Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern EuropeAuthor(s): John A. ArmstrongSource: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 1968), pp. 396-410Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1878147Accessed: 21/01/2010 06:00

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Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe

John A. Armstrong University of Wisconsin

Collaboration, in the sense of co-operation between elements of the population of a defeated state and the representatives of the victorious power, has been common throughout history. Even the more organized, systematic forms of collaboration which one may call "collaborationism" are frequently encountered, especially in European wars prior to the French Revolution. With the rse of nationalism and concomitant mass involvement, collaborationism acquired a more odious connotation. It remained, however, for the Nazi conquests to make the practice a mat- ter for general execration. The sweeping German conquests provided the potential for collaborationism on a scale unparalleled since the Napoleonic wars. Compared to many aspects of World War II history, however, the phenomenon of collaborationism has received little critical attention. A major reason has been, no doubt, the painful implications of collaborationism for historians native to the country where it oc- curred. For other scholars, a more decisive obstacle, perhaps, has been the extreme complexity of the motives and forms of collaborationism. Given the paucity of studies, one cannot hope at this stage to do more than take a tentative step toward clarifying the problem, but even an incomplete typology may be useful.

The complete ruthlessness of Nazi ethnocentrism implied contempt for foreign social structures and values which led to attempts to manip- ulate all elements of the defeated populations. As a result, collabora- tion with the Nazis has frequently been regarded as an indication of the disintegration of the social systems of the defeated countries.' Tak- ing this position, many observers have compared naziism with com- munism as an ideological movement distintegrating the traditional state system by appealing to latent social antagonisms. To the extent to which Nazi supporters in defeated states really came from socially dis- affected elements of their populations, this generalization would appear

1 During and immediately after the war, "fifth columns," real or imagined, were often regarded as a parallel indication of social disintegration. For an analysis of the exaggerations involved, in at least one case, in this view, see Louis de Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War (Chicago, 1956).

Collaborationism in World War II 397

to be supported. On the other hand, when elements ethnically dif- ferent from the dominant population provided the basis for collabora- tionism, it resembles the form of aid to the enemy typical of the age of nationalism since 1800.

As is usually the case in analysis of gross historical phenomena, pure or ideal types are not encountered in practice. One can, however, select polar types in which each of these forms of collaborationism is clearly dominant. Collaborationism arising from social antagonisms was, perhaps, most clearly apparent in Vichy France.2 The collabora- tionist role of ethnic elements disaffected from the French national majority was clearly insignificant. Personal ambitions and resentments played, of course, a highly important part. For the most part, however, these individual motives arose directly or indirectly from the social and ideological conflicts which racked the French social system. The same dominance of social and ideological motivations appears in collabora- tionism in two of the other occupied countries of western Europe- the Netherlands and Norway. In Belgium, persistent Flemish disaf- fection for the dominant French culture constituted a major motiva- tion for collaboration. Leaving aside the tangled question of the in- fluence of the royal household in the Belgian brand of collaborationism, however, one must stress that even in that country an important ele- ment, headed by Leon Degrelle, was definitely motivated by social and ideological considerations rather than by ethnic disaffection.

The situation in eastern Europe was very different. The number of cases of collaborationism was much larger. Some instances, like the Arrow Cross regime in Hungary in 1944-45, were dominated by social and ideological motivations not drastically different from the predomi- nant type of collaborationism in western Europe. It is worth noting that most of these instances were in states which originally had been allies rather than conquests of the Germans. In the latter states, the dominant collaborationist element arose in ethnic groups which had been in a subordinate position in the prewar political and social sys- tems. On the surface, therefore, these instances of collaborationism appear to cluster around the pole opposite to that identified by the Vichy regime. More penetrating investigation suggests that the dichot- omy was not quite so clear-that social and ideological motivations as well as ethnic resentments were present. The ethnic element colors

2 The original version of this essay was presented at the American Historical Associaticn at its December 1966 convention. I am very grateful both to fellow participants in that program and to members of the audience for their com- ments, which have enabled me to improve my presentation.

398 John A. Armstrong

the social and ideological motivations to such an extent, however, that the latter appear quite different from the typical western European motives for collaborationism. In the following discussion the bulk of the evidence will be derived from the Ukrainian collaborationist ex- perience. As will become apparent, Ukrainian collaborationism comes closest to being the polar case of predominance of ethnic motivation. It is crucial to recognize that Ukrainian collaborationism was not an isolated phenomenon, however, but part of a broader tendency in wartime eastern Europe. Consequently, the analysis of the Ukrainian case will be presented in a framework built on comparison with col- laborationism in Croatia and Slovakia.

During World War II, politics in all three of these areas was dominated by extremist nationalist parties which resembled the Fascist and Nazi parties in many respects. One might be tempted to conclude that collaborationism in the Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovakia, as in western Europe, was based principally on ideological affinity. The actual situation in the three eastern European lands was much more complex. An obvious and fundamental difference between them and western European occupied countries was that the eastern European areas were not independent states before 1939; these areas had not constituted independent states at any time in modern history.3 The Ukrainian, Slovak, and Croat populations were at least marginally distinct from neighboring ethnic groups, but elements of the latter were politically dominant in the Ukraine, Slovakia, and Croatia. While one cannot posit the rise of rebellious national consciousness as inevitable when one ethnic group is dominated by another, such a development has been the rule rather than the exception during the past century. In fact, nationalism as a political movement developed in all three areas during the late nineteenth century and was greatly accelerated by the conditions at the end of World War I. The close relation between this development and collaborationism is suggested by the fact that tenta- tive co-operation between nationalist elements and German or Italian representatives began at that time, though neither side could then be remotely described as Fascist. The relation between Slovak nationalists and Germany was not very important at that time, but even the mod- erate Croat leader, Vladko Macek, relates how the Italian Military Mis- sion in Croatia in 1919 helped him transmit an anti-Serbian petition to the Paris Peace Conference.4 Collaboration between Germans and Ukrainians of all political shadings during 1918 was, of course, a far more

3Efforts were made to establish a Ukrainian state in 1918-20, but it never controlled more than a fraction of Ukrainian ethnic territory.

4Vladko Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom (New York, 1957), p. 82.

Collaborotionism in World War II 399

important phenomenon.5 During the interwar period, moderate Croat political groups continued to maintain contacts with Italy, though with some circumspection and hesitancy.6 In Slovakia, the turn toward col- laboration with Nazi Germany was more sudden and more intense; as a result, some of the really democratic groups opposed the trend.7 In the Ukraine, al! political elements (except Communists, if one leaves aside official Nazi-Soviet collaboration) worked with the Nazis at some time between 1939 and 1945.8 For the UNR (Ukrainian National Republic) group, populist and socialist in origin, collaboration was reluctant and restricted; nevertheless, it took place. The monarchists were far more enthusiastic, though the Nazi regime scarcely recipro- cated their affection. The Ukrainian Christian Democrats, the UNDO, also collaborated reluctantly, largely in restricted administrative situa- tions, but they did collaborate throughout the war. In all these instances, collaboration was based on pragmatic grounds: the Germans and the Italians were nearby; they were great powers; on the surface they seemed to present no vital threat; and, above all, the Germans were against the status quo which the moderate nationalists sought to upset.

The evidence that collaboration with Italy and Germany began before fascism was a factor, and was engaged in by most political elements in the "submerged" eastern European ethnic groups, strongly supports the hypothesis that ethnic dissatisfaction, rather than social and ideological motivations, was dominant there. Further support for this hypothesis is provided by close analysis of the apparent ideological affinities between Nazi ideology and the extreme nationalism politically dominant in these groups.

In all three, the extreme nationalist ideology was developed before the Nazis came to power in Germany. The Slovak extremists, in the Slovak People's Party, began to develop a totalitarian ideology and organization in the 1920's. From the beginning, they appear to have been influenced strongly by Italian fascism but not by naziism. Prob- ably they could not have prevailed over the conservative clerical wing of the party without the example and support of the Nazis, however.9

5See especially John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution (Princeton, N. J., 1952); and Hans Beyer, Die Mittelmnaechte und die Ukraine (Munich, 1956).

6 Jacob B. Hoptner, Ylugoslavia in Crisis (New York, 1962), pp. 140-41. 7 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 88-96. 8 Except as noted, my evidence concerning the Ukrainian situation is pre-

sented in Ukrainian Nationlalism (New York, 1963). 9 Lettrich, pp. 75, 96-97; Joseph A. Mikus, Slovakia: A Political History,

1918-1950 (Milwaukee, 1964), pp. 118-19. Both authors are Slovaks, but Lettrich is strongly opposed to Slovak separation from Czechoslovakia, while Mikus, while favoring the more moderate wing of the People's Party, rejects the tie with Prague.

400 John A. Armstrong

The situation in Croatia was clearer. The Ustaga party was formed in 1928 as an avowed conspiratorial and terrorist organization. Un- doubtedly, the Italian Fascist model was influential, but Macedonian and Albanian conspiratorial groups seem to have provided more im- portant models.10 The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was constituted the following year.11

Like the extreme Slovak Populists and the Usta'sa, the OUN was influenced by Italian fascism. Dmitro Dontsov fervently proclaimed his admiration for Mussolini.12 But Dontsov, who occupied a uniquely important place in the development of OUN ideology (although he was never formally a member), is a man of unusually complex intel- lectual descent. An East Ukrainian by origin, he was strongly attracted by Marxism before World War 1.13 Quite possibly (although he harshly rejected Russian populism) Dontsov was influenced by the conspira- torial model of the Narodnaia Volia.14 By the late 1920's, however, Dontsov rejected all of the "ideas of the nineteenth century," and hailed a curious collection of "heroes," including Nietzsche, Bergson, Georges Sorel, Kipling, Kitchener, and Theodore Roosevelt. Dontsov's main intellectual inspiration at this period was drawn from Maurice Barres and Charles Maurras. Roman Olynyk, the most systematic student of Dontsov's ideas, goes so far as to speak of his "infatuation" with the French writers of the Action Franqaise.15 Even if one accepts Ernst Nolte's view that the Action Francaise constituted the "first epoch of Fascism," the relationship between the Action Francaise and Italian fascism was at most only marginally significant when Dont- sov embraced the French ideas.'6 At least as a start, it seems prefer- able not to call the OUN's ideology "fascism" but to designate it "integral nationalism," in accordance with Carlton Hayes's classifica- tion of the Action Franqaise model. In any case, it is clear that the

10 Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat, 1941- 1945 (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 19.

11 Though the OUN and the Ustasa were formally constituted at the end of the 1920's, both were, to some degree, developments from earlier semi- conspiratorial organizations among their ethnic groups.

12 Dmitro Dontsov, De shukaty nashykh istorychlnykh tradytsii [Where To Seek Our Historical Traditions] (2d ed.; Lvov, 1942).

13 Roman Olynyk, "Literary and Ideological Trends in the Literature of Western Ukraine, 1919-1939" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Montreal, 1962), p. 44.

141 have no direct evidence of this influence on Dontsov, but it was an extremely common one among East Ukrainians of his generation. See, e.g., the postwar emigre publication Narodnia Volia, 1949 et seq.

15 Olynyk, pp. 46-48. 16 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Franqaise, Italian Fascism,

National Socialism (London, 1965).

Collaborationism in World War II 401

relationship of the OUN to naziism was in no way one of affiliation but, at the most, one of affinity. Ideological positions shared by the two movements derived from remote, and often unrecognized, intel- lectual sources. Since both naziism and integral nationalism are notori- ously obscure and contradictory in their ideological positions, it is extremely difficult to define these affinities. Their influence both in stimulating and in limiting collaboration was so important, however, that the affinities must be traced at least schematically.

The great paradox in the relation between naziism and integral nationalism arises from the fact that the basic affinity between the movements is the ascription of absolute value to the nation. Every- thing is to be subordinated to ethnocentrism, to the Nazi or integral nationalist concept of national interest. No alternative human value or moral scruple is to be considered. Obviously this constituted agreement on a basic ideological principle, but just as obviously the agreement afforded no basis for collaboration, for the principle meant that con- flicting interests were to be served at all costs, rather than reconciled. Eastern European integral nationalists assumed that there would be no conflict between German (or Italian) national interests and those they envisaged for their own nations. Dontsov, for example, wrote that Germany "never did anything against our national unity."'17 In fact, specific conflicts arose as soon as collaboration began. The prewar history of the Usta'sa is the story of the conflict between its deter- mination to smash the Yugoslav state by any means and Mussolini's and Hitler's schemes for using the Ustasa as a pawn alternately to disrupt or blackmail the Yugoslav regime.'8 Even after the Axis cast the die in favor of a "Ustasa state," they found integral nationalist fanaticism a seriously disrupting influence. Probably all that prevented the Germans from taking armed action to curb Ustasa excesses in 1941 was the necessity for withdrawal of German troops to the eastern front.'9 The Germans cynically played off the Slovak integral national- ists against the Hungarians and, after the Slovak rebellion of 1944, reduced the latter to puppets. The most extreme conflict of interests was in the Ukraine, where Hitler was determined to reduce the popu- lation, at least in the eastern Ukraine, to serfdom. The OUN, on the other hand, was determined at all costs to establish an all-Ukrainian state. As a result, initial efforts of both branches of the OUN to col- laborate ended in disillusion and bloody suppression of the integral nationalists.

17 Dontsov, p. 84. 18 Hory and Broszat, pp. 27 ff. 19Ibid., p. 97.

402 John A. Armstronig

It is notable that in all of these cases the obvious affinity in idoliz- ing the nation in itself led to friction rather than to collaboration. The failure of extreme nationalism to provide a basis for unity is ap- parent in spite of the fact that affinity of ideologies went much further than insistence on primacy of national interest, however.

The avowed organizational affinities are probably least important. All three eastern European integral nationalist organizations were avowedly based on the Fuehrerprinzip. In fact, all departed sharply from the Nazi model in a curiously similar fashion. Whereas Adolf Hitler was the undisputed master, the real motivating force of naziism, the integral nationalist parties were marked by dispersion of authority. Each had a "founder" who was dead, and therefore sanctified, by the time World War II began: Evhen Konovalets for the OUN, Andrei Hlinka for the Slovak Populists, and Josip Frank for the Usta'sa.20 Each had a relatively conservative leader who leaned toward hier- archical rather than charismatic models of leadership: Andrei Melnik for the OUN, Jozef Tiso for the Populists, and Slavko Kvaternik for the Usta'sa. Sooner or later each conservative was overshadowed by a fanatic rival employing personalist methods of leadership. Thus Kvater- nik's attempt to establish the authority of the military within a "normal" state framework was submerged by Ante Pavelic's emphasis on the "Ustasa party-state" and the party militia, developments undoubtedly popular among the party rank and file. Vojtech Tuka (who also strongly favored a para-military organization) became the dominant force in Slovakia. Stepan Bandera attracted the mass of active OUN members to open revolt against Melnik's leadership. The forms of internecine conflict varied widely. In no case, however, did they result in a situation in which the party leader was at once founder, supreme ideologue, charismatic leader, and absolute dictator, as in Germany. While it is entirely possible that a supreme leader of an integral na- tionalist movement would have caused more trouble for the Nazis, the divisions among the nationalists tempted the Nazis to play off one faction against another to achieve short-range objectives. Material col- laboration was temporarily enhanced, but the prerequisites for longer- term co-operation were undermined.

If ostensibly identical organizational principles failed to provide a basis for collaboration, the superficially similar approaches of Nazis and integral nationalists to, the question of national identity ultimately resulted in severe strains on collaborationism. Nazi and integral na- ationalist alike refused to accept the ethnic group as it was, but de-

20 Frank died long before the Ustasa was formed, but it honored him as its spiritual forerunner; Slavko Kvaternik was his son-in-law.

Collaborationism in World War 11 403

manded that it conform to an ideal which they themselves had con- ceived. For all, the ideal nation was a racial concept. Hitler's efforts to realize the ideal by physically eliminating "racially impure" ele- ments and encouraging the breeding of the "racial supermen" are too horrifyingly close to require recounting here. Although (because of the religious pressures alluded to below) the Slovak Populists did not emphasize the biologically racial aspects of their ideology, Ustaga and OUN spokesmen did not shrink from accepting explicit racism. For the Ustaga leader Ante Pavelic, repugnant ideas like the Yugoslav concept were propagated only by "foreign blood."2' Dontsov scorned objections to "zoological nationalism."22 An anonymous OUN spokes- man wrote, "Nationalism is based on feelings, which are carried by the racial blood."23

On the other hand, neither Nazis nor integral nationalists took the logical step (if one can refer to logic in racist ideology) of relating the eastern European nations to the broader Slavic entity. The Nazis regarded the East Ukrainians as Untermenschen but (after some hesita- tion) accepted West Ukrainians into the Waffen SS and tacitly over- looked the Slavic origins of the Slovaks and Croats. Contrary to all historical or linguistic evidence, the Ustaga asserted that the Croats were a "Gothic" people; the SS acquiesced in this interpretation, at least to the extent of accepting Croat recruits.24 On the other hand, the Slav nationalists showed little sympathy for one another. It is true that the formation of the Slovak state served as a cerain stimulus for the Ustaga and that the latter permitted the formation of a "Ukrain- ian legion."25 Each Slavic integral nationalist group, however, had at least as strong ties with geographically distant, non-Slavic movements.26

The main emphasis of the integral nationalists was, like Maurras', on the unique nation in history. An explicit object of Dontsov's scorn was the "nineteenth-century" theory of "Slav brotherhood."27 For Dontsov, there were "master nations" and "plebian nations." In a given historical period, a nation might fit in either category, depending on its "psyche." Characteristically, Dontsov turned to Italy for evi- dence to support his theory: at the time of the Adowa defeat, Italians

21 Hory and Broszat, p. 29. 22Dontsov, p. 49. 23 "Sigma" in Nastup, Mar. 23, 1940. 24Hory and Broszat, pp. 29, 71. 25Nastup, July 12, 1941. 26The OUN had especially close ties with the Lithuanian government (and,

later, Lithuanian underground forces); the Ustaga had links with Spain and Peron's Argentina. I have not been able to find evidence of Slovak ties of comparable importance.

37Dontsov, p. 104.

404 John A. Armstrong

were inferior, but fascism had raised them to the ranks of the master races.28 The Ukrainians had been a master race in the Cossack period but by the nineteenth century had declined to plebian status. But na- tional purification could restore them.29

For the eastern European integral nationalists, as for the Nazis, the principal thrust of "national purification" consisted of the elimina- tion of enemies who had contaminated or thwarted the "racial soul" or "national psyche." At first sight, this essentially negative, destructive characteristic seems to have been accompanied by a positive aspect, the cult of "heroism." All of these movements had their martyrs, their blood-soaked flags, their rituals of dedication. Ostensibly, these rituals were designed to inculcate discipline and self-sacrifice; in fact, they were essential corollaries of the idolatry of the nation. The emphasis on "thinking with the blood" was aimed at undermining rationality and insuring blind obedience and inevitably destroyed all traditional moral scruples. It is at this point that the ambiguous position of the integral nationalists, as compared to the Nazis, becomes most apparent. Both types of movements rested on the idolatry of the ethnic group, but for the Germans the separate identity of the group, a historical nation, was scarcely in question. Each of the three eastern European ethnic groups was, on the other hand, not quite sure of its identity. The normal appeal to historical continuity was uncertain, for each had been submerged for centuries in states identified with other ethnic groups. The other accepted criterion for nationhood, a distinctive literary lan- guage, was also somewhat in doubt. Slovaks and Ukrainians, though speaking recognizably distinct Slavic tongues, always had to face the contention that their tongues were dialects of Czech and Russian, respectively, rather than full-fledged languages. The position of the Croats was even more critical, for the only significant difference be- tween their language and Serbian was orthographical. Under these circumstances, integral nationalists in all three groups were compelled to recognize what was, in fact, a basic element in the development of ethnic distinctiveness in eastern Europe-religious peculiarity. The real dividing line throughout modern history between Croats and Serbs has been the division between Catholic and Orthodox. For the Slovaks, the position was not quite so clear, but there is little doubt that their alienation from the Czechs arose in large part from the dichotomy between the Hussite and anticlerical traditions prevalent among the Czech elite and the conservative clerical orientation of most Slovaks. This dichotomy was strengthened by the economic differences between

28 Ibid., pp. 101-2. 29 Ibid., pp. 66-67.

Collaborationism in World War II 405

agrarian Slovakia and industrialized Bohemia to a degree which made Slovak collaborationism resemble, to some extent, a conservative social reaction, as in western Europe, rather than the typical eastern European ethnic protest. In both cases, however, the predominance of integral nationalism based, in the last analysis, on religious distinction led to organizational and personal dilemmas, which contrasted sharply to the thoroughgoing Nazi rejection of religion. From the narrow standpoint of collaborationism, these dilemmas were a minor hindrance. Nazi observers doubted that Slovakia could have a "Fuehrerstaat here with parish priests as protagonists"30 but found that if permitted a little self-deception the Slovak integral nationalists, the avowed defenders of "Christ's Slovakia,"3' could be induced to co-operate in the most extreme atrocities.32 On the whole, the Slovak Populists seem to have required Nazi encouragement in scrapping all moral limitations, whereas the Usta'sa appalled the Nazis themselves. Yet the Usta'sa regime, to an even greater extent than the Bratislava regime, was based on an appeal to religion, as its Easter 1941 proclamation shows: By God's providence and the will of our great ally as well as the centuries- old struggle of the Croatian people and the great readiness to sacrifice of our leader Ante Pavelic . . . today before the resurrection of the Son of God, our independent state of Croatia also arises.33 However timid the church hierarchies may have been in trying to curb integral nationalist excesses, friction inevitably arose. It is significant that the founder of the Slovak Populist party, Andrei Hlinka, was a priest but also that he began his political career by open rebellion against his bishop.34 The friction between Monsignor Jozef Tiso, nom- inal head of the Slovak state, and the integral nationalist elements among the Populists, if scarcely establishing Tiso's reputation for courage or statesmanship, is undeniable. Though there is consider- able evidence that clerics-especially Franciscans-were involved in some of the worst Usta'sa atrocities, even lay Ustasa members had to stifle their consciences, as indicated by the terrible self-condemnation: "I am perfectly aware what is in store for me. For my past, present, and future deeds I shall burn in hell, but at least I shall burn for Croatia."35

One of the principal attractions of the Ukraine as a case study is that the religious and social forces working for collaborationism were

30 Quoted by Mikus, p. 121. 31 Lettrich, P. 75. 32 Ibid., pp. 182 ff.; Mikus, pp. 97 ff.; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the

European Jews (Chicago, 1961), pp. 459 ff. 33 Quoted in Hory and Broszat, p. 53. 34Lettrich, p. 68. 35 Quoted by Macek, p. 245.

406 John A. A rmstrong

not significant enough to complicate the effect of the ethnic factor as much as in Slovakia and Croatia. If it had not been for the distinc- tions between the Greek and Latin rites and regulations, the western Ukrainians might have become Polonized in the nineteenth century. The sociological base of integral nationalism was the Greek Catholic population, with priests' sons extraordinarily prominent in the OUN. Nevertheless, almost nine-tentlhs of the Ukrainian population was Orthodox rather than Catholic in back'ground; so were many integral nationalist leaders like Dontsov himself. It was impossible, therefore, to base nationalism on religious distinctiveness, as Dontsov recognized in contrasting the present to the "heroic age" of the Ukraine during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: "Religious belief, as presently language, was the dividing line between nations. Then the religious struggle was the national struggle, as now the linguistic struggle is."3"

But avoiding or muting the appeal to religious distinctiveness did not release the OUN from the terrible moral dilemma inherent in the adoption of an integral nationalist ideology. One way out was religious indifference, or at least anticlericaiism, which was apparently strong in the OUN ranks in the 1930's. Most rank-and-file members would not overtly reject their religious upbringing, however, and the leaders did not wish to repudiate religious support. In spite of his scorn for the churches, Heinrich Himmler permitted Greek Catholic chaplains in the SS Division Galicia, largely recruited by the OUN. In return the church supported this form of armed collaborationism but continued to stress the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." Sermons were designed to warn Ukrainians against taking part in the slaughter of Jews and also to prevent the fratricidal terrorism within the OUN. In both cases, the church's moral influence was inadequate to prevent flagrant crimes, whether instigated by the Germans or not, but strains were apparent.

Insofar as the integral nationalists were prepared for ruthless action against the Nazis' enemies, the basis for collaboration existed. Yet one must distinguish between real and avowed attitudes even here. Nazi and integral nationalist propaganda denounced a long series of common ideological enemies. Plutocracy, Freemasonry, cosmopolitanism, liberal- ism, democracy, and communism were called subversive of the national ideal. To the extent to which integral nationalists really regarded such ideas as their principal opponents, the collaborationist motivation approaches that of reactionary western European movements which worked with the Germans in order to overcome domestic enemies. In fact, the degree to which the integral nationalist movements took these

3S Dontsov, p. 22.

Collaborationism in World War II 407

ideas seriously varied considerably. In tune with its clerical conserva- tive tendency, the Slovak Populists were most sincere in attacking liberalism, democracy, Freemasonry, and plutocracy-but nearly al- ways identified these "evil" forces with Prague. The Usta'sa was far less concerned with subversive ideas. Among the Ukrainian national- ists, ideologues like Dontsov joined the attack on ideological enemies, such as democracy, but chance remarks (even under Nazi censorship) betrayed nationalist writers' admiration for Great Britain and the United States.37

More remarkable, while all integral nationalists denounced Com- munists, both Slovaks and Croats apparently experienced little diffi- culty in opportunistic contact with them. The Slovak regime maintained correct relations with the U.S.S.R. during the Nazi-Soviet pact. It is said that the Minister of the Interior in Slovakia, Alexander Mach, shut his eyes to Communist activity.38 Communism was not a serious concern of the Ustasa until Tito's partisan activity became threatening.39 For the OUN, on the other hand, communism was always identified with one of the two great enemies, as it could hardly fail to be if the dream of Ukrainian independence under integral nationalist leadership was to be realized. The struggle against world communism was fre- quently referred to as a basis for collaboration with the Nazis and Fascists.40 Disappointed as it was, however, the OUN found another basis for collaboration when the Nazi-Soviet pact was published-the common desire to destroy the Polish state. Even more significant is the fact that Ukrainian integral nationalists constantly emphasized that communism is merely the contemporary expression of Muscovite oppression.

The above analysis points to ethnic rather than to ideological enemies as the real concern of integral nationalism. Even ethnic enmity was highly concentrated. It is true that integral nationalism, by de- manding absolute allegiance to one's own ethnic group and interpreting history as a struggle among nations, stimulated general ethnic antago- ism. But the attitude of the eastern European nationalists toward the Jews provides a clear indicator of the real concentration of ethnic

37See the remark by one A. Biloshits'kyi in the Zhitomir neswpaper Ukrayns'ke Slovo (then controlled by the OUN) that, "just as in America there is one automobile for every five persons, in the U.S.S.R. for every five persons there is one shot, sentenced to prison, or banished to Siberia" (quoted in Krakivs'ki Visti, Sept. 14, 1941, p. 3). For Dontsov's continued antipathy to democracy, see Dukh naslhoi davyny [The Spirit of Our Past] (2d ed.; Munich and Montreal, 1951), pp. 6, 304.

38 Mikus, p. 181. 39 Hory and Broszat, p. 177. 40 Dontsov, p. 18.

408 John A. Armstrong

hatred. Anti-Semitism has been endemic in the Ukraine and Slovakia and, to perhaps a lesser extent, in Croatia. Integral nationalist writings confounded Jews with cosmopolitanism, plutocracy, democracy, bol- shevism, and the other ideological enemies. Except for the OUN, which was suppressed before it could offer more than verbal support to Nazi attacks on the Jews, eastern European integral nationalist groups participated heavily in anti-Semitic atrocities. Even in the Ukraine, numerous young men, who can be presumed to have had some exposure to integral nationalist doctrines, enlisted in German auxiliary police units which carried out frightful attacks on Jews.4' After breaking with the Germans, however, organized OUN forces underground or in guerrilla units adopted attitudes toward the Jews ranging from indifference to provision of refuges. The Ustasa had a longer history of ambivalence toward the Jews. Its propaganda made the rather far-fetched identification of "Jewry" and Belgrade, but from the 1920's on a considerable number of Jewish intellectuals were asso- ciated with the Usta'sa cause. While the Usta'sa had few scruples about joining in Nazi atrocities against Jews in general, "its" Jews were protected.42 Many in the Slovak Populist party, on the other hand, did harbor scruples against mass execution of Jews. Anti-Semitism in Slovakia, however, was more deeply rooted in the conservative Slovak identification of Jews with the Czechs as an educated minority holding the best posts and controlling the economy. For the Slovak integral nationalists, Jews merely constituted an appendage of the principal ethnic enemy, the Czechs. The real aim of the Slovak Populists was to drive out Czechs as persons and as influences, regardless of the cost.43 Since this aim coincided with Nazi determination to reduce the Czechs to helpless wards of the Reich, Populist-Nazi collaboration was (apart from the religious complications described above) firm. The Usta'sa was even more single-minded in its concentration on the main enemy, the Serbs. But circumstances were different. Whereas Czech officials, teachers, and merchants could, as urban elements, be deported, it was harder to uproot the centuries-old Serb villages of Bosnia and Slavonia. Yet integral nationalism demanded an ethnically "pure" greater Croatia. Genocide, in the most literal sense of the term, was the Usta'sa "final" solution.44 After destroying the Yugoslav

41 As one of many examples, see Nuremberg trial document NO-1061 (Mid- west Interlibrary Center collection), listing hundreds of members of the "Trav- niky" battalion (engaged in the Warsaw Ghetto suppression) with obviously Ukrainian names.

42 Hory and Broszat, p. 89; Hilberg, pp. 457-58. 43 Lettrich, pp. 142 ff.; cf. Mikus' statistics (p. 108) on the elimination of

Czech teachers.

Collaborationism in World War 11 409

regime, however, the Nazis retained no special animus against the Serbs, who produced a considerable collaborationist element. Apart from this consideration, the extreme Ustasa attacks on the Serbs were bound to create chaos detrimental to the German war effort. As a result, Ustas'a-Nazi collaboration, though maintained until the end of the war, was uneasy.

As indicated previously, Nazi-OUN collaboration was vitiated from the start by Hitler's determination to treat the Ukraine as a colony of serfs. In spite of the systematic decimation of OUN activists by Nazi execution squads, however, the OUN returned to collaboration- ism as soon as it could be directed against the main enemies. The Ukrainian integral nationalist situation was peculiar in that there were two enemies of almost equal significance-the Poles and the Russians. Even before 1939, 80 per cent of the Ukrainians were under Soviet (or, in OUN eyes, Muscovite) domination. 'This situation dictated a concentration on the enemy from Moscow, a concentration encouraged by prominent East Ukrainian figures like Dontsov. On the other hand, nearly all the active leaders and most of the OUN rank and file were West Ukrainians, who had grown up fighting Poles. As a result, the OUN was a faithful German auxiliary in the Polish campaign of 1939. Later, OUN units took advantage of the unsettled conditions in the occupied territories to carry out attacks on Polish villages designed to destroy or drive out Polish enclaves on what was considered Ukrain- ian territory. Since these atrocities, like the Ustaga excesses, were potential threats to the war effort, they constituted an additional bar- rier to collaboration.45 So did ruthless OUN attacks on Russian ele- ments in the East Ukrainian cities in the autumn of 1941. In both cases the Nazis preferred to play off the scorned Slavic elements against each other, rather than to risk giving the Ukrainians a free hand. In spite of all this, when the Nazi regime offered to collaborate with Ukrainians again, the OUN agreed. Hatred of the Nazis was undiminished, but the desire to fight the principal enemy, the Rus- sians, proved more intense. As a result, the more moderate wing of the OUN overtly aided in recruiting the Waffen SS Division Galicia, and the extreme wing at least acquiesced in the recruitment. After the Soviet reconquest of Volhynia and Galicia, OUN-led guerrillas there co-operated as much as possible with the Wehrmacht.

In sum, the basic motivation for eastern European integral na- tionalist collaborationism was ethnic. For the integral nationalists, the

44Hory and Broszat, pp. 93 ff.; Stephen Clissold, Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power (New York, 1949), pp. 13, 93 ff.

45On February 28, 1942, e.g., the German organ, Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung, recorded the death sentence given a Ukrainian for killing a Pole.

410 John A. Armstrong

war was another phase of a generations-old struggle against the dominant ethnic groups, and the Nazis were unsatisfactory but indis- pensable allies in this struggle. What made the World War II situation fundamentally different from earlier examples of collaborationism in eastern Europe was the dominance, in both the local submerged ethnic groups and among their great-power allies, of movements which preached and practiced utter unscmpulousness in the service of na- tional idols.