Bachelor of Science (Honours) in Social Sciences with … · 2018. 5. 31. · Classification: Upper Second-class Honours (2.1) This work is being submitted for MA in Philosophy Date

Thomas Goomis – X3365365 A857 Dissertation Page -1-

Dissertation Title: ‘Liberal political philosophy: Sustaining systemic

inequalities in a multicultural world.’

Thomas Goomis

Personal ID: X3365365

Bachelor of Science (Honours) in Social Sciences with Psychological

Studies and Sociology

Awarded: 31 December 2011

Classification: Upper Second-class Honours (2.1)

This work is being submitted for MA in Philosophy

Date of submission: September 2015


ABSTRACT

This dissertation will focus on liberal political philosophy – specifically – the

inability of contemporary liberal philosophy to meet the demands of equality and fair

treatment to national minorities and ethnocultural groups in a pluralistic and

multicultural society. I will first establish the framework of liberal philosophy by

discussing the core liberal philosophical principles. This will begin with a detailed

unpacking of John Rawls’ traditionalist perspective. From there the multiculturalist

aspect of liberal philosophy will be explored by assessing the writings of Will

Kymlicka to further develop the liberal thesis. The aim is to build on the liberal

theory so the dissertation unfolds as a systematic argument, continuously referring to

the inability of the liberal philosophy to address and offer remedies to systemic

institutionalized injustices. This will form the basis in which to contrast liberal and

illiberal positions, from the writings of I. Young and B. Parekh. The tensions of the

liberal commitment to basic rights, and the power to grant or refute said rights by the

democratic election process, vesting the power in the governing majority, will be a

continuous theme throughout the dissertation. Thus, the United States is of particular

concern, as the case study that I will present is regarding the plight of the African-

American, positioned as a national minority. The overall scope of the liberal political

philosophy, from my conclusions, suggests that liberal political philosophy sustains

endemic inequalities as it pertains to the African-American. I will argue that the lack

of power in the current form of collective agreement, in conjunction with ineffective

political representation, undermine the African-American efforts as a group to

receive and prosper from the same opportunities that the dominant white majority

enjoys. When discussing equality and fairness, and seeking reparations for unfair

treatment, I will argue that there has to be real world attempts to redress and shift

power within the political structure to affect real change. Therefore, I will later

introduce radical contemporary philosophical writings with viewpoints that are

reflective of the current situation of the African-American experience. My

conclusion section will entail a general assessment of the failure of the liberal

political philosophy to engage and remedy the marginalization and oppression of the

African-American. Furthermore, I will assert as a final conclusion that a fully

inclusive political philosophy needs to engage a pluralistic and diverse methodology

approach, in order to best serve the needs of a society in a multicultural world.


Dissertation Title: ‘Liberal political philosophy: Sustaining systemic

inequalities in a multicultural world.’

Thomas Goomis

Personal ID: X3365365

Bachelor of Science (Honours) in Social Sciences with Psychological

Studies and Sociology

Awarded: 31 December 2011

Classification: Upper Second-class Honours (2.1)

This work is being submitted for MA in Philosophy

Date of submission: September 2015

Declarations:

1. This dissertation has not previously been submitted for a degree or other

qualification at The Open University or any other university or institution.

2. I prepared this dissertation with no assistance from any other person.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 5-8

2. LIBERALAISM ........................................................................................................................ 9-20

3. MULTICULTURALISM ....................................................................................................... 21-42

4. CASE STUDY – THE PLIGHT OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ................................. 43-56

5. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 57-59


‘Liberal political philosophy: Sustaining systemic inequalities in a multicultural

world’

1. INTRODUCTION

Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule

of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit

the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly

injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his

transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the

right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek

reparation.

— John Locke, “Second Treatise”

The political aspects of multiculturalism and cultural diversity are wide-ranging,

fluid, and ever evolving. They are intertwined in complex human experiences in

every modern Western state and subject to laws and policies, intended to serve its

citizens best interests, through democratic processes. The core tenets of any political

ideological philosophy provide the democratic judicial and social framework in

which it refers back to its principles, in the real world application of contemporary

policies and general governance. However, the modern democratic state is not

populated with a singular homogenous entity, and conceptions of justice and equality

of its citizens are not being served within a structure of universally accepted

principles. It might appear even-handed, even morally and ethically so, to a majority

of citizens that some form of equal treatment of all persons in society should be the

guiding principle for a fair model of distribution of justice and equality. On face

value, and certainly to the dominant governing majority, this is an entirely rational

proposition. However, I will argue that equal treatment is not considered the same

treatment to all citizens, as it is not possible and not a reality in a modern state. Issues

such as ethnicity, sexual identity, women’s rights and indigenous people all share the

notion of equality and fairness in basic rights, and differentiated rights, if applicable,

to a particular group. Therefore, it would stand to reason, and is philosophically

plausible, that a comprehensive political philosophy in a modern Western state must


be inclusive in regards to some form of pluralism. A liberal approach to

multiculturalism must recognize and accept cultural diversity, whereby national,

ethnocultural minorities, and minority group rights are directly affected by

ideological political philosophy.

This dissertation will focus on contemporary liberal political philosophy. I will first

establish the framework that is the core of its philosophical principles. Then, I will

discuss how these theories underpin the notion of what is constitutive, and

understood by their doctrine, what the meaning of the good life in a modern western

state is, and the opportunities to achieve it. While the focus is contemporary, the

background of how a liberal political philosophy came to be is equally important.

Discussions of theories of social contracts, basic recognized social structures and the

evolution of institutionalized inequalities all serve to explain and support the

arguments for and against the principles of liberal political philosophy. The United

States is of particular concern, as the case study that I present is the plight of the

African-American. Thus, the overall scope of the dissertation is, how liberal political

philosophy sustains systemic inequalities within the African-American ethno-cultural

group. Periodically, examples will be touched upon to support or refute claims made

by the liberal theorists using the African-American to provide context. In the last

section I will discuss the conditions endemic to the African-American as a minority

group, i.e., oppression and marginalization. These will be unpacked and used as a

gauge to measure the successes or failures of a liberal political philosophy. The aim

is to scrutinize and to set a foundation to unpack liberal philosophy, multiculturalism,

group rights, and contemporary aspects of political philosophy. I will spend

considerable time examining theoretical liberalism from its traditional roots, moving

to liberal multiculturalism and then on to a hybrid of liberal and illiberal theoretical


perspectives. This is necessary to eventually make the case that a real world

application of a political philosophy is the only plausible method to achieve a model

of distributive justice in the form of ex ante reparations.

The claim stated above can only be realized if it can be established that liberal

political philosophy cannot accommodate the necessary conditions of fair and equal

treatment, in a pluralistic and multicultural society. To achieve this aim, there must

be a philosophical commitment and a rigorous approach to come to terms with and to

resolve the following philosophical problem: […] ‘what can be done to resolve the

tensions between liberalism (particularly a commitment to rights which cannot be

infringed by a powerful majority) and democracy (which vests political power and

legitimacy in the hands of the majority)’ (Matravers 2003: p. 4)? With that in mind I

assert the notion, as a core claim of this dissertation, that liberalism is questionable as

a viable contemporary political philosophy if the tensions cannot be resolved.

Furthermore, if the guiding core principles of liberal political philosophy can be

substantiated as propagating these tensions, then through the use of the case study it

will be argued that liberalism sustains inequalities and suppresses pluralism by being

de facto non-inclusive in the overreliance of their core principles.

Hence, having then established what a liberal political philosophy is, and what my

main aims are, I will have set the groundwork to see what multiculturalism offers as

a liberal theory to remedies of the tensions in dealing with national minorities and

subgroups. Specifically, how to resolve the fair treatment dilemma of groups that

suffer injustices of oppression and marginalization. Finally, I will present the case

study of the African-American and then be able to gauge the successes or failures of

a liberal political philosophy in regards to their plight and their special needs - the

special needs associated with the African-American, categorically positioned as a


national minority in a hegemonic Caucasian dominant society in the United States. I

will then conclude this dissertation with a version of what an overlapping,

ideologically unbiased inclusive political philosophy could look like: a theoretical

political philosophy that attempts to overcome any set ideological value system, by

being unconfined to strict adherence to fixed principles and addresses the needs of

the African-American in the real world.


2. LIBERALISM

The foundation of liberal political philosophy is rife with theoretical variances. Over

time a broad spectrum of interpretations has developed, ranging historically from J.S.

Mill to more recently, John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron and Will Kymlicka. These

writers of liberal political philosophy and multiculturalism will provide much of the

context for the purposes of discussing liberalism in this paper. It is necessary to

narrow down the contributing political writers and to reflect on the notion that each

of these theories was and is continually being developed to reflect ideologies at any

given historical juncture concerning economics, society or government. These are the

parameters that need to be set and will be used to inform the overall construct of the

dissertation. What will follow is a discussion which goal is to intertwine the above

theories in explaining the liberal concept of political philosophy. This is seemingly a

straightforward task, combining various theoretical versions of the same ideology,

explaining the nuances and comparing and contrasting them. However, as Jeremy

Waldron states, it is anything but straightforward. ‘The terms 'socialism',

'conservatism', and 'liberalism' are like surnames and the theories, principles and

parties that share one of these names often do not have much more in common with

one another than the members of a widely extended family’ (Waldron 1987: p. 127).

These terms, particularly conservatism and liberalism, are wide open to philosophical

comprehension and critique. The purpose then is to provide a liberal construct that

will guide the arguments set out in this dissertation.

While the interpretations fluctuate over time, they all adhere to a few common

features, or principles that define their theoretical positions. Ubiquitously, liberalism

in contemporary liberal theories of social justice and equality begins with the

individual. It builds on the premise of individual liberty, autonomy of the individual,


basic rights, and strongly advocates the freedom of choice in how an individual

constructs, or has the opportunity to attain, her personal, or group conception of the

good life. In this dissertation, I will argue that liberalism rests on a certain

interpretation about the justification of social arrangements, and that this view is

intended to underline some of the differences and similarities between liberalism and

other ideologies. It should be made clear at this point that a liberal political

philosophy is committed to a conception of freedom and respect for the abilities and

autonomy of individual persons, namely the citizens, within the society of the

democratic state. The adherence to these commitments establishes the condition that

all aspects of the social polity should either be made acceptable, or capable, of being

made suitable by reasonable means, to every individual. This condition applies as

well to all variances of groups and subgroups. Secondly, I will argue that a liberal

conception of freedom and equality must be able to succinctly meet the condition

that its social and political order is legitimate in that the citizens agree and consent to

the conditions of being governed, by the ruling polity. And very importantly, it must

be morally permissible to enforce the said conditions against them. These common

features are the framework of the liberal conception of a political philosophy.

Considered one of the most influential writers of recent times is John Rawls who, in

his seminal book, ‘A Theory of Justice’, (Rawls 1999 [1971]), provided a robust and

comprehensive account of a liberal political philosophy. The work of Rawls will be

used as a core foundation in explaining the liberal doctrine and the principles

intended for this dissertation. The writings of Will Kymlicka will be used throughout

as an argument for inclusive multiculturalism in a liberal political philosophy as the

dissertation unfolds. One important aim is to determine if there is a genuine variation


of liberalism that can ultimately serve as a plausible political philosophy that

addresses the needs of a pluralistic multicultural citizenry.

According to Rawls, a concept of a liberal democratic state is arrived at from

individuals selecting principles of justice, as impartial and unbiased rational choices,

therefore ensuring the principle of justice as fairness (Rawls 1999: p. 12) is

sustained, principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. ‘This ensures

that no one is advantaged or disadvantage in the choice of principles by the outcome

of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances (Rawls 1999: p. 34).

The individual is unencumbered of external interferences, viewing behind the veil of

ignorance, freely choosing and favouring the rights of the self, prior to the overall

good. The liberal concept of state stresses freedom of expression, freedom of thought

and equality before the law. A core tenet of a liberal philosophy is the principle of

autonomy. Autonomy in the sense that an individual is free to choose a conception of

life that best suits his or her personal tastes. For the liberal political philosophy this is

an absolutely necessary condition to sustain the notion of a liberal state and support

the principles that constitute liberal philosophy in establishing the conception of the

good life. Autonomy is critical for the liberal construct, and in this dissertation I will

work from this thesis and assume that persons are autonomous in their having the

opportunity and freedom to choose the goods that are constitutive of the good life.

The argument then turns, and more focus is placed on the principle of justice as

fairness and the underpinning principle of universal treatment of all citizens. The

theoretical principle of autonomy and freedom of individual choice is intricately

intertwined with the availability of opportunities within the society from which to

choose. Logically then, the state must be capable to provide the same (universal)

opportunities to all. Although this liberal philosophy is a synthesis of a democratic


state conceived as a utopian thought experiment, it has nonetheless stood the test of

time as a comprehensive theory.

It is worth noting that Rawls’ methodology of selection of principles of justice is a

device, for argumentative purposes, to set the condition that fairness in justice

requires impartiality. Within that theoretical framework, Rawls posits two principles

of justice: Here we are mainly concerned with the second principle, the difference

principle. Rawls stipulates, ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so

that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b)

attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of

opportunity’ (Rawls 1999: p. 72). This is intended to mean that unless the least well

off can profit from any inequalities in welfare and benefits, there is no social justice.

He argues that a liberal political philosophy should aspire to be one that equally and

fairly meets the diversity and embedded beliefs, values etc., of its citizens, and one

where a consensus is established within agreed upon limits, and reasonable in the

arrived at normative consensus. Therefore, it is plausible to assume from this

assertion that a basic condition of all inclusiveness and plurality needs to be met to

validate social justice. A fully coherent political philosophy would aspire to a

achieve a form of pluralism whose function it is to be successful in defining the

common good for all groups, regardless of any cultural differences, whereby

agreeing to a minimal consensus of shared values and concurring that these values

are at least worth pursuing. A certain baseline would need to be established that

encompasses the aims of a political philosophy. A political philosophy positioned to

stipulate fairness in justice, equal opportunities for all groups, and a morally

legitimate theory that addresses issues of oppression and marginalization of groups

would be characteristic of a liberal pluralistic baseline. In short it should aspire to,


‘[…] end oppression, which by definition is socially imposed’ (E. Anderson 1999: p.

288). If these conditions are not met, or are not recognized as necessary conditions,

then a liberal political philosophy will remain limited to a doctrine of difference-

blind universal treatment, and this will prove to be problematic when the theme of

universality of same treatment of all groups is later explored. The difference

principle allows for all possibilities of a conception of fairness and equality, because

it is difference-blind and must be so. Where justice and equality for all groups is

concerned, however, the theory is compromised. Whereby if the individual is a priori

to the group, meaning that the autonomy of the individual comes before the needs of

the group, then this is a conundrum for the liberal theorist and a dilemma for the

difference principle. Rawls readily admits, indeed suggests it a virtue, that his

version of a liberal political philosophy isn’t a fully comprehensive theory. In the

following passage Rawls states it thusly, and provides an egalitarian explanation,

which acknowledges and then rejects the subjective elements necessary for a fully

coherent political philosophy.

A doctrine is fully comprehensive when it covers all recognized values and

virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought; whereas a

doctrine is partially comprehensive when it comprises certain, but not all,

nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated. By definition,

then, for a conception to be even partially comprehensive it must extend

beyond the political and include nonpolitical values and virtues. […] Political

liberalism is not, then, a view of the whole of life: it is not a (fully or

partially) comprehensive doctrine (Rawls in Matravers 2003: p. 165-66).

In fact the above definition is Kantian in premise and form. ‘In this way the

underlying structure of Kant’s doctrine is detached from its metaphysical

surroundings so that it can be seen more clearly and presented relatively free from

objection’ (Rawls 1999: p. 233). A pluralistic doctrine that aims to overcome

oppression and marginalization would arguably be inclined to extend beyond the

political and choose inclusiveness of all non-political values and virtues that


comprises all groups and subgroups, regardless if these virtues are recognized by

liberalism or not. For example, I would suggest that to be difference-blind would

equate that fair treatment is also colour-blind. This is surely the proposition of justice

as seen from behind the veil of ignorance, and as such, arguably, doesn’t meet the

inclusiveness required of a pluralistic society nor the requirements of a

comprehensive doctrine.

Rawls, endeavoring to overcome the dilemma and satisfy the condition of pluralism,

suggests that a political conception needs to meet a reciprocity condition. ‘[…] it is

not necessary to have strict consensus, for often a degree of overlapping consensus

allows the reciprocity condition to be fulfilled’ (Rawls 1999: p. 340). Although

Rawls was referring to duty and obligation of justice, this also applies to advancing

the idea of incorporating the overlapping of liberal doctrines. Therefore, instead of

the liberal restricting itself to a minimal set of considerations, there can be agreement

on certain core principles, thereby reaching a broader platform of consensus, for

instance, expanding the liberal doctrine to include both the private and public

spheres. This is the more modern liberal approach to pluralism and hybrid liberal

multiculturalism that writers like Will Kymlicka defend and which will be further

explored here. The gap that is filled by liberal multiculturalists as opposed to

traditional liberalists is allowing national minorities, such as indigenous people, the

notion of incorporating different rights for different groups. However, the challenge,

indeed the paradox, is to explain how these shared core principles are the very ones

that undermine their political philosophy.

Writing from the perspective of the multiculturalist, Will Kymlicka recognizes the

need for a pluralistic approach to a liberal political philosophy and one that conjoins

a multicultural aspect. Kymlicka, in a more contemporary liberal stance, posits the


need for an inclusive philosophy, one that melds the cultural aspects with the liberal

philosophy. The following quote encompasses his stance on liberal philosophy and

its corresponding principles quite succinctly: ‘The liberal view I am defending insists

that people can stand back and assess moral values and traditional ways of life, and

should be given not only the legal right to do so, but also the social conditions which

enhance this capacity (e.g. a liberal education)’ (Kymlicka 1996: p. 16). The social

conditions are understood to be the structural institutions that support a liberal state.

It goes back to the core principle of autonomy, addresses the moral authority of the

liberal, and expresses fairness and justice from the institutions that provide the liberal

framework to the social element that in turn supports the liberal principles. That in

short shrift is the framework of an ideal liberal construct. It is reasonable to suspect

that an overlapping consensus is a priori of a preexisting liberal democracy, in which

the majority shares liberal values. However, this opens the argument of question

begging, as Kymlicka is justifying liberalism with reference to liberal intuitions and

presupposed shared liberal values. A core tenet of liberalism is that in justice as

fairness all individuals are, viewed from behind the veil of ignorance, equal. While

this may be theoretically true, we are not all the same. One cannot surgically divide

and separate culture from the political. The personal is the political, and they are

intrinsically interwoven. Kymlicka accepts the premise that the cultural aspect is part

of the pluralistic political landscape.

The sort of culture that I will focus on, however, is a societal culture—that is,

a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the

full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,

recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private

spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a

shared language (Kymlicka 1996: p. 1).

This is a culturally inclusive statement that neatly encompasses the liberal’s attempt

to reference all aspects of society back to a liberal vantage point. The meaningful


ways of life are open to many interpretations, and all interpretations would include

equal opportunities to access the full range of human activities as suggested by

Kymlicka. The good life, given the right liberal prescription, becomes seemingly

passive to cultural influences and transcends above and crosses over to illiberal

groups, merely because some aspects of their cultures are liberal. This is arguably an

elitist position and one challenged by Bhikhu Parekh. He asserts, […] ‘directly or

indirectly and subtly or crudely, liberals continue to absolutize liberalism. Hence

their persistent tendency to make it their central frame of reference, divide all ways

of life into liberal and nonliberal, equate the latter with illiberal, and to talk of

tolerating and rarely of respecting or cherishing them’ (Parekh 2000: p. 240). Again,

it is the circularity of argument where liberals acknowledge culture embeddedness,

but remain too firmly committed to the thesis that culture is, and must be structured

as such, to advocate and improve the individual capacity for autonomy. The

presupposed universality of liberalism, even when only strains of liberalism exist in

subcultures, positions the liberal political philosophy to be undermined by its own

principles. By this I mean that autonomy and the basic rights advocated by liberalism

are not congruent and applicable to all groups and subgroups. Equal treatment does

not necessarily promote autonomy, and as such, it is misleading, and does not

advance the theory of a fully comprehensive liberal doctrine.

Thus far I have explained how liberal writers, Rawls, Waldron and Kymlicka,

integrate overlapping liberal views to construct and sustain a liberal political

philosophy that seemingly promotes justice as fairness, integrates pluralism in the

liberal principles and engages issues of multiculturalism. However, the sum of the

core principles amounts to an approach that while perfectly logical, still falls short of

addressing the need for special rights for certain groups. The critique of their


positions all along has been consistent in arguing how the liberal political philosophy

sustains inequalities by adhering to all things liberal as the starting point and insisting

on a sameness, i.e. a difference-blind treatment in the application of its core

principles. I will now discuss how liberal interaction with illiberal groups affects

domestic culture and policies. While the discussion of illiberal groups tends to be

oriented around religious topics, i.e. citizens of faith (Gaus 2014: p. 15), this thesis

will incorporate the cultural aspects of the African-Americana, citizens of colour, for

the purposes of deconstructing the liberal political philosophy. The condition

stipulated earlier in this section that was posited as a necessary condition for the

liberal philosophy to meet was, […] ‘to end oppression, which by definition is

socially imposed’ (E. Anderson 1999: p. 288-9). I will then take this one step further

and add, ‘Its proper aim is not to ensure that everyone gets what they morally

deserve, but to create a community in which people stand in relations of equality to

others’ ‘Ibid pp. 288-9’. This condition must be met by the liberal philosophy. If it is

not, there are significant gaps in the theory that cannot be considered plausible, thus

their principles will be rejected.

It is certainly reasonable to project the proposition that the condition to end or

minimize oppression and marginalization has at least some minor obstacles for the

liberal political philosophy. When considering the plight of the African-American

experience, it can be demonstrated that indeed, polity and liberal political

philosophical principles hinder and possibly sustain inequalities in a multicultural

society. The issues to be addressed will be oppression and marginalization. Are the

African-American as an oppressed and marginalized minority, and if so, why are

they treated as a subgroup, and how, if so, does a liberal political policy play a role in

the continual oppression and marginalization? Secondly, are the African-American


communities provided equal treatment in comparison with other groups in similar

communities? Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that the African-American

have continued to be oppressed and marginalized in black only communities. By

unjust systemic local and national politics they have been marginalized and

gerrymandered into ghettoes where the virtues of the liberal societal culture are kept

out of reach, by limited opportunities and moreover, poverty. If this premise were

true, and liberal principles played a role in sustaining inequalities, then how would

the liberal philosophy address the need to remedy the situation? It would be too easy

and open to scapegoating to assign blame merely on liberal principles and move on

from there. There must be other factors worth considering. Is it simple bad luck

(Anderson 1999: p. 292) that one is born into such circumstances? At this point in

the discussion, I will limit the definition of bad luck to a condition or to attributes

that might describe the African-American of today, as such. ‘Recent egalitarian

writing has come to be dominated by the view that the fundamental aim of equality is

to compensate people for undeserved bad luck—being born with poor native

endowments, bad parents, and disagreeable personalities, suffering from accidents

and illness, and so forth’ (Anderson 1999: p. 288). It is not so much the remedy to

the bad luck that is under scrutiny here at this juncture, it is moreover to ascribe a

position that liberal egalitarian theorists use when arguing their principles. The point

being, how can a liberal stance of equal opportunity of education, basic rights etc., be

applied to a position of being born into a minority bad luck community where access

to better schools has been revoked through marginalization? This will be taken up for

further critique in the multiculturalism chapter. Another consideration is the theory

of the social contract, hypothetically as a thought experiment or in real world

practicality. In other words, the way that we interpret a social contract can be


problematic, and in conjunction with a bad luck explanation, it obstructs the

successful pursuit of liberal principles as liberal remedies.

I will argue it is a myriad and combination of liberal political characteristics that

underpin a failure to address oppression in a multicultural world. The combination is

philosophically, sociologically and historically constructed. And as such, it can be

better understood when one considers how the object of the current liberal social

contract differs from traditional contract theorists who like Hobbes or Locke, placed

the object of the social contract in association of political terms. Their concern was

with the obligations the citizen has to the state, consenting to the limits and

justifications and to obey the state. Rawls, among others, made the philosophical

shift from consent in terms of social contract theory and positioned it where it is now

thought of as an agreement.

The role of unanimous collective agreement is in showing what we have

reasons to do in our social and political relations (Freeman 2007: p. 19). Thus

understood the agreement is not itself a binding act—it is not a performative

that somehow creates obligation—but is reason-revealing. If individuals are

rational, what they agree to reflect the reasons they have (Lessnoff 1986: p.

15).

So, in a contemporary setting, social contract theorists such as Rawls in A Theory of

Justice did not base obligations on consent per se, rather, obligations must pass

muster through the framework of the original agreement, which by definition are:

‘They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own

interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental

terms of their association’ (Rawls 1999: p. 33). And here is a shifting point in

political theory where obligation was not based on consent but one of […] ‘The

question of justification…by working out a problem of deliberation’ (Rawls 1999, p.

16). A deliberative approach attempts to solve a justificatory problem by means of


collective agreement among the citizenry. This process entails and includes justifying

social arrangements that are reasonable and have normative properties. Rawls later

took the object of agreement to be principles of justice meant to regulate the basic

structure.

The basic structure is understood as the way in which the major social

institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental

rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through

social cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the legally enforced forms

of property, and the organization of the economy, and the nature of the

family, all belong to the basic structure (Rawls 1999: p. 258).

This is a very broad and all-encompassing liberal declaration. If the same rules and

agreements throughout all levels of a society are justified having met the condition of

collective agreement, then ipso facto the conditions that ‘shape the division of

advantages’ ‘Ibid p. 258’ take on the characteristics of a social contract and the

institutions provide the basic structure. Arguably this could be understood as a

conceptual super-structure in which to host a theoretical status quo social contract. If

the liberal philosophy claims that the status quo is arrived at by collective social

cooperation, then the social contract must include fair and equal representation of all

social groups. The furtherance of social contract exclusion by groups will be more

fleshed out and brought to light in the case of the African-American later in the

multicultural section of this paper. For now, it suffices in summary, to assert that

liberal principles are constitutive of, partially or entirely, an institutionalized basic

structure. The principles of autonomy, difference-blind treatment and collective

agreement are some of the core tenets of the liberal political philosophy. These

principles are not innocuous; they don’t reside in a philosophical vacuum. The liberal

political philosophy guides the reasoning behind social policies that are influential in

the marginalization and oppression of the African-American.


3. MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalists generally adhere to the claims that groups make up various forms

and facets of societal culture, and each group’s difference represents their cultural

variances. A common basis of agreement of liberal and multiculturalists is that these

groups are democratically recognized and their cultural diversities are to be

accommodated. While liberals would argue that they too are also inclusive in

accommodating cultural differences, some multiculturalists expand the notion of

plurality by advocating group rights specific to the particular needs of a group’s

collective representation. The aim here is to expound on the differences in principles

that traditional liberal philosophy advocates for equal treatment for groups, and

conversely, counter what contemporary illiberal multiculturalists see as liberal

shortcomings. Examples of groups that entail cultural variances are minorities,

subgroups of ethnocultural backgrounds and indigenous persons. Within these

groups there are culturally specific attributes that encompass religion, race, ethnicity,

language, socioeconomic factors etc. ‘Culture is a notoriously overbroad concept,

and all of these categories have been subsumed by or equated with the concept of

culture’ (Song 2014). Multicultural theorists tend to concentrate their respective

political philosophical theories on immigrants and national minorities. Liberal

philosophy and moreover liberal multiculturalism theory, in order to be all-inclusive,

would need to fully incorporate ethnocultural groups, specifically the African-

American, to be considered a fully comprehensive philosophy. Most political

philosophies in a modern Western state are committed to certain inalienable rights

that govern the opportunities for, and the advancement of, remedies to inequalities in

the evolving political concepts of identity, difference and recognition. […] ‘all of

which share a commitment to revaluing disrespected identities and changing

dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalize certain


groups’ (Young 1990, Taylor 1992, Gutmann 2003). What follows is an example of

how an illiberal multiculturalist attempts to accommodate cultural differences to a

marginalized group, where group representation would better serve the need for more

equal opportunities, and a more fair distributive theory of justice and equality.

A rather contentious theory developed by Marion Young challenges the liberal

principle of citizenship. Her somewhat radical conception of citizenship is based on

differentiated citizenship – that is, a conception of citizenship in which rights, for

example, for political representation, are not uniform but vary between groups and

are distributed on a special group basis. (Young 1989: p. 215). The point of this

example is to differentiate the positions of liberal political principles and those of a

multiculturalist. The liberal is committed to same rights - that is - a universality of

one size fits all ideal of equality. In contrast, Young posits a more pluralistic nuanced

notion of how to address fairness in political representation in the democratic

decision making process. The dichotomy here is the tendency of the liberal theorist

to presuppose variances in minority cultural practices by positioning the differences

in how they can best be understood and tolerated within the framework of liberal

principles. And this is problematic for the liberal, as society is fluid and a fixed

model is rigid. When a principle of universal treatment of groups equates to a

principle of same remedies, then logically some group will be burdened with

enforced inequalities that become institutionalized. This is not a successful all-

inclusive methodology.

Contemporary moral and ethical liberal philosophy makes claims that attempt to

affix values and certain beliefs that should be applicable to all groups. They take as a

starting point the evident variances between groups and cultures and ascribe a

universal notion of what would a reasonable individual common attribute. The


variances are bundled together into individual choices that make up the group

consensus. However, in determining what is considered inclusive of the good life,

i.e., what is desirable and valuable to an individual, it is problematic to liberal

reasoning to suggest what a group’s aspirations are, when addressing cultural

pluralism. ‘Normative reason, it is suggested, entails universality in a Kantian sense:

when a person claims that something is good or right he or she is claiming that

everyone in principle could consistently make that claim, and that everyone should

accept it’ (Young in Matravers 2003: p. 236). Normative values are as diverse as the

groups to which liberals assign universal treatment. Granting group differentiated

rights to ethnocultural minorities is another way of accommodating diversity in

normative aspirations. The liberal principle in this way is exclusionary; it doesn’t

allow diversification within groups. What follows is the liberal principle of same

group rights that sustain the notion of what is considered normative and hence, the

liberal version of differential treatment is arguably conflated with discrimination by

exclusion. To further confound the liberal dilemma, it’s not the same principles as it

applies to immigrant groups or national minorities. So, a fair definition of

multiculturalism for the purposes intended in this dissertation is:

The argument is that failure to offer special treatment is in some

circumstances itself a kind of unequal treatment. For, it is said, the same law

may have a different impact on different people as a result of their religious

beliefs or cultural practices. Thus, the liberal claim that equal treatment is

generated by a system of uniform laws is invalid (Matravers 2003: p. 250).

Here the argument shifts from a purely philosophical nature to a blend of the liberal

and nonliberal political philosophy. Simply put, the non-liberal in this hybrid is not

committing to the traditional liberal principle of same rights to all groups. The

ethnocultural group, the African-American, aren’t making claims of self-

determination, only equality in justice and fairness in opportunity on terms with the

dominant society at large.


A liberal theorist’s methodology in resolving a political pluralist dilemma associated

with identity, normative values, differences in groups and group recognition, has

been guided by an all-encompassing general principle of non-discrimination. By

applying the same liberal doctrine to minorities and immigrants to that of religious

groups, the same principles of equal treatment could be applicable to all. Important to

consider in the theory is the equation of the individual freedom of choice, and the

hands-off approach by the state. ‘Ethnocultural groups, like religious groups, should

be protected from discrimination, but the maintenance and reproduction of these

groups should be left to the free choices of individuals in the private sphere, neither

helped nor hindered by the state’ (Kymlicka 1997: p. 72). I present this binary

viewpoint only to serve as an extreme starting point in which to counter the liberal

political philosophy. Kymlicka invokes the above statement to assert that his

alternative approach is well established ‘Ibid: p. 72’. He further states that the

orthodox liberal view is incoherent as the state must, and therefore does, intercede to

promote equalities. My purpose is to demonstrate that the starting point of the

liberal’s approach isn’t that far from the orthodox view, in terms of multiculturalism,

to be positioned as sustaining inequalities borne of liberal principles.

Although Kymlicka rejects the above claim that the state should never interfere with

the private sphere, he does so with the oft-repeated liberal caveats. The liberal values

of autonomy and equality are framed as such to suggest that culture, […] ‘is said to

be instrumentally valuable to individuals, for two reasons. First it enables individual

autonomy’ (Song 2010). If culture were a by-product of the choices of individuals

freely choosing the normative values that constitute the framework of their beliefs,

then the private sphere would theoretically be the dominant sphere. The public

sphere would abide by the conditions set by the private sphere. This would be


considered a less diluted concept of autonomy. However, if the state is the governing

principle, then I see freedom curtailed, even if only with minimal intervention from

the state. The reality is, it depends on which group one is referring to, because clearly

some groups have more opportunities to exercise autonomy. Autonomy is only able

to come to fruition if there are adequate choices available to choose from. Culture, as

in the above example of religious groups being equal to the other groups, provides

the normative context from which to meaningfully construct their lives. Autonomy is

clearly less able to be a predominate factor in choosing the constructs of what is

considered the good life for some groups as opposed to other groups.

Hence, having the opportunities and the freedom to make autonomous choices that

individuals should enjoy are key to its theoretical success. Inequalities are subject to

individual choices, and even personal attributes. According to Kymlicka, there is a

direct line of connection between the self-respect of the individual and the respect

conferred to the group that the individual belongs to. So, the inequalities that arise

within the minority group from the lack of respect from the majority culture, based

on forms of discrimination and marginalization, for instance, are considered un-

chosen inequalities. Luck egalitarianism (Anderson 1999: p. 289), as touched on in

the liberalism section above, argues that the individual choices that one makes are his

responsibility, and one must be held responsible for any inequalities that stem from

these choices. It is worth noting an example of the ensuing case study at this point: Is

the plight of the African-American in the U.S. based on bad luck egalitarian claims,

or is there ingrained ethnocultural non-discrimination liberal principle prevalent in

both the private and public sphere that needs remedied? Liberal political philosophy

theorists, Kymlicka included, contend that antidiscrimination laws alone can’t satisfy

or remedy the situation because states cannot be neutral (but they can interfere, with


bias) with respect to culture and thus the members of the minority group are not

treated equally. Which only goes to the argument that the state must also adhere to a

blanket policy of same discriminatory principle, regardless of the cultural ethnicity of

the group. If this is an outright rejection of differential treatment, purported as a

liberal solution to solving the dilemma of discrimination, then I would suggest that

the adherence to the principle is a form of discrimination. As such, it is plausible to

assert that there are some variances of liberal principles that do in fact sustain

inequalities. Furthermore, and most importantly, is to redefine the issue of not why

or how discrimination exists, as it is unquestionably empirically valid to state overt

discriminatory practises do exist. Moreover it’s how they are systemic and are

continuously applied to the ethnocultural group of African-American. If states can’t

be neutral in differential treatment, then as Marion Young argues:

Equal treatment requires everyone to be measured according to the same

norms, but in fact there are no ‘neutral’ norms of behavior and performance.

Where some groups are privileged and others oppressed, the formulation of

law, policy, and the rules of private institutions tend to be biased in favor of

the privileged groups, because their particular experience implicitly sets the

norm (Young in Matravers 2003: p. 233).

If antidiscrimination laws are rejected by the liberal political philosophy as treating

the group members inequitable, how does the more contemporary liberal theory of

multiculturalism, like Will Kymlicka, handle the contentious theme of antiracism?

‘Race has a more limited role in multicultural discourse. Antiracism and

multiculturalism are distinct but related ideas: the former highlights “victimization

and resistance” whereas the latter highlights “cultural life, cultural expression,

achievements, and the like”’ (Blum 1992, p. 14). What I intend to now explore are

the actual practices of liberal democracies in regards to ethnocultural groups. How

does the liberal multicultural political philosophy address the issues of race and

discrimination in pluralistic society?


The first step is to unpack the distinctions between legal immigrants and national

minorities. The aim is to inquire how a liberal political philosophy can explain the

differentiation of the two and how this then applies (or understood) in regards to the

African-American experience. Sarah Song, a writer on multiculturalism poses the

question, ‘What is the relationship between multiculturalism and the integration of

immigrants?’ (Song 2010). In most liberal democracies, the immigrant is expected, if

not forced, to integrate into the dominant society. The quest for the good or better

life, or whatever reasons brought them to hold an immigrant status, becomes tied to

the social participation requirements through policy, education, laws etc. Immigrants

are granted a multicultural allowance (of tolerance) and are often encouraged to

maintain some aspects of their original cultural identities to foster some, but not

necessarily all cultural attributes, to achieve full assimilation. This is clearly apparent

in the Chinese immigrant communities in New York or San Francisco in the U.S.A.

for instance. On the other hand, national minorities such as the American Indians

were historically forced and coerced to assimilate to the cultural demands of the

White hegemonic settlers. Over time, this indigenous group was relocated, given

land and accorded rights of self-government. These rights included the opportunities

for inclusive education and the possibility of economic prosperity. The relationship

between certain ideals of multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants is well

established. And accordingly, this includes differential treatment in liberal

democracies of national minorities, immigrants and ethnocultural groups. Kymlicka

attempts to answer the question why there is a need for a type of differential

treatment, and explains this with liberal philosophical conditions. He rejects the

notion of direct ethnocultural prejudices from the dominant group. He suggests that,

‘Majority cultures have typically been equally contemptuous of the ethnocultural

identity and practices of homeland minorities and of immigrant groups’ (Kymlicka


1997: p. 74). He is then resolved to ascribe the need for differential treatment to the

attributes of aspirations and expectations of the immigrants and national minorities,

who might end up simply in a bad luck life because of poor choices.

These different groups have different sets of beliefs of what constitutes the good life.

This entails not only their aspirations and expectations, but also what they believe

they are entitled to from the state. Kymlicka asserts that these personal beliefs are

met and accommodated through the collective agreement of mutual expectations.

Presumably by an accommodation process through a mix of private and public

spheres negotiations, over time by redefinition and interpretation, based on liberal

principles. The end result, through this methodological process, is the acceptance of

national minorities and immigrants. And he concludes his argument with the

following: ‘So it is worth contemplating the possibility that the patterns of

ethnocultural relations which have emerged within constitutional liberal democracies

reflect the slow but steady working out of liberal principles’ (Kymlicka 1997: p. 74).

I would suggest that his liberal philosophical theory is short-sighted, non-inclusive,

and skirts the issue of discrimination by not addressing what it entails, and arguably,

that it is racism. It is worth noting that this is not to suggest that Kymlicka is

denying that discrimination still exists, rather, it is plausible that he is acknowledging

that there are alternatives to the traditional liberal abstract, but simultaneously, the

liberal principles will accord themselves to an eventual remedy. However, even

afforded that plausible notion, it still leaves the liberal political philosophy in an

incoherent and incomplete state, i.e. as discussed above in the liberalism section, and

worth repeating. ‘By definition, then, for a conception to be even partially

comprehensive it must extend beyond the political and include nonpolitical values

and virtues.’ […] ‘Political liberalism is not, then, a view of the whole of life: it is


not a (fully or partially) comprehensive doctrine’ (Rawls in Matravers 2003: p. 165-

66).

Therefore, it is arguably not a comprehensive theory, if one, it refuses to accept

empirical evidence of the societal realities, and two, if it cannot apply its principles

to the multicultural issue of prejudice. Which then raises a contentious issue: is this

an unambiguous violation of exclusionary non-political values and virtues, through

systemic racism? If so, as I will further explore, it is then endemic to the liberal

political philosophical principles that they sustain inequalities.

So, in light of what has been outlined above, I will now position the liberal

perspective of multiculturalism in a contemporary situation to gauge the overall

argument of fair and equal treatment to all groups, specifically an ethnocultural

group. The African-American didn’t immigrate to America, and they aren’t

indigenous to the country. According to Kymlicka, […] ‘there are some ethno-

cultural groups, such as the African‐Americans, that were never appropriately seen

as immigrants or national minorities’ (Kymlicka 1996: p. 23). It was through forced

migration that the native African came to America, to be used as slave labour in

service of the wealthy white hegemonic planter aristocracy. And once here they were

colonized, placed in slave labour camps, and then subjected to separate unjust

criminal codes that were targeted to and only applied to black people. It is not the

intention of this dissertation to provide a historical account of the plight of the slave

or the origins of slavery in detail. Although there is a long and robust history of

philosophical theory to ownership and property rights that certainly provided

temporal justification for slavery within Britain, notably, and then to America, that


would be an addendum to a lengthier dissertation.1 However, it is necessary to offer

some contemporary contextual backdrop to illustrate and illuminate how a liberal

political philosophy developed over time and how their core principles, of universal

treatment for instance, came to stand in relation to empirical evidence as it unfolded

over time. In turn it will reflect the temporal recursive attempts to apply liberal

principles to bridge the chasm of bad luck egalitarian claims and oppression by

ingrained ethnocultural discrimination, e.g. racism.

The proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the impact of

brute from human affairs, but to end oppression, which by definition is

socially imposed. Its proper positive aim is not to ensure that everyone gets

what they morally deserve, but to create a community in which people stand

in relations of equality to others (E. Anderson 1999: p. 288).

Whatever explanation is adopted in defining what constitutes the economic

causational framework of racism in the U.S.A., and how, unintentionally or

otherwise, it did arise in form and practice to become a systemic doctrine that

promotes inequalities in the African-American experience. Bad luck isn’t

constitutive of a social order based on inherent talents. An individual or group that

hadn’t efficiently utilized their talents isn’t a causal effect to produce just deserts or

dictate a deterministic conception of the good life to its natural conclusion. Rather, it

is being born in a society that by default limits equal opportunities and lack of life

choices that in turn construct bad luck. I will briefly explore this claim on which to

critique the liberal perspective. The proposition as stated above in the liberalism

chapter and reiterated here is as follows: a liberal political philosophy is problematic

in addressing how to provide a remedy for inequalities and injustices regarding the

plight, i.e. marginalization and oppression, of the African-American. First, however,

a brief summary of the actual situation of the African-American and how it came to

be, and as it is now understood, is necessary to then address the crux of the premise.

1 Having said that, it would make for a more fully comprehensive undertaking to combine this variant of political

liberalism, but for the purpose of this dissertation it is not viable, but nevertheless needed to be considered.


Although slavery was formally abolished and blacks were granted freedom and

limited rights as stated in the 13th amendment to the U.S. constitution, not more than

a decade later, slavery by another name1 was introduced. The autonomous capitalist,

still operating within the model of agribusiness and slave labour dedicated to

generating individual wealth, was replaced with an even more valuable form of

slavery. […] ‘more valuable because the state, not the capitalist, was responsible for

sustaining the enslaved labor force, meaning that blacks were arrested without real

cause and prisoners were put to work for these business interests. The system

provided a major contribution to the rapid industrial development from the late 19th

century’ (Chomsky 2015). This economic model of slave labour was sustained until

WWII where the war effort required a more or less free labour market and allowed

for a form of egalitarianism to take shape. Factory work provided a black family with

equal opportunities to acquire property and access to education. The civil rights

movement, part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s great society welfare state, opened some

doors for the African-American, and by the mid 1960’s, Martin Luther King’s efforts

to develop a movement of the poor and make legal headway to confront racism in the

northern states was, for all practical purposes, shut down. The second economic

casual element of the framework of racism took place under the presidency of

Ronald Reagan. The neoliberal policies (favouring the white wealthy class structure)

implemented in the late 1970’s, hit the poorest and most vulnerable in society, i.e.

the blacks already dwelling in the state sponsored projects. Reagan’s war on drugs

was deeply racist in conception and execution, and initiated a new Jim Crow. 2 There

are of course many more layers of social constructionism, social psychology and

variances of political philosophy that cannot be addressed in this short thesis,

1 Also the title of an important book by Douglas A. Blackmon. Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement

of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II

2 Michelle Alexander’s term for the revived criminalization of predominantly black men. The incarceration rates

continue to have a devastating effect on opportunities for growth and education within the black community.


however, the two pillars of the economic casual framework provided here present a

reasonable depiction of the method through which institutional racism was brought

about and produced the fabric that interweaves all aspects of the African-American

situation. ‘The persistence of systemic racism means there are penalties for blackness

in America’ (Harris 2015). This is a unique situation in the nation building of

America, and one that a liberal political philosophy is problematic in addressing how

to provide a remedy for inequalities and injustices regarding the plight of the

African-American.

To reiterate, the black American was neither an immigrant nor considered a national

minority. The liberal philosophy must be able to apply its principles here to provide a

reasonable solution or a theoretical alternative to the problem of racism. If it could be

demonstrated that this is not plausible, it would be considered a violation of liberal

principles in general, and thusly must be rejected. Therefore, in order to further the

multiculturalist position regarding racism, it is necessary to return to Rawls for this

section of the chapter. There have been many proposed remedies for the vast

inequalities that the African-American has suffered and continues to suffer, as no

other ethnocultural minority in the history of the U.S. has. Some of these attempts at

remedies include: equal opportunities for education, affirmative action programs,

welfare, integration policies, fairer political representation, just to name a few.

I’m going to now address a general concept of redistribution. There is undoubtedly a

philosophical need to question how to achieve equality through fairness in the

distribution of wealth and resources. Thus, the aim is to ascertain how liberal

principles, discussed within the politics of liberal equality, when applied to the case

study, succeed or fail. And the result will determine if they are to be accepted or

rejected. The first premise to be discussed is the differentiation of liberal theory in


regards to the welfare state and distribution of social primary goods. The citizens of

the modern democratic state, aside from strict libertarians, are all committed to some

version of a welfare state. To what degree is debatable, but it is a necessary condition

that some form of what constitutes an ideal life is established. As Jeremy Waldron

aptly states, […] ‘there is something like pursuing a conception of the good life that

all people, even those with the most diverse commitments, can be said to be engaged

in […] although people do not share one another’s ideals, they can at least abstract

from their experience a sense of what it is like to be committed to an ideal of the

good life’ (Waldron 1987: p. 145). In order for persons to pursue these commitments,

it is a necessary condition that there are viable means made available for all citizens

that allow for these social conditions to be met. This is a truism of all social contract

theories, including Rawls, and is contextually valid for the purposes of the following

explanation. In Rawls’ theory, the resources available to all parties within the society

are called primary goods (Rawls 1999: p. 54). He posits two kinds of primary goods,

social and natural primary goods. The concentration is focused on the social primary

goods. These are goods, material or benefits that are directly distributed by social

institutions, like income and wealth, opportunities of education, access to health care

and rights and liberties. Rawls argues that the rational actor would choose, behind

the veil of ignorance, the principle of justice that would allow best possible access to

the primary goods, i.e. the institutional distribution of social goods that contribute to

the good life. This would require that the rational person needs to accept the

possibility that not knowing where they could end up in society they must empathise

with every other member of society, to ensure that equal consideration is given to all

accounts. Indeed, to meet the condition of the original position, all parties are bound

to ensure the best possible access to primary goods that lead to a worthwhile life, are

selected behind the veil of ignorance. This is a necessary condition.


However, there are many life possibilities and variances thereof to choose from. One

could choose that all social groups receive equal shares of the primary social goods.

Rawls argues that this would be irrational, not because it absolutely violates the

difference principle, but because it doesn’t serve the conditions of the difference

principle. ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both

(a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged’ […] (Rawls 1999: p. 72).

All groups receiving an equal share cannot meet the necessary condition that would

require that there be an improvement to everyone’s access to social goods. A

utilitarian principle could be the chosen model, whereby social institutions are

obligated to a distribution model that maximises utility of social primary goods to all

parties. However, the argument follows that the utilitarian principle is integral to risk.

It requires that in order to maximise utility, some groups must sacrifice for the

greater good of the majority. This sacrifice, voluntary or involuntary, exposes

vulnerabilities to the liberties inherent to a multicultural society, in both the liberal

welfare state and the distribution of social primary goods. ‘Indeed, it leaves you

unprotected precisely in those situations where you are most likely to need protection

– e.g. when your beliefs, skin-colour, sex, or natural abilities make you unpopular, or

simply dispensable, to the majority’ (Kymlicka 2002: p. 65). Rawls argues that

sometimes, in order to arrive at the intended concept of the difference principle, a

fluid description of the original position is acceptable, as long as it yields the

principles that we find intuitively acceptable. It is my contention that there is a fault

in this argument. The original position is theoretically based on impartiality in the

selection of fairness and equality, i.e. there being no discrimination of gender, race or

sex. These attributes are neutralized in the thought experiment. However, once

intuition, in the sense of being empirically and culturally positioned on the ground, as

it were, is interjected into the equation the difference principle is no longer


contextually valid. Intuition is highly subjective and open to conjecture and nuances.

It is certainly temporally fluid and shifts as the cultural landscape alters over time.

This is a challenge to liberal philosophy and one that could plausibly reject, or at

least one that could negate a pure hypothetical conception of justice or equality.

So, the interpretation of a conception of justice that is regarded intuitively

acceptable, might arguably lead to utilitarianism and leave certain groups vulnerable,

i.e. the African-American. Rawls admits to adapting the original position to yield

principles that adhere to our intuitions. I would suggest that this is question begging.

It is at the very least arguably a somewhat circular logic that lands the liberal

political theory inevitably back to a faulty premise of its core principles. Meaning,

this tends to be an overreliance on a presupposed universality of its principles and for

all practical purposes is not able to offer a reasonable solution to the dilemma of

pluralism or racism. Bhikhu Parekh makes this distinction clear in his claim that

liberals construct a binary absolutism in what is considered liberal or nonliberal

principles. He provides a rather succinct example to highlight this binary by the

example: divide all religions into either Christianity or non-Christianity, and declare

the latter anti-Christianity. He accuses liberals of moving the goalposts to fit the

conditions staked out by their positions. For instance, […] ‘thin down liberal

principles to what they take to be their minimum content, and make tolerance of

nonliberal cultures conditional upon their acceptance of it’ (Parekh 2000: p. 240).

From my perspective there appears to be no distinction between what is liberal by

nature, what is liberal by historical developments, what is absolutely universal, or

what minimums of liberalism are or are not accepted across the board. And this

argument is relevant to intuition being utilized as a theoretical device to make the

difference principle more applicable and flexible to a version of liberal philosophy


that strives to be more inclusive than it is in application. From a hybrid

multiculturalist perspective, the theoretical options available to encourage plurality

and promote economic fairness are left few and far between - particularly when

excluding intuition and empirical evidence and then attempting to apply the liberal

political philosophy in both theory and in society. There are variances of

multiculturalism where group rights and group representation might provide better

liberal (or otherwise) alternatives to equality and opportunity. What is vital is to

explore these alternatives and to answer the question: can these alternatives lessen

the societal impact of oppression and marginalization in regards to the African-

American and offer some ideas to a more balanced principle of distributive justice?

Earlier in this section, the concept of differentiated citizenship, a multicultural theory

posited by Marion Young, was used as an example to establish a juxtaposing position

to the liberal application of same treatment in providing the necessary conditions for

same rights, a universal (one size fits all) ideal of equality. The contrast is stark,

between a fixed set of principles and a pluralistic nuanced notion of how to address

fairness in political representation in the democratic decision making process. It is

also essential to determine if there is in fact a remedy to inequality, or at least a

plausible alternative to initiate a new or different starting point. The following quote

encapsulates Young’s position and offers a theoretical starting point to evaluate

differences in political philosophies: […] ‘where differences in capacities, culture,

values, and behavioral styles exist among groups, but some of these groups are

privileged, strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment tends to perpetuate

oppression or disadvantage’ (Young in Matravers 2003: p. 220). It is not a trivial task

to seek and employ any remedy of lasting philosophical value. However, it is both

necessary and reasonable to consider any alternatives, including for instance a


philosophical shift to meld a hypothetical social contract agreement and an actual in-

praxis collective agreement into a model that represents the real world. Historical

context is a necessary condition when considering the formulation of a societal

framework that offers remedies to real world inequalities. James Buchanan summed

this up quite eloquently. ‘We start from here, from where we are, and not from some

idealized world peopled by beings with a different history and utopian institutions.

Some appreciation of the status quo is essential before discussion can begin about the

prospects for improvements’ (Buchanan 2000 [1975], xv). From there, it is worth

noting that the U.S. Constitution was created as a white-only social contract under

which blacks were not penned in as free and equal parties. It was theoretically drawn

up and became a legally binding contract without the equal rights of the African-

American being considered - which naturally led to very real world consequences.

The African-American did not choose to be here and did not agree to abide by the

constraints of freedom and liberty that was used to oppress and marginalize them.

The experience of the African-American is a very unique situation and one that is

ever evolving, albeit slowly, given the need to accommodate the historical baggage.

It would appear seemingly obvious that some explanation of liberal social contract

theorists would be able to shed some reasonable insights and conclusions addressing

social remedies, i.e. for example, ex ante equality endowments (Kymlicka 2002: p.

89) to the plight and suffering of an ethnic group that comprises a population of some

41.7 million persons1 in the U.S. These insights and conclusions should address the

crux of the social contract. […] ‘the problem of justification – what principles can be

justified to all reasonable citizens or persons’ (D'Agostino, Gaus, and Thrasher

1 Those who identified only as African American made up 13.2% of the U.S. population-over 41.7 million people. The US

Census Bureau projects that by the year 2060 there will be 74.5 million African Americans including those of more than one

race in the United States, making up 17.9% of the total U.S. population. Apr 28, 2015,

www.cdc.gov/minorityhealth/populations/REMP/black.html

http://www.cdc.gov/minorityhealth/populations/REMP/black.html


2014). The starting point that I claimed above is that being excluded from the

creation of any social contract, Rawlsian or otherwise, violates fair and equal

conditions when insisting on the principle of universality of equal treatment. Of no

less importance is the lack of political representation for all reasonable citizens. This

factor is paramount in sustaining inequalities through continued oppression and

marginalization of a minority group. As Marion Young further concludes: ‘The

inclusion and participation of everyone in social and political institutions therefore

sometimes requires the articulation of special rights that attend to group differences

in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage’ (Young in Matravers 2003: p.

220). It is a well-known fact that the African-American in the U.S. is an oppressed

and marginalized minority group. Some attempts to remedy the status quo of their

situation have been discussed here and thusly found to be less than conclusive as

viable and plausible alternatives to alleviate or minimize their plight. The aim now is

to discuss group special rights and to evaluate Young’s theory. Can her alternative

approach counter the liberal thesis of multiculturalism and provide a genuine form of

equality?

A basic assumption postulated in her writing is that modern political thought

surmises that citizenship implies a social contract that suspends any and all group

differences, be it status, variances in wealth distribution or general issues of societal

inequality amongst its citizens. Citizenship trumps all group differences and levels

all concepts of fair treatment.

With equality conceived as sameness, the ideal of universal citizenship carries

at least two meanings in addition to the extension of citizenship to everyone:

(a) universality defined as general in opposition to particular; what citizens

have in common as opposed to how they differ, and (b) universality in the

sense of laws and rules that say the same for all and apply to all in the same

way; laws and rules that are blind to individual and group differences (Young

in Matravers 2003: p. 219).

As I discussed above, civil rights and social movements intended to bring about


social change for the African-American have for the most part failed. The belief that

extended citizenship to minority groups would automatically level social justice and

equality also fell short of its mark. Marion Young’s view is that a universality of

inclusion is in tension with the liberal principle of universality of equal treatment. A

proper conception of citizenship must regard cultural differences and variances

within groups. For instance, amongst many others, is a women’s right to their own

reproductive decisions. Her proposed solution is that democratic processes engage

special mechanisms that provide representation of groups that are oppressed or

otherwise disadvantaged, as well as the individuals within their group. Woman’s

groups would hold the power of legal veto to effectively manage their reproductive

rights as they see fit. A concrete idea of a special mechanism is the formation of a

constitutional convention (Young in Matravers 2003: p. 231). […] ‘which would

determine which groups deserve special representation, and then for those groups

organize themselves – with group assemblies which would delegate group

representatives’ (Matravers 2003: p. 215). Her conception of citizenship is

difference-blind, and her theory is a problem for liberals and for hybrid

multiculturalists as well. For even the most hybrid multiculturalist is still committed

to the liberal position that the activities of the citizenry create a general will of the

people. This is a presupposed universality and is exclusionary to cultural diversity. If

B. Barry, who is critical of multiculturalism in general, is correct in his assessment of

his version of liberalism, then not only is liberalism open to being criticized for

absolutizing liberalism as Parekh charges, it is arguably open to the claim that

liberalism sustains inequalities through oppression and marginalization by order of

difference-blind principles of justice. Whereby, as Barry writes: ‘Liberalism offers

limited cultural or group rights, but it can’t accommodate “deep diversity” – since

liberals, in so far as they are liberals, need to insist on certain norms – such as respect


for individual autonomy’ (Barry 2001: p. 259).

The multiculturalist writer Amy Gutmann provides an example of how this process

unfolds, and thus propagates oppression. She suggests that increased democracy

within the community, for example control of the local education system, led to

forced segregation of blacks due to the dominant white privileged group being better

able to express and implement their preferred personal preferences of self-interest.

The overall conclusion of A. Gutmann, as summarized by Young, is that ‘Such cases

indicate that when participatory democratic structures define citizenship in

universalistic and unified terms, they tend to reproduce existing group oppression’

(Young in Matravers 2003: p. 224). It is now clear how the liberal version of

citizenship is flawed, and how through a democratic exclusionary process it

perpetuates and sustains oppression. How can special rights offer a remedy to this

institutionalized process of oppression and discrimination, i.e. racism?

The notion that there is a need for recognizing and adjusting political policy in the

case of cultural differences should be understood and accepted as a necessary

condition. The theory posited by Young seems on the surface a radical concept of

citizenship. It is certainly plausible, and in general a viable alternative to a strictly

liberal conception of citizenship. However, it appears to me that while it does

overcome the obstacle of the liberal approach, it leaves the special needs requirement

lacking in context. The veto power of disadvantaged groups is left to be the sole

recourse for a viable remedy. Young’s argument is philosophically intriguing and

compelling and addresses needs in a contemporary political landscape. Yet, it is not a

sustainable theory of providing actual recourse. Her insistence on fair political group

representation, formed and executed by committee-based activism with a veto power


to ensure political change, is indeed a good basis for furthering the multiculturalists’

position. If, for instance, the minority groups had the power of voting by referendum,

this would encourage, perhaps even force changes, in the way that education,

housing, health care and access to resources would be better served to the African-

American.

I have discussed many and various liberal, multiculturalist, illiberal and hybrids of

political philosophical views. At this point in my discourse, my conclusion is that not

only one philosophical theory, as a standalone thesis, could reasonably be termed an

all-inclusive doctrine able to provide plausible alternatives that proffer a sustainable

remedy. The liberal’s difference-blind same treatment to all groups has been

established and found lacking in real world applicability. The multiculturalist, while

certainly better equipped for real world pluralistic cultural inclusiveness, still lacks

viable solutions. The last illiberal discussion, while absolutely radical, is still a

theory. In a utopian society, a combination of all theories that best meets the

conditions of equality and fairness would be a fully comprehensive political

philosophy. Very recently, however, more radical and urgent approaches to defining

and understanding the impact of current social movements in the U.S., which are

affecting the status quo of the African-American, are beginning to take form and

garner substance. This social movement is open to, and in need of, a comprehensive

political philosophy that could redefine the way remedies could be recognized and

implemented. As will be discussed in the next section, the plight of the African-

American is not a utopic situation. The basic structure, the social contract and the

liberal philosophical political principles have been theorized to serve the better off in

society, which leaves the minority groups vulnerable. The exclusion of some

minority groups, through practice or as a thought experiment that has formed


political consensus has contributed to the continued marginalization and oppression

of the African-American. The next section is the case study, where examples of

contemporary events involving the African-American will be unpacked and

discussed.


4. CASE STUDY – THE PLIGHT OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN

The case study of the African-American is difficult for a liberal political

philosophical theory. As has been discussed above on numerous occasions, it is

difficult to compartmentalize and apply philosophical theory to the unusual plight of

the African-American as an indigenous group, or a national minority. This difficulty

has not resolved itself and the blacks in the U.S., in philosophical terms, have been

grouped together with women, gays and lesbians, Latinos and groups that have been,

or still are, denied basic rights. While it is this writer’s view that women deserve all

the rights of men, on all levels, in all cases, it is my claim that they are treated by the

liberal the same as the African-American in some ways, but they are treated as such

as a gender, not a race. The distinction is significant. The plight of the African-

American involves discrimination of gender, and as an ethnic minority. This is no

way to be diminutive of the plight of women’s rights. It’s solely to emphasize the

differences in scale and impact on a particular group. It is my further contention and

claim that the liberal political philosophy is an ideology. And as such wields power.

As mentioned above in the liberalism section, political philosophy does not exist in a

vacuum. Theory is abstracted and leads to real world consequences.

As long as political ideology and practice persisted in defining some groups

as unworthy of equal citizenship status because of supposedly natural

differences from white male citizens, it was important for emancipatory

movements to insist that all people are the same in respect of their moral

worth and deserve equal citizenship. In this context, demands for equal rights

that are blind to group differences were the only sensible way to combat

exclusion and degradation (Young in Matravers 2003: p. 243).

As has been discussed in detail, the difference-blind liberal principle hasn’t been

successful as a remedy for fair and equal treatment of groups. Yet it persists as a

viable theory on which an entire philosophical doctrine has been built around. I

would suggest that to be absolutely difference-blind would equate that fair treatment


is also colour-blind. This is surely the proposition of justice as seen from behind the

veil of ignorance. And it therefore fails to meet the conditions of a comprehensive

doctrine because minus inclusiveness, it does not meet the pluralistic notion of the

liberal multiculturalist. The only point in reiterating this theme is to once again

reaffirm the notion that the liberal political philosophy remains contemporary as a

driving force in sustaining inequalities. It has been demonstrated many times that this

liberal principle only propagates marginalization and oppression, yet it is still being

actively debated.

Consider the dilemma of having an ineffective recourse through the concept and

principle of collective agreement. It is worth reiterating that the collective agreement

is necessary to sustain the basic structure. Through a deliberative process

justificatory problems by means of collective agreement among the citizenry are

agreed upon, so social arrangements are made reasonable and have normative

properties. I’m referring to normative properties arrived at by reasoning that entails

universality in a Kantian sense whereby, ‘when a person claims that something is

good or right he or she is claiming that everyone in principle could consistently make

that claim, and that everyone should accept it’ (Young in Matravers 2003: p. 236).

Thus, the implied social contract is a qualitative construct, subjective, yet

substantiated by collective agreement. This is a very important principle, to the

liberal and illiberal philosophy alike. The African-American as a subgroup and

ethnic minority were never considered a legitimate citizen. Not as an immigrant nor

indigenous, in a free and democratic state. The institutionalized inability of the

democratic state to seek redress through a bona fide method of collective agreement

is particularly daunting to the cause of the African-American. This dilemma has

extenuating consequences. Principles of liberty and freedom are therefore affected as


well. These principles: negative or otherwise, are thought to be important by

reasonable citizens or persons, is another factor affects full citizenship. For the sake

of argument, assume that a person has freely entered into a social contract but is

burdened by limits of freedom and liberty. If the contract were then enforced against

her, it would seem a plausible result of a logical social contract, that no freedom has

been violated. However, according to Jeremy Waldron the same argument could be

applied to social rules. Regardless if it be an agreement or social rule,

[…] If the rule is simply imposed, without reference to the consent of those

who are to be bound by it, then something important in this connection is lost

- namely, the capacity of human agents to determine for themselves how they

will restrain their conduct in order to live in community with others. That

capacity will have been pushed aside in the name of social order, as though it

were something of no consequence; and that is an attack on what we should

conceive as the importance of freedom (Waldron 1987: p.133).

So either way, by giving consent and having it used against you, or not being in the

position to negotiate terms relative to Rawls’ original agreement, any form of

coercion violates liberty. As has been mentioned throughout this dissertation, the

African-American did not agree to any social contract – they were forced here by the

will of the dominant white hierarchy and used as slaves, nothing more than a tool to

enhance the betterment of the agronomic class. It’s abundantly clear that they have

been throughout history, violated, in both philosophical principles and in real world

terms. The historical unfair treatment of the African-American has created unique

inequalities that run deep and wide and affect every facet of the their pursuit of a

conception of what constitutes a good life. ‘Where some groups are privileged and

others oppressed, the formulation of law, policy, and the rules of private institutions

tend to be biased in favor of the privileged groups, because their particular

experience implicitly sets the norm’ (Young in Matravers 2003: p. 244). These are

institutionalized obstacles with few recourses of remedies left to any notion of a


collective agreement principle for the African-American. In the multiculturalist

section above I provided a brief historical context of how the plight of the African-

American came to pass through political legislation (civil rights) and economic

policies (conservative) - thereby legally forming institutionalized discrimination and

hence, racism.

Recently there have been numerous racially charged events in the United States that

have once again brought the plight of the African-American to the attention of the

entire world. Aside from the fact that there persists intolerance and general apathy to

their plight, nonetheless they are seeking answers, and unpardonably the questions

are answered with more of the same intolerance and racism. How does a liberal

political philosophy, one that claims to serve a pluralistic and multiculturalist’s view,

take up any sort of redress and acknowledge the political problem? Moreover, how

does the philosophy address and formulate a policy of fairness and equal treatment?

The liberal political philosophy must address the proposition of the African-

American demand to alter the political landscape and to find recourse in equality and

fairness. Throughout the course of this dissertation I have discussed and laid claims

against numerous variations of liberal philosophy and have concluded that all efforts

have fallen short of applicable remedies, both as thought experiments and in real

world scenarios. For the purposes of the case study, and to lay the groundwork for

more philosophical discussion and analysis, I will revert to current philosophical

discourse aimed at general public consumption. Mass media has taken up the issues

of the African-American and there abounds scholarly writings that offer insight into

a more radical philosophical academic rhetoric.

Contemporary writings on the plight of African-American, from a philosophical


basis, tend to posit more radical propositions that directly address and reflect current

events. With the blatant acts of racism and openly discriminatory acts of aggression

towards the African-American, particularly following the summer of 2014, there is

now more than ever a need to address the African-America situation. Black

community members and leaders, activists, academics, students, individuals bent on

violence and mayhem, and the national media have all contributed to the

conversation of how the issues of the African-American should be treated. This

national conversation embodies a thick culturally distinguishing aspect within it. The

political situation today calls for the blacks to make change to the status quo, and this

demand for change is trumpeted from a political landscape that is as different as the

sameness that engulfs it. And it is from this viewpoint, that a philosophical approach

can be rendered useful to the case study. The addition of current topical

philosophical arguments is intended to offer another layer of theoretical thought to

the base philosophical principles of liberalism and multiculturalism.

Chris Lebron, an assistant professor of African-American studies and philosophy at

Yale University, recently published an article in the New York Times that suggests it

is time for a new black radicalism. ‘By radicalism I mean the explicit intention to use

strong, nonconventional and unsanctioned means to effect systemic change by either

disrupting the status quo or reinstating a preferred previous status quo’ (Lebron

2015). He asserts two premises that are conditional to his argument. First he

challenges the claim that radicalism and fundamentalism are interchangeable. His

contention is that fundamentalism is an ideology and that all ideologies inherently

share a critical flaw, one of question begging. That is, the conclusion to the premise

is built into the proposition. For instance, my being a radicalized Muslim means that

others that don’t share my religious views are infidels and therefore deserve death as


their punishment. So, the truth of my world-view is interpreted through the evidence

that I chose to understand as reality. Chris Lebron’s conclusion is that ideology then

negates the rational and reasonable choices that affect the conception of the good life

in regards to social and cultural polity. Ideology in this light of course would help to

facilitate the marginalization and oppression of a minority group. It is not a large leap

of logic to assert the correlation between the characteristics of an ideology (but not

necessarily fundamentalism) and what a liberal uses as the starting point of what is

constitutive of a liberal state. His second claim is, ‘Radicalism, in contrast, is

significantly (but not entirely) post hoc — it is inherently pragmatic and arises in

response to real threats, actual slights, suffered deprivations and obvious oppression’

(Lebron 2015). So, we must accept the premise then that some form of radicalism is

a reactionary remedy to the oppression and marginalization borne of an ideology

enforced upon a subgroup.

Systemic racial inequality is interwoven throughout every aspect of the daily life of

the African-American. The news is inundated with reports of police literally getting a

free pass with murdering blacks. Ideologies of hate and white supremacists’ acting

on this hate are still commonplace. The recent Charleston massacre where 9 African-

American were killed in a church is but one example. As has been mentioned many

times in this paper, inequalities and unequal opportunities in education, income,

social welfare as well as being ghettoized, hence lacking, as Rawls’ theory entails,

primary social goods, naturally has positioned the ethnic minority group in a state

between rage and despair. This is the status quo in America for the African-

American, particularly in communities in which they have been largely marginalized,

and subjected to interpretations of laws that don’t apply to the white majority. One

blatant example is the police method of racial profiling and arbitrary stop and frisk


policies of the black man on the street. And so it bears repeating here, ‘For, it is said,

the same law may have a different impact on different people as a result of their

religious beliefs or cultural practices. Thus, the liberal claim that equal treatment is

generated by a system of uniform laws is invalid’ (Matravers 2003: p. 250). It is

reasonable and quite plausible to exchange the phrasing of religious or cultural

beliefs to mean persons of colour. In short, as Chris Lebron writes, ‘It is an unjust

status quo, thus it must be disturbed, disrupted’ (Lebron 2015). This is the point

where it is important to question what sort of liberal or multiculturalist positions, i.e.

by advocating additional rights, group differentiated redistribution, and group

representation may or may not succeed in remedying inequalities.

It is well known that the plight of the African-American extends for some 150 years,

since the Emancipation Proclamation was written. The attempts by the African-

American to actively and reasonably engage the white institutions have failed

miserably. An aggressive effort is being made once again to address the systemic

inequalities. It is plausible to assert that political change would be the only feasible

method in which to accomplish this. Lebron sums this up thusly, ‘First, that any

resurgent black radical politics must also be a unified politics, one that values central

leadership coupled with an explicit program of action’ (Lebron 2015). The protests

and mass demonstrations over the last year have brought the attention to the world of

the plight of the African-American, but little change has occurred, neither on the

local community nor the political level. As was quoted in the opening section of the

introduction, […] ‘in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the


right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek

reparation’ (Locke 1690). 1

Iris Young’s group differentiated rights theory will be used once again here to gauge

the effectiveness of an illiberal approach to providing a remedy, a form of reparation,

and to ascertain if it might be sustainable. First I must concede to one particularly

valuable assertion by Kymlicka, made in response to B. Parekh, where he challenges

the notion that developing a liberal theory of minority groups is merely a condition to

be met in the necessary resolution of ethnocultural group differences. ‘But as I’ve

already suggested, this is a serious mistake. Developing a coherent liberal theory is a

not trivial step, since the overwhelming majority of real-world political disputes

between ethnocultural groups in the West are precisely over the application of liberal

principles’ (Kymlicka 1997: p. 83). For the sake of comprehensiveness, and to

sustain the line of argument laid out throughout this paper, it is necessary once again

to highlight the liberal’s fallacy at using liberal principles as the starting point to

define philosophical political theory. While fallacy might be considered an overly

harsh critique, it is applicable here because as Kymlicka himself stressed on multiple

occasions in his reply to critiques from Young and Parekh, liberal philosophy hasn’t

been able to address the plight of the African-American with any reasonable success.

It would seem illogical to rely on the presupposed universality of liberal principles

that admittedly neither do, nor can, offer a complete philosophical accountability,

and therefore nor a remedy to a large subgroup of its citizenry. To simply assert that

because one ethnocultural group doesn’t fit neatly categorically into the naturalized

immigrant or national minority model, it is set aside as a ‘gray’ area to be later

theorized. ‘My theory, as yet, says little about these groups. I emphasized this

1 John Locke ‘Second Treatise of Government’ Chapter II § On the State of Nature.


limitation in the book, and deliberately left open the question of how the theory can

be extended or applied to these hard cases or gray areas’ (Kymlicka 1997: p. 78).

And yet, the African-American belongs to the ‘societal culture’ depicted by

Kymlicka, as do the immigrant and other national minorities. Where does one group

fall out of the model while the other two have successfully been accommodated? I

would argue that it is what it’s been all along, being denied differential treatment.

Liberalism demands equality of opportunity for education and access to political and

economic institutions. Immigrant’s access to equality is aided by the state to ensure

the normative values of the societal culture are met through standardized language

and institutional integration. These values are sustained when given the opportunity

to practice customs of their heritage and not being denied their ethnocultural

identities. The homeland from which they immigrated shouldn’t be the determining

force that allows or negates the privilege of differential treatment. The African-

American has not been accorded the same rights and access to equality as the

dominant hegemony, also not as immigrants have, and other national minorities. My

assertion is that this is a direct violation of liberal principles. The African-American

participates within the common institutions in accordance with the state sanctioned

dominant language as is required of the liberal condition of the societal culture.

However, Kymlicka insists that the ethnocultural conflicts that exist are not

measured on the legitimacy of liberal values or the basis if they do or do not adhere

to liberal or illiberal principles. He posits that national minorities, for example the

Catalans, Scots, or Flemish, that ‘There is no evidence whatsoever that they differ

from the majority in their basic political values’ (Kymlicka 1997: p. 81). While this

might on face-value suggest that there is a possibility that there is no direct evidence

of a casual association that they are more likely to adhere to liberal political


principles.

Or consider African-American, who are often considered the most important

proponents of multiculturalism in the United States. Here again there is no

significant difference in their commitment to democracy, the U.S.

Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Parekh’s claim that minority groups in the

West are ‘generally’ nonliberal seems to me to be demonstrably false

(Kymlicka 1997: p. 81).

Taking the above quote in support of his thesis, the dichotomy revealed is that even

if it is plausibly true, it has been demonstrated that the African-American still doesn’t

have the same rights equal to their commitment to democracy. The bottom line to the

closing argument for this argument is to state the only real difference in theory and

practice is discrimination, and thusly racism. Therefore, differential treatment is

necessary. If the liberal political philosophy were to be regarded as comprehensive,

the difference-blind principle would have to be upheld as being colour-blind, in

theory and practice. As long as it remains status quo, no reparations will be

forthcoming and no remedy will alleviate the notion of universality of treatment,

historically or otherwise. The illiberal must insist on a form of distributive justice

that accommodates reparation. The only sound method available to philosophically

bring this principle to bear is to first reject the liberal principle of universality of

difference-blind treatment, because it cannot meet the colour-blind condition

necessary of the difference principle. The African-American must be regarded as an

illiberal minority group and be given differential treatment in the form of political

philosophy. The theory posited by I. Young’s committee veto power was earlier

critiqued in this paper, mostly due to the ineffectiveness found in the

multiculturalism approach to provide actual remedies. However, it has come to light

that some form of veto power is one the few plausible options to grant African-

American the right to accept or reject, by political committee, on a case-by-case

basis, reparations for abuses in the past. Arguably, the same method could be applied


to construct and prevent future discriminatory practices through fixed notions of

equality and opportunity. However, reparations cannot be viewed as a blank-check

strategy, i.e. redress through a tort law system of civil injustices. Rather, attempts to

leverage equality must begin at the source, and the source is abject poverty. […]

‘Roughly 22 percent, or a total of 16 million kids, were living in poverty in 2013, a

jump of 4 percentage points and 3.2 million kids from five years earlier. Break this

figure into subgroups and the picture looks even grimmer, with 39 percent of black

kids and 33 percent of Hispanic kids in poverty.’1 When more than one out of three

African-American children are raised in households that are well below the poverty

threshold, then all the proposed means to provide equal opportunities, theoretically of

practically, are for naught.

There is no ladder to be climbed to achieve equality in education, housing and health.

The proposed committee, armed with the power of veto, would conceivably have the

power of representation and thus the power of negotiation to procure federal funds

for quality community based schooling. These processes should be monitored and

amended until progress is measurably on the upside and further benchmarks are

agreed upon through representation. This example of an approach would be based on

a moral and just system of reparation. An even more radical proposition, and one that

would accompany the veto as partial remedy, would be a voting structure that would

aim to force policy changes to be made by the power of the vote. The author of the

concept, Theodore Johnson, a doctoral candidate in law and policy at Northeastern

University, posits this radical solution: weighted voting.

A five-thirds compromise would imbue African Americans with a larger

political voice that could be used to fight the structural discrimination

expressed in housing, education, criminal justice and employment. Allowing

1 New data on child well-being released by the Annie E. Casey Foundation – source: data from the U.S. Census Bureau,

2009–2013 American Community Survey


black votes to count for 167 percent of everyone else’s would mean that 30

million African American votes would count as 50 million, substituting

super-votes for the implausible idea of cash payments (Johnson 2014).

Johnson’s assertion is that this would be a temporal solution, not intended to shift the

power indefinitely, only to the point where reparations are systematically instilled.

This proposition would be a start to lead us full circle, to return to the basic

fundamental proposition that has encompassed the entirety of this dissertation. I.e.

[…] ‘what can be done to resolve the tensions between liberalism (particularly a

commitment to rights which cannot be infringed by a powerful majority) and

democracy (which vests political power and legitimacy in the hands of the majority)’

(Matravers 2003: p. 4)? In the many readings it took to arrive at this phase, the

dichotomy remains, and has not been fully resolved. Predominantly because it was

not possible to bridge the overall overlapping liberal and illiberal political

philosophies, coherently, into one that satisfied the tension articulated by Matravers.

The suggested proposition to follow is theoretical. However, it should be noted that it

is my intention to present this carefully and not to fall into the liberal political

philosophical conundrum of positioning biased theories that is only to serve the

ideology. Although the ideas may be formally correct, I want to avoid grandiose

ideas. Meaning, theoretical ideas lacking any actual social relevance or real world

application, that don’t gain any political traction, outside philosophical analytical

debates. Because ultimately, whatever means are used to achieve conclusive ends, it

must remain in the philosophical realm and debate whereby, ‘Democracies are not

neutral political instruments; they are worth defending to the extent that they

institutionalize in politics a more ethical treatment of individuals than the political

alternatives to democracy, which range from benevolent to malevolent autocracies

and oligarchies’ (Gutmann 2003: p. 28).


Therefore, what would be required is an ideological impartial resolution. As with any

political system, a political philosophy would also demand built-in checks and

balances that monitor and constrain the development of a fair reparation model.

Furthermore, a provision would have to additionally allow the representative

committee unencumbered activism to negotiate the terms of the social conditions of

the political system in order to ensure verifiable legitimacy of any topic of reparation

at any given time. Both ideas, a commitment to rights and power within the majority,

can coexist quite peacefully, as they are historically inextricably intertwined.

Democracy deals with the instrumental value of having a shared unity and identity

with the citizens. Liberalism then addresses the question of what to do when not

everyone shares the same group values. A figurative principle of colour-blind group

differentiated rights would stand as the guiding framework, same as the difference-

blind principle does in the liberal construction. With such a philosophical political

concept, the African-American would have some means of leveraging the political

power of the majority and would serve to defend the liberal’s notion of basic rights.

The supposition of universality of rights would need to be abandoned because same

treatment has been compromised by the power of the subgroup to negotiate fair

representation and ultimately veto. The rights of the individual remain intact,

however, merely the power has been shifted to abet a fairer and more equal balance

of achieving what is considered to be the good life. Primary social goods should and

would be more fairly distributed through a collective cooperative model. This would

seem like a plausible method in which to achieve reparation through peaceful and

sound philosophical principles of fairness and equality. However, given the attempts

of liberals theorists, multiculturalists, and any hybrid approach thereof, having failed

to foresee that a demand to shift the power away from the majority through acts of


rebellion and potential violence would be a logical move, this would seem a fatal

undermining of liberal political philosophy. It is not necessary to reject the liberal

positions outright, it merely demands inclusion of illiberal theory, whereby forsaking

some strict ideological viewpoints. As it stands then, without a philosophical

compromise, liberal principles are left to sustain systemic inequalities in an

otherwise relatively just society - a just society of and for the status quo, from the

perspective of the dominant governing majority. I would argue the crux, at the very

heart of the problem of resolving the tension as stated by Matravers above, is the

necessary condition to be met, through whatever means possible. This is what I

believe that all writers of political philosophy have been trying to get across in one

form of philosophical theory or another throughout their writings. What follows

logically, from my summation, is that a mixed model of liberal and illiberal political

philosophical theories is needed, unhinged from ideological platforms, in order to

meet the necessary conditions to relieve the tensions as written above. The only

reasonable way to approach this, philosophically, and in the modern context in which

the real world operates, is to invoke a model that incorporates all aspects of cultural

diversity and group rights. Thus, it would not be referred to as a liberal or illiberal

political philosophy.


5. CONCLUSION

It has been well established that the liberal and illiberal variations of political

philosophy have their particular strengths and weaknesses. The variances are

reflective of the historical and cultural context where they were situated. I have

demonstrated through multiple lines of arguments, when weighed against various

theories and validated against a case study, that the liberal political philosophy’s core

principles are problematic for a sustainable notion of fairness and equality to all

groups. A political philosophy in a modern Western state must be inclusive in

regards to multiculturalism and diversity. Both the private and public spheres must

be recognized as equal to the cause of equality and considered a whole unit in order

to achieve a comprehensive political philosophy. I argued that liberalism is not

universal in application of its principles, and the overreliance on the difference-blind

principle as an equal and fair treatment is inconsistent. Furthermore, it was

determined that many of a liberal political philosophy’s main arguments are circular

in logic and tend to arrive at question begging. The liberal political philosophy is

lacking in regards to recognizing all human rights, across the spectrum of all

minority groups. This is problematic in a world that has changed rapidly with

challenges from national minorities, variations of multiculturalism and forms of

differentiated citizenship. Hence, apparent gaps in their logic were unpacked, which

revealed the tendency to undermine their political philosophy principles in both

theory and real world application. However sound the liberal stance is on a

theoretical basis, and it is very relevant in that regard, the historical and cultural

aspects draw a straight line through the arguments and leave the illiberal theorists

with the upper hand in a relevant modern day democratic context. This was shown to

be a very decisive turning point in the overall structure of the liberal and illiberal

argument. The second faulty aspect was the inability of the liberal approach to


overcome and resolve the tensions that arise when there is an overreliance on any

infringement of an individuals’ basic rights. However, the same individuals

simultaneously position the power to distribute equality and fairness in the hands of

the political governing majority.

The universality of same treatment could not resolve the above dilemma and is thus

rejected. In addition, the principle of autonomy must also be rejected as it is at the

very heart of the conundrum. The liberal framework is a valuable theoretical

instrument, and from behind a veil of ignorance, it is brilliantly situated.

Unfortunately the difference principle, operating unencumbered from a difference-

blind theoretical model, cannot escape the reality of the colour-blind actuality. While

it stands to reason that a theory is only as valid as its applicability, it doesn’t follow

that applicability can be selected, arbitrarily or otherwise, to fit a theory. It seems to

me that liberal political theories are a benchmark within the historical and economic

times from which the principles are then built around. They were written to support

the majority within the contemporary ideology of the society at the time. Presently,

the minority is less ably accorded fair representation and negotiations of the terms

and conditions of an equal distributive justice model. And this, arguably, is the point

of no return for the liberal political philosophy. The case study was a fair and

unbiased mirror to reflect the conditions that a same treatment principle demands to

be justified as a liberal philosophy. It is the basis for this argument, given the social

upheaval currently experienced by the black citizenry of the U.S., that there must be

significant changes to the way that a philosophical doctrine addresses the world of

today and comes to terms with the fact that reparation is better done through policy

changes that affect institutional structural changes. Society would be better served

with a philosophical and historical understanding of discriminatory biases, rather


than the potential violent and radical solutions that become the status quo if left

unchecked. Therefore, my conclusion is that this cannot be achieved with liberal

theories constitutive of a different place and pluralistically speaking, of a very

different time, which are for better or worse, still actively utilized to discuss

contemporary political philosophy. As such, it is worth considering that the liberal

claims of the successes of inclusivity of its principles, actually entails its failures, and

is thus self defeating and hence illogical. Therefore, I suggest that the liberal status

quo does indeed sustain systemic inequalities in a multicultural world.


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