Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1981

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1981

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USAARlSCI SUPPORT CENTERPO BOX 62 577Fnpr RUCKER AL 36362 0577


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JULY 1981 VOLUME 27 NUMBER 7

rigadier General Ellis D. ParkerArmy Aviation OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters,Department of the ArmyMajor General Carl H. McNair Jr.Commander Brigadier General Richard D. KenyonDeputy Commander

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U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama U.S. Army Aviation CenterFc >rt Rucker, Alabama

2 Air Defense Artillery, MG John B. Oblinger Jr.6 Army Aviation Forces In The AirLand Battle,MG Carl H. McNair Jr. and CPT Josef Reinsprecht14 Reporting Final16 Views From Readers20 You Can Say No CW3 Russell C. Wingate23 TRADOC Systems Managers; Program/ProjectProduct Managers, Helen McCollough26 Army Aviation's Museum Needs A New Home,Betty J. Goodson28 Aviation Personnel Notes LTC Richard L. Naughton3 PEARL's32 DES Report To The Field34 Hangar Talk: The FLIP And Aeronautical Charts,CW2 Gary R. Weiland35 Threat: HIND Armament, What Are The Facts?Donald L. Madill38 Black Hawk Around The World; Part I: A Proposal,MAJ Brendau P. Blackwell44 From Balloon To Black Hawk; Part II: World WarII, LTC David M. Lam M.D.

Ins de Back Cover: ATC Action Line: Special VFRCover: On the extended battlefield Army avia-tors will be operating in conjunction with theArmy's new air defense weapon, the Stinger.See Major General Oblinger's article on airdefense tactics beginning on page 2

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Honorable John A. MarsSecretary of the ArmRichard K. TierneyEditor

The miss ion o f the U S Army Aviation Digest USPS 415-350) S to prOVideInformat io n of an operational . functional nature concerning safety and aircraftacc ide nt preve ntio n. training . maintenance . operations research and development .av iati o n medicine and oth er rela ted data

This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General HeadquartersDepartment of the Arm y 25 Ap nl 1980 In accordance with Army RegulatIOn310- 1

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The Olge t S an offi cial Depar tme nt of the Army periodical published monthlyunde r t he supervIS ion of the Commanding General . U S Army AVia tion CenterViews exp ressed he rein are no t necessarily those of the Department of the Armynor the U S Army A Viation Center Photos are U S Army unless otherw isespeCif ied Use of the masculine pronoun S Intended to Include both ge ndersun less otherwise stated Material may be reprinted prOVided credit S given to theOlge t and to the author unless otherwise indicated

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Those not ellg Ible for official distribution or who desire personal copies o f theDigest can order the magazine from Ihe Superintendent of Docume nts . USGovernment Printing Office Washington DC 20402 Annua subscription ratesare 2000 domestic and 25 .00 overseas


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A IRSPACE, THE ELEMENT in which we Armyaviators must work, is often taken for granted. Infact, sometimes we may tend to feel that it all belongsto us. Such is certainly not the case, especially whencritical airspace over the battle area is considered.The third dimension of the battlefield must be mutuallyshared by many types of aircraft and weapons andonly through close and continuing coordination cansuch sharing be effected.

Ground weapons which guard our friendly skiesbelong to the Air Defense Artillery, and our leadarticle for July vividly describes their use in bothdefense and offense in the AirLand Battle. The author,Major General John B Oblinger Jr. , commandinggeneral, Air Defense Center and School, Ft. Bliss,TX, speaks with authority in describing the criticalrole that these weapons must play.Looking further at a scenario expected to be typicalof tomorrow 's conflicts, General Oblinger tells it likeit is Since there will only be a limited number of airdefense systems available, it is incumbent upon ourcommanders to carefully weigh the priorities for theweapons' dispersal and sites to be protected.

The placement and use of the air defense artilleryunits will be a key element in the AirLand Battleequation, and General Oblinger's article provides anexcellent means for Army Aviation personnel tolearn more of this contribution.Just as ADA will be a prime factor on the extendedbattlefield, Army Aviation must bear equally increasingresponsibilities. That is the topic which Captain JosefReinsprecht and I address in "Army Aviation Forcesin the AirLand Battle." This is a look into the future-asto how we must fight , if we are to counter the depthand breadth of the threat on the modern battlefield.Army Aviation systems and forces allow the commander to see and fight far beyond the friendly frontline of troops on an extended battlefield. Programedand future technological advances in weapons, electrooptica l and aircraft systems will greatly enhance thiscapability and allow even deeper ground target engagements with a corresponding disruption of the enemy'ssecond echelon forces. Army Aviation units must,however, be prepared now to develop, practice, applyand refine the extended battlefield concept usingtoday's assets. The implementation momentum mustbe maintained so that aviation unit leaders and aircrews produced by the training base are fully preparedfor their expanding roles in the AirLand Battle. Inorder to do so, we must know and understand theconcept and principles involved - a must for yourreading.

Much of the professionalism of our Army Aviationteam is predicated upon our standardization program

JULY 1981

and a thorough knowledge of our aviation publicationsChief Warrant Officer, CW2, Gary R. Weiland challen ges the level of that knowledge with his monthlyarticle "Hangar Talk. Passing these examinationshas caused many of us to wrinkle our brow in concentration How well can you do ?And in this issue, you will also find the introductionto an exciting propositon advanced by Major BrendauP. Blackwell, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff forResearch , Development and Acquisition , Headquarters, DA , in his article, "Black Hawk Aroundthe World" (the second part will be published inAugust). Major Blackwell is not writing simply aboutthe UH-60 being deployed with Army units worldwide, he is presenting a plan for circumnavigation ofthe globe by a UH-60, Black Hawk, a feat which hasnot been accomplished to date by any helicopter.In addition to achieving an aviation first for theArmy, Major Blackwell contends that such a flightwould "be a bold test of the ultimate se lf-deploymentcapability of the Black Hawk What are yo urthoughts and where can we sign up?

These are just a few of the highlights of the excellentreading ahead for you in this viation Digest issue(do be certain to read about "Captain Curious" inthe VFR column ). It is our intent to have yourmagazine contain informative, entertaining and, aboveall, lifesaving material that will help us each do ourjobs better- be it in maintenance, operations, safety,air traffic control or other Army Aviation relatedendeavors. For when we do our job better , our entireArmy will benefit therefrom.

Major General Carl H McNair Jr.Commander U.S. rmy Aviation CenterFort Rucker L1


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A RMY Aviation and Air Defense Artillery (ADA) are bothvita l members of the combinedarms team. Successful cooperation between aviation, air defense and the supported maneuver forces depends to a largeextent on each member understanding the practices and techniques of the others. I appreciatethis opportunity to share withthe Army Aviation communityinformation about the way ourAir Defense Artillery is organizedand tasked to contribute its shareto the success of the total forcein tomorrow s conf l icts.I n those confl icts, it is expected that two distinct air battles will be fought in the divisionand throughout the corps area.One will focus on the neutralization of communications faci l i-ties, depots and staging areasand will primarily be executedby high performance fixed wingaircraft. This air battle will extendfrom the brigade rear to thecorps rear area. The other airbatt le wi ll be fought from thebrigade rear to the forward line

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in theOFFENSE and EFENSEMajor General John B. Oblinger Jr.

Commanding GeneralU.S. Army Air Defense Center and SchoolFort Bliss, TX

where approximately 80 percentof the enemy s aircraft will beattack helicopters.

D org niz tionnd t sk org niz tionThe air defense to counterthese two distinct threats is ajoint Army-Air Force responsibility, with the Army responsibility being accomplished bydivisional as well as nondivisional Air Defense Artillery forces.The divisional ADA fire units thatare availab le to deal with this

threat consist of the numbersof Chaparral, Vulcan and Redeyeweapons shown in figure 1,clearly indicating there are sim-ply not enough air defense weapons available to the maneuvercommander. Consequently , themaneuver commander must priorit ize his assets for air defenseprotection , setting up the basisfor air defense task organizationand mission assignment, and the

subsequent positioning of organic weapon systems on theground by the divisional ADAcommander.Let me use a divisional tacticalsituation to illustrate how all thistakes place . In this particularscenario, the division is aboutto defend an area with an approximate 60 kilometer km)front and 80 km depth . Thedivision commander has assessed that the combined armsarmy he is facing will attempt abreakthrough to destroy or capture communications facilitiesand depots located in the corpsarea. The division estimate ofthe situation is that the mostlikely ground avenue of approach is through the 1st Brigade sector (figure 2).Considering that brigade s criticality, recuperability and vulnerability, the division commander established the 1 st Brigadeas his number one air defensepriority, with the 2d Brigade, thedivision tactical operations center and ammunition storage areafollowing in order. Next, he pro-

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FIGURE 1: Divisional ADA Fire UnitTotals (Current)Division TypeArmoredMechanizedInfantryAirborneAir Assault

Chaparral/Vulcan/ Redeye*24 24 7224 246724246804863048 62

With Stinger, all Redeye figures change to72 teams for each division type

vided this initial guidance to hisChaparral/Vulcan (C/V) battalioncommander, who then task organized his force to defend thedivision s priorities. Due to theirgreater mobility Vulcan andRedeye units pri marily supportthe brigades, while Chaparral,although integrated into the defense of the division s top priorityto provide it more mix, primarilysupports the more static assetsto the rear.Once his task organization iscomplete, the C/V battalion commander will assign his forcestheir missions. That may be anarrative mission to defend aspecific facility or location, anADA standard tactical missionor a standard tactical missionwith certain elements modifiedor deleted.Let s sidetrack a moment andtake a closer look at the standardtactical missions, as these willnormally be assigned to ADAelements supporting maneuverforces:

General Support. Provides airdefense for the force as a wholeand is not committed to anyspecific element.General Support Reinforcing.Provides air defense for theentire force and, secondarily,also augments the coverage ofanother ADA unit; is not committed to any specific element.Reinforcing Augments thecoverage of another ADA unit,

JULY 1981

and both are committed to aspecific element of the force.Direct Support OS). Providesdedicated air defense for a specific element of the force whichdoes not have its own ADA, sothe ADA unit is committed tothat specific element.Each of the four ADA standardtactical mission definitions closely resembles that used by thefield artillery. Also similar to thefield artillery these missions

General Oblinger

create a special relationshipbetween the supported and supporting units by specifying certain responsibilities for each commander. One of these responsibilities concerns where supporting ADA fire units are positioned.While performing a direct support standard tactical mission,the individual ADA fire unit commanders position their systemson the ground with approval ofthe local ground commander.Final approval of position selection is the responsibility of themaneuver commander in consideration of air defense needsto overall mission accomplishment.Returning now to our scenario:The top air defense priority , the1st Brigade, has a direct supportADA battery of three Vulcanplatoons, two Chaparral platoons

and one Redeye platoon. Thebrigade commander determineshis air defense priorities, andthe battery commander thenallocates available fire units toprovide adequate protection forthem (figure 3). Again, Vulcanis allocated to the defense ofmaneuver elements and Chaparral is placed in defense of morestatic assets to the rear.Establishing priorities and tailoring available forces continuein the same manner for one ofthe 1st Brigades subordinatetask forces, TF 1-77. The threedirect support Vulcan platoonsallocated to the task force aresufficient to cover the force sthree companies, the top priority. However, the next priority,a bridge to the rear, is left undefended because of insufficientADA weapons. Realizing thebridge s importance, the taskforce commander TFC) requestsadditional ADA assets from 1stBrigade, which are granted. OneRedeye section, consisting offive teams, is issued a new mission, moving it from the brigadesammunition point to TF 1-77.Another item of concern inthis situation for the TFC is theuse of h s OS Vu Ican systems inthe ground support role , sincethat can cause a degradation ofVulcan s air defense capabilitythrough a shortage of ammunition , or of the proper ammunition. Therefore, the TFC care-

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passes into the main battle area.Again, this support should beprovided in accordance withestablished priorities.The four specific fundamentalsof ADA use-mass, mix, mobilityand integration-were alsotouched on in our scenario discussion. While each is importantand is considered and providedfor in every operation, their relative emphasis will vary fromsituation to situation.In a defensive operation,where enemy penetration andsaturation tactics must be countered, the needs for weaponsmass and mix generally assumeprominence. However, this doesnot mean that mobility and integration are unimportant northat they should not be providedfor in any defense design.Where ADA systems are positioned on the ground dependson both tactical and technicalrequirements and is closely related to what they are defending.This fact must be balancedagainst the tactical requirementto engage the attacking aircraftbefore its ordnance release,thereby dictating that the fireunits be positioned out from,rather than directly on, the defended asset. Other tactical factors include requirements forbalance, defense in depth andmutual supporting distances,which for Chaparral and Vulcanstipulate positioning these weapon systems no farther apartthan 2,000 and 1,000 meters,respective IyJust as with other weapons,ADA systems must see, eithervisually or through radar, theirtargets before engagement.Earth curvature as well as terrain and radar masking are primary considerations in this regard and dictate the requirementof either commanding terrain orforward slopes for emplacement.Other technical requirements,varying from system to system,

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also influence position selectionand include backblast areasaround all missile system positions (15 meters in the case ofChaparral) , 10-degree terrainslope limitations for Chaparraland Vulcan, and line-of-sightcommunications requirements.

DefensiveManeuver ImplicationsImplications for the maneuvercommander of how and whereADA units are used in the defense are the number of assetsdefended, terrain allocation, unitsignatures, air defense suppres

sion, and liaison and communications.First, since the needs for ADweapons mass and mix assumeprominence in the defense, eachasset being defended will beprovided a larger number of ADAsystems than in the offense.Because there are only so manyADA systems in the division, thismeans that fewer assets willreceive ai r defense protectionin the defense than in the offense.Next, there are several implications for the maneuver commander concerning where supporting ADA units are positioned.The most obvious of these isthat there is only a limitedamount of accessible commanding terrain within any area ofoperation. Positions selected forADA units are unavailable formaneuver force use and viceversa. This is one of the manyareas in which the maneuvercommander must balance theneeds of his supporting ADA unitagainst those of his organic andother supporting units, whilemeasuring their contributions tomission accomplishment. Notonly must the maneuver commander consider position requirements for the ADA unitdedicated to his support, but hemust also consider position re-

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quirements for high/medium airdefense HIMAD) units-Hawkor Nike-Hercules-which maybe operating in h s area andwhich therefore require themaneuver commander's approval for their position selection.That commander must alsorealize the risk that supportingADA fire units may disclosemaneuver positions through visual, electronic or smoke signatures and must weigh the benefits received versus the cost.Should the price be too high,he has the authority to directhis supporting ADA unit to aweapons-hold status, therebyprecluding all but self-defense

the most im-port nt implic tions the requ irement for

li ison nd com-munic tion between

supported ndsupporting units

engagements. Additionally, measures taken to reduce unit signatures must be a top trainingpriority for all the commander'sunits-organic, attached andsupporting.Another risk the maneuvercommander must realize is thepossibility of incidental maneu

ver damage during periods ofheavy enemy air defense suppression. Once again , this is anarea where he must seek a relative balance between two seemingly conflicting needs, providing his assets as much air defense protection as possiblewhile minimizing the effects ofenemy air defense suppressionactivity on those same assets.Perhaps the most importantimplication for the maneuver

commander concerning how andwhere ADA units are used inthe defense is the requirementfor liaison and communicationbetween the supported and supporting units. To meet that, thesupporting ADA commander willnormally establish his commandpost at or near the support unit'sCPo Communications are assuredby all supporting fire units monitoring the support unit's command net as well as their ownnets. Liaison and communication allow the passing of pertinent air defense informationfrom the ADA to the maneuverunit and provide a means forthe maneuver commander topass equally important information to the ADA unit. The air de-fense of a maneuver unit s theresponsibility of that maneuverunit commander consequently,the maneuver unit commandermust ensure that supportingADA elements are fully integrated into all aspects of everyoperation.

Offense OperationsMoving from defensive to offensive operations, Air DefenseArtillery supports and assists themaneuver commander as it destroys enemy high performanceaircraft and attack helicopters,causes enemy aircraft to loseeffectiveness through prematurerelease of ordnance, and provides suppressive fires againstground targets in specified casesAs you recall, in the defensethe fundamental needs for airdefense mass and mix wereparamount, resulting in a relatively small number of heavyindividual defenses. Those requirements change in the offense where the attacker'S needfor flexibi lity and speed sh iftsthe air defense focus primarilytoward mobility and integration.Since an attacker is particu

Continued on page


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RMY VI TION FORCES IN THE


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FIGURE : EIGHTTR DOC MISSION AREASClose CombatFire SupportAir DefenseCommunicationsCommand / ControlIntelligence / Electronic Warfare

Combat Support/Mine WarfareCombat Service Support

the Army Aviation Mission Area Analysis, the formation of Battlefield Development Plan III, the Concept Based Requirements Strategy and in the trainingprocess.

This article further disseminates AirLand Battleemerging doctrine to the U.S. Army Aviation community and describes how Army Aviation forces willtrain for and fight the AIRLAND BATTLE.

These concepts are embodied in TRADOC Pamphlet525-5, The AirLand Battle and Corps 86, dated 25March 1981 , as well as General Donn Starry's (commanding general, U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand recent article on the Extended Battlefield in the March 1981 issue of Military eview (forreprints contact Military Review USACGSC , Ft.Leavenworth, KS 66027); and in General Starry'sconfidential videotaped briefing entitled AirLandBattle. These basic references outline an approachto military operations that realizes the full potentialof our Armed Forces. Many of the terms and ideasthat are depicted in this article have been extractedword for word from these three sources with theintent of adhering to doctrinal discipline and main-FIGURE 2: U.S. CORPS AREAS OF INFLUENCENOTE : Friendly unit areas of influence are dependent uponthe following planning horizons: Battalion 0-3 hours; Brigade0-12 hours; Division 0-24 hours; Corps 0-72 hours; Echelonabove Corps 72 + hours. These planning horizon parameters are relatively inflexible, however, due tovariations in terrain , threat deployment and resultant threat rates of closure the deriveddistances from the FLOT may vary

FlOT J : : ; ~

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taining training standardization.The AirLand Battle is the result of an evolution in

doctrine and is not new in terms of originality. Itsimply uses more descriptive terms and may at themoment seem somewhat revolutionary consideringthe attrition oriented, albeit, active defense mind-setthat has for some time pervaded our thinking, doctrineand training.

The AirLand Battle concept has evolved fromthe Extended Battlefield, which was preceded by theIntegrated Battlefield, the Central Battle and theCorps Battle, in that order. So it is essentially ablending of two primary notions- extending the battlefield and integrating employment of conventionalnuclear, chemical and electronic means- to describea battlefield on which the enemy is attacked to thefull depth of his formations. 2The potential enemy we must train to fight, astypified by the threat in Central Europe, the MiddleEast and Korea, is a modern, well-balanced mechanized fighting force that outnumbers us in men andweapons and is trained to seize and keep a hightempo of offensive actions, Soviet sty Ie

With this threat in mind, what we seek to obtainthrough this concept is the capability for the earliestpossible initiative of offensive action by our combinedair and land forces to bring about a conclusion of the1 Brigadier General Donald R Morelli, DeS , TRAOOC, Letter, ATOO-ZO, ConceptBased Acquisition System, 29 January 1981, pp. 1-3.2 TRAOOC Pamphlet 525-5 , The AirLand Battle and Corps 86 , 25 March1981 , p. 2.

attalion Brigade Division Corps



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battle on our terms.) The leadership of the Army isconvinced that a real potential exists now to do this,to fight outnumbered and win, but only if currentassets are correctly organized, trained and employed.So, to expeditiously facilitate the necessary trainingmeasures that are required the following four-phaseprogram is undergoing implementation: Phase I: Major command conferences to formulate basic ideas. Phase II: Training and Doctrine Command andmajor command joint proposals for implementation of priorities and assets. Phase III: Joint product provided to head

quarters of corps/ divisions. Phase IV: Service schools/ centers produceleaders trained to fight the AirLand Battle.It is important to note that the Army is already inall of these phases of implementation to some degree.The Potential BattlefieldThe overwhelming superiority in force ratios enjoyedby the threat demands that our operative tacticsprovide for quick and favorable resolution of thebattle to preclude being overrun by follow-on echelons.This would allow our political authorities to negotiatewith their adversaries from a position of strength. In

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) nationsin particular, we cannot for long trade space fortime; in other words, we must plan to deny theenemy his objectives. Furthermore, despite our previous espousal of the active defense, in none of thecritical areas of the world would U.S. forces findsufficient maneuver room to conduct a protractedtraditional nonlinear defense in depth 4 An excellentexample of the distances required for an articulateand successful defense in depth strategy can be gleanedfrom German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's190-mile, World War II counterstroke at Kharkov,Russia which consumed the equivalent distance fromDetroit to Chicago. In this same light, the Russiansweep around von Manstein's left flank after Stalingradwas farther than the distance from the East Germanborder through Germany, Holland and Belgium. sOf the three classic methods for breaching a defense-surprise, fire and maneuver, and concentration offorces- the threat can be expected to employ adiversified mixture of all three. However, GeneralHerman Balek and Major General A.D.F.W. vonMellenthin of World War II German Wehrmacht fameconsider the concentration of forces, as epitomizedby the speed of the attacker, to be the most difficultto defend against. > The defense forces must thereforeget set well forward to defend against assault echelonsand simultaneously destroy, delay, and disrupt followon echelons in an attempt to gain the initiative andgo on the offensive.

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Consequently, when considering the potentialbattlefield, in order to win we must not only avertdefeat but also achieve a definable victory- andquickly By postulating a victory through offense asour goal, we also accrue a deterrent benefit by assuringenemy leaders that there will be no return to a prewar status quo for them if they fail to win.Defining the Extended Battlefield

While competitive numbers of men, weapons andsystems are important, of greater concern is theirability to influence the Schwerpunkt or criticalpoint in the battle. This influence is related to distancefrom the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and canbe further defined as functions of mobility, weapon'sranges and time, as shown in figure 2 In the AirLandBattle the battlefield is extended in three ways, indepth, forward in time, and lastly in the range ofassets employed (assets are extended to include higherlevel all-service acquisition and attack resources).Historically, victory in battle has seldom beenachieved purely as a result of superiority in numbersor technology. In fact, the employment of resourcesto their maximum effective influence in the battlehas historically been the determining factor. 7 Consequently, the degree of resource employment we willstrive to obtain is the simultaneous conduct of theclose-in battle and the deep attack of follow-onechelons with continuous planning for maximum useof all conventional, nuclear and chemical capabilitiesunder a single commander at division and higherlevel. (Note: Brigades are generally not capable ofexecuting deep attacks without reinforcement. However, some independent heavy brigades and air cavalryattack brigades have the inherent resources to conductdeep attack operations.)

The' corps commander will have to orchestrate hisground and air forces to create an opportunity toassume the offensive. In the process of deploying hisdefensive forces the corps commander will have to3 Ibid4 General Donn A. Starry, CG, TRADOC, Extending the Battlefield, USACGSCMilitary eview Volume LXI, No.3, March 1981, p. 34 .5 General William DePuy (USA Ret), General s Balck and von Mellenthin onTactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine, published b y the BDM Corporation,McLean, VA, 19 December 1980, p 23. This report (BDM/W-81-077-TR) wassponsored by the Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Office of theSecretary of Defense, and the Defense Nuclear Agency and addresses amongother critical areas of interest such topiCS as: Smaller Units, Pure Force Composition (below brigade level), Maneuver Strategy, Risk Assumption, CommandFunctions and Combat Leader Development.6 Ibid p. 14.7 General Donn A. Starry, CG, TRADOC, AirLand Battle, TRADOC Videotape

2E-777-81 09-B , April 1981, Classified CON FIDENTIAL , distribution is limited.

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plan 72 hours in advance, coordinate with precision,execute with offensive violence, and yet beware notto fight piecemeal.In general, the most decisive offensive is one whichstrikes with overwhelming force into the enemy'srear and destroys or captures his service support,combat support, and command and control.8 Attacksset the tempo of the battle and are planned aroundsix basic fundamentals of the offensive: See the battlefield. Concentrate overwhelming combat power. Suppress enemy defensive fires. Shock, overwhelm and destroy the enemy. Attack deep into the enemy rear. Provide continuous mobile support.If, thus far, these conceptual demands and postulations appear to be wishful thinking or hopelessdreaming, one must observe that the German forcesin World War II routinely expected to fight outnumbered by as much as 5: 1, often 10: 1, yet expectedto win, and frequently did. Generals Balck and vonMellenthin have directly attributed their battlefieldsuccesses in these circumstances to superior individualsoldier traits, quality of unit performance, smaller,more efficient unit organizations, leadership fromthe front and unity of command.9Battles have been lost by forces that were not onlywell-deployed but were able to derive maximum ef-fectiveness from all weapons. So ultimately whilenumbers, technology and deployment are important,intangibles, such as morale and the will to win, canbe the deciding factor.

WinningThe successful employment of extended attack bydefensive forces, as an alternative to purely defensiveactions behind the FLOT to avert defeat, has beenamply and dramatically demonstrated by the Israeli

armed forces in several recent come as you arewars. Although maintaining a posture of defense, towin, all of our units must be prepared and inclined toact offensively despite that defensive posture.

Maneuver and logistical planning must anticipateenemy vulnerabilities that are created by our actionsin the close-in and deep attack battles. To do this,leaders must be adept at interpreting the concept ofoperations of units one level higher than their own.Additionally, leaders must willingly assume riskscommensurate with the desired payoff. Put anotherway, the more formidable the opponent, the greaterthe need for a daring venture of calculated risk.Deep attack of all enemy echelons is ultimatelythe unifying idea we must grasp to realize our fullpotential for winning a definable victory. There arethree primary tools for conducting deep attack:

1

Interdiction by air, artillery, special forces. Offensive electronic warfare. Deception.The tactics of American football can be used todemonstrate the desired results of the AirLand Battle.The combined arms team is used to block the enemy'skick (massive firepower) whenever possible. By sackinghis quarterback with command, control, communications and intelligence C3I) we create uncertaintyand slow his drive short of the line of scrimmage(FLOT). Interceptions, fumbles and injuries (reducingenemy alternatives) allow us to seize the ball (initiative)and go for the long shot (tactical nuclear releaseauthority and/ or the offensive) and ultimately thegame (win).Currently, our air forces are better suited - throughinherent system's mobility, firepower and C3I capabilities - to conduct deep attack operations thanother combat organizations. Additionally, the followingnear-term and future Army Aviation systems willfurther enhance the ability of the combined armsteam to conduct deep attack in the AirLand Battle.

SEMSpecial electronics mission aircraft (SEMA) allow

the commander to see the battlefield far beyond theFLOT. The better he sees the battlefield the moresurely he can concentrate his forces or employeconomy of forces at the right time and place.The improved GUARDRAIL system (RC-12D) provides communications intercept, exploitation and emit

ter locating capabilities at corps level. The QUICKFIX lIB (EH-60) will be welcomed as the first truedivision level electronic warfare system. It will beable to disrupt the integrity of threat communicationsnetworks as well as provide protection against hostileradar emitters.

The QUICK LOOK (RV-l) currently provides acorps level system which conducts visual reconnaissance and monitors opposing force radar emitterswhile simultaneously retransmitting that data to groundprocessing facilities for quick processing and dissemination. The Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR, OV-1D) complements QUICK LOOK at corps level withnear realtime radar imagery of both fixed and movingtargets, in addition to infrared (IR) imagery andphoto recon functions.

The Heliborne Standoff Target Acquisition System(SOTAS) will be mounted on an EH-60 to furtherround out the commander' s ability to see far beyondthe FLOT. SEMA systems and capabilities enable usto allocate resources to attack threat weaknesses8 FM 100-5, Operations , HQDA, Washington, DC, 1 July 1976, p. 4-6.9 DePuy, Op cit. pp. 38-49.



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and concentrate forces against threat attacks.AHIP

The Army Helicopter Improvement Program(AHIP) is developing an improved scout helicopterthat is more capable of fighting in conjunction withthe attack helicopter. It will provide improved battlefield reconnaissance, realtime information, security,aerial observation and target acquisition/ designationsystems during day, night and reduced visibilityoperations. To enhance its effectiveness in the highthreat environment, improvements will emphasizetactical terrain flying, electronic countermeasuresan air-ta-air self-defense missile system, and visionenhancing equipment for more effective targetdetection, acquisition and handoff. The mast-mountedsight (MMS) provides standoff target acquisition andlaser designation systems that will allow scout helicopters to remain masked for reconnaissance, surveillance, artillery observer and target acquisitionmissions. The MMS will also provide visionics morecompatible with AH-IS and AH-64 capabilities.

AH 1SThe AH-IS fully modernized Cobra currently beingfielded will be an integral part of the Army's attack

helicopter force through the year 2000. The AH-IScan carry 8 tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireguided (TOW) missiles, 320 rounds of 20 millimeter(mm) and 1470 mm (2.75 inch FFAR) rockets in theEuropean environment. In an alternate mission configuration, the aircraft can carry up to 76 70 mmrockets for multiple battlefield effects such as highexplosive, illumination, smoke and multipurposeshaped charge su bmunitions. When fielded, theForward Looking Infrared Augmented Cobra TOWSight (FACTS) will provide the AH-IS attack fleetwith an enhanced target engagement capability undernight and obscured visibility conditions.

AH 64The AH-64 advanced attack helicopter will provide

the Army with an improved capability to influencethe battle over a broad front and the flexibility toaccomplish the mission during day/ night and adverseweather conditions. The AH-64 can be armed withas many as 16 HELLFIRE missiles in addition to itsrapid-firing, armor piercing, 30 mm cannon whichhas a maximum effective range of 3 kilometers.Alternate mission configurations for the AH-64 includearmament loads of up to 7670 mm rockets or a combination of HELLFIRE, 70 mm rockets and 30 mmrounds. Reliability, availability and maintainabilityhave been built into the AH-64 from the ground up;

JULY 98

furthermore, the AH-64 has been designed so that itis nearly invulnerable to 12 7 mm and is highly resistantto 23 mm rounds. The Pilot's Night Vision System(PNVS) will enhance the AH-64's night/adverseweather capability, denying the advantages of limitedvisibility to the enemy. In concert with the TargetAcquisition and Designation System (T ADS), thePNVS will enable the AH-64 to fight in conjunctionwith the M-l tank and engage enemy forces r o u n d ~the-clock.

UH 60The UH-60 Black Hawk is our new firstline utilityassault helicopter that will provide extended range,speed and payload for increased logistics and mobilitycapabilities. The Black Hawk will be used primarily

n the main battle area as a squad-carrying and logisticsaircraft. It will be organic to combat support aviationcompanies and air cavalry troops and will replacethe UH-l Huey on a two-for-three basis. The UH-60will enable the ground commander to make theoffense a viable operational concept by conductingair assault raids, rapid movement of antiarmor temas,rapid resupply throughout the battle area, and rapiddeployment of rear area security forces in responseto enemy airborne and airmobile operations.

CH 47DThe CH-47D Chinook modernization program willprovide a helicopter that will meet the medium lift

transport needs of the 1980s and 1990s. Majormodifications are being made to the CH-47 that willallow it to operate with internal or external loads of25,000 pounds on a standard day. The CH-47D willplaya vital role on the modem battlefield, particularlyin the conduct of high priority tactical airlift tomaneuver forces that will be widely dispersed toavoid becoming potential nuclear or chemical targets.

Strategic DeployabilityThe capability of selected Army aircraft (AH-64,UH-60, CH-47) to self-deploy to a distant battlefield

or throughout extended battlefields is realizable nowas demonstrated in August 1979 by Operation Northern Leap. During that exercise four CH-47 helicoptersflew from Ft. Carson, CO, to Heidelberg, Germany.Within 30 minutes of their arrival in Germany, theCH-47s flew their first mission in support of UnitedStates Army, Europe. With regard to rapid deploymentforces, Major General John W McEnery (chief ofstaff, U.S. Army Forces Command) recently identifiedheliborne elements as a most effective option forcefor use in a rapid deployment role because they areleast hindered by terrain and most capable of attriting


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and even stopping attacking threat forces on anextended battlefield. O In short, existing and plannedaviation units such as the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade(ACAB), due to their modularity and composition,act as a natural nucleus for a small but potent rapiddeployment force.

Aviation Contribution toAirLand Battle ow

Army Aviation forces through the application ofmaneuver, speed, superior firepower and economyof force will make significant contributions to theintegrated conduct of the close-in "LandAir" battleand deep attack interdiction in the extended AirLand Battle. (Note: The close-in battle is primarilya land battle with support from air forces. The termLandAir is quoted from General Starry's videotape.)Furthermore, this capability is inherent in aviationunit organizations and equipment now. Engagementof first echelon threat divisions by our forward divisionstoday would witness divisional aviation's current superior capability to destroy, delay and disrupt the threat.As stated earlier, aviation forces are integral to alleight TRADOC mission areas and will play a keyrole in developing the battlefield. More specifically,in the covering force area and the main battle areaof the close-in battle, current and near future divisionalaviation elements, such as the ACAB, will performthe following typical missions: Close Combat target acquisition, processing,

attack and attack assessment by attack helicopterteams, joint air attack teams (JAAT), air cavalryand air assault forces. Fire Support extended target acquisition primarily by SOTAS; target attack, counterfireand interdiction with long range and precisionguided munitions by scout and field artilleryobservation aircraft; with target damage assessment by attack, scout and SEMA aircraft. Air Defense primarily by scouts armed withlightweight air-ta-air missiles and attack aircraft.

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Combat Support, Engineer and Mine Warfare-primarily by utility, medium lift and utility minelaying countermine (aerial mine detection) aircraft. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare primarilyby SEMA and scout aircraft with additional support from air cavalry aircraft. Command and Control facilitated primarilyby scout, utility and operat ional suppor t aircraft. Communications electronic, visual and messagecommunications capabilities facilitated by virtually all aircraft. Combat Service Support battle support, reconstitution and force movement primarily by

utility, medium lift and operational supportaircraft while attack and scout aircraft provideprotection during the conduct of those tasks.A quick look at the fundamentals of tactical employment for aviation systems/ forces reveals that theydiffer little from ground fighting techniques. In mounted warfare the tank is the primary offensive weapon. 11Consequently, aviation elements and all other elementsof the combined arms team must be employed tosupport and assist the forward movement of tanks.Considering the mobility advantage that the M-ltank has demonstrated over our other ground vehicles,the possibility cannot be discounted that M-l equippedunits may out-drive their combat support and combatservice support elements. In this contingency, aviationforces may be the only means of providing M-l tankunits with the security, fire support and even logistical resupply demanded by a thrust for deep objectives. 12 As armored units move forward aviation unitswill support and assist them by: Guarding open flanks. Reinforcing in event of enemy counterattacks. Deepening penetrations. Sweeping around flanks to hit enemy reserves. Overwatching and providing fire suppor t againstenemy elements.Although not all inclusive, the following criticalaspects of employment should be common considerations for all aviation elements. Combined arms team employment optimizeseffectiveness.

Terrain flying is essential. Engaging from maximum effective range, withminimum exposure time to threat ADA (air defense artillery), is essential. Critical threat targets must be killed in priority.In the deep interdiction of the follow-on echelons,Army Aviation, in conjunction with the combinedarms team under the direction of the corps commander, will conduct low level, high speed attackswell beyond the forward line of own troops by flyingbelow the minimum engagement altitude of reararea threat air defense systems to interdict criticalsecond echelon threat combat elements. Divisionalelements of the combined arms team artillery, attackhelicopters, Air Force close air support aircraft andjoint air attack teams will engage targets beyondthe FLOT out to the maximum effective range ofdivisional artillery (approximately 4 kilometers). CorpsArmy Aviation forces and Air Force offensive air1 Major General John W. McEnery CofS FORSCOM Talking Paper: TheRapid Deploymen t Force undated p. 311 Op. cit. p. 4-7 .12 Ibid p. 4-11.



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support aircraft will engage threat second echelonforces beyond the area of influence of divisionalartillery in an effort to disrupt or destroy threatavenues of approach, CJI , airfields, assembly areas,logistics and nuclear targets.The operational demands of fighting outnumbered

will require careful consideration for deep targetacquisition and accurate target value analysis. Theemployment of joint air attack teams and other scarcesystems must be planned with precision to coincidewith expected windows for offensive action. Thesewindows for offensive action will include the coordinated early release of tactical nu'dear weapons, withcareful consideration for the earliest time when releasecould possibly be expected and the optimum orlatest possible time for use of nuclear weapons. Thiswindow for nuclear release would put critical threatsecond echelon forces within 24 to 60 hours of theFLOT.IJFighting outnumbered will also put severe demandson our limited assets and will require us to be innovative

and maximize our resources. Some of the methodsthat could be developed to support the requiredextended range capability are: auxiliary fuel tankson aircraft, CH-47D fuel tanker accompaniment orrendezvous with the attack force, and even airemplaced FARP (forward arming/refueling point)operations beyond the FLOT in enemy country.

In light of the fact that potential targets faroutnumber available delivery systems, target prioritization and close monitoring of subsequent ammunition rates without restricting weapons employmentand operational capabilities will be necessary. Furthermore, of critical importance to the employment ofaviation systems in a nuclear/chemical contaminatedenvironment will be the requirement for nuclear/chemical protective planning and equipment foraircraft and personnel prior to H-hour.

How t Train NowUsing TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 and the How toFight series of field manuals, we must train now aswe intend to fight with today's forces and equipment.This training should include (but is not limited to)the following five requirements: FIRST establishmanagement of sensor assets by those who will employthem in war. SECOND develop and utilize integratedtarget analysis cells at division, corps and theaterlevel. THIRD anticipate lack of dispersion in enemysecond echelons and plan to attack these concentrations continuously. FOURTH train air forces in timelyand responsive deep target acquisition and attack.FIFTH conduct corps and division level exercisesthat stress the following fundamentals: the issuance

of mission orders, the development of team and unit13 Starry, Military Review Op. cit p. 41.

JULY 98

skills, and ultimately the spirit of the offense.Army Aviation must, and will confront the demandsof the Air Land Battle with enthusiasm and conviction.The challenges implicit in our job of preparing forthe next war demand that we forecast and producethe required airframes, weapons systems, munitionsand supplies. We must ensure that our forces aretrained to perform on the battlefield around-theclock, with current and projected systems. Developmental units such as the ACAB are being tailored tomeet these needs.

The AirLand Battle is not a future experimentpending acquisition of new systems. Corps and divisionscan and must train now to fight on the AirLandbattlefield. As new systems are fielded and integratedinto the force structure, our operational capabilitywill be further strengthened. In the meantime wemust maintain the momentum established duringimplementation of Phase I of the AirLand Battle andachieve as quickly as possible the objectives ofPhase IV - that is ensuring that our aircrews leavethe training base ready for their respective roles onthe battlefield.Army Aviation is in a unique position to fight whatthe Chief of Staff of the Army, General E C. Meyercalls the Three Days of War : To deter the day before the war. To fight the day of the war. To terminate conflict in such a manner that on

the day after the war the United States and itsallies enjoy an acceptable level of security.Army Aviation forces will playa key role as a memberof the combined arms team in winning the ThreeDays of War in the AirLand Battle.Although not specifically cited in the text, the following references are includedin the bibliography of this article.

COL John C Bahnsen, USA Attack Helicopter Fundamental Tactics,Aviation Digest Vol. 25, April 1979.

Brereton Greenhous, The Armor-Aircraft Interface: An Historian's Perspective, RUSI Journal September 1979.

G eneral Frederi ck Kroesen, CINCUSAREUR, Remarks to Symposium onNonmechanlzed Infantry, Haus-Rlssen, Hamburg, FRG on 30 April 1980.General Kroesen's remarks on infantry-armor force mix considerations Impact on aviation force composi tion also and lend further credence to the observations of General's Balck and von Mellenthln.

Army Aviation RDTE Plan, Ninth Edition, October 1980. Copies may beobtained from the Directorate for Advanced Systems, AVRADCOM, 4300Goodfellow Boulevard, SI. Louis, MO 63120; distribution Is limited.

General William E DePuy (USA Ret), FM 100-5 Revisited, Anny,November1980.

John C F Tillson IV, The Forward Defense of Europe, USACGSC Mlln ry'evle., Vol LXI, No.5, May 1981. Lieutenant General William R Richardson, DCG TRADOC, Winning on the

Extended Battlefield, Anny June 1981.

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REPORTINGFIN L

LateNews From rmy viation ctivities

FROM FORT RUCKEROaedalian Award. Combat Skills I Branch, LoweDivision, Department of Training and Doctrine,has received the Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) Daedalian Army AviationFlight Safety Award. Captain Calvin E Ball, branchcommander, accepted the large silver trophy,plaque and citation from Brigadier GeneralRichard A. Ingram, commandant of the AirCommand and Staff College, Maxwell Air ForceBase, AL.The award is presented annually by the Orderof Daedalians, one of America s oldest professional aviation organizations, to the TRADOC aviationunit with the best flight safety record and aircraftaccident prevention program during the fiscalyear. Combat Ski lls I flew over 30,000 accidentfree hours during fiscal year 1980.WOC Hall of Fame Remodeled. The WarrantOfficer Candidate Hall of Fame has been remodeled to create a new wing commemorating Army

warrant officer aviation participation in theVietnam conflict. The new area features a displayof individual brass plates for each of the 1,183warrant officer aviators who died in the war,from the first, Warrant Officer. W01. Joseph AGoldberg who was killed in action in 1962, throughthe last, Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, Larry AZich who was carried as missing in action untilNovember 1979 when his status was changedto KIA. _Specialist 5 Thomas E Missildine, who isattached to the 62d WOC Company for duty atthe Hall of Fame, was in charge of the remodeling. He said that all materials used in the jobwere donated or purchased by donations, andall the work was done by warrant officer candidates.The WOC Hall of Fame is open from 0900 to1100 and from 1300 to 1600 Mondays throughFridays. It is not normally open on weekends;but should a group wish to visit the hall on aSaturday or Sunday, arrangements can be madethrough the 62d WOC Company, telephone 255-2810. Chief Warrant Officer, CW2, David Brubachis the curator. (USAAVNC-PAO)

4

FROM L B MLogistics Meeting. The Society of Log isticsEngineers will hold its 16th annual symposium26 to 28 August in Seattle, WA. Its theme,Modern Logistics Technology, will embracethe broad spectrum of logistics, both commercial

and military/aerospace. For further information,contact Keith B. Kittle, symposium generalchairman, P O Box 58202, Seattle, WA 98188,or Robert R Leonard, Society of Logistics Engineers, Suite 922, 303 Williams Ave, Huntsville,AL 35801, telephone 205/539-3800/3833.FROM GERM NY

59th ATC Battalion Wins Awards. The 59th AirTraffic Control Battalion, assigned to Germanyand commanded by Lieutenant Colonel BertHervey, has been recognized by the Army Aviation Association of America as the USAREURAviation Unit (small unit category) of the Yearfor 1980. Two members of the battalion s 240thATC Company, Specialist 5 Charles E Ledfordand Sergeant First Class James Mooney, alsoreceived awards as, respectively, the ATC Maintenance Specialist of the Year and the USAREURAir Traffic Controller of the Year. (Rickey Harris)FROM W SHINGTON

Symposium. The 52d Shock and VibrationSymposium will be held 27 to 29 October in NewOrleans, LA. Host will be the Defense NuclearAgency with the cooperation of the Army Waterways Experiment Station. Papers relating to themany aspects of shock and vibration technology

Brithday Cake. The Army AviationCenter celebrated the 39th birthdayof Army Aviation at a party inJune sponsored by the ArmyA viation Association ofAmerica at Ft. Rucker, AL.

Cutting the cake areMajor General Carl H.McNair Jr., left, commanding general, Ft.Rucker, and BrigadierGeneral Robert M.

leich (Ret.), AAAAnational awardsboard chairmanphoto by

SP4 Denise Starr


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are solicited. For further information contact:The Shock and Vibration I nformation Center,Code 5804, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC 20375: AUTOVON 297-2220; commerciaI202-767-2220. (VBIC)HSM Approved. The Humanitarian ServiceMedal has been approved asa means to recognizepersonnel who participated in the followingoperations: Liberia Coup D'Etat, 12 April to 22May 1980; Wichita Falls/Vernon, TX TornadoDisaster Relief, 10 to 21 April 1979; Haiti HurricaneRelief, 6 to 21 August 1980; Jackson, MS, FloodDisaster Relief, 8 April to 9 July 1979; GrandIsland, NE, Tornado Disaster Relief, 3 to 18 June1980; Nicaraguan Evacuation of Noncombatants,11 June to 31 July 1979. For further informationcall AUTOVON 221-8698/8699. (MILPERCEN)

FROM VIRGINICivilian Schooling for Army Officers. Annually,the Department of the Army budgets more than$3 million for educating warrant and commissioned officers to the associate, undergraduate andmasters level. This amount is used for fundingapproximately 440 officers in fully funded programs and more than 400 in partially fundedprograms. In addition to satisfying personal educational goals, these programs provide the Army

with the capability to fill about 4,500 positionsvalidated as requiring graduate education forjob performance.Fully funded civilian education programsprovide the major source of degrees in the scientific, engineering and other hard skill shortagedisciplines that the Army requires.Partially funded civilian education programsprovide a number of Army personnel with anopportunity to obtain their academic degreeswithin a short period of time at minimum cost tothe Army and the individual. In addition to satisfying personal educational goals, these programsprovide the Army with the capability to fillpositions validated as requiring graduate education for job performance. In recent years, manyof the partially funded programs have beenunderutilized while individuals go to school inan off-duty status. True, there are certain limitingrequirements shortage discipline, specialtysupporting, etc.); however, these are minimaland not difficult to meet.To prepare for education in a shortage discipline, a solid background is generally needed inmath through calculus and/or at least one foreignJULY 1981

New Tower. This new standard air traffic control tower(background) is shown next to the original at Libby ArmyAirfield, Ft. Huachuca, AZ. The new tower is prefabricatedand is an Army standard. Towers identical to this are underconstruction or in use at Ft. Polk, LA; Wheeler Air ForceBase, HI; Ft. Leonard Wood, MO; Ft. Knox,KY; and Ansbach,Germany

language. If your proficiency in these areas isweak or nonexistent, you should be enrolling inthese courses off-duty so that you are betterqualified for graduate study later. You mustremember that attendance is competitive andyou should do everything possible to be fullyqualified.For more information write HQDA MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPP-E, 200 Stovall Street,Alexandria, VA 22332 or call AUTOVON 221-0685/8100 or commercial (202) 325-0685/8100.(DAPC-OPP-E, Majors Sharp and Richey)FROM CONNECTICUT

Rescue Award. A redesigned Sikorsky Helicopter Rescue Award consisting of a citation andgold pin is now available for helicopter crewmembers who perform a lifesaving mission in aSikorsky helicopter.Mili tary and civilian pilots and othercrewmembers who meet that criterion should be recommended for the award by their commandingofficer, a company official or other authority.Details of the rescue should accompany therecommendation. Each person nominated forthe award must have been aboard the helicopterinvolved at the time of the rescue.Forms for making the recommendation areavailable from the Awards Board Secretary,Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford, CT 06602.

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VIEWS ROM RE DERS

Editor:As one of the Army's "part-time" fixedwing aviators, I have a vested interestin the peculiarities of fixed wing flight.While I was reading the December 1980copy of the A viation Digest I cameupon Stanley Grayson's article, HowTo Avoid The Vmc-Related Accident."It reminded me of an article that myinstructor gave me to read during my"twin transition." But credit should goto Mr. Grayson because his was quite abit better- so much so that I mailedmy copy to my old" flight instructor.As my copy of Vmc is now in themail, I'd like to request a reprint of thatarticle. Additionally, I missed the twofirst articles in the series , "The FlatSpin" and "Spin Awareness" and I'dappreciate it if you could a lso send methose two articles. If they are as goodas the Vmc articles I'll probably behitting the Xerox machine to ma kereprints

In conclusion, I'd like to say that theA viation Digest keeps getting betterevery day. The "Threat" series and vehicle/ aircraft identification series a lsohas been great. But the one topic thatreally gets me going is aerodynamicsand flight technique. This is probablywhy I liked the articles I requested somuch. Keep up the great work.

Editor:

CW2 Bradford A. PowellECo , 501stAvn Bn(Cbt)APO New York 09326

Cmon guys, get your stuff togetherYou've really outdone yourselves withthe quality (or should I say lack thereof)exhibited by your proofreading of theFebruary 1981 issue. Let's start withthe photo on the top of page 3. I realize

the USAREUR should be ge lting thebulk of the newest and most combat-ready equipment that is available, butan AH-l that has the capability to firetwo, that 's (2), TOW missiles at thesame time? Amazing In addition, theTOWs in question look suspiciouslylike 2.75 inch FFARs.

The article on page 38 is very informative, but the photo on the same pagecreates some confusion. Since whendid the UH-l get so skinny, and growcrosstube fairings, too'All kidding aside, the informationprovided to the Army Aviation community by the A viation Digest is topnotch. I have been an avid reader since1964 and look forward to more of thesame. Keep up the good work.SSG Gerald D. KimelU.S. Army Safety CenterFt. Rucker, AL You're right in both cases. Thoseare 2.75 inch rockets:; they were firedfrom launchers mounted inboard fromthe TOW tubes visible in the photo onpage 38:; the dolly is under an AU1Cobra. We appreciate your calling theerrors to out attention ( when it rains, itpours) and regret any difficulties it mayhave caused any of our readers. Wealso appreciate your kind remarks.Editor.Editor:

Women are vital to the aviationbattlefield of tomorrow . Traditionally ,we have denied women a combat role.This denial is because of some verylogical, sound reasoning, a nd some notso sound. Women are the givers of life,we can 't ask them to take life away.Very sound , logical, emotional reasoning.

Women are inferior to men. They

are weaker physically. They are weakerpsychologically. They are weaker emotionally. They a re not as intelligent asmen. Women can ' t handle stress as wellas men. Quite possibly we are just alittle afraid to have women in combat.Margaret Mead expressed this thoughtrather aptly in the August 21, 1972 issueof the Teacher College RecordIt is possible that the historic re

fusal to give women weapons . . .may be due not to a rejection ofputting the power of death into thehands of those who give life, butrather because women who kill . . .are more implacable and less subjectto chivalrous rules with which menseek to mute the savagery of warfare.I t may be that women would kill toothoroughly and endanger the negotiations and posturings of armies,through truces and prisoner taking,with which nations at war eventuallymanage uneasy breathing spacesbetween wars.In nature, is not the Mother defending her young the most ferocious comba

tant? The male world maintains thatwomen are just not capable of fulfillingthe combat role. Most women do indeedhave a physical handicap, but, only asfar as upper body strength is concerned.Consider the other areas that womenare said to be inferior in.

There are too many reports, statistics,surveys and studies, that analyze women,to list. Suffice it to say the end result, inmy opinion , is that women, generally ,are better suited for a given job thanmen. Women have quicker reflexes,better endurance, are more emotionallystable than men , ad nauseum. Giventhe same education and opportunity, awoman is at least as qualified as hermale counterpart . Not to mention, thereis a historical precedent too.

Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these let ters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of materialprinted in any issue by writing to : Editor U.S. rmyAviation Digest P.O . Drawer P Ft. Rucker L 36362

16 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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During World War II women madeavailable more men for the combat roles.In their desire to aid the war effort inany way they could, women took overthe industry. Women manufactured alarge percentage of our nation's warmaterials. The Women's Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) provided a valuableservice to the military, These womenwere instructor pilots for the males inthe military. They towed targets, madetest flights and delivered new and sometimes barely airworthy aircraft to alltheaters of the war.Today women are even more involvedin aviation than during the war. Todaywomen are pilots on commercial airlines, some as captains. Today allbranches of our military use women asnoncombat duty only pilots. NASA hasseveral superbly qualified women in-volved in the space program right nowas astronauts. There is no doubt thatwomen are capable of doing any jobthat they are qualified for. Of about 2million people in the military, 95 percentare male. Of about 28 million womenages 18 to 35 in the Uni ted States, only97,000 women are in the armed services.That is a very large, untapped resourcethat the military can t ignore.We must fully integrate women intoall aspects of the military if we are toproperly use all of the assets availableto us. To fail in this respect is discriminatory to all. Discriminatory to the menin that it places the entire burden ofcombat on the men. It also denies menthe opportunity to serve during peacetime in the more desired assignmentsbecause women are always filling thosejobs. Discriminatory to the women inthat it prohibits them from being fullyparticipatory members of our military.As a result, men will resent women,especially in aviation, until women doall that the job entails, not just selectedportions. This is not a legal matter assome believe. No laws exist that prohibitwomen in combat roles, only policiesexisting at this time.

We need these women to fill thesejobs because there aren t enough menjoining the military to allow past prejudices to continue without jeopardizingour national security. We can no longerprotect our women from war. Civilianpopulation centers will be targets ofdestruction during future intercontinental warfare. Women will be among

JULY 98

the first casualties of that disaster.Women are vital to our future militarystrength. Our very survival may dependon them.

Editor:Although this is entitled "My Son" Iwould like to dedicate this to all theyoung women and men graduating inthis class on behalf of their parents and/ orhusbands and wives

Q

Q

Q

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CW3 John E ThomsonFt. Rucker, AL

o: LT Robert C AdamsY SON

It was nine months ago with hopes so highThat you started your class on how to flyThis was your dream when you were youngTo be an Army pilot some day, my sonWe've talked about so many thingsThe books, the maps, the silver wingsAnd then one day you said to me"I forgot to tell you about my I.P."What you said was a shock to meCause I never thought anyoneWould speak that way to you, my son.I'm sure there were times you wanted to say"Please, Mr. I.P., don t stare at me that way,'Cause I'm as nervous as I can be."Oh dear God, I wish that heWould have a little more patience with meI'm trying so hard to learn

And remember what you sayAbout the main rotor and tail rotorThat keep Huey in the air that wayI'm flying now, sir, and I knowThe collective and cyclic are in control.So thanks to you, Mr. I.P. for being his guide all the wayThe night flying and cross-country trips he madePassed the instrument test you gaveAnd finally, tomorrow is his graduation daySo now, my son, I'd like to sayWhen you are at the controls and on your wayPlan your flight and recheck your plansAnd trust your instruments, you know you canRemember your variation, deviation and winds aloftStay clear of those thunderstorms and frontal troughs.And with fond memories in your heartA permanent change of station you are about to startWith so much pride and a job well doneThis was your dream when you were youngIt's Fort Polk - here you comeYou are cleared for takeoff so give her the gun.Congratulations and best wishes, my son.

All my love,MomApril 28, 1981

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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ a a a aMrs. Kenneth D. Adams (Marie)4970 Prieto Dr.Pensacola, FL 32506

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Editor:Fledgling aviators are being graduated from Ft. Rucker now at closeto 1,000 per year, and my unit received12 of them within a 3-month period.This letter is to them.An aviator has wings, but a pilotflies. And to fly, the pilot must overcomethree hurdles:A new pilot must approach flyingwith his eyes wide open. He must havefear, respect and absolute assurance.Flying any other way is a mistake.Leaving anyone of these on the groundwill cause him to live to regret hissteps. The pilot who takes these withhim will never suffer defeat, and hisactions lose the blundering quality ofa fool's hapless performance.When we first enter flight school,

we are not really sure what to expect.Our intentions are vague, and our objectives are not clearly defined. Wehave hopes that will never materializebecause we have no idea of the difficulties we will encounter in learningto fly. Our progress follows the normallearning curve. t is slow at first. Thenbit by bit, it comes together, and later,we learn rapidly and things finally startto fall in place.But soon enough, the neat picturepainted at flight school gets muddled.The artificial constraints are not inplace in most field units, and our expectations soon clash with reality. In "real"flying, the Aviation Center cannotprepare an aviator for every unforeseen situation. After one or two unpleasant, perhaps dangerous, experiences, we actually begin to develop afear of flying. Our learning halts. Flyingis not what we expected. Every flightbecomes anew potentially dangerousexperience, and fear, without compassion, begins to intensify. We findourselves asking, "Is that what I reallywant to do?"And so, we reach our first hurdle,fear. f at this point the pilot begins toshun missions and find nonflying jobs,little usually happens to him. He simplystops being a pilot. He is, of course,defeated, and our units have those typesin them. Like penguins, they have wingsbut don't fly. Having been defeated intheir flying efforts, they sometimesbehave like failures in their other jobs'areas. The first hurdle has ended theirlearning.

Fear is perhaps the greatest hurdle

18

and is never really completely overcome. Fear will always be waiting, andthe pilot can succumb to it in his firstor fifteenth year. Three examples ofthis are a CW2, a CW3 and a CW4whom I know. I'll call them Tom, Dickand Harry. Tom, the CW4, ran afoulof some thunderstorms, and when hefinally landed, the refuel pump read196 gallons into a UH-l. Dick, the CW3,whited out in a blizzard and left a neatset of 100-foot long paralle l lines in thesnow. Harry, the CW2, was defeatedby the isolation of flying in Alaska.These three now spend their time doingother jobs and only fly to make minimums.

To overcome fear, the pilot simplymust not run away. He must face hisfear, take a deep breath and shake itoff. And even though he has it withhim always, he must fly again and again.And a moment comes when he is abovethe first hurdle.

But then he meets the second. Actually, as with fear, it was and always willbe there. The second hurdle is to comprehend the big picture - how terrainand weather will affect his flight, whatpassenger to pick up, where to go,how to navigate, fuel and distance calculations, and all the other myriad thingsthat could turn a successful missioninto a harrowing experience. Once thepilot has the big picture, he will neverdoubt his actions. He will have selfassurance and clarity of mind. He cando what he pleases because he can seeclearly to the end of his actions.And in the second hurdle lies thethird. In the development from noviceto expert, he has defeated fear andobtained the big picture. He feels hecan do as he pleases without fear, andso comes the final hurdle-power. Asthe history of the world shows, poweris the highest of all hurdles. In the caseof a pilot: He has conquered fear andlearned enough to conceptualize thebig picture, but now, what is he goingto do with it ?The most tempting reaction is togive in to it because, after all, he feelstruly invincible. He can do whateverhe pleases. He commands; he beginsby taking risks, cowboying, and in theend, he is making all the rules becausehe is a master. The pilot who succumbsto power is at first flamboyant andclownish. He later becomes cruel andcapricious.To overcome this hurdle, he must

simply be aware. Aware that in truthhe has never completely overcome hisfear and will never completely obtainthe big picture. He must disciplinehimself at all times. The challenge isnot to see how much he can get awaywith and live. The challenge is insteadto operate at all times without fearand with complete understanding. fhe does not give into his power butinstead redirects his expertise towardthe mission, he can truly be said tohave become a mature pilot.

Editor:

CW2 Brandon L TolbertA Co., 501st ABCAPO New York 09326

Reference the article "Out I Went "in the March 1981 Aviation DigestSeveral publications have printed thestory of Mr. Tobin's plight, all portrayinghim as a hero for having survived undersomewhat adverse conditions.t might better serve the aviationsafety community if one additional fact

is printed. Mr. Tobin was not authorizedto be performing crewmember dutiesat the time of his mishap. Had he beenproperly qualified prior to the flightthe incident might never have takenplace. Supervisory error first classIncidentally, there used to be a safetychain on U-21 doors to prevent thistype mishap. They were removed acouple of years ago (an engineeringimprovement) because "we never havethat kind of problem."Colonel Derald H. SmithDAR COM Aviation OfficerU.S. Army Troop Support andAviation Materiel Readiness Command4300 Goodfellow BoulevardSt. Louis, MO 63120

Editor's Note: t was directed inFebruary 1980 that the safety chain beremoved from the door of the U-21Ute because the National Transportation Safety Board and the Anny SafetyCenter determined that the chain couldbe an inpairment to ingress and egressin case of an accident. Directions weregiven in a message from the ArmyTroop Support and Aviation MaterielReadiness Command, St. Louis, MO.

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Editor:The following is submitted for publication in the Aviation Digest

"CAPTAIN CURIOUS"Your article "Out I Went " in the March 1981 issue of

the Aviation Digest prompted me to recall an incident ofsimilar nature. The names used are fictitious, but theincident is not, and may be of some interest to U 21 Utepilots curious about the in-flight characteristics of U 21doors.

I do not remember the exact date; however, it waseither November or December of 1970. I was assigned as aU 21 instructor pilot in the command aircraft company,Long Than, Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and was discussingsome standardization policies with the unit standardizationinstructor pilot who was about to return to the States.Since I was to fill his position, we were deeply involved inconversation that evening in his room when in burst CPTTom Newby. He was terribly upset and wanted to talk tous about his flight that day with CPT "Curious" Murphy.

They had flown several passengers to Da Nang thatmorning in a U 21 and were dead heading back to LongThan at 10,500 feet (feet wet) down the coast of RVN.CPT Curious, who was the aircraft commander (AC), hadbeen doing his homework by reading the U 21 operator'smanual when he came upon a paragraph about the U 21door. It stated that the door was an "air-stair" door which,when opened in flight, would streamline and float horizontally so that the crew could step on it to bailout in theevent of an emergency. Being airborne qualified, CPTCurious told CPT Newby that he didn't believe that statementand intended to open the door to determine its validity.

CPT Newby was flying in the left seat and, feeling obligated to protect his AC, attempted to instruct CPT Curiousthat such a feat was a dangerous and witless deed. "I'm theAC," replied CPT Curious, "and I'm gonna do it "Whereupon, he exited the right seat, moved to the rear ofthe cabin, unlatched the safety chain and opened thedoor. CPT Newby felt the aircraft shutter slightly andturned around in his seat to find the aircraft empty. Thethought of explaining to the company commander how helost his AC sent a horrifying chill through his corporealframe. Furthermore, how was he going to land with thedoor open?

All of these thoughts petrified the now desperate CPTNewby when he noticed a hand appear at the right bottomcorner of the door. For one fleeting moment, the idea ofrevenge for all the previous consternation of the deedflashed before CPT Newby. Up jumped the devil and said,"Use your rudder pedals and shake him off " But the light sideof the Force prevailed, and CPT Newby reduced power,lowered the flaps and gear and flew the aircraft at slow flightspeed.

CPT Curious, who was no longer curious , managed toget his left leg into the aircraft and, by using the brutestrength he had acquired during his airborne training,climbed back into the U-21, closed the door and crawledon his hands and knees back to the cockpit.Silence was not golden as CPT Curious sat in the rightseat pondering his exploration of the unknown. His rightleg, which caught in the plastic wrapped cable used tolower the door from the inside, and left him dangling from10,500 feet at 200 knots over the South China Sea, hadbeen severely injured. "CPT Newby," he stammered, "we'lltell them at Long Than that the annunciator panel doorlight came on and I went back to check it. When I grabbedthe door handle, the door came open and pulled me out. "CPT Newby's loyalty overrode his good judgment and heagreed to the story. Upon returning to Long Than, andtelling their incredible yarn, CPT Newby was proclaimeda hero for saving the life of his AC.

As CPT Newby looked at us , swallowed the last of hisdrink, and attempted to put aside his guilt, he concluded bysaying, "I think CPT Curious needs psychiatric help." Weconsoled CPT Newby. Assured he'd done the right thing, heleft to rest and fly another day. And what of CPT Curious?Oh, he's still curious, but not about the U21 door. He wastemporarily grounded, evaluated, and placed in copilot statusuntil his curious nature could be controlled and until he demonstrated the mature professionalism required for all Armyaviators.The moral to this incident is simple-so simple, in fact,it need not be stated .

Enough said

Major James L JohnsonChief, Flight Standardization and TrainingFifth U.S. Army

Post script-Thank God, the Army didn't purchase pressurized U 21s in 1966.

JULY 98 9


22/52

oucan sayNoALL TOO OFTEN rather than sayno young and not so young aviatorsaccept missions which are beyondtheir capabilities or the capabilities of their aircraft. From my ownexperience I believe these wrongdecisions are made many times because of peer and command pressure actual or imagined- andoverconfidence.Sometimes we need to say no.For example while I was in Vietnam10 years ago 14 people were killed

2

and 6 seriously injured within a 7-day period on three separate missions. The first mishap involved aUH-l H flying at night. While flyingon the beach side of the compoundthe aircraft entered IMC about 300feet agl became inverted andcrashed into the sea killing four ofthe five individuals on board. Theinstrument meteorological conditions were forecast.The second mishap involvedanother UH-IH on a routine mede-

vac mission at 0400. The pickupzone was a 5-minute flight about 2miles up a valley. The crew pickedup three patients with minor injuriesand then departed to the east. Thepilot entered heavy rain showersafter about 30 seconds of flightand flew into the northern wall ofthe valley. The three patients andthree crewmembers were killed.The only survivor was the crewchief.The third mishap occurred during

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an emergency resupply mission. Atyphoon was due to hit the areathe next morning. Although theground troops still had three daysof supplies, they felt they neededmore to weather the storm. Thewinds were between 30 and 40 knotswhen the resupply aircraft departedon the mission. The weather wasworse in the mountains than expected or reported. Approximately 1kilometer from the LZ, the aircraftentered instrument meteorologicalconditions and flew into a mountain.The aircraft burned on impact,killing three crewmembers and onepassenger. Three passengers andone crewmember survived.Two of these mishaps occurredat night and one occurred duringdaylight hours. However, all of themoccurred while the weather wasless than desirable. Two were onroutine missions and one was onan emergency resupply. I emphasize emergency resupply becauseit later came to light that the groundcommander had more than enoughsupplies to last several days. Therefore, there was no real urgency.Each mission could have beendelayed, postponed, or aborted, oran alternate means could have beenused to complete the mission.True, these mishaps happened10 years ago. But since then I'veseen an OH-58 and an AH-l crashin instrument meteorological conditions while the crew was en routeto a small town for a static display.

JULY 98

I've also seen two aircraft crash onan island above the 10, ) x)-foot level.An AH-l crashed first and only 1hour later an OH-58 crashed at thesame location. In both cases, thepilots either exceeded their own ortheir aircraft's capabilities.Every year we continue to losepeople and aircraft because of faultyaircrew judgment. Although pilotsgather all of the available information concerning a given flight, someof them still make wrong decisions.We've all made wrong decisionsand, hopefully, we have learnedfrom our mistakes. Many of us havea considerable amount of experience in aviation, and some of usfly with less experienced pilotsevery day. While none of us havenecessarily had the same experiences, we especially need to seethat individuals with less experiencelearn from our mistakes. We must

CW Russell C WingateE D ) ~U s IY S FfTY a nl

be open and honest with each other.When we are flying together, weneed to talk to each other and tellthe less experienced pilots why wedo something a certain way, so thatthey can profit from our expertise.

t all boils down to one thing-professionalism. Take, for instance,one commander who told me hewas a fatalist, while trying to getme to fly lower and lower in themountains at night. And to top itoff I attended a safety awardsceremony one day and after General X handed out the awards forsafe flying he proceeded to chewthe aviators for getting bogged downwith safety regulations. He equatedus with the Air Force because wewere falling back on our regulationsand, in his opinion, turning downtoo many missions.

t is not always easy to say no,but we re supposed to be professionals. f we strive to be professional in all aspects of our career,we should have the respect of ourpeers and commanders. Becauseof this respect, they will acceptour decisions when we say no toa mission which is beyond our limitations and those of our aircraft.This article was written from a lessonplan prepared by the author while hewas attending the Aviation SafetyOfficer Course. The views expressedin this article are those of the authorand not necessarily those of theDepartment of the Army or the ArmySafety Center.

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IRDEFENSERTILLERY

Continued from page 5larly vulnerable to air attack,local air superiority is highlydesirable, and support in theform of counterair and groundbased H IMAD units must becoordinated between the maneuver commander and the regionair defense commander. This isaccomplished through the airdefense officer supporting eachrespective maneuver headquarters and through the Air Forcedirect air support center collocated with the corps airspacemanagement eleQ1ent. Thesesupporting air defense elementsmust be integrated into the commander s plan of attack andscheme of maneuver and alsointo a comprehensive defense,guaranteeing coordination ofeffort and unity of action.

s a result, the air defensescheme of the division as awhole consists of a larger number of small, mobile ADA forcessupporting maneuver elements,while a modicum of relativelylarger sized defenses is retained atound critical installations and combat s ~ r v i e support areas. Therefore ADA inthe offense is generally deploy-ed with Redeye or Stinger)teams and Vulcan squads inte-grated into attacking combinedarms company teams with Chap-arral platoons or batteries pro-tect ing assets such as battalionor brigade trains crit ical com-mand posts and supporting fieldartillery. s the maneuver elements move forward, H I MADbatteries positioned in the divisional area should also relocateforward, with approval of theregion air defense commander,to extend coverage for attacking22

forces and division and corpsrear elements.s the .kttack develops into

an exploitation and subsequently a pursuit, maneuver forces become even more vulnerable toair attack as they penetrate thedepths of the enemy s defensesand move beyond friendlyHIMAD coverage. Since formations during these phases areextended and the limited ADAavailable must cover more area,the maneuver commander mustrecognize that air defense cover-age cannot be as effective. So it is particularly important during

u CIS the attackdevelop. air defefllJecoverage become less

effective thusforcing greater r li-ance on Air Force

counterair support

an exploitation or pursuit thatAir Force counterair operationssupport and establish local airsuperiority.OffensiveManeuver Implications

To this point I have mentionedseveral implications for the maneuver commander concerningADA use in the offense. Theseinclude greater numbers of maneuver assets being defendedby smaller sized ADA elements,coordination requirements forcounterai r and HIMAD support,and the realization on the partof the maneuver commanderthat as the attack develops, airdefense coverage becomes lesseffective, thus forcing greaterreliance on Air Force counterair support.Additionally, the maneuverimplications discussed previ

ously for defensive operationsalso apply to the offensive situation, although somewhat modified. The risks of signature detection and incidental maneuverdamage to enemy suppressionof air defenses, for instance, arered uced because we have theinitiative and because of reduced unit size and more frequent unit movement. Conversely, the need for liaison and communication increases due to theextremely fluid nature of theoffense and the increased requirements for coordination.

summaryAir defense impacts heavilyon the maneuver commanderand as such is a vital element ofthe combined arms team. It isessential that the ground commander establish his prioritiesso that the air defense commander can allocate his resources to provide the best pos

sible air defense protection, thusallowing the division s maneuverelements to move with greaterfreedom on the battlefield sothey can close and destroy theenemy.Remember, the air defenseof a maneuver unit is the responsibility of that maneuver unitcommander. Although we air defenders assist him to accomplishthis responsibility, each maneuver commander must not onlylearn air defense himself butmust also train his subordinatesin air defense.



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TRADOC SYSTEMSMANAGERS T8MUNITED STATES Army Training and Doctrine

Command TRADOC) Systems Managers TSMs)are catalysts in the acquisi tion system. They aremanagers that guide all us r aspects of assignedsystem s). It is their responsibility to organize,energize, integrate, expedite and ensure thatthe proper user office does its job with respectto assigned systems.Normally, each TSM office is collocated withthe proponent center/school. Although charteredformally by the commander, TRADOC, the TSMmanager works directly for the center commanderor school commandant. -The standard TSM office is staffed with: One colonel One lieutenant colonel Two majors One secreta ryAviation-related TSMs with their correct addressand telephone numbers AUTOVON and commercial) are listed below. TSMs are located at theU.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362,unless otherwise indicated.)Utility Helicopters Black Hawk and UH-1)ATTN: ATZQ-TSM-UCOL Cornelius F. McGillicuddy Jr TSM)MAJ E Gordon JrMAJ B. GenterAUTOVON: 558 664217115/3505COMMERCIAL: 205-255-6642/7115/3505Helicopter Launched Fire and Forget Missile HELLFIRE)and Multipurpose Lightweight Missile System MLMS)ATTN: ATZQ-TSM-H/MLMCOL Lee C. Smith Jr TSM)LTC Darryl AndersonMAJ Mike StacyMAJ P) Dave Lu mCW2 Charles KnuppAUTOVON: 558-5905/6005COM M E RCIAL: 205-255-5905/6005Attack Helicopters AAH, AH-1 and LCH)ATTN: ATZQ-TSM-ACOL David L. Funk TSM)LTC M. S. GlynnMAJ P) W. P. LeachMAJ T. J. RoopMAJ M. L. BrittinghamMAJ K. L. LandonMAJ J. A. MitteerCPT M. K. MinichAUTOVON: 558-5171/2108/3408COMMERCIAL: 205-255-5171/2108/3408

JULY 1981

Scout Helicopters AHIP, OH-58, OH-6 and ASH)ATTN: ATZQ-TSM-SCOL Robert S. Fairweather Jr TSM)LTC R. A. Neuwien JrMAJ E G. Fossum IIMAJ T. E. KonkleMAJ A. L. PopeAUTOVON: 558-4909/3808/2872COM MERCIAL: 205 255 490913808/2872Position/Navigation Systems POS/NAV)U.S. Army Combined Arms CenterATTN: ATZL-CAT-MPFt. Leavenworth, KS 66027COL Roger J. Browne II TSM)MAJ D. J. Gagliano ,AUTOVON: 552-2197COMMERCIAL: 913-684-2197Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio SubsystemSINCGARS)U.S. Army Signal Center and Ft. GordonATTN: ATZH-TSM-SGFt. Gordon, GA 30905COL Jo

Documents

Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1981