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8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy
1/7
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8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy
2/7
When objects
are
presented
within
the
conterf
of art
(;rnd
until
r'cccntly
objects
alr,r':rys
have
been
used)
they
are
as eligible for aesthetic consicleration
as
are
any objects
in
the rvorld,
:rnd an
aesthetic consideration of an
object
existing in
tire
reah'n
of
art
neans that thc
ob-
j('(t'\
c\i:tclrcc or futtcriorrirrg in rn .u-t
('ontext
ii
irrelcvrnt
to
the
.restheti,
judq.'rr,
rrr.
The relation
of aesthetics to
art
is not
unlike
that
of
aesthetics
to architecture.
in
that
architecture
has
a
very
specttic _function
ancl
how
'good
its
design
is
is
prirnarily related to
hor,v
well
it
performs its
function.
Thus,
judgements
on
r,vhat it
looks
like
correspoud
to
taste,
and
wc
c:ln
see
that throughor-rt history different exarnples
of architecture
rre
pr..rised
rt
dillerent
times depending
on the
aesthetics of
particular
epochs. Aesthetic
thinking h:rs
cven gone so far
as to
nrake
exalnples
of
architecture not related
to
art
at all, rvorks of:rrt
irt
thcrttsclve'
(c.g.
tlrc pl rrrrrid.
oI Egyptl.
Aesthetic
considerations
are
indeed
dlways
exftaneous to an object's function or
reason
to
[..
Unlcrs
oF coursc.
Llre
objcct'r
rcJson
to bc i. :rricrl;
.re\tl)ctic.
An
t'rarrrplc oi.r
purely
aesthetic
object is
a
decorative
object,
for
decoration's prirn:rry
function
is
to
aclcl
sorrething
to
so as
to
nrake
nrore
attractive;
adorn; om:rment,
ancl this
relates directly
to
taste. And
this
leads
us
directly to
Formalist
art and criticisnr. Fornralist
art
(painting
rncl
sculpture) is the
vanguard of decoration, and,
strictly
speaking,
one cor-lld
reasonabll,
:rsst-r't
that its
rrt
condition
is
so
rninimal
that
for
all functional
plrrposes
it
is
not
.rrt
rt
-r11,
bur
pure
exercises
in
aesthetics.
Above
all
things
Clernent
Greenberg is
the
critic
of
taste. Be-
hind ever1, one of his
decisions
there
is
an aesthetic
judgernent,
rvith those
judgcuLents
re-
flecting
his t:rste.
And
r'vhat
does his taste reflect?
The
per iod
hc
grel- up iri as a critic,
the
period
real
for hirn:
the flfties.
Giverr his theories
(if
they have
any
logic to them
rt
all)
horv
else
can one account
for
his disinterest in Frank
Stella,
Aci
Reinhar:dt, and others ap-
plicable
to his
historical
schenre?
Is it
because he
is
...
basically unsyrrpathetic on per-
sonally
experiential
gror-rnds ?
Or,
in
other
words,
their rvork
doesn't sr-rit his taste?
But in
the
philosophic
tabula rasd
of art,
if
someone
calls
it
art,
as
Don
Judd
has
said,
it's
art.
Given this, formalist painting
and sculpture
activitv
can
be
granted
an
art
con-
dition,
but only bv
virtr:e
of
its
presentation
in ternrs
of
its ert idcr
(c.g.
a
rectangr-rlarly-
shaped
canvas
stretched over rvooden
supports and stained with
such and such colors, tLs-
ing
such and such fornrs,
givrnq
such
rnd
such
l
visr-ral
experience, etc.).
Lookine
at
contemporary art
in
this
light,
one reaiizes the
minimal
creative
ellort taken
on
the
part
of
formalist
artists
specifrcall,v,
and all
painters :rnc1
sculptors
(rvorking
:rs such toclay) generrll1'.
This
brings
us
to
the realization
that formalist
art and
criticism
accept f,s
a definition of
art
one rvhich
exists
solely
on morphological
grounds. While a vast quantity
of similarlv
looking
objects or irnases
(or
visually related
objects
or
irnages) nlay
seenr
to
be related
(or
connected) bec:ruse of a
sirnilarity of visual/experiential
readines,
one cannot claim fronr
this ar-r artistic
or
conceptual relationship.
It is obvious then
that
fornralist
criticisrn's reliance on
nrorphology
leads
necessarily
r,vith
a
bias torvard
tl-re
rnorphology
of
traditional art.
And in
this sense such
criticisru
is
not
rc
lated
to
a
scientific
nethod
or
a1ly
sort of en'rpiricism
(as
Michael Friecl,
rvith his detriled
clescriptions of paintings ancl
other
'icholarlv
pirraphernalia
lvould
rvant
us to believe).
Formalist
criticism
is
no more than
an
analysis of the
physical
attributes
of
particular
ob-
jects
r,vhich happen
to
exist in
a
morphological
context. tsut this
doesn't
add any
kriou,l-
642
I
ANCUACE
AND
CONCEPTS
8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy
3/7
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8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy
4/7
aesthetics,
as
we
have
polnted
out,
are
conceptutlly
irreievant
to
art.
Thtts,
any
physic:il
thing
crn
becorne
olt.iet
d,drt,
tl'rat
is to
say,
carl
be
considcred
tasteful,
aesthetically
pleasing'
etc'
But
this
has
no bearrnEi
on
the
objc'ct's
application
to
an
rlt
context;
that
is'
its
f'rrrctionin'g
in
an
art
corltext.
(E.g.
if a
collector
takes
a
painting,
attaches
1egs,
and
uses
it as
a
dininc-
t:rble
it's:rrr
act
unrclated
to
art
or
the artist
becaltse,
(ls
drt,
thf,trvasn't
thc
;ttt'tst's
irttention')
And
rvhat
holds
trr-re
for
Duchamp's
work
applies
as
r'vel1
to
most
of
the art
after
hinr'
In
other
\vorcls,
the
value
of
cubism
is
its
idea
itr
thc
re:rlm
of
art,
not
the
physical
or
vi-
sual
qualities
seen
in
a
spccific
painting,
of
the
p.llticularization
of
certain
colors
or
shapes'
For
thesc
colors
al}d
shapes
are
the
art's
language,
lrot
its
merning
conccptually
:rs art
To
look
r-rpon
a cubist
.itraster:rvork
now
ts
art
is
nollsensical,
conccptually
speaking,
:rs
far
as
art
is
concerned.
(That
visual
infomration
rvhich
\,vas
unique
in
cubisrn's
hnguage
has
nolv
bee'
generally
absorbed
and
has
a
lot
to
do
with
tl'rc
rvay
in
rvhich
one
deals
r'vith
painting
,,lingr,ristically.,'
{E.g
rvhat
a
cubist
painting
meant
expcrirnentally
and
col1ceptuall1'
to'
, y,
cl..tr,rd
Stein,
is
beyond
our
spe
cuiation
because
thc
same
painting
then
nteant
sonle-
thing
clifferent
than
it does
nor.r,'.})
The
value norv
of
an
original
cubist
painting
rs
not
unlike,
1n
nost
fespects,
an
origirral
nlanuscrlpt
by
Lord
B1'rorr,
or
The
Spirit
o/
St.
Lortls
as
it
is
seen
i1
the
Smithsonial
llstitution.
(lncleed,
nrLlseums
fill
the verv
same
function
as
the
Smithsonian
Institr-rtion-u,hY
else
wor-rld
theJeu
dc
Pawne
wing
of
thc
Lor'rvrc
cxhibit
c6zanne,s
ancl
Van
Gogh's
palettes
as
prouclly
as
thc'v
clo
their
palntings?)
Actual
rvorks
of
art
are
little
more
th:rn
historical
curiosities.
As
lar
as
r;r/
is
concerned
van
Gogh's
paint-
ings
aren't
worrh
any
morc
than
l-ris
palette
is.
They
are
both
collector',s
items
Art
,,lives
thr-ough
influencing
other
art,
not
by
existing
as
the
physicai
residue
of
an
artist,s
ideas.
The
reason
why
different
artists
fl-om
the
past
are
bror'rght alive
again
is
be-
cause
soille
aspecrt
of
their
work
becomes
'irsable
b1'
living
artists
That
there
is
no
truth
as
to
rvhat
.rrt
is
seenls
quite
unr:ealized'
what
is the
fiurctron
of
art,
or
the
nature
of
art?
If
\ve
continue
our
analogy
ot
tne
forms
art
takes
as
being
art's
language
one
can
realize
then
that
a
\r'ork
of art
is a
kincl
of
propositiort
presented
within
the
context
of
art
as
a
comlllent
on
art'
-works
of
arr
are
al.)alytic
propositions.
That
is,
if
vicu'cd
within
their
context-as
art-
they
provide
no
inforrnation
\vhat-so-ever
about
any
nl:ltter
of
fact
A
Nork
of
rrt
is r
t:ru-
tology
in
tl-rat
it
is
a
presentation
of
the
artist's
intention,
that
is,
he
is sayine
that
a
partic-
ular
rvork
of
art
l.s
art,
\vl]ich
means,
ts
t
deinitiott
of
art.
Thus,
tliat
it is
art
ls
trLle
a
prtorL
(u,l]ich
is
rvhat
Judd
means
when
1-re
states
thf,t
if
someoue
cal1s
it
art,
it's
art )'
Indeed,
it
is
nearly
inrpossible
to
discttss
art
in
general
terms
rvithout
talking
in
tautolo-
gics-filr ro attempt
,,,
ir rp
art
bv
a'y
other
handle is
to
merely
focus
on
f,nother
as
pect
oI
quality
of
tl'.
p,opo,ition
rvlriclr
is
usually
irrelcvant
to
the
:rrt
lvork,s
.,aft
condi-
tion.
one
beelns
to
realize
that
art's
art
condition
is
a cotrceptual
state'
That
the
language
forrtrs
r.vhich
the
artlst
tiarnes
his
propositions
in
arc
often
private
codes
or
ianguages
ts
an
ilevit:rble
outcone
of
art's
freedonl
from
1 orphological
constrictious;
and
it
follor'vs
fi-onr
this
tbat
o'e
has
to
be
familiar
rvith
contenporary
21rt
to
:rppreciate
it and
understand
it.
Likervise
one
understands
why
t[e
n-ran
on
the
street
is intolerant to
lrtistic
art
and
al-
rvays
der-nands
art
in a
traclitional
language'
(And
one
unclerstands
rvhy
formalist
art
seils
like
hot
cakes. )
only
in
painting
and
sculpture
dicl
the
artists
al1
spcak
the
saure
language'
d44
LANGUAGE
AND
CONCEPf'S
8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy
5/7
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8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy
6/7
think
of
it
as
art? If
he doesn't
take
the responsibility
of it
being
art, who
c:rnj
or
shor-rlcl?
His
rvork certainly
appe:lrs
to
be
err-rpirically
verifirble:
lead
can
do
arrd
be used
lor
manv
physical
activities.
In
itself
this
does
anything
but
lead
us
into
a
dialogue
about
the narure
of
art.
In
a sense
then
he
is a prin-ritive.
He has no
idea
about
art. Hor,v
is it
then
that
rve
knorv
about
his
activiq '?
Because
he
has
told
us
it
is
art by
his:rctions
o-fter Itis
activitv
has
taken place.
That
is,
by
the
fact he
is with
several galieries,
pLlts
the physical
r:esidue
of
his
activity
in
museums (and
sells thenr
to
art
collectors-but
as we have
pointed
out,
coi-
lectors
are
irreievant
to
the
condition
of art
of a
work). Tl-rat
he
denies his
r,vork is
art
but
plays
the artist is
more
than
just
a paradox.
Serra
secretly
feels
that
arthood
is
arrived
at empirically.
-What
onc finds
all
thror-rghor-rt the rvritings
of
Ad Reinhardt
is this
very similar
thesis
of
art-as-art,
and
that
'irt
is
always dead,
and
a
'living'
art is
a
deception.
Reinhardt
had
a
very
clear idea
about
the
nature
of
art,
and l'ris
importance
is
fal
fronr
L.eing rccognizcd.
Forurs
of
art that
can
be
considered
synthetic
propositions
are verifiable
by the
rvorld,
that
is
to
say, to understand
these
propositions
one
nlllst
leave
the tautological-like
Il-arne-
work
of
art
and
consider
outside
information.
But
to consider
it
as
art
1t
is
ne.essrrv
to
igllore
this
same
outside
information,
because
outside
information
(experiential
c1-ialities,
to
note)
has
its
own intrinsic
worth. And
to
comprehend
this r,vorth
one
does
not
need
a
state
of irt
condition.
From
this it is
easy to realize
that
art's
viabiliq,
is
not
connected
to
the presentation
of
visr-ral
(or
other) kinds
of
experience.
That
this
nray
have
bc-en
one
of
art's extraneous
flrnc-
tiotts
in
the
prececiing
centuries
is
not
unlikely.
After
all, rlan
in
even
the nineteenth-
centllrv
lived
in
a fairly standardizecl
visr-ral
environment.
That
js,
it
was ordinarilv
predictable:
as
to what
he r'vould
be
conring
into
cont:rct
rvith
clav after
da,v.
His
visual
environrnent
in
the
part
of
the
world
in
rvhich
he livc'd
was fairly
consistent.
In
our
tirne
rve have
an ex-
perientially
drastically
richer
environnlent.
One
can
flv all
over
the
earth in
a
rnatter
of
hours
and
days, rrot
months.
We have
the cinema,
and
color television,
as
lvell
as the rnal-
made
spectacle
of
the
lights
of Las
Vegas
or the
skyscrapers
of
Nerv York
City.
The rvhole
world
is
there
to
be
seeu,
and
the rvhole
r,vorld can rvatch man
rvalk
on
the rnoon
lrom
their
living
rooms.
Certainlv
art
or
objects
of paintine
and
sculpture
cannot
be expected
to compete
experientially
with
this?
The
notion
of
'use
is
relevant
to
art
and its
language.
Recently
the
box or cube
forn-r
h:is
beeu
used
a great
deal lvithin
the
context
of art.
(Take
for
instance
its
use
by
Judd,
Morris,
LcWitt,
Bladen,
Smith,
8e11, and
McCracken-not
to rnention
the
quantiry
of
boxes
and
cubes
that
came
after.)
T1're dillerence
betrveen
all
the various
uses
of the
box or
cube
form
is directly
related
to the
differences
in
the
intentions
of
the
artists.
Further,
as
is par-
ticularly
seen
in
Judd's
rvork,
the
use
of
the
box or
cube
forrn
illustrates
very
weil our
ear-
lier
claim
that
arr object
is
only art
r,vhen
placed
in
the context
of
art.
A
fer,v
examples
rvill point
this
out.
One could
say
that
if one
of
Judd's
box
forms
u,as
seen
filled
rvith
debris,
seen placed
in
an industrial
setting,
or
even
merely
seen
sitting
on
a street
corner,
it
-'vould
not
be identified
rvith art.
It follorvs
then
that
understanding
and
consideration
of it as
an art
work
is necessarlt
a
priori to
viewing
it
in
order
to
,,.see',
it
as
a
rvork
of
art.
Advance
information
about
the
concept
of art
and
about
an
2rrtist's
concepts
U+6
LANGUAGE
AND
CONCEPTS
8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy
7/7
LN
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