Bahrain - Freedom House 2017_Bahrain.pdfBahrain’s leading Shiite cleric Isa Qassim was stripped of citizenship for “serving foreign interests” and “promoting sectarianism and

www.freedomonthenet.org

FREEDOM ON THE NET2017

Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017

● StartinginJune2016,broadbandconnectionsweresuspendedfrom7pmto1aminadaily“internetcurfew”inthebesiegedtownofDiraz,hometothepersecutedShiiteclericIsaQassim(seeRestrictions on Connectivity).

● Popularamonglocaldissidents,securecommunicationsappTelegramwaspermanentlyblockedthatsamemonth(seeBlocking and Filtering).

● Thewebsitesofprominentpoliticalandreligioussocietiesbelongingtothecountry’smarginalizedShiitemajoritywereblocked(seeBlocking and Filtering).

● Bahrain’sonlyindependentnewspaper,al-Wasat,wasbannedfromusingelectronicmediaforthreedaysinJanuaryandlatersuspendedaltogetherforitscriticalreporting(seeContent Removal).

● TheMinistryofInformationAffair issuedadecreetorestrictnewsoutletsfromsupplementingtheironlinereportingthroughuser-generatedlivevideo(seeMedia,Diversity, and Content Manipulation).

● FromJune2016toMay2017,atleast12internetusersreceivedprisonsentencesthatamountedtoacombinedtotalof148months.Manymorewerearrestedorinterrogatedforinsultingthekingordefamingthegovernment(seeProsecutions and Detentionsfor Online Activities).

Bahrain2016 2017

Internet Freedom Status Not Free

Not Free

ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 10 11

LimitsonContent(0-35) 27 27

ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 34 34

TOTAL* (0-100) 71 72

* 0=mostfree,100=leastfree

Population: 1.4 million

Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 98 percent

Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes

Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes

Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes

Press Freedom 2017 Status: Not Free

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FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017


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IntroductionInternetfreedomremained“NotFree”in2017asauthoritiesrestrictedinternetconnectionsinDiraz,censoredoppositionwebsites,anddetaineddozensofactivistsforsocialmediaposts.

AlthoughBahrainhassomeofthebestinternetpenetrationandspeedsintheworld,onlinefreedomshavesuffere fromgovernmentmovestoquellunrest.InJune2016,thegovernmentreneweditswidespreadcrackdownonShiiteleadersandthepoliticalopposition,intensifyingcensorship.1AuthoritiesshutdownShiitereligiousorganizationsaccusedofillegalfundraising.Acourtalsoshutteredal-Wefaq,thekingdom’sprimarypoliticaloppositiongroup.

Bahrain’sleadingShiiteclericIsaQassimwasstrippedofcitizenshipfor“servingforeigninterests”and“promotingsectarianismandviolence.”Inabidtopreventhisarrest,supportersgatheredaroundQassim’shomeinthetownofDiraz.Authoritiesestablishedcheckpointstorestrictaccesstothetownandimplementedadaily“internetcurfew,”disruptingbroadbandconnectivitybetween7pmand1am.Qassimwasgivenasuspendedprisonsentenceforillegalfundraisingandmoneylaundering,andsecurityforcesforciblydispersedhissupportersinDirazonMay23,2017,leavingatleastfiv deadanddozensinjured.

ThesecuremessagingappTelegram—popularamongthecountry’sdissidents—wasblockednationwideinJune2016andremainedinaccessibleinmid-2017.AuthoritiesblacklistedthewebsitesofShiite-ledorganizations,whichjoinedhundredsofoppositionoutletsandforumsblockedsinceprodemocracyprotestsescalatedin2011.ThosedemonstrationscalledforgreaterrepresentationofthemajorityShiitepopulationinthecountry’sSunni-ledgovernment,butwereviolentlydisbandedbymilitaryforcesfromneighboringSaudiArabia.

Bahrainisstillusesocialmediatoorganizefurtherprotestsandcallattentiontorampantabusebysecurityforces,butthegovernmenthasseverelyrestrictedrelatednewscoverage.Newsoutletshavebeenbannedfromembeddinguser-generatedvideos,andtheireditoriallineisvigorouslypoliced.Al-Wasat,theonlyindependentnewspaperinthecountry,wasbannedfromusingelectronicmediainJanuaryafteritpostedarticlesrelatedtoaviolentuprisinginthetownofA’aliandthecontroversialexecutionofthreeShiitemeninthefirs useofthedeathpenaltysince2010.2AcourtsuspendedthenewspaperentirelyinJuneafteroneofitsarticlesreferredtothe“legitimategrievances”ofprotestorsinMorocco.

Whilesocialmediahasprovenhardertocensor,authoritiesoftenusesocialmediapostsasevidenceinordertointerrogateorjailprominentoppositionleaders.FromJune2016toMay2017,148monthsofprisonsentenceswerecollectivelypassedincasesinvolving12internetusers.Manymorehavebeenarrestedorinterrogatedonchargessuchasinsultingthekingordefamingthegovernmentunderthecountry’sharshpenalcode.Humanrightsgroupshavedocumentedwidespreadaccountsoftorture,includingtoextractconfessionsofwrongdoing.

1 ForamorecompleteoverviewofdevelopmentsinBahrainrelatedtopoliticalrightsandcivilliberties,pleasesee“Bahrain,”Freedom in the World,FreedomHouse,2017,https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/bahrain.2 BenHubbard,“BahrainExecutes3ShiitesConvictedinDeadlyAttackonPolice,”The New York Times,January15,2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/bahrain-shiites-executions.html?_r=0.

Introduction

Obstacles to Access

Availability and Ease of Access

Restrictions on Connectivity

ICT Market

Regulatory Bodies

Limits on Content

Blocking and Filtering

Content Removal

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Digital Activism

Violations of User Rights

Legal Environment

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

Intimidation and Violence

Technical Attacks

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Obstacles to AccessBahrain is one of the most highly connected countries in the world. Competitive prices for broadband data services have led to high levels of mobile internet penetration. However, a partial internet shutdown has been ongoing since June 2016 in Diraz, and the regulator has ignored calls to resolve the situation.


Key Access Indicators

Internet penetration (ITU)a 2016 98.0%2015 93.5%2011 77.0%

Mobile penetration (ITU)b 2016 217%2015 185%2011 131%

Average connection speeds (Akamai)c 2017(Q1) 7.9 Mbps2016(Q1) 5.2 Mbps

aInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.bInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.cAkamai,“StateoftheInternet-ConnectivityReport,Q12017,”https://goo.gl/TQH7L7.

BahrainhasrisenrapidlyintheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion’s(ITU)ICTDevelopmentIndex(IDI),3andrankedfirs intheArabregionin2016.4Bahrainhad2.67millionmobilesubscriptionsbymid-2017,representingapenetrationrateof184percent.Broadbandpenetrationwasat166percentor2.4millionsubscriptions,ofwhich93percentconsistedofmobilebroadband,asopposedtofixe broadband.5

Pricesformobilebroadbandareamongthelowestintheregion.6Fixed-linebroadbandsubscriptionscostBHD20(US$26),lessthanonepercentoftheaveragemonthlyincome,fora20Mbpsconnection,withsimilarpricesformobileinternet.7Speedshavealsoincreased,andtheportionofsubscriberswithspeedsof10Mbpsorabovehasgrownsignificantly accordingtoa2016reportbythenationalregulator.8Anauditindicatedthat100percentofthepopulationarewithinreachof3Gand4Gmobilenetworks.9Batelco,astate-controlledinternetserviceprovider(ISP)

3 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),ITU releases annual global ICT data and ICT Development Index country rankings,2015https://goo.gl/doJ1Ic.4 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“MeasuringtheInformationSocietyReport2016”,http://bit.ly/2f1vtSK.5 TelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorityofBahrain,“QuarterlyMarketIndicators–Q22017,”October17,2017,http://www.tra.org.bh/media/document/MCD%2010%2017%20097%20Quarterly%20Market%20Indicators%20Q2%202017%20public.pdf.6 TRA,“Bahraincomparedwellwithdevelopedcountriesinthetelecomprices”,December28,2015,http://bit.ly/1PyGTWT.7 SeeBatelco,“MobileInternetPackages,”accessedMarch14,2017http://batelco.com/internet/mobile/packages/#1460968152589-bf57c4c1-aacc,andBatelco,“HomeInternetPackages,”accessedMarch14,2017http://batelco.com/internet/home/packages/#1456127273735-02d47f66-4418.8 TRA,TelecommunicationsMarketIndicatorsintheKingdomofBahrain,February2016,slide30http://goo.gl/XfzgpZ.9 TRA,“4GDownloadSpeedincreasesto23%Comparedto2014AccordingtoTRA’slatestKingdom-wideMobileAuditReports,”December19,2016,http://bit.ly/2hQEwo1

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beganofferin “superfast”500Mbpsspeedstoresidentialsubscribersin2016,10while4GLTEmobilesubscriptionshavebeenavailablesince2013.

Internetaccessiswidelyavailableinschools,universities,shoppingmalls,andcoffe shops,whereBahrainisoftengatherforworkandstudy.Adultliteracywasatnearly95percentandBahrainispossessahighlevelofEnglish-languageproficienc .11Thegovernmentprovidesfreecomputertrainingprograms,whichhadserved15,000citizensbyNovember2015.12


SinceJune23,2016,authoritieshaveimplementedan“internetcurfew”intownofDiraz.Thecurfewwasimplementedassecurityforcesplacedthetownundersiegewhenprotestorsstagedasit-inaroundthehouseofShiiteclericIssaQassem,accordingtoAmnestyInternational.13Mobiledataconnectionsweredisabledandfixed-lin connectedheavilydisruptedeverydayfromthehoursof7pmto1am.14ISPsinitiallyclaimedthedisruptionswereduetoatechnicalerror,althoughlaterinformedcustomerstocontacttheTRA.15OnereportestimatedthatresidentsspentoverUS$570,000ontelecommunicationsservicesthattheyneverreceivedovereightmonthsofdailyinternetshutdowns.16Thereportdidnotcalculatetheadditionalimpactonsmallbusinesseswhichcannotprocesspaymentsduringthehourswhenserviceisshutdown.17NoactionhasbeentakenbytheTRAtoaddressconsumercomplaintsabouttheshutdowns,despitewidespreadcriticismfromthemedia,18nongovernmentalorganizations,19andindividuals.20

OnMay23,2017,authoritiesstagedaviolentcrackdownonthesit-in,21leavingatleastfiv dead

10 “BatelcoFirstandOnlyTelecomtoProvideSuperfastFibreInternet500Mbps,”BizBahrain,August2,2016, http://bit.ly/2qsjMVY 11 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),Measuring The Information Society,2014http://bit.ly/1xrVMi8.12 Bahraine-government,“QuduratTrainingProgram”,accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1IQ1YMIand“E-government:wetrained15thousandcitizensoncomputers,”[inArabic]Alwasat,November30,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1051215.html.13 “Bahrain:atleastonedeadandhundredsinjuredasgovernmentviolentlycracksdownonopposition,”AmnestyInternational,May23,2017,https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2017/05/bahrain-at-least-one-dead-and-hundreds-injured-as-government-violently-cracks-down-on-opposition/.14 PressRelease,“NewInvestigationFindsBahrainISPsImposing“InternetCurfew”inProtestArea,”BahrainWatch,August4,2016,http://bit.ly/2s6xIX6,andFatenBushehri,“OngoingInternetCurfewinDirazformorethan100Days,”BahrainWatch,October7,2016,http://bit.ly/2s0huiX.15 “TheTRAandthetelecommunicationscompaniesclaimthatthereisadefectinthenetworktocovertheisolationofDirazbyauthorities,”[inArabic]BahrainMirror,July12,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/32464.html16 BahrainWatch,“250DaysofInternetShutdownCostsResidentsOver$500,000”,AccessedMay10,2017http://bit.ly/2lbhDjJ17 “ShuttingdowntheInternetfromNorthwestBahrainisdamagingBahrain’sdrivetowardsaknowledgeeconomy,”[inArabic]Alwasat,July4,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1133752.html18 “ShuttingdowntheInternetfromNorthwestBahrainisdamagingBahrain’sdrivetowardsaknowledgeeconomy,”[inArabic]Alwasat,July4,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1133752.html19 BahrainWatch,“CoalitionofNGOssignaLetterDemandingInternetRestorationinDiraz,”August28,2016,http://bit.ly/2r82pxI20 “TelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorityReceives7ComplaintsaboutInternetCutoffinDiraz,”BahrainMirror,November3,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/en/news/34545.html21 “SecuritydevelopmentsinAl-Darazandtheclosureofroadsleadingtothearea,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May23,2017,http://bit.ly/2rLlbJg

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anddozensinjured.22Theshutdownswereongoingthroughthecoverageperiod,andreportedlycametoahaltinJuly.23

AlthoughthereisnocentralizedinternetbackboneinBahrain,allISPsareindirectlycontrolledbythegovernmentthroughordersfromtheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(TRA).ServiceprovidersconnecttonumerousinternationalcablesandgatewaysprovidedbyTata,Flag,SaudiTelecom,EtisalatandQatarTelecom,amongothers,makingthecountrymoreresilienttounintentionalinternetoutages.24InApril2017,thechairpersonoftheTRAboardannouncedaplantoestablishanationalfiber-opti broadbandnetwork,allowingallserviceproviderstosharefiberopticinfrastructurebuiltbyBatelco.25

ICT Market

Batelco,Zain,andVIVAarethethreemobilephoneoperatorsinthecountry,andalsoserveasitsmaininternetservicesproviders(ISPs),alongwithMenatelecom,thefourthlargestISP.Intotal,around12ISPswereinbusinessasof2016.26ThegovernmenthasacontrollingstakeinthelargestISP,Batelco,whileotherISPsareownedbyinvestorsfromtheprivatesector,includingnon-Bahrainiinvestors.

Regulatory Bodies

MobilephoneservicesandISPsareregulatedbytheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(TRA)underthe2002TelecommunicationsLaw.TheTRAisresponsibleforlicensingtelecommunicationprovidersandfordeveloping“acompetitionledmarketfortheprovisionofinnovativecommunicationsservices,availabletoall.”27AlthoughtheTRAistheoreticallyanindependentorganization,inpracticeitsmembersareappointedbythegovernmentanditschairmanreportstotheMinisterofStateforTelecommunications.TheInformationAffair Authority,whichregulatespressandpublications,28mergedwiththeMinistryofInformationAffair (MIA)inDecember2016.29InAugust2016,theTRAissuedadecisionorderingalltelecommunicationcompaniesinBahraintopurchaseanduseaunifie technicalsystemforblockingwebsites(seeBlockingandFiltering).

TherehavebeennoreportedinstancesofISPsbeingdeniedregistrationpermits.However,inearly2015theTRArevokedthelicensesof14smallinformationandcommunicationtechnology(ICT)companies,includingsomethatvoluntarilyrequestedthecancellation.InFebruary2016,theTRArevokedthelicenseofthesmallmobileandfixed-lin provider2Connect.30Amongotherissues,the

22 “5killed,286heldinBahrainraidonShiitecleric’stown,”ABCNews,May23,2017,http://abcn.ws/2qYDBry23 LuaLuaTV,Twitterpost,May25,2017https://twitter.com/LuaLuaEnglish/status/86769892322964684824 TRA,Renesys Internet Ecosystem Report (December 2012),http://bit.ly/2qsaPwd25 “TechnicalcommitteesfromBatelcoandtheTelecommunicationsAuthorityinpreparationfortheliberationoftheterrestrialnetwork,”[inArabic]Alwasat,April7,2017,www.alwasatnews.com/news/1227945.html26 TRA,Telecommunications Market Indicators in the Kingdom of Bahrain,slide6https://goo.gl/05CDuh27 TRA,“Vision&Mission,”accessedMarch30,2014,http://tra.org.bh/en/about-us/vision-mission.html.28 InJune2013,Mohamedal-RumaihiwasnamedPresidentoftheIAA,replacingFawazal-KhalifawhoremainedMinisterofStateforTelecom.29 “RoyaldecreeregulatingtheMinistryofInformationAffairs, [inArabic]Alwasatnewspaper,December1,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1186132.html30 TRA,“RevocationoftelecommunicationlicensesgrantedbytheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority,”pressrelease,February25,2016,http://goo.gl/ZRgbnY.

Introduction

Obstacles to Access



ICT Market

Regulatory Bodies

Limits on Content


Content Removal


Digital Activism

Violations of User Rights

Legal Environment




Technical Attacks

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companyhadfailedto“providealawfulaccesscapabilityplan”31whichwouldallowsecurityunitstoaccessmetadataaboutcommunicationssentoveritsnetwork.32

Limits on ContentExpanding a crackdown on the opposition, authorities blocked the websites of two of the country’s largest Shiite political and religious organizations and closed down the only independent news outlet in the country. Telegram, an encrypted messaging app used by the political opposition and human rights community, was also blocked. Meanwhile, the government undertook moves to centralize web filtering, ordering all ISPs to install new equipment. Self-censorship is rife, particularly on issues related to the monarchy, religion, and relations with the neighboring countries of the Arabian Peninsula.


NewcensorshipincidentsweredocumentedinresponsetorecentpoliticaldevelopmentsinBahrainandneighboringcountries.Politicalcontentiswidelyblocked,andauthoritiesrampedupcensorshipafterthe2011protests,inwhichonlinemediaplayedadecisiverole.

AcrackdownonShiitegroupswasfeltonline.InJune2016,acourtsuspendedthecountry’smainShiiteoppositiongroup,al-WefaqNationalIslamicSociety,anddissolveditaltogetherinSeptember,rulingitwas“harboringterrorism,”incitingviolence,andfomentingsectarianstrife.33ThegovernmentalsoorderedtheclosureoftheIslamicEnlightenmentSociety(al-Taweya),aprominentShiitereligiousorganizationaccusedof“illegalfundraising.”34Thewebsitesofboththeorganizationswereblocked.35Accountsbelongingtoal-WefaqonTwitter,36Instagram,andFacebookpostsalsostoppedposting.37

AlsoinJune,authoritiesblockedthecommunicationsappTelegram,whichwaspopularamongindependentmedia,politicalopposition,andprotestgroupsinBahrain.38LualuaTV,anoppositionnewsoutletbasedoverseas,hadfourassociatedwebsitesblockedwithinoneweek.39

InMay2017,authoritiesblockedanumberofQatarimediawebsites,includingal-Jazeera,al-Sharq,andRaya.40ThemovecoincidedwithadiplomaticcrisisbetweenQatarandseveralMiddleEasterncountriesafterhackerspostedafakereportontheQatarNewsAgencywebsiteandsocialmediaaccounts,inwhichtheemirofQatarappearedtoadmitprovidingsupporttogroupswhooppose

31 TRA,Article35OrderNo.2of20162Connect’sbreachofArticle24(b),53and78oftheTelecommunicationsLaw,February4,2016,http://bit.ly/2bldqnG.32 TRA,LawfulAccessRegulation,accessedAugust14,2016,http://bit.ly/2b5Xyb3.33 “BahraincourtupholdsdissolutionofmainShiiteoppositiongroupal-Wefaq,”DeutscheWelle,September22,2016,http://www.dw.com/en/bahrain-court-upholds-dissolution-of-main-shiite-opposition-group-al-wefaq/a-19568009.34 BahrainCenterforHumanRights,“Bahrain:AuthoritiesEscalateCrackdownonShiaClericsandFreedomofReligion,”June17,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/791435 “BlockingthewebsiteofAlwefaqSociety,”[inArabic]Alayamnewspaper,June14,2016,http://www.alayam.com/online/local/584797/Index.html36 TheTwitteraccountofAlwefaqSociety,accessedMay25,2017https://twitter.com/ALWEFAQ37 TheFacebookaccountofAlwefaqSociety,accessedMay25,2017https://web.facebook.com/AlwefaqNews38 BahrainWatch,“LeadingBahrainiISPsareBlockingTelegramTraffic June28,2016,http://bit.ly/2qpuw8l.39 LuaLuaTV,Twitterpost[inArabic],“TheBahrainiauthoritiesblocksLuaLuaTVwebsiteforthefourthtimeinaweek,”June30,2016,https://twitter.com/LuaLuaTV/status/74864622397282714140 “BahrainFollowsSuitafterUAEandSaudiArabia,BlocksQatariMediaOutlets,”BahrainMirror,May25,2017, http://bahrainmirror.org/en/news/38932.html

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otherleadersintheregion.SeveralcountriescutoffdiplomaticrelationswithQatarfollowingtheincident.41

YouTube,Facebook,Twitter,andinternationalblog-hostingservicesarefreelyavailable.However,severallivestreamingservicesremainblocked,42suchasPalTalkandMatam.tv,whichhavebeen

usedtoconductpoliticalseminars43andbroadcastShiitereligiousceremonies,respectively.44ThelivestreamingservicePeriscopewasstillavailableinmid-2017.Acrowdsourcedlistof367blockedwebsitesindicatedthat39percentofsitesblockedasofMay2017wererelatedtopolitics,while23percentrelatedtotheuseofvariousinternettools,suchasanonymizersandwebproxies.45

OtherblockedwebsitesincludeBahrainOnline,aprominentonlineforum;46theArabNetworkforHumanRightsInformation(ANHRI);theBahrainCenterforHumanRights(BCHR);Bahrain Mirror, apopularnewssite;andal-Quds al-Araby,aLondon-basednewspaper.47AreportfromNovember2015indicatedthatmorethan85percentofBahrainiwebsitesarehostedoutsideofthecountry,48despiteexcellentinfrastructure.Eveniftheyareblocked,websiteshostedoverseasarelessliabletobeingremovedbylocalhostingprovidersincomplianceofgovernmentordersandremainaccessibletoBahrainiswithaccesstocensorshipcircumventiontools.

Multiplestateorganizations,includingtheMinistryofInformationAffair (MIA)andtheMinistryofInterior,canordertheblockingofawebsitewithoutacourtorder.TheMIAblockswebsitesthatviolateArticles19and20ofthecountry’sPressRulesandRegulations,whichincludematerialjudgedas“instigatinghatredofthepoliticalregime,encroachingonthestate’soffici religion,breachingethics,encroachingonreligionsandjeopardizingpublicpeaceorraisingissueswhosepublicationisprohibitedbytheprovisionsofthislaw.”49Thus,anysitethatcriticizesthegovernment,therulingfamily,orthecountry’sstatusquoissubjecttoblocking.AnupdatedlistofblockedwebsitesisregularlysenttoISPs,whichareinstructedto“prohibitanymeansthatallowaccesstositesblocked.”50LicensesofISPsmayberevokedbytheTRAforfailingtocooperationwiththeMIA’sblockingorders.51

InAugust2016,theTRAorderedalltelecommunicationscompaniestoemployacentralizedsystemforblockingwebsitesmanagedbytheTRA.52TheordermayrelatetoaUS$1.2millioncontract

41 KarenDeYoungandEllenNakashima,“UAEorchestratedhackingofQatarigovernmentsites,sparkingregionalupheaval,accordingtoU.S.intelligenceofficials Washington Post,July16,2017,http://wapo.st/2yRxjiX.42 Thesesitesincludebambuser.com,ustream.tv,andotherwebsitesthatstreamdirectlytoTwitterliketwitcasting.tv,see,Bahrain Freedom Index(blog),http://bit.ly/2b8aYNJ.43 ReportersWithoutBorders,“CrackdowncontinuesinBahrain,BloggersgoontrialinEmirates,”June16,2011,http://bit.ly/1OUSoae.44 BCHR,“Bahrain:The“CyberSafetyDirectorate”MonitorsInternetActivityInStyleSimilartoBigBrother,”November25,2013,http://bit.ly/1FleBho.45 “AtaGlance:Bahrain,”Herdict,accessedonFebruary22,2015,http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth?fc=BH.46 BenBirnbaum,“BahraincontinuescrackdownonShi’iteopposition,”The Washington Times,September14,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQCXLs.

“WebStatsDomian-Mail.bahrainonline.org,”WebStatsDomain,accessedMarch19,2013,http://bit.ly/1L7Fyla.47 BahrainCenterforHumanRights,“ANHRIcondemnsblockingAl-QudsAl-Arabinewspaperwebsite,”May24,2011,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/412648 AhmedAlDosari,“Bahrainiwebsitesmigratefromtheirhomeland...Willtheycomebackoneday?,”[inArabic](blog),November21,2015,http://bit.ly/2bSztUN.49 Decree—by—LawNo.47Regardingorganizingthepress,printingandpublishing,October23,2002,http://bit.ly/2blcAaB.50 ReportersWithoutBorders,“AuthoritiesStepUpOffensiv AgainstJournalistsandWebsites,”May14,2009,http://bit.ly/1hDJh2l.51 ReportersWithoutBorders,“AuthoritiesStepUpOffensiv AgainstJournalistsandWebsites.”52 TRA,ResolutionNo.(12)of2016PromulgatingtheInternetSafetyRegulation,accessedMay25,2017http://bit.ly/2r6vqbf.

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awardedearlierintheyeartoCanadiancompanyNetsweepertoprovidea“nationalwebsitefilterin solution.”53Netsweeperhassincebeenidentifie onnineISPsinthecountry,andfilter politicalcontentonatleastone.54Itwasnotclearifthenewtechnologywillincreasetheamountofcontentsubjecttoblocking,orjustchangethemechanismsinvolved.

Thedecision-makingprocessandgovernmentpoliciesbehindtheblockingofwebsitesarenottransparent.Thelistofallblockedwebsitesisnotavailabletothepublic.Inaddition,webmastersdonotreceivenotification orexplanationswhentheirwebsitesarebanned.Whentryingtoaccessablockedsite,usersareonlyinformedthatthewebsitehasbeen“blockedforviolatingregulationsandlawsofKingdomofBahrain.”Althoughthelawdoestechnicallyallowaffecte individualstoappealablockwithin15days,nosuchcasehasyetbeenadjudicated.

Content Removal

Websiteadministratorsareheldlegallyresponsibleforcontentpostedontheirplatforms,includinglibel.InFebruary2016,theinteriorministrystatedthatWhatsAppgroupadministratorsmaybeheldliableforspreadingfalsenewsiftheyfailtoreportincidentsthatoccurintheirgroup.55Spreadingfalsenewsisacriminaloffense Inaddition,newsemergedinApril2015ofplanstocreateaBahraininationalsearchenginewiththehelpofRussiantechnologyexperts,basedonRussia’s“Sputnik”searchengine.ThemovewouldenableauthoritiestoeasilyremoveunwantedsearchresultswithouttheneedtosecurecooperationfromU.S.-basedsearchengines,suchasGoogle.56

InJanuary2017,thegovernmentclaimedthatithadmetwithFacebook,Twitter,andSnapchattoremoveunidentifie “inappropriatecontent.”Accordingtotransparencyreports,neitherGoogle,Facebook,Twitter,norSnapchatremovedanycontentbasedonrequestsfromtheBahrainiauthorities.Twitterdidreceivetworemovalrequestsinthefirs halfof2017,butdidnotwithholdanycontent.57Indeed,localobserverscomplainedthatinappropriatecontentcontinuedtobewidelyavailableonsocialmedia.58

Authoritiesalsouseextralegalmeasurestoforciblyremoveonlinecontent.Througharrests,59prosecutions,60andtorture,61securityforceshavecoercedmanyonlineforummoderatorsto

53 BahrainTenderBoard,“AwardedTendersMonthlyReportFrom1/1/2016to1/31/2016,”page5,[inArabic]http://goo.gl/ilUJIF.54 CitizenLab,“TenderConfirmed RightsAtRisk:VerifyingNetsweeperinBahrain,”September21,2016,http://bit.ly/2cCUQVO.55 “InteriorMinistry:GroupAdmininBahrain,isresponsibletotheauthoritiesforeverythingpublished,”[inArabic]LualuaTV,February19,2016,http://lualuatv.com/?p=33529.56 “RussiacouldhelpBahraininestablishinganationalsearchengine”,UNLOCKPWD,July30,2015,http://bit.ly/1LNLSRJ.57 “Bahrain,”Transparency Report,Twitter,https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/bh.html.58 “Culturallyinappropriatecontentonsocialmediablocked,”BahrainNewsAgency,January3,2017,https://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/764204andiProtestbh,Twitterpost,January13,2017,11:45AMhttps://twitter.com/iprotestbh/status/81999377515823104159 Nonexhaustivelistofforummoderatorswhoweresubjecttoarrestfoundat:http://bit.ly/1He9SYQ;accessedvia:BCHR,

“Bahrain:Afterdestructionoftheactualprotestingsiteat“thePearl,”thegovernmentshiftstoeliminatevirtualprotests,”May17,2011,http://bit.ly/1LmOd7Y.60 BahrainGatewayfarewelltweet,accessedAugust14,2016,https://twitter.com/b4bhcom/status/622400160346341376.61 MonaKareem,“Bahrain:TwitterUserJailedfor66DaysforTweeting,“Global Voices,December5,2011http://bit.ly/1JXimWe.

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permanentlyshutdowntheirwebsites.62AfterbeinginterrogatedbysecurityforcesonMay24,2017,activistAdela-MarzooqdeletedallthecontenthepostedonTwitterbetweenMarchandMay2017.HehadreportedextensivelyonadeadlycrackdownonprotestorsinDiraz(seeRestrictionsonConnectivity).63AccountsoperatedbytheoppositioncanalsobetemporarilyshutdownonTwitterbecausegovernmentsupportersorganizetoreportthemforviolatingtheplatform’spolicies.64


Decree68/2016,passedbytheMIAinJuly2016,restricteduseofelectronicmediabypressoutlets.NewspapersmustnowobtainlicensesfromBahrain’smassmediadirectorateinordertodisseminateelectronicmediaonwebsitesorsocialmedia.65Thelawdoesnotdetailwhatcriteriawouldbeusedtoprovideorrenewtheone-yearlicense.Additionally,newspapersmaynotpostvideosovertwominutesinlengthandareforbiddenfromlive-streamingvideo.Thelawalsostipulatesthatelectronicmediamustreflec thesamecontentastheirprintedcounterparts,effectivel limitingothermultimediacontent.Furthermore,outletsmustprovidealistoftheirsocialmediaaccountsandwebsiteaddresses,aswellasthenamesofthosewhooverseethemaspartofthelicenseapplication,exposingemployeestopossiblemonitoringandcoercion.Undertheexistingpresslaw,mediaprofessionalsfacesixmonths’imprisonmentand/orafin ofBHD5,000(US$13,260)forpublishingwithoutalicense.

Pressurealsomountedonal-Wasat,Bahrain’sonlyindependentnewspaper,whichwasseparatelybannedfromsharingYouTubecontentinearly2016.66InJanuary2017,theMIAtemporarilybarredal-Wasatfromusingelectronicmediatools,effectivel shuttingdownitswebsiteandsocialmediaaccountsforthreedays.67Themoveoccurredonedayafteral-Wasatpublishedaheadlinestoryabouttheexecutionofthreepoliticalprisoners.Theministryclaimedtheoutletwas“incitingaspiritofdivisionandharmingnationalunity.”TheMIAorderedtheindefinit suspensionoftheentirepublicationinJune.68

Theauthoritiesareknowntomanipulateonlinecontentinordertofabricategreaterpublicsupportforgovernmentpolicies.AccordingtothewatchdoggroupBahrainWatch,thegovernmenthashired18publicrelations(PR)firm forpromotionalcampaignssinceFebruary2011,representingatleastUS$32millionincontracts.69AtleastonePRagencywascontractedtoprovide“weboptimizationandblogging”services,70whileotherswerehiredforonlinereputationmanagement.71

62 ModeratoroftheAlDairForumtalksabouthisdetention,sayinghewasforcedtoshowtheinterrogationoffic howtoclosethewebsite:“Ahmedal-DairiModeratorofAlDairForumsinthefirs episodeofhistestimony:thuseasedvoiceofZakariaAlAsheeriforever,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,January4,2012,http://bahrainmirror.com/article.php?id=2678&cid=117.63 iProtestbh,Twitterpost,May26,2017,04:49AMhttps://twitter.com/iprotestbh/status/86807151066109542464 BahrainDetainees,Twitterpost,May12,2015,8:23AM,Atweetmentioningoneoppositionaccountsthathasbeensuspendedduetoreports,accessedJuly31,2015https://twitter.com/BH14Detainees/status/598146464934547456.65 “InformationMinisterissuesedict68/2016,”BahrainNewsAgency,July16,2016,http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/73610666 “IAApreventsAlwasatfromusing“Video”andYouTube,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January25,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1072283.html.67 “TheMinistryofInformationAffair decidedtostopthecirculationanduseofAl-Wasatnewspaperforelectronicmediaimmediately..,”[inArabic]Bahrain News Agency,January16,2017,http://bna.bh/portal/news/76601768 “Bahrain:OnlyIndependentNewspaperShutDown,”HumanRightsWatch,June18,2017,https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/18/bahrain-only-independent-newspaper-shut-down.69 BahrainWatch,“PRWatch–keepinganeyeontheKingdom’sPR,”http://bahrainwatch.org/pr/.70 “Trippi&AssociatesManipulateInternetContentonBehalfofBahrainGovernment,”Bahrain Freedom Index(blog),July20,2011,http://bit.ly/1L7nCqT.71 MarcusBaram,“LobbyistsJumpShipinWakeofMideastUnrest,”Huffington Post,March25,2011,http://huff.to/1ePbiw .

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InOctober2014,oneofthesePRcompaniestriedtoforceThe Huffington PostnottowriteabouttheUnitedKingdom’sinvestigationoftortureallegationsagainsttheBahrainiking’sson.72ProgovernmentblogslikeCitizens of Bahrainalsospreadpropaganda.73Authoritieshaveurgedprogovernmentuserstopostaboutcertaintopics,sometimeswithunintendedconsequences.74InJanuary2014,theprimeministerandtheministeroftelecommunicationsheldseveralpublicmeetingswithprogovernmentuserstoencouragethemto“defendBahrain’srulingsystem.”75

Similarly,an“armyoftrolls”hasbeenactiveonTwittersinceFebruary2011,76whenhundredsofaccountssuddenlyemergedtocollectivelyharassandintimidateonlineactivists,77commentators,andjournalistswhovoicedsupportforprotestsandhumanrights.78Theprogovernmenttrollshavebeenmoderatelyeffectiv insilencingorreducingtheactivityofoppositionvoicesbothinsideBahrain79andabroad.80Thetrollshavealsoplayedavitalroleinspreadinginformationthatiscontroversial,offensive orfalse,81inordertodistorttheimageofprotesters,spreadhateandconflict ordiscreditinformationpostedonsocialnetworks.82Thesetrollaccountsusuallyhavefewornofollowersandtendtoappearanddisappearincoordinationwithoneanother.Inonerecentincident,trollssprangintoactioninJune2016afteradecisiontorevokethenationalityofIsaQassim,theforemostShiitereligiousauthorityinBahrain.Researcherssaid50percentoftweetsdistributedwiththe#Bahrainhashtagderivedfrombotsandtrollstweetinganti-Shiitemessages.Inaperiodof12hoursonJune22,over5,000sectariantweetswereregisteredonthehashtag.83Twittersuspended1,800botaccountsrelatedtothemanipulationcampaign.84

InAugust2013,BahrainWatchrevealedevidenceofconnectionsbetweentheBahrainigovernmentand“extremist”accountsonTwitterandFacebook,whichadvocatedviolenceagainstboththegovernmentandprotesters.85Itwasalsorevealedthatthegovernmentimpersonatesopposition

72 JamesDorsey,“BahrainrattledbyUKcourt’sopeningofdoortoinvestigationoftortureallegations,”The World Post,October21,2014,http://huff.to/10vInw .73 CitizensforBahrainwebsite,accessedMay26,2017,https://www.citizensforbahrain.com74 “Bahrain’sInteriorMinisterLaunchedHateCampaign..SectarianTakfir DiscourseReturnedUnderHashtag#No_to_Iranian_Intervention,”Bahrain Mirror,August22,2015,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/25858.html.75 “HRHPremiercallsfortheneedtousesocialnetworkstodefendthenation,”Bahrain News Agency, January14,2014,http://bit.ly/1L7p6S3.76 BobHooker,“Bahrain’sTrollArmy,”Web 3.0 Lab(blog),February17,2011,http://bit.ly/1W8HJN3.77 SeeBrianDooley,“NoStampRequired:AllTooEasyfor#BahrainTwitterTrolls,”Huffingt Post,September25,2015http://huff.to/1WmSue ,andBrianDooley,“‘Troll’Attackson#BahrainTweetsShowDepthofGovernmentAttemptstoSilenceDissent,”The World Post, November17,2011,http://huff.to/1i mxf9.78 J.DavidGoodman,“‘TwitterTrolls’HauntDiscussionsofBahrainOnline,”The Lede (blog),The New York Times,October11,2011,http://nyti.ms/1NBl3Sv.79 iManamaa,Twitterpost,May13,2011,7:39am,http://bit.ly/1iCuvtJ;Sultanal-Qassemi,“PioneerBloggersintheGulfArabStates,”Jadaliyya,December20,2011,http://bit.ly/1k4jzR5;BobHooker,“DisturbingDropinTweetinginBahrain,”Web 3.0 Lab (blog), March22,2011,http://bit.ly/1OcDDik.80 “TwitterTrollingasPropagandaTactic:BahrainandSyria,”Jillian C. York (blog),December10,2011,http://bit.ly/1hXiMFN.81 “SoManyTrollsbutsoFewLeaders:TheInformationWarinBahrain,” Marc Owen Jones,March14,2011,http://bit.ly/1V0gq5c;HusseinIbish,The Bahrain Uprising: Towards Confrontation or Accommodation?,TheHenryJacksonSociety,November2011,9,http://bit.ly/1P8SNpf.82 DavidWheeler,“IntheArabSpring’sWake,TwitterTrollsandFacebookSpies,”The Chronicle of Higher Education (blog),November29,2011,http://bit.ly/1Kx8zdJ.83 MarcOwenJones,“TheAutomationofSectarianism:AreTwitterBotsSpreadingSectarianismintheGulf?,”June21,2016,http://bit.ly/28TOtwt,andMarcOwenJones,“Around51%ofTweetson#BahrainHashtagCreatedbyAutomatedSectarianBots,”June22,2016,http://bit.ly/2s0Jcfm.84 MarcOwenJones,“NewSectarianBotsStillFloodingTwitterwithAnti-ShiaHateSpeech,”June28,2016,http://bit.ly/2qYtiUsandVideobyErinKilbride,Twitterpost,July4,2016,14:20PMhttps://twitter.com/neo_chlo/status/75007692884615987285 BillMarczak,“IsBahrain’sGovernmentrunningextremistaccounts?”BahrainWatch,August5,2013,http://bit.ly/1UpiYil.

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figure onsocialmediainordertosendmaliciouslinks,suchasIPtrackers,toanonymousgovernmentcriticsthatcanbeusedtoidentifyandprosecutethem.86

Thestatealsoissuesoffici statementswarningagainstthediscussionofcertainsubjectsandthe“misuse”ofsocialmedia.87OnJanuary3,2016,theinteriorministrythreatenedtotakeactionagainstanyinsultor“negativediscussion”oftheSaudiexecutionsofNimral-Nimr,aprominentShiitecleric,and42othermen.88OnMarch26,2015,theinteriorministryalsoissuedawarningthatitwouldtakestepsagainstanyoneexpressingopinionsagainstBahrain’sinvolvementintheSaudi-ledcoalitionconductingairstrikesinYemen89(seeProsecutionsandDetentionsforOnlineActivities).

Therearesomegovernmentrestrictionsononlineadvertising,butmanyoppositionwebsitescontinuetooperatenonetheless.Whileitisdifficu forblockedwebsitestosecureadvertising,popularsitessuchasBahrain Mirror(390,000viewsmonthly)havenotfacedsignifican financia pressures.ThisisduetothefactthatmostBahrainioppositionwebsitesarerunwithlimitedresources,andareoftenself-funded.Furthermore,thewebsitescontinuetoreceivelargeamountsoftrafficfromuserswithinBahrainthroughtheuseofproxyservices,dynamicIPaddresses,andvirtualprivatenetwork(VPN)applications.Whilethegovernmentdoesblockaccesstocircumventiontools,includingworkaroundssuchasGooglePageTranslate,Googlecachedpages,andonlinemobileemulators,internetsavvyBahrainistendtobypasstherestrictions.

TheinternetremainsthemainsourceofinformationandnewsformanyBahrainis,particularlythoseactiveonTwitterandFacebook.90However,internetusersexerciseahigherdegreeofself-censorship,particularlyasinvestigationsofusers’onlineactivitieshavebeenlaunchedatworkplacesanduniversities.91OnTwitter,onlineforums,andcommentsections,mostpeopleusepseudonymsduetothefearofbeingtargetedbytheauthorities.92Manysharecontentprivatelyonsocialmediainsteadofpublicly.AtleastsomehavetemporarilywithdrawnfromTwitterafterreceivingthreatstotheirpersonalsafety.93

Digital Activism

Activistsrelyondigitaltoolstobringattentiontoprotestsandhumanrightsviolations,givenrestrictionsonpressfreedomandthelackofinternationalmediacoverage,whichiscompoundedbythefactthatmanyprominentjournalistsarebarredfromthecountry.9495Onlinecampaignswere

86 BillMarczak,“BahrainGovtusingfakeTwitteraccountstotrackonlinecritics,”BahrainWatch,pressrelease,July31,2013,http://bit.ly/1hXjfrJ.87 “MOI:legalactionagainstanyonewhoabusestheuseofsocialmediaandraisessectarianstrife,”[inArabic]Alwasat,June27,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1003344.html.88 “MinistryofInterior(MOI):legalactionsagainstanymisuseorabuseontheimplementationoftheSaudijudicialrulings,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January3,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1063913.html.89 “MOIwarnsagainstdivision,sedition,”March26,2015,Bahrain News Agency,http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/660794.90 “Twomillionand200KaccountsinthesocialnetworksinBahrainin2015,”[inArabic]Alwasat,December15,2015http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1057013.html.91 SimeonKerr,“Manamafight backincyberspace,”Financial Times,May23,2011,http://on.ft.com/maUYxm.92 NancyMessieh,“Onlineanonymity:Agatewaytofreedomorabuse?”The Next Web,August14,2011,http://bit.ly/1PNCI8x.93 “Bahraindoctor@BAHRAINDOCTORthreatenedwitharrestbecauseofhertweets,”Bahrain Freedom Index (blog), accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1DhPISu.94 “AccessDenied,”aprojectoftheindependentresearchandadvocacyorganizationBahrainWatch,chroniclesthemanyjournalists,researchers,academics,andNGOworkersthatwereexpelledfromordeniedaccesstoBahrainfromthe2011uprisinguntilnow.See,http://bahrainwatch.org/access/.95 AmiraalHussaini,“Bahrain:TweetingAppallingConditionsatJawPrison,”Global Voices,July19,2012,http://bit.ly/1ikgVuE.

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pickedupbyinternationalmediainthepastyear.Overtenthousandstweetswerepostedwiththe#save_Bahrain_prisonershashtag,resultinginaBBCreportonprisonconditionsinthecountry.96Over40,000tweetshavebeenpostedunderanotherhashtag,#Diraz,ascitizenjournalistscoveredlocalviolencein2017.97Socialmediapostswereusedbyexpertstoidentifythetypesofweaponsusedbysecurityforcesagainsttheprotestors.98

Inaddition,the“CoalitionofFebruary14Youth”protestmovementcontinuestousesocialnetworks99toorganizeprotestsandbringinternationalattentiontolocalcauses.100YouTubevideosareuploadedtodocumentpoliceattacksonciviliansandtorturetestimonies,101andrelativesorfriendsofdetaineesregularlyuseTwittertocampaignfortheirreleaseandtoprovideupdatesaboutprisonconditions.102

Violations of User RightsViolations of user rights in Bahrain were rampant, with at least 18 users arrested, detained, or prosecuted over the coverage period. Collectively, 148 months of prison sentences were passed down to 12 users, while others remain on trial or in arbitrarily detention for charges like insulting the king or defaming the government. Bahraini law does not contain adequate protections for free speech, given provisions that ban criticism of the royal family, the spread of false news, or insults to foreign nations. A new law was passed to allow for the trial of civilians in military tribunals.

Legal Environment

Bahrain’slegalenvironmentpresentsmanyobstaclestointernetfreedom.AccordingtoArticle23oftheconstitution,freedomofexpressionisguaranteed,“providedthatthefundamentalbeliefsofIslamicdoctrinearenotinfringed,theunityofthepeopleisnotprejudiced,anddiscordorsectarianismisnotaroused.”103Article26statesthatallwritten,telephonic,andelectroniccommunications“shallnotbecensoredortheirconfidentialit bebreachedexceptinexigenciesspecifie bylawandinaccordancewithproceduresandunderguaranteesprescribedbythelaw.”104

ThePressandPublicationsLawof2002promisesfreeaccesstoinformation“withoutprejudicetotherequirementsofnationalsecurityanddefendingthehomeland.”Bahrainijournalistshavearguedthatthesequalifyingstatementsandloosely-wordedclausesallowforarbitraryinterpretationand,inpractice,thenegationofthemanyrightstheyseektouphold.105

96 “BBCTrend,”[inArabic]BBC,June12,2016http://www.bbc.com/arabic/blogs/2016/06/160612_social_media_12_june?ocid=socialflow_twitte .97 “#Diraz:Bahrainiangeronsocialnetworkingsites,”[inArabic]BBC,January27,2017,http://www.bbc.com/arabic/trending-38771006?ocid=socialflow_twitte .98 BahrainWatch,“CriticalInjuryasArmedMenFire9mmRoundsandShotgunsatCiviliansinDiraz,”January26,2017,http://bit.ly/2n9Cnpe.99 Coalition14Feb,TwitterAccount,https://twitter.com/COALITION14.100 TobyC.JonesandAla’aShehabi,“Bahrain’srevolutionaries,”Foreign Policy,January2,2012,http://atfp.co/1JBnf7R;U.S.EmbassyBahrain,“DemonstrationNotice3–January17,2013,“newsrelease,January17,2013,http://1.usa.gov/1JDUPMH.101 BCHR,“BlockingtheDocumentary‘SystematicTortureinBahrain’onYouTube,”February8,2011,http://bit.ly/1NBlaO4.102 BahrainDetainees,TwitterAccount,https://twitter.com/FreedomPrayers/lists/bahraindetainees.103 ConstitutionoftheKingdomofBahrain,art.23,http://www.shura.bh/en/LegislativeResource/Constitution/Pages/default.aspx.104 ConstitutionoftheKingdomofBahrain,art.26.105 IREX,“Bahrain,”Media Sustainability Index 2008, 2009,https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/MSIMENA08_Bahrain.pd .

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InApril2017,thekingapprovedaconstitutionalamendmenttoallowforthetrialofciviliansinmilitarycourts.106Whenmilitarycourtslastoperatedinthismannerduringastateofemergencyin2011,judgespassedlongsentencesof15yearsandlifeimprisonmenttobloggers.Inaddition,thepublicprosecutorhasbeguntousealegalprovisionthatcallsfortheprosecutionofteenagers’parentswhentheirchildrenarearrestedforcriminalactivities,suchas“misusingsocialmedia.”107

Onlinecensorshipandcriminalpenaltiesforonlinespeecharecurrentlyenforcedunderthe2002PressandPublicationsLaw,108whichdoesnotspecificall mentiononlineactivitiesbutwasextendedtomobilephonesin2010.109Thelawallowsforprisonsentencesfromsixmonthstofiv yearsforrepeatoffenders forpublishingmaterialthatcriticizesIslam,itsfollowers,ortheking,aswellascontentthatinstigatesviolentcrimesortheoverthrowofthegovernment.110Inaddition,the2002TelecommunicationsLawcontainspenaltiesforseveralonlineactivities,suchasthetransmissionofmessagesthatareoffensiv topublicpolicyormorals.111However,sentencescanbelongerifusersaretriedunderthepenalcodeorterrorismlaws,especiallywhenitcomestosocialmediacases,wherethecurrentpressandpublicationlawisnotused.112Forinstance,underthepenalcode,anyuserwho“deliberatelydisseminatesafalsestatement”thatmaybedamagingtonationalsecurityorpublicordermaybeimprisonedforuptotwoyears.113UnderArticle309ofthePenalCode,any

“expressionagainstoneoftherecognizedreligioussects”orridiculeoftheirritualsmaybepunishedbyafin ofBHD100(US$266)orprisontermofoneyear.Thegovernmenthasusedthesevagueclausestointerrogateandprosecuteseveralbloggersandonlinecommentators.


BetweenJune2016andMay2017,atleast22individualswerearrested,detained,orprosecutedfortheironlineactivities.114WhilemanywerestillontrialasofMay2017,148monthsofprisonsentenceswerecollectivelypasseddownon12Bahrainiusersduringthecoverageperiod.

TheElectronicCrimesDirectoratepublishesoffici statisticsofcybercrimecaseseachyear,althoughitisdifficu todeterminewhichcasesarerelatedtopolitical,social,orreligiousspeechthatisprotectedunderinternationalnorms.Atotalof682caseswerenotedin2016,including73casesofdefamation,57casesof“insultingastatutorybody,”9casesof“incitinghatredagainsttheregime,”7casesof“disseminationoffalsenews,”3casesof“insultingaforeigncountry,”and339casesof

106 “BahrainKingapprovesmilitarytrialsforcivilians,”TheHindu,April3,2017,http://bit.ly/2r8qggR.107 “MOI:arrestofnumberofthosewhoabusedsocialmedia,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January4,2016,http://bit.ly/2b9ULdQ.108 Forcaseswheretheauthoritieshaveusedthe2002presslawtocensoronlinewebsites,seeBCHR,“Websiteaccusedofviolatingpresscode,BCHRconcernedthatmoveisaimedatsilencingcriticalvoices,”October1,2008,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/2446;

“Closingablowtofreedomofopinionandexpression,”[inArabic] Alwasat,April25,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA;“Blockingusers‘Twitter’causedbyaviolationoftheCopyrightAct,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January3,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA.109 HabibToumi,“BahrainimposesblackoutonBlackBerrynewssharing,”Habib Toumi (blog),April8,2010,http://bit.ly/1IBqlM4.110 PressandPublicationsLawof2002oftheKingdomofBahrain(No.47of2002).111 TheTelecommunicationsLawOfTheKingdomOfBahrain,LegislativeDecree48.112 “Alhammadi:Noderelictionindealingwiththecomplaintsofthemisuseofsocialmedia,”[inArabic]Alwasat,August4,2015,http://bit.ly/2bqEFfV.113 BahrainPenalcode,1976,art.168,http://bahrainrights.org/BCHR/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Bahrain-Penal-Code.doc.114 Listofprosecutedonlineusers2016-2017:http://bit.ly/2rrAWYQ,accessedviabahrainrights.org.

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“misuseofelectronicdevices.”Additionally,therewere54casesof“hacking.”115Multipleusershavealsobeenarrestedforcallingfor“illegalassemblies”.116

Severalpeoplewereprosecutedfor“insultingtheking”overthecoverageperiod:

● Soccerplayer Mohammadal-Alawiyat wasarrestedonJune9,2016forhistweets.117HewasheldinpretrialdetentionuntilSeptember2016.Atrialhadnotbeenpubliclyreportedbymid-2017.

● OnJune27,2016,BahrainiartistKhalilal-MadhoonwasarrestedinrelationtoacontroversialInstagramcommentonwhethertheword“majesty”appliesbettertoGodortheking.118Hewasreleasedonemonthlater.

● OnAugust31,2016,twouserswhotweetedunderpseudonymsweresentencedunderArticle214ofthePenalCode.119TaibaIsmaeel,whowasarrestedon26June2016,receivedaone-yearprisonsentenceandafin ofBHD1,000(US$2,650).HameedKhatam,whowasarrestedonJuly25,2016,receivedasentenceoftwoyearsinprison.120ThesentencewaslaterreducedbyoneyearinNovember.121

● OnFebruary9,2017,Younisal-Shakouriwassentencedtooneyearinprisonforatweet.HehadbeenarrestedonJuly25,2016.

Otherswereprosecutedforcriticizingthegovernment:

● OnJune8,2016,KhalidAbdulaal, aformermemberofparliament,wassentencedtooneyearinprisonfor“insultingtheministryofinterior”onTwitterin2014.Hehadreceivedanearlierone-yearsentenceinMay2015fordenouncingtheuseoftorturetoextractconfessions.AsanMP,hewasimmunefromprosecutionatthetimehepublishedthestatements.122

● OnJune16,2016,HabeebJaafarAhmed,a45-year-oldmilitaryoffice wassentencedtothreemonthsinprisonfor“incitinghatredagainsttheregimeandsecurityforces”onTwitterandFacebook.123HehadbeenarrestedonApril10,2016.

115 “Combatingcybercrimeattendsto682reportsin2016,halfofwhicharemisuseofcommunicationsdevices,”[inArabic]Alayam,February26,2017,http://www.alayam.com/alayam/Variety/634778/News.html116 “InteriorMinistry:thearrestofpeoplewhopostedinflammator materialtocallforunauthorizedsit-insthroughthemeansofcommunication,”[inArabic]Alwasat,July26,2016http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1141385.html.117 “BahrainiAuthoritiesChargeFootballPlayerover“InsultingBahrain’sKing”,”BahrainMirror,June10,2016,http://bit.ly/2rISlfn.118 “OnEveofUNResolutionforInternetFreedom:Websitesblocked,InternetDisrupted,andSocialMediaPostsContinuetoLeadtoArrestsinBahrain,”BCHR,July3,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/7969.119 Article214proscribes“apunishmentofimprisonmentforaperiodofnolessthanoneyearandnomorethansevenyearsandafin ofnolessthanBD1,000andnomorethanBD10,000willbeinflicte uponanypersonwhooffend inpublictheMonarchoftheKingdomofBahrain,thefla orthenationalemblem.”BCHR,“BahrainKing:Upto7YearsImprisonmentifYouInsultMe!,”February9,2014,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/6747.120 “BahrainiAuthoritiesSentenceMoreActiviststoPrisonTermsforCriticisingtheKing,”BCHR,September9,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8148121 “HameedKhatam’sprisonsentencereducedfromtwoyearstooneyearonchargesof“insultingtheking”,”[inArabic]ManamaPost,November17,2016,http://www.manamapost.com/news.php?name=2016041622122 “MorearrestsandjailsentencesinBahrainoversocialmediaposts,”BCHR,June20,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919123 “MorearrestsandjailsentencesinBahrainoversocialmediaposts,”BCHR,June20,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919

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● OnNovember10,2016,humanrightslawyerMohamedal-Tajerwaschargedwith“insultinggovernmentinstitutions,incitinghatredofareligioussect,andmisusingatelecommunicationsdevice”underArticles172,216,290ofthepenalcode.HehadsentaprivatevoicemessageoverWhatsAppstating“It’sclearthatthereisateaminthepublicprosecutionandcybercrimesdivisionwhoseonlyjobistositatcomputersandintercepteverywordaboutSunnis,SaudiArabia,hatredoftheregime,orinsultsagainsttheking.”Additionally,hewasinterrogatedoveratweetthatsaid,inEnglish,“Historytellsstoriesoffallingdictators,butthelessonisneverlearnt#bahrain”andforretweetingapostthatreferredtothegovernmentas“theregimeofprohibition.”124

● OnJanuary15,2017,thesamedayBahrainexecutedthreepoliticalprisoners,125oppositionleaderEbrahimSharifwasinterrogatedforcriticizingtheexecutionsonTwitter.126OnMarch20,hewaschargedwith“incitinghatred”againsttheregime(Article165ofthepenalcode)andagainst“factionsofsociety”(Article172),127overaseparateTwitterpostwhichcriticizedtheauthoritiesfordissolvingpoliticaloppositionsocieties.Hehadalsosharedinformationabouthumanrightsviolations.128

● InFebruary2017,aclericwasfine BHD50(US$133)forinsultingparliamentonInstagram.129Hehadcalledtheinstitution“ajoke.”

Severalindividualshavebeenarrestedorfine fordefaminglocalfigure andinstitutions:

● InJuly2016,aboardmemberofBahrain’sChamberofCommerceandIndustrylodgedacomplaintagainsttheboard’schairpersonoveramessagesentoveraWhatsAppgroupdedicatedtoboardmembers.Theboardchairwasorderedtopayafin ofBHD50(US$133)inOctober.130Separately,Mohamedal-Aradi,abusinessmanactiveonTwitterwassummonedtwiceinFebruaryandMarch2017,131forallegedlydefamingthesameChamber.132

● On15August2016,policearrestedGhadaJamsheer,ahumanrightsdefenderandblogger,whenshereturnedtoBahrainfromoverseas.133Despiteillhealth,shewasrequiredtoservepartofa10-monthprisonsentencehandeddowninrelationtoallegationsaboutcorrupt

124 “Bahrain:HumanRightsLawyerCharged,”HRW,December1,2016,https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/bahrain-human-rights-lawyer-charged125 “BahrainExecutesthreeStatelessTortureVictimsFollowingKingHamad’sAuthorisation,”BCHR,January15,2017,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8434126 BahrainMirror,Twitterpost,January15,2017,09:36AMhttps://twitter.com/BahrainmirrorEN/status/820686137807306752andoriginaltweet,EbrahimSharif,Twitterpost[inArabic],January14,2017,07:45AMhttps://twitter.com/ebrahimsharif/status/820295702878134272127 “BAHRAIN:PoliticalOppositionLeaderEbrahimSharifChargedWith“IncitingHatred”,”BCHR,March20,2017,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8611128 “AuthoritiesreleaseEbrahimSharifafterquestioninghimabouthistweetsonmartyrAbdullahAl-Ajouz,”[inArabic]BahrainMirror,March20,2017,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/37311.html.129 “TheclericBasharal-Aliwasfine 50dinarsforinsultingtheHouseofRepresentatives,”[inArabic]Alwasat,February8,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1208401.html.130 “TheformerchiefexecutiveoftheChamberofCommercewasconvictedofinsultingoverWhatsapp,”[inArabic]BahrainMirror,October2,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/33983.html.131 MohamedAlAradi,Twitterpost[inArabic],March22,2017,https://twitter.com/mohamedaradi/status/844480302504464384132 “TweetingleadstheActivistAlAraditotheprosecution,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May12,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1212841.html.133 “BCHRCondemnsImprisonmentofWomen’sRightsDefenderGhadaJamsheer,”BCHR,October7,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8232.

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managementatKingHamadUniversityHospitalthatshepublishedonTwitterin2014.134InDecember2016shewasreleasedandgivenagovernmentjobinlieuoftheremainderofhersentence.

● OnNovember29,2016,SocialmediaactivistFaisalHayyatwassentencedtothreemonthsinprison135overatweetdeemedto“insultasectandareligiousfigure. 136LocalNGOsspeculatedthattherealreasonforhisarrestmayhavebeenhispublishingofalettertotheministerofinterioroverFacebook,137inwhichheclaimedhehadbeentorturedbysecurityforcesin2011.138

NabeelRajab,oneofBahrain’smostprominenthumanrightsdefendersandTwitterusers,139hasbeeninandoutofprisonsince2012forvariouscaseslinkedtoonlinespeech.140RajabisthepresidentoftheBahrainCenterforHumanRights,anongovernmentalorganizationthatremainsactivedespitea2004governmentordertocloseit.141AsofMay2017,hehadbeeninpretrialdetentionforalmostayear,142andhadundergone13hearingsonchargesincluding“spreadingfalsenewsduringatimeofwar”and“insultingastatutorybody.”143ThechargeswerebasedonTwitterpostsabouttheSaudi-ledcoalitionairstrikesinYemenandtheallegedtortureofdetaineesatJawprison.144InJuly,hewassentencedto2yearsinprisonfor““fordisseminatingfalsenews,statementsandrumorsabouttheinternalsituationinthekingdomthatwouldundermineitsprestigeandstatus,”andremainsdetainedashisappealhasbeenrepeatedlydelayed.145

Atleasteightotherinternetusersarestillservingprisonsentencesfrompreviousyears,including

134 “Bahrain:HumanrightsdefenderGhadaJamsheerfreedfromprison,allowedtoworkoffremainderofhersentence,”GCHR,December12,2016,http://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/1448.135 “Theimprisonmentofthemediaactivist«FaisalHayat»3monthswitheffect, [inArabic]ManamaPost,November29,2016,http://bit.ly/2rJ721S.136 “JournalistFaisalHayyatFacingPrisonfor“Defamatory”Tweets,”BCHR,November3,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8292.137 FaisalHayyat,Facebookpostoflettertotheministerofinterior[inArabic],October1,2016,https://www.facebook.com/faisal.hayyat.16/posts/10154731342476162.138 “JournalistandSocialMediaActivistArrestedafterWritingCriticalLettertoMinisterofInterioraboutTortureSuffere in2011,”BCHR,October10,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8238.139 Rajabwasrankedthe“mostconnected”TwitteruserinBahrainaccordingtoasurvey,withover260,000followersasofMay2015.See:Wamda,How the Middle East Tweets: Bahrain’s Most Connected ReportDecember3,2012,http://bit.ly/1Jf8vdo.140 NabeelRajabwasfirs arrestedonMay5,2012andheldforoverthreeweeksfor“insultingastatutorybody”inrelationtoacriticismdirectedattheMinistryofInterioroverTwitter.OnJune9,2012,hewasarrestedagainaftertweetingabouttheunpopularityofthePrimeMinister(alsoamemberoftheroyalfamily)inthecityofAl-Muharraq,followingthesheikh’svisitthere.AgroupofcitizensfromthecitypromptlysuedRajabforlibelinashowofobediencetotheroyalfamily.OnJune28,2012,hewasconvictedofchargesrelatedtohisfirs arrestandorderedtopayafin ofBHD300($800).Shortlyafterhewasreleasedonbail,hewasre-arrestedonJuly9,2012afteracourtsentencedhimtothreemonthsimprisonmentfortheAl-Muharraqincident.ThecourtofappealslateracquittedRajab,althoughhehadalreadyservedmostofhissentence.HewaskeptinprisonuntilMay2014toservetwo-yearsentencefor“callingforillegalgatheringsoversocialnetworks.”HewasthenarrestedandimprisonedfromApril2,2015toJuly13,2015aspartofasix-monthsentenceonchargesofinsultingpublicinstitutionsunderarticle216ofthepenalcodeforatweetinwhichhequestionedwhetherBahrainisecurityinstitutionsare

“ideologicalincubators”fortheso-called“IslamicState”terroristgroup.HewasreleasedthatJulyforhealthreasonsbutplacedonatravelban.141 BCHR,“AboutBCHR,”http://bahrainrights.org/en/about-us.142 “Updates:ArrestandDetentionofBCHR’sPresidentNabeelRajab,”BCHR,accessedMay26,2017,http://bit.ly/28MiH7o143 Nabeel.Rajab,Instagrampost,August2015,https://instagram.com/p/5aXYEGyGET/.144 BCHR,“NabeelRajab’scaseupdate,”May6,2015,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7517.145 JoeStork,“BahrainiRightsCriticImprisonedforYemenTweets,”HumanRightsWatch,September28,2017,https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/28/bahraini-rights-critic-imprisoned-yemen-tweets.

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AhmedHumaidan,HussainHubail,SayedAhmedal-Mousawi,146FadhelAbbas,147HussainKhamis,Yousifal-Amm,148andAbduljalilal-Singace.Al-Singace,aprominenthumanrightsdefenderandblogger,hasbeenservingalifesentencesince2011onchargesofpossessinglinkstoaterroristorganizationaimingtooverthrowthegovernment,149disseminatingfalsenews,andincitingprotestsagainstthegovernment.150


Severalreportshavedocumentedtheuseofspywarebythegovernmentagainstdissidents.InNovember2015,newevidenceshowedthatBahrainhadusedRemoteControlSystem(RCS)fromItaliancybersecurityfir HackingTeam.Thespywareallowsremotemonitoring,includingrecordingphonecalls,loggingkeystrokes,takingscreenshots,andactivatingcameras,amongotherfunctions.151MaliciouslinksareoftensentfromTwitterandFacebookaccountsimpersonatingwell-knownoppositionfigures friends,152orevenaccountsofarrestedusers.153InOctober2015,atleastfourcaseswererecordedinwhichoppositionmembersreceivedemailscontainingmaliciousspyware.154

Giventhattheauthoritieshavebeenquicktoidentifysocialmediauserswhooperateunderapseudonym,manyusersareconcernedaboutrestrictionsontheabilitytouseICTsanonymously.TheTRArequiresuserstoprovideidentificatio whenusingWi-FiandWiMaxconnections,andthegovernmentprohibitsthesaleoruseofunregisteredprepaidmobileSIMcards.155FurtherrestrictionsonthesaleofSIMcardswereintroducedinDecember2015.TheTRAissuedaregulationthatlimitsindividualsfrompurchasingnomorethan10pre-paidSIMcardsfromasingleserviceprovider.IndividualsmustbephysicallypresentwhenregisteringSIMcardsandprovidersmustverifytheidentityofallsubscribersonanannualbasis,includingthroughfingerprintin .156Additionally,SIMcardsareonlyavailablefromserviceproviders,notthirdparties.157ThemovecameaftertherecentprosecutionofindividualsaccusedofusingSIMcardstocarryoutbombattacks.158

InJanuary2017,thegovernmentratifie theArabTreatyonCombatingCybercrime,asetof

146 ForfurtherdetailsrefertoFOTN2016Report.147 “AmendmentofthepenaltyofformerWahdawiFadhilAbbastothreeyears,”[inArabic]Alwasat,October27,2016,http://bit.ly/2e0aldp.148 “3yearsinsteadof5fortwitteraccountownerof«HajiAhmed»,”[inArabic]Alayam,November12,2016http://bit.ly/2s1fnvd.149 ReportersWithoutBorders,“DetainedbloggerAbduljalilAl-Singaceonhungerstrike,”September6,2011,http://bit.ly/1N5BjuP.150 ReportersWithoutBorders,“DetainedbloggerAbduljalilAl-Singaceonhungerstrike.”151 BahrainWatch,“HowTheGovernmentofBahrainAcquiredHackingTeam’sSpyware,”November13,2015,http://bit.ly/2bVNSQ5.152 BahrainWatch,“TheIPSpyFiles:HowBahrain’sGovernmentSilencesAnonymousOnlineDissent”,May15,2013,accessedMarch31,2014,https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/viewreport.php.153 BahrainWatch,TwitterPost,March13,2015,12:28PM,https://twitter.com/BHWatch/status/576464787422339072.154 BahrainWatch,“UrgentSecurityAlertforBahrainiActivists,”October18,2015,http://bit.ly/2ba422J.155 Geoffre Bew,“TechnologyBillRapped,”Gulf Daily News,July20,2006,http://bit.ly/1UduN5E.156 “Adoptionoftheuseoffingerprin torecordphonechip,”[inArabic]Alayam,July28,2016,http://goo.gl/ytz8Zu.157 TRA,“TRAissuesSIM-CardEnabledTelecommunicationsServicesRegistrationRegulation,”February7,2016,http://bit.ly/1Q1eK8l.andTRA,“ResolutionNo.(13)of2015,PromulgatingtheSIM-CardEnabledTelecommunicationsServicesRegistrationRegulation,”accessedAugust14,2016,http://bit.ly/2bv8bmV.158 “7and3yearsimprisonmentforthreeBahrainiswhohaveregisteredphonechipsinthenamesofAsians,”[inArabic]Alayam,November9,2015,http://goo.gl/hHqupc.

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standardsdevelopedseveralyearsagotostemthemisuseoftelecommunicationsdevices,financia fraud,thepromotionofterrorism,andaccesstopornographiccontentonline.WhileBahrainalreadypassedacomputercrimeslawcontainingmanyoftheprovisionsin2014,thetreatyestablishesnewrulesontheretentionofuserdataandreal-timemonitoringofactivities,aswellasamechanismforsharinginformationbetweensignatoriestohelpcombattransnationalcrime.Thelackofstronghumanrightsstandardsinthetreatymayincreasethescopeforprivacyinfractionsonceitistransposedintolocallaw.159

SinceMarch2009,theTRAhasmandatedthatalltelecommunicationscompanieskeeparecordofcustomers’phonecalls,emails,andwebsitevisitsforuptothreeyears.Thecompaniesarealsoobligedtoprovidethesecurityserviceswithaccesstosubscriberdatauponrequestfromthepublicprosecution,whiletheprovisionofthedatacontentrequiresacourtorder.160

Cybercafesarealsosubjecttoincreasingsurveillance.Oversightoftheiroperationsiscoordinatedbyacommissionconsistingofmembersfromfourministries,whoworktoensurestrictcompliancewithrulesthatprohibitaccessforminorsandrequirethatallcomputerterminalsarefullyvisibletoobservers.161

ACyberSafetyDirectorateattheMinistryofStateforTelecommunicationsAffair waslaunchedinNovember2013tomonitorwebsitesandsocialmedianetworks,ostensiblyto“ensuretheyarenotusedtoinstigateviolenceorterrorismanddisseminateliesandfallaciesthatposeathreattothekingdom’ssecurityandstability.”162Officia hadearliercreatedaunittomonitorsocialmediaandforeignnewswebsitesto“respondtofalseinformationthatsomechannelsbroadcast”in2011.163

A2014computercrimeslaw(60/2014)criminalizestheillegalaccessofinformationsystems,illegaleavesdroppingovertransmission,andtheaccessandpossessionofpornographicelectronicmaterials.164Italsocriminalizestheencryptionofdatawithcriminalintentionsatatimewhenexpressionisoftenconsideredacriminalact.


Typically,arrestsofBahrainiusersinvolveextralegalmethodsofintimidation,suchasphysicalviolenceandtorture.165InApril2017,thefamilyNajahHabeebreportedthatshewassubjectedtobeatingandsexualharassmentinordertoextractconfessionsonchargesincluding“runningaccountsonTwitterandTelegram”thatsheusedfor“insultingtheking”andspreading“hatredoftheregime.”Asofmid-2017,shewasstillinpretrialdetention.

RightsactivistEbtisamal-Saegh,whowith theadvocacygroupSalam forDemocracyandHuman

159 “LawNo.(2)of2017ontheratificatio oftheArabConventiontocombattechnicalcrimesofinformation,”[inArabic]Offici Gazette,January26,2017,http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K0217.pd .160 Geoffre Bew,“BigBrother’MoveRapped,”Gulf Daily News,March25,2009,http://bit.ly/1MULfsL.161 ReportersWithoutBorders,“CountriesUnderSurveillance:Bahrain.”162 “ShaikhFawazpraisesCyberSafetyDirectorate”,Bahrain News Agency,November18,2013http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/588716.163 AndySambridge,“Bahrainsetsupnewunitstomonitormediaoutput,”Arabian Business,May18,2011,http://bit.ly/1JmHKqP.164 GeneralDirectorateofAnti-Corruption&Economic&ElectronicSecurity,LawNo.(60)fortheyear2014oninformationtechnologycrimes,[inArabic]accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1QMpBFD.165 “People&Power–Bahrain:Fightingforchange,”YouTubevideo,24:30,postedbyAlJazeeraEnglish,March9,2011,http://bit.ly/1Flun6y.

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Rightsdocumentstortureandotherrightsabusescommitteebyauthorities,hasrecentlyencounteredsevere reprisals forherwork. Following sustained legalandotherharassment in connectionwithmaterialshetweeted,inMay,al-SaeghreceivedasummonsfromBahrain’sNationalSecurityAgency(NSA).Uponpresentingherselfatitsoffice shewasblindfolded,beaten,andsexuallyassaulted;herattackersalsointerrogatedheraboutotherrightsactivistsandherassociationwiththeUNHumanRightsCouncil,andattemptedtocoercehertouseherTwitteraccounttoannounceherretirementasarightsactivist.166Instead,inJuly,sheusedherTwitteraccounttodenounceabuseofwomenbyNSAagentsandtocriticizeBahrain’sking.167Hourslater,plainclothesoffice actingwithoutawarrantraidedherhome,confiscate al-Saegh’sphoneandnationalIDcard,andtookherintocustody.ShewasreleasedinOctober,butnowfacesterrorismchargesinconnectionwithherJulytweets.168

InaseparatecaseonApril2,MahmoodAbdulhameedsaidsecurityforceshadbeatenhim,lefthiminacoldroom,andthreatenedtoassaulthiswifeandsister,whiletheywereholdinghimindetentionoveraWhatsAppmessage.169Othergovernmentcriticsreportedbeingsubjecttoabuseinsimilarcases,includingTaibaIsameel,whosaidshewasarrestedat3:15amonJune26,2016andsubjecttopsychologicalpressure.170HabeebAhmedwasarrestedinApril2016andheldincommunicadoforthreedays.Hesaidsecurityforcesthreatenedtoarresthisparentsandbrothersifherefusedtoconfess.171SaidYousifal-Muhafda,wholivesinexileafterbeingdetainedinrelationtoonlinespeechinthepast,saidthatamemberofBahrain’sNSAcontactedhimonInstagramwithathreattohurthisbrothersifhedidnotstoptweeting.172

Othershavebeensubjecttoharassmentandsocialsanctions.Progovernmentinternetuserspostphotosofprotestorsonsocialmediainordertoidentityandpunishthemin“electronicwitchhunts.”Governmentservicesandhousingcanbewithheldfromthoseaccusedofparticipatinginprotests,andsomehavebeenfire .173

Technical Attacks

CyberattacksagainstbothoppositionandgovernmentsupportersarecommoninBahrain.OppositionnewssitesBahrain MirrorandBahrain al-Youm cameunderattackinAugust2016174

166 PeterBeaumont,“ActivistwhoaccusedBahrainisecurityservicesofsexualassaultisrearrested,”Guardian,July6,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/06/activist-rearrested-bahrain-risk-torture-amnesty-international-ebtisam-al-saegh;“Ebtisamal-Saeghtorturedandsexuallyassaulted,”FrontlineDefenders,June1,2017,https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/ebtisam-al-saegh-tortured-and-sexually-assaulted,andpleaseseePDFdownloadhere:https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde11/6392/2017/en/.167 “Bahrain:Womanhumanrightsdefenderathighriskoftorture,includingsexualassault,”AmnestyInternational,July4,2017,https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/bahrain-woman-human-rights-defender-at-high-risk-of-torture-including-sexual-assault/.168 “Bahraintemporarilyfreesfemaleactivist,”Middle East Online,October23,2017,http://middle-east-online.com/english/?id=85545.169 BahrainPressAssociation,Facebookpost[inArabic],April21,2017,https://www.facebook.com/BahrainPA/posts/1431092103622587.170 “OnEveofUNResolutionforInternetFreedom:Websitesblocked,InternetDisrupted,andSocialMediaPostsContinuetoLeadtoArrestsinBahrain,”BCHR,July3,2016,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/7969.171 “MorearrestsandjailsentencesinBahrainoversocialmediaposts,”BCHR,June20,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919.172 “Bahraintargetsfamiliesofhumanrightsdefenderstointimidatethem,”BCHR,March10,2017,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/8583.173 BCHR,“ReturnofElectronicWitchHuntinBahrainLeadstoArrestofAliAbdulraheem,”July14,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/8008.174 BahrainMirror,Twitterpost,August12,2016,https://twitter.com/BahrainmirrorEN/status/764125566329126916.

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andJanuary2017,respectively,inreprisalfortheircoverageofpoliticalevents.175InApril2017,thewebsiteoftheonlyremainingpoliticaloppositionparty,theNationalDemocraticAction(WADD),cameunderrepeatedattack.176

Institutionsarealsotargeted.Authoritiesobservedaround167,000hackingattemptsand107millionmaliciousemailsongovernmentsystemsin2016.177InApril2017,thewebsiteoftheBahrainiFootballAssociationwascompromisedbyaPalestinianhackerwhocriticizedBahrainforhostingarepresentativefromIsraelduringtheFIFAcongressinMay2017.178

175 “Websiteof(BahrainToday)issubjecttoafailedhackingattemptoriginatedfromtheUAE,”[inArabic]BahrainAlyoum,January24,2017,https://www.bahrainalyoum.co.uk/?p=79059.176 “TheelectronicattacksonWAAD’swebsitearebeingrenewedforthesecondtimeinaweek,”[inArabic]LualuaTV,April9,2017,http://lualuatv.com/?p=52867and“WAAD:Ourwebsitewashackedandunknownarenowincontrol,”[inArabic]Alwasat,April2,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1226155.html.177 “E-Government:morethan107millionharmfulemailswerehandledin2016,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May12,2017,http://bit.ly/2rrqcK5.178 “Video:PalestinianhackerpenetratesthesiteoftheFIFAtoprotestBahrainhostingoftheIsraelidelegationintheFIFACongress,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May12,2017,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1227500.html.

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Documents

Bahrain - Freedom House 2017_Bahrain.pdfBahrain’s leading Shiite cleric Isa Qassim was stripped of citizenship for “serving foreign interests” and “promoting sectarianism and