not stop it because of Garibaldi#s enor!ous popular appeal. Slipping out of Genoa and

landing on the shores of Sicily in "ay 18*', Garibaldi#s guerrilla band of a thousand ?Aed

Shirts@ captured the i!agination of the Sicilian peasantry. )ut$itting the t$entythousand!anroyal ar!y, the guerrilla leader $on battles, gained volunteers, and took +aler!o. Then he and

his !en crossed to the !ainland, !arched triu!phantly to$ard aples, and prepared to attack

Ao!e and the pope.%pecting and probably hoping at first that Garibaldi $ould fail, the $ily Cavour no$

!oved 6uickly to profit fro! his victories. ;e sent Sardinian forces to occupy !ost of the +apal

States Fbut not Ao!eH and to intercept Garibaldi. >no$ing that an attack on Ao!e !ight bringabout $ar $ith 9rance, Cavour feared Garibaldi#s radicalis! above all. &s te!porary ruler of

Sicily and aples, Garibaldi had already introduced free education and tentative social refor!s

and had disbanded the Jesuits and nationali-ed their property. Therefore, Cavour i!!ediatelyorgani-ed a plebiscite in the con6uered territories.


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The Lollverein#s tariff duties $ere substantially reduced so that &ustria#s highly protected

industry could not bear to oin. n retaliation, &ustria tried to destroy the Lollverein by inducingthe south Ger!an states to leave it, but $ithout success. ndeed, by the end of 18( all the

Ger!an states e%cept &ustria had oined the custo!s union. & ne$ Ger!any e%cluding &ustria

$as beco!ing an econo!ic reality. "iddleclass and business groups in the Lollverein $ereenriching the!selves and finding solid econo!ic reasons to bolster their idealistic support of

national unification. The gro$ing econo!ic integration of the states $ithin the Lollverein gave

+russia a valuable advantage in its struggle against &ustria#s supre!acy in Ger!an political

affairs.The national uprising in taly in 18( !ade a profound i!pression in the Ger!an states.

n +russia great political change and $ar/perhaps $ith &ustria, perhaps $ith 9rance/see!ed

6uite possible. &long $ith his top !ilitary advisers, the tough!inded illia! of +russia Fr.18*1/1888H, $ho had replaced the unstable 9rederick illia! D as regent in 18(8 and beco!e

king hi!self in 18*1, $as convinced of the need for !aor ar!y refor!s. illia! $anted to

double the si-e of the highly disciplined regular ar!y. ;e also $anted to reduce the i!portanceof the reserve !ilitia, a se!ipopular force created during the apoleonic $ars. &r!y refor!s

!eant a bigger defense budget and higher ta%es.

+russia had e!erged fro! 1848 $ith a parlia!ent of sorts, $hich $as in the hands of theliberal !iddle class by 18(. The $ealthy !iddle class, like the landed aristocracy, $as greatly

overrepresented by the +russian electoral syste!, and it $anted society to be less, not !ore,!ilitaristic. &bove all, !iddleclass representatives $anted to establish once and for all that the

parlia!ent, not the king, had the ulti!ate political po$er. They also $anted to ensure that thear!y $as responsible to +russia#s elected representatives and $as not a ?state $ithin a state.@

These de!ands $ere popular. The parlia!ent reected the !ilitary budget in 18*=, and the

liberals triu!phed co!pletely in ne$ elections. >ing illia! then called on Count )tto vonBis!arck to head a ne$ !inistry and defy the parlia!ent. This $as a !o!entous choice.

+%')&*c T&e' Co))&n

The !ost i!portant figure in Ger!an history bet$een :uther and ;itler, )tto von

Bis!arck F181(/188H has been the obect of enor!ous interest and debate. & great hero to

so!e, a great villain to others, Bis!arck $as above all a !aster of politics. Born into the+russian lando$ning aristocracy, the young Bis!arck $as a $ild and te!pestuous student given

to duels and drinking. +roud of his Junker heritage and al$ays devoted to his +russian sovereign,

Bis!arck had a strong personality and an unbounded desire for po$er. 2et in his drive to secure

po$er for hi!self and for +russia, Bis!arck $as e%traordinarily fle%ible and prag!atic. ?)ne!ust al$ays have t$o irons in the fire,@ he once said. ;e kept his options open, pursuing one

policy and then another as he !oved $ith skill and cunning to$ard his goal.

Bis!arck first honed his political skills as a diplo!at. &c6uiring a reputation as anultraconservative in the +russian asse!bly in 1848, he fought against &ustria as the +russian

a!bassador to the Ger!an Confederation fro! 18(1 to 18(. Transferred ne%t to St. +etersburg

and then to +aris, he $orked to$ard a basic goal that $as $ellkno$n by 18*=/to build up

+russia#s strength and consolidate +russia#s precarious Great +o$er status.To achieve this goal, Bis!arck $as convinced that +russia had to control co!pletely the

northern, predo!inately +rotestant part of the Ger!an Confederation. ;e sa$ three possible

paths open before hi!. ;e !ight $ork $ith &ustria to divide up the s!aller Ger!an states lyingbet$een the!. )r he !ight co!bine $ith foreign po$ers/9rance and taly or even Aussia/ in

a $ar against &ustria. )r he !ight ally $ith the forces of Ger!an nationalis! to defeat and e%pel

&ustria fro! Ger!an affairs. ;e e%plored each possibility in !any co!plicated diplo!atic!aneuvers, but in the end the last path $as the one Bis!arck took.

That Bis!arck $ould oin $ith the forces of Ger!an nationalis! to increase +russia#s po$er

see!ed unlikely $hen he took office as chief !inister in 18*=. Bis!arck#s appoint!ent !ade astrong but unfavorable i!pression. ;is speeches $ere a sensation and a scandal.


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the govern!ent $ould rule $ithout parlia!entary consent, Bis!arck lashed out at the !iddle

class opposition7 ?The great 6uestions of the day $ill not be decided by speeches andresolutionsthat $as the blunder of 1848 and 184/but by blood and iron.@


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going over the head of the !iddle class directly to the people, !uch as apoleon had done in

9rance. &ll the $hile, ho$ever, ulti!ate po$er rested as securely as ever in the hands of +russiaand its king and ar!y.

n +russia itself Bis!arck held out an olive branch to the parlia!entary opposition.

"arshaling all his diplo!atic skill, Bis!arck asked the parlia!ent to pass a special inde!nitybill to approve after the fact all the govern!ent#s spending bet$een 18*= and 18**. "ost of the

liberals u!ped at the chance to cooperate. 9or four long years, they had opposed and critici-ed

Bis!arck#s ?illegal@ !easures. 2et Bis!arck, the king, and the ar!y $ith its aristocratic

leadership had succeeded beyond the $ildest drea!s of the liberal !iddle class. n 18** Ger!anunity $as in sight, and the people $ere to be allo$ed to participate actively in the ne$ state.

"any liberals repented their ?sins,@ and none repented !ore ardently than ;er!ann Bau!garten,

a thoroughly decent history professor and !e!ber of the liberal opposition. n his essay ?& SelfCriticis! of Ger!an :iberalis!,@ he confessed in 18**7 ?e thought that by agitation $e could

transfor! Ger!any. . . . 2et $e have e%perienced a !iracle al!ost $ithout parallel. The victory

of our principles $ould have brought us !isery, $hereas the defeat of our principles has broughtboundless salvation.@= The constitutional struggle $as over. The Ger!an !iddle class $as

bo$ing respectfully before Bis!arck and the !onarchial authority and aristocratic superiority he

represented. n the years before 114, the virtues of the aristocratic +russian ar!y officerincreasingly replaced those of the !iddleclass liberal in public estee! and set the social

standard.

The F*&nco-P*"''%&n &*, 18701871

The rest of the story of Ger!an unification is anticli!actic. n 18*0 Bis!arck for!ed an alliance

$ith four south Ger!an states and transfor!ed the Lollverein into a custo!s parlia!ent. But the

south Ger!ans $ere reluctant to go further because of their different religious and politicaltraditions. Bis!arck reali-ed that a patriotic $ar $ith 9rance $ould drive the south Ger!an

states into his ar!s. The 9rench obligingly played their part. The apparent issue/$hether a

distant relative of +russia#s illia! Fand 9rance#s apoleon H !ight beco!e king of Spain/$as only a diplo!atic prete%t. By 180' the 9rench leaders of the Second !pire, goaded by

Bis!arck and alar!ed by their po$erful ne$ neighbor on the Ahine, had decided on a $ar to

teach +russia a lesson.&s soon as $ar against 9rance began in 180', Bis!arck had the $holehearted support of

the south Ger!an states. ith other govern!ents standing still/ Bis!arck#s generosity to

&ustria in 18** $as paying big dividends/Ger!an forces under +russian leadership decisively

defeated the !ain 9rench ar!y at Sedan on Septe!ber 1, 180'. :ouis apoleon hi!self $ascaptured and hu!iliated. Three days later, 9rench patriots in +aris proclai!ed yet another 9rench

republic and vo$ed to continue fighting. But after five !onths, in January 1801, a starving +aris

surrendered, and 9rance $ent on to accept Bis!arck#s harsh peace ter!s. By this ti!e, the southGer!an states had agreed to oin a ne$ Ger!an e!pire. The victorious illia! $as

proclai!ed e!peror of Ger!any in the ;all of "irrors in the palace of Dersailles. urope had a

nineteenth century Ger!an ?sun king.@ &s in the 18** constitution, the king of +russia and his

!inisters had ulti!ate po$er in the ne$ Ger!an !pire, and the lo$er house of the legislature$as elected by universal !ale suffrage.

Bis!arck and the ne$ Ger!an !pire i!posed a harsh peace on 9rance.


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terrible cri!e. They could never forget and never forgive, and thus relations bet$een 9rance and

Ger!any after 1801 $ere tragically poisoned.The 9ranco+russian ar, $hich uropeans generally sa$ as a test of nations in a pitiless


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obliged to furnish labor services or !oney pay!ents as the lord sa$ fit. "oreover, the lord could

choose freely a!ong the serfs for ar!y recruits, $ho had to serve for t$entyfive years, and hecould punish a serf $ith deportation to Siberia. Se%ual e%ploitation of fe!ale serfs by their lords

$as co!!on.

Serfdo! had beco!e the great !oral and political issue for the govern!ent by the 184's, but it!ight still have lasted !any !ore years had the Cri!ean ar of 18( to 18(* not occurred. The

$ar began as a dispute $ith 9rance over $ho should protect certain Christian shrines in the

)tto!an !pire. Because the fighting $as concentrated in the Cri!ean peninsula on the Black

Sea, Aussia#s transportation net$ork of rivers and $agons failed to supply the distant Aussianar!ies ade6uately. 9rance and Great Britain, aided by Sardinia and the )tto!an !pire,

inflicted a hu!iliating defeat on Aussia.

This !ilitary defeat !arked a turning point in Aussian history. The Aussian state had been builton the !ilitary, and Aussia had not lost a !aor $ar for a century and a half. This defeat

de!onstrated that Aussia had fallen behind the rapidly industriali-ing nations of $estern urope

in !any areas. &t the very least, Aussia needed railroads, better ar!a!ents, and reorgani-ationof the ar!y if it $as to !aintain its international position. "oreover, the disastrous $ar had

caused hardship and raised the specter of !assive peasant rebellion. Aefor! of serfdo! $as

i!perative. &nd as the ne$ tsar, &le%ander Fr. 18((/1881H, told the serf o$ners, it $ould bebetter if refor! ca!e fro! above. "ilitary disaster thus forced &le%ander and his !inisters

along the path of rapid social change and general !oderni-ation.The first and greatest of the refor!s $as the freeing of the serfs in 18*1. ;u!an bondage $as

abolished forever, and the e!ancipated peasants received, on average, about half of the land. 2etthey had to pay fairly

high prices for their land, and because the land $as o$ned collectively, each peasant village $as

ointly responsible for the pay!ents of all the fa!ilies in the village. The govern!ent hoped thatcollective responsibility $ould strengthen the peasant village as a social unit and prevent the

develop!ent of a class of landless peasants. n practice, collective o$nership and responsibility

!ade it very difficult for individual peasants to i!prove agricultural !ethods or leave theirvillages. Thus the effects of the refor! $ere li!ited, for it did not encourage peasants to change

their old habits and attitudes.

"ost of the later refor!s $ere also half$ay !easures. n 18*4 the govern!ent established a ne$institution of local govern!ent, the -e!stvo. "e!bers of this local asse!bly $ere elected by a

threeclass syste! of to$ns, peasant villages, and noble lando$ners. & -e!stvo e%ecutive

council dealt $ith local proble!s. The establish!ent of the -e!stvos !arked a significant step

to$ard popular participation, and Aussian liberals hoped it $ould lead to an elected nationalparlia!ent. They $ere soon disappointed. The local -e!stvo re!ained subordinate to the

traditional bureaucracy and the local nobility, $hich $ere heavily favored by the property based

voting syste!. "ore successful $as refor! of the legal syste!, $hich established independentcourts and e6uality before the la$. ducation $as also liberali-ed so!e$hat, and censorship $as

rela%ed but not re!oved.

The ndustriali-ation of Aussia

Until the t$entieth century, Aussia#s greatest strides to$ard !oderni-ation $ere econo!ic ratherthan political. ndustry and transport, both so vital to the !ilitary, $ere transfor!ed in t$o

industrial surges. The first of these ca!e after 18*'. The govern!ent encouraged and subsidi-ed

private rail$ay co!panies, and construction boo!ed. n 18*' the e!pire had only about 1,=('!iles of railroadsE by 188' it had about 1(,('' !iles. The railroads enabled agricultural Aussia

to e%port grain and thus earn !oney for further industriali-ation.


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nationalists and super patriots, $ho beca!e so!e of the govern!ent#s !ost enthusiastic

supporters. ndustrial develop!ent also contributed !ightily to the spread of "ar%ian thoughtand the transfor!ation of the Aussian revolutionary !ove!ent after 18'.

n 1881 &le%ander $as assassinated by a s!all group of terrorists. The era of refor! ca!e to

an abrupt end, for the ne$ tsar, &le%ander Fr. 1881/184H, $as a deter!ined reactionary.Aussia, and indeed all of urope, e%perienced hard ti!es econo!ically in the 188's. +olitical

!oderni-ation re!ained fro-en until

1'(, but econo!ic !oderni-ation sped for$ard in the !assive industrial surge of the 18's.

ationalis! played a decisive role, as it had after the Cri!ean ar. The key leader $as Sergeiitte, the tough, co!petent !inister of finance fro! 18= to 1'. arly in his career, itte

found in the $ritings of 9riedrich :ist Fsee page 08H an analysis and a progra! for action. :ist

had stressed the peril for Ger!any of re!aining behindngland in the 18's and 184's. itte sa$ the sa!e threat of industrial back$ardness

threatening Aussia#s po$er and greatness.

itte !oved for$ard on several fronts. & railroad !anager by training, he believed that railroads$ere ?a very po$erful $eapon . . . for the direction of the econo!ic develop!ent of the

country.@4 Therefore, the govern!ent built stateo$ned railroads rapidly, doubling the net$ork

to thirtyfive thousand !iles by the end of the century. The gigantic transSiberian lineconnecting "osco$ $ith Dladivostok on the +acific )cean five thousand !iles a$ay $as

itte#s pride, and it $as largely co!pleted during his ter! of office. 9ollo$ing :ist#s advice,itte established high protective tariffs to build Aussian industry, and he put the country on the

gold standard of the ?civili-ed $orld@ in order to strengthen Aussian finances.itte#s greatest innovation, ho$ever, $as to use the est to catch up $ith the est. ;e

aggressively encouraged foreigners to use their abundant capital and advanced technology to

build great factories in back$ard Aussia. &s he told the tsar, ?The inflo$ of foreign capital is. . .the only $ay by $hich our industry $ill be able to supply our country 6uickly $ith abundant and

cheap products.@( This policy $as brilliantly successful, especially in southern Aussia. There, in

eastern Ukraine, foreign capitalists and their engineers built an enor!ous and very !odern steeland coal industry al!ost fro! scratch in little !ore than a decade. By 1'' only the United

States, Ger!any, and Great Britain $ere producing !ore steel than Aussia. The Aussian

petroleu! industry had even pulled up alongside that of the United States and $as producing andrefining half the $orld#s oil.

itte kne$ ho$ to keep foreigners in line. )nce a leading foreign business!an ca!e to hi! and

angrily

de!anded that the Aussian govern!ent fulfill a contract it had signed and pay certain debtsi!!ediately. itte asked to see the contract. ;e read it and then carefully tore it to pieces and

thre$ it in the $astepaper basket $ithout a $ord of e%planation. t $as ust such a fiercely

autocratic and independent Aussia that $as catching up $ith the advanced nations of the est.The Aevolution of 1'(

Catching up partly !eant vigorous territorial e%pansion, for this $as the age of estern

i!perialis!. By 1' Aussia had established a sphere of influence in Chinese "anchuria and

$as casting greedy eyes on northern >orea. hen the diplo!atic protests of e6ually i!perialisticJapan $ere ignored, the Japanese launched a surprise attack in 9ebruary 1'4. To the a!a-e!ent

of selfconfident uropeans, &sian Japan scored repeated victories, and Aussia $as forced in

Septe!ber 1'( to accept a hu!iliating defeat.&s is often the case, !ilitary disaster abroad brought political upheaval at ho!e. The business

and professional classes had long $anted to !atch econo!ic $ith political !oderni-ation. Their

!ini!al goal $as to turn the last of urope#s absolutist !onarchies into a liberal, representativeregi!e. 9actory $orkers, strategically concentrated in the large cities, had all the grievances of

early industriali-ation and $ere organi-ed in a radical and still illegal labor !ove!ent. +easants

had gained little fro! the era of refor!s and $ere suffering fro! poverty and overpopulation. &tthe sa!e ti!e, nationalist senti!ent $as e!erging a!ong the e!pire#s !inorities. The politically


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9or good reason, ordinary people/the !asses of an industriali-ing, urbani-ing society/felt

increasing loyalty to their govern!ents. "ore people could vote. By 114 universal !alesuffrage had beco!e the rule rather than the e%ception. This develop!ent had as !uch

psychological as political significance. )rdinary !en $ere no longer denied the right to vote

because they lacked $ealth or education. They felt that they countedE they could influence thegovern!ent to so!e e%tent. They $ere beco!ing ?part of the syste!.@

o!en also began to de!and the right to vote. The $o!en#s suffrage !ove!ent

achieved its first success in the $estern United States, and by 11 $o!en could vote in t$elve

states. urope, too, !oved slo$ly in this direction. n 114 or$ay gave the vote to !ost$o!en. lse$here, $o!en such as the nglish !!eline +ankhurst $ere very !ilitant in their

de!ands. They heckled politicians and held public de!onstrations. These efforts generally failed

before 114, but they prepared the $ay for the triu!ph of the $o!en#s suffrage !ove!enti!!ediately after orld ar .

&s the right to vote spread, politicians and parties in national parlia!ents represented the

people !ore responsively. The !ultiparty syste! prevailing in !ost countries !eant thatparlia!entary !aorities $ere built on shifting coalitions of different parties, and this gave

individual parties leverage to obtain benefits for their supporters. Govern!ents also passed la$s

to alleviate general proble!s, thereby ac6uiring greater legiti!acy and appearing !ore $orthy ofsupport.

There $as a less positive side to building support for strong nationstates after 1801.Govern!ents, often led by conservatives inspired by the e%a!ples of Cavour and Bis!arck,

found that they could !anipulate national feeling to create a sense of unity and to divert attentiona$ay fro! underlying class conflicts. 9or e%a!ple, conservative and !oderate leaders $ho

despised socialis! found that $orkers $ho voted socialist $ould still rally around the flag in a

diplo!atic crisis or that they $ould cheer enthusiastically $hen distant territory of doubtfulvalue $as sei-ed in &frica or &sia Fsee Chapter =*H. Therefore, governing elites fre6uently

channeled national senti!ent in an antiliberal and !ilitaristic direction after 1801. This policy

helped !anage do!estic conflicts, but only at the e%pense of increasing the internationaltensions that erupted in 114 in cataclys!ic $ar and revolution Fsee Chapter =0H.

The Ge*)&n E)!%*e+olitics in Ger!any after 1801 reflected !any of the general develop!ents. The ne$ Ger!an

!pire $as a federal union of +russia and t$entyfour s!aller states. "uch of the everyday

business of govern!ent $as conducted by the separate states, but there $as a strong national

govern!ent $ith a chancellor/until 18', Bis!arck/and a popularly elected lo$er house,called the Aeichstag. &lthough Bis!arck refused to be bound by a parlia!entary !aority, he

tried nonetheless to !aintain one. This situation gave the political parties opportunities. Until

1808 Bis!arck relied !ainly on the ational :iberals, $ho had rallied to hi! after 18**. Theysupported legislation useful for further econo!ic and legal unification of the country.

:ess $isely, they backed Bis!arck#s attack on the Catholic church, the socalled >ulturka!pf or

?struggle for civili-ation.@ :ike Bis!arck, the !iddleclass ational :iberals $ere particularly

alar!ed by +ius I#s declaration of papal infallibility in 180'. That dog!a see!ed to askGer!an Catholics to put loyalty to their church above loyalty to their nation. )nly in +rotestant

+russia did the >ulturka!pf have even li!ited success. Catholics throughout the country

generally voted for the Catholic Center party, $hich blocked passage of national la$s hostile tothe church. 9inally, in 1808 Bis!arck abandoned his attack. ndeed, he and the Catholic Center

party entered into an uneasy but !utually advantageous alliance. Their reasons for doing so $ere

largely econo!ic.&fter a $orld$ide financial bust in 180, uropean agriculture $as in an increasingly

difficult position. heat prices plu!!eted as cheap grain poured in fro! the United States,

Canada, and Aussia. e$ lands $ere opening up in orth &!erica and Aussia, and theco!bination of railroads and technical i!prove!ents in shipping cut freight rates for grain


15/22

drastically. uropean peasants, $ith their s!aller, less efficient far!s, could not co!pete in

cereal production, especially in $estern and southern Ger!any. The peasantry there $as largelyCatholic, and the Catholic Center party $as thus converted to higher tariffs to protect the

econo!ic interests of its supporters.

The sa!e co!petitive pressures caused the +rotestant Junkers, $ho o$ned large estatesin eastern Ger!any, to e!brace the cause of higher tariffs. These noble lando$ners $ere oined

by so!e of the iron and steel !agnates of the +russian Ahineland and estphalia $ho had

previously favored free trade. ith three such influential groups lobbying energetically,

Bis!arck $as happy to go along $ith a ne$ protective tariff in 180. n doing so, he $on ne$supporters in the Aeichstag/the Center party of the Catholics and the Conservative party of the

+russian lando$ners/ and he held on to !ost of the ational :iberals.

Bis!arck had been looking for a $ay to increase ta%es and raise !ore !oney for thegovern!ent. The solution he chose $as higher tariffs. "any other govern!ents acted si!ilarly.

The 188's and 18's sa$ a $idespread return to protectionis!. 9rance, in particular, established

very high tariffs to protect agriculture and industry, peasants and !anufacturers, fro! foreignco!petition. Thus the Ger!an govern!ent and other govern!ents responded effectively to a

!aor econo!ic proble! and $on greater loyalty. The general rise of protectionis! in the late

nineteenth century $as also an outstanding e%a!ple of the dangers of selfcentered nationalis!7high tariffs led to international na!ecalling and nasty trade $ars.

&s for socialis!, Bis!arck tried to stop its gro$th in Ger!any because he genuinelyfeared its revolutionary language and allegiance to a !ove!ent transcending the nationstate. n

1808, after t$o atte!pts on the life of illia! by radicals Fthough not socialistsH, Bis!arckused a carefully orchestrated national outcry to ra! through the Aeichstag a la$ that strictly

controlled socialist !eetings and publications and outla$ed the Social


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i!pending socialist upheaval in both groups. 2et the ?revolutionary@ socialists $ere actually

beco!ing less and less revolutionary in Ger!any. n the years before orld ar , the strengthof socialist opposition to greater !ilitary spending and i!perialist e%pansion declined

substantially, for e%a!ple. Ger!an socialists identified increasingly $ith the Ger!an state, and

they concentrated on gradual social and political refor!.

Re!"#$%c&n F*&nce

&lthough apoleon #s reign !ade so!e progress in reducing antagonis!s bet$een classes, the

$ar $ith +russia undid these efforts, and in 1801 9rance see!ed hopelessly divided once again.The patriotic republicans $ho proclai!ed the Third Aepublic in +aris after the !ilitary disaster

at Sedan refused to ad!it defeat. They defended +aris $ith great herois! for $eeks, living off

rats and -oo ani!als until they $ere starved into sub!ission by Ger!an ar!ies in January 1801.hen national elections then sent a large !aority of conservatives and !onarchists to the

ational &sse!bly and 9rance#s ne$ leaders decided they had no choice but to surrender &lsace

and :orraine to Ger!any, the trau!ati-ed +arisians e%ploded in patriotic frustration andproclai!ed the +aris Co!!une in "arch 1801. Daguely radical, the leaders of the Co!!une

$anted to govern +aris $ithout interference fro! the conservative 9rench countryside. The

ational &sse!bly, led by aging politician &doiphe Thiers, $ould hear none of it. The &sse!blyordered the 9rench ar!y into +aris and brutally crushed the Co!!une. T$enty thousand people

died in the fighting. &s in June 1848, it $as +aris against the provinces, 9rench against 9rench.)ut of this tragedy, 9rance slo$ly for!ed a ne$ national unity, achieving considerable

stability before 114. ;o$ is one to account for this5 :uck played a part. Until 180( the!onarchists in the ?republican@ ational &sse!bly had a !aority but could not agree $ho

should be king. The co!pro!ise Bourbon candidate refused to rule e%cept under the $hite flag

of his ancestors/a co!pletely unacceptable condition. n the !eanti!e, Thiers#s destruction ofthe radical Co!!une and his other fir! !easures sho$ed the fearful provinces and the !iddle

class that the Third Aepublic !ight be !oderate and socially conservative, escaping the e%cesses

that !any still associated $ith the republican govern!ent of Aobespierre and the Terror Fseepages 0'4/0'*H. 9rance therefore retained the republic, though reluctantly. &s +resident Thiers

cautiously said, this $as ?the govern!ent $hich divides us least.@

&nother stabili-ing factor $as the skill and deter!ination of the !oderate republicanleaders in the early years. The !ost fa!ous of these $as :eon Ga!betta, the son of an talian

grocer, a $ar!, easygoing, unsuccessful la$yer $ho had turned professional politician. & !aster

of e!erging !ass politics, Ga!betta co!bined elo6uence $ith the personal touch as he preached

a republic of truly e6ual opportunity. Ga!betta $as also instru!ental in establishing absoluteparlia!entary supre!acy bet$een 1800 and 180, $hen the deputies challenged "arshall

"ac"ahon and forced the so!e$hat autocratic president of the republic to resign. By 180 the

great !aority of !e!bers of both the upper and the lo$er houses of the ational &sse!bly$ere republicans. &lthough these republicans $ere split a!ong !any parlia!entary groups and

later a!ong several parties/a situation that led to constant coalition politics and the rapid

turnover of !inisters/the Third Aepublic had fir! foundations after al!ost a decade.

The !oderate republicans sought to preserve their creation by $inning the hearts and!inds of the ne%t generation. Trade unions $ere fully legali-ed, and 9rance ac6uired a colonial

e!pire. "ore i!portant, under the leadership of Jules 9erry, the !oderate republicans of s!all

to$ns and villages passed a series of la$s bet$een 180 and 188* establishing free co!pulsoryele!entary education for both girls and boys. &t the sa!e ti!e, they greatly e%panded the state

syste! of public ta%supported schools. Thus 9rance shared fully in the general e%pansion of

public education, $hich served as a critical nationbuilding tool throughout the estern $orld inthe late nineteenth century.

n 9rance !ost ele!entary and !uch secondary education had traditionally been in the

parochial schools of the Catholic church, $hich had long been hostile to republics and to !uchof secular life. 9ree co!pulsory ele!entary education in 9rance beca!e secular republican


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education. The pledge of allegiance and the national anthe! replaced the catechis! and the ?&ve

"aria.@ "ilitant young !ale and fe!ale teachers carried the ideology of patriotic republicanis!into every corner of 9rance. n their classes, these $o!en and !en sought to $in the loyalty of

the young citi-ens to the republic so that 9rance $ould never again vote en !asse for dictators

like the t$o apoleons.Unlike !ost estern countries Fincluding the United StatesH, $hich insisted on the total

?purity@ of their fe!ale ele!entary teachers and $ould not hire !arried $o!en, the Third

Aepublic actively encouraged young teachers to !arry and guaranteed that both partners $ould

teach in the sa!e location. There $ere three !ain reasons for this unusual policy. 9irst, !arriedfe!ale Fand !aleH teachers $ith their o$n children provided a vivid contrast to celibate nuns

Fand priestsH, $ho had for generations stood for !ost pri!ary education in the popular !ind.

Second, the republican leaders believed that !arried $o!en Fand !enH $ould better cope $iththe potential loneliness and social isolation of unfa!iliar to$ns and villages, especially $here

the local Catholic school $as strong. Third, 9rench politicians and opinion leaders $orried

continually about 9rance#s very lo$ birthrate after 180', and they believed that $o!enco!bining teaching careers and !otherhood $ould provide the country $ith a good e%a!ple.

;iring !arried schoolteachers $as part of an effort to create a $hole ne$ culture of universal,

secular, and republican education. This illustrates a larger truth/that truly lasting politicalchange !ust usually be supported by changes in the underlying culture.

&lthough the educational refor!s of the 188's disturbed 9rench Catholics, !any of the!rallied to the republic in the 18's. The li!ited acceptance of the !odern $orld by the !ore

liberal +ope :eo I F18081'H eased tensions bet$een church and state. Unfortunately, the


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unpopular opinions. n 18*0 Bena!in


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beco!ing a fully independent nation in 1'(. n this light, one can also see ho$ hopeless $as the

case of the )tto!an !pire in urope in the later nineteenth century. t $as only a !atter ofti!e before the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Ao!anians $ould break a$ay, and they did.

The A"'/*o-H"n6&*%&n E)!%*e

The dile!!a of conflicting nationalis!s in reland also helps one appreciate ho$

desperate the situation in the &ustro;ungarian !pire had beco!e by the early t$entieth

century. n 184 "agyar nationalis! had driven ;ungarian patriots to declare an independent

;ungarian republic, $hich $as savagely crushed by Aussian and &ustrian ar!ies Fsee pages 081/08=H. Throughout the 18('s, ;ungary $as ruled as a con6uered territory, and !peror 9rancis

Joseph and his bureaucracy tried hard to centrali-e the state and Ger!ani-e the language and

culture of the different nationalities.Then in the $ake of defeat by +russia in 18**, a $eakened &ustria $as forced to strike a

co!pro!ise and establish the socalled dual !onarchy. The e!pire $as divided in t$o, and the

nationalistic "agyars gained virtual independence for ;ungary. ;enceforth each half of thee!pire agreed to deal $ith its o$n ?barbarians@/its o$n !inorities/as it sa$ fit. The t$o

states $ere oined only by a shared !onarch and co!!on !inistries for finance, defense, and

foreign affairs. The popular !ayor of Dienna fro! 180 to 11', arl :ueger, co!binedantiSe!itic rhetoric $ith calls for ?Christian socialis!@ and !unicipal o$nership of basic

services. :ueger appealed especially to the Ger!an lo$er !iddle class/and to an unsuccessfulyoung artist na!ed &dolf ;itler.

n ;ungary the "agyar nobility in 18*0 restored the constitution of 1848 and used it todo!inate both the "agyar peasantry and the !inority populations until 114. )nly the

$ealthiest onefourth of adult !ales had the right to vote, !aking the parlia!ent the creature of

the "agyar elite. :a$s pro!oting the use of the "agyar F;ungarianH language in schools andgovern!ent $ere ra!!ed through and bitterly resented, especially by the Croatians and

Ao!anians. hile "agyar e%tre!ists ca!paigned loudly for total separation fro! &ustria, the

radical leaders of the subect nationalities drea!ed in turn of independence fro! ;ungary.Unlike !ost !aor countries, $hich harnessed nationalis! to strengthen the state after 1801, the

&ustro ;ungarian !pire $as progressively $eakened and destroyed by it.

: MAR;ISM AN THE SOCIALIST MOEMENT

ationalis! served, for better or $orse, as a ne$ unifying principle. But $hat about socialis!5


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Section of the orkers nternational. Belgiu! and &ustria;ungary also had strong socialist

parties.&s the na!e of the 9rench party suggests, "ar%ian socialist parties $ere eventually

linked together in an international organi-ation. &s early as 1848, "ar% had laid out his

intellectual syste! in The Co!!unist "anifesto Fsee pages 0*(/0**H. ;e had declared that?the $orking !en have no country,@ and he had urged proletarians of all nations to unite against

their govern!ents. Joining the flood of radicals and republicans $ho fled continental urope for

ngland and &!erica after the unsuccessful revolutions of 1848, "ar% settled in :ondon. +oor

and depressed, he lived on his !eager earnings as a ournalist and on the gifts of his friend9riedrich ngels. "ar% never stopped thinking of revolution.


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The gro$th of labor unions reinforced this trend to$ard !oderation. n the early stages of

industriali-ation, !odern unions $ere generally prohibited by la$. & fa!ous la$ of the 9renchAevolution had declared all guilds and unions illegal in the na!e of ?liberty@ in 101. n Great

Britain, atte!pts by $orkers to unite $ere considered cri!inal conspiracies after 10. )ther

countries had si!ilar la$s, and these obviously ha!pered union develop!ent. n 9rance, fore%a!ple, about t$o hundred $orkers $ere i!prisoned each year bet$een 18=( and 1840 for

taking part in illegal co!binations. Unions $ere considered subversive bodies, only to be

hounded and crushed.

9ro! this sad position $orkers struggled to escape. Great Britain led the $ay in 18=4 and18=( $hen unions $on the right to e%ist but FgenerallyH not the right to strike. &fter the collapse

of Aobert )$en#s atte!pt to for! one big union in the 18's Fsee page 04H, ne$ and !ore

practical kinds of unions appeared. :i!ited pri!arily to highly skilled $orkers such as!achinists and carpenters, the ?ne$ !odel unions@ avoided both radical politics and costly

strikes. nstead, their sober, respectable leaders concentrated on $inning better $ages and hours

for their !e!bers through collective bargaining and co!pro!ise. This approach helped pave the$ay to full acceptance in Britain in the 180's, $hen unions $on the right to strike $ithout being

held legally liable for the financial da!age inflicted on e!ployers. &fter 18' unions for

unskilled $orkers developed, and bet$een 1'1 and 1'* the legal position of British unions$as further strengthened.

Ger!any $as the !ost industriali-ed, sociali-ed, and unioni-ed continental country by114. Ger!an unions $ere not granted i!portant rights until 18*, and until the antisocialist la$

$as repealed in 18', they $ere fre6uently harassed by the govern!ent as socialist fronts. or$ere socialist leaders particularly interested in union activity, believing as they did in the iron

la$ of lo$ $ages and the need for political revolution. The result $as that as late as 18(, there

$ere only about =0',''' union !e!bers in a !ale industrial $orkforce of nearly 8 !illion. Then$ith Ger!an industriali-ation still stor!ing ahead and al!ost all legal harass!ent eli!inated,

union !e!bership skyrocketed, reaching roughly !illion in 11=.

This great e%pansion both reflected and influenced the changing character of Ger!anunions. ncreasingly, unions in Ger!any focused on breadandbutter issues/$ages, hours,

$orking conditions/rather than on the disse!ination of pure socialist doctrine. Genuine

collective bargaining, long opposed by socialist intellectuals as a ?sellout,@ $as officiallyrecogni-ed as desirable by the Ger!an Trade Union Congress in 18. hen e!ployers proved

un$illing to bargain, a series of strikes forced the! to change their !inds.

Bet$een 1'* and 11, successful collective bargaining gained a pro!inent place in

Ger!an industrial relations. n 11 alone, over ten thousand collective bargaining agree!entsaffecting 1.=( !illion $orkers $ere signed. Gradual i!prove!ent, not revolution, $as beco!ing

the pri!ary goal of the Ger!an tradeunion !ove!ent.

The Ger!an trade unions and their leaders $ere in fact, if not in na!e, thoroughgoingrevisionists. Aevisionis!/that !ost a$ful of sins in the eyes of !ilitant "ar%ists in the

t$entieth century/$as an effort by various socialists to update "ar%ian doctrines to reflect the

realities of the ti!e. Thus the socialist d$ard Bernstein F18('/1=H argued in 18 in his

volutionary Socialis! that "ar%#s predictions of evergreater poverty for $orkers and evergreater concentration of $ealth in everfe$er hands had been proved false. Therefore, Bernstein

suggested, socialists should refor! their doctrines and tactics. They should co!bine $ith other

progressive forces to $in gradual evolutionary gains for $orkers through legislation, unions, andfurther econo!ic develop!ent. These vie$s $ere denounced as heresy by the Ger!an Social


22/22

party, but he re!ained at heart a gradualist and opti!istic secular hu!anist. Nuestions of

revolution split Aussian "ar%ists.Socialist parties before 114 had clearcut national characteristics. Aussians and socialists

in the &ustro;ungarian !pire tended to be the !ost radical. The Ger!an party talked

revolution and practiced refor!is!, greatly influenced by its enor!ous tradeunion !ove!ent.The 9rench party talked revolution and tried to practice it, unrestrained by a tradeunion

!ove!ent that $as both very $eak and very radical. n ngland the socialist but non"ar%ian

:abour party, reflecting the $ellestablished union !ove!ent, $as for!ally co!!itted to

gradual refor!. n Spain and taly, "ar%ian socialis! $as very $eak. There anarchis!, seekingto s!ash the state rather than the bourgeoisie, do!inated radical thought and action.

n short, socialist policies and doctrines varied fro! country to country. Socialis! itself

$as to a large e%tent ?nationali-ed@ behind the i!posing faOade of international unity. This helpse%plain $hy $hen $ar ca!e in 114, al!ost all socialist leaders supported their govern!ents.

SMMAR.

9ro! the !idnineteenth century on, estern society beca!e nationalistic as $ell as urban and

industrial. ationstates and strong!inded national leaders gradually enlisted $idespread

support and gave !en and $o!en a greater sense of belonging. ven socialis! beca!eincreasingly national in orientation, gathering strength as a cha!pion of $orkingclass interests

in do!estic politics. 2et even though nationalis! served to unite peoples, it also drove the!apart. Though !ost obvious in the United States before the Civil ar and in &ustria;ungary

and reland, this $as in a real sense true for all of estern civili-ation. The universal nationalfaith, $hich reduced social tensions $ithin states, pro!oted a bitter, brutal co!petition bet$een

states and thus threatened the progress and unity it had helped to build.

Individuals in Society Garibaldi, Hero of the PeopleWhen Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807188!" visited #n$land in 18%&, he received the 'ost triu'phant elco'e ever

$iven to any forei$ner) Honored and feted by politicians and hi$h society, he also captivated the 'asses) *n

unprecedented crod of a half 'illion people cheered his carria$e throu$h the streets of +ondon) hese ovations

ere no flu-e) In his ti'e, Garibaldi as probably the 'ost fa'ous and 'ost beloved fi$ure in the orld). Hocould this be/

* rare co'bination of ild adventure and etraordinary achieve'ent partly accounted for his de'i$od status) ornin 2ice, Garibaldi ent to sea at fifteen and sailed the 3editerranean for telve years) *t seventeen his travels too-

hi' to 4o'e, and he as converted in an al'ost reli$ious eperience to the 52e Italy, the Italy of all the Italians)6*s he later rote in his bestsellin$ *utobio$raphy, 5he 4o'e that I beheld ith the eyes of youthful i'a$ination

as the 4o'e of the futurethe do'inant thou$ht of 'y hole life)6

Sentenced to death in 18& for his part in a revolutionary uprisin$ in Genoa, Garibaldi barely escaped to South

*'erica) 9or telve years, he led a $uerrilla band in :ru$uay.s stru$$le for independence fro' *r$entina)5Shiprec-ed, a'bushed, shot throu$h the nec-,6 he found in a tou$h youn$ o'an, *nna da Silva, a 'ate and

co'panion in ar's) heir first children nearly starved in the ;un$le hile Garibaldi, clad in his lon$ red shirt,

fashioned a le$end as a fearless freedo' fi$hter)

4eturnin$ to Italy in 18&8, the ca'pai$ns of his patriotic volunteers a$ainst the *ustrians in 18&8 and 18ed hi' their on and sa that he re'ained true to spite of his triu'phs, thereby ennoblin$ these livesand aspirations) Welco'in$ runaay slaves eAuals in +atin *'erica, advocatin$ the e'ancipation of o'en,

introducin$ social refor's in the B and pressin$ for free education and a broader in the ne Italy, Garibaldi the

national hero for freedo' and hu'an di$nity he co''on people understood and loved hi' for it

Documents

AP EURO CHAPTER 25