ASIA COMP 2 · 2019. 12. 19. · ABSTRACT This Special Report examines the reasons behind the dramatic political demise of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as well as what his

ABSTRACT This Special Report examines the reasons behind the dramatic political demise ofJapanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as well as what his failure means for the future of Japan’stwo major political parties. Robert Pekkanen of the University of Washington points to elec-toral reforms since the 1990s as having fundamentally changed Japan’s political landscapeand put more emphasis on the prime minister and cabinet as the face of the ruling party.Shinju Fujihira of Harvard University analyzes Abe’s failures as due mainly to a perceivedincompetence in appointing cabinet officials and a disconnect with the electorate regardingreform priorities. Jun Saito of Franklin and Marshall College notes that the Democratic Partyof Japan (DPJ), because of its stunning victory in the July 2007 upper house elections, is poisedon the threshold of power. Sherry L. Martin of Cornell University focuses on the role of theundecided voter, especially women, in Japanese elections, underscoring that political leaderswould do well to heed the voting preferences of this portion of the electorate.

Japan’s Political Mess: Abe Failed, Can Fukuda Do Better?

INTRODUCTIONMARK MOHR

The overwhelming defeat in the July 2007House of Councilors (upper house) elec-tions of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe andhis Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was a consid-erable shock to the Japanese political system.Afterall, the LDP, since its inception in 1955, had neverlost control of the upper house. In addition, Abewas following as prime minister the extremelypopular Junichiro Koizumi. Abe himself, when hetook office in the fall of 2006, had a popularityrating of over 70 percent, yet a little over a yearafter he took office, he resigned, his administrationin shambles.What went wrong? How did Abe losehis popularity so quickly? What lessons can theLDP learn from this defeat so as to avoid a similar

fate in the next, House of Representatives (lowerhouse) election, which determines who will con-trol the government? Is the opposition party, theDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the victor in theupper house election, now in the ascendant?These and other questions were discussed at anOctober 31, 2007, symposium at the WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars. Thefour essays that follow examine Koizumi’s legacy,the reasons for Abe’s failure, the current status ofthe DPJ, and the nature of the changing Japaneseelectorate, in which the undecided vote is grow-ing.Together, they provide analytical depth to theresults of the upper house election, pointing toreforms that began over a decade ago and whichcontinue to impact the body politic today.

In the first essay, Robert Pekkanen, chair ofthe Japan studies program and assistant professor at

SPECIAL REPORTNo. 139

JANUARY 2008

EDITED BY MARK MOHR

Mark Mohr is program associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program.

Asia ProgramROBERT PEKKANENWhat Is Koizumi’s Legacy?Evaluating Change in Fukuda’sLDP

PAGE 5

SHINJU FUJIHIRALegacies of the AbeAdministration

PAGE 9

JUN SAITOThe Democratic Party of Japanand Japan’s Future

PAGE 15 SHERRY L. MARTINJapanese Political AttitudesAgainst an Evolving PoliticalLandscape

PAGE 23

2

the Henry M. Jackson School of InternationalStudies at the University of Washington, evaluates thepolitical legacy of former (and extremely successful)prime minister Junichiro Koizumi. He notes thatmost reforms of the Koizumi era grew out of thepolitical changes of the 1990s in the lower house ofJapan’s Diet, or parliament, rather than originatingfrom Koizumi himself. Pekkanen explains that fromthe inception of the LDP in 1955 until the 1993election, Japan was under what is commonly calledthe ’55 System. Under this system, districts electedmultiple representatives, and voters marked their bal-lots for only a single candidate. Parties were not per-mitted to transfer the votes cast from a more success-ful candidate to a less successful one in order to winmore seats—circumstances which placed a premiumon name recognition of the candidate over value ofthe party’s label. The new hybrid mixed-memberelectoral system in place since 1993 gives more valueto the importance of the party label.

Pekkanen argues that the changes apparent inKoizumi’s leadership, in dealing with factions, theimportance of the cabinet, and the central role ofthe prime minister, all had their origins in the polit-ical reforms of the 1990s, and all continued underprime ministers Abe and Fukuda. He notes thatunder the ’55 System, factions were the determin-ing factor in selecting the LDP party president, butpoints out that, despite media and public percep-tions to the contrary, current Prime MinisterFukuda’s campaign for the party presidency showeda different character than the earlier horse-trading,particularly in the fact that factions split their votesand transfactional alliances won the day. Fukuda, heasserts, like Koizumi and every other recent LDPparty president, was not chosen in the way that ear-lier leaders were.

Koizumi also famously exercised his independ-ence in choosing his cabinet, disdaining the faction-

al formulas that had served as the basis for cabinetsin the past. Factional balancing, the trait of makingsure factions were represented in the cabinet inroughly the same strengths they held in the legisla-ture, was a game Koizumi said he would not play.However, here again Pekkanen notes that none ofthe LDP prime ministers after 1993 have playedthat game as their predecessors did. Comparing theAbe and Fukuda cabinets, Pekkanen sees that bothcontinued the basic trends of not balancing factionsand appointing a greater percentage of non-legisla-tors and women to cabinet posts.

While the cabinet is increasingly important to theLDP’s electoral success, Pekkanen asserts that theposition and personality of the prime minister is evenmore important. Other factors involved in Japan’schanging political landscape include electoralreform, which raised the value of the party label invoting, and the increasing ability of the media toaffect voters’ perceptions. Koizumi dominated mediaattention throughout his tenure, but again, statesPekkanen, Koizumi merely symbolized a deepertrend. Increasingly, and in no small amount becauseof television, voters see the prime minister as becom-ing an independent factor influencing their view ofthe party, and thus their ballot decision. Pekkanenconcludes that these aspects of the LDP—weakerfactions, more important cabinets, and a larger primeministerial role in elections—that were characteristicof Koizumi’s tenure are actually part of a fundamen-tal transformation growing out of the politicalreforms of the early 1990s. Both Abe and Fukudacontinued these basic trends. But these trends aboveall emphasize party and personality. Therefore, theLDP has a lot riding on Fukuda’s success. He willeither be able to sustain his initial popularity formany years, predicts Pekkanen, or flame out quickly.

In the second essay, Shinju Fujihira, associatedirector of the program on U.S.-Japan relations at

The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposition that only those witha sound scholarly grounding can begin to understand contemporary events. One of theCenter’s oldest regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical and cul-tural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s capital. In seminars, workshops,

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3JAPAN’S POLITICAL MESS: ABE FAILED, CAN FUKUDA DO BETTER?

the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs ofHarvard University, explores the reasons for thefailure of the Abe administration. It all started verywell, notes Fujihira: Abe’s first cabinet, formed inSeptember 2006, had an initial approval rating of71 percent. At age 52, Abe was the youngest primeminister and the first to have been born after WorldWar II. His distinguished family lineage—he wasthe grandson of former Prime Minister NobusukeKishi and the son of former Foreign MinisterShintaro Abe—added a sense of grandeur to hisimage. Yet, by the time of his resignation inSeptember 2007, Abe had been prime minister foronly 366 days, the seventh shortest tenure amongthe 28 prime ministers in postwar Japan. Whatwent wrong?

One obvious problem, echoing Pekkanen’s pointabout the importance of choosing a cabinet, wasthat Abe’s track record in this area was disastrous.Five ministers resigned over various scandals, andone committed suicide. Another, the minister ofhealth, labor and welfare, who did not resign,nonetheless referred to women as “child-bearingmachines.” Finally, there was the devastating revela-tion in the spring of 2007 that the Social InsuranceAgency lost track of over 50 million public pensionrecords. What especially alienated voters most wasAbe’s lackluster response to opposition questioningin the Diet over this issue. Abe said that he wantedto avoid inciting fear among the public rather thanimmediately getting to the bottom of the record-keeping problems. As he prepared his party for theHouse of Councilors’ election in July, Abe couldnot escape the criticism that he often chose incom-petent officials to serve in his government.

Adding to Abe’s woes brought on by the compe-tency issue was the fact, according to Fujihira, thatAbe’s vision for the country reflected a basic dis-connect with the priorities of the electorate. Abe’spriorities were education, defense, and constitu-tional reform. In these areas, Fujihira points out, hemade significant progress. Four education-relatedbills were passed during Abe’s tenure. The JapanDefense Agency was upgraded to the Ministry ofDefense.And the national voting law, passed in May2007, specified the legal provisions for conducting anational referendum for constitutional revision forthe first time in postwar Japan.

The problem for Abe, however, was that publicopinion polls throughout this period clearly and

consistently indicated that a majority of voters iden-tified welfare (such as social security reform) andeconomic issues (e.g., job creation) as their top pri-orities.They ranked Abe’s ideological priorities suchas constitutional reform at or near the bottom.At theend of the day, Abe was simply unable to convincevoters that his priorities were more important thantheir concerns over “bread and butter” issues. Oneconomic and welfare issues, asserts Fujihira, Abelacked the kind of passion that he exhibited overconstitutional and defense-related issues. It was thisdisconnect with the voters, coupled with the percep-tion of incompetence in choosing cabinet officials,Fuhihira concludes, which led to the LDP defeat inthe House of Councilor’s election and Abe’s subse-quent resignation.

Jun Saito, assistant professor in the departmentof government at Franklin and Marshall College,examines in the third essay the growing influence ofJapan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Partyof Japan (DPJ). The DPJ, as has been previouslynoted, secured a stunning victory in the Japaneseupper house elections this past summer. Saitoattributes the upper house result due at least asmuch to LDP weaknesses as DPJ strengths.

He notes, echoing Fujihira, that Abe and his cab-inet were extremely incompetent in containingscandals. In addition, Saito asserts that the LDP’selectioneering team performed much more poorlythat the DPJ’s. The LDP’s policy slogan, for exam-ple, was to “Make Growth Real.” The LDP’s eco-nomic platform, according to Saito, looked as if itwere written by the World Bank or theInternational Monetary Fund. For rural voters whohad provided stable support for the LDP fordecades, this slogan did not make much sense, as realincome had ceased to grow for almost a decade.TheDPJ’s policy platform, on the other hand, was ori-ented more toward distributive policy packages.Consequently, in the July upper house election, theDPJ performed disproportionately well in theLDP’s former rural strongholds.

Whatever the reasons for its victory, Saito assertsthat the DPJ is now well situated to affect Japanesepolitics. It can decide the fate of bills in the Diet;although the LDP (along with its junior coalitionpartner, the Komei party) can theoretically overridethe upper house’s decision with a two-thirds major-ity vote in the lower house, this would not meetwith the approval of the electorate, resulting in

4 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

plummeting approval rates. Moreover, the nextupper house election is not until 2010. Upperhouse incumbency will bring a significant amountof political resources to local DPJ organizations,which were previously weak. These DPJ upperhouse members will also serve as an importantresource for the day-to-day activities of DPJ candi-dates for the lower house.

Saito further argues that since the lower houseelectoral reforms of the 1990s (mentioned promi-nently by both Pekkanen and Fujihira), Japan hasbeen gradually moving toward a two-party system,and the DPJ has been the main beneficiary of thistrend.Turning to an examination of the DPJ itself,he concludes that it is basically a centrist party char-acterized by political pragmatism, noting that evenif the DPJ were to seize control of the government,a radical change in diplomatic as well as domesticpolicy is unlikely to take place.

In the final essay, Sherry L. Martin, assistantprofessor at Cornell University, jointly appointed inthe government department and the program infeminist, gender, and sexuality studies, looks specif-ically at the impact on the political system of theimportant category of nonpartisan voters, thoseunaffiliated with any party. She points out that,depending on when voters are polled (i.e. howproximate to an election), between one-quarter andtwo-fifths of the Japanese electorate has claimed notto support any particular party in the system. Andwomen constitute a majority of unaffiliated vot-ers—research has shown that this was true even inthe 1960s and 1970s.

Looking first at the 2005 lower house elections,she observes that a gender gap in voting had openedup among nonpartisan women and men.Nonpartisan women, despite Koizumi’s seemingappeal, overwhelmingly supported the DPJ, whilenonpartisan men supported the LDP. Differences inattitudes about security and defense increased theodds that women and men would vote for differentparties. In 1976, approximately 30 percent of menand 14 percent of women agreed with the state-ment, “Japan’s defense force should be strength-ened.” By 2005, the approximately 30 point gapbetween men and women on this issue was at itslargest in thirty years. Also in 2005, social welfarewas an important factor for women choosingbetween the LDP and the DPJ. Women who feltstrongly that social welfare provisions should not be

limited to the elderly and disabled were more like-ly to support the DPJ

Thus for Martin, given the gender-based patternsin issue preferences and party support in 2005, theoutcome of the 2007 upper house election couldhave been predicted. Despite concerns expressed inthe media that nonpartisan women would be reluc-tant to vote for the DPJ in 2007, these voters hadalready demonstrated their willingness to vote forthe DPJ in 2005.The goal for the DPJ now, after itsvictory in last summer’s upper house elections, statesMartin, should be to maintain this support and buildstronger affective ties with this important segment ofthe electorate.

Unfortunately, according to Martin, neither partyhas articulated a substantive policy agenda that pro-poses accessible and effective solutions to the press-ing social concerns that Japan now faces, such as adeclining population and shrinking labor force. In2005, the DPJ won the support of women withouthaving to establish a substantive position. Afterexposing the missing pension records in 2007, theparty only had to position itself as an alternative tothe LDP. In the future, the DPJ can hold the supportof nonpartisan women, and further its strengthamong women more generally, only if it is able toframe strong policy alternatives that are a substantivecontrast to the LDP.

In conclusion, the four essays that follow are inagreement that while former Prime MinisterKoizumi was brilliant in taking advantage of theJapanese political and electoral system, it was thepolitical and institutional reforms of the 1990s whichgave him that opportunity. Koizumi’s successor,Shinzo Abe, proved not as astute as his predecessor.Furthermore, he was beset by scandals which he mis-managed.There was also a severe disconnect betweenAbe’s priorities (constitutional, defense and educationissues) and those of the electorate (social welfare andjob creation) which Abe was never able to overcome.

Adding to this mix, the electorate itself is restless,with the percentage of undecided voters remaininglarge.Women make up a majority of these undecid-ed voters.They seem to place a greater priority onthe same social and economic issues which Abe didnot address well.To succeed, current Prime MinisterFukuda would do well to heed the lessons that Abeseemed not to have learned. The same message isequally applicable to Ichiro Ozawa, leader of Japan’smain opposition party.


Talk about a tough actto follow! FormerPrime MinisterJunichiro Koizumi radiatedstyle and personality, sustainedimplausibly high publicapproval ratings, and led theLiberal Democratic Party(LDP) to its greatest ever elec-toral triumph in 2005. His suc-

cessor would almost inevitably suffer by comparison.Nevertheless, few expected Shinzo Abe’s reign to beso disastrous. It certainly started well, with recordapproval ratings. However, it ended in tears. UnderAbe’s leadership, the LDP was thoroughly routed inthe House of Councilors (the upper house in Japan’sbicameral legislature) election in July 2007. For someweeks, he resisted pressure to resign, but then unex-pectedly quit in September 2007, just days afterannouncing to the legislature his intention to stay andpush through a renewal of refueling legislation.Koizumi and Abe seem polar opposites, at least interms of their success.Yasuo Fukuda’s subsequent elec-tion as party president of the LDP raised the specter inthe press of the return of factional politics.This all begstwo questions. First, how much did Koizumi changethe LDP? Second, how will Fukuda do?

THE KOIZUMI EFFECT

After his famous threat to destroy the party, the LDPunder Koizumi behaved differently than it hadunder the ’55 System, when the LDP maintainedelectoral dominance over the Japan Socialist Party(JSP) from 1955-1993 under the peculiar SingleNon-Transferable Vote Multi-Member District(SNTV MMD) electoral system. (Under this system,districts elected multiple representatives, and votersmarked their ballots for only a single candidate.Parties were not permitted to transfer the votes from

a more successful candidate to a less successful onein order to win more seats—circumstances whichplaced a premium on name recognition of the can-didate over value of the party’s label.) Surprisingly,however, following Koizumi both Abe and Fukudacontinued many important reform trends that hadbeen in place since the mid-1990s. Looking beyondheadlines, we can trace how today’s LDP fundamen-tally differs from earlier incarnations. In many ways,Koizumi simply exemplified these changes mostclearly, but no post-‘55 System prime minister isimmune from them. In fact, the sharp contrastbetween Koizumi and Abe is itself driven by under-lying transformations in Japanese politics: theincreased importance of the media, and the greatersignificance of the prime minister. Below I willfocus on these underlying changes in three areas,each of which was a signature area for Koizumi: fac-tions, cabinets, and elections.

FACTIONS AND FINDING FUKUDA

Like Abe, Fukuda became prime minister thanks to amajority generated by Koizumi. Opposition leaderssuch as Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party ofJapan (DPJ) labeled Fukuda a product of the smoke-filled room dealings of the LDP’s past. Press reportstouted the revival of factions as a driving force inchoosing the party president. However, there is muchless to this than meets the eye; there has been noreturn to faction leaders as king-makers.

Under the ’55 System factions were the deter-mining factor in selecting the LDP party president,who always became the prime minister. Rival factionleaders stacked up their votes like blocks, trying toreach the minimum winning coalition of 50 per-cent+1 votes. The competition was usually personaland sometimes very personal, and fairly close to nakedpower grabs.What mattered was how the faction boss-es could line up the votes: they decided everything.

WHAT IS KOIZUMI’S LEGACY? EVALUATING CHANGEIN FUKUDA’S LDP

ROBERT PEKKANEN

Robert Pekkanen is chair of the Japan studies program and assistant professor at the Henry M. Jackson School ofInternational Studies at the University of Washington.

That all changed when the LDP changed the rules forselecting the party president in the 1990s, giving non-legislators a much larger voice in the process.

Fukuda’s campaign for the party presidencyshowed a different character than the earlier horse-trading. There were no blood oaths. Instead, factionleaders discussed the choices with their members,sometimes even asking for their permission to take acertain course of action. More importantly, factionssplit their votes.This was not factional bloc voting. Farfrom it, transfactional alliances won the day andmembers decided this election as much as their lead-ers. Chart 1 above shows how factions split their votesbetween candidates Fukuda and Taro Asoh.

Koizumi was another beneficiary of the new wayLDP party presidents and thus prime ministers arechosen.The mistaken charges of factional revival forFukuda cloud the fact that Fukuda, like Koizumi andevery other post-’55 System LDP party president, wasnot chosen in the way that earlier leaders were.

CABINETS

Koizumi also famously exercised his independencein choosing his cabinet, disdaining the factional for-mulas that had served as the basis for cabinets in thepast. On the other hand, Abe was criticized forforming a cabinet stocked with his friends and ide-ological fellow travelers. However, a deeper analysisshows that Koizumi and Abe—and indeedFukuda—have much more in common with eachother. There is a distinct pattern to their cabinetsshaped by the new electoral realities facing the party.Recent research I have conducted with Ellis Kraussand Benjamin Nyblade shows how this works.1

Cabinets are crucial for parties. Cabinet ministersare the “face” of the party, and cabinets are often the


CHART 1: VOTES FOR LDP PARTY PRESIDENT 2007 BY FACTION

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Machimura Tsushima Koga Yamasaki Ibuki Komura Asoh Nikai Tanigaki Ind

AsohFukuda

Source:Author analysis based on multiple media reports in Japanese press, September 2007.

Fukuda’s campaign for theparty presidency showed adifferent character than theearlier horse-trading. Therewere no blood oaths.


locus for decision-making. Not incidentally, mostlegislators harbor deep ambitions to sit in the cabi-net. Any party has to balance these goals in allocat-ing cabinet positions. The electoral system in placein Japan through the 1993 election, the previouslymentioned SNTV MMD system, devalued partylabel and made elections often a contest among LDPcandidates. The new hybrid mixed-member elec-toral system forces the LDP to place a premium onpolicy-making and generating votes from the popu-larity of cabinet members.

Many of the most celebrated aspects of Koizumi’scabinet-making were simply expressions of thesenew realities. While Koizumi might have graspedthis more clearly than others, his cabinets were infundamental ways very similar to those of otherpost-’55 system prime ministers. For example, fac-tional balancing—the trait of making sure factionsare represented in the cabinet in roughly the samestrengths they hold in the legislature—was a gameKoizumi said he wouldn’t play. However, none of theLDP prime ministers after 1993 have played thatgame as their predecessors did. Average proportion-ality has declined sharply from 1980-1993 (87 per-cent) to 1996-2005 (74 percent). Seniority is alsomuch less important. Previously, LDP cabinet minis-ters arrived in lock-step. Seniority determined whenone became a minister. From 1980-1993, 96 percentof cabinet appointments were at the predicted time,and none were early. From 1996-2005, however, theon-time ratio declined to 85 percent and 7 percentof appointments came early.

Handing out a cabinet appointment to a non-leg-islator is a dangerous game. Every legislator save thePM covets these posts, the highest to be had. Careerambitions played a role in tearing the LDP asunder inthe past, and doling out these posts to civilians is play-ing with fire.As policy-making has become a relative-ly more critical function in the cabinet, though, thebenefits of getting an outside expert are more impor-tant. Accordingly, we see a huge increase in non-leg-islators sitting in cabinet. Koizumi’s appointment ofTakenaka made news, but it was not really that excep-tional. By duration, we see non-legislators becomingministers nearly 15 times more often after electoralreform as before. Electoral reform also dramaticallyimproved the chances of women finding their wayinto cabinet. Compared to the period from 1955-1993, women are now more than twenty times as like-ly to be in the cabinet.

If we compare the Abe and Fukuda cabinets, wesee that they both continued these basic trends.However, it is possible to also glimpse some evi-dence that Fukuda grasped this fundamental trans-formation more fully than Abe did. Abe’s first cabi-net had a slightly higher than average proportional-ity (76.6 percent) while Fukuda’s was a bit under theaverage. Abe made three early appointments whileFukuda made four. Neither made any late appoint-ments and both appointed the same number ofwomen ministers (11.1 percent). Fukuda had morenon-legislators (11.1 percent to 5.6 percent). Oneshould not make too much of this, though, asFukuda and Abe are much closer to each other andto Koizumi than they are to the ’55 System primeministers. It’s just that Fukuda is a bit further alongthe curve than Abe.

ELECTIONS

The cabinet is increasingly important to the LDP’selectoral success. The prime minister is even moreimportant. The prime minister’s importance hasrisen because of several factors. Electoral reformraised the value of the party label in voting. This istrue not only because there is now a proportionalrepresentation vote, where voters mark a ballot fortheir preferred party. Compared to SNTV MMD,even the single member district (SMD) part ofJapan’s electoral system places a premium on theparty label. After all, choosing among multiple LDPcandidates by definition means the LDP label is lessimportant in choosing how to vote. Administrativereform and other restructurings have strengthenedthe prime minister’s policy making powers, too.Even more important is how the media affects vot-ers’ perceptions.2 Koizumi dominated media atten-tion throughout his tenure.This reached a near feverpitch in the September 2005 election, whenKoizumi and “the assassins” (high-profile or celebri-ty candidates run by the LDP against Koizumi’sopponents) saturated the coverage. Again, Koizumi

The cabinet is increasinglyimportant to the LDP's electoralsuccess. The prime minister iseven more important.


just symbolizes a deeper trend. In surveys takensince the 1970s, voters increasingly respond that tel-evision plays an important role in their decisionmaking. Krauss and Nyblade have demonstratedhow voters’ images of the prime minister (measuredby Cabinet approval rating) began to diverge fromtheir baseline assessment of the party in the 1980s(See Chart 2, above). Increasingly, how voters seethe prime minister is becoming an independent fac-tor influencing their view of the party, and thustheir ballot decision. This means that there will bemore higher highs, like Koizumi, and more lowerlows, like Abe and Mori. It also implies that we willsee more booms and busts.

CONCLUSION

What about the questions raised in the first para-graph? Along the dimensions I have examined, wesee that these aspects of the LDP—weak factions,more important cabinets, and larger prime ministe-

rial role in elections—that Koizumi headlined areactually part of a fundamental transformation. BothAbe and Fukuda continued these basic trends.However, we can glimpse at least a smidgen of evi-dence that Fukuda has been more responsive tothese trends. Fans of Fukuda might argue that this isa good omen for his success.

For the LDP, a lot rides on Fukuda’s success.Precisely because of that, we are more likely to findFukuda riding high for many years as a successfulleader or flaming out quickly.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Pekkanen, Benjamin Nyblade, and Ellis S.Krauss, “The Logic of Ministerial Selection: ElectoralReform and Party Goals in Japan,” unpublished manu-script. The analyses of cabinets throughout this paperare part of this collaborative work.

2. Ellis S. Krauss and Benjamin Nyblade, “‘President–ialization’ in Japan? The Prime Minister, Media andElections in Japan.” British Journal of Political Science,Vol.34 (April 2004): 357-368.

CHART 2: CABINET AND PARTY SUPPORT BY LDP PRIME MINISTER, 1960–2001

Source: Ellis S. Krauss and Benjamin Nyblade,“’Presidentialization’ in Japan? The Prime Minister, Media and Elections in Japan.” BritishJournal of Political Science,Vol. 34 (April 2004): 357-368

This paper describes andexplains what I con-sider to be the fivecore characteristics of the Abeadministration. First, it lasted fora relatively short time. ShinzoAbe was prime minister for 366days, which ranks as the seventhshortest tenure among 28 primeministers in postwar Japan, less

than one-third the length of his grandfather NobusukeKishi (1,241 days), less than one-fifth that of his prede-cessor Junichiro Koizumi (1,980 days), and shorter thanthe profoundly unpopular tenure of Yoshiro Mori whopreceded Koizumi (387 days). Second, despite his shorttenure, the Abe administration was notable for its con-servative ideological ambition and its ability to pass lawsthat reflected Abe’s core convictions, especially thoserelating to education,defense,and constitutional reform.Third, in foreign policy, the Abe administration shouldtake credit for mending Japan’s relations with itsNortheast Asian neighbors and advocating a “value-based diplomacy” (kachikan gaiko), but it also facedunexpected frictions in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Fourth, in terms of its domestic agenda, the Abeadministration was ultimately unable to reconcile itsavowed commitment to economic reform with itsefforts to rectify the adverse effects of Koizumi’sreforms, especially the so-called “stratified society”(kakusa shakai). It did not help that Abe was criticizedfor his slow response in addressing the Social InsuranceAgency’s mishandling of millions of pension records inthe spring of 2007. Fifth, Abe’s government wasengulfed by an unusually large number—even byJapanese standards—of scandals and verbal gaffes,which severely tarnished its reputation. Five resigna-tions of cabinet ministers and a shocking suicide by asitting minister within one year were unprecedentedin Japan’s postwar history. In July 2007, facing voters’anger over scandals and the lost pension records, Abeand the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) entered the

House of Councilors (the upper house in Japan’sbicameral legislature) election utterly unprepared.While he did not resign until September 12, Abe’sability to govern had largely vanished after the LDP’shistoric loss in that election.

What explains these five core characteristics of theAbe administration? My paper’s central argument isthat Japan’s new institutional environment fundamen-tally clashed with Abe’s leadership style. On the onehand, the administrative reforms of the RyutaroHashimoto cabinet (1996-98) established the newCabinet Office and strengthened the prime minister’sleadership capabilities from his official residence (kan-tei), and have enabled the prime minister to set a strongdirection for policymaking in a top-down fashion.Variously described as “kantei leads” (kantei shudo),“kan-tei diplomacy” (kantei gaiko), and “prime minister rules”(shusho shihai), the prime minister now has significantlymore institutional resources for exercising politicalleadership in domestic law-making and foreign policy.1

At the same time, the electoral reform of 1994 hastransformed elections into a contest between the partyleaders of the incumbent LDP and the DemocraticParty of Japan (DPJ), who must respond to and per-suade public opinion in a “bottom-up” fashion. Abeentered this institutional environment, emphasizingthat he was a “fighting politician (tatakau seijika),” whowould fight for his own convictions, even when he wasconfronted by harsh critics. In adopting this stance,Abeeffectively utilized the institutional resources of theHashimoto reforms to exert his policy preferences in a“top-down” fashion, but he was less adept at persuad-ing the public toward his policy preferences in a “bot-tom-up” fashion.2 The disjuncture between thedemands of political leadership in Japan’s new institu-tional environment and Abe’s leadership choicesexplains, on the one hand, his impressive conservativelegislative victories, and on the other, his inability torespond effectively to public opinion swings that ulti-mately led to the LDP’s historic loss in the House ofCouncilors election. The discussion below elaborates


LEGACIES OF THE ABE ADMINISTRATIONSHINJU FUJIHIRA

Shinju Fujihira is associate director of the program on U.S.-Japan relations at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairsof Harvard University.


on the five core characteristics of the Abe administra-tion, and illustrates the interaction between Abe’s lead-ership style and Japan’s new institutional environment.

ABE’S POPULARITY AND RESIGNATION

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tenure will certainly beremembered for the way it began and especially thestunning way it ended. Abe’s first cabinet, formed inSeptember 2006, had an initial approval rating of 71percent (according to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll),second in postwar Japan only to the approval rating ofKoizumi’s first cabinet in the spring of 2001.At age 52,Abe was the youngest prime minister and the first tohave been born after World War II. His distinguishedfamily lineage—of being Nobusuke Kishi’s grandsonand former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe’s son—added a sense of grandeur to his image. Given Abe’syouth, he certainly leapfrogged through the hierarchyof the LDP to become prime minister.Abe compensat-ed for his youth with his nationwide popularity, whichderived from his consistently hawkish stance againstNorth Korea and its abduction of Japanese citizens.Andthat popularity gave legitimacy to Abe’s claim that hewas a “fighting politician” who would protect andimprove Japanese people’s lives. Prior to becomingprime minister,Abe elaborated on his conservative con-victions in his book, Toward a Beautiful Country(Utsukushii kuni e), which eventually sold over half amillion copies.That book focused mostly on the coreconcerns of postwar Japanese conservatism, such asconstitutional reform, defense, and education, and gavea useful preview of what the Abe administration wouldlook like. In the fall of 2006, the LDP’s strategy seemedclear and eminently plausible.Abe may have been rela-tively young and inexperienced, but he was popular,like his predecessor Koizumi.Abe at the time gave theLDP the best chance to win the House of Councilorselection in July 2007, and the next House ofRepresentatives (the lower house) election, to be heldpresumably in 2008 or 2009.

After the LDP’s defeat in the House ofCouncilors election, however, Abe decided not toresign, even though he had posed the question tovoters,“Are you going to choose me or Mr. Ozawa”(leader of the DPJ, the Democratic Party of Japan)?Instead, he invoked his own conception of leader-ship, saying that he was willing to continue his fight,more so than ever, now that the public had expressedits dissatisfaction with his administration.Abe’s healthdeteriorated in August, especially during his trips toSouth and Southeast Asia.As Abe later admitted him-self, the timing of his resignation could not havebeen worse, as it came only four days after pledgingcooperation on the war on terror with PresidentGeorge W. Bush at the Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation meeting, three days after saying that theextension of the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law(ATSML) put his job at stake, two days after makinghis policy speech to the Diet, and on the day whenhe was scheduled to begin his fight to renew theATSML on the Diet floor.The public was startled bythe dramatic contrast between Abe’s youthful imageat the start of his administration and his fatigued andthin look at the press conference announcing his res-ignation on September 12.

IDEOLOGICAL AMBITION AND FOREIGNPOLICY

The defining characteristic of the Abe administrationwas its ideological ambition and its decision to prior-itize conservative legislative efforts relating to educa-tion, defense, and constitutional reform.Abe’s politicallanguage—such as “beautiful country” and “breakingaway from the postwar regime” (sengo rejiimu kara nodakkyaku)—emphasized Japan’s tradition, history, andculture, and questioned the ideological underpinningsof Japan’s political choices after the Second World War.As prime minister, he established the EducationRebuilding Council in October 2006 to pursue hisvision of educational reform. In December, the Abegovernment passed the revised Fundamental Law ofEducation, which called for nurturing love of one’scountry and hometowns, and emphasized respect fortradition, culture, and “publicly-oriented spirit” (kokyoseishin). The Abe government also passed three moreeducation-related laws in June 2007. The defense-related laws his government passed upgraded the JapanDefense Agency to the Ministry of Defense, andreferred to the overseas deployments of the Self-

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’stenure will certainly be remembered for the way itbegan and especially the stunning way it ended.


Defense Forces (such as peacekeeping and recentoperations in the Middle East) as a core mission.Andthe new referendum law (kokumin tohyo ho), passed inMay 2007, specified the legal provisions for conduct-ing a national referendum for constitutional revisionfor the first time in postwar Japan.These laws relatingto education, defense, and constitutional reform hadall been important but unrealized legislative concernsof the conservatives within the LDP. Abe’s leadershipin the areas of education, defense, and constitutionalreform led to expeditious and impressive conservativelegislative victories.

Abe’s choice to focus on conservative legislationwas remarkable for two reasons. First, he was able topass such laws with the legislative majorities he inher-ited from Koizumi from the elections of the House ofRepresentatives (in 2005) and the House ofCouncilors (in 2001 and 2004). Thus, Abe made adeliberate political decision to use Koizumi’s majori-ties in the two houses to advance his conservativeagenda. Second, public opinion polls clearly and con-sistently indicated that a majority of voters identifiedwelfare and economic issues as their top priorities,while they ranked Abe’s ideological priorities such asconstitutional reform at or near the bottom. InOctober 2006, in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll (in whichrespondents could list as many of their priorities asthey wished), social security reform such as pensionsand medical reform came out as the top priority (59.2percent of the respondents), followed by businessconditions and job creation (at 50.6 percent), whileconstitutional reform was far behind at 5.7 percent.3

In August 2007, immediately after the House ofCouncilors election, the public similarly respondedthat it prioritized social security reform (65.1 per-cent) and business conditions and job creation (51.7percent) over constitutional reform (7.4 percent).4

These numbers suggest that many voters disagreedwith Abe’s legislative priorities, and he was unable toconvince many voters why issues such as constitu-tional reform and his grand vision of a “beautifulcountry” should be more important than “bread andbutter” issues.5

In foreign policy, Abe continued Koizumi’semphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance, but he also aimed

to repair diplomatic relations with China and SouthKorea and advocated a “value-based diplomacy”(kachikan gaiko) that reached out to Australia and Indiaas well. Abe’s visits to Beijing and Seoul in earlyOctober 2006 did much to repair Japan’s relationswith the two countries which had been damagedduring Koizumi’s time. Abe chose China as the firstdestination of his overseas trip, which was unprece-dented for a postwar Japanese prime minister.Whilehis visit took place on a rainy day in Beijing, the rainreportedly stopped the moment he stepped off hisplane. In a joint press statement, Japan-China relationswas referred for the first time as a “mutually benefi-cial relationship based on common strategic interests”(senryakuteki gokei kankei), language that departedfrom the usual (and more mundane) formula of“peace and friendship.” And Abe’s visit was followedby Premier Wen Jiabao’s well-received visit to Tokyoin April 2007. Abe’s strategy was to remain ambigu-ous about his intent to visit the Yasukuni Shrine (thusavoiding Koizumi’s mistake of announcing his intentto visit the shrine on the controversial date of August15). On North Korea, the Abe government support-ed the February 13 agreement within the Six PartyTalks which committed North Korea to shut downits nuclear weapons program. But on Japan’s abduct-ed citizens—the issue that he was deeply committedto—he was unable to move beyond the stalemate ofthe time. Meanwhile, Abe’s “value-based diplomacy”saw important developments in Japan-Australia andJapan-India relations. The Japan-Australia JointDeclaration on Security Cooperation, unveiled dur-ing then Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to Tokyoin March 2007, affirmed the two countries’ commit-ment to upgrading bilateral strategic cooperation.And in June, the two countries held the Defense andForeign Ministers’ “two-plus-two” meeting for thefirst time.Abe’s visit to India in late August also pavedthe way for strengthening strategic and economiccooperation between the two countries (and he alsopaid tribute to the dissenting judge of the Tokyo wartribunal, Radhabinod Pal). Abe’s diplomacy madenotable progress on Japanese diplomacy in NortheastAsia, and expanded Japan’s foreign policy options byreaching out to Australia and India.

Abe’s conceptualization of leadership as a “fightingpolitician,” however, inadvertently generated frictionsin the U.S.-Japan alliance. While Abe steadfastlyremained ambiguous about his intent to visit theYasukuni Shrine, he reacted strongly against U.S.

Many voters disagreed withAbe’s legislative priorities.


House Resolution 121, introduced in January, 2007,which condemned the Japanese government for notacknowledging its responsibility for the “comfortwomen” during the Second World War.Abe’s personalviews had been well-known, as he had opposed theKono statement of 1993 that accepted the Japanesegovernment’s responsibility on this matter. In March,Abe’s statement that there was “no coercion by thegovernment in the narrow sense of the word” furtherinflamed controversy in the United States. In the end,Abe expressed his remorse regarding the comfortwomen to U.S. President George W. Bush at theirCamp David meeting in April. This was a strikinginstance in which a Japanese prime minister specifical-ly addressed Japan’s “history problem” in Asia in ameeting with a U.S. president. Furthermore, after theLDP’s historic loss in the House of Councilors, Abeinsisted that he would fight for renewing the ATSMLand staked his political survival on it, even though itwas clear that DPJ chief Ozawa was going to capitalizeon this issue and scuttle the passage of the ATSML. Onthese two instances of U.S.-Japan relations, Abe choseto fight battles which he probably could not win.

DOMESTIC AGENDA AND SCANDALS

In contrast to his conservative legislative agenda andforeign policy, the Abe government did not proposebold initiatives to tackle Japan’s economic, budgetary,and welfare-related problems. While Abe vowed tocontinue economic reform, he correctly sensed theelectorate’s “reform fatigue” from the Koizumi era.And he often expressed his concerns about the con-cept of a “stratified society” (kakusa shakai) that divid-ed winners and losers in the course of economicreform.The Abe government did not lack for propos-als—most notably the “Challenge Again AssistanceMeasures,” the “Asian Gateway,” and “Innovation25”—but he was ultimately unable to persuade thepublic how such programs would directly raise ordi-nary citizens’ living standards. Furthermore, inDecember 2006, Abe welcomed back the 11 postalrebels (expelled prior to the September 2005 House ofRepresentatives election) to the party who sharedAbe’s conservative convictions. For many voters, thisexposed the fundamental contradiction between Abe’scommitment to reform and his willingness to rehabil-itate the LDP’s anti-reformist elements.With regard toJapan’s large public debt, the Abe government delayedthe decision over raising the consumption tax until the

fall of 2007.And Abe’s budget for fiscal year 2007 wasconstrained due to large public debt, and containedmostly piecemeal measures. Finally, most devastatingwas the revelation in the spring that the SocialInsurance Agency mishandled over 50 million publicpension records.What alienated voters most was Abe’slackluster response to DPJ questioning in the Diet.Atone point,Abe stated that he wanted to avoid incitingfear among the public rather than immediately gettingto the bottom of the record-keeping problems. TheAbe government did pass reform-related laws rightbefore the House of Councilors election (on the dis-solution of the Social Insurance Agency and revision ofthe national civil service law). But these last-ditch leg-islative efforts failed to impress the electorate. On eco-nomic and welfare issues, Abe simply lacked the kindof passion that he exhibited in conservative anddefense-related agendas.

Finally, in his first cabinet,Abe appointed many of hisloyalists and friends to major cabinet and party posts,thereby bypassing an older and more experienced gen-eration of LDP politicians.6 That decision, in turn, madeAbe’s cabinet vulnerable to attacks by critics, who casti-gated it as a “cabinet of buddies” (otomodachi naikaku)and “honoring past services” (ronkokosho). Of the 17cabinet ministers,11 entered the Abe cabinet for the firsttime. Four cabinet ministers—Hakuo Yanagisawa(Health, Labour, and Welfare), Akira Amari (Economy,Trade and Industry),Toshikatsu Matsuoka (Agriculture,Forestry and Fisheries), and Yuzo Yamamoto (FinancialServices)—were directly involved in and vigorouslysupported Abe’s election in the LDP presidential race.From the so-called “NAIS society” (NAIS no kai)(which combined the first letter of their four last names,including Abe’s),Takumi Nemoto (special advisor to theprime minister), Nobuteru Ishihara (acting secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party), and YasuhisaShiozaki (chief cabinet secretary) all occupied influentialgovernment and party posts.Yoshihide Suga (Minister of

On economic and welfareissues, Abe simply lacked the kind of passion that heexhibited in conservative anddefense-related agendas.


Internal Affairs and Communications), Sanae Takaichi(Minister of State for Okinawa, Northern Territories,and Gender Equality), and Shoichi Nakagawa (LDPpolicy chief) had also been Abe’s long-time allies.Thesechoices antagonized the older generation within theLDP, who feared that Abe was accelerating generationalchange within the party.7 Abe also formed “Team Abe”within the prime minister’s official residence (kantei) byappointing a maximum of five special advisors to theprime minister, and calling on government ministries tosecond bureaucrats who were eager to work directlywith the prime minister.All in all,Abe’s cabinet appoint-ments and formation of “Team Abe” indicated that heintended to realize his vision of his “beautiful country”with his loyalists, and to “presidentialize” the kantei tomake it function as a Japanese-style White House.

Given the preexisting criticism over his cabinetappointments, the Abe cabinet became particularly vul-nerable to attacks once a series of scandals involving“politics and money” (seiji to kane) and inappropriatestatements by cabinet ministers surfaced starting in late2006.8 In December,Masaaki Honma (chief of the gov-ernment’s Tax Commission appointed by Abe) resignedafter a magazine reported that he lived in public hous-ing with his mistress, even though he had called for pri-vatization of such housing for government employees.Afew days later, Genichiro Sata, State Minister forAdministrative and Regulatory Reforms, resigned dueto accounting irregularities and large expenses at hisoffice. In January, Minister of Health, Labour, andWelfare Yanagisawa referred to women as “child-bearingmachines” (kodomo wo umu kikai), but Abe did notactively seek his resignation and replaced him only afterthe cabinet reshuffle in August. Most shocking was thesuicide of Agricultural Minister Toshikatsu Matsuoka—a prominent figure in the LDP’s agricultural policytribe—in May, after he was pilloried for months by themedia and in the Diet over questionable funds andexpenses in his office. Two agricultural ministers whofollowed, Norihiko Akagi and Takehiko Endo, alsoresigned due to their own political funding irregulari-ties.And in July 2007, Defense Minister Akio Kyuma—already under fire for his remarks critical of PresidentGeorge W.Bush’s decision to invade Iraq—resigned afteranother controversial remark that the U.S. atomicbombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki “could not behelped” (shiyo ga nai). For a prime minister who pridedhimself of being a “fighting politician” who would leadJapan toward his vision of a “beautiful country,” thesescandals were severe blows.As he prepared the LDP for

the House of Councilors’ election in July, he could notescape the criticism that he often chose incompetentofficials to serve in his government.

CONCLUSION

The 366 days of the Abe administration offer a fascinat-ing case study of the possibilities and limits of conser-vative leadership in contemporary Japanese politics. Onthe one hand, given the centralization of power in thekantei and the Cabinet Office, the prime minister hasthe ability use his institutional resources to steer hiscountry in a decidedly conservative direction.However, the incumbent Japanese prime minister mustalso serve as his party’s “face of the election” (senkyo nokao) and build a significant legislative resume prior tothe House of Representatives and Councilors elections.Given Japanese voters’ enduring concerns over welfareand economic issues, a single-minded legislative focuson ideologically divisive issues will tend to hurt theLDP’s electoral chances in the foreseeable future.Futureprime ministers would do well to heed the lessonslearned from the Abe administration.Without the scan-dals and the Social Insurance Agency’s missing records,the Abe administration might have survived longer. ButAbe’s core problem was the fundamental gap betweenits ideological ambition and the modesty of its eco-nomic and welfare policy record.

Recent developments in the Fukuda governmentalso offer a stark contrast with his predecessor. Fukudadoes not share Abe’s conservatism, and has shut downAbe’s project to build a “beautiful country.” During theearly weeks of Fukuda’s tenure, the so-called “twistedDiet” (nejire kokkai) provided political momentum forthe DPJ to block the ATSML’s extension in the Houseof Councilors, even though a plurality of Japanese sup-port such an extension. In mid-October, the partisandebate over the ATSML’s extension expanded into var-ious controversies over the possibility that Japan’s fuelmight have been diverted to the Iraq War; the problemof civilian control over the military (as the latter hid itsunderstated reporting of the amount of fuel untilrecently); and the problems created by formerAdministrative Vice Minister for Defense, TakemasaMoriya’s ethics violations and arrest. However, in a dra-matic turnaround, Fukuda and Ozawa had closed meet-ings in which they discussed the possibility of a grandcoalition.When Ozawa did not immediately reject theidea of a grand coalition, he was criticized by his ownparty and submitted his letter of resignation. The DPJ


begged him to stay as the party leader,which led Ozawato withdraw his resignation. The drama over Ozawa’sretracted resignation took place less than two monthsafter Abe’s resignation as prime minister, and Ozawa’sactions seemed to put a halt to the DPJ’s momentum.More generally, the Fukuda government appears to beveering away from the blatantly top-down kantei poli-cymaking style, and to devoting itself instead to vexingdistributive issues such as welfare, taxation, and fiscaldeficit.9 Fukuda’s choices so far demonstrate that theJapanese prime minister has a significant range of alter-natives in how and how much to utilize his markedlyenhanced institutional resources for political leader-ship.10 And it will certainly be worth following how hewill manage the complex “top-down” resources and“bottom-up” imperatives of contemporary Japanesepolitical institutions.

ENDNOTES

1. See the very important contributions by Masato Shimizu,Kantei Shudo (Kantei Leads) (Tokyo: Nihon KeizaiShimbunsha, 2005); Tomohito Shinoda, Kantei Gaiko(Kantei Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2004); and

Hakutaka Takenaka, Shusho Shihai (Prime Minister Rules)(Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2006).

2. On the importance of persuasion in political leadershipafter the Abe administration, see Gerald Curtis,“‘Settokugata seiji’ e tenkan dekiruka (Can JapanTransition to ‘Persuasion-Style’ Politics?),” Asahi Shimbun,September 17, 2007.

3.These figures are cited by Atsushi Kusano in Shokun!,Vo.39, No. 8 (August 2007): 43.

4. Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 2007.5. See the insightful analysis by Takashi Mikuriya in Bungei

Shunju,Vol. 84, No. 16 (November 2006): 149, and TaseYasuhiro in Shokun!,Vol. 39, No. 8 (August 2007): 26.

6.The following borrows heavily from Tetsuya Miyazaki,“‘Senshu boei, otomodachi naikaku’ no zento (Prospectsfor ‘Defensive Defense and the Cabinet of Buddies’),”Bungei Shunju,Vol. 84, No. 16 (November 2006): 158-9;and Takashi Uesugi, Kantei Hokai (Collapse of the Kantei)(Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2007): 44-56.

7. Interview with a former LDP Diet member (October 26,2007).

8. On Abe’s cabinet scandals and the LDP’s defeat in theHouse of Councilors election, see the very interesting dis-cussion by Takeshige Kunisada,Yasuhiro Tase, and Atsuo Itoin “Abe Seiken Tsuirakusu! (The Abe Cabinet Crashes!)”in Shokun!,Vol. 39, No. 8 (August 2007): 24-55.

9. Interview with an LDP official (October 29, 2007).10. Interview with a Japanese government official (October

28, 2007).


apanese politics is experi-encing an unprecedentedphase of institutional adjust-

ment and adaptation. Since theruling coalition, which consistsof the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) and the Komei Party, lostmajority control of the Houseof Councilors (the upperhouse) of the Diet ( Japan’s leg-

islature) in the July 2007 election, not a single bill hasbeen passed by the legislature. Yasuo Fukuda, Japan’snew prime minister as of late September, 2007, is fac-ing a serious legislative stalemate. Having expected thissituation, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe steppeddown from the top government leadership position,less than two months after his party’s historic defeat inthe upper house election.

It is the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) whichnow decides the fate of bills in the Diet.Although theLDP-Komei coalition can theoretically override theupper house’s decision with a two-thirds super major-ity votes in the House of Representatives (the lowerhouse), doing so would entail the significant cost ofplummeting approval rates. In one opinion poll thatfollowed the resignation of Prime Minister Abe, pub-lished in the Asahi Shimbun, September 14, 2007, 41percent of the respondents answered that they wouldfavor a DPJ-led government as opposed to 31 percentwho would prefer an LDP-led coalition. More thanhalf of the respondents were in favor of calling a lowerhouse election in the immediate future.

Extrapolating from the upper house election results,many projected that the DPJ would win majority con-trol of the lower house in the upcoming general elec-tion without major difficulty. Regardless, the DPJ isnot free from problems. Shortly after Ichiro Ozawa, thepresident of the DPJ, was negotiating a grand coalitiondeal with Prime Minister Fukuda, the executive boardmembers of the DPJ unanimously opposed Ozawa’s

proposal. In early November, Ozawa abruptlyannounced his intention to resign his post as the partypresident, but only two days later he withdrew his pre-vious announcement. Apparently, the DPJ’s seniormembers persuaded Ozawa to retain his position asparty leader, but the turmoil that surrounded Ozawa’sresignation announcement damaged the party’s reputa-tion as a credible alternative to the LDP.

This essay reviews recent developments in Japanesepolitics and provides projections for the future by ana-lyzing the upper house election results in July.Although Japanese politics is encountering a briefperiod of turbulence, the political system of the coun-try is in fact in the process of transitioning to that of aWestminster style majoritarian regime.This change canbe understood as a slow-but-steady adjustment processthat reflects the changes first brought on by the elec-toral incentives of the 1994 electoral reform. In thenext section, I will contrast several hypotheses that areintended to explain the LDP’s defeat in the upperhouse election in July, by considering both short–termshocks and long-term institutional and behavioralchanges. The section after that clarifies the nature ofthe DPJ as a centrist party.The final section concludesthis essay by providing a set of projections.

IS THE LDP LOSING GROUND?

When we review the development of Japanese poli-tics in the last decade, it once appeared that thealliance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) andthe Komei Party would be insuperable. While mostrural prefectures belonged to the LDP’s stronghold,the Komei provided pivotal support to the LDP, espe-cially in urban competitive districts. Prime MinisterKoizumi’s popularity added to the electoral strengthof the ruling coalition.When Shinzo Abe assumed histerm as prime minister, he was no less popular thanhis predecessor and very few observers expected thathis term would end within a year. In trying to make

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN AND JAPAN’S FUTURE

JUN SAITO

Jun Saito is assistant professor in the department of government at Franklin and Marshall College.

J


sense of the increasing volatility of the election out-comes in Japan in the recent past, we need to consid-er the change in electoral incentives associated withthe 1994 electoral reform.

Under the old Single Non-Transferable Vote(SNTV) system (Chu– Senkyoku Sei), incumbents fromthe LDP faced a very strong incentive to deliver tar-geted services to their core supporters.This is becausethe LDP typically fielded multiple candidates in thesame district and these incumbents needed to com-pete against their co-partisan peers without harmingthe collective partisan label. Instead of engagingthemselves in public policy debate, incumbentsworked hard to solidify their support base by provid-ing pork barrel projects. The opposition partiesespoused leftist ideologies and failed to function asviable alternatives to the governing LDP, partlybecause the SNTV system had an incentive for par-ties to distance themselves in terms of policy posi-tions, and partly because they did not have access topork barrel projects.1

The alliance of reform-oriented politicians andopinion leaders in the early 1990s led to the abolitionof the SNTV rule in the lower house. In June 1993, asignificant minority of LDP incumbents defected fromthe party, which resulted in the passage of a non-confi-dence motion against Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa.As a result of the ensuing general election, the LDP fellfrom power for the first time in the 38 years of theparty’s history. An electoral reform bill was enacted inthe following year, and the first election for the lowerhouse under this new system was implemented in 1996,combining 300 Single-Member Districts (SMD) and200 Proportional Representation (PR).

Since winning a majority in the lower house is aprerequisite for any party to gain control of the gov-ernment, political parties transformed their electoralstrategies accordingly.The change in the LDP’s strate-gy had at least the following three consequences. First,

since electoral reform entailed massive reapportion-ment, the political influence of formerly underrepre-sented urban voters was magnified. Thus, subsidiesgoing to formerly overrepresented rural areas werecurtailed.2 Second, the governing coalition faced anincentive to reallocate resources from its stronghold tomarginal districts.Under the old SNTV system, as longas the LDP was able to garner more than 75 percent ofthe votes, the party could secure all 3 seats in districtswhere the district magnitude was three.3 After the elec-toral reform, this was no longer the case.Third, becausethe SMD system pulls political parties toward the cen-ter of the ideological spectrum, policy platforms ofopposition parties became more centrist. In a nutshell,the DPJ ascended to the position of a viable alternativeto the LDP. As electoral competition became stifferthan before, the LDP hedged the risk of losing controlof the government by forging a coalition with theKomei Party, which has a solid electoral support base,especially in urban districts, and is backed by theBuddhist sect of So– ka Gakkai.

The DPJ’s victory in the July upper house elec-tion was part of this long-term adjustment process,but instead of asking why the DPJ won the last upperhouse election, we could reformulate the question byasking why the LDP suffered a defeat. There are afew competing as well as complementary explana-tions. The first explanation is that the 2007 upperhouse election results reflected poor performance bythe prime minister’s government and his party. Inparticular, Abe’s cabinet was extremely incompetentin containing scandals. In addition, the LDP’s elec-tioneering team performed much more poorly thanthe DPJ’s or the LDP’s predecessors.The second fac-tor is more institutional and will have irreversibleeffects on the LDP’s electoral fortune. Voters aregradually observing the adverse effects of formerPrime Minister Koizumi’s reforms and are alsobecoming skeptical about whether these reformsproduced any positive results. Ironically, it was notKoizumi but his successor who paid the price. Thethird factor is changing voter behavior. Previously,voters dissatisfied with the current government per-formance split their support between centrist oppo-sition parties and the more leftist Japan CommunistParty. Recently, these anti-government voters arealigning themselves with the DPJ.

The first explanation concerns Abe’s inability tocope with short-run political crises.The Abe admin-istration was plagued by a series of money scandals,

It once appeared that thealliance of the LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP) and the Komei Party would be insuperable.


and Abe handled these incidents very maladroitly.Instead of firing cabinet ministers immediately afterthe eruption of scandals, Abe protected these minis-ters until the last minute. Notorious examples includethree consecutive ministers of agriculture:ToshikatsuMatuoka, who committed suicide, Norihiko Akagi,whose poor showing in a press conference during thecampaign period severely damaged the LDP’s morale,and Takehiko Endo, who resigned only eight daysafter appointment.

Previously, the Japanese public had tolerated thegovernment party’s mishandling of political financesbased on its overall trust in the party’s competency.Thistime, the LDP was not effectively able to make anappeal to the voters based on its relative competencycompared to the other parties. Since the SocialInsurance Agency recognized in February that it losttrack of more than 50 million pension records, publicresentment of the government mounted. In contrast,the DPJ claimed credit for making the governmentrecognize the problem. Obviously, this was not Abe’sfault at all. However, now that voters learned that thegovernment had lost the pension records, trust in theLDP’s competency rapidly declined. It is in a period ofpolitical crisis that the true competency of an adminis-tration is tested and is revealed to the public.AlthoughAbe’s initial approval rate was as high as 70 percent, thefigure plummeted sharply over time. When Aberesigned in September this year, his approval rating wasgenerally as low as 30 percent, although there weresome variations among polling companies.

In addition, the LDP’s electioneering team simplydid a poor job in setting the election agenda. Forinstance, the mass media widely reported the powerstruggle within the party as well as the contestationbetween the anti-reform former LDP members andpro-reform “assassins” (high-profile or celebrity candi-dates run by the LDP against Koizumi’s opponents)during the 2005 lower house election campaign peri-od. Consequently, amidst this LDP strife, the DPJ dis-appeared from the public eye. Additionally, Abe pur-sued a strategy of defeating the DPJ by means of seri-ous bipartisan policy debates. Regardless of whetherthe DPJ’s policy platform was perceived as good orbad, the mass media compared the platforms of theLDP and the DPJ in roughly equal amounts of cover-age. In the 2005 lower house elections, both pro-reform and anti-reform voters cast their ballots for theLDP, but this time the DPJ successfully managed tocollect anti-government protest votes.

The way the LDP and the DPJ framed the agendaalso led to a significant difference in both parties’ per-formance. The LDP’s policy slogan was to “MakeGrowth Real” (Seicho– wo Jikkan ni). The LDP’s eco-nomic platform looked as if it were written by theWorld Bank or the International Monetary Fund,which reflected orthodox recipes for macroeconomicgrowth in neoclassical economics. For rural voterswho had provided stable support for the LDP fordecades, this slogan did not make much sense, as realincome had ceased to grow for almost a decade.Thefruit of the recent macroeconomic recovery is oftenexemplified by the construction rush in downtownTokyo, which has little to do with the trickle downeffects to the countryside. In addition, the Japanesepublic was increasingly aware of income disparity interms of both social class and geographic region.TheDPJ’s policy platform, on the other hand, was orient-ed more toward distributive policy packages.Consequently, in the July upper house election, theDPJ performed disproportionately well in the LDP’sformer strongholds.

The second explanation is based on recent institu-tional changes in Japanese politics.The Triad Reformof local government finance (Sanmi Ittai Kaikaku)reduced the size of intergovernmental transfers thatgo to municipal governments. In addition, during theKoizumi period, the number of municipalitiesdecreased from 3,249 to 1,842, a reduction by about43 percent. What this implies is a weakening of theLDP’s local party organization.Article 91 of the LocalAutonomy Law (Chiho– Jichi Ho–) stipulates the stan-dard size of municipal legislatures roughly as a loga-rithmic function of municipal population sizes. Forinstance, while small villages and towns with popula-tions between 5,000 and 10,000 typically elect 18council members, large cities with populations of250,000 elect 38 council members. Thus, smallmunicipalities have a higher ratio of legislator-per–voter representation. When small municipalitiesare annexed into nearby cities, this automatically

It was this network of clien-telism that boosted the LDP’selectoral success throughoutthe past several decades.


requires that a large number of these municipal legis-lators somehow need to give up their elective office.The important point is that a vast majority of thesemunicipal legislators were effectively serving as paidactivists for the LDP. Although very few candidatesrun for municipal council elections as official LDPaffiliates, most of them retain informal ties with theparty. It was this network of clientelism that boostedthe LDP’s electoral success throughout the past sever-al decades.4 In addition, the LDP perhaps over-adjust-ed its fiscal policy to win a majority of the seats inlower house elections, where urban voters are betterrepresented. In contrast, upper house seats are serious-ly malapportioned in favor of rural prefectures, and itis in these over-represented rural prefectures that LDPincumbents were hard hit and defeated by DPJ chal-lengers in the July election.

As an illustration of the LDP’s weakening electoralsupport base, Figure 1 (see below) plots the change inthe LDP’s vote share in upper house district races(2001-07) as opposed to the change in the averagemunicipal population sizes. Given the fact that popu-

lation growth in most prefectures in Japan was stag-nant in the recent decade, the increase in the averagemunicipal population size reflects the reduction in thenumber of municipalities within the prefecture. Alsonote that Junichiro Koizumi was selected as the LDP’sparty president and assumed his term as prime minis-ter shortly before the 2001 upper house election.Because of carefully elaborated electoral and mediaexposure strategies, the LDP and the Komei Partyenjoyed a landslide victory in that election.As we cansee, there is a moderately negative correlationbetween municipal mergers and the LDP’s electoralperformance. But since the government promotedmunicipal mergers by using short-term financialincentives, these municipalities with recent mergersreceived favorable treatment in terms of increasedsubsidies and clearing of outstanding debt. As theremaining benefits of these short-term incentives dis-appear, these mergers may have a more substantivelynegative impact on the LDP’s future electoral per-formance. Apparently, the reason the LDP has pur-sued this local government reform is to finance social

HokkaidoAomori

IwateMiyagi

Akita

Yamagata

Fukushima

Ibaraki

Tochigi

Gumma

Saitama ChibaTokyo

Kanagawa

Niigata

Toyama

Ishikawa

Fukui

Yamanashi

Nagano

Gifu

Shizuoka

Aichi

Mie

Shiga

KyotoOsaka

HyogoNara

WakayamaTottori

Shimane

Okayama

Hiroshima

Yamaguchi

Tokushima

Kagawa

Ehime

Kochi

Fukuoka

Saga

NagasakiKumamoto

Oita

Miyazaki

KagoshimaOkinawa

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

0 .5 1 1.25Change in Mean Municipal Population Size (2001-07, in log)

Prefectural Obs (N=47) OLS Prediction

FIGURE 1: MUNICIPAL MERGER AND THE LDP’S ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun. 2004, 2007. Saninsen De–ta CD-ROM [Data CD-ROM for the House of Councilor Election]. Tokyo:YomiuriShimbun.


security programs, given that the population is agingat an unprecedented rate.While failure to cope withsocial security issues would negatively influence theparty’s electoral performance, as it did in the 2004upper house election, financial reform of this sort alsoentails electoral costs.

The third explanation for the LDP’s defeat con-cerns the behavior of the voters. Given the fact thatthere existed several major political parties in Japanduring the SNTV period, realignment into a two-party system was a slow process. Even though thelower house district races constitute the basic frame-work of electoral contestation in Japan, prefecturalassembly members are still elected from the SNTVrule, where the number of seats ranges from one to18. Even though most lower house incumbentselected from SMD belong to either the LDP or DPJ,there are still a significant number of prefecturalassembly incumbents who are affiliated with theSocial Democratic Party (SDP) and the JapanCommunist Party (JCP). Although the SDP and itselectoral support base, in particular public sector

labor unions, usually cooperate electorally with theDPJ whenever the SDP fails to field a candidate,there have been no such formal cooperative rela-tions between the DPJ and JCP. During electioncampaign periods, the JCP headquarters criticizesthe DPJ’s policy stance no less harshly than it criti-cizes that of the LDP. Protest votes were thus divid-ed between the more centrist DPJ and the leftistJCP. It was also widely believed that communist vot-ers were ideologically oriented and were less likelyto vote strategically.

Empirical evidence, however, suggests that protestvoters are discarding the communists when the racesbecome more competitive. Figure 2 (see below) plotsthe change in the JCP’s vote share between the 2001and the 2007 election as opposed to the change in thewinning margin in the corresponding elections. Forprefectures where the district magnitude is 1, thewinning margin is calculated as the difference in voteshare between the winning candidate and the top-losing candidate divided by the total number of eligi-ble voters.Wherever the district magnitude is equal to

Hokkaido

AomoriIwate

Miyagi

Akita

Fukushima

Ibaraki

Tochigi

Gumma

Saitama

TokyoNiigata

Toyama

IshikawaFukui

Nagano

GifuShizuoka

Aichi

Mie

Shiga Osaka

Hyogo

Nara

Wakayama TottoriShimane Okayama

Hiroshima

Yamaguchi

Tokushima

Kagawa

Ehime

Kochi

Fukuoka

SagaNagasaki

Kumamoto

Oita MiyazakiKagoshima

-10

-50

5

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20Change in Winning Margin (2001-07, %)

Prefectural Obs (N=46) OLS Prediction

Chiba

Yamagata

Kanagawa

Yamanashi

Kyoto

Source: ibid.

FIGURE 2: CHANGE IN ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS AND THE JCP’S VOTE SHARE


or larger than 2, the vote share of the barely winningcandidate and the top losing candidates are consid-ered in a similar manner.The reduction in the win-ning margin implies that races became more compet-itive, whereas an increase in the winning marginmeans the opposite. Also note that the JCP’s districtcandidates are almost always non-competitive. Exceptfor a few prefectures, most of the JCP’s seats are gen-erated in the proportional representation portion. Aswe can see, when the races become more competi-tive, JCP voters are more likely to cast their ballots forother parties’ candidates, whereas JCP voters stick totheir own party when elections are not competitive.The data suggests that the voters ordinarily leaningtoward the JCP avoid “wasting” their ballots and givetheir protest votes to their second best alternativecandidate, since that candidate is more likely to win.Although further scrutiny is necessary to estimate thefull impact of this type of strategic voting, exit pollsconducted by mass media suggest that these commu-nist supporters are less likely to cast their ballots forthe LDP-Komei coalition candidates than for theDPJ candidates.

In addition to citizens’ spontaneous coordinationof protest votes, the JCP headquarters recentlyannounced its strategy for the next lower house elec-tion. In order to avoid wasting financial and humanresources, the JCP will cease to field candidates inmany of the lower house district races.The JCP hadfielded candidates in all 300 SMDs until the 2003election. However in 2005, the party withdrew can-didates from about 30 districts. In the next election,party headquarters announced that the number ofcandidates would be reduced to 130 and instead shift-ed its resources to PR races. Although the JCP stillbashes the DPJ as a second LDP and argues that thereneeds to be a viable opposition party, the JCP’s strate-gic transition will facilitate coordination of protest

votes and eventually help the DPJ’s electoral chances.Whatever the reasons for the LDP’s defeat and

hence the DPJ’s victory, the loss of the majority in theupper house will bring about two significant long-run political consequences. One is electoral and theother is legislative. Because the current lower houseterm will end before the next upper house election in2010, the bicameral split will continue until the nextlower house election. Looking at the current situationfrom an electoral aspect, we can see that incumbencywill bring a significant amount of political resourcesto local DPJ organizations, which were previouslyweak. Unlike lower house members who can be upfor election at any time during their maximum 4-yearterm, an upper house member’s term is fixed and lastsas long as 6 years. Thus, once elected, upper housemembers can provide a stable resource base for localparty organizations.These DPJ upper house memberswill serve as an important resource for the day-to-dayactivities of DPJ candidates for the lower house.Unless the LDP makes a significant concession to theDPJ, non-budgetary legislation can be blocked, result-ing in the possibility of a prolonged stalemate.Then,the natural question is to what extent the policy pref-erences of the LDP-led coalition and those of theDPJ differ. In order to understand this point, we needto clarify who make up the DPJ.

DPJ: WHO ARE THEY?

The majority of DPJ Diet members are new entrantsto politics who did not have direct experience in run-ning for office during the SNTV period.Nevertheless, the party’s leadership positions areoccupied by descendants of pre-reform oppositionparties as well as defectors from the LDP. Descendantsof former opposition parties who later joined the DPJwere from several centrist parties as well as the cen-trist faction from the Japan Socialist Party. Newentrants are office-seeking political entrepreneurswho do not exhibit strong ideological policy stances.The remaining question is to what extent defectorsfrom the LDP differ from incumbents who remainedin the party.

There is in fact an established empirical literaturethat statistically analyzes the determinants of legisla-tors’ party switch in Japan in the 1990s. Cox andRosenbluth as well as Kato argue that junior memberswho were electorally more vulnerable opted to leavethe party.5 In contrast,Reed and Scheiner demonstrate

Because the current lowerhouse term will end before thenext upper house election in2010, the bicameral split willcontinue until the next lowerhouse election.


that legislators’ preferences for electoral reform signif-icantly explain who left the party and who stayed.6 Inaddition, Saito shows that, in addition to legislators’preferences for reform, the status of projects in incum-bents’ electoral districts affected the likelihood ofdefection.7 Legislators who left the LDP in 1993 wereelected from districts where key infrastructure projectswere finished. For instance, bullet train projects wereeither finished or committed in the districts of IchiroOzawa, Tsutomu Hata, and Kozo Watanabe. AmongOzawa’s protégés who also initially defected from theLDP, incumbents whose districts were in need ofinfrastructure projects ended up returning to the LDP,their “old nest”: Toshiro Nikai of Wakayama andShigeru Ishiba of Tottori, to name a few. In sum, thebenefit of belonging to the party in power, i.e., to gainaccess to pork barrel projects, is larger when incum-bents are elected from poorer districts.All other thingsbeing equal, incumbents acted more sincerely to pur-sue their policy preferences. Thus, Japan’s partisanrealignment reflected institutional preferences and thelegacy of pork barrel politics in the past, rather thanany ideological schism that might seriously divide thenation over important policy issues.

THE DPJ AND JAPAN’S FUTURE

This brief description of the DPJ suggests that theparty is centrist, that is, characterized by politicalpragmatism.The current legislative stalemate can per-sist into the future, as the initiative for the grandcoalition between the LDP and DPJ has failed. Interms of foreign policy, although there may be ashort-run phase of adjustment in U.S.-Japan diplo-matic relations, the basic framework of the securityalliance will remain intact.The DPJ would be willingto make practical compromises from time to time,unless the party’s electoral survival is threatened.

Even if the DPJ were to seize control of the gov-ernment, a radical change in diplomatic as well asdomestic policy is unlikely to take place. In addition,it is worth pointing out that the DPJ added so muchcompetitive pressure to the LDP-led coalition in the

past that the government eventually pursued reformagendas that the DPJ and its leaders had previouslyadvocated. For instance, Junichiro Koizumi wasopposed to electoral reform until the last minute.Yetironically, it was Koizumi who took advantage of thepartisan swing under the SMD system to record alandslide victory. Many of the reform agendas he pur-sued were in fact already explicated in Ichiro Ozawa’sbook, which was one of the best-selling books in1994.8 The LDP has been able to stay in power for thepast decade, in my opinion, by copying from thereform agenda of the DPJ.This is one typical exam-ple of what is called median voter equilibrium inpolitical science theory.9 In this sense, although theDPJ was not in control of the cabinet, its presencenonetheless had a direct effect on the LDP’s politicalas well as policy program.

Ozawa is a pragmatist, who adapted to a narrowniche in the political marketplace.While he was head-ing the former Liberal Party, he was largely regardedas a market-oriented libertarian. Analysts of the timeregarded Ozawa’s Liberal Party as situated to the rightof the LDP’s ideological spectrum. After the LiberalParty was merged into the Democratic Party, the lib-ertarian platform was virtually abandoned. In the lastupper house election, the DPJ won a landslide victo-ry mainly by forging a redistributive policy package.On the other hand, Ozawa is a fundamentalist in thesense that he has consistently advocated introductionof the Single Member District electoral system eversince he ran for office for the first time in 1969. Aslong as Ozawa serves as the DPJ’s leader, his party willbe committed to preserving the existing electoralinstitution in the lower house, which has generatedthe forces for political change in Japan over the lastfifteen years.

As political actors adapt to the rules of the game, theSMD electoral system is likely to produce a viablebipartisan system and a majoritarian government,which is nothing other than the Westminster model.This model of majoritarian government is a mecha-nism of accountability, rather than mere representation,and Japan is in the process of emulating this prototype.Although it is still uncertain whether the DPJ will beable to control the majority of seats in the lower housein the near future, public policies of the LDP-led coali-tion are already reflecting the influence of majoritariangovernment. The country will gradually transformitself to a “normal country” that seeks to play a moreactive role in the international system, but this is more

The party is centrist, that is,characterized by politicalpragmatism.


an indication of Japan’s pragmatic response to thechanging international environment than its ideologi-cal commitment to its self-congratulatory history.10

This trend of electoral pragmatism will continue todominate the political arena in Japan, unless electoralincentives are overturned, for example, by returning tothe old SNTV rule.

ENDNOTES

1. Using a unidimensional spatial model, Gary Cox makesthis point. See Gary W. Cox,“Centripetal andCentrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems,” AmericanJournal of Political Science,Vol. 34, No. 4 (1990): 903-35.

2.Yusaka Horiuchi and Jun Saito,“Reapportionment andRedistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform inJapan,” American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 47, No. 4(2003): 669-82.

3.The district magnitude is the number of elected represen-tatives in an electoral district. Under the old SNTV rule,district magnitude typically ranged between 3 and 5.

4. Ethan Scheiner, Democracy without Competition in Japan:

Opposition Failure in a One-party Dominant State (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

5. Gary W. Cox and Frances M. Rosenbluth,“Anatomy ofa Split: the Liberal Democrats of Japan,” Electoral Studies,Vol.14, No. 4 (1995): 355-76; Junko Kato,“When theParty Breaks Up: Exit and Voice among JapaneseLegislators,” American Political Science Review,Vol. 92, No.4 (1998): 857-70.

6. Steven R. Reed and Ethan Scheiner,“ElectoralIncentives and Policy Preferences: Mixed Motivesbehind Party Defections in Japan,” British Journal ofPolitical Science,Vol. 33, No. 3 (2003): 469-90.

7. Jun Saito,“When Preferences are not Behavior.” Paperpresented at the Stanford Conference on Electoral andLegislative Politics in Japan, Stanford University, June11-12, 2007.

8. Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan (New York:Kodansha International, 1994).

9.Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (NewYork: HarperCollins, 1957).

10. Frances M. Rosenbluth, Jun Saito, and Annalisa Zinn,“America’s Policy Towards East Asia: How it Looksfrom Japan,” Asian Survey,Vol. 47, No. 4 (2007): 584-600.


apan’s political landscape isevolving as decades-long,interlocking socio-demo-

graphic changes unfold along-side institutional reforms. Arapidly aging society andbelow-replacement birthratesco-produce a declining popu-lation and shrinking laborforce. Economic disparities

between urban and rural areas are widening at thesame time that concerns about the future of the wel-fare state

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