Digest Author:

Arnault v. Nazareno (Power to punish; subject of inquiry)Facts: Philippine Governemnt, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought Buenavista and Tambobong estaets for the sums of P4.5M and P500,000. Ernest Burt was paid P1M thru Jean Arnault and P500,000 for the his interest in the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The original owner of Buenavsita were the San Juan de Dios Hospital but the Philippine Government held a 25 year lease constract with an option to buy it for P3M. However, San Juan de Dios Hospital sold it to Burt for P5,000,000. The original owner of Tambobong was the Philippine Trust Company. It sold the estate to Burt for P1.2M however because Burt field to pay thus the estate was sold to the Rural Progress Administration. The Senate then adopted Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the estates deal. One of the people examined was Jean Arnault. However in the examination, he refused to answer the question on who did he give the P440,000 to first on reason that he did not want to incimiante himself and later on because he said he forgot who the person was. Because of this, Senate put him in contempt.ISSUES:WON the inquiry was valid.HELD+RATIO:YES it was.The power of inquiry is incidental to the legislative function as it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. Experience has show that to the information that Congress had tried to acquire in aid of legislation are often unavailing and are not accurate or complete so some ,eans of compulsion is essential to obtain it. But no person can be punished as a witness unless his testimony is required in a matter in which that House has jurisdiction to inquire and it would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of the House’s inquiry can be bounded. In the present casem the transaction involved a questionable and irregular expenditure of public fund of which the Congress is the constitutional guardian and it also involved governemtn agencies created by Congress and officers who are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.

The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body, must be material or necessary to the exerces of a power of the House such as to legislate or to expel a member. Ever question must be material to the subject of the inquiry or the investigation. And the materiality of the question must be determine by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The necessity for legislative action are determined by the sum total of the information gathered and not by only a fraction of it. In this case, the question is peritent to the matter under inquiry as the subject is to determine the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. This is a matter of public concern as it is the duty of the guardian of the treasury.

Sabio v GordonFacts: Corazon Aquino issued EO 1 creating the PCGG with the task of recovering ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos regime. Defensor Santiago introduced Senate Reso 455 directing an aid of inquiry on legislation to losses incurred by POTC and other due alleged improprieties by their board of directors and was submitted to the committee of accountability of public officers and investigations and committee on public services. Chief of staff Inocencio with orders from Gordon invited Sabio to be one of the resource persons for discussion of SR 455. Sabio repeatedly declined citing sec 4b of EO1 saying that the inquiry has limits. The committee asked their arrest and detained them. With both parties agreeing, Sabio was allowed to go home and his petition for habeas Corpus was moot and arrest warrants suspended.

Issues: WoN Section 4b of EO1 is repealed by 1987 ConstiWoN senate has power to punish them for contempt

Held+Ratio: Yes. The power of inquiry is inherent in senate. Operations of government are proper subjects of investigation because is a legitimate subject of legislation. This power extends to govt agencis created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or abolish, such as the PCGG. It is also inconsistent with Art XI sec 1 of consti which talks about public accountability because it encourages irresponsibility and places them beyond the reach of courts. It also goes against the twin provisions of Art II sec 28 and Art III sec 7 promoting transparency in policy-making and operation of govt. and to provide information for people to exercise their consti rights.

Yes. The order came from the authority of the whole Senate with approval by the Senate president and 15 senators. This exercise of power is a matter of self-preservation and it is necessary to require and compel the disclosure of such information for legislation given that they can punish such denial of information. Their rights were not violated because it is curtailed for a compelling state interest; to prevent corruption and to promote morality in public administration. So long astheir constitutional rights are respected, it is their duty to cooperate with the Senate committee in their efforts for intelligent legislative action.

Digest Author:

David v. Arroyo Facts: On Feb 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of EDSA I, President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1017, declaring a State of Emergency, and GO 5, calling out the officers of the AFP and PNP to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. One week later, she issued P1021 which lifted P1017. Certain events led to the President issuing those orders. Those were the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Pursuant to P1017 and GO5, the police and officials of the executive department proceeded to attempt and actually arrest people without warrant (Randolf David, Ronald Llamas, KMU and NAFLU-KMU members), cancel rally permits, disperse rallies, impose standards on media or any prior restrain on the press and the warrantless search of the Tribune office and seizure of some articles for publication.ISSUES:WON orders issued by the President were constitutionalHELD+RATIO:YES only certain portions are unconstitutional.PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence pursuant to Section 17, Article XII. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees (as constitution vests this power in Congress); (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.

The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. The powers of a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated

by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest requires a delegation from Congress.

Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State.

Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and preventacts of lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.

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SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary (Delegation of Emergency Powers)Facts: On July 27, 2003, three hundred junior officers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. They demanded the resignation of the President and other executive officials due to corruption. The President then, pursuant to Sec 18, Article VII of the Constitution, issued Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. The Oakwood occupation had ended by the evening of the same day. The President however, lifted the state of rebellion after.ISSUES:WON the proclamations of the President declaring “a state of rebellion” unconstitutional.HELD+RATIO:NO the proclamation of the President was not unconstitutional as it was within her powers as the Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief.The Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion to exercise the calling out power. Sec 18 Article VII of the Constitution grants the President a sequence of graduated powers. From the 1) calling out power, 2) power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and 3) the power to declare martial law. Only last 2 of these conditions require the conditions of an actual invasion or rebellion. And the President may call armed forces whenever it becomes necessary. And the provision does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. This is because that President has not only Commander-in-Chief powers but also Executive powers. Taking a look at the US constitutional history, it shows that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough and became more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath. The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion comes from her powers as chief executive and from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Section 4 Chapter 2, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 gives the president the authority to proclaim upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend. Therefore, a declaration of a state of rebellion is unnecessary. It only gives notice that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is no proof that the president has acted in grave abuse of discretion and there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.

Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23(2) Article VI of the Constitution.

Ampatuan v PunoFacts:Arroyo issued proclamation 1946 placing The provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudaray and the city of Cotabato under a state of emergency. AFP and PNP were directed to take necessary measures. PGMA issued AO 273 transferring the supervision of ARMM from DILG and later AO 273-A amending it and used delegating. Petitioners contend that president encroached on the ARMM autonomy and that DILG secretary’s control is contrary to RA 9054 and Consti, saying that it was granted power to control over ARMM and not just administrative supervision. They also say that there is no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency and it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers. Respondents contend that proclamation is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander in chief and delegated her powers to DILG.

Issue: WoN president invalidly exercise her emergency powers when she called the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of violence

Held+Ratio:

No. The president proclaimed a state of emergency not a national emergency. She did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her extraordinary powers. The calling out powers is vested in the president and such deployment is not an exercise of emergency powers as understood in Art 6 sec 23 (2) of Consti. She issued proclamation 1946 to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in places mentioned and in order to pacify the situation. The present administration has not withdrawn the state of emergency.

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Case Title: Guingona v. Carague

Topic: Fiscal Powers of Congress

Facts:

This petition assails the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 billion in automatic appropriation (86.8 for debt service) and P153.3 B appropriated under the General Appropriations Act. Appropriations for the Department of Education amount to P27 B

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 81 (Foreign Borrowing Act), PD 1177 (Revising Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of New Society), and PD 1967 (Act Strengthening the guarantee and payment positions of RP)

Guingona seek the declaration of unconstitutionality of PD No. 81, Sec 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Issue-Held: W/N the aforementioned provisions of law are unconstitutional – No.

Ratio:

Congress complied with the mandate to assign the highest budgetary priority to education

While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount ofP29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority to education

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process

Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Automatic appropriations under aforementioned Presidential Decrees enacted by President Marcos are not functus officio when he was ousted. Such are not inconsistent with the new constitution.

Petitioner contends that the presidential decrees contradict Sec 24 and Sec 29(I) of Article 6 of the Consti. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for debt service.

Court does not adhere to the contentions. An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative million The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power

Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

Tolentino v Secretary of FinanceFacts:

Digest Author:

RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance the administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code however its constitutionality was challenged. Several bills were introduced in the Hret seeking to amend provisions of the NIRC relative to VAT. Tolentino contends that this bill did not exclusively originate from the Hret as required by Art 6, sec 24 and even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and passed 3 readings in Hret, it did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate ways and means committee and senate passed the SB 1630. Tolentino said that amendment HB 11197 should have been done by substituting the text of SB 1630, keeping it a House Bill and the senate version becomes it text although Tolentino did also sign the Senate bill.

Issue: WoN RA 7716 violate Art VI sec 24 and Section 26(2) of the Constitution

Held+Ratio:No. It is not the law but the revenue bill that is required by Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the Hret. A bill originating from it may undergo changes in the Senate that the result would be rewriting the whole. Insistence that a revenue statute be the same as a House Bill would deny Senate’ power to “concur and propose amendments” and thus violates the coequality of the legislative power of the two houses of Congress. Senate can propose its own version with respect to the bills required by the Constitution. The initiative of filing revenue, tariff, tax bills and bills of local application must come from the Hret because they can be expected to be more sensitive of the local needs and problems coming from the different districts. Senators are expected to approach the problem on national perspective. Also the president had certified Senate bill 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of the legislative practice.

Alvarez v. Guingona (precinct-level documents)Facts:

House Bill 8817, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives. It was then transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the Senate just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817. Senate committee in Local Government, after public hearing submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration that both bills were the seamen. House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.ISSUES:WON Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.HELD+RATIO:YES it originated in the House.It cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720.The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.In Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance the Court said that: “To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required by the Constitution to ‘originate exclusively’ in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced.Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.Southern Cross Cement vs Phil CementFacts:

Digest Author:

Petitioner is a domestic corp while respondent is an association of domestic cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from Philcemcor alleging that importation of gray Portland cement in increased number has caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, and depressed local prices. DTI issued an order imposing a provisional measure of 20.60 pesos per 40kg bag on importations of gray Portland cement for a period not exceeding 200 days from date of issuance. Tariff commission (TC) received a request from DTI to determine won to impose a safeguard measure on the imports pursuant to section 9 of the Safeguard measures Act and its IRR. The investigation states that the industry is not suffering impairment in its condition from the imports of gray Portland cement thus recommending to definitive general safeguard measure. Philcemcor then filed a petition. After, the CA granted the petition and said that the findings of the commission are recommendatory and they fall with the secretary’s discretionary review. Southern Cross’ petition made it in time before the CA decision became final. DTI secretary issued a decision contrary to the TC and imposed a safeguard measure.

Issue: WoN DTI secretary has delegated tax legislation to issue safeguard measures.

WoN SMA contradicts with the GATT which the country is part of

Held+Ratio:Yes. Under the SMA, the secretary shall make a preliminary determination on whether the increased imports affect the industry. He is also authorized to decide won to impose a definitive safeguard measure and what measure should be applied. The secretary is also empowered to extend or terminate, reduce or modify his previous ruling on the measure. Section 5 reveals legislative intent to restrict DTI sec’s power to impose a general safeguard measure by preconditioning it on a positive determination of the TC. The executive power to impose these measures is but a delegated power and power of taxation is a preserve of the legislature. DTI secretary may impose under the SMA with the variations of increase or imposition of tariff-rate quotas, modification of the restriction, adjustment measures including the provision of trade adjustment assistance and any of combinations of such. These measures are imposts which are the subject of delegation under Sec 28(2) of Art 6. DTI secretary authority is derived from the SMA and does not flow from any inherent executive power. Limitations imposed by section 5 are absolute, warranted as they are by a constitutional fiat.

No. The SMA was designed no to contradict but to complement GATT. Such safeguard measure is the exception rather than the rule, making it difficult to obtain a general safeguard measure. The Philippines is obliged to observe its obligations under GATT. The GATT prescribes conditions before a member-

country may impose a safeguard measure. SMA conforms to the procedure of GATT on Agreement on safeguards and Congress has chosen the Tariff commission as the competent authority to conduct such investigation.

Pascual v Secretary of Public Works

Digest Author:

Facts:Zulueta a member of the Senate of the Phil owns several residential lands situated in Pasig, Rizal named Antonio subdivision. These lands have been reserved for the feeder roads which were the private property of Respondent. Zulueta sent a letter to the Municipal Councel offering to donate the lands and the Council accepted but without a Deed of Donation in favor of them. When RA 920 entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for Public works” was promulgated, Respondent still owns the lands. The council was informed of its approval through respondent. RA 920 appropriates 85k for the construction, repair, extension and improvement of the roads. Pascual contends that the appropriation would relieve Zulueta from the burden of constructing its roads at his own expense and it would greatly advance the value of the subdivision therefore the appropriation is illegal and void ab initio. Respondent while a member of senate executed a Deed of Donation and said that it is of a nature of a contract but it was contended that such donation is unconstitutional because of the prohibition of members of Congress to be financially interested in any contract of Govt. Petitioner wanted RA 920 to be declared null and void and deed of donation be declared unconstitutional while respondent questioned the capacity of petitioner to file because it must be the provincial fiscal of Rizal and not its governor to file and Zulueta alleged that there’s no law making illegal the appropriation of public funds for private property. ISSUES:WON RA 920 is valid

HELD+RATIO:No. RA i920 is null and void. The legality of the appropriation depends on whether the roads were private or public when RA 920 was passed. When it was passed, the feeder roads belonged to Zulueta and so it was a private property. Thus it was null and void. The deed of Donation was signed 5 months after the approval of the Act in order to give legality to the appropriation but it still did not cure the defect.

Brillantes v Comelec

Facts: Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing comelec the use of automated election system for the process of counting and canvassing of votes of the elections. It also mandated Comelec to use automated machines and electronic equipment. Reso No 02-0170 provided for three phases for a modernization program. PHASE I: computerized system of registration and voters validation or the biometrics system of reg, PHASE II: Computerized voting and counting of votes and PHASE III: electronic transmission of results. Comelec faced the problem of funding the implementation of the project since the money allocated for the AES has been spent for the equipment. The Comelec still wanted to carried out phase III even with all these developments and even if PHASE I and II was not implemented. Comelec en banc met to resolve on won to proceed with the implementation of PHASE III. Com. Tuason did not object but was concerned on the budget; saying that the other funds may not be proper for alignment. Despite reservations of its members, Comelec approved the resolution two weeks before the natl and local elections declaring that it adopt the policy that the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to Comelec.

ISSUES:WON Resolution 6712 is void for violating Art VI sec 29(1) HELD+RATIO:YES it did. Electronic transmission and tabulation of election results is “unofficial” in character meaning it did not emanate or acknowledged by the government. Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and the 2003 General Appropriations act. The implementation of which would entail hiring of addtl manpower, services and equipment. It would indeed need the disbursement of public funds which involves appropriations. RA 9206 has no appropriation for the project of Comelec for the electronic transmission of the unofficial election results. There is however 225 M appropriation of the capital outlay for the AES modernization, udner RA 8436for the natl and local elections. The money cannot also be taken from the Comelec savings in violation of Art VI, sec 25(5). The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. Here, no law has been enacted to transfer savings to another item to fund the assailed resolution. Also despite the concerns of the commissioners during their meeting the assailed resolution was still approved the next day even with the absence of a certification of validity.

Garcia v Mata

Digest Author:

Facts: Eusebio Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with AFP. With the RA 1382, Garcia cannot raise the defense of non-reversion to inactive status because of lack of accumulated active commissioned service which is about 9 years. With the RA 1600 he could now raise such defense as it gives him 10 years of service. He was a reserve officer until his reversion to an inactive status pursuant to RA 2332. ISSUES:WON HELD+RATIO:YES it did.

Farinas v. Executive Secretary (prohibition on riders)Facts: This case is about the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 14 of RA 90056 (Fair Election Act) as it repeals Section 67 of BP 881 which states that any elected official running for office shall be considered resigned upon filling of his COC. RA 90056 is the consolidation of House Bill 9000 which is an act allowing the use of mas media for election propaganda and Senate Bill 1742 which is an act to enhance the holding of free, honest, peaceful and credible elections through fair election practices. This was consolidated through a Bicameral Conference Committee. The Report was resubmitted to the Bicam conference to present further amendments. Another report was submitted by the committee was then approved by Congress after a vote of 125 for and 3 against. ISSUES:WON Section 14 is unconstitutional for being a rider.WON it is violative of the equal protection clause.WON the law can be nullified for irregularities.HELD+RATIO:No it is not a rider therefore it is constitutional.Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution states that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. This is aimed against the evils of omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation and surreptitious and unconsidered encroaches. To determine whether there has been compliance, the ruls is that Constitutional provisions relation to the subject matter and tittles of statues should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirements should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statue seeks to effect without expressing each an every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The tittle need not be an abstract or index of the Act. The discussions of the Bicameral Conference Committee show that the Tittle was actually created to assure that the specific provision can be accommodated by the law.

Not it is not violative of the equal protection clause.The clause is not absolute as long as it is subject to reasonable classification. Substantial distinctions exist between elective and appointive officials as appointive officials are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

NO it may not.The enrolled bill doctrine applies.

Digest Author:

Demetria v. Alba (direct violation)Facts: This case is about the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of PD 1177 which states that the President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different department, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive department which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department included in the General Appropriations Act. ISSUES:WON paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 117 is constitutionalHELD+RATIO:NO it is unconstitutional.Section 16(5) of the 1973 constitution, now Article VI Section 24(5) states that no law shall be passed authorizing the transfer of appropriations, however, the President may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The contended law unduly over extends the privilege granted under Section 16(5) as it empowers the president to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department to any program of any department without regard as to WON the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken or WON the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.

Liga ng mga Barangay v. COMELEC (unused funds)Facts: The General Appropriation Act of 1994 appropriated only P137.878M for the 1994 barangay elections. This was insufficient to pay the cost of the holding of the elections. Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of barangays, questioned the illegal transfer and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution by the COMELEC. They allege that the COMELEC would be transferring public funds from the executive and legislative branches of Government to COMELEC which they would use for the holding of the barangay elections. COMELEC however said that they would fund the upcoming elections using the P137.878M given by Congress and the use of its own saving resulting from unused funds originally intended for the conduct and supervision of elections and possible from a portion of its modernization fund as well as funds of local government units.ISSUES:WON COMELEC’s proposed use of funds is invalid.HELD+RATIO:NO it is not.Sec 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and Sections 17 and 19 of the General Appropriations Act allows the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective office from savings in other items for their respective appropriations. Saving refer to portions of balances of any programmed appropriation free of any obligation still available after satisfactory completion or unavoidable abandonment of work. Augmentation implied the existence of an item with an appropriation which after evaluation of needed resources is determined to be deficient. Also pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, the use of Local government funds is acceptable to defray necessary and reasonable expenses of its elections and they are mandated to share in the expenses of the election for the barangay officials through the appropriation of funds for the purpose.

Digest Author: