Bahrain a Very Complicated Little Island

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NeumaNN: BahraiN: a Very CompliCated little islaNd

Bahrain: a Very CompliCated little island

Ronald E. Neumann

Ambassador Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy, served as ambassador to Bahrain from 2001 to 2004. The following is an expanded version of an article that appeared in Foreign Policy on April 19, 2013.

© 2013, The Author Middle East Policy © 2013, Middle East Policy Council

Bahrain’s troubles are getting worse. There is little visible sign on the ground of promised reforms. New and more vio-

lent opposition groups are appearing, one composed largely of Sunnis who oppose concessions to the Shia majority. Govern-ment repression is intensifying in reply to more lethal attacks. Bahrain seems stuck in a vicious circle. The government and royal family will not fall, but neither can they suppress the protests. Without reform, the economy stagnates. While Gulf Coopera-tion Council (GCC) aid will keep it afloat, the violence prevents foreign investment, and the economy is unable to generate the jobs needed to offer young Bahrainis a bet-ter future. Massive mutual distrust between opposition and government, deepening communal divisions, and splits within both the royal family and the opposition that weaken leadership all combine to make compromise difficult. And, as has been true since protests first rocked Bahrain in 2011, the domestic opposition and inter-national media will use the events to vilify the government and royal family. During my visit in March, I found a situation far more complex than the partisan portrayals.

Western media reporting on Bahrain has produced a one-dimensional version of a complex situation, with little attempt to probe the realistic policy choices that the United States faces in the region. It has characterized the situation as a Tunisia-like struggle of a people against a regime, a Shiite underclass versus a Sunni elite, with a focus on the abuse of civilians by government forces. To be clear, most of the opposition is Shiite, and there have been serious abuses. But the calls for reform that began in 2011 have a long history in Bahrain, and almost everything else over the past couple of years is as contested as it is complicated. Two disputes particularly undergird the current troubles because of the deep suspicions that they arouse: the Shia belief that King Hamid reneged on reforms promised in 2001, and the suspi-cion of Iran on the part of the royal family and the Sunnis, in general. The Iranian problem is the older of the two. Iranian claims on Bahrain go back at least into the nineteenth century. During the rise and fall of various outside pow-ers, rulers on each side of the Gulf were able at different times to collect religious taxes (zakat) from populations on the Arab

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Middle east Policy, Vol. XX, No. 4, WiNter 2013

One was Shia religious ties with Iran. Shia in Bahrain are divided in both origin and doctrinal practice. Some are Arabs long resident in Bahrain; some are of Irani-an descent but resident for over 100 years; others arrived after the Iranian revolution. They follow different marja-e taqlids (re-ligious guides).6 A significant percentage pay the Shia religious tax (khums) to the Iranian leaders, first Khomeini and later Khamenei. Bahraini Sunni authorities usu-ally paid no attention to these distinctions. Additionally, many Shia religious students traveled to Iran for religious in-struction. A significant portion of Bahraini Shia followed Iraq-based marjas, so-called “quietists” who tended to stay out of poli-tics, at least until the U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, during the long and repressive Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad, the Bahrainis found it unsafe to seek religious instruction in their traditional religious schools in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala. Hence Iran was the only desti-nation available for students. This trend added to Bahraini-government suspicion. Of course, the fact that until at least 2004 (during my period as U.S. ambassa-dor) the Shia regularly carried pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei in their Ashura processions did nothing to persuade Bah-raini authorities of their loyalty to Bah-rain — and neither did their references to Khamenei during demonstrations in 2005.7 While most Western commentators focus on the fact that the current protesters carry Bahraini flags, others have not forgotten the long period of apparent symbolic al-legiance to Iranian leaders. For Bahraini authorities, it has been and remains an absolute belief that “Iran pulls the strings.” That this belief is self-serving does not render it less deeply believed, as conversa-tions over many years have shown me.

side. With the entrance of the British East India Company into the Gulf in 1819-20 to suppress piracy, the British secured a dominant political role, and the territorial claims of Iran and the Gulf sheikdoms were essentially frozen.1

However, Iran maintained its claims to Bahrain and three Gulf islands into the twentieth century. When Britain withdrew from the Gulf in 1971, the shah of Iran officially gave up his claim to Bahrain but took possession of two islands claimed by the newly formed United Arab Emirates. At the same time, Iran reached a territo-rial and resource-sharing agreement with the emirate of Sharjah over Abu Musa Island, but subsequently used its power to effectively dominate the island in a dis-pute that has continued to this day. 2 After the Iranian revolution, there were fears in Bahrain that Iran would again assert its claim. The discovery in 1981 of weapons smuggled into Bahrain, apparently by Iran to support a coup,3 reinforced the general Bahraini sense of a resurgent revolutionary Shia Iran bent on expansion. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were periodic eruptions of Shia pro-test, the setting off of small bombs (usu-ally without loss of life) and demonstra-tions against the government of the emir, Sheikh Isa bin Salman. With considerable help from British advisers, the Bahraini government put down the demonstrations, and there were widespread allegations of torture.4 American diplomats of the period, including me,5 received repeated claims from Bahraini authorities of Iranian sup-port for the various protest movements. These claims usually exceeded what we saw in American intelligence reporting; however, there were a number of factors that constantly underpinned Bahraini-government alarm.

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gradually lost hope for further reforms in the process that had begun with so much optimism in 2001.

The “Spring” period Demonstrations began in Manama in February 2011. At first peaceful and cross-sectarian, the situation became progres-sively more violent and more complex. It has now resulted in a kind of stand-off, with violence slowly getting worse and the Shia-Sunni split deeper and more painful than ever before. Two simplified narratives have developed from these events. Neither is wholly true and, perhaps more impor-tant, neither holds a basis for solution. The opposition narrative holds that the demonstrations were peaceful calls for reform; that the demonstrators are not rep-resentative of only one sect; that all they ask for is democracy; that they have been confronted with increasing violence, re-pression and human-rights abuses; that ne-gotiations have been empty of content and that reforms promised by the king have not been delivered. According to this view, the issue is democracy and human rights; pres-sure needs to be put on the government to cease abuses and install democracy. From the side of the government and royal family, the narrative is different. They emphasize that, after the initial con-frontations, they released political prison-ers, withdrew troops from the streets and offered far-reaching negotiations. In return, the opposition refused to negotiate without major concessions in advance — “surren-der now and we’ll negotiate the details” was the government’s interpretation of the demand. Further, the demonstrators then proceeded to try to close down the finan-cial district, Bahrain’s economic hub, and moved toward Riffa, where much of the royal family resides. From this view, the

When Emir Hamad bin Isa became ruler of Bahrain in 1999 upon the death of his father, he proclaimed many reforms. Prisoners were released. The 1974 decree of state security was abolished. Many ex-iled opposition politicians were allowed to return to Bahrain with full political rights.8 The emir proclaimed that a new constitu-tion would be drafted, and a referendum to this end was passed overwhelmingly in 2001. In 2002, in keeping with the referen-dum, Emir Hamad became King Hamad, proclaiming that he was constructing a constitutional monarchy.9 The reforms eventually brought into place by the new constitution were real and extensive. Nevertheless, they fell short of Shia expectations, which included a unicameral parliament that they would dominate by their numbers. Instead they got a two-chamber parliament with an upper house appointed by the king and empowered to block legislation from the lower chamber. Serious gerrymandering of electoral districts with very uneven populations guaranteed that the Shia would not receive over 18 deputies in the 40-seat parliament. Shia disappointment led their new opposition party, al-Wefaq, to boycott the first parliamentary elections. However, independent Shia candidates not affiliated with al-Wefaq did run in 2002,10 sweep-ing the 18 Shia constituencies available to them in an election that appeared fair as far as the balloting was concerned. Al-Wefaq entered the 200611 elections and rejected all the non-al-Wefaq deputies, replacing them with their own candidates. However, they were increasingly frus-trated with their lack of power. This was seriously exacerbated by the elections of 2010, when there were widespread claims of ballot fraud.12 Thus, during the years from 2001 to 2011, the Shia opposition

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has been a growing Salafi movement in Bahrain, only a tiny fraction of which is politically extremist. Nevertheless, in 2003 and 2004, the burgeoning Sunni extremism was an issue that I raised with senior royal and government officials. They tended to downplay it, as they were more worried about Shia issues. By 2008, when I returned for a visit, I was surprised by the extent to which senior Bahraini intelligence officials were concerned about Sunni extremists and their links to terrorist movements. This, of course, was a period when the Shia were

largely qui-escent, and al-Wefaq was still in parlia-ment. I note this bit of personal his-tory simply to record that there has been

for some time a growing Sunni opposition outside of Bahraini government control or auspices. This small tendency seems to have grown and allied itself with non-extremist Sunni oppositionists in reaction to the demonstrations. The new movement is reasonably large, but it is composed of a number of groups and is difficult to clas-sify.17 One of its demonstrations involved between 120,000 and 400,000 supporters,18 a point largely unreported in the West-ern press. While this movement is on the government’s side in refusing concessions, it may, as some have reported, be more hard-line than at least some within the gov-ernment and royal family. Thus, while the government almost certainly had a hand in its development, in my judgment the Sunni opposition cannot be fully controlled by the government. The seeds of even greater

opposition had thrown down the gauntlet and had to be met with force. Underly-ing all this is the alleged backing of Iran, which is seen as instigating a sectarian Shia opposition determined to overthrow the royal family and take power, to the detriment of the Sunni population. Looking more closely at events reveals flaws in both narratives. The critical events of 2011 have been well covered else-where.13 My purpose here is only to note a few salient facts. The early demonstrations at the Pearl Roundabout in Manama did include Sunnis and nonsec-tarian op-positionists and did call for reform.14 However, that is not the full story. Inspired by events in Tunisia, people of every type and sect took to the streets, well beyond the expectations of any of the organizing groups or parties.15 Even then, there were participants who called for the overthrow of the regime and the imposition of religious law, and invoked religious authorities.16 They were not by any account a majority of the early dem-onstrators, but they were present, certainly sending mixed messages to a fearful gov-ernment. As the demonstrations progressed, the Sunnis fell away and gradually gave rise to several Sunni opposition parties, both religious and relatively secular. These groups are difficult to characterize, partly because there has been little study of them. The government can be presumed to have played a role in turning out supporters. However, this is not the whole story. There

The appointed upper house includes technocrats as well as women and Jews. It is difficult to believe that any of these groups would be represented in a parliament elected along strictly majoritarian lines.

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sented in a parliament elected along strictly majoritarian lines. Obviously, there are numerous ways to build minority represen-tation and protections into a future con-stitutional system. Unfortunately, none of them are being seriously discussed at the moment. The different narratives of the recent past are particularly evident in the discus-sion of the brief period in which real nego-tiations were, or appeared to be, offered. On March 12, 2011, Crown Prince Salman called for negotiations that would include discussion based on seven principles:

• A parliament should be fully empow-ered.

• A government should represent the will of the people.

• Voting districts should be fair.• Nationalization policies should be

discussed (referring to nationalizing Sunnis).

• Government and financial corruption should be combated.

• National assets should be protected (referring to the taking of public land, particularly beaches, for private use).

• Sectarian tensions should be ad-dressed.20

A memorandum given to the opposi-tion that evening included an additional offer: an agreement on amending the constitution would be put to a referendum, as would ideas that did not secure con-sensus during negotiations.21 Throughout the following day, March 13, violence worsened throughout Bahrain. Individuals were attacked; people armed with swords and iron bars were reported in the streets; and a wide variety of clashes occurred in many parts of the island. That evening in separate meetings, both the religious

sectarian strife are present, although they have not ripened into the violent confron-tations of Iraq or Syria.

WhaT Kind of democracy? The call for democracy in the Bahraini context is anything but simple. Whether the Shia number 70 percent of the popula-tion, as they claim, or a smaller figure, as others assert, they are almost certainly a majority.19 This poses two complications regarding a simple call for “democracy.” First, when people vote as a community, an elected majority becomes a function of community size. This is very different from a flexible system in which losers in one election believe they have a chance to become winners at another time. If the tyranny of a minority is (rightly) seen as wrong by the majority, absolute control by the majority is equally seen as wrong by the minority. That is the basis for many checks and balances in our own consti-tutional system and the reason protection of minority rights is such a strong feature of Western democracy. There is currently little appetite for or belief in the effective-ness of such a balancing mechanism in Bahraini politics. For Sunnis and the royal family, the call for democracy is viewed as a pretext for Shia domination. The second problem is that the domi-nation of the Shia community by reli-giously based parties leaves little apparent space for the representation of minority views, even within the Shia community. When al-Wefaq joined the second parlia-ment, it refused to support any of the often more liberal or secular Shia deputies who had won seats in the first parliament, which al-Wefaq boycotted. The appointed up-per house includes technocrats as well as women and Jews. It is difficult to believe that any of these groups would be repre-

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leader, Sheikh Isa Qassim, and the al-Wefaq leader, Sheikh Ali Salman, rejected the proposed dialogue and called for the election of a new constitutional assembly. Their decisions appear to have reflected both an exaggerated belief in the opposi-tion’s strength and fears that compro-mise would not be accepted by their own supporters — particularly the youth, who formed the backbone of the street protests and were enflamed by their losses. Demonstrations continued on the fol-lowing day, March 14, including armed attacks on unarmed police posts. For the government, the combination of increas-ingly violent demonstrations and the rejection of dialogue was tantamount to a demand for surrender first and negotia-tion of details later. That evening, Saudi National Guard forces crossed into Bah-rain; on the morning of March 15, King Hamad decreed a state of emergency.22 The reimposition of forcible repression quickly followed and has continued. Many Shia politicians have concluded that the rejec-tion of negotiations in those crucial March days was a mistake, a considerable overes-timation of their power. Nevertheless, there is also a strong belief that the negotiation offers were never serious, but simply a continuation of the empty promises of the initial constitutional referendum. From the other side, there is a comparably strong view that the opposition was never serious about reform; that it was only a pretext for domination. The truth of either narrative is less important than the strength with which it is believed by its partisans.

diviSionS on BoTh SideS As the crisis has gone on, both the government/royal family and the opposi-tion have suffered from divisions in their ranks. The result has been an added mea-

sure of inflexibility in decision making and compromise. Although the divisions within the royal family are analyzed and discussed by outsiders, it should be noted that, as the family has remained fairly close-mouthed, most analysis is indirect. The minister of defense, Field Marshal Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed al-Khalifa; the minister of the royal court, his brother Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa;23 and the long-time prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al Khalifa, are generally regarded as the least inclined to compromise and the most certain of Shia perfidy. Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamid bin Isa Al Khalifa is pictured as the leader of the “reformer” wing in the family. While there is probably a good deal of truth to the characterization of who is more likely to compromise, this depiction has over-simplified the picture. In fact, a power struggle between the crown prince and his uncle, the prime minister, preceded the demonstrations and has become inter-twined with the debate over how to resolve them. In these earlier rounds of behind-the-scenes politics, the crown prince first lost a struggle for increased power in the cabinet reshuffle after the first parliamentary elec-tion. He then gained great power over eco-nomic decision making and now has lost much of that power back to his uncle. The crown prince’s most recent appointment as first deputy prime minister may somewhat amend the balance, although this remains speculative and without support from any policy changes to date. Prince Salman’s June 2013 visit to Washington seemed to repeat a pattern in which the family sends forth its reformers to tell Westerners what they want to hear, but then ignores whatev-er messages the reformers bring back. All that said, outsiders do not know how the

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leaders and the suppression of their move-ments, the parties continue to draw sup-port. Al-Wefaq cannot make deals without negotiations with its allied parties and consideration of the positions of these more disparate groups that compete with it for political influence in the Shia community. As the protests continue, more violent groups are emerging. A group calling itself the al-Ashtar Brigades claimed responsi-bility for a bomb that destroyed a vehicle on July 17, 2013. Since the end of 2011, the February 14 group has used progres-sively more violent tactics although its lethality is still very limited and its explo-sives unsophisticated. Both al-Ashtar and the February 14 movement share the goal of ending the monarchy of King Hamad. Both groups look for inspiration to Sheikh Isa Qassim, but the February 14 move-ment does not claim to act in the name of religion, whereas the al-Ashtar Brigades invoke Quranic passages regularly.28 The mix of groups with different aims that venerate Sheikh Isa Qassim underscores both his influence and the questions raised by others as to where he stands on many issues and whether he would ultimately be a force for compromise. There are disputes over whether the government was sincere in offering nego-tiations led by Crown Prince Salman. Did the opposition miss its best opportunity by rejecting talks and demanding that the gov-ernment make extensive advance conces-sions? Or were the negotiations a govern-ment ploy to justify forcible suppression? The government’s narrative notes that it released prisoners, allowed exiles to return, and withdrew its forces from the streets until the demonstrators increased the vio-lence and tried to close down central areas of Manama. The opposition cites deaths of protesters, claims it wants only democratic

internal power struggles affect the govern-ment’s responses to the opposition; most analysis of it is extremely conjectural. The divisions among the Shia are more numerous and somewhat clearer. The al-Wefaq party is the largest group and is often assumed to be speaking for the whole. This is convenient, as the party has an avowed bias toward democracy. However, al-Wefaq also tends to follow the fiery 75-year-old Shiite cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim, who has resisted many proposals to settle the crisis. His influence is almost certainly larger, especially with the youth aligned with al-Wefaq, than that of the party’s own political leaders. Smaller par-ties — the National Democratic Action So-ciety, the National Democratic Assembly, the Democratic Progressive Tribune and Al-Ekhaa — are all allied with al-Wefaq. Other parties are more radical, and the splits may be deepening. Al-Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democ-racy) is outlawed because of its calls for outright regime change.24 However, its leaders, Abduljalil al-Singace and Hassan Mushaima, are strong figures with much apparent popular support. Both have been imprisoned since the February 2011 upris-ing.25 The Bahrain Islamic Action Society, a small Shiite faction, is also outlawed. It is a successor to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, widely held to be allied with Iran and involved with the earlier coup attempt.26 Another Shiite group, Amal, is known as the “Shirazi faction” for its ties to radi-cal Shiite clerics in Iran who are linked to Ayatollah Shirazi. Amal’s leader, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Mafoodh, has been in prison since 2011, and Amal was outlawed in 2012 in what the Bahrain Center for Human Rights called a “kangaroo court.”27 Notwithstanding the imprisonment of these

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reform, and says that human-rights viola-tions continue in nightly raids on Shiite villages.

Bahrain iS UniqUeBahrain differs markedly from other “Arab Spring” countries despite superficial similarities. First, the divide in Bahrain is between the Sunni and Shiite communities, not between the people and the govern-ment. There is now a large Sunni move-ment that styles itself as an opposition but is almost completely ignored in Western reporting. Some of its members want political reform; many are adamantly anti-Shiite and opposed to concessions. This movement’s most distinguishing feature is that it exerts pressure on the king and government not to yield to Shiite dominance. Bahrain’s government also has advan-tages that the rulers of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya did not. The support of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, especially the Saudis, gives Bahrain’s government the financial and military depth to resist pres-sure. Indeed, Bahrain’s economic ratings have remained within investment grades; one economic rating service recently raised them.29 Many in the Bahraini Army are from Pakistan, Jordan and Yemen. They are not likely to develop sympathies with the protesters. And Bahrain is a small area (760 square kilometers, or about three-and-a-half times the size of the District of Columbia) where insurgency or lengthy protests are relatively easy for the govern-ment to control.

So revolution is not coming to Bah-rain. Yet the government cannot regain calm or stability without reform. But what does reform mean, and how hard should the United States press the government to change? In Manama, there is a mix of fear and anger on all sides. Bahrain stood with the United States in several difficult wars and was praised by Washington for years; it

has been a loyal ally and the base of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Thus, it is not particu-larly surpris-ing that the Al Khalifa

regime cannot understand the criticism it now receives, such as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement that Bah-rain is “on the wrong track.” Indeed, the government’s killing of protesters and the continued mistreatment of prisoners horri-fied U.S. officials. But Bahraini resentment may partially be due to the fact that they see old friends in Washington now turn-ing on them — at a time when officials in Manama believe deeply that Iran is calling the shots for the opposition. Outsiders, however, do not see evidence of this. Iran might well meddle if it could, but the op-position appears homegrown. Even more serious than the threat from Iran is the Bahraini government’s fear that, though the Shiites are calling for democracy, they would really put in place a theocracy led by Sheikh Isa Qassim. The country’s leading Shiite cleric clearly has great power and very strong influence with the opposition in the street. He is credited with calling for the March 9, 2012, demon-stration, estimated at 100,000 protesters.30

Even more serious than the threat from Iran is the Bahraini government’s fear that, though the Shiites are calling for democracy, they would really put in place a theocracy.

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of the demonstrations. This probe, led by the internationally respected Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, produced a lengthy and detailed report.31 It documented extensive violations of human rights by the security forces and a much lower but still signifi-cant number by the demonstrators. It found no explicit evidence of Iranian support or instigation. King Hamad publicly accepted the re-port, put in place a commission to evaluate the recommendations and eventually an-nounced a series of reforms. The problem is that outside observers and opposition figures simply do not see the reforms tak-ing place.32 Reports of torture and beatings continue. Trial results appear to many to be based on highly questionable evidence, and allegations of pretrial torture continue. A code of police procedure and oversight measures introduced by foreign advisers are reportedly now being circumvented by beatings that take place at informal holding stations before prisoners are entered into the formal detention system.33 The Bahraini government continues to insist that reforms take time. Yet, while it is correct that some reforms — like training judges and reforming the judicial system — do not happen overnight, the government’s pleas for more time can-not be taken at face value. The behavior of Bahrain’s police, in particular, needs to change now. The result is to pose two questions: Are the reforms not implement-ed because the king does not want them implemented? Or does he lack the neces-sary control to enforce his orders? Neither answer enhances royal credibility. The re-sult is to foment Shia anger and suspicion and subvert the minimal trust essential for a negotiated solution. I was able to speak to a small num-ber of figures in the Shiite opposition

Could Sheikh Isa Qassim really turn off the violence with a word, as the govern-ment and royal family believe? It is hard to know. Would democracy actually turn out to be a theocracy? Again, hard to know, but the ascendant Islamist movements throughout the Middle East reinforce the royal family’s deep concerns. Bahrain’s rulers look also at Shiite predominance in Iraq and see Sunni parties forced aside while Iranian influence grows. They also see Hezbollah’s and Iran’s support for the Syrian regime as proof of religious domination by Shia opposi-tionists. Many Sunnis, not just the royal family, find nothing in the Iraqi or Syrian experience they would want replicated in Bahrain. Good liberal Westerners are inclined to say, if radical parties come to power, that is the price of democracy. But as we look at the rise of Islamism throughout the Middle East, it is not yet clear that Islamist regimes will yield power democratically or allow the inclusion of non-Islamist par-ties once installed. This does not mean the United States should give up its long-term faith in democracy. It is, however, at least useful to recognize that some of our belief is built on a universal humanistic ideology that clearly remains unproven in the Mid-dle East. This might make us more tolerant of the concerns of those who will have to live under the resulting experiment. The fear of Shia extremism is very real. As one fairly moderate member of the Sunni opposition said to me in March, “I want reform [of the monarchy] and more democracy, but not at the price of having an Iranian-type government. I would rather have a dictatorship.” Yet the royal family and the government have a major cred-ibility problem. In a widely praised action, King Hamad called for an investigation

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during my March 2013 visit to Bahrain. This is a limited sample, but it included a representative from al-Wefaq, the largest opposition party in the then ongoing (now suspended) national dialogue that was supposed to formulate consensus recom-mendations to the king, though none have yet been agreed upon. Al-Wefaq’s suspi-cions of the royal family’s intentions are as strong as its opponents’ suspicions of the party. The al-Wefaq representative insisted his party is not seeking overthrow of the monarchy and laid out reasonable steps for reform of parliament and elections. How-ever, the devil is in the details. The predominantly Shiite opposition is concerned that recommendations from the dialogue will vanish into limbo after being sent to the king, or that, like the earlier referendum, they will be enacted in such truncated form as to be meaningless. The opposition insists on endless proce-dural guarantees, such as the promise of a referendum on whatever is agreed to and having a representative of the royal family present in the dialogue. The royals won’t do this, saying that the king is “not a party to the negotiations” but stands above them. It is a delicate point. On the one hand, the opposition knows that the royal family is clearly a player and that no real reform will happen without the king’s consent. On the other hand, publicly putting the royal family on a par with the opposition would be deeply insulting to the royals and might, in the zero-sum politics of Bahrain, look like political weakness and increase oppo-sition strength. The demand that a high-ranking royal be present in the negotiations is not likely to be met. Increased arrests also inflamed the disagreements. After the government arrested al-Wefaq’s deputy leader, Khalil al-Marzoon, on September 17, 2013, al-Wefaq suspended its partici-

pation in the dialogue. Bahraini officials in early October announced that dialogue would stop for the Hajj period and would recommence on October 30, but there is no sign as of this writing that al-Wefaq will rejoin. As time passes, the hope for com-promise dims.34 It is a symptom of the opposition’s distrust of the government that it demands more and more guarantees, but this is a dangerous tactic. The opposition already lost a significant opportunity for serious negotiations by demanding concessions before beginning negotiations in 2011. Its demands to be reassured before talking substance may backfire again. The Saudi position has become in-creasingly important, as the House of Saud is a major financial supporter of the Bah-raini government. Some knowledgeable observers with whom I spoke think the Saudis are not as hard-line in their support of the government as is often said. Some think the Saudis would even support con-cessions, so long as the royal family stayed solidly in power. While this has yet to be tested, I was told by credible observers that even al-Wefaq thinks there may be some benefit in directly involving the Saudis in a mediating role. Though the ingredients for a grand compromise may be present, however, the parties simply cannot agree on a serious vision for moving forward. The bottom line is this: The government cannot make the Shiite opposition accept purely sym-bolic gestures of reform, but the opposition lacks the power to compel a one-person, one-vote democracy that could lead to the permanent subordination of the Sunni community — not to mention the royal family. The distrust is so high that each faction suspects the other of harboring maximalist goals.

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positioned to help break this deadlock, but resentment toward Washington runs high on both sides of Bahrain’s political divide. Opposition leaders fault America for not supporting democratic principles. They focus on the single dynamic of human-rights violations, insisting that America is a hypocrite if it does not stand for democ-racy above all else. The government and royal family, meanwhile, say that U.S. pressure on them is influencing the opposition to inflate its demands. They look at U.S. calls for reform through the lens of Washington’s abandonment of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and fear that reform will only whet the op-position’s appetite for more change. This view of U.S. partiality is nurtured both by some U.S. actions, such as President Obama’s mentioning al-Wefaq by name in one speech (thereby creating an impression of partisanship) and by a nearly complete lack of clarity about the preferred U.S. endgame in Bahrain. Things have reached such a pass that President Obama’s rather mild criticism of Bahrain at the UN Gener-al Assembly as having “sectarian tensions” was met with furious Bahraini rebuttals.44

The truth is that the United States would have a difficult time using its lever-age over the royal family under the best of circumstances. Some Americans see removing the naval base or threatening to do so as useful pressure, while others call for at least studying where it might go.45 Yet with the GCC states rallying strongly in support of the Al Khalifa, it seems probable that no Gulf state would help the United States pressure Bahrain by offering the U.S. Navy an alternative home in the Gulf. This would be true, even if the United States were able to afford to replicate the billions of dollars already invested in the base or do without such

recenT evenTS Meanwhile, the violence and repres-sion are getting worse and further enflam-ing each side. A July 17 vehicle bombing in the exclusive Sunni neighborhood of Riffa was blamed on the al-Ashtar radical oppo-sition group,35 although oppositionists also claimed it was staged by the government.36 This followed attacks on the police in a Shia village that left one officer dead and three others injured,37 and another attack on the home of a member of parliament.38 The government is moving forward with new restrictions.39 Fifty Shiites have been sentenced to jail terms of up to 15 years.40 Al-Wefaq’s deputy leader was arrested un-der charges that many find questionable.41 On the other side, and in emulation of the so-called Tamarod (Rebellion) cam-paign that opposed the military in Egypt, Bahraini oppositionists launched their own Tamarod campaign calling for the overthrow of the al-Khalifa. Their August 14 demonstrations fizzled42 but probably intensified the government’s determina-tion to increase the repression. The result was new decrees in late July, issued with the strong support of the Parliament from which al Wefaq had withdrawn, impos-ing new penalties for “terror instigators,” including the revocation of citizenship.43 Further, the Justice Ministry banned political societies from meeting foreign diplomats, government representatives or foreign organizations without permission. The cycle of opposition fragmentation, government repression, and opposition violence goes on. No one with the power to settle matters appears to have a vision of how to get out of the mess.

U.S. involvemenT The United States, with its interests in both stability and democracy, should be

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royal role remains essential for balance, both to win Saudi support and to prevent extremists on both sides from plunging the country into far greater violence. How hard should the United States push for a grand compromise in Bahrain? If Washington exerts no pressure, the hard-liners within the government and royal family will be able to block any real reform. But if Washington puts too much pressure on the royals, they will conclude that it seeks their overthrow, and America will get nothing. Above all, the United States needs clarity about how much reform it actually wants. Only then can Washington hope to give clear signals to the government in Manama and consult effectively about a compromise with im-portant regional allies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Whether there remains space for com-promise of any sort in Bahrain is open to question. The political culture, as in many countries without a democratic tradition, is a zero-sum game; compromise is seen as weakness rather than a route to political solutions. It would be at least as difficult for Shia leaders to sell their constituents on accepting — and, more important, maintaining — a compromise solution as it would be for the royal family and govern-ment to overcome their internal suspicions and fears and cede some space to their op-ponents. Yet without a solution, there will be only losers. And the losers will include the United States, for real U.S. interests in Bahrain are harmed by the lack of stabil-ity. It is this fact — not who holds the high ground of moral authority — that requires America to press all sides for progress and reform and to include a parallel discussion with Saudi Arabia. But Washington must do so in such a way that all parties under-

assets as minesweepers positioned inside the Gulf for future contingencies.46 Loss of the base would be serious, if not cata-strophic, should there be a future confron-tation with Iran. Yet even the removal of the U.S. naval base in Bahrain could not persuade the Bahraini government to take actions it deems suicidal. Further, there are major U.S. interests at stake in America’s relationship with Bahrain, which has stood with the United States in three wars and plays a key role in U.S. military efforts to maintain the free flow of oil in the Persian Gulf. The oil flow is vital to America’s economic health, a legitimate major U.S. national interest. In short, the relationship between the United States and Bahrain is one of mutual advantage that is difficult to turn into pressure. Yet stability is also a U.S. interest, and that calls out for our involvement.

conclUSion A solution must be found in signifi-cant, but still partial, reforms. The Shiite majority must have more access to real power in political representation, in the drafting of laws and in economic opportu-nity. Yet, because the communal frictions are so sharp, power should not be allocated only on the basis of one person, one vote. A pragmatic approach of balancing inter-ests with checks on them has proved essen-tial in U.S. history. An absolute insistence on the purity of popular representation in drafting our constitution would have precluded the fundamental compromise that led to the creation of the U.S. Senate, where disproportionate weight is given to smaller states. In the Bahraini case, deriv-ing a system of balances without perpetual deadlock will be difficult. The Al Khalifa family may not be neutral, but a strong

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Yet since our current policies and lack of attention (due to the many other crises in the region) are leading nowhere, it would be worth trying.

stand what it is asking for and how high the stakes are. Whether the United States can carry out such a policy — and whether it would work — are very open questions.

1 “Britain’s Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820–1971,” Journal of Social Affairs (American University of Sharjah) 22, no. 87 (2005): 29-45; John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf; People, Politics, Pe-troleum (Middle East Institute, 1975); and Rohollah K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role (University of Virginia Press, 1972).2 Ibid. 3 Hasan Tariq Alhasan, “The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain,”Middle East Journal 64, no.4 (Autumn 2011): 603-17.4 Ian Henderson, Daily Telegraph, August 4, 2013; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shia; The Forgotten Muslims (St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 143-144; and Robert Fisk, “Briton at the Heart of Bahrain’s Brutality rule,” Independent, February 18, 1996.5 I was a deputy assistant secretary of state for the Arabian Peninsula (1997-2000) and ambassador to Bahrain (2001-04).6 Fuller and Francke, Chapter 6; Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival; How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (Norton, 2007).7 Nasr, Shia Revival, 235.8 “Bahrain: Promising Human Rights Must Continue,” Amnesty International, March 13, 2001, AI Index MDE 11/005/2001.9 “Bahrain Profile,” BBC News, April 20, 2013. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 “Shia Group Holds Strong Position in Bahrain Elections,” BBC News, October 24, 2010. 13 See particularly Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford University Press, 2013); Jane Kinninmont, “Bahrain Beyond the Impasse,” Chatham House (June 2012); and Kristin Smith Diwan, “Bahrain Shia Question: What the United States Gets Wrong about Sectari-anism,” Foreign Policy, March 2, 2011. The most detailed account is in Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni et al., Report of the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), November 23, 2011.14 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 13ff.15 See Kinninmont, “Bahrain Beyond the Impasse,” 3, and Bassiouni, BICI, 95, on the variety of views being expressed.16 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 48.17 Kinninmont, “Bahrain beyond the Impasse,” 17.18 Bassiouni, BICI, 96.19 There are no census figures that distinguish sectarian affiliation. All claims, no matter how frequently bandied about in the press, need to be seen as guesses at best and partisan at worst. My only firm conclusion from my own time in Bahrain was that if all the claims of both communities were correct, the island had to have at least twice as many people in the population as anyone knew about.20 Kinninmont, “Bahrain Beyond the Impasse,” 5; BICI, 134.21 Bassiouni, BICI, 136.22 Bassiouni, BICI, 123-149.23 The two brothers are known as “khawalids” — they hail from a branch of the Al Khalifa family that is traced to an ancestor Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa (Khawalid is the Arabic plural of Khalid). See Charles Levin-son, “A Palace Rift in Persian Gulf Bedevils Key U.S. Navy Base.” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2013, and Kenneth Katzman, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy” (Congressional Research Service, July 16, 2013).

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24 On March 7, 2011, Haq, Wafa’a, and the Free Bahraini Movement called for toppling the monarchy and establishing a republic: Bassiouni, BICI, 115.25 New School for Social Research, Center for Public Scholarship, “Dr. ‘Abdul-Jalil Al-Singace,” last modi-fied December 17, 2012, http://www.newschool.edu/cps/subpage.aspx?id=56447.26 “Bahrain Profile,” BBC, April 20, 2013; and Hasan Tariq Alhasan, “Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981.”27 Bahrain Center for Human Rights, “Report: Amal, First Political Party in Bahrain and the Region under Kangaroo Military Trials,” November 29, 2011; and Andrew Hammond, “Bahrain Closes Islamist Party, Cites ‘Violent’ Cleric,” Reuters, July 10, 2012.28 “In Bahrain, Opposition Groups Become More Radical,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, July 19, 2013.29 Kristin Jones, “Fitch Ratings Affirmed Bahrain’s Rating, Noting Growth and Political Efforts,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2013.30 “Bahrain’s Shias Demand Reform at Mass Rally,” al Jazeera, March 10, 2012.31 Bassiouni, BICI. 32 International Crisis Group, “Conflict Risk Alert: Bahrain,” April 16, 2012. See also Sarah Margon and Mary Laurie, “Ignoring Bahrain’s Iron Fist,” Foreign Policy, October 15, 2013.33 There is a steady flow of reports on this point from Amnesty International and Freedom House. A few recent ones from Amnesty include “Bahrain: Appeal for Action Update: Prosecution of 20 Health Workers,” July 29, 2013; “Bahrain: Further Information: Bahraini Prisoner Denied Medical Attention,” July 29, 2013; “Bahrain, Still No Justice for Torture,” July 25, 2013; as well as “Bahrain Government’s Endorsement of Defamation Law Flouts Reform Claims,” Freedom House, April 16, 2013. See also Brenda Bowser-Soder, “One Year after Bassiouni, U.S. Should Chart New Course in Bahrain,” Human Rights First, November 21, 2012; and Rebecca Lowe, “Bahrain: A year after Bassiouni Report Protests Continue and West Stays Silent,” International Bar Association, November 3, 2012.34 Mansoor al-Jamri’s Facebook page, “Bahrain: Political ‘Cul-de-sac’ under the Mercy of Bigger Regional Events,” of October 13, 2013.35 “In Bahrain Opposition Groups Become More Radical,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, July 19, 2013.36 “Al Khalifa behind Bomb Attack in Riffa: Bahraini Activist,” Press TV, July 20, 2013, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/20/314692/al-khalifa-plotted-riffa-blast/37 “Bahrain police attacked in Sitra and Janabiya,” BBC World News, July 9, 2013.38 “Bahraini MP’s House Attacked with Petrol Bombs: State Agency,” Reuters, July 15, 2013.39 Human Rights Watch, “Bahrain: Parliament Moves to Curtail Basic Rights,” August 1, 2013.40 Margon and Laurie; also Amnesty International, Bahrain: 50 Shia Activists Sentenced amid Torture Allega-tions, September 30, 2013.41 Margon and Lauri.42 Kristin Diwan, Bahrain in Egypt’s Shadow, MENA Source, The Atlantic Council, September 27, 2013.43 Diwan, op cit.44 Obama UN speech transcript, Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obama-un-speech-tran-script-2013-97261.html; and Yara Bayoumi, “Bahrain Stung by Obama Comment on Sectarian Tension,” Reuters, Sept. 26, 2013.45 Hendrick Simoes, “Senator Seeking Contingency Plan for Bahrain Base,” Stars and Stripes, August 1, 2013.46 Clearing Iranian mines was a major problem during the 1987 U.S. confrontation with Iran during the so-called “tanker war,” when the U.S. Navy escorted Kuwaiti-owned oil tankers. Mine sweepers are shallow draft vessels that are not designed for open oceans. The fighting ended before the United States was even able to deploy minesweepers to the Gulf. Ever since, it has permanently based minesweepers in Bahrain. I watched these developments as deputy chief of mission in Abu Dhabi during the tanker war and in subse-quent positions at the State Department and in Manama.

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Documents

Bahrain a Very Complicated Little Island