Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

Briefing to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: Diversion of Civilian Explosives and

Commercial Products for use in IEDsApril 2014

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Purpose

Provide a briefing about:

• Civilian explosives (commercial grade explosives) and products used to make detonators that can be diverted from legitimate civilian use to IEDs

• Best practices for stopping or limiting the diversion of commercial products and commercial grade explosives for use in IEDs.

• The briefing complements two other briefings on diversion of chemical precursors and military explosives for use in IEDs.

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Global IED Highlights Reporting Period: January 1-31, 2014

THAILAND: Jan 292x Killed, 2x Wounded

2x Homemade IEDs, 1x Motorcycle Vehicle-borne IED

Royal Thai RangersBRN

RUSSIA: Jan 156x Killed

2x IED-trapped vehiclesPossible IK TTP Development

Caucasus Emirate (IK)

SOMALIA: Jan 283x Killed, 8x Wounded

Radio Controlled IEDMarketplaceal-Shabaab

NIGERIA: Jan 2799+ Killed, 100s Wounded

Complex IED AttackKawuri VillageBoko Haram

IRAQ: Jan 14285+ Killed, 400+ Wounded

Various IEDs, Primarily Vehicle-borne IEDEthnic and Security Targets

ISIL Predominantly

COLOMBIA: Jan 241x Killed / 2x Wounded

Unknown IEDNational Police

Likely FARC

ISRAEL: Jan 271x WoundedUnknown IED

IDF Border PatrolUnknown

EGYPT: Jan 246x Killed, 70+ Wounded

1x Vehicle-borne IED, 4x Other IEDsVarious Cairo Targets

Ansar Jerusalem

SOMALIA: Jan 91x KilledMAIED

Political Figureal-Shabaab

NIGERIA: Jan 1430x Killed, Unknown Wounded

Complex Vehicle-borne IED AttackArmy Checkpoint

Boko Haram

SYRIA: Jan 136x Killed, 14x Wounded

Vehicle-borne IEDRebel Controlled Checkpoint

ISIL

PAKISTAN: Jan 135x Killed

Radio Controlled IEDPolice Convoy

TTP

PAKISTAN: Jan 94x Killed, Many Wounded

Vehicle-borne IEDPolice VIP Motorcade

TTP

PAKISTAN: Jan 148x Killed

Radio Controlled IEDPolice Mobile Unit

TTP

PHILLIPPINES: Jan 1324x WoundedUnknown IED

Arakan UniversityUnknown

PHILLIPPINES: Jan 147x Wounded

Unknown IED Complex Attack57th IN BN

New People’s Army

BANGLADESH: Jan 236x Wounded

UNK IEDRajshahi University

Unknown

YEMEN: Jan 287x WoundedUnknown IEDYemeni Army

AQAP

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Example 1: CGE components* and other seized items:• 37 tons of Potassium Chloride*• 25 tons Ammonium Chloride*• 4 bundles of detonation cord• 36 remote controls• 78 bundles of circuit wire• ~15 tons of Aluminum Powder*• 10 drums of Acid• 80 drums of prepared explosive*• 2 bags of sawdust• 5 sacks of Ammonium Nitrate*

Note: Indicated trucks were wired for VBIED attack but lacked HME

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CGE and Commercial Products Diverted for use in IEDS

IEDs require a detonator and detonating cord to initiate its main charge and there are various components that make-up CGE. The illegal sale and distribution of these CGE

components to nefarious actors is an enduring threat around the world.

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Example 2: CGE components* and other seized items:• 2,400 anti-personnel mines• 2 anti-tank mines• 516 homemade bombs*• 6 Improvised Explosive Devices*• 1 suicide jacket• 24 timers• 250 detonators• 61 unidentified wire rolls• 8 hand grenades• 148 electronic devices• Unidentified electronic components, literature and computer disks

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CGE and Commercial Products Diverted for use in IEDS

IEDs require a detonator and detonating cord to initiate its main charge and there are various components that make-up CGE. The illegal sale and distribution of these CGE

components to nefarious actors is an enduring threat around the world.

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Common Products used in IEDs

Blasting accessories used in IEDs:

Commercial grade blasting caps are found in caches; however, post blast analysis does not allow for detonator identification. Blasting caps are sometimes improvised by taking the core out of detonation cord. Without commercial blasting caps and detonation cord terrorists would be significantly hindered in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. The cardboard spools of detonation cord frequently have the identification label removed making origin difficult to determine.

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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CGE Focused EffortUNCLASSIFIED

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To prevent the diversion of CGE from legitimate to illegitimate use means implementing proper vetting and accountability of end-users. Focused effort is on disrupting, degrading, and denying the illegal sale

and distribution of these CGE components to nefarious actors.

4AUG12; 2,600 TOVEX Sticks05FEB13 - Kabul

Two common products used in IEDs:

TOVEX is frequently used in suicide vest and VBIED operations. It has been

identified being smuggled through known high volume smuggling routes.

WABOX is also used in various attack operations. This product has been identified in

caches and used in suicide vests.

19FEB13; 100 lbs WABOX4DEC12; 26 WABOX sticks

9SEP13; 15 lbs TOVEX

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Elements of a National C-IED ProgramUNCLASSIFIED

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Focus Effort:• On the commercially-produced products that are most difficult to improvise, most easily

controlled, and most commonly used in IEDs if not controlled.• A comprehensive range of C-IED capabilities employed by Ministries/Departments in

coordinated actions.

Elements of a National C-IED Program:• Legislative and regulatory control of components • Programmatic approach to developing a comprehensive range of C-IED capabilities• Operational approach to employing coordinated Ministerial/Departmental core

capabilities• International capability development and operational employment through bi-lateral,

multi-lateral relationships and coalitions.

Key C-IED Capabilities and Enabling Technologies:• Engage Domestic and International Partners• Exploit Information and Materials from IED Attacks• Advance Innovative Intelligence and Information Analysis• Maintain Deployable C-IED Resources• Screen, Detect, and Protect• Safeguard Explosives and Select Precursor Materials• Coordinate and Standardize Training and Equipment• Develop Operational Plans for IED Contingencies

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Whole-of-Government Approach

Collaboration — Coordination —TeamworkIt takes a network to defeat a network … today and in the future

Collaboration — Coordination —TeamworkIt takes a network to defeat a network … today and in the future

Leveraging the tools and authorities of all partners to counter the HME threat

Diplomatic Engagements

Defense Trade Controls

Entity listing

UN Security Council Resolutions

Financial sanctions

Export controls

Rewards for Justice

Criminal / civil sanctions

Interpol notices

Global Outreach and Education

Commerce regulations and sanctions

Law enforcement

Trade, travel investigations

Asset seizure

Organize, train and equip

Finance investigations

Money laundering

Intelligence Reporting

Common Intelligence

Picture

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Lines of EffortFertilizer Industry• Develop a non-detonable

fertilizer• Increase detection,

identification and interdiction • International regulations• Education/public awareness• Industry-led action

Explosives Industry• Increase detection,

identification and interdiction • International regulations• Education/public awareness• Industry-led action

Tools and Methods• Information sharing• Testing• Collaborative Actions• Research & Development• Stewardship• Secure Supply Chains • Distribution Regulations• Networking / Marketing• Industry-wide Standards

The global and enduring IED threat also requires collaboration with IndustryIndustry Partners

Fertilizer Industry• International Fertilizer Industry

Association (IFA)• The Fertilizer Institute – USA• Fertilizers Europe• Canadian Fertilizer Institute• Agricultural Retailers Association• Ammonium Nitrate Nitric Acid

Producers Group

Explosives Industry• Institute of Makers of Explosives

(IME)

Results• Fatima Group suspended CAN

sales in Baluchistan and KPK (Feb 2013)

• IFA established Product Security Task Force (Apr 2013)

• JIEDDO was IME delegation member to 43rd UN Subcommittee on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods

Results• Fatima Group suspended CAN

sales in Baluchistan and KPK (Feb 2013)

• IFA established Product Security Task Force (Apr 2013)

• JIEDDO was IME delegation member to 43rd UN Subcommittee on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods

Collaboration — CoordinationHarder to accomplish … but necessary to be effective

Collaboration — CoordinationHarder to accomplish … but necessary to be effective

Including Non-traditional PartnersUNCLASSIFIED

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

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Actions to Limit the Diversion of CGE in IEDS

1. Restrict the sale of precursors 2. Mark products to identify where they were produced3. Use a logistics management system that monitors the flow of products to determine

where diversion occurs4. Alert governments of illegitimate imports and shipments (ghost and front

companies/distributers)5. Implement proper vetting and accountability of end-users6. Government and industry must to work together to secure and account for CGE

products from their point of manufacture to their final use7. Border security and preventing smuggling of lethal aid is a shared concern8. Conduct direct engagements with CGE manufactures9. Encourage industry to industry training10.Engage industry partners and associations to encourage greater CGE product

stewardship

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The intent is to focus the community and industry efforts on thecommercially produced products that are most difficult to improvise,

most easily controlled, and most commonly used in IEDs if not controlled.

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

www.jieddo.mil

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