ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional

Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 30, No. 3 (2008), pp. 351-78 DOI: 10.1355/cs30-3a

© 2008 ISEAS ISSN 0219-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

ASEAN and Political Changein Myanmar: Towards aRegional Initiative?

JÜRGEN HAACKE

ASEAN states have favoured diplomacy and peer pressure inorder to sway Myanmar's military regime to release Daw Aung SanSuu Kyi and other political detainees and to promote nationalreconciliation. So far, ASEAN's combined efforts have not been verysuccessful, although the generals are moving Myanmar beyond extra-constitutional rule. This paper asks whether, in the aftermath ofthe September 2007 protests, the constitutional referendum andCyclone Nargis, there is much scope for a new regional effort topromote reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar that isadditional to the support ASEAN offers for the good offices of theUnited Nations Secretary General. The paper sets out different positionsheld within ASEAN on promoting political change in Myanmar. Italso examines the prospects for putting into practice recent ideasto address Myanmar's political situation in new regional settings.The paper concludes that: (1) significant difference characterize theMyanmar policy of individual ASEAN countries in line with varyinginterests and pressures, and dissimilar views on what — if anything— should be done to help Myanmar democratize; (2) Indonesia isthe only ASEAN country to have conceptualized a possible regionaldiplomatic initiative, but its full implementation and success are farfrom certain.

Keywords: Myanmar, ASEAN, national reconciliation, Jakarta Initiative onMyanmar, Cyclone Nargis, AIPMC.

JÜRGEN HAACKE is a Senior Lecturer at the London School of Economicsand Political Science, United Kingdom.

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On 9 February 2008, Myanmar's ruling State Peace and DevelopmentCouncil (SPDC) announced that a referendum on the final draft ofthe country's new constitution would be organized in May. It alsoindicated that there would be multi-party elections in 2010. Reactingto calls to include Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League forDemocracy (NLD) in a belated broadening of the country's politicalprocess before the referendum, the military regime, headed hy SeniorGeneral Than Shwe, made clear that it would pursue its roadmapto a "disciplined" democracy as planned.^ Nevertheless, the regime'sinformation minister stated that those who failed to participate in theNational Convention (NC), which had worked out most of the newconstitution's substance, would have the possibility of participatingin the referendum and subsequent election.^

A week before the referendum. Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar,causing massive devastation and loss of life, particularly in theAyeyarwady (Irrawaddy) delta.' Ignoring widespread internationaldisbelief and criticism, the ruling junta nevertheless proceeded withthe referendum in those areas not affected by the cyclone. In otherareas the referendum was briefly postponed until 24 May. Accordingto the SPDC, 98.12 per cent of eligible voters cast their votes in thereferendum, with 92.48 per cent supporting the draft constitution.^Few observers helieve that this outcome was not manipulated.While the constitution, which will effectively leave political powerin the hands of the military commander-in-chief, was ratified andpromulgated, Suu Kyi's house arrest was extended to May 2009.

Member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), which Myanmar joined in 1997, have for years heenobliged to deal with the regional and international implications ofthe Myanmar ruling junta's refusal to accede to the demands hothfor political reconciliation and change as put forward by theinternational community and the grouping itself At their recent41st annual meeting, ASEAN foreign ministers expressed their"deep disappointment" over the extension of Suu Kyi's renewedhouse arrest, repeated the call hy ASEAN leaders to release her andother political detainees, and reiterated the view that the MyanmarGovernment should engage in a meaningful dialogue with all groups,and work towards a peaceful transition to democracy in the nearfuture.^ ASEAN foreign ministers also encouraged Naypyidaw towork closely with the UN Secretary General and his Special Advisoron Myanmar, Ihrahim Gamhari.** Interestingly, ASEAN's collectiveposition in 2008 appears to differ only in degree from the joint stancearticulated after the Depanyin incident in May 2003 that marked

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the beginning of Suu Kyi's latest spell of detention. Then, foreignministers urged Myanmar to resume its efforts towards nationalreconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned leading toa peaceful transition to democracy, welcomed the assurances givenby Myanmar that the measures taken following the incident weretemporary and looked forward to the early lifting of restrictionsplaced on Suu Kyi and NLD members, and also reaffirmed theircontinued support for the efforts of the UNSG Special RepresentativeTan Sri Razali Ismail.'

The limited change in diplomatic rhetoric is notable givenintervening developments, including the repeated failure by ASEANChairs to influence Myanmar's military leadership on politicalreconciliation and the September 2007 protests. Although Myanmarcan influence the statements of the grouping, the continuity ofpublic diplomacy could suggest not only that ASEAN's position onMyanmar has remained effectively unchanged, but also that ASEANstates do not necessarily see a role for the Association and/orindividual members to go the extra mile to promote political changein Myanmar. Alternatively, the similarities in ASEAN's publicpronouncements on Myanmar may primarily reflect ASEAN discord onhow to deal with Myanmar, the agreed position towards Naypyidawnotwithstanding. This paper thus asks three questions: (1) HasASEAN's position on Myanmar really been more or less frozen overthe past five years? (2) What is the balance of opinion withinASEAN on the political situation in Myanmar? (3) What prospectsare there for the grouping or individual members to promote aregional approach in order to influence the SPDC leadership to dowhat ASEAN has been asking Naypyidaw to do, not least in theaftermath of Cyclone Nargis?

To address these questions this article is divided into three parts.The first highlights major developments in ASEAN's declaratoryposition on Myanmar to put the output of the 2008 ASEANMinisterial Meeting (AMM) into perspective. The second sketchesin broad terms the individual national positions on Myanmar. Thethird focuses on recent ideas and efforts to promote Myanmar'spolitical transition. The article concludes that despite the frustrationwidely felt within the region over the SPDC's recalcitrance, andNaypyidaw's tendency to embarrass other members, including itsrepeated refusal to allow ASEAN a constructive role in its politicaltransition, the scope for a collective approach is limited giventhe considerable diversity in perspective on Myanmar within thegrouping. Secondly, the Indonesian Government seems to remain

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keen to develop ideas for a new minilateral diplomatic process thatwould perhaps allow some regional states to influence the militaryjunta. Its implementation, let alone success, cannot be taken forgranted, however.

ASEAN's Tough Talk on Myanmar

Notwithstanding the apparent similarities in ASEAN rhetoric onMyanmar as expressed in the joint communiqués of 2003 and 2008,Southeast Asian foreign ministers and leaders have been prepared topublicly articulate trenchant criticisms of Myanmar for internationaland domestic consumption. Statements issued in relation to two recentevents are illustrative of this phenomenon. One was formulated inresponse to the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations inMyanmar in September 2007;" the trigger for the second was thelate refusal by the SPDC leadership to allow a briefing by UNSGSpecial Advisor Ibrahim Gambari to the leaders of the East AsiaSummit (EAS) in November 2007.^

The military's decision to crack down on peaceful monk-ledprotests in September 2007 led to the sharpest rebuke of Myanmarever sanctioned by ASEAN governments. In a statement issued bySingapore as ASEAN Chair on the sidelines of the UNGA plenary,foreign ministers expressed their "revulsion" over reports that thedemonstrations in Myanmar were being suppressed by violent forceand that there had been a number of fatalities." Expressing fullsupport for the good offices role of Ibrahim Gambari, ministersmoreover urged the Myanmar Government to grant him full accessto all parties and to cooperate fully and work with him. Thestatement was issued because ASEAN countries felt that they hadno option but to clarify their collective position on developmentsin Myanmar and the significant regional and international outragethe latter caused.

In November 2007, Singapore, again as Ghair, released anotherrobust statement on Myanmar, which made clear that the militaryregime in Naypyidaw was henceforth expected to fend for itself indealing with the UN and the wider international community, untilthe military leadership again wanted ASEAN to be of assistance. Readout by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, and ostensiblysupported by eight fellow ASEAN leaders following Myanmar'srefusal to allow a briefing by Ibrahim Gambari at the 2007 EAS,the ASEAN statement outlined members' joint expectation thatMyanmar work with the UN in order to: (1) open up a meaningful


dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League forDemocracy (NLD); (2) make full use of the good offices of the UNSCand Professor Gambari in this process; (3) lift restrictions on SuuKyi and release all political detainees; (4) work towards a peacefultransition to democracy; and (5) address the economic difficultiesfaced by the people of Myanmar. ASEAN affirmed its readiness "toplay a role whenever Myanmar wants it to do so", while stating that"[m]ost Leaders expressed the view that Myanmar could not go backor stay put"." While the September statement thus seemed designedto give ASEAN a role in Myanmar's political process following aperiod of almost two years during which it had steadily refused todefend Myanmar internationally,^^ the November one signalled thatASEAN was suspending collective attempts to directly influenceMyanmar's political process."

In the event, ASEAN's position to cut short its efforts topromote national reconciliation not only left the effectiveness ofthe grouping's stance on Myanmar hostage to the success of thegood offices undertaken by Gambari (at least temporarily), butalso exposed intramural discord over dealing with Myanmar, asalluded to by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonoat the informal pre-summit meeting of ASEAN leaders.^" Notably,the division within ASEAN over Myanmar broadly mirrors thatover the issue of whether the organization should still respect itsown core principles and norms, not least non-interference. It hasalso been evident in other forums. For instance, the voting recordby ASEAN states on draft resolutions on Myanmar's human rightssituation at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) puts the originalASEAN-6 and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia clearly at odds, althoughboundaries are not always tightly drawn. Voting on the situation inMyanmar at the UNGA in late 2007, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand all abstained, while Laos,Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam voted against the resolution underconsideration. Cambodia was absent.

The Perspectives of the ASEAN States

ASEAN's intramural differences on Myanmar, which have made itdifficult for it to launch a collective Myanmar initiative of substance,are put into greater relief by examining individual country perspec-tives. They are largely shaped by four factors: (1) varying levelsof commitment by governments to promote democracy and humanrights; (2) a wide range of economic interactions with Myanmar,

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special interests, as well as geopolitical and security considerations;(3) different views about how ASEAN members should respond tointernational pressure over Myanmar's political impasse; and (4) thepossible political uses of the Myanmar issue at home and abroad,including image projection. Two further factors also impinge onthe respective approach adopted by individual ASEAN countries:the political "bruising" experienced at the hands of the SPDC,and varying assessments regarding the junta's actual willingness toembrace political change. The relative importance of these factorsdiffers considerably from country to country.

Singapore

From Singapore's perspective, Myanmar's way of responding to regionaland international concerns about its domestic developments has forsome time been a thorn in ASEAN's relations with key dialoguepartners and the city state's attempts to focus fellow members onadvancing economic integration in Southeast Asia. Singapore's leadershave been exasperated in particular over the glacial pace with whichthe SPDG has implemented its own "roadmap to democracy", in partbecause this has exposed the city state and the region to increasingWestern pressure to do more to influence Myanmar's top leadership.In the aftermath of the September protests. Minister Mentor LeeKuan Yew referred to an unstable Myanmar as a "time bomb"."Noting the economic mismanagement of the ruling military juntain the absence of political reconciliation, Singapore in the wake ofthe September protests argued that Myanmar could not be allowedto simply return to the status quo ante. Significantly, however,Singapore's leaders have not deemed it a prudent investment oftheir time and reputation to invest heavily into personal diplomacyat the highest level to influence Naypyidaw, presumably becausethey have not held out much hope to persuade the SPDG to dowhat ASEAN expects of it.

Nevertheless, finding a way to exert influence over Myanmar hasbeen a central question during Singapore's recent chairmanship ofASEAN (July 2007-July 2008). Noting how the strident nationalismand recalcitrance of the ruling generals has been reinforced bypunitive policies adopted by the West, Singapore has spoken outagainst ASEAN countries imposing retaliatory measures againstMyanmar because it sees economic sanctions as an ineffective meansto sway the military regime as long as Myanmar maintains tradingties with Ghina and India. But there is also a political objective.


as Singapore seeks to avoid the ASEAN countries from pushingMyanmar further into China's arms. Appreciating that Myanmarhas considerable geopolitical significance given its location at thecrossroads of South and Southeast Asia and the wider East Asia, arelated apprehension is that weaker ties between Myanmar and theother ASEAN countries could cause a situation in which China andIndia engage in a destabilising competitive struggle for influence inthe country leading to adverse effects for the ASEAN region.'*^ Atthe same time, Singapore has regarded China and also India as bestplaced to exert influence on the SPDC. Singapore's push for theCambari briefing at the 2007 EAS, and bence tbe need to supporttbe UN role in Myanmar, was sold in Beijing and New Delbi witbreference to their potential image gains given persistent internationalcriticisms of tbe backing extended by Cbina and India to Myanmar'sruling military regime.

Tbere bave been questions wby Singapore does not more forcefullyexercise its assumed leverage over Myanmar, wbicb is considered toderive from its position as one of tbe country's main trading partnersand investors as well as provider of banking services to tbe regime.Notably, one of tbe current Vice-Presidents of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC], Indonesian parliamentarianDjoko Susilo, bas squarely pointed tbe finger at wbat be considersSingapore's continued blind support for tbe regime.^' For its part, theSingapore Covernment has said it would abide by all UN sanctions(tbougb tbese remain only bypotbetical); it bas however refused tobe drawn over bow mucb money from Myanmar bas flowed intoSingapore, and wbat tbe level of Singapore investment in Myanmaris.'" Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew bas sougbt to pour cold water overclaims tbat tbe city state bas leverage over Myanmar, arguing tbat"[t]be members of ASEAN wbo could influence tbem [SPDC leaders]will be Tbailand and beyond [tbat] Cbina and India. Tbe rest of us— we are a kind of background muzak.""

Thailand

Thailand bas consistently, albeit witb varying levels of entbusiasm,supported national reconciliation in Myanmar following tberenormalization of bilateral ties witb Yangon under Prime MinisterTbaksin Sbinawatra in 2002. Building and retaining trust witbMyanmar's military leadersbip bas been a core objective. Tbisinvolved (1) curtailing political and territorial space previouslystill available to SPDC regime adversaries, including tbe etbnic

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minorities; (2) consolidating and strengthening economic links withMyanmar, especially investment in the areas of hydropower andnatural gas exploration; and (3) abstaining from trenchant criticismsof the incumbent junta, while treating as security issues the cross-border flow of narcotics and refugees. In 2003, the SPDC adoptedBangkok's proposal to formulate a roadmap to democracy, albeit onewhose substance differed (Thailand had suggested a quick release ofSuu Kyi as an initial confidence building measure). Thailand alsosucceeded in late 2003 in creating a new platform bringing togetherregional and extra-regional states in a dialogue with Myanmar's junta.However, the Thaksin government was unable to persuade Yangon topolitically invest in this kind of multilateral conference diplomacydubbed the "Bangkok process". Only one gathering materialized; plansfor a second meeting in April 2004 fell victim to the SPDC's statedneed to concentrate on the re-launch of the National Convention asthe first step of the SPDC's roadmap. The removal of Prime MinisterKhin Nyunt later that year reduced scope for change. Meanwhile, Thaiofficials have essentially looked at Myanmar in two ways: on the onehand, Myanmar has been considered as the source of transnationalthreats that impact Thailand's national security. On the other hand.Thai officials appreciate that Bangkok's diplomatic leeway vis-à-visMyanmar is circumscribed by the reality of Thailand's dependencyon its neighbour's natural gas, timber and labour.

After Thaksin's ouster in September 2006, the interim militaryleadership appreciated that it was not endowed with sufficientmoral authority to publicly lecture its counterpart in Myanmar ondemocratization. Instead, it focused on building confidence withsenior Myanmar leaders and promoting stability on the border. Forinstance, shortly after China and Russia vetoed the US-UK draftresolution on Myanmar in January 2007, Thai supreme commanderBoonsrang Niempradit visited Myanmar to discuss counter-narcoticscooperation. Reacting to anti-SPDC protests in September 2007, somewithin Thai policy-making circles supported convening the ASEANTroika or initiating a multilateral diplomatic dialogue similar to theSix-Party talks over North Korea's nuclear programme (to revive ineffect the "Bangkok Process").™ Neither idea was decisively pursued,however.

The incoming elected government of Samak Sundaravej, who wasPrime Minister from January-September 2008, practised continuityin Thai-Myanmar relations. When travelling to Naypyidaw for hisintroductory visit, Samak suggested that Western views of Myanmarwere too critical. His agenda ostensibly excluded Myanmar's human


rigbts situation and conflict vy itb etbnic minorities. Instead, economicissues dominated. Tbis focus was maintained wben Myanmar's PrimeMinister Tbein Sein visited Bangkok at tbe end of April 2008.'^Dependent on Myanmar's natural gas reserves, tbe Tbai Governmentis committed to belp improve Myanmar's physical infrastructure.During tbe time of bis brief appointment, Tbai Foreign MinisterNoppodon Pattama confirmed tbat Tbailand would pursue tbeUS$6 billion Tasang bydropower project on tbe Salween River.Notably, tbe pursuit of Tbai economic interests bas taken placedespite significant disencbantment witb tbe SPDC among Tbailand-based civil society and buman rigbts groups. Indeed, Thailand'srecent governments have also ignored tbe critical voice of KraisakCboonbavan, former Senator and Cbairman of tbe Senate ForeignAffairs Committee, wbo is presently AIPMC's President. In whatmay represent a more widespread view within Thailand's elite,former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej's recently described SuuKyi as a "political tool" of Europe and suggested that efforts toengage Myanmar would be more productive if concern for her wasleft off tbe d^^

Tiie Philippines

Tbe Pbilippines bas routinely expressed concern over tbe bumanrigbts situation in Myanmar and especially the treatment of Aung SanSuu Kyi, as well as the perceived failure by the SPDC to speedilyadvance the country's return to democracy. Working under PresidentGloria Macapagal Arroyo, foreign secretaries Teofisto Guingona Jr(2001-02), Bias Ople (2002-03), Delia Domingo-Albert (2003-04) andAlberto Romulo (August 2004-present) bave all been more or lesscritical of Myanmar. In 2005, Manila put forward four demands: (1)tbe full implementation of tbe roadmap; (2) the safe and early releaseof Suu Kyi; (3) the full participation of the NLD in political life,especially in drafting the constitution; and (4) the return of the UNSpecial Envoy (then Razali Ismail).'^ While the Philippine positionhas been tbat ASEAN sbouid offer full support to the good officesof the UNSG, Manila angered Naypyidaw by also offering support fortbe involvement of tbe UNSC in late 2005 in order to bring aboutnational reconciliation in Myanmar. Tbe fate of Suu Kyi remains tbeoverriding issue for Manila in its bilateral ties witb Naypyidaw. AtASEAN's January 2007 Cebu Summit, tbe Pbilippine President toldthen Prime Minister Soe Win that Suu Kyi's house arrest must notbe extended. At the following ASEAN Summit in November, sbe

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insisted that the NLD leader "must he released now"/^ and pledgedto continue working for her release to pave the way for democraticreforms." The President even suggested that Philippine ratification ofthe ASEAN Charter and political progress in Myanmar were linked,particularly as regards to Suu Kyi's release, although more recentlyshe established an inter-agency task force to secure the Charter'spassage through the Senate.

While Manila's policy towards Myanmar huilds on ASEAN'scollective position and reflects mainstream Philippine political values,domestic circumstances and external political pressures provide addedstimuli. Myanmar has heen a target of criticism across the politicaldivide in Philippine congressional politics. One of the most vocalcritics of Myanmar has heen Senate Minority Leader Aquilino "Nene"Q. Pimentel Jr. (PDP-Lahan), who has also heen vice-president of theASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus. Given the President'slack of legitimacy and the limited political cost of a downturn inhilateral relations with Naypyidaw, her keenness to lead on thisissue of international concern is not surprising. Also, Manila hasnothing to gain by resisting US pressure on Myanmar.

Vietnam

Hanoi has wished for the active and effective implementation ofMyanmar's roadmap to democracy. ^^ In its official rhetoric, Hanoihas emphasized the importance of stability in Myanmar, both as aprerequisite for the country's economic reform as well as for regionalstability and development. While there is no deep historical friendshipbetween the two countries, Vietnam has offered Myanmar amplediplomatic support in a range of regional and international settings.For instance, the methodical diplomacy pursued by Hanoi as Chairof the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM] in 2004 helped broker a dealwhereby Myanmar participated at the ASEM Summit organized byVietnam that year. Pointing to Vietnam's own experience of havingbeen subjected to international sanctions, Hanoi has consistentlyarticulated its opposition to punitive measures being imposed againstMyanmar.

In line with other ASEAN countries, Hanoi has expressed supportfor the good offices role of the UNSG and his Special Advisor.Unlike many of the original ASEAN states, however, Vietnam hasnot been specifically concerned with the credibility of Myanmar'spolitical process, although Hanoi welcomed the announcement ofthe referendum and the multi-party elections as positive progress."


Vietnamese reluctance to unambiguously endorse demands for politicaltransition in Myanmar is more or less clearly linked to concernsabout the incumbent regime's own political future as well as concernsabout any ASEAN role in amplifying external pressure. The depth ofHanoi's reluctance to see members interfere in the domestic politicsof Myanmar was highlighted when the Vietnamese leadership madeclear its objections to the scheduled Gambari briefing at the EASin November 2007.

Malaysia

Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has favoured parallel roles forASEAN and the UN to advance democratic reforms in Myanmar.Suggesting that Myanmar could no longer count on the grouping todefend the SPDC in the absence of progress with respect to its ownroadmap, Malaysia ostensibly secured at the 2005 ASEAN Summitan invitation for Malaysia's foreign minister, as ASEAN Chairman, tovisit Myanmar "to learn first-hand of the progress".^" Whether SeniorGeneral Than Shwe really issued or agreed to such an invitationwas unclear. In the event, Myanmar's leadership played hardballwith Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, bydelaying his visit, not accepting his coming as ASEAN Chair, anddenying him requested talks with Suu Kyi and Than Shwe. Given thisdiplomatic bruising, Syed Hamid concluded that "Myanmar does notwant us to stand with them ... [and] ... it is best that it is handledby the UN."^^ There has been much less diplomatic language aboutMyanmar, not least by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.Significantly, however, Malaysian policy-makers have not set asidethe idea that ASEAN could play a role in bringing about peacefulpolitical change in Myanmar if Naypyidaw was willing. Also, Malaysiahas not regarded Myanmar as posing a threat to international orregional peace and security despite concerns about its treatment ofMuslims. Hence, unlike Manila, Kuala Lumpur has rejected UNSCaction in favour of the good offices role of the UNSG.

Malaysia's ambivalent Myanmar policy, moreover, reflects acombination of economic interests (including state-owned energycompany Petronas' investment in the Yetagun gas project) andincreasing domestic political pressures. The AIPMC, which comprisesthe most infiuential group of Myanmar critics in Southeast Asia, wasfounded in Malaysia.^" Among them are Datuk Mohd Zaid Ibrahim,Senator in the Dewan Negara, who was President of AIPMC from2004-08, and Democratic Action Party MP Teresa Kok. Notably, the

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defiance of Myanmar's military rulers and Malaysia's response hasclearly become an issue in Malaysian party politics. For instance,Lim Kit Siang, former chairman of the Democratic Action Party (DAP)and parliamentary opposition leader from 2004-08, who also serveson the AIPMC Steering Committee, severely criticised Syed Hamidin October 2007 for allegedly undoing the "revulsion" statement ofthe ASEAN Foreign Ministers." He also demanded that Myanmar'ssuspension and expulsion from ASEAN must remain options. Myanmarwas also an issue for YB Datuk Seri Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, whoas leader of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People's Justice Party) headedthe parliamentary opposition from March 2008 until she vacatedthe seat for her husband. Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim, who won theresultant by-election in August 2008. Wan Azizah remains one ofthe Vice-Presidents of AIPMC. Meanwhile, under Anwar, who hasbeen a fervent advocate of transparent and accountable government,the opposition's commitment to human rights improvements anddemocratization in Myanmar, as well as its interest in investigatingthe role of Petronas in Myanmar, will likely ensure that the UMNO-led government remains under pressure on these issues and limitthe scope for developing new initiatives.

Indonesia

With Indonesia's own successful transition from authoritarianism todemocracy in mind, Jakarta has reiterated that Myanmar can undergoa similar political transition. Indeed, President Yudhoyono hasidentified the sharing of Indonesia's experience of regime transitionas the "soft power approach" to bringing democracy to Myanmar.Indonesia has publicly recognized the sensitivities of the SPDC andacknowledged the regime's anxieties concerning Myanmar's territorialintegrity and stability. Jakarta has also offered military cooperationin the form of training. The purpose has been to build trust and toreassure the generals because, as Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayudaargued, the core impediment to political change is a "sense ofinsecurity on the part of the military junta about their future indemocratic Myanmar".^^ Indonesian policy-makers have neverthelessmixed quiet diplomacy, involving for instance the President, cabinetministers, and former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, with publiccriticism of tbe SPDC. For instance, while abstaining on the UNSCvote on the situation in Myanmar in January 2007, Indonesia hadno qualms about pointing to the Human Rights Council as anappropriate forum to take the junta to task. Also, the September


2007 violence was publicly interpreted as resulting from a lack ofdemocratization."

Reacting to the junta's suppression of the September 2007protests and more persistent calls from Western countries andthe UN to help achieve political change in Myanmar, Wirajudasuggested that Naypyidaw embark on a transitional period of fiveyears to allow the military leadership to gain confidence in thetransition process (that would involve a power-sharing arrangementbetween the military and civilian leaders).^^ In November 2007, AliAlatas reiterated that Myanmar's armed forces should play a power-sharing role in the transition and gradually disengage from nationalpolitics, as happened in Indonesia.^^ As the SPDC's February 2008announcement regarding the referendum and elections made clear,however, Indonesia's advice is not being followed. Hassan Wirajuda'spleas that the draft constitution should be revised to accommodatethe interests of ethnic groups and the Bamar political opposition,and that including Suu Kyi was critical to the political processbeing credible and acceptable, were made in vain.

With ASEAN's reputation at stake over Myanmar, and Jakartabeing a long-time advocate of "regional solutions to regional problems",Indonesia arguably has a greater interest than other ASEAN states insetting up a regional framework to influence Naypyidaw. Followingthe September protests, for instance, ideas about invoking the ASEANTroika mechanism were put forward, potentially involving Indonesia,Singapore and the Philippines. Obstacles to its establishment haveremained, however. Countries such as Singapore are wary about thelikely unevenness of decisions deriving from the Troika's normalrotational membership. Apart from the issue of representation, noagreement exists among members to reconsider the ad-hoc natureof the Troika, which would be based — if set up — on respectfor the principles of non-interference and consensus. Indonesia hasnevertheless remained wedded to the idea of ASEAN playing alarger role in influencing the SPDC. As Indonesia's Foreign Ministersaid, "[Myanmar] being a member of the ASEAN family, we see theimportance of ASEAN or Indonesia, at least, to engage Myanmarso we can ensure the process that they are now undertaking ...could result in a solution that is also acceptable to the internationalcommunity".^'' This suggests that, for Jakarta, ASEAN in principleremains a more appropriate forum to address the challenge posedby Myanmar than other regional dialogue settings, including theEAS. That said, Indonesia has emphasized the important role thatChina and India play with respect to Myanmar by pointing out

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that no regional initiative towards Myanmar would succeed withouttheir active and full support. At the 2007 Singapore Summit, Chinaand Indonesia agreed jointly to rely on diplomacy to encouragereconciliation, democracy and development in Myanmar."

Jakarta is clear that its efforts are best pursued in conjunction withthose of the UN. Indonesia has strongly supported the good officesrole of the UNSG to promote political reconciliation in Myanmar. Thissupport was unambiguously communicated to Naypyidaw after theSeptember protests, prompting Senior General Than Shwe to assurePresident Yudhoyono that Myanmar would work with the UN SpecialAdviser.^' Jakarta has not been enthusiastic about pushing regimetransition through the UNSC, however, as illustrated in its votingbehaviour. When holding the Council Presidency in November 2007,Indonesia navigated between, on the one hand, the positions of thosecountries that were deeply sceptical about whether the outcomesattained by Gambari during his visit to Myanmar in early Novembermet the objectives of the UNSC Presidential Statement of 11 October2007, ^ and, on the other hand, those which regarded the Gambarimission as a success. Indonesia bridged the divide by releasing apress rather than a presidential statement on Myanmar.''"

While the government has managed to regularly blunt parliament-ary pressure on Myanmar, there is considerable support for Myanmar'sdemocratization in the House of Representatives [Dewan PerwakilanRakyat, or DPR) across a number of political parties, including Golkar.A key voice is that of Djoko Susilo, from the National Mandate Party,who is chairman of the national parliamentary caucus on Myanmarand one of three Indonesians presently on the AIPMC SteeringCommittee. Notably, the legislature has become increasingly assertiveon the issue of Myanmar's democratization. For instance, in March2008 the DPR rejected the accreditation of the proposed new Myanmarambassador to Indonesia.^^ Also, in a symbolic move, DPR speakerAgung Laksono, Deputy Chairman of Golkar, in August 2008 invitedseveral exiled Burmese politicians to attend a session organized bythe DPR, The first decision in particular has complicated Indonesia'sties with Naypyidaw,

As this broad overview shows, considerable variation hascharacterized the perspective of ASEAN states towards Myanmar.Singapore and Thailand, while critical of Myanmar, have basicallyadopted a pragmatic attitude vis-à-vis Naypyidaw, which feeds inpart on economic interests and the need to deal with cross borderand regional implications of Myanmar's politics and practices. Thepositions towards Myanmar adopted by the Philippines, Malaysia


and Indonesia highlight the importance of values in foreign policyand point to the growing significance of pluralist constraints. Ofthose ASEAN members examined here, Vietnam remains the mostfervent exponent of traditional understandings associated withthe "ASEAN way" and its application to Myanmar, Given thesedifferences, ASEAN leaders have found it difficult to do much morethan to agree on their collective support for the UNSG good officesrole. Only Indonesian policy-makers have tended to demonstratesustained interest in developing a new regional initiative towardsMyanmar.

Towards a New Regional Initiative?

The rationale for a new regional — but not necessarily simply anASEAN — initiative towards Myanmar seems clear. First, Westernpolicy vis-à-vis Naypyidaw has proved ineffective: diplomatic pressureand sanctions have had limited impact, ASEAN's own recordin shaping decision making in Myanmar is also far from stellar.Second, there is a widespread perception in Southeast Asia thatpolitical developments in Myanmar continue to impact negativelyon ASEAN's international image. Third, while ASEAN's engagementof Myanmar has not induced Naypyidaw to reconsider its position,say, on the drafting of the constitution or in relation to Suu Kyi,ASEAN countries, and Indonesia in particular, remain importantpartners for Western countries in efforts to infiuence Myanmar'smilitary leaders; the same is true from the UN perspective, notleast given the limitations of the present UNSG mandate and thepractical difficulties encountered in implementing it.

In this context, it is important to note that it remains unclearwhether Professor Gambari will succeed in facilitating politicalreconciliation given the junta's criticisms of how he has executedthe good offices role to date. In November 2007, the MyanmarGovernment complained to Gambari that his mission had yieldedlittle for the military junta; instead, said the generals, Naypyidaw hadbeen subjected to an unprecedented UNSC Presidential Statement,more sanctions by the United States, European Union (EU) andAustralia, as well as criticisms put forward by the former UN ResidentCoordinator,^^ Beyond suggesting that there was little incentive torespond to UN exhortations on national reconciliation, the juntaalso sternly rejected as interference in the country's internal affairs,Gambari's proposal to mediate between the regime and the politicalopposition, and objected to Gambari conducting extensive visits to

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the region to discuss Myanmar's situation.^^ Subsequently, the rulingjunta publicly doubted the UNSG Special Adviser's impartialityand accused Gambari of taking instructions from the Great Powers.Pointing to Gambari's release of a statement by Suu Kyi during astopover in Singapore following his November 2007 visit to Myanmar,its Information Minister even accused Gambari of a breach of trustand of being biased in favour of the NLD leader. According to theminister, the statement "was dangerous to the degree of hurting theprevailing peace and stability of the nation in addition to harmingthe already-achieved national unity".''^

Of course, Gambari has himself indicated that he wishes topursue several issues: the release of political prisoners and thehuman rights situation, progress on a time bound dialogue betweenthe government and Suu Kyi; a credible political process, economicand humanitarian issues and a regularised process of engagement."^Following the referendum, and with elections planned for 2010,the challenge for Gambari has remained how to make Myanmarrespond positively to these points. After his visit to Myanmar inAugust 2008, he admitted that the tangible results attained werebelow expectations (see below).

A regional approach might also usefully supplement the workof the Group of Friends of the UNSG on Myanmar, formed inDecember 2007, which has included several Asian countries aswell as Myanmar's key Western critics.'"* This forum — normallyorganized at ambassadorial level in New York — has yet to provethat it can bring about a real meeting of minds among participants.Notably, Myanmar is not included. No clear breakthroughs or newinitiatives have as yet been reported as outcomes of the group'smeetings. Though the Group of Friends was scheduled to meet atministerial level for the first time in September 2008, diplomaticprocesses involving fewer participants have been considered aspotentially more effective in usefully complementing the UNgood offices process with a view to inñuencing the SPDG to takesubstantive steps to promote political reconciliation in the run-upto the 2010 elections.

Two Ideas

In the aftermath of the September violence, two ideas took holdabout possible new regional diplomatic settings in which to do justthat. One was to pursue a multilateral dialogue, broadly followingthe format of the Six-Party talks on North Korea. Another was for


Indonesia to engage Myanmar's military regime in a setting structuredalong the lines of the Jakarta Informal Meetings.

Within policy-making and academic circles inside and outsideSoutheast Asia there have been several permutations of the ideaof establishing a forum akin to the Six Party Talks in which tofacilitate Myanmar's national reconciliation. Dating back to 2005,one analyst has proposed that ASEAN, China and India, v rith thebacking of the US and EU, spearhead a regional initiative.*^ Morerecently, other analysts have suggested to either involve theUNSC Permanent Five, plus Norway, Japan, Singapore (as ASEANChairman);^" or to anchor the group in East Asia, involving ASEAN,China, India and Japan.'"' What the respective proposals have sharedin common is the focus on opening a dialogue between the militaryregime and Suu Kyi, and the assessment that the involvementof China and at least some ASEAN countries is crucial. Whilethe shared basic purpose for this forum also seems to focus onhaving in place a carrot-and-stick approach to make Myanmar'smilitary accept political concessions, the variations in relation toparticipants indicate unease about whether Western countriesshould be directly involved. Indeed, ASEAN countries tend tostress that China and possibly India are the only countries ableto influence Naypyidaw. Seen in this light, Singapore's efforts tosupport the Gambari briefing at the EAS represented an attemptto identify one possible venue for a future broad-based regionaldialogue, even though the primary immediate motive probablyfocused on avoiding the junta's procrastination on implementingits roadmap.

As events in November 2007 showed, however, Myanmar's topleadership has little if any interest in seeing what it regards as itsdomestic affairs discussed in a formal diplomatic setting, even inthe presence of mainly East Asian states. Even more significantly,China decided not to press Naypyidaw on this issue althoughBeijing initially was generally supportive of the idea. Having subse-quently been subjected to international criticism over political unrestin Tibet in March 2008, Chinese leaders have indicated no eager-ness to open up a formal multilateral dialogue on Myanmar. TheSichuan earthquake and the Olympic Games have made China focusfurther inwards, raising question marks about Beijing's willingness topursue a formal diplomatic process about Myanmar with one of theaforementioned constituencies. Economic calculations also matter;pushing the generals in Naypyidaw too much on political reconciliationpotentially damages Beijing's economic agenda.^" This agenda is

368 Jürgen Haacke

significant. Beyond the import of natural gas, China's apparent decisionto establish an oil refining base in Yunnan, for instance, also signals agrowing interest in seeing Myanmar become a major transit countryfor oil shipments."

The second diplomatic approach considered potentially usefulto influence Myanmar's generals is a version of the Jakarta InformalMeetings organized by Indonesia in the late 1980s. ^ Importantbacking for convening a modern day equivalent has come from theInternational Crisis Croup, but the idea has also been consideredattractive more generally. Above all, the appeal of such talks w ouldlie in them bringing together the parties to the political conflict, andtheir regional backers, and to do so informally. In Cambodia's case,the Jakarta Informal Meetings represented the first occasion afteryears of fighting at which the four competing political forces inCambodia came together to discuss power sharing and the inter-national supervision of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. Notably,the first meeting was divided into two stages to accommodateremaining diplomatic sensitivities: only after the meeting of theCambodian parties to the conflict were they joined by Vietnam,Laos and the then ASEAN countries in regional multi-party

Drawing on the experience of the Jakarta Informal Meetings tofurther political transition in Myanmar is no guarantee for success.First, the contemporary situation in Myanmar is clearly differentfrom that in Cambodia in the 1980s. Then the Cambodian factionsbegan to come under increasing pressure from their external patronsto move towards a political resolution of the Third IndochinaWar. Vietnam and the Soviet Union sought to reduce the financialburden and political cost linked to sustaining Vietnam's militaryintervention in Cambodia and to concentrate on their own economicreconstruction. China too stood increasingly ready to strike a dealwith the other four permanent members of the UNSC — at theexpense of the Khmer Rouge. By comparison, Myanmar's neighboursare today not in a position to be able to expect that they couldpress the ruling regime to make concessions on issues it takes to benon-negotiable, in part because Naypyidaw will play them againstone another. Secondly, the Vietnamese-backed People's Republic ofKampuchea in part also acceded to the Jakarta process because itfaced stiff military opposition from the Khmer Rouge and the non-communist opposition. By contrast, Myanmar's military governmenthas over time imposed greater military control over the country(remaining problems of reach resulting from ceasefire accords with


ethnic minorities notwithstanding). Third, in the Cambodian case,four major parties vied for power. In Myanmar, the lines of conflictare drawn among the Bamar majority, and between the Bamarmajority and a considerable number of ethnic nationalities.^^ Tliiscomplicates the organization of any informal process, quite apartfrom the fact that tiie SPDC has been unequivocal in its rejectionof outside parties becoming involved in its dealings with tiie ethnicnationalities. Fourth, tbe Jakarta Informal Meetings were designedbut failed to make headway on the question of power sharing andtbe proposed UN peacekeeping. In Myanmar, bowever, the questionof power sbaring bas already been addressed by tbe referendum ofMay 2008.

The practical difficulties encountered in laying the groundworkfor political reconciliation between tbe current leadersbip and SuuKyi were bighligbted by developments following tbe Septemberprotests. In early October 2007, Senior General Tban Sbwe spelledout tbe terms for a personal meeting witb Suu Kyi. His preconditionswere that tbe NLD leader abandon confrontation, retract ber threatof "utter devastation" and end her support for sanctions.^'^ Suu Kyiresponded witb a media statement released by Ibrabim Gambari,whicb apparently was not sbared with tbe junta before its publica-tion. Tbe statement expressed tbe expectation tbat tbe phase ofpreliminary consultations witb Suu Kyi, involving Labour MinisterAung Kyi as liaison minister, would lead to "a meaningful and timebound dialogue witb the SPDC leadersbip" as soon as possible.^'^Tbe statement bad added tbat sbe was committed to constructivedialogue and invited tbe government and all relevant parties tojoin ber in tbat spirit. Despite tbe positive tone, it would appearthat to tbe junta Suu Kyi's message sounded like a refusal tocomply witb tbeir demands, particularly as regards sanctions, andan indication of ber likely continued unwillingness to cede politicalground. Indeed, ber invitation that tbe government join ber for adialogue was probably interpreted as bordering on tbe condescend-ing because sbe was thereby suggesting that sbe was morallysuperior to tbe generals. Not surprisingly, tbe dialogue betweenSuu Kyi and tbe regime quickly failed to advance. The subsequentdecision by tbe NLD to appeal for a "no" vote in tbe constitutionalreferendum bas likely also been taken as a sign of continuedintransigence.

In short, tbe basic conditions tbat led tbe Cambodian partiesdown the path of tbe Jakarta Informal Meetings are not present inMyanmar's case, while the refusal of tbe main Bamar protagonists

370 Jürgen Haacke

to recognize tbeir respective claims to legitimacy poses a veryserious obstacle to reconciliation. It is tbus not surprising thatIndonesian foreign policy advisers at least temporarily concludedin Marcb 2008 that "... wbat kind of role Indonesia sbould take isnot yet well defined".^'' But it was clear tbat if Jakarta did undertakeefforts to initiate a new diplomatic process on Myanmar, tbe latterwould bave to be quite different from the original Jakarta process innature and composition. Tbe question is wbether in tbe aftermatbof Cyclone Nargis tbe idea of a regional initiative to advancepolitical reconciliation in Myanmar bas proved any easier to acbieve,notwitbstanding tbe ratification and promulgation of tbe regime'snew constitution.

The Impact of Cyclone Nargis

In tbe aftermatb of Cyclone Nargis, a diplomatic stand off betweenMyanmar and tbe international community arose wben tbe juntanot only delayed international relief workers from accessing tbedevastated Ayeyarwady delta, but also rejected tbe use of American,Frencb and British naval assets to speed up tbe relief effort. Inview of tbe obstruction encountered, tbe UN and various reliefagencies voiced concerns about a possible second large-scale waveof deatbs among survivors in tbe delta from a lack of clean drinkingwater, water-borne diseases and malnutrition.^^ Tbe difficulties inproviding assistance prompted an international debate about apossible humanitarian intervention on tbe basis of tbe responsibilityto protect.

ASEAN responded to tbe cyclone by establisbing a "Coalitionof Mercy" for tbe Myanmar relief effort. Naypyidaw was persuadedto allow entry for tbe first ever deployment of tbe ASEANEmergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), assembled by tbe ASEANSecretariat in coordination witb tbe ASEAN Committee on DisasterManagement (ACDM) and the government of Myanmar. Basedon ERAT's assessment, ASEAN country teams provided targetedassistance in support of tbe military government's aid distributionto the affected population. On 12 May 2008, representatives oftbe ASEAN Secretariat, the World Bank and tbe United NationsOffice for tbe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) met todiscuss botb tbe relief effort, and medium and long-term measuresfor the victims of Cycione Nargis. ASEAN Secretary General SurinPitsuwan called the grouping's response to the cyclone a "definingmoment".^"


Rattled by unceasing calls for humanitarian intervention inMyanmar, ASEAN members — at a special foreign ministers meetingconvened in Singapore in mid-May — also suggested to the SPDCleadership that the crisis offered Naypyidaw a final opportunity toallow the Association a role in facilitating the military's relationswith the international community. According to Singaporean ForeignMinister George Yeo and then ASEAN Chairman, "it was quite adramatic encounter because the other ASEAN Foreign Ministersconfronted our Myanmar counterpart asking him: 'Look, whatdoes Myanmar mean to us, and what do we mean to you?' TheIndonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, was particularlyemphatic on this point."™ In the event, Myanmar's ruling juntaaccepted ASEAN's attempt at bridge building between Naypyidawand the international community, at least with respect to addressingthe humanitarian situation. While the decision did not reverseMyanmar's position of November 2007 when Prime Minister TheinSein had unambiguously stated his country's preference to dealdirectly with the UN, it allowed ASEAN Secretary General SurinPitsuwan to lead ASEAN's Humanitarian Task Force, which in turngave rise to the establishment of a tripartite core group to coordinatethe relief effort, involving ASEAN, the UN and Naypyidaw. Thishelped save lives.''^

Gradual improvements in access offered by the junta in therun-up to an international pledging conference organized in Yangonburied ideas about offering assistance to the survivors of thecyclone without Naypyidaw's consent. Than Shwe duly informedUN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon that all foreign disaster-relief experts would be given access to the hard hit delta. At theconference, which was co-chaired by the secretary generals ofthe UN and ASEAN, and involved 51 countries as well as 24UN agencies and international NGOs, the SPDC finally affirmedthat it would welcome international assistance with no stringsattached.

Dealing with the cyclone has opened up new opportunitiesto discuss Myanmar's need for assistance and reconstruction aswell as for the capacity building more generally required to copewith the chronic emergency, which is said to have grippedthe entire country for some time.^^ For instance, John Holmes, UNUndersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and EmergencyRelief Coordinator, expressed the hope that dialogue and cooperationbuilt up in the response to Cyclone Nargis could be extended toother humanitarian issues.*^^ Also, the post-Nargis Joint Assessment

372 Jürgen Haacke

report explicitly prepares the ground for rehabilitation assistance.Significantly, there has even heen hope that the spirit of cooperation,which has characterized Myanmar's recent cooperation with the UNand ASEAN, might in future extend to political matters. Althoughthe junta has in the past dismissed the notion that it would sacrificeits political-security interests for financial carrots, the military isassumed to understand that any longer-term development assistanceis inextricably linked to political transition.

Drawing parallels with the experience of the political agree-ment on Aceh in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami,the Indonesian Government has heen particularly keen to exploitthe perceived window of opportunity opened up hy the successfulrelief effort to inject momentum into Myanmar's political process.In this context, Indonesian academics and advisers have put beforePresident Yudhoyono the so-called Jakarta Initiative on Myanmar.When submitted, its implementation was said to involve appointinga special envoy and forming a dialogue group including China andIndia, as well as Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and offering themilitary leadership political and security assurances in return forprogress in relation to national reconciliation and democratization."^Notably, the proposal has also focused on the regime's reconciliationwith Myanmar's ethnic minorities. With the proposed electionsscheduled for 2010, Indonesians remain particularly concernedabout the release from house arrest of Suu Kyi and other politicaldetainees.^'

This initiative still lacks official status. As the prospects of SeniorGeneral Than Shwe agreeing to the proposal are uncertain. PresidentYudhoyono has not deemed it prudent to formally submit the initiativeto Naypyidaw. In part, Yudhoyono's reluctance to do so is linked toelectoral calculations. A refusal on the part of Than Shwe to meetthe Indonesian president and/or to accede to the initiative, possiblyin response to the DPR's decision to reject the accreditation of anew Myanmar ambassador to Indonesia, is perceived as politicallydamaging to Yudhoyono in advance of presidential elections in July2009. Instead of establishing the envisaged dialogue group involvingadditional ASEAN representation, Jakarta has therefore pursued theidea of instituting ambassadorial level talks in a smaller setting.In June, for example, the Indonesian permanent representative inNew York reportedly hosted two informal luncheons involving hiscounterparts from Myanmar, India and Ghina as well as ProfessorGambari.**"


The composition of this focus group marks the development ofa potentially crucial diplomatic venue. It also suggests that Indonesiacontinues to regard the exercise of the UN good offices as essentialto Myanmar's political transition. Indeed, though Professor Gamhari'svisit to Myanmar in August 2008 produced no immediate tangibleoutcomes,"' Jakarta offered demonstrahle diplomatic support, arguingthat the good offices role was a process rather than an event.Indonesia's leadership likely considers such support all the moreimportant as the diplomatic gloves have also again come off inthe political struggle hy Western states against Myanmar's militarygovernment. In this context, it is notable that the new focus groupon Myanmar has been moving towards a ministerial-level meeting.This would be an important development despite the continuedanxiety regarding the possibility that Than Shwe could at any timeput a stop to Jakarta's efforts, even as regards to ambassadorial talks.Dealing with Indonesia, China, India and the UN in one forumshould leave Myanmar's diplomats relatively comfortable, however.Should the junta decide to begin to meet at least some of theexpectations regarding the release of political detainees in advanceof the 2010 elections, Indonesia's initiative may yet develop furthermomentum.

Conclusions

Underneath the veneer of the ASEAN consensus position that hasprevailed on Myanmar, member countries have been seriously divided.The intramural differences regarding Myanmar stem from a range offactors, including varying levels of commitment by governments topromote democracy and human rights; quite diverse sets of economic,security and geopolitical interests relating to Myanmar; and varyinglevels of need and/or willingness to join the chorus of Myanmar's critics.The political bruising sustained above all by Malaysia and Singapore,when forcing the issue of Myanmar's political reconciliation anddemocratization, as well as Jakarta's apparent belief in Naypyidaw'spreparedness to consider their ideas for regime transition have leftIndonesia as the only ASEAN country that seems committed to invest-ing in a regional initiative in support of the UN good offices role.Significantly, however, the Myanmar leadership has yet to reallyplay its cards. Moreover, even if Indonesia's initiative for an additionaldialogue made useful progress, there remain many, potentially insuper-able, domestic obstacles to meaningful political change in Myanmar.

374 fürgen Haacke

NOTES

I am very grateful for the helpful suggestions of two anonymous referees on anearlier version of this article.

1 Myanmar's seven-step roadmap includes the reconvening of the NationalConvention, the drafting of a new constitution, its adoption through nationalreferendum, the holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (legislativebodies) according to the new constitution, the convening of Hluttaws, and thebuilding of a modern, developed and democratic nation by the elected stateleaders, as well as the government and other central organs.

2 "SPDC Spoke Authoritative Team meets Special Adviser to UN SecretaryGeneral", New Light of Myanmar, 8 March 2008.

3 According to official figures, more than 78,000 people perished, with a further56,000 missing. The UN estimates that 2.5 million people were affected.

4 See Announcement No. 7/2008 of 29 May 2008 in New Light of Myanmar,30 May 2008.

5 Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs GeorgeYeo, Singapore, 20 July 2008 <www.mfa.gov.sg>.

6 Myanmar's administrative capital was moved from Yangon to Naypyidaw (alsospelled Nay Pyi Taw) in November 2005. See Maung Aung Myoe, The Roadto Naypyitaw: Making Sense of the Myanmar Government Decision to Moveits Capital, Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series, No. 79 (Singapore:National University of Singapore, November 2006).

7 Joint Communique of the 36th ASEAN foreign ministers meeting, Phnom Penh,16-17 June 2003 <http://www.aseansec.org/14833.htm>.

8 On the September 2007 protests, see for instance International Crisis Group,Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report No. 144, 31 January 2008;and UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situationof Human Rights in Myanmar, A/HCR/6/14, 7 December 2007.

9 For a more detailed discussion of these developments, see Jürgen Haacke,"ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma", in Myanmar/Burma: Challengesand Perspectives, edited by Xiaolin Guo (Stockholm: Institute for Security &Development Policy, 2008), pp. 131-58, also available online <http://www.isdp.eu/file/publications/boaks/08/myanmarburma>.

10 Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeoin New York, 27 September 2007 <www.mfa.gov.sg>.

11 ASEAN Chairman's statement on Myanmar, 20 November 2007 <http://www.aseansec.org/21057.htm>.

12 For details on ASEAN's relationship with Myanmar see Ruukun Katanyuu, "BeyondNon-interference in ASEAN: The Association's Role in Myanmar's NationalReconciliation and Democratization", Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006): 825-45; JürgenHaacke, Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implica-tions (London: Routledge for IISS, 2006), Gh. 3; Pavin Ghachavalpongpun, "NeitherConstructive, Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN's Burmese Policy", paperpresented at Conference on Between Isolation and Internationalization: the Stateof Burma, at Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 8-9 May2008.


13 Singapore's foreign minister has revealed that "till today, I don't understandwhy Myanmar thought that they were better off dealing directly with the UN,than with the UN through ASEAN". See Transcript of Interview of Minister forForeign Affairs George Yeo with the local media on the 41st ASEAN MinisterialMeeting, 16 July 2008 <www.mfa.gov.sg>.

14 "Southeast Asian Summit opens with Myanmar row", Forbes.com, 20 November2007 <http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2007/ll/20/afx4357164.html>.

15 "Lee Kuan Yew: Myanmar crisis destabilizes ASEAN region", Radio SingaporeInternational, 6 October 2007 <http://www.ntu.edu.sg/corpcomms2/news/RSIonline_071006_MinisteriaiForum.pdf>.

16 Transcript of Reply by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo to questions onASEAN and Myanmar in Pariiament on 22 October 2007 <www.mfa.gov.sg>.

17 Djoko Susilo, "Singapore and Myanmar junta", Jakarta Post, 3 March 2008.

18 Transcript of Reply by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo to questions onASEAN and Myanmar in Parliament on 22 October 2007 <www.mfa.gov.sg>.

19 Quoted in "S'pore's Lee criticises Myanmar military rulers", Reuters (India),8 January 2008 <http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-31287320080108>.

20 Supaiak G Khundee and Piyanart Srivalo, "PM suggests 6-Party Taiks", TheNation, 16 October 2007 <www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/10/l6/headlines/headlines_30052579.php>.

21 "Human Rights Issue not on Samak's Agenda", The Nation, 1 May 2008 <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/05/01/opinion/opinion_30071980.php>.

22 Saw Yan Naing, "Angry Reaction to Samak's 'Suu Kyi is a Tool' Remark", TheIrrawaddy, 26 August 2008.

23 Alberto Romulo, "On the Issue of Myanmar", Statement, 21 November 2005<http://www.dfa.gov.ph/archive/speech/romulo/myanma.htm>.

24 Martin Abbugao, "Myanmar faces calls for Suu Kyi release at Asia Summit",Agence France Press, 21 November 2007.

25 Office of the President, Republic of the Philippines, "PGMA to continueworking for release of Myanmar's Daw Aung Suu Kyi-Bunye", 22 November2007 <http://www.op.gov.ph/news.asp?newsid=19447>.

26 The governments in Phnom Penh and Vientiane have adopted a similarposition.

27 Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Nation supports UN roie, respects Myanmarsovereignty", 18 March 2008 <http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns080320094634/view>.

28 Ghairman's Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December2005 <www.aseansec.org/18039.htm, para. 34>.

29 Syed Hamid Albar, "It is not possible to defend Myanmar", Asian Wall StreetJournal, 24 July 2006 <www.burmanet.org/news/2006/07/24/asian-wall-street-journal-it-is-not-possible-to-defend-myanmar-syed-hamid-albar>.

30 For details of the activities of AIPMG, see <http://www.aseanmp.org/>. Someviews are spelled out in Asian Voices: Myanmar's Threat to Regional Security,

376 Jürgen Haacke

2006. On the influence of parliaments in Southeast Asia, see Jürgen Rüland,Clemens Jürgenmezer, Michael H. Nelson, and Patrick Ziegenhain, Parliamentsand Political Change in Southeast Asia: Comparative Study of India, Indonesia,the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand (Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 2005).

31 Lim Kit Siang, <http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2007/10/17/never-suspend-myanmar-from-asean-hamids-statement-most-deplorable-and-reprehensible/>.

32 Quoted in "Myanmar must defend itself if brought to UN Security Council:Indonesia", Agence France Press, 23 August 2006 <http://www.newagebd.com/2006/aug/24/inat.html>.

33 "Indonesia unsatisfied with Myanmar's excuse", Antara News, 29 September2007 <http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/9/29/indonesia-unsatisfied-with-myanmars-excuse/>.

34 Hassan Wirajuda, Speech to Chicago Council on Clobal Affairs, 2 October 2007;"Myanmar junta should be offered shared rule: Indonesia FM", Antara News, 3October 2007 <http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/10/3/myanmar-junta-should-be-offered-shared-rule-indon6sia-fm/>.

35 Quoted in Haslinda Amin and Arijit Ghosh, "Sudarsono says elections inMyanmar wouldn't reduce army's role", Bloomberg, 15 November 2007.

36 Quoted in "Indonesia wants Suu Kyi in Myanmar democracy process". AgenceFrance Presse, 27 February 2008 <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i4bJGpmQoMCbj9BEz3KmrGPGMR0A>.

37 "RI, China agree Myanmar crisis cannot be solved through pressures", AntaraNews, 21 November 2007 <http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/ll/21/ri-china-agree-myanmar-crisis-cannot-be-solved-through-pressures/>.

38 "Myanmar junta reassures SBY on cooperation", Jakarta Post, 18 October 2007.

39 This statement focuses on the early release of political detainees, the creationof the necessary conditions for a genuine dialogue with Suu Kyi and allconcerned parties and ethnic groups to achieve an inclusive national reconcil-iation, and the adoption of the necessary measures to address the political,economic, humanitarian and human rights issues in Myanmar. See UNSC,Statement by the President of the Security Council, A/PRST/2007/37,11 October 2007.

40 Security Council SC/9171, Security Council Press Statement on Myanmar,15 November 2007 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9171.doc.htm>.

41 "House rejects new Myanmar ambassador", Jakarta Post, 8 March 2008 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/07/house-rejects-new-myanmar-ambassador.html>.

42 See the Statement of the United Nations Country Team in Myanmar on theOccasion of the UN Day, Yangon, 24 October 2007 <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KHII-78W7DR?OpenDocument>. Charles Pétrie, head of theUN country team was subsequently expelled.

43 "Clarification on Myanmar's situation to UNSG's Special Envoy Mr IbrahimAgboola Gambari", New Light of Myanmar, 7 November 2007.

44 "SPDC Spoke Authoritative Team meets Special Adviser to UN SecretaryGeneral", New Light of Myanmar, 8 March 2008.


45 For Gambari's assessment, see "I do not see an alternative to dialogue". TheIrrawaddy, 4 April 2008 <http://www.irrawaddy.org/interview_show.php?art_id=11280>.

46 The Group of Friends is a consultative forum for developing a shared approachin support of the implementation of the UNSG good offices mandate. Itcomprises Australia, China, France, India, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Russia,EU Presidency, United Kingdom, United States, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailandand Vietnam.

47 Amitav Acharya, "Democracy in Burma: Does Anybody Really Gare?", YaleGlobal Online, 1 September 2005 <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.art.cle?id=6219>.

48 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, "Asia's Forgotten Grisis: A New Approachto Burma", Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, pp. 155-58.

49 Michael Vatikiotis, "ASEAN key to Myanmar change", Asia Times Online,23 October 2007 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ24Ae01.html>.

50 See Bertil Lintner, "Ghina no sure bet on Myanmar", Asia Times Online,8 November 2007 <www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IK08Ae01.html>.

51 Elaine Kurtenbach, "Ghina's GNPG and Yunnan sign Burma-related PipelineAgreement", The Irrawaddy, 3 December 2007 <http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9495>.

52 G.P.F. Luhulima, "Forty Years of ASEAN-what to do with Myanmar", JakartaPost, 16 November 2007.

53 See Sorpong Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefleldto Ballot-Box (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), Gh. 1.

54 Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma(Washington D.G.: East-West Genter, 2007); also see Mary P. Gallahan, PoliticalAuthority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, andCoexistence (Washington D.G.: East-West Genter, 2007).

55 Government of the Union of Myanmar, Announcement No. 1/2007, 4 October2007, reprinted in The New Light of Myanmar, 5 October 2007 <http://myanmargeneva.org/NLM2007/eng/10oct/n071005.pdf>. For a useful overview ofgovernment viewpoints on Suu Kyi's alleged provocations, see <http://mission.itu.ch/MISSIONS/Myanmar/mofa/Article%20_English.pdf>.

56 The full text is available at <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/ll/08/asia/AS-GEN-Singapore-Myanmar-UN-Text.php>.

57 Rizal Sukma, "Time to act on Myanmar democratization", Jakarta Post, 4 March2008.

58 For an overview of the human toll and economic damage, see Post-Nargis JointAssessment Report: A report prepared by the Tripartite Gore Group comprisedof Representatives of the Government of the Union of Myanmar, the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations with the support of theHumanitarian and Development Gommunity, July 2008, p. 1 <http://www.aseans8C.org/21765.pdf>.

59 "A Gonversation with Surin Pitsuwan", 14 May 2008 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16284/conversation_with_surin_pitsuwan_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F9884%2Fsurin_pitsuwan>.

378 Jürgen Haacke

60 Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo's interview with DowJones, 16 July 2008 <www.mfa.gov.sg>.

61 Post-Nargis Joint Assessment Report: A report prepared by the Tripartite CoreGroup comprised of Representatives of the Government of the Union of Myanmar,the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations with thesupport of the Humanitarian and Development Community, July 2008, SectionV. <http://www.aseansec.org/21765.pdf>.

62 Mark Duffield, On the Edge of No Man's Land: Chronic Emergency in Myanmar,Centre for Governance and International Affairs, Working Paper, No. 1 (UK:University of Bristol, 2008).

63 UN News Gentre, "Top UN Official Discusses cyclone response with Myanmar'sPrime Minister", 24 July 2008 <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=2 7484&Gr=Myanmar&Crl =>.

64 Greg Sheridan, "Jakarta proposes to use cyclone in push for radical change inBurma", The Australian, 2 June 2008 <http://virww.burmanet.org/news/2008/06/02/the-australian-jakarta-proposes-to-use-cyclone-in-push-for-radical-change-in-burma-greg-sheridan/>.

65 In the event of her release, there would also be the question whether Suu Kyiwould want to assume representative or ministerial office (the fact that her twosons are UK citizens does not necessarily pose an obstacle to her assuming apolitical role, but the regime might wish to frustrate this by construing a caseaccording to which her alleged continued allegiance to Britain prevents hercandidature).

66 Wai Moe, "Indonesia Taking an Active Role in Burma's Affairs", The Irrawaddy,25 July 2008.

67 Aung Zaw, "It's a Process Perhaps, but a Failed one". The Irrawaddy, 28 August2008. For Gambari's reflections on this visit, see "Interview: Taking a DeepBreath", The Irrawaddy, 22 September 2008.

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ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional