Armor Magazine, May-June 1989

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)st of us like to do the fun things that comewith our business, like shooting and manewer-ing. And guys in our sister branches get just asexcited about shooting large bullets at targetsthey can't see and jumping from perfectly opera-tional airplanes. But when it comes to trackingthe ammo, fuel, and chow from supply point toconsumer, we would rather let someone elsehandle the mundane, unglamorous details. Wetend to the attitude illustrated by a remark thatAdmiral Ernest J. King made to a staff officer in1942, "I don't know what the hell this 'logistics'is that Marshall is always talking about, but Iwant some of it."Few would challenge the wisdom of a state-ment attributed to the Duke of Wellington duringthe Peninsular Campaign in 1811 "It is verynecessary to attend to all this detail and to tracea biscuit from Lisbon into a man's mouth on the

frontier and to provide for its removal from placeto place by land or by water, or no militaryoperations can be carried out."Nevertheless, logistics continues to be a painin the neck and it's getting lower all the time. Toexamine some facets of the problem, we offer atrilogy of articles. In Armor's Achilles Heel,Tank Sergeant author Ralph Zumbro throws thelight of hindsight on the difficulties in trying tosupply dispersed armor units in Vietnam. MAJMartin E.Dempsey and CPT Alfred C. Tanner

team up to offer solutions to the dilemma oftrying to refuel while providing the enemy alucrative target, in Hot Refuel: Part of theAgility Equation. And finally, 1LT Michael P. Gil-roy explains well how to use a support matrix tosimplify and streamline the difficult supportplatoon mission in The Battalion SupportPlatoon at the NTC.

GeorgeA. Custer did many things well. Forall we know, Generals Terry and Gibbon mayhave said, "You done good," to him on manyoccasions. But in June 1876,Custer's intel-ligence preparation of the battlefield couldhave used some work. 1LT Steven J. Martintakes a non-traditional ook at the LittleBighorn debacle in Defeat at the GreasyGrass, and shows us how to reap lessonsfrom pre-mechanized history applicable to thefind art of IPB.A pair of authors provides insight on how tomagnify two combat multipliers. While we tendto think "defense" when we think mortars, CPTRichard F. Atkinson shows us the flip side inEmploying he Heavy Mortar Platoon in theOffensive. And CPT Richard G. Cardillo Jr. ex-plains how critical the commander's intent isto the FSO in Commander's Intent and the

Field Artillery.In a more lighthearted vein, MAJ HaroldCoyle, author of the best-sellers, TeamYankee and Sword Point, gives us his tongue-in-cheek version of the origin of the NTC inBook One: Genocide.In concluding, I would like to introduce oyou PFC Jody Harmon, our new contributingartist. This issue marks his first cover, and youcan find his work throughout the issue. Hejoins SFC Robert Torsrud in producing llustra-

tions of a quality that we think is the best inthe professional bulletin business.There is more here. If you can't find some-

thing you can use, it's your fault.- PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:WILLIAM J. MEEHAN 11Brigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


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I The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-89-3 (Test)Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS H. TAlT

ARMOR (ISSN 00042420) is publishedbimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.Disclaimer: The information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does itchange or supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy foreach heavy brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalionheadquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com-pany, and motorized brigade headquarters ofthe United States Army. In addition, Armyllbrarles, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA andMACOM staff agencles with responsibiltty or ar-mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or-ganizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-inchief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the US. Army ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponency ln-cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primarily as infantrycarriers; all weapons used exclusively in thesesystems or by CMF 19serles enlisted soldiers;any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexclusively; training for al l SC 12A, 128, and12C officers and for all CMF-%series enlistedsoldiers; and information concerning the train-ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armorand armored cavalry units at the brigadehegi-ment level and below, to include Threat units atthose levels.Material may be reprinted, provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright i s indicated.May-June 1989,Vol XCVIll No. 3

Features7

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Armors Achilles Heelby Ralph ZumbroBook One: Genocide (Or How the NTC Came to Be)by MAJ Harold W. CoyleHot Refuel: Part of the Agility Equationby MAJ Martin E. Dempsey and CPT Alfred C. TannerTactical Weaknesses Seen at the NTCby LTC Peter F.ManzaTeam-COFT Training for the CAT 89 CompetitionDefeat at the Greasy Grass: IntelligenceOperations at the Battle of the Little Bighornby 1LT Steven J. MartinEmploying the Heavy Mortar Platoon in the Offensiveby CPT Richard F.AtkinsonThe Battalion Support Platoon at the NTCby 1LT Michael P. GilroyTo Estimate the Situationby MAJ Michael W. SymanskiReinforcing Leadership in the AOBC Officerby CPT Mark E. Asbury and CPT Jesse WhiteTo Gain and Maintainby LTC Robert R. vany and CPT Michael D. FormicaCommanders Intent and the Field Artilleryby CPT Richard G. Cardillo, Jr.Leadership: Loving and Taking Care of Your Soldiersby MAJ Joseph N.G. LeBoeufDepartments

2 Letters 6 Recognition Quiz2 Contacts 20 Recognition Quiz Answers4 Commanders Hatch 50 Bustle Rack5 Drivers Seat 52 Books


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Praisefor Cav Story...And Some Fine TuningDear Sir,COL (P) Jarrett J. Robertson mademany excellent suggestions in his article,

"Cavalry Missions and Structure," in yourNovember issue. I am happy that some-one has finally taken the time to expoundon the importance that 19Ds have on themodern battlefield.

Under the current battalion scoutplatoon make-up, 1 feel that certain addi-tions to the TOE would make the scoutplatoon itself more self-sufficient and ef-fective. I feel that the platoon sergeant

should be placed in a HMMWV in order tocomplete his support functions of issuingthe "beans and bullets." The H M Wwould afford the platoon sergeant addedmobility and effectiveness in resupplyinghis platoon. The platoon, in turn, couldmaintain sustained combat effectivenessand mission accomplishment by being al-lowed to remain on its mission, such as ascreen line forward of the main body.

In addition, I feel that the platoon leadershould command the platoon from a Brad-ley, separate from the platoon itself. Thiswould entail adding another Bradley tothe scout platoon MTOE. Thus, the scoutplatoon structure would include sevenBradleys (three pairs of Bradleys and the

platoon leader's track) and a HMMWV pesection. The HMMWs would accomplis1the close-in recon missions, based 01their speed and stealth. The HMMWV'combat effectiveness would further be enhanced by the addition of the MKl'grenade launcher.

1 concur totally with COL (P) Robertson'Inclusion of an infantry squad on an MBradley, so that the battalion scouplatoon's final make-up would be seveiM3 Bradleys, one M2 Bradley, and fouHMMWs. I feel that the platoon sergearshould be in the grade of E8 and that hisenior scout should be an E7. This leadeiship structure would be similar to th

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix Is 464.DIRECTORY- Points Of Contact Commercial prefix is kea Code 5o2-6 24- x~~ ~).A R M O R Editorial Offices

Editor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick J. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensProduction AssistantVivian ThompsonContributing ArtistsSFC Robert TorsrudPV2 Jody Harmon

22492249261026102610

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other special platoons' make-up, specifi-cally the mortar platoon.

1 also agree with COL (P) Robertson'ssuggested organization of the cavalryplatoon, troop, squadron, and regiment,and would add the HMMWVs mentionedabove. Their effectiveness can be wit-nessed at the NTC, as used by theOPFOR scouts in BRDM 2 VISMOD altera-tions.

In closing, I would like to thank thecolonel for his article and his analysis inreference to the current poor capabilitlesof reconnaissance under the current TOE.

By the way, where are the Expert ArmorTests and badges that we were promised?

SCOUTS OUT!MONTYA. MILLERSSG, SAFRG

SCUBA for ScoutsReconnoitering Rivers?Dear Sir,1 was impressed by the article, "RedArmy Tank Commander," by LTC Richard

Armstrong, in the November-Decemberissue. It was well written, and illustratesthe difficulty involved in moving large for-mations, especially cross-country.

The hardships endured by the Red Armytankers as they searched for suitable river-crossing sites brought to mind a projectthat the Armor School worked on wayback in 1965. We looked at the use ofSCUBA equipment and techniques for useby scouts to find and mark crossing sites.I think it was a tasking from the old Com-bat Developments Command - ArmorAgency, and the Command & Staff Depart-ment got the job. The conclusion, as Irecall it, was that the scouts could betrained and the equipment procured offthe shelf, but that the job could be doneby engineers.

111 bet those Red Army tankers wouldhave enjoyed having a wet suit in thatcold weather! But they probably just builta fire to dry out and then went on theirway...

CALVIN HOSMER 111COL, Armor (Ret'd.)Durham, N.H.

Helping EngineersTo HelpYouDear Sir.1 read with interest 1LT Keaveny's ar-

ticle, (Jan-Feb issue), on use of the en-gineers in preparation of the deferise andwould like to add some lessons that Ihave learned from six years of directlysupporting armor units.

Although the article addressed mainlytechnical aspects, I would like to addresstwo major problem areas that are verycommon, and severe enough that theycan ruin any chance of properly diggingin an armor unit. They are: handoff be-tween armor units (sections, platoons,and companies) of heavy equipment andwarning or notification of NBC or enemyattack.

The first problem is an easy one to solveif the proper attention is given in unitSOPs and operation orders, and if thechain of command stresses the impor-tance of not losing any blade hours. TheSOP or order must set procedures for thetransfer of equipment and place theresponsibility on the armor units. For ex-ample, the order states that "E Troop willhave two dozers for six hours and thenthey transfer to F Troop, and F Troop willkeep the dozers until all tanks are dug into F Troop CDR's satisfaction; if timeremains, they will then dig in all ADA as-sets under SDN control." This is wheremost orders stop, and this is where theconfusion starts. Most digging is done atnight, and most dozer operators areprivates or specialists. Even the most con-scientious private runs a good risk of get-ting lost between tank positions or units.Either the SOP or the order needs to con-tain something similar to the following:"The unit receiving the digging assets hasthe responsibility to pick up that assetfrom the losing unit. Under NO cir-cumstance will the losing unit allow theengineer equipment to depart his locationwithout an escort from the gaining unit.This applies from company level down tosection level, with the TCs picking up andescorting equipment within platoons." (Ifthis is in the SOP, a reminder needs to beincluded in the order.)If this sounds like Iam degrading the en-

gineers (my own branch) let me explain.The heavy equipment platoon is lucky if ithas a platoon leader, most likely only aplatoon or section sergeant who is busytrying to coordinate maintenance supportfrom his parent unit in another sector or

fuel support. The operators have probablybeen digging for days (no exaggeration atthe NTC), are bone tired, and are lucky ifthey have a map and compass. Chancesare, if they are told to head "that-a-way for300 meters until you run into F Troop,"they will be found the next morning afterthe battle is over.

The second problem is more difficult tosolve. The only radios authorized in theplatoon are for the platoon leader's andplatoon sergeant's vehicles; none for theequipment. Several solutions are im-mediately apparent: (1) keep the equip-ment together and one of the abovevehicles with the equipment at all times,or (2) rely on the armor units for warning.The first option hinders flexibility indeploying equipment, and in reality it isthe second option that must be usedmost of the time. This places the burdenon the armor platoon leader to warn theequipment operators and ensure that theyare in the proper MOPP posture. This notonly applies to NBC attacks, but also toenemy attack. Too often the dozeroperators are only aware of the enemy at-tack when the enemy tanks roll past theirpositions, and the evaluator tells themthey are dead. The operators must bestopped and told face-to-face, (rememberthey are wearing a dust mask, goggles,and hearing protection). This is somethingthat is easily overlooked on FTXs becausethe commander wants the dozers to digfor the next battle and will often "bringthem back to life," rather than have theequipment sit idle, or "dead" for hours. Inreal life the failure to warn the operatorswill cost their lives, and at the NTC willresult in lost blade time.

Proper training on these areas duringhome base FTXs, and a review of SOPsand orders, will help ensure maximumuse of heavy equipment and save lives.

ERIC C. SIMPSONCPT, Resident EngineerAthens, Greece

Some Comments on Observers,Crew Size, and AutoloadersDear Sir,I've recently started receiving your jour-

nal again after almost 10 years, and it'sgreat to see that your professional forumis still going strong.

Continued on Page 57ARMOR - May-June 7989 3


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Leadership: Often StudiedBut Seldom UnderstoodThe Army has been studying

leadership since WWII. In fact,there has been a major leadershipstudy approximately every 18months for the past 44 years. TheCommand and General Staff Col-lege and the Army War Collegehave been studying the subject.Everyone has an opinion aboutwhat constitutes successful leader-ship. Evidently, we seldom reachconsensus, otherwise the subjectwouldn't require so much study.

We have all kinds of leaders in ourArmy. Some units have informalleaders who take charge, fi l l avacuum, even though it is beyondtheir normal responsibility. They arethe so-called natural leaders;however, they may also be in-dividuals who have learned, overtime, how to motivate soldiers.

Those who are good leaders under-stand the human dimension ofleadership and don't have to in-timidate in order to get things done.Intimidation is easy, especially ifyou are a senior officer or NCO. Infact, the more rank, the greater theopportunities to intimidate. If youare oversized and loud, your abilityto frighten increases exponentially.If a leader must use scare tactics, hewill lose the respect of his soldiers.

Good leaders thrive on interactionwith soldiers of all grades. They in-stinctively, or through serious study,know what makes a human beingtick. Soldiers know who theseleaders are and will follow themanywhere, under the most difficultconditions.

The most interesting of ourleaders are the natural ones. The ex-ample that comes to mind is MGJoe Lutz, chief of staff of SpecialOperations Command. Beforevalues became a popular subject fordiscussion in our Army, hepublished a pamphlet, "Values inthe 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment:A Commander's Perspective." Irecently had the occasion to reviewit. His treatise was simple andstraightforward, and I quote hisphilosophy:

"To recognize each individual as asingularly unique, dignified humanbeing. This forms the basis for allother values and, as such, is the keylo a people-oriented philosophy. Allother values become suspect shouldthis value be ignored."

As commander of the 3d CavalryRegiment during the OperationalTest I1 of the M1 tank in 1978, heled his soldiers through the mosttrying of times. He was able tomotivate his soldiers to new heightsthrough personal example, loyalty,and just plain human under-standing. The soldiers of that regi-ment worshipped him.

Although he has gone on togreater achievements in increasinglydifficult assignments, he will alwaysbe remembered as the 57th Colonelof the Regiment. He is a leaderwhom all officers should tr y to emu-late, not because he is a great caval-ryman and special operations sol-dier, but because he gets more outof people with less effort than

MG ThomasH. TaitComm anding GeneralU S .Army Armor Cen ter

anyone I know. He is also techn.;aly proficient, and if we have to sendour sons and daughters off to battle,we want them to be led by soldierslike him. He is an untapped naturalresource for our Army and shouldalways be assigned to leader-shiplcommand positions.

Those who believe that only themanagerial skills of the corporateboardroom are necessary to leadand command American soldiersare out in left field, beyond thebleachers and in the parking lot.And there are senior soldiers whosincerely believe the Army can berun like a major corporation. Theyrun unhappy ships because they donot, will not, understand the humandimension of leadership and, thus,do not understand soldiers. Theybelieve intimidation is th e answer.Some also attempt to hide behindwhat they perceive as a superior in-tellect, and arrogantly dismiss anyattempt to treat soldiers with dig-nity.

The key ingredients to leadershipsuccess are understanding and lis-tening. Those who are always in the"push to talk mode should go on"listening silence;" they might learnsomething.

Soldiers are our most importantasset. Take care of them, love them,and they will surprise you with theirenergy, loyalty, and their ability toaccomplish any mission.

"Treat 'Em Rough!"

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CSMJohn M. StephensCommand Sergeant MajorUS . Army Armor Center

The "Year"of th e NCOThe "Year" of the NCO is about 6months old now, and many

programs have been developed tostrengthen the NCO Corps forseveral years to come. Let's take alook at Armor NCOs. Where arewe and where do we need to go?Six years ago we had problems. Theproblems were brought on byArmor's continuous reclassificationprogram, assignment policies, andcommanders' and senior NCOs' will-ingness to allow incompetence toexist.

The Armor Force's major NCOproblem was that Department ofthe Army promotion boards couldnot select for promotion the num-ber needed. According to therecords, to be a platoon sergeant orfirst sergeant was like having theplague, a number of NCOs wereavoiding the positions. School(NCOES) attendance was weak, GTand SQT scores were low, evalua-tion reports indicated poor tomediocre duty performance andpotential.Today, the Armor NCO profile is

strong. Through tough standards, as-signments, policy changes, im-proved NCOER, outstanding SQTscores, much improved GT scores,and most of all, outstanding com-mander support, you have one ofthe strongest, if not the strongest,Career Management Fields in the

Army! The last three promotionboards have put a stamp of ap-proval on 75 percent of the filesthey have screened. That's 75 per-cent of the eligibles for promotionto meet the minimum qualificationsfor promotion to the next highergrade.

A few years ago, nobody called meabout their NCOs not beingpromoted. Today, I get phone callsfrom wherever Armor units are as-signed about why their NCOs werenot selected for promotion. Thecalls are not from individuals, butfrom the chains of command, whichare concerned about their NCOsand soldiers.

Now, the problem lies in the num-bers to be promoted, which havebeen reduced due to budget con-straints, but certainly not due to thequality of the Armor NCO duringthe "Year of the NCO."

From 1978 to 1982, enlistmentswere below average. During 1Y83and after, we started receiving verytalented enlistees. The Excellencein Armor Program was developedand approved in 1Y85 as a sound ex-cellence program that had thepotential to develop and retain out-standing soldiers in the Army. Out-standing soldiers could rapidly be-come noncommissioned officers,

with a few going to OCS for com-missioned service. The program isnot working well in the hands of thechain of command. With almost3,000 soldiers selected for theprogram, only a few have becn or-ganizational selected. Those whoare eligible for attendance toNCOES are not being allowed orselected to attend. Sergeants arenot being allowed to take Certifica-tion Test I1 for an extra 50 promo-tion points. Some quality sergeantsare attending Master GunnersSchool, but are not members of theEIA Program.

Why is it so important that theEIA Program for Armor succeed?What does it have to do with theYear of the NCO?If the quality of the Noncommis-sioned Officer Corps in Armor is toremain sound and improve, then theEIA Program must succeed. Wemust make every effort to retainquality soldiers in the Army. TheEL4 Program is desiped to speedthe quality soldier up the ladder ofproficiency in order to sustainand/or improve the quality of theArmor noncommissioned officer.

The "Year of the NCO" focuses onprograms to sustain and/or improvethe quality of the NCO. The EIAProgram will ensure that futurequality of the Armor noncommis-sioned officer.

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1

3

Soviet Vehicle Recognition Quiz

5.

2.

4.

6.See Answers on Page 20

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Armor is rightfully called th e Com-bat Arm of Decision. Absolutelynothing alters the course of an in-fantry battle as radically as the ar-rival of a thundering behemoth thatis spewing high explosives, drippinggrenades, and crushing buildings.In Vietnam, once the decision was

made lo try heavy armor, the tankswere an instantaneous successwherever they were applied. Unfor-tunately, several problemsdeveloped, all of which stemmedfrom two basic facts.

First, there were too few of us togo around. For instance, in mid-1967, my company, A-1/69, was theentire armor support for the 1st AirCav, seventeen worn, battered M-48A3s spread out to three fullbrigades of airmobile infantrymen -and they had no other ground sup-port. Second, the supply

When armor units are broken up,As they are likely to be in "limitedwars,"Resupply becomes a fight in itself

mechanisms of a normal armor unitare designed for a conventionalEuropean/North African conflict.There is no way that a line com-pany's abbreviated logistic tail canhandle fractioned operations.

Sometimes the company was splitinto six, or even eight, sections,spread over 250 miles of mountains,paddies, and jungles. Our only"reserve" was lhe six tank! As youmay suspect, controlling and supply-ing these scattcred sections was anightmare.

Armor's Achilles heel is its insa-tiable appetite for combustibles and

spare parts. An M48-M-series tankis supposed to be turned in forrebuild at 4,500 odometer miles, butwe ran ours for 15-20,ooO miles. Thelessons we learned are directly ap-plicable to the two most likelyscenarios for a modern war, the Air-Land Battle and th e so-called Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC).

As far as the tank and its crew areconcerncd, LIC is a misnomer. Thepoliticians may classify a givenfracas as "low-intensity," but downin the jungles, the crews will belighting like wildcats in heat.

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"Unfortunately, even mechanized infantry isn tset up to support heavy armor. The ammunitionand spare parts aren't in their supply line. Onetime, a TC called in for a resupply of 90mm andgot a slingload of 90-mm recoilless rifle ammo.''

In one village battle, wehad to pull out and re-ammo three times inone day. Unfortunately,even mechanized in-fantry isn't set up to su pport heavy armor. Theammunition and spareparts aren't in theirsupply line. One time, aTC callcd in for aresupply of Wmm andgot a slingload of 90-mm recoilless rifleammo.

Whcn you are cross-linked with infantry,your tanks will be scat-tered to the winds, andyou can't afford to losetrack of them. When ter-rain intervenes, set outrelays or establish linksthrough other ncts.

I have been in lirelights so closethat we had to button up andmachine-gun the VC off eachother's hulls. One TC popped uptoo soon and got a canister pellet inthe jaw. Our exec once got into aknife light with an NVA oflicer inhis owii trirrct! When you have toclub hostiles off your hull with thegun tube, that is high intensity - forthat crew.

Tanks that are lighting that hardhave to be resupplied, and quickly.

At one time, we werein such demand that infantry COSwcre loath to admit that they hadtanks with them for fear that some-one else would ask Cor the armor,claiming imminent contact. In thatinstance, the air cav units couldreach their own HUs, but ours wasout of range. Eventually, we evolveda split supply system thilt used theresources of the host unit for suchday-to-day items as fuel, rations,and small arms ammo. When thingsgot hot, though, we had to have

armor ammunition and replacementcrewmcn on tap.

No one, except another tanker,can anticipate the needs of armor incombat. Using seasoned tankers tocontrol the flow of combustibles ex-pedites the process because their ex-perience allows them to undcrstandthe needs of the men in the turrets.

We discovered this by accidentwhen my decrepit dozer tank tookone hit too many and had to beturned in for rebuild. My crew and Igot trapped in company base just assome of its critical personnelrotated out. I was assiped th eduties of ammo/POL NCO, andwhen a call came in, we didn't haveto guess what was needed. We knew.1 learned to sleep with one eye

open, and to keep one ear tuned tothe radio track. Every time a tankor section passed through companybase, the support troops wouldcheck with the TCs to see what wasneedcd.

We developed the practice ofkeeping a basic load Cor oneplatoon in helicopter cargo slings,under canvas, ready to go. Thatsupply had to be partially unpackcdin order to ease the job of the menon the other end. Ninety millimetermain gun rounds, for example, wereuncrated but left in the fiber tubes.We also had several sizes and

8 ARMOR - MayJune 7989


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makeups of slingload. Sometimes, aplatoon or section would call in,needing only a few main gunrounds, C-rats, water, and a fewmechanical spares. Other times, asection on convoy escort wouldneed a few hundred gallons ofdiesel choppered out in bladders.

After a while, you develop an in-stinctive feel lor the type of opcra-tion, and start planning ahead.When a section of tanks is workingthrough a heavily fortified area, i t isgoing to draw HE and HEP morethan any other type 01 ammunition.A convoy rescue, on the other hand,will burn a lo t of flechette and coilx.

The prime rule is that everythingnecessary fo r a protracted cngage-ment must be in company base, incargo slings at all times. Any chop-per, even a gunship, can lift supplyloads. I have seen an ARA shipcome into a hot LZ, drop off asling, and then take up station overa tank and start shooting.

The highest priority after contactmust be the establishmentof a semi-secure LZ for medevac, resupplyand reinforcement. Many times,only tanks can do this, because asection of forest must be smashedflilt to allow the birds to l i d .Several times, we had to pull thetanks out o f a village. form up online, and wheel around in a circle toclear both brush and snipers out ofan area. It was also necessary, attimes, to carry th e wounded out on

the tanks, and haul ammo back tothe infantry.

Tanks working in a built-up areaexpend ammunition at a prodigiousrate. A Patton-series tank carries be-tween 54 and 64 ounds of main gunammo, which can be shot oTl in afew hours. We learned, early on,that coax and SO storage in all mainbattle tanks is insufficicnt. Twcntythousand rounds o f 7.62 and 4,OMlrounds of S O ought to be con-sidered minimum.

We also learned to stow extramain gun rounds outside the turret,and to expend them in ti bonibard-ment period, before entering a hotzone.

All this consumption, however,will work the hell out of the com-pany HO people. For one thing, thelirst-use ammunition dump must beat company base, not battalion. Thecompany doesnt provide enoughbodies or vehicles, so battalion hasto be tapped beforehand forvehicles and personnel. These menshould be attached to the company,under control of its NCOs.

We had to set up a flying columncomposed of two 5-tonners and onedeuce and a half. One truck and itstrailer were for ammo and demoli-tion supplies, and the second rigwas equipped with POL pods. Thedeuce and a half was crammed withgeneral supplies and carried ourown personal gear. Each truck

should come with a driver and aload handler or two. There werenever enough bodies to go around,and at one time, I was moving am-munition with Monlagnards.

For t h e types or war that we seemto be headed for in the latterdecade of this century, thc companysupply system is going to have to heslightly modified. Wheclcd vehiclesjust cant go all the places that atracked vehicle can. On many oc-casions, we used APCs to haulammo into a remote area becausehelicopters couldnt get downthrough triple-canopy rain forest.

A much better solution wouldhave been to use M-548s. That way,each one could he loaded with com-hustihles and set up to tow a fuelbladder. Each carrier should comewith enough crew to handle cargo,and light, i f need be. There shouldbe a SO ring on each one, and theyhave to have radios. In far too manyinstances, we had to find the tanksby following their tracks - or evenby asking the infantry if theyd seenthem.

The company bunkers must heable to resupply the whole outfitseveral times over, once contact isestablished, and the ready-slingsmust be sent off more quickly. Next,whatever means of transport is prac-ticable must be sent of f to resupplyth e base itself. The flow of ammuni-tion must not stop, or youll lose theinitiative.

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asks in the Septem-ber/October issue ofARMOR, Even if westop the Warsaw Pactcold, shouldnt we haveto expect to throw themout of every town andforest they will be sure todefend?

Soviets make un -scrupulous use of the civil popula-tion, and that will force us to createmany small, independent armoredunits, with the attendant supp-ly/admin problems.

Once the enemy is on the dcfen-sive, the pressure must be relent-less, and that means massive con-sumption of fuel, ammo, and ra-tions, as well as spare parts.

We must give some seriousthought to adding a support platoonto the line armor company, especial-ly to those that are part of an in-fantry division. It should be fullytracked, and capablc of allowing thecompany to split into six segments.The supply, mess, and maintenancepeople would all fit in here, and weshould add an artillery-style ammosection. Also, youd gain an extra of-ficer who could double as liaisonwith cross-linked outfits.

Whoever is controlling the re-supply operation must get with thecompany HU noncoms and set up arunning inventory. A balance mustbe struck between having enoughcombustibles on hand, and stillheing able to move the wholeshcbang on a moments notice.When move-out time comes, youllhave to make a decision betweenmaking extra trips, or destroying theextra supplies in place.

Our normal ground supply proce-dure was to take my three-truckcolumn and make bi-weekly runs to

the nearer platoons or sections, asnecessary. Dcpending on local VCactivity, we would either make theruns unescorted, or tag along with ahardened convoy. We usually stuckto roads or tank trails, and let thetanks come out to us.

For a unit that was over 50 milesout, wc would draw cxtra trucksfrom battalion, or a transportationcompany, and set them up withtheir own supplies in a section ofthe host units firebase. (On one oc-casion, we had a platoon workingwith the Korean Capital Division,and had to carry an interpreter withus).

Unless something radical ha ppened, one ru n every two weeks wassufficicnt for these detachrncnts. Inany case, there was always enoughin their dumps to replace a basicload at least twice, and a Chinookfrom Pleiku or Bong Son could easi-ly restock thcm in a few hours.

As time in the field accrues, sowill the need Cor spare parts and ad-vanced maintenance. As a result,therell usually be one or two tanksin the company LZ being workedon, and these ciin be tapped for es-cort duty. Alternatively, when onetank is returning to its platoon, thetrucks can simply tag along. Thisalso allows them to penetratedeeper into the hush, because thetanks can pull thcm through roughgoing, as well as protect them.

If a platoon has beenout much over twoweeks, it will need every-thing from Colemanmantles and mosquitonets to torsion bars andturbo chargers, bearings,seals, headlights ..he listis almost endless. Yourmotor sergeant is thekey hcre. His experiencewill allow him to second-

guess wear and tear, and to replacethings before thcy blow.

When a road wheel or idler bear-ing, for instance, starts to use toomuch grease, rcplace it before thewheel falls off. When a battery getstoo thirsty, replace it before theothers get pulled down, too. Youhave only as much voltagc as tliclowest bilttery in the harness, andplugging in the slave ciible is not ad-visable when lead bees are trimmingthe underbrush.

When you have exceeded turn-inmileage by douhle or triple, and arebeing shot at in the bargain, therules go out the hatch. Annual milin-tcnance was being done quarterly inVietnam, and normal monthlv lubeschedules had to be pulled weekly.If the parts can be gotten to thetanks, its amazing how much repairwork the crews can perform out inthe field. We even hrought a VTRout to the Cambodian border andchanged powerpacks on top of ajungled mountain.

As mileage increases, so does thelist of on-hoard spares. We learncdlo carry road wheels and extra tracksections, headlights, bolts, lengths ofwire, LMG spares - I think wehauled about a half ton of partsmost of the time. Some tanks evencarried a few torsion bars, lashed tothe sponson boxes.

In a normal tank or cavalryplatoon, theres no such thing as

10 ARMOR - May-June 1989


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pliltoon or section equipment, be-cause youre supposed to be able toget everything necessary from com-pany HU.

Thats fine for a World War il-type operation. but if youre in aCentral American rain forest, orhalfway across Africa. youre goingto have to be self-supporting. Thatmeans extra gear, and a place tohitul it. Long-range base antennas,fo r example, and engine-liftingslings. Extra-length tow cables andslave cables. Fuel transfer pumpsand hoses. Trip llares, claymores.and wire for semiperniancntpcrimeters. The list goes onlorever, and all this needs to hestowed. Eventually, we wound upmanufacturing oversize bustle racksand splitting up the accessorics.

If a section or platoon is tooperate in a defined area, say, outof some infantry firebase, it can begivcn a trailer load of basics and afuel trailer. You simply hook t h etrailers directly to the tank and haulyour housekeeping gear with you.This method will give a heavy sec-tion an independent capability, be-cause three tanks and two platoonsof infantry can live for quite a whileoff five tons of general supplies.The normal SOP was for one tankand one platoon to man theperimeter and rest, while the otherplatoon and two tanks beat thebushes.

You can find a way to get fuel, am-munition, food and parts out to thetanks, but evcntually, wear on themachincry \vi11 overcome the supplyof mechanics, and conibat attritionwill cause a shortage of skilled crew-men. There simply arent any sparetroops in a line company unless youcross-train your rear echelon typesas tankers.

1 have seen three TCs medevacedout in half an hour. The gunnerstook over the titnks, and galvanizedcooks and clerks came out on thesupply ships. Most of the time,whcn a platoon was sent out toclean up an ambush, thered be aline of would-be loaders waiting bythe gate. We even used Air Forcemen during Tet.

Cross-training will also help solveth e mechanic problem. If you starthaving your motor people give clas-ses now, and send your morepromising candidates to schools,you will drastically increase yourunits effectiveness and flexibility.

Americans are unique in that we,more than any other nation, arewedded to machinery. That meansthat our Army, more than anyother, can keep tanks running underadverse and even impossible condi-tions.

Wed damn well better be plan-ning ahead, though, because th eRussians are still building 260 tanksper month. That means that the fate

ARMOR - May-June 7989

of the free world is resting squarelyon our armored shoulders.

Tank Sergeant, RalphZumbros memoir of hisservice in Vietnam, wasreleased in paperback lastyear by Pocket Books. Hehas served as an NCO ineach of the combat arms,including combat servicein the RVN. He has com-manded tanks in Vietnam,USAREUR, and CONUS,and has served as a gun-nery and demolitions in-structor. With a degree inmarine propulsion technol-ogy, hes also worked asa salvage diver, yacht cap-tain, and vocational-techni-cal instructor. Currently,he is writing full-time andh is n e w b o o k ,IJun g I et ra c ks , co-authored with his formerXO, James Walker, is dueto be released by PocketBooks this summer.


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Book One:GenocideFrom the heavens, God heard

their appeal for salvation. What Hesaw did not please Him. With a600-ship Navy and the the B-lbomber on the way, He turned to(OrHowthe NTC Came to Be) answer the prayers of His lostchildren.

Accordingto MAJ HaroldW. CoyleIn the beginning, there was only

So, on the first day, God createdthe National Training Center. And

darkness and a vast void populatedby OCs, computer technicians, andthe OPFOR. Across the face of thegreat barren nothingness, these in-digenous personnel wandered lost,aimless, and without purpose. Indespair, they cried out, "Father,save us. Look down upon us andtake pity on such miserable crea-tures as us."

lo, the masses rejoiced in the f x tthat they had received a missionand funding. tiod looked down andsaid, "For a start, it ain't bad."

On the second day, God createdth e hardware and tools for His hud-dled masses. For the computer tech-nicians, He gave them the StarWars building, an air conditionedoasis of wire, diodes, and CRTs

from which the COG could reachout and touch everyone. To t h eOPFOR, He gave them Sheridanswith unlimited warranties,VISMODs, and no speedometers.

But the greatest gift of all went tothe OCs; the controller gun. Therewas much happiness over this. Infact, the masses were so pleasedwith Him that, in His honor, theynamed the controller gun after Him.

On the third day, very early, Godcreated NTC rotations. Beforedawn, He summoned forth the war-rior chiefs of His armored andmech brigades and assigned themthe tasks of leaving their green, lushdomain where they ruled supremeand sally forth into the Valley of



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Death. There, DRRTs watched andreported. Computer techniciansscanned the air waves and recordedevery move. Worse, hordes of OCsmoved throughout the vast waste-lands, watching, waiting, recording,as th e armored and mech forcewandered about singularly and inclumps. And in their time, theOPFOR fell upon the hordes of t h ewarrior chiefs, wreaking great havocand destruction. It was not a prettysight. From His heavens, Godlooked down and said, "Not bad fora beginning. But now what?"

On the morning of the fourth day,it came to Him. To aid the warriorchiefs, He created the eight operat-ing systems, (later to be revised toseven, once all the warrior chiefshad memorized the eight). Godtook these eight operating systemsand again summoned His warriorchiefs, and to them He said, "Takethese, my children. Read them.Learn from them, and go forth andprosper at the NTC, for within themare the keys to success.'' The war-rior chiefs, awed by His presence,accepted the gift, went back to thcirgreen pastures, and became con-fused.

But all was not well. Despite Hisgenerous gift of knowledge and wis-dom, the warrior chiefs stillblundered forth into the Valley ofDeath and were decimated by therampaging OPFOR. Searching for asolution, God tore a page frommedieval history. Using the prin-ciples perfected by the Spanish In -quisition, He created the AAR onthe fifth day. In a flash, OCs,trained in the finer points ofphysiological torture and KGB inter-rogation techniques, scoured thecountryside in small vans, linked byradio to the Star Wars building, insearch of warrior chiefs who vio-lated His holy writ, (Le. the eightoperating systems). When found,the offending warrior chief and his

selected minions were crammedinto the t iny vans and subjected tohours of multimedia "AARs". Godlooked down upon this andchuckled.

But all was not well, for soon afew warrior chiefs not only began tomaster the OPFOR, but, misguidedand ill advised, some evenpronounced the NTC to be fun. So,on t h e sixth day, God created firemarker teams, Hind hclicopters,and infantry augmentation of theOFPOR. To them, He charged,'Go, seek, strike, and punish the of-fending warrior chiefs. Make thembelievers." And so, in liege with theOPFOR and OCs , these new ele-ments roamed the vast wastelandsin search of wayward warrior chiefs.And in His name, the fire markerteams, Hind helicopters, and in-fantry augmentees metered out swiftand just punishment.

Now, this being the NTC, therewas no rest on the seventh day. In -stead, God searched far and widefor new and exciting ways to tor-ment His warrior chiefs. And as Hesearched His great domain, He castHis eyes upon the light infantry. Ina flash of inspiration, He decidedthat they too should share in the"fun" at the NTC. So again Hecalled forth His warrior chiefs tothe mound and bestowed uponthem a new gift. He called it theheavy/light rotation. Rather thanrejoice, however, the warrior chiefscried out in fear, "What, My Lord,shall we do with them? We have nodoctrine, no common ground. Weare pleased with your gift, but weneed your light to show us the way."

But there was only silence anddarkness. Confused and in greatfear, the warrior chiefs eachreturned to their respective greenpastures where they contemplatedtheir navels and awaited divineguidance. But lo, there was none.So, with mounted warriors and


'Light Fighters" hand in hand, th ewarrior chiefs went forth once moreinto the Valley of Death. Thoughthere was much befuddlement andlittle success, the warrior chiefs didnot protest, for they feared the" M R .

Satisfied that His work at the NTCwas done, God looked upon Hisvast domain and searched for newworlds to create. And lo, fromacross th e great Atlantic, He heardmuch gnashing of teeth and the rent-ing of clothes. Looking from Hisheavens, He saw another great voidwhere darkness, despair, and fearabounded. He was unhappy withwhat He saw at Hohenfels. Callinghis lost children of Hohenfelstogether, He said to them, "Fearnot. Be strong of heart. I haveheard your cries, and have come togive you purpose and meaning."

And so, He went back andscheduled a command and staffmeeting for early Monday morningat which He would announce His in-tent to clone the OPFOR, computertechnicians, and OCs at the NTCand levitate t he clones to Germany,where the Seventh Army warriorchiefs would be able to partake ofthe fruits of the dreaded 'AARs".

Satisfied with His efforts for theweek, He turned off the lights, lock-ed the door, and went home to Her.

Major Harold W. Coyle is a1974 distinguished militarygraduate of VMI. He hasserved as a tank platoonleader in the FRG, chief of theM1 Branch and Gun Manage-ment Branch in the WeaponsDepartment, USAARMS, armoradvisor to Readiness GroupKnox, and assistant operationsofficer with the CombinedField Army in Korea. He is cur-rently assigned to Fort Hood.

13


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Hot Refuel:Part of the Agilityby Major Martin E. Dempseyand Captain Alfred C. Tanner

The tenets of Airland Battle canoften take on lofty meanings as theyare debated in the Army school sys-tem. But they have meaning, too,where the track pad meets the roadin the MlAl armor battalion.

One of the four tenets -AGILITY -seems to us to be the essence of thearmor battalion support platoonleader's mission. I t is the supportplatoon leader's job to keep the fuel-intensive tank fleet responsive andon the move. One of hi s most valu-able tools in accomplishing this mis-sion is the hot refuel.

The hot refuel is so called becauseof the urgency with which it is ac-complished, and because vehiclesdo not shut down during theprocess of refueling. Properlyplanncd and executed, the hotrefuel is what makes t h e sweepingcounterattacks of current AirlandBattle doctrine possible. The ho trefuel is what makes it possible fora commander to pull units out of

one part of the battle, move themover extendcd distances, andemploy them elsewhcre on the bat-tlefield.

In the 'Thundcr Brigade" of the 3dArmored Division, we practice hotrefuel at least once each yuarter. Inthe 4 th Battalion, 67th Armor, hotrefuel is part of our unit Mission Es-sential Task List (METL).

Hot rcfuel takes advantage of th ecapabilities of the My78 Heavy Ex-panded Mobility Tactical Truck(HEMTT'). The M978 fuel truckhas a 2,500-gallon tank, a 300-gallon-per-minute centrifugal pump, andtwo hose reels, each equipped with50 feet o f one and one-half inch dis-pensing hose. Each hose has a 50-gallon-per-minute capacity. Thereare 12 M978 tank trucks in thearmor battalion support platoon.

Planning for hot refuel is part ofevery OPLAN produced in 4-67Armor. After the battalion S3 has

wargamed his concept of the opera-tion, the battalion S4 uses the Class111 Bulk Pliinning Factors in SB 710-23 (o r in USACGSC ST 101-2) andpredicts fuel consumption for eachphase of the operation.

For example, il the operation willbegin with a movement from a tacti-cal assembly area along secondaryroads and into an attack positionjust short of an LD/LC some 60kilometers away, the S4 can predicthow much fuel each tank will needto he "topped off' as it crosses theLD/LC. Such a movement wouldprobably mean one hour of tacticalidle (TI) and two hours o f road-march along secondary roads (SR).The formula to compute consump-tion is straightfoward:

TlME IN HOURS X CONSUMP-TION RATE FOR TI + TlME INHOURS X CONSUMPTIONRATE FOR SR = GALLONSTALIONCONSUMED BY THE BAT-



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The S4 computes the fuel requiredfor each tank by dividing the bat-talion total by 58 (the number oftanks assigned). In this example, thecomputations work out as follows:1.0 (675.8) + 2.0 (3,059.8) =6,795GALLONS FOR THE BAT-

TALIONand

6,795GAL divided by 58 TANKS= 117 GALLONS PER TANKThis 117 gallons represents 23 per-

cent of the MlAl's capacity.

With this information, the S4know that he must provide eachtank 117 gallons of fuel if the hat-talion is to cross the LD/LC"topped off." He also knows that at50 gallons-per-minute it will takethe M978 approximately twominutes to bring an individual tankto near capacity. He can now planthe hot refuel.

As with most military operations,th e hot refuel planning processbegins with a map reconnaissance.The object is to find areas along thebattalion's line of march that willsupport up to eight M978 fuelersparked either abreast or in columnat least 100 meters apart.

The criteria for selection of hotrefuel sites vary little from criteriaused in th e selection of other sitesfor military operations. However,


Figure 1. Short Site Configuration

Hot Refueling: Two Waysto Set Up the Site75


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Figure 3. Hot Refueling at NightUsing Chemlites for Traffic Control

traflicability in the hotrefuel site is essential be-cause the entire battalionwill pass through in aboutan hour. The hot refuel siteis also a very lucrative tar-get and at the same timevery vulnerable. The sup-port platoon leader seeks asite with some cover andconcealment, but the mosteffective protection for thehot refuel site is careful0 SEC before occupationand rapid use of the lidlityonce it is established.

After a map reconnais-sance, the support platoonleader conducts a groundreconnaissance and selects at leasttwo hot rcfuel sites. These becomepart o f the service support annex tothe S3's OPORD and are annotatedon the service support averlay. Heselects multiple sites because thekind of operations requiring hotrefuel often produce conflicts overpossession o f terrain among friendlyunits. He alerts th e support platoonsergeant and briefs his platoon onhow the hot refuel is to be con-figured at each site. There are twostandard hot refuel configurations:the short site and th e long site(figures 1 and 2). Common to eachconfiguration is t h e preparation ofthe M978 fuelers, which must begrounded and camoullaged.

Two 10-pound fire extinguishersare positioned to the rear of eachfuel truck. The support platoonlcadcr establishes traffic controlpoints (TC'P) at the point where thebattalion will leave the designated

0 0 0TANK REFUELING LANEe

e 0ID epTANK REFUELING LANE

0 00DIRECTION 8 F TRAVEL-0 0 0 0

TANK REFUELING LANEe

m e e eI D TANK REFUELING LANE0 0 0 0

Fig. 3 HOT REFUEL AT NIGHT0 Green Chemlites0 Red Chemlites

route, at the rear of each group offuelcrs, and at the point where thebattalion will rejoin the designatedroute.

As tanks enter the hot refuel site,they maintain road march speed.Trained drivers know to fall in onthe fuelers and to take their direc-tions from the traffic control points.They position thcir tank adjaccnt tothe designated M978. They workquickly, but they have been trainedto understand the delicate balancebetween a sense of urgency andsafety.

During limited visibility and atnight, chemical lights are used tomark lanes for the tanks (figure 3).Tank crcwman are trained to drivebetween red and grccn lights, andTCPs guide them into position. Alltraffic control points and lucl hand-lers are equipped with filtercd flash-lights.

Security at the hot rcfucl site is t h eresult o f a combination of the sup-port platoon's heavy machine gunassets, Stinger teams attached to t h eplatoon Tor this phase of the opera-tion, and the arrival of th e tank com-panies. However, as mentioned ear-lier, clearly the best security for ahot refuel operation is OPSEC andspeed.

The hot refuel site must he set upand operational one hour from thetime the support platoon leaderreceives the order to execute it. Itwill be brokcn down and rcadv tomove W minutes after the first tankbegins to refuel.

The support platoon leadermanages "time at the pumps," basedon guidance h c receives from the S4and battalion executive officer.Each fuel squad leader in theplatoon uses a stop watch tomonitor "time at the pumps" for his



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HEMTT fueler's design permits refueling wovehicles at once, on either side.three trucks. I f 100 gallons per tankis the goal, t he squad leader allowseach tank two minutes on the pump.When that time has elapsed, thesquad leader instructs his fuel hand-lers to pull th e hose, and he wavesthe tank on its way. A tank com-pany trained in hot refuel can passthrough a site and receive 100 gal-lons (2 minutes) of fuel for eachtank in about eight minutes.

Because each tank receives thesame amount of fucl, t h e first tankinto the site is t h e first tank out, andthe battalion's march is virtuallyuninterrupted. The battalion hitsthe LD/LC nearly "topped ofP andconfigured as it wants to be when itmakes contact.

When the battalion has passedthrough the refuel site, the supportplatoon breaks down its camouflagenets and moves to a designated,secure location. There, i t cross-levels the fuel tanks. The empty fueltrucks then move to a support hat-talion forward fuel point to drawfuel; the full trucks remain on callto support the battalion.

The "Bandits" of 4-67 Armor usedthe hoc refuel with great successduring Reforger '88. We used it

both in the counterattack roledescribed here, and while pullingout of dcfcnsivc positions inresponse to a change in mission. Weused it to bring our tank fleet - andattached Bradlcys - to near-full onfuel, and we used i t to provide thefleet a one- (SO gallons) or two-(100 gallons) minute burst of fucluntil the situation settled and refuel-ing could he accomplished on ourterms. We used as many as eightM078 fuelers, and we used as few asfour, depending on how quickly thebattalion commander wanted com-panies on the move. We used bothshort and long sites based on theterrain available.

The hot refuel works. It works be-cause we train with it. It works be-cause our support battalion (S4FSB) supplies our M978s forward.It works because we take advantageof the capabilities o f our equipment.I t works, and it adds to our agilityon the battlefield.I n Srq>p!vitfg IVkv; Martin Creveld

suges ts that tactics is the art of thepossible, and logistics the art of thepractical. In 4-67 Armor, thesecome together in the hot refuel -part of the agility equation.


Major Martin E.Dempsey Is the executiveofficer of 4th Battalion,67th Armor in Friedberg.Germany. He is a 1974graduate of the UnitedStates Military Academyand a 1988 graduate ofthe Command andGeneral Staff College. Hehas served with theSecond Armored CavalryRegiment and the FourthInfantry Division.Captain Alfred C. Tannerwas commissioned inArmor from NorwichUniversity in 1985 and isa graduate of the Armor

Officer Basic Course, theMotor Officer Course, Air-borne School, JungleSchool, and the GermanAirborne School. He hasserved as an M1 tankplatoon leader, supportplatoon leader, and com-pany executive officer. Heis currently attending In-fantry Officer AdvanceCourse at Ft. Benning.

17


20/56

Tactical Weaknesses Seen at the NTC:by Lieutenant Colonel Peter F. Manza

Despite much improvement,Rotating units seem to haveReached a plateau...The emphasis on "winning" at the

NTC has inspircd major, positivechanges in our training philosophiesand the improved readiness of theforce. Yet, to even the casual ob-sewer, our forces have reached aplateau of effectiveness through thecontinued failure to address fun-damental issues of battalion andbrigade tactics. I will address theseissues as an ex-regimental com-mander and my opinions arc certain-ly open to criticism, based upon thislimited view.

The artillery systemDoes not workI t is broke, hecause the maneuver

commandcr does not control theresource, is out o f the communica-tions link for call for fire, and is sub-ject to passing the problem off, in-stead o f fixing it. Failure t o hi t theOPFOR with sufficicnt artillery is asignificant weakness of the force,and only the maneuver commandercan solve the problem. We can look

for some solutions lo the OPFOR,which do not employ automiition orsecure radio:0 Pass calls for fires over the com-

mand net as spot reports. Central-ize authority lo deny the engage-ment of a target at the hattalionIcvcl. Sounds like the pre-lYSOs, butit works!0 Make the subordinate com-

mandcrs plan their fires with theFISTS and hold the commandersresponsible for the execution. TheFIST must then rehearse the fireplan with the maneuver commanderand mark engagement areas.

The S2 must also call for tiresthrough other means the com-mander provides - scout platoon,rcconnaissance clcments, FISTteams, etc. This places the respon-sibility for long-range fires (thoseoutside of the battalion direct-fireengagement areas) in the hands o fthe man responsible for the area ofinterest.0 Have the battalion fire coor-

dination elements report fires inprogress, rounds expended, andplanned fires. This systeni backs up

breakdowns in communicntions. al-lows for allocation of itssets, and as-sures tinicly fires when necdcd.0 Use FASCAM in the offense to

pin forces down (target p1.tI oondefensive positions). segregate apart of the battlefield. or deny likelyavenues of approach by 11 rescrveforce. Look at the holes dug by thedefender; this simple technique willtcmplate the dcfense in suflicientdctitil to execute accurate fire plans,to include FASCAM. The 104th Ar-morcd Brigade was the master o fthe FASCAM in the attack. FAS-CAM used in the offense does nothave to be covered by fire in ordcrto confuse, delay, or segregate.

The maneuver commander is thekey to fixing the system, not the artil-lery, for he alone controls the plan-ning and the means to execute.

Keep a reserveAlthough our doctrine at battalion

level certainly does not encouragethis, four tanks can break the at-tack, and a tank company loose inthe rear of a defender destroys thewill to fight. A reserve forceprovides flexibility, a resource to



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gain the initiative, and a forcecapable of executing deceptionplans. However, its probable loca-tions in the defense must be as wellplanned as any othcr, to include en-gineer support.

We still don't use -Our infantry well

lacking are definitive missionsduring offensive operations.

Engineers walking at night are ef-fcctive in clearing passagcs andlanes, and marking hreaches formaneuver forces. Combined with adisniounted infantry attack, theygain mutual support.

Although commanders at the NTChave identified our use of infantryas a problem, little has bccn ac-complished. Infantry platoons, cross-trained as security elements andreconnaissance elements, are one o fthe better missions Ib r continuousoperations, particularly in thedesert. The M2 platoon, much likethe BMP-equipped OPFOR unit,provides a suitablc force capable o fvaried mounted and dismountedoperations, which can supplementor replace the battalion scoutplatoon. Security operations con-ducted by infantry platoons are thebackbone of the OPFOR securityduring defenses. They are used inthe regimental security zone for am-bushes, flank security during move-ment to contact, as advance guards,and in any number of missionswhere the BMP's mix of weaponscan be effective. The U.S. infantryplatoon does not appear to operatewell in such independent missions.Apparently, problems are caused bypoor training, inadequate doctrine,and a lack of mission.

Getting more fromOur engineersEngineer support must involve

more than digging lighting positionsfor comhat vehicles. The excuse o finadequate equipment for offensiveoperalions is weak at best. What is

The attacking OPFORStill has the initiativeI n the defense, we still appear to

he too smart lo r our own good. Onnunierous occasions, the dcfendcr'sdecision point is equated to somemythical decision point o f the at-tacker.In almost all instanccs during a

regimental attack, the decision as towhich of two avenues of attack touse was made nine hours before H-hour. Intelligence updates only con-firmed the choice, deception plansand infantry attacks made thechoice possible, and finally artillerypreparations were time sensitiveand could not be changed withintwo hours of attack.

The real issue in the conduct ofthe defense is initiative. Thedefender must do something to getthe initiative away from the attack-er. The 3rd ACR, in defendingSIBERIA, was the master of thisprinciple by defending forward be-hind Thc Whale, where the regi-ment had to enter the engagementarea piecemeal. This truly took theinitiative away from th e attacker.

Deception incorporated into thedefense is essential, and must be apart of the plan to be believable.Resupply operations are the usualindicators of real and deception

p h s . The 9th Infantry Division'srotation was a classic example ofusing deception operations, andmuch can be lcarned from its ap-proach to executing operations thatcombined deception, maneuver, andattack by lire. The risk is high, butthe payoff has the potential to ini-prove sccurity for thc forcc andgain the initiative.

Weaknesses persist inReconnaissance and securifyApparently, thcre is an intrinsic

weakness in reconnaissance andsccurity cywrations in the U.S.Army. First, the introduction oftrucks in the scout platoons will notsolve the basic doctrinal problem ofwhat tltc scorrl ylatoort is to do. Inthe regiment, the issue is simple -do reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance platoon al-ways lost when it had to fight. Thiswas particularly true when it had tolight to gain intelligence. In reality,it fought to gain access to an areafor reconnaissance. When the niis-sion was supported by other arms,particularly dismounted infantry,the introduction into an area ofoperations by the reconnaissanceplatoon came after the light.

Our contention was that theregimental reconnaissance platoonshould be equipped with all trucks(BRDM). This is easy to say, con-sidering that the regimental bat-talions/conipanies were prepared toconduct sccurity operations themsel-ves, and are not dependent uponthe scout platoon or the counter-reconnaissance effort of the bat-talion as we currently execute ourdoctrine. The U.S. Army must solvethe basic doctrinal problem and as-



22/56

sign the mission and equipment ac-cordingly - particularly at brigadelevel.

Plan for coordination,But keep plans simplePlans must he simple yet coor-

dinated. The OPFOR used the "out-dated" graphic order with a S2matrk for AIS and TIS, plus an en-gineer work plan, artillery maneuverand fires plan, air defense plan (of-fense included), an IPB, plus asecurity or reconnaissance planprepared by the S2. This graphic ap-proach was combined with a well-vcrscd SOP and simplistic Sovict-style graphics, which orient theforce utilizing fire lines. The S2 is abig player and therefore receivedthe assets to do his job, and theagony of defeat i l it didn't work.

Antitank doctrine in the U.S.Army can get a boost i l we studySoviet approaches to antitankplatoon operations, particularly inthe offense. In the offense, the an-titank platoons (nine BRDM-2s)protect the flanks or other likelyavenues of approach with mussedfires, in coordination with attackhelicopters. Simple graphic coor-dination measures, such as firinglines, are used to orient the fires ofboth weapons systems and informthe higher headquarters about loca-tion. Overwatch by thin-skinnedvehicles, such as the ITV andBRDM, is next to impossible toachieve in the offense. In thedcfense, the antitank platoons werecoordinated with the reserve (alsoco-located) to improve survivability,maximize thcir mobility, and addtheir long-range fires to the reservefire lines or to engagement areasforward. Engineer support for firing

positions was critical, as was theability to reconnoiter all engage-ment areas and mark the limits offire.Some conclusionsFinally, I think one can easily

deduce that the OPFOR has the ad-vantage of time and place, and ofdoing on a daily basis. ButOPFOR's degree of intensity has in-creased markedly as the standardsof the "BLUEFOR improved. Theissues discussed above assume com-petent soldiers, good equipment,and the skills to employ the or-ganization, which is gcncrally trueof all units coming to the NTC.Leadership is seldom the issue. l n -tensity sometimes is the issue. Theissue now is training at the harderlevel of coordination, and Tiing thesystems and doctrine that arebroken. This will require a directedeffort into the "how to" manuals.Armor commanders will have totake the lead in applying the lessonsby questioning currcnt procedures,offering alternatives to systems thatbreak during combat, and trainingthe combined arms force for com-bat.

Lieutenant ColonelPeter F. Manza was com-missioned in Armor fromOCS and has served invarious Armor assign-ments, the most recentas commander of the 1stBn., 63d Armor, the NTCOPFOR. He is currentlyattending the Naval WarCollege, Newport, R.I.

Recognition Quiz AnswersCraig M. Hughes of the Threat

Division, USAARMS, prepared thisissue's Recognition Ouiz. Instead ofshowing the full vehicle, Mr. Hugheshas focused on distinctive details ofSoviet vehicles. It's a difficult quiz,and only those who have kept currenton the most recent developments inSoviet ground force equipment willcorrectly identify all vehicles.-Ed.

1. BMD. The airborne emblem onthe turret hatch, the AT-5 missile tothe right of the commander, and themantlet of the 73-mm cannon are theidentifiers telling you this is a BMD.

2. BMP-2. The 30-mm main gun(the BMP-1 has a 73-mm gun), the AT-5 missile, and the smoke grenadelaunchers to the right of the turretidentify the BMP-2.

3. BRDM-2. You can see that this isa wheeled vehicle, limiting the fieldsomewhat. It's the centered turret withthe 14.5mm gun, and the engine atthe rear of the hull with exhaust sys-tem (partially painted) on each side,that identifies this as the BRDM-2.

4. 2S9. This is a relatively new sys-tem and difficult to identify. The dis-tinctive mantlet, the size of the gun(120-mm) and the unique turret areidentifying features of the 2S9 self-propelled airborne assault howitzer.

5. MTLB. The unsupported track(Le., no return rollers), boat-shapedhull, and small turret mounting the7.62-mm machine gun are all featuresof the MTLB.

6. BTR-80. This looks l ike a BTR-60or 70, but notice that the roof hatchesin the middle of the hull have beenreconfigured, and there are firingports in each hatch. These obviousfeatures identify this vehicle as theBTR-80.



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Team-COFT Trainingfor the CAT'89 Competition"RED6 this is yoorrr National Judge -

Watclt Your Front.""RED Elcrireiits, this is RED 6,

watch yai r front."

"One one, shot 27 riglit, need helpwith Q2."

"OlW orw,gw llle n co1rnt.""One our, I coirrit four. ''"01ie rie, roger four."This platoon radio transmission

did not take place on a firing range,it occurred in a simulation device inVilseck, FRG. I t is the newlydesigned Canadian Army TrophyTeam - COW (T-COFT), designedand built by General ElectricAerospace. I t is an essential part of

tocompeting for the coveted CATtrophy. Considered by many tankersthroughout NATO as the "SuperBowl" of tank gunnery, t h e CATcompetition requires tank crewsfrom five nations to rapidly and ac-curately engage targets, which areconsiderably smaller than the stand-ard NATO "H"-series argets.

the U S . Army's latest appro'IC1

Teamwork is the key to CAT com-petition, ai d the new C O R trainerprovides the environment todevelop each platoon into a rapidengagement force. The Vilsccktrainer is a network of four shcl-tered U - C O f l systems. The train-ing program is specifically dcsignedto provide a tank platoon with theopportunity to train rigid fire dis-tribution i d ontrol. The databaserepresents lanes 3, 4. 5, and 6 ofRange 9 at the Bergen training areain the northeast arcit ol the Fedt.ridRepublic of Germany. Naturidvcgetation. lane surfaces, rangemarkers and targets accuratelyprovide platoons with a com-puterized version of the actualrange. Crews are able to movethrough the simulated terrain just asthey will on the day of the competi-tion.

Features unique to the CAT (T-COFT) include main gun and trooptargets that correspond in size,shape, and color to those firedduring the week of competition. Tar-gets are both stationiiry and moving,with a range b i d from 800 o 2000meters. A crew can engage up toeight targets simultaneously fromany firing position on the range.The ballistic characteristics of120mm SABOT are so exact that agunner must perlorm all manipula-tions correctly in order to obtain atarget hit. Gun tube bending anddroop are also introduced, requir-ing a gunner to periodically perform

a muzzle refcrence system update inorder to maintain proper boresight.The TEAM-COW capitalizes onthe skills learned in individual gun-nery training. A platoon gunneryrole further develops collective coor-dination and gunnery skills.

Another new innovation in the T-C o n is the system's performancemeasurement capabilities. Auto-mated scoring stringently followsthe rules of competition scoring. Aspecial CAT "Platoon Battle RunScore" summary is generated at theend of each battlerun. It providesthe platoon with a total score, in-cluding thc time score. hit andbonus score lor main gun targets,machine gun score, and main gunammunition bonus points. In addi-tion to providing a platoon score,each tank receives printouts, whichlist the targets it engaged, whetherhi t or miss, the t ime to engage, andthe exact lay of the reticle aimingdot in relation to the center mass oftarget. The T-COFT can operate asan individual crew traincr. a sectiontrainer, or a pliltoon trainer. C'om-petition scoring gives unit leaders astandardized approach to training,and requires each crew todemonstrate mastery o f difficultskills. The strongest feature of theU-COW system, direct mcasure-ment of critical skills, is preservedand increased in the new T-COFT.All required data to produce a high-ly qualified tank commander/gunnercombination is readily available.



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Lane 4 tank fol-lows Lane 3 tankfrom quarantinearea to Bound 1.

Lane 3 tank hasturned onto its lanewhile Lane 4 tankcontinues to moveon its appropriatelane.ARMOR - May-June 1989


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Lane 3 tank con-ducts offensiverecon from Bound 2to Bound 3. Lane 4tank conducts simul-taneous offensiverecon from Bound 1to Bound 2.

Lane 4 tank moves1 to

2 in prepara-

ARMOR - MayJune 7989 23


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Lane 3 tank con-ducts range recon,while Lane 5 tankrecons from Bound1.

In the near future, the ArmorSchool in Fort Knox will receive thefirst CONUS platoon configurdonof COW. The device, named UTL2,will provide Armor Officer Basicstudents with the opportunity totrain fire distribution and control at

bincd arms training range in Grafen-wochr, and provide computerizedscenarios based upon Tank TableXI1 in FM 27-12-1, plus special pur-pose scenarios based upon a Threatattacking or defending force. AOBstudents will also have the capability

a collective level. UT12 will to formulate a battle plan by con-resemble Range 301, a major com- ducting a reconnaissance of the

CAT Platoon Battle Run ScoreDate: 12/6/88 Instructor:Carlsberg, K. Program: CATVehicle: 1/11 All Commander: Lane, B. Gunner: Black, J.ExerciseNo.:201 114 Platoon 3/68 C1sit Firing Target Kill Platoon HiffMiss StatusNo. Tank Number Time WMl PL PS WM21 PS 32 8 HITPL 3A 5 HITWMl,WMP,PL Q l 11 HIT MISS HIT

Hit Score Time Score Hit Bonus Ammo Bonus MG Points Totalloo00 6120 500 400 1800 18820Status: Exercise Complete - FreezeKeypad Options: Perf, Repeat, Shot Pat, Print, Terminate

area through a special recon excr-cise. The system will also provide avaluable resourcc to tcst new innova-tions such as the Commander's In-dependent Thcrmal Viewer. Byusing the existing proven COFT sys-tem hardware in the new platoonand section trainers, a substantiatedmethod o f measuring proficiencycan be ohtained. In addition, t h enew applications of the C o n sys-tems avoid the enormous expenserequired for new design anddevelopment costs. The currentpost facilities, instructors, and main-tenance support can mect a widervariety of training needs.

United States Army Armor crewshave displayed expert skills in thepast three CAT competitions.Hope-fully, in the I Y N competition, theywill surpass previous levels. TEAM-COFT supports the specific needsof the CAT '89 competition; per-haps future generations of networkCOFTS will support much. much.more.



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L

se

Defeat at the Greasy Grass:Intelligence Operationsat the Battle of the Little Bighornby First Lieutenant Steven J. MartinOn the afternoon of 26 June 1876,

Lieutenant James Bradley led adetachment of 23 Crow scouts upthe Little Bighorn River. Behindhim was a force of over onethousand infantrymen and caval-rymen under th e command ofGeneral Terry, who was attemptingto trap a village o f hostile Sioux be-tween himself and the 7th Cavalry,under the command of LTC Custer.Terry had received reports from ex-cited scouts belonging to Custerthat there had becn a large battlethe previous day, and the soldiershad been destroyed. Although he

was doubtful that the 7th had beenwiped out, it was obvious that therehad been some sort of light, and allhad not gone \veil for Custer.

As Bradley hurried south alongthe river, he found equipmentbelonging to the 7th Cavnlry strewnamong the remains of an Indian vil-lage, indicating that at least some ofwhat the scouts reported earlier wastrue. He moved up onto a ridgewhich ran along the east side of theriver to get a bcttcr view. Fromthere, he could see what looked likethe remains of some slaughtered

buffalo on a hillside, their whitemeat shining through t h e haze o fthe oppressive heat, which was overone hundred degrees. As Bradleymoved closer, however, it becameobvious that the objects were notbuffalo carcasses, but the naked andmutilated bodies of the men of the7th Cavalry.

Bradley moved among the bodiesto get a count of how many soldierswere actually there. A quick surveyindicated that there were about twohundred men on the hillside and inthe immediate vicinity. Visibly



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"The leader of the scouts, Forked Horn, toldReno that the Indian band was too large for hisbattalion to handle. Custer scoffed at the notionof any number of Sioux being too large to hand-le. '

shaken, Lieutenant Bradley rodenorth to inform General Terry ofwhat he had found.

Lieutenant Bradley was the firstwhite man to see the sight of"Custer's Last Stand." Custer hadled the 665 personnel of the 7thCavalry against the largest con-centration of Indians ever to as-semble in North America. The bat-tle cost the lives of Custer and 271of his mcn, and became one of themost discussed engagements inAmerican military history. Althoughthe battle occurred over 100 yearsago, it is replete with lessons fortoday's intelligence oflicers, espe-cially those at battalion and brigadelevels.

24 June, 1600hours:Mid-afternoon of 24 June found

Custer near the headwaters of theRosebud River, approximately 30miles from the Little Bighorn. Hehad been detached from a largerforce headed by General Terry inth e north. Custer's mission was toswing south o f a large band of In -dians and prevent their movementsouth to the Bighorn Mountains,while the larger column under Terrymoved from the north down theBighorn River. The Indians wouldthus be caught between the hvocolumns and given the choice of an-nihilation or surrendcr.

Preceding the 7th Cavalry was adetachment of Crow and Arikarascouts under the command ofLieutenant Charles Varnum. MilchBouyer, a half-breed, led six Crowsto the front about ten miles, since

the Crows knew the tcrrain. Twogroups of Arikaras, led by theirleaders, Bobtailed Bull and Soldier,followed, scouting each side of theRoscbud River. Also with thescouts were Lonesome CharlieReynolds, a local woodsman. and ablack man named Isiah, who hadvoluntccred for t h e trip so he couldsee the Indian country he loved somuch.

This scout organization was fairlytypical of those used at the time.Maps of th c area were rare andvery inaccurate (for example. themap used by General Terry hadonly hypothetical courses for allrivers except the Yellowstone, andthese courses were off by as muchas forty miles. This forced com-manders to rely on local Indians toact as guides and interpreters of thevastly different Indian culture. TheIndian scouts were of inestimatahlevalue to the commander. They werethe eyes and ears of the Army, andtheir daring and bravery under fireis well-documented. The differencesin cultures hetween them and thewhite soldiers they fought alongsidecaused some problems, but theArmy effort against the hostile In-dians of the Plains would have beenseverely crippled without them.

The scouts were on the trail of ahostile band of Sioux and CheyenneIndians, which was travcling a fewclays ahead of them. What theyfound was very disturbing to them.Custer, along with the rest of theleaders on the mission, was initiallytold that there were not many war-riors in the field, and those thatwere were not united. He believed

that no more than five hundred war-riors were scattered about theBighorn Mountain area. and was,therefore, prepared to meet a smallforce of warriors, which wouldnaturally t ry to break contact and es-cape. This had not turned out to hethe case. On a scout mission priorto Custer's detachment from Terry,Major Reno came upon a large In-dian trail. The leader of the scouts,Forked Horn, told Reno that the In-dian band was too large for his bat-talion to handle. Custer scoffed atthc notion of any number o f Siouxbeing too large to handle. He quick-ly moved south and located thc trailReno found and was now followingit. The trail was one mile widewherc it crossed the Rosehud Rivcr,and the scouts estimated that it wasmade by 1,500 lodges, or ap-proximately 4,500 warriors. On theday prior, the command had comeacross a village remains, where agcat religious ceremony had takenplace. The Sioux had left signs thatthey had prepared strong"medicine," and could not bedefeated. They also indicated that ifthe cavalry did not find the Siouxthe Sioux would come after thecavalry - a tactic almost unheard ofin the Indian Wars.Mistoke #1: Custer failed to up-

date his enemy template or alter hisassessment of the enemy's probablecourse of action.

As the Indian trail was found, itbecame obvious that there werethousands of Indians on the war-path. Custer amended his estimateo f the number of Indians in the Iiclclsomewhat (he now felt there might



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be up to 2,000 warriors), but stillheld firm the belief that the Indianswould run when they saw the caval-ry, and the real challenge o f the up-coming fight would not be todestroy the enemy in battle, but tocatch hi m as he ran.

Custer initially developed anenemy template and probablecourse of action based on the infor-mation known when he left Ft.Abraham Lincoln in South Dakotaon 17 May. His mistake was that hefailed to reassess this estimate inthe light of increasing evidence thathe was off the mark. The number ofwarriors in the field was of little im -portance to Custer, who believedt he 7th Cavalry could defeat the en-tire Sioux Nation hy itself. The big-ger village simply meant more gloryshould he succeed in capturing it.

Custer's poor understanding of theenemy's culture, morale, strength,and intentions caused him to mis-judge his probable course or action.This was a ma,jor error which wouldhave a large impact on the decisionsmade in the next 24 hours.24 June, 2200 hours:Believing that he was closing in on

the Indian village, Custer ordered anight march. He hoped he would beable to observe the camp the nextmorning. He would make thedecision to attack or wait at thattime.

There was no moon on the eve-ning o f 24 June. The 7th Cavalrystumbled through the night, with thesoldiers often falling asleep on their

mounts. The evening was fillcd withth e sounds of ti n cups bangingtogether, the pack mules briiyingand the soldiers' curses at beingbumped into by others. The soldierswcrc beginning to tire after over amonth in thc field and the hurriedpace of the past few days, and weremostly concerned with their owncomfort and when they wouldreturn home. At daybreak, the rcgi-ment had reached the foothills ofthe Wolf Mountains. some fifteenmiles from the Little Bighorn, andmade camp. The soldiers immediale-ly started campfires to boil coffee.

The noises the regiment madeduring the evening's march could beheard for miles, just as the smoke ofthcir camplires could he seen formiles. The regiment had made con-tact with some Sioux hunting partiesin the morning and there was littledoubt that the hostiles knew of the7th Cavalry's presence. C-uster or-dered Lieutenant Varnum, MilchBouyer, Charlie Reynolds, and fourCrows to some high ground (calledthe Crow's Nest by the Crows) tosee if they could observe the village.Mistake #2: the 7th Cavalry's

poor OPSEC posture allowed theIndians to track them from a longdistance, liastcning Custer'sdecision cycle and forcing Custcr l ogive up any thoughts of surprisingthe village.

The U S Army of the late 180strained for conventional wars, in -volving thousands of soldiers. Thecombat experience of the Armycame out o f the Civil War. Oflicersin the Army were used to an

OPSEC posture that pcrmittcdclanking cups, braying mules, andcamp fires. Comniandcrs had beensuccessful in the Civil War using accrtain set of methods and they sawno need to change them to any de-gree when confronted by a group of"barbarians." Noise and lightdcscipline in all units was poor,and in this case allowed the enemyto track the soldiers from dozens ofmiles away. Only the scouts seemedto have any appreciation for properOPSEC. They were rarely dis-covcrcd and were usually ablc to ap-proach close to enemy villages un-detected.

Custcr realized that the enemywas probably aware or his presence.Hc was about to make some kc ydccisions on the Crow's Nest, andmuch of his reasoning would bebased on the fact that he had beencompromised. He would prefermore time to rest and recon. but hefelt he was forced to attack to catchthe village before it began to breakup. Thus the poor OPSEC postureo f the soldiers forced Custer into acourse of action h e would havepreferred to avoid and helpedcreate th e conditions that allowedth e Indians to defeat him.

25 June, 0600 hours:From the Crow's Nest, the Crows

could see th e Indian Village in thevalley created by the Little BighornRiver, or the Greasy Grass as the In -dians called it. It was huge. Theground was white from the tipis,and the pony herd covered the hillsbehind the village like a brown car-

~~ ~ ~ ~~~

ARMOR - MayJune 1989 27


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"Towait would allow the Indians time to scatter, andthe moonless nights would not help the cavalry trackthem. Custer felt he had no choice - he had to movein closer to the village or risk losing it entirely."

pet. Milch Bouyer had been amongthe Sioux for 30 years, and he hadnever seen a village so large.

The scouts sent word to Custer,who climbed the hill to look for him-self. By the time he reached the top,however, the village was obscurcdhy th e haze created during the hotJune day. Bouyer assured Custerthat the village was out there and hedescribed its immense size.

Custer had a ma.jor decision tomake. He either had to move in andclose with the village, or he couldwait, rest his men and conductfuther reconnaissance of the village(or villages, fo r Custcr was not surehow many villages there actuallywere, nor was he entirely sure of thereported village's location. since hecould not see it himself). It is herethat it is possible to observe the ef-fects of the previous errors in intel-ligence. Based upon the facts thatthe Sioux knew of the cavalry'spresence (due to poor OPSEC) andthe incorrect estimate that the In-dian village would scatter when thecavalry approached, Custer decidedthat it was necessary to close withthe village. To wait would allow theIndians time to scatter, and themoonless nights would not help thecavalry track them. C'uster felt hehad no choice - he had to move incloser to the village or risk losing itentirely.

Unsure as to what Indian forcemay exist farther south and remcm-bcring his mission to deny enemymovement in that direction, Custerordered Captain Benteen to takethree troops and move southwest.

He told Bentecn to "pitch into" any-thing he came across. Custer tookthe remaining nine troops and thepack train directly west, toward thereported location of the Indian vil-lage.Mistake #A Custer failed to con-

duct any reconnaissance on the ob-jective prior to choosing a course ofaction.

The reasons why Custer chose tomove when h e did have been dis-cussed. Ncvcrthclcss, a good rccon-naissance of the objective is essen-tial to any offensive mission.Custer's only knowledge of thecnemy came from a sighting at a dis-tance of 15 miles. He had no clearpicture of the actual number of war-riors he would face, how they werearrayed (for example, was the campjust one large camp, or severalsmall camps which could bedefeated separately?), and he hadno idea i f there were other camps inthe area, which could support t h emain village. Also, he had nodetailed terrain analysis. He did notknow how terrain would support orhinder his maneuver, or even if anattack against the village in itspresent location was possible. Agood reconnaissance and surveil-lance plan could have answered allof these questions.25June, 7300hours:Custer had taken the remainder of

the regimcnt to a spot approximate-ly two and a half miles from the vil-lage. There, against a bluff, theycame upon a funeral tipi. The tipiheld the body of a warrior killed

while fighting agtainst GeneralCrook in the Battle of th e Rosebudon I6 June several miles to thesouth, and wcwld come to hc knownas the "Lone Tipi."

The debate over how the Indianwas killcd came to an abrupt endwhen a scout named Fred


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brain. Scouts should only reportwhat they see; they should not inter-pret it. That is th e job o f the intcl-ligence officer (in this case, it wasthe job of Custer).A better

Documents

Armor Magazine, May-June 1989