Did the Articles of Confederationprovide an effective national

constitution?

Viewpoint: Yes. The Articles of Confederation provided an effective frame-work of government by resolving the postwar financial crisis, establishingthe basic policies for westward expansion, and creating a permanent fed-eral bureaucracy to carry on the affairs of state when Congress was not insession.

Viewpoint: No. The Articles of Confederation provided for a central govern-ment that was too weak to confront and resolve the postwar financial, com-mercial, and diplomatic emergencies facing the young nation.

The Articles of Confederation, adopted in 1781 as the first national con-stitution of the United States, reflected American fears of consolidatedauthority and the potential for corruption resulting from their experiencesunder a strong centralized British government that regulated commerce,imposed taxes, raised a standing army in peacetime, quartered troops in pri-vate buildings, and abrogated colonial charters and jury trials. Motivated bysuch fears, the Framers of the Articles ignored the issue of ultimate sover-eignty—a major bone of contention in the Anglo-American dispute—and,instead, divided the major powers of government between the union and thestates. They also believed—perhaps naively—that the exigencies of war andpublic virtue would encourage the states to abide by Congressional mea-sures. Thus, the Articles allowed each state to retain its "sovereignty, freedomand independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right" not expressly del-egated to the U.S. Congress. The only prerogatives entrusted to Congressincluded the "sole and exclusive right and power" to regulate foreign affairs,initiate war, declare peace, fix weights and measures, regulate Indian affairs,establish a post office, send and receive ambassadors, coin money, andmediate boundary disputes between the states. As extensive as these pow-ers may appear, the new U.S. Congress lacked the critical ability to raisetroops, levy taxes, or even regulate trade. To fund operations during wartime,it could only lay assessments on the states, hoping they would comply. TheArticles also made no provision for an executive branch or a system of courtsto force obedience to national laws. Consequently, the union was little morethan "a firm league of friendship" among thirteen independent states under anemasculated federal government.

Although Congress lacked the ability to resolve important fiscal, political,and diplomatic problems confronting the nation, the question still remains:Could the United States have nonetheless survived under the Articles of Con-federation? Contemporaries were divided on this question. Some of the elitefeared that Shays's Rebellion (1786-1787) was a portent of even greater law-lessness unless the central government was given sufficient power to imposeorder. Urban artisans wanted a stronger national government with the author-ity to exact tariffs to protect domestic manufacturing. Likewise, wealthy mer-chants and shipowners wanted a national government powerful enough tosecure trading privileges, while land speculators and settlers desired a gov- 17

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

eminent capable of removing threats to westward expansion posed by Native Americans, the Span-ish, and the British.

Many other Americans were content with the Confederation government. Farmers and mer-chants living in the Middle and Southern states, for instance, were enjoying either high tobaccoprices or increasing food exports to Europe, thus enabling them to begin climbing out of the postwardepression and to pay off their war debts. Additionally, many small, subsistence-level farmers livingin relative isolation were unconcerned with protective tariffs, trading privileges, or national politics,for that matter.

This division between Americans over the circumstances of the nation during the 1780s reflectscontentions among historians in assessing the viability of the Articles of Confederation. Some schol-ars point out that the Articles carried the nation through a protracted, pernicious, and successful waragainst a powerful nation; secured a vast territory; laid down the basic policies for an orderly west-ward expansion; and created a bureaucracy that carried on the day-to-day work of the central gov-ernment. In short, the United States during the Confederation period was a prosperous society witha populace in high spirits and a federal charter that enabled the nation to begin recovering from thedislocations of war.

However, other historians have taken a more critical view of the Articles, blaming them for crip-pling Congress's ability to confront national economic, political, and diplomatic problems during thecritical period of the 1780s. They highlight that Congress had difficulty getting a quorum necessaryto conduct business; had no permanent source of revenue; lacked the power to resolve the nationalfinancial crisis; and failed to satisfy foreign creditors or to maintain a military force capable of defend-ing Western territories from foreign threats. In brief, these critics conclude, the federal governmentwas a threat to the general welfare of the nation and a laughingstock in the international community.

Because nationalists at the Constitutional Convention (1787) scrapped the Articles of Confeder-ation and replaced it with the present federal constitution, it will never be known for certain if theUnited States would have flourished under the initial charter. A counter-factual analysis of the ques-tion might be interesting, but it would probably not prove to be any more conclusive. If nothing else,though, the issue forces one to consider which groups of people were suffering the most during the1780s and what the nationalists hoped to gain with a stronger central government. Were they moti-vated in their actions by a true concern for the public welfare or by self-interest? Moreover, were theyupholding or violating the political principles of the American Revolution as expressed in the Decla-ration of Independence (1776) that a people have a right to "alter or abolish" a government when it"becomes destructive" of their "unalienable rights" to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"?

Viewpoint:Yes. The Articles of Confederationprovided an effective frameworkof government by resolving thepostwar financial crisis,establishing the basic policies forwestward expansion, and creating apermanent federal bureaucracy tocarry on the affairs of state whenCongress was not in session.

Many historians regard the Articles of Con-federation, the first federal constitution of theUnited States, as materially flawed. They comparethe Articles to the Constitution of 1787 andassume as a standard of judgment the answers toquestions of constitutional order and public pol-icy created in the latter. Historians then judge thealternative answers crafted in the Articles to beinadequate or incorrect. In so doing they misun-derstand the Articles and the political culture thatunderlay them.

The criticisms about the Articles of Confed-eration are based on a set of assumptions that inanthropological terms could be described as eth-nocentric. Ethnocentrism is the evaluation of asociety or culture from the perspective of one'sown culture and imposing as a standard of judg-ment one's own values. To describe the nativesof the New World, following European contact(1492), for example, as "heathens" or "uncivi-lized" is to impose a European model uponanother culture. It leads to frequent misunder-standings about the nature, customs, and valuesof the foreign society. Likewise, historians judgethe Articles from the perspective of the Constitu-tion of 1787 and impose as a standard of judg-ment the answers to questions of constitutionalorder and public policy created by the latter doc-ument. In doing so they profoundly misunder-stand the Articles and the alternative solutionsto governance they represent.

No doubt the Articles of Confederation cre-ated a "weak" central government, if the standardof measurement is the national government cre-ated by the Constitution of 1787. It created a con-federation rather than a national government. A

18 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

more meaningful assessment would be a compari-son of the powers and practices of the central gov-ernment under the Articles to previousconfederations known to Americans at the time.In "Notes on Ancient and Modern Confedera-cies" (1786) James Madison described and evalu-ated several confederacies, some of whichpossessed in theory greater powers than thoseheld by the central government under the Arti-cles. The Amphictionic Confederacy (circa six-teenth century B.C.E.), for example, possessed fullpower "to propose and resolve whatever theyjudged useful to Greece." In the Belgic Confeder-acy (mid seventeenth century C.E.) the "StatesGeneral" held a power to levy both import andexport taxes. In both cases, however, Madisonobserved, the execution of powers was quite differ-ent from the theory. The Amphictionic Confeder-acy did not prevent war between its constituentparts, and the taxing authority existed in the Bel-gic Confederacy but was never utilized. Some ofthe Framers also knew of the one American ante-cedent to the Articles, the New England Confed-eration. Formed in 1643 to unite the colonies ofMassachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Hartford, andNew Haven, the Confederation granted to thecentral government the power to consider causesof a general nature and to conduct foreign affairswhile reserving to each constituent part the con-duct of its internal affairs. Like the European con-federacies that Madison studied, internaldifficulties plagued the New England Confedera-tion. The most pressing problem proved to be theinability of the Confederation to enforce its deci-sions against its most powerful member, the Mas-sachusetts Bay Colony. As with the Europeanconfederacies, the theoretical strength of the NewEngland Confederation failed to translate intoreality during its duration (it ended in 1684).Madison incorrectly assumed that the defect wasendemic to all confederacies. As he observed inThe Federalist No. 37, the "history of past confed-erations can furnish no other light than that ofbeacons, which give warning of the course to beshunned, without pointing out that which oughtto be pursued." His rejection of all confederacies,of course, ignores the relative strength of the gov-ernment created by the Articles.

In contrast to its predecessors, the Confeder-ation government exercised the powers granted toit with a considerable vigor—securing indepen-dence, establishing the institutional framework ofgovernment, and organizing the Northwest terri-tories. The responses of states that ratified theArticles of Confederation between 1777 and 1781constitute a second indication of the strength ofthe Confederation. Virtually every state expressedsome degree of displeasure with the Articles asthey were presented to the state legislatures. Muchof that dissatisfaction related to the demand ofthe "landless" states for a share of the common

lands of the king. Other states disliked the appor-tionment of expenses among the states on thebasis of the white population only. Seven states,even as they ratified the Articles, expressed a con-cern that in particular ways the document createdtoo powerful a central government. Individualstate legislatures called for a diminution of thecentral government's power to maintain a peace-time army and to pass legislation with the votes ofonly nine states. Some states also wanted toimpose greater controls on the post office, whileothers wanted to have the rights to conduct for-eign affairs and to allow state, rather than federal,courts the power to try pirates and settle disputesover land claims. In the context of eighteenth-century America, the problem is not that the Arti-cles lacked adequate powers but that they pos-sessed too many powers.

The political power of its defenders, duringthe debate over ratification of the Constitution,represented the relative strength of the Articles ofConfederation. Because history is more oftenwritten by (or for) the winners, one tends to forgetthe losers in the debate over ratification. Yet, asubstantial number of Americans were not merelyopposed to the Constitution but were in favor ofthe Articles. For example, many Antifederalistpamphleteers and essayists—among them"Agrippa" of Massachusetts, "Cato" of New York,and "Centinel" of Pennsylvania—argued explicitlyin favor of the Articles and against the Constitu-tion. One should remember, too, that a sizablepercentage of the American people, as measuredby the candidates they voted for in the ratificationconvention elections, believed the Articles ade-quate for the needs of the nation in 1787-1788.

Although it is not possible to determine totalpopular support for the Constitution, the votes ofthe people's representatives are illustrative. If oneconsiders only the first North Carolina conven-tion and includes the votes of Rhode Islandtowns on whether to call a state convention, onediscovers that 935 delegates or their equivalentvoted for the Constitution; 709 voted against it.These latter delegates favored the Articles of Con-federation. Some Antifederalists who voted forratification also preferred the Articles, but Feder-alists persuaded them that the alternative to ratifi-cation was anarchy and civil war. In thisdoomsday scenario, Federalists' dire prognostica-tions were clearly wrong. The nation could havecontinued to operate under the Articles. MortonBorden and Otis L. Graham Jr. speak directly tothis issue in Speculations in American History(1977). Although their work is obviously counter-factual, they conclude that the short-term resultsof the rejection of the Articles would not havebeen catastrophic. "We can speculate with assur-ance that there would have been no invasions, norevolutions, and no wars between the states—for

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 19

20 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONSeveral sections of the Articles ol Confederation addressthe rights and powers of the federal government:

VI. No State, without the consent of theUnited States in Congress assembled, shallsend any embassy to, or receive any embassyfrom, or enter into any conference, agreement,alliance or treaty with any King, Prince orState; nor shall any person holding any officeof profit or trust under the United States, orany of them, accept any present, emolument,office or title of any kind whatever from anyKing, Prince or foreign State; nor shall theUnited States in Congress assembled, or anyof them, grant any title of nobility.

No two or more States shall enter intoany treaty, confederation or alliance whateverbetween them, without the consent of theUnited States in Congress assembled, speci-fying accurately the purposes for which thesame is to be entered into, and how long itshall continue.

No State shall lay any imposts or duties,which may interfere with any stipulations intreaties, entered into by the United States inCongress assembled, with any King, Princeor State, in pursuance of any treaties alreadyproposed by Congress, to the courts ofFrance and Spain.

No vessel of war shall be kept up in timeof peace by any State, except such numberonly, as shall be deemed necessary by theUnited States in Congress assembled, for thedefense of such State, or its trade; nor shallany body of forces be kept up by any State intime of peace, except such number only, asin the judgement of the United States in Con-gress assembled, shall be deemed requisiteto garrison the forts necessary for thedefense of such State; but every State shallalways keep up a well-regulated and disci-plined militia, sufficiently armed and accou-tered, and shall provide and constantly haveready for use, in public stores, a due numberof field pieces and tents, and a proper quan-tity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.

No State shall engage in any war withoutthe consent of the United States in Congressassembled, unless such State be actually

invaded by enemies, or shall have receivedcertain advice of a resolution being formed bysome nation of Indians to invade such State,and the danger is so imminent as not to admitof a delay till the United States in Congressassembled can be consulted; nor shall anyState grant commissions to any ships or ves-sels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal,except it be after a declaration of war by theUnited States in Congress assembled, andthen only against the Kingdom or State andthe subjects thereof, against which war hasbeen so declared, and under such regula-tions as shall be established by the UnitedStates in Congress assembled, unless suchState be infested by pirates, in which casevessels of war may be fitted out for that occa-sion, and kept so long as the danger shallcontinue, or until the United States in Con-gress assembled shall determine otherwise.

VII. When land forces are raised by anyState for the common defense, all officers ofor under the rank of colonel, shall beappointed by the legislature of each Staterespectively, by whom such forces shall beraised, or in such manner as such State shalldirect, and all vacancies shall be filled up bythe State which first made the appointment.

VIII. All charges of war, and all otherexpenses that shall be incurred for the com-mon defense or general welfare, and allowedby the United States in Congress assembled,shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,which shall be supplied by the several Statesin proportion to the value of all land withineach State, granted or surveyed for any per-son, as such land and the buildings andimprovements thereon shall be estimatedaccording to such mode as the United Statesin Congress assembled, shall from time totime direct and appoint.

The taxes for paying that proportion shallbe laid and levied by the authority and direc-tion of the legislatures of the several Stateswithin the time agreed upon by the UnitedStates in Congress assembled.

Source: "The Articles ol Confederation,'U.S. His-torical Documents Archive <http-J/w3.one.net/-mweiler/ushda/artconf.htm>.

none of those threatened. Nor would there havebeen an economic breakdown, social chaos, ormob rule—for the state governments were rulingeffectively." There would probably have beenanother constitutional convention, as some Anti-federalists proposed while opposing the Constitu-tion. That convention would, Borden andGraham suggest, have done what the first meetingfailed to do: amend the Articles of Confederation.Such a convention would almost certainly havegranted to the central government, as was urged in1785, the power to regulate trade and collect animpost. A sure source of revenue, in turn, wouldhave allowed the central government to begin toreduce the Revolutionary War debt and secure theloyalty of its citizens.

Had the Confederation survived, it alsoseems likely that the powers of the federal govern-ment would have expanded. The leadership ingovernment would, however, have been focusednot in the cabinet (Alexander Hamilton as secre-tary of treasury and Thomas Jefferson as secretaryof state) but in Congress, where the locus of polit-ical authority existed under the Articles of Con-federation.

In the long run, of course, Madison insisted,all confederations were doomed to failure, but it ispossible that the Articles of Confederation couldhave governed the nation well into the nineteenthcentury. Granted, the War of 1812 would in alllikelihood not have occurred because the votes ofthe New England states would have prevented theadoption of a resolution of war. Neither wouldthe abolition of slavery have taken place in themanner it did (although the Confederation gov-ernment had in fact blocked the expansion of sla-very in 1787, while individual states were actingagainst it as well in the 1780s). American politicalhistory would have been different, but it seemsunlikely that the future of the nation would havebeen in jeopardy had the United States kept theArticles.

The gradual development of the powers andprocesses of the new government after 1789 alsoprofoundly influence interpretations of the Arti-cles of Confederation. Some historians have criti-cized the Confederation Congress because somestates did not bother to send delegates to its meet-ings; for the lack of a quorum, which often pre-vented the consideration of pressing issues; andbecause the government lacked a permanent capi-tal. To some extent all of these criticisms are valid,although the implications that historian RobertDivine in America, Past and Present (1984) drawsare rather present minded. Yes, some states didnot send delegations to the Confederation Con-gress at times. What can be deduced from a simi-lar situation when Rhode Island refused to sendany delegates to the Constitutional Convention;when New Hampshire's delegates did not attend

until July (nearly two months after the start of theconvention); or when delegates that signed theConstitution did so as individuals, since NewYork was not represented at the time of the sign-ing? Pressing issues in the Confederation Con-gress were, according to Divine, "often" postponedfor lack of a quorum. One might legitimately ask:how frequent is "often"? The answer, according toEdmund Cody Burnett, historian of the Confed-eration Congress, is five times between 1774 and1787. Is it a sign of weakness or a sign of a differ-ent political system and values?

The so-called weaknesses of the Articles ofConfederation were a result of a different set ofassumptions about the purpose of representationin the federal legislature and the relationship ofthat legislature to the states. The initial meetingof the Continental Congress was designed tounite the colonies in their resistance to Britishcolonial policy. Delegates from Massachusetts, inparticular, believed that the colonies must standtogether if the resistance movement was to suc-ceed. Their mission therefore was to build a con-sensus among the delegates. The "unanimous"declaration of the thirteen states in 1776 alsoreflected the purpose of the existence of the Con-gress—to unite the individual colonies in the com-mon cause. The Articles required more than asimple majority for the legislature to act. Theydid so because the Framers of the Articlesbelieved that the central government, itself a crea-ture of the states, should act only when there waswidespread agreement—a nationally distributedmajority rather than a simple or regional one.

Twenty-first-century criticisms of the Articleswould have made no sense to the Framers. Ofcourse, Congress adjourned upon occasion forlack of a quorum. Yes, states sometimes did notsend delegates. When Congress therefore did notact, it was not a sign of weakness or debility; it wasa sign the system was working as its Framers hadintended. Modern criticism that the Congress metin different places rather than in a single perma-nent location (a capital city) would similarly haveperplexed the Framers of the Articles. During theRevolutionary War (1775-1783) the Congressmoved several times. After the war Congress metin both Philadelphia and New York. Eighteenth-century political leaders recognized the impor-tance of the meeting place of any legislative body.Those states closest to this location had an inher-ent advantage; close geographic proximity meantan increased likelihood that those states wouldhave a full representation in the legislature. Outly-ing states in a premodern transportation erawould more often be underrepresented in the leg-islature. Jurist John Jay explicitly stated duringthe New York ratification convention that the"residence" of the central government was worth$3 million per year to the state that secured it. The

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 21

fact that the Massachusetts state conventionassembled in highly Federalist Boston is one fac-tor mentioned by historians in explaining why theAntifederalist majority became a Federalist one bythe close of the meeting.

These political and economic consider-ations—and perhaps a recognition of the need tobring government to the people—meant that inthe eighteenth century some states shifted themeeting place of their legislature among severallocations. In North Carolina and New York themeeting place of the state legislatures changed ona regular basis. Two New Hampshire ratifyingconventions met in different cities—again anaccommodation to the assumption that govern-ment should make itself accessible to the peopleby coming to them rather than establishing a sin-gle permanent residence. Furthermore, after 1789the "permanent" federal capital shifted from NewYork to Philadelphia and then to Washington,D.C. Other branches of government continued tobe dispersed, with the mint remaining in Philadel-phia and the federal courts and justices of theSupreme Court riding circuit until 1837.

Modern scholars tend to interpret the Arti-cles of Confederation from the perspective of theConstitution and therefore assume that theanswers to political questions decided in the Con-stitution were right and that the Articles werewrong. In doing so one misjudges the Articles inboth theory and practice. The Articles were nei-ther ineffective in their time nor inappropriate totheir age.

-STEVEN R. BOYD, UNIVERSITYOF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO

Viewpoint:No. The Articles of Confederationprovided for a central governmentthat was too weak to confront andresolve the postwar financial,commercial, and diplomaticemergencies facing theyoung nation.

In the mid 1780s New Jersey leadersdesperately needed to improve their state'sfledgling economy. Not only was the statemired in a depression that had struck all ofpost-Revolutionary War America, but New Jer-sey's economy had long been weak because of itscommercial dependence on nearby New YorkCity and Philadelphia. State leaders, therefore,sought to use Great Britain's recent Order inCouncil to invigorate their commerce, but atthe expense of their neighbors. The Order

laid crippling trade restrictions upon thenow-independent United States. It cut offAmerican access to lucrative markets in the WestIndies and prohibited U.S. merchant ships fromdoing business in British home ports. Pennsylva-nia and New York retaliated with steep tariffs.New Jersey officials, however, refused to discrim-inate, hoping that goods from the old mothercountry would now flow through their ownports. New York retaliated against New Jerseyand imposed a tax upon foreign products enter-ing its borders through another state. This mea-sure led New Jersey to levy a £30-per-month feeupon New York for use of a lighthouse the statemaintained on Sandy Hook. These actions con-stituted, as historian Norman K. Risjord hasnoted in Jefferson's America, 1760-1815 (2002),"an exercise in malarkey." They point, nonethe-less, to several critical problems that confrontedthe new nation in the 1780s: the fragility of theunion following the War for Independence(1775-1783) and the utter inability of the fed-eral government created by the Articles of Con-federation either to solve the postwar crises or toengender a broad-based sense of national loyalty.

In 1888 historian John Fiske labeled the1780s the "Critical Period of American history,"and for many years afterward scholars judged thedecade to be a time of turmoil and peril for theyoung nation. Indeed, the United States seemedon the verge of collapse. In the second half ofthe twentieth century, however, more extensiveresearch into the Confederation period has pro-vided scholars with a more complex picture.Some historians have concluded that the 1780swere not chaotic at all. Rather, these years con-tained important accomplishments, includingthe famous Land Ordinance (1785) and North-west Ordinance (1787), both of which deter-mined the process for orderly settlement of theOhio Valley region up into present-day Michiganand Wisconsin.

The Articles though, were not one of thegreat achievements of the period. Time and again,this system of national government failed to meetthe economic and political challenges of nation-hood. The United States unlikely could have sur-vived intact under its provisions. Part of theproblem was that little thought and preparationwent into their creation. During the Revolution-ary period, Americans' central loyalty remainedwith their states, and few were truly concernedwith the national government. Thus, the Articleswere hastily drafted in 1776 and passed by the Sec-ond Continental Congress in 1777. It then tookfour years of petty wrangling among the statesbefore the plan was formally adopted.

Although the Articles were stronger thansome people had anticipated, the governmentlacked significant powers. The Continental Con-

22 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

gress could neither impose direct taxes nor raiseindependent revenues of any sort. States wereexpected to fund the government through volun-tary requisitions. Congress could enter into com-mercial treaties with foreign nations, but itlacked the ability to regulate interstate com-merce. The federal government could not evencontrol trade between individual states and for-eign powers. At the same time, the statesretained considerable freedom. Article 2 declaredthat "each State retains its sovereignty, freedomand independence, and every power, jurisdiction,and right, which is not by this confederationexpressly delegated to the United States, in Con-gress assembled."

The strains engendered by the long waragainst Great Britain further undermined thisalready flimsy system. Rather than creatingstronger unity, the conflict exacerbated existingdivisions. As historian John Murrin has pointedout in "Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma ofAmerican National Identity" (1987), "Americansdiscovered during the Revolutionary War thatthey did not really like each other very much."Therefore, with leaders highly protective of theirstates' prerogatives and possessing little alle-giance to a national government, many insistedthat the United States remain nothing morethan "a firm league of friendship."

Following the defeat of Charles Cornwallis'sarmy at York Town (1781), British determinationto continue the war waned. As a result, however,the states began to ignore the Confederation gov-ernment and its needs altogether. Not only didthey often refuse to pay congressional requisi-tions, but the states also consistently appointeddelegates of inferior talent and quality. Indeed,most postwar members of Congress lacked theintellectual weight and political skills of their pre-decessors. They were also notoriously lax aboutattending sessions. In the winter of 1784, Con-gress nearly failed to ratify the Treaty of Paris(1783) before its deadline simply because it couldnot reach a quorum. Although enough membersfinally materialized to approve the accord, atten-dance dropped again afterward. An exasperatedThomas Jefferson told James Madison, "We can-not make up a Congress at all. We have not satabove 3 days I believe in as many weeks. Admoni-tion after admonition has been sent to the states,to no effect." In addition to protecting the influ-ence of their states, leaders withheld support forthe Confederation government out of ideologicalconvictions. Few genuinely believed that a land aslarge and diverse as the United States could andshould be ruled as a unified republic. The repub-lics throughout history had always been territori-ally small and possessed homogeneous populations.In the interest of stability, it seemed wiser to let the

states take the lead, with Congress serving as asimple coordinating body.

These factors caused, as Madison put it, "aspirit of locality" to sweep postwar America,with state legislatures becoming the dominantforce in politics. Other developments acceleratedthe process. Throughout the Revolutionaryperiod, male citizens voted in ever greater num-bers for their state representatives, and the votersincreasingly demanded that these representativesfully address their specific needs and interests.Therefore, an avalanche of bills designed toappease local constituents were introduced inone state house after another. Most of these mea-sures were passed without any regard to theirimpact on the nation. Madison witnessed thisprocess as a member of Virginia's GeneralAssembly, and he pessimistically concluded thatthe states were blithely undermining both thefederal government and the union. Congressfound itself, moreover, unable to address severalserious problems because of this growing fac-tionalism and fears that concerted nationalaction might hurt the individual states.

These shortcomings became abundantlyclear by the mid 1780s when several economicand diplomatic crises came to a head. The prob-lems originated in the conclusion of the Revolu-tionary War. American commerce, for example,slowed considerably after the conflict as militarycontracts evaporated and spending declined.Import trade with the former mother country,moreover, resumed with a vengeance because of apent-up demand for British manufactures. Amer-ican exports, however, did not advance at nearlyso robust a pace. The result was a significant out-flow of specie coupled with deflation. The eco-nomic crisis hurt Americans in several ways.Falling prices made debts (both public and pri-vate) more burdensome. Debtors throughoutthe country demanded that state governmentshalt collections and foreclosures until the eco-nomic crisis had passed. The economic down-turn also led assemblies to issue paper currencyto relieve money shortages. Rhode Island wentthe furthest of any state by issuing a fresh batchof currency notes and also by requiring creditorsto accept the bills at face value and levying a£100 fine on those who refused to accept thepaper. The result was, as Madison noted, a "con-vulsion," with merchants packing up and fleeingthe state rather than doing business under suchconditions. As the depression deepened, otherpeople also found their lives disrupted. Manyfishermen throughout New England immi-grated to Nova Scotia to find work. Marinerswho remained could often find no other employ-ment than in the Atlantic slave trade—a branch ofcommerce that had remained tragically robust.

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23

First page of BenjaminFranklin's copy of the

nation's first charter withannotations by Thomas

Jefferson(Manuscript Division, Library of

Congress, Washington, D.C.)

There has been considerable debate amongscholars concerning the depression of the 1780s.Some historians, such as Merrill Jensen, havecontended that the United States actually experi-enced rapid economic growth during thisperiod. Other scholars have argued the oppo-site-that America veered toward economic col-lapse. Recent research reveals that neitherconclusion is justified. Studies of regional econo-mies show an uneven downturn. Large parts of

the country, such as New England and theLower South, suffered greatly while otherregions, such as the Mid-Atlantic states, wereonly slightly affected. Whatever its true depth,the depression was nonetheless crucial in bring-ing an end to the Confederation government.The slump raised significant doubts about theadequacy of the Articles. Because it could notregulate commerce, Congress had few tools withwhich to address the crisis. It controlled neither

24HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

the national money supply nor commercial rela-tions among the various states. Congressionalleaders implemented some measures to improvethe economy, but their efforts foundered. Nearthe conclusion of the war, for example, Superin-tendent of Finance Robert Morris convincedCongress to establish the Bank of North Amer-ica. Chartered by the government to help financethe conflict as well as bring the states under auniform "money connexion," Morris believedthe bank would stabilize the national economy.Although manifestly needed, the charter of thebank expired in 1784 solely because RhodeIsland refused to support a needed nationalimpost to fund the institution.

Adding to the country's woes were diplo-matic problems, especially with Great Britain.American leaders (perhaps naively) believed thatonce hostilities ended they would be able toresume old trading patterns with the empire. InJuly 1783, however, the London governmentordered American shipping closed both to thehome islands and to imperial ports throughoutthe Caribbean. This measure dealt the U.S. econ-omy a double blow by seriously weakening thenation's maritime industries and greatly curbingthe export of food commodities. National leaderswanted to strike back, but Congress lacked theauthority. Thus, retaliation fell to the states. As thedispute between New Jersey and New York illus-trates, this solution was hardly an effective meansof resolving this problem. Americans resented therestrictions, but getting thirteen state legislaturesto respond together proved impossible.

Other British actions further illustrate theConfederation government's ineffectiveness. In1782 the Crown had promised to surrender Brit-ish forts in what soon would become the North-west Territory of the United States. After thewar, however, many statehouses and courtsbarred the collection of debts owed to Britishcreditors; the states also refused to return confis-cated property of Loyalists. Because the royalgovernment believed that both these things hadbeen promised in the Treaty of Paris, Britainrefused to evacuate the forts. Despite the viola-tion of U.S. territory, Congress was powerless.America's diplomat in England, John Adams,lodged a protest, but the ministry simply ignoredit. Congress had originally sent Adams to Lon-don to negotiate a treaty of commerce thatwould end British trade discrimination againstthe United States. He failed to accomplish hismission, largely because the hapless U.S. govern-ment convinced Britain not to budge on a singleissue. In Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas inthe Making of the Constitution (1996), historianJack N. Rakove noted that Adams's "failuresowed nothing to his own faults as a diplomat

and everything to the fundamental weaknesses ofthe Articles of Confederation."

The United States fared little better withSpain over navigation rights to the MississippiRiver. In 1784 Spain closed the great waterwayto Americans. The move proved devastating tosettlers who needed to transport their produceto market. Without access to the Mississippi,Spain's action rendered U.S. Western territorieseconomically useless, at least in the near term.Officials from Madrid also sought to create disaf-fection among American settlers, hoping thatSpain would eventually obtain at least some ofthe eastern shore of the river. Congress selectedSecretary for Foreign Affairs John Jay to negoti-ate the dispute. After finding himself unable tomove Spanish negotiators, Jay reluctantly agreedin 1786 to surrender America's right to navigatethe river for twenty-five years in return for a com-mercial treaty between the two powers. The pro-posal sparked bitter outrage among Southerndelegates who felt that Jay (a New Yorker) hadsacrificed their region's interests—especially theirability to expand westward—in order to boost theNortheast's economy. Congress eventually killedthe pact because of fierce Southern opposition,but it revived long-standing sectional animositiesas well as fears that the United States, boundonly by a weak central government and littlenational loyalty, would soon disintegrate intoregional confederacies.

Shays's Rebellion (1786-1787) proved thefinal straw leading Americans to abandon theArticles. When the insurrection began in westernMassachusetts in early autumn, Congressionalleaders were already looking for ways tostrengthen the national government. Eventssince the early 1780s had convinced many politi-cal leaders that significant changes were neededif the United States was to survive. Recent histo-rians have correctly pointed out that Shays'sRebellion was hardly a true insurrection. Therebels simply wanted justice within a system theyperceived as politically and economically unfair.The magnitude of the "rebellion," however,hardly matters. The upheaval demonstrated tokey American leaders (in particular, GeorgeWashington) that instability was only going togrow worse unless significant changes occurred.

In April 1787, just weeks before the Consti-tutional Convention in Philadelphia, Madisondrafted a memo titled "Vices of the Political Sys-tem of the United States" in which thesoon-to-be "father of the Constitution" pouredout his frustrations. He complained about thefailure of the states to pay requisitions, theirrepeated encroachments upon congressionalauthority, and the "Injustice of the laws." Healso lamented the powerlessness of the centralgovernment. Madison's memo accurately

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 25

described the problems the nation confrontedunder the Articles of Confederation. Created at atime when American leaders were loyal above allto their states, this system of national govern-ment had encouraged regional self-interest, fac-tionalism, and localism. The Articles also failedto provide leaders with the political means tohandle in a systematic and united fashion themany problems unleashed by the Revolution.Indeed, the events of the 1780s demonstratethat a stronger national system was not onlydesirable but also was absolutely crucial for thelong-term survival of the United States.

-PHILLIP HAMILTON, CHRISTOPHERNEWPORT UNIVERSITY

References

Morton Borden, The Antifedemlist Papers (EastLansing: Michigan State University Press,1965).

Borden and Otis L. Graham Jr., eds., Speculationsin American History (Lexington, Mass.:Heath, 1977).

Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Con-gress (New York: Macmillan, 1941).

Robert Divine, America., Past and Present (Glen-view, 111.: Scott, Foresman, 1984).

Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: AnInterpretation of the Social-Constitutional His-tory of the American Revolution, 1774-1781(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,1940).

Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the UnitedStates during the Confederation, 1781-1789(New York: Knopf, 1950).

Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union,1781-1789 (New York: Harper & Row,1987).

John Murrin, "Roof Without Walls: TheDilemma of American National Identity,"in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Con-stitution and American National Identity,edited by Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein,and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel Hill: Uni-versity of North Carolina Press, 1987).

Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics andIdeas in the Making of the Constitution (NewYork: Knopf, 1996).

Norman K. Risjord, Jefferson's America, 1760-1815 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,2002).

Robert A. Rutland and others, eds., The Papers ofJames Madison, volume 9 (Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia, 1975).

26 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION