Bailey v. Jeff Co Deputies

7/31/2019 Bailey v. Jeff Co Deputies

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

SHANE BAILEY, )

)Plaintiff, ))

vs. ) Case No. 4:12-CV-2016

)TIMOTHY DAVIS, in his individual ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

capacity, ANDREW GODI, in his individual)

capacity, ROBERT YOUNG, in his )individual capacity, JANE DOE, in her )

individual capacity, and )JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)Defendants. )

PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT

COMES NOW Plaintiff Shane Bailey (hereinafter Plaintiff), by and through his attorney,

and for his Complaint against Defendant Timothy Davis (hereinafter Defendant Davis),

Defendant Andrew Godi (hereinafter Defendant Godi), Defendant Robert Young (hereinafter

Defendant Young), Defendant Jane Doe (hereinafter Defendant Doe), and Defendant Jefferson

County, Missouri (hereinafter Defendant Jefferson County) and respectfully states to this

Honorable Court the following:

1. This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and common law avenues of

recovery for deprivations of Plaintiffs rights and for state law claims against all Defendants.

2. Plaintiff sues Defendant Davis in his individual capacity.

3. Plaintiff sues Defendant Godi in his individual capacity.

4. Plaintiff sues Defendant Young in his individual capacity.

5. Plaintiff sues Defendant Doe in her individual capacity.

Case: 4:12-cv-02016 Doc. #: 1 Filed: 10/29/12 Page: 1 of 15 PageID #: 1


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JURISDICTION

6. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343. The

supplemental jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide claims arising out of state law is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367.

VENUE

7. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2).

8. Defendant Jefferson County is a political subdivision of the State of Missouri acting

under color of State law, and is a person for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action of damages.

9. Defendant Davis, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County officer

working under the direction and control of the Defendant Jefferson County.

10. Defendant Godi, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County officer working

under the direction and control of the Defendant Jefferson County.

11. Defendant Young, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County officer


12. Defendant Doe, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County duty nurse


COLOR OF STATE LAW

13. At all relevant times, Defendant Davis acted under color of state law.

14. Particularly, Defendant Davis acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,

regulations, policies, customs and usages of the State of Missouri, and its political subdivisions.

15. At all relevant times, Defendant Godi acted under color of state law.

16. Particularly, Defendant Godi acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,




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17. At all relevant times, Defendant Young acted under color of state law.

18. Particularly, Defendant Young acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,


19. At all relevant times, Defendant Doe acted under color of state law.

20. Particularly, Defendant Doe acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,


FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Highway 30

21. On or about March 13, 2012, Plaintiff was driving his truck on Highway 30 in

Jefferson County, Missouri when he ran out of gas.

22. As Plaintiff ran out of gas, he pulled his truck off of Highway 30 to a grassy area just

off of the highway.

23. Jefferson County Deputy Don Feldman (Deputy Feldman) arrived at the location

where Plaintiff ran out of gas.

24. Prior to driving on Highway 30, Plaintiff had hit the side mirror of his truck with his

hand in frustration, causing a cut on his hand.

25. Prior to Deputy Feldmans arrival at the location where Plaintiff ran out of gas,

paramedics had arrived at the scene and treated Plaintiffs hand.

26. Deputy Feldman placed Plaintiff under arrest for municipal infractions.

27. In the process of handcuffing Plaintiff, Deputy Feldman took Plaintiff to the ground

and threatened to pepper spray Plaintiff.

28. Deputy Feldman transported Plaintiff to the Jefferson County jail for booking and

processing.



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At the Jefferson County Jail

29. While at the Jefferson County jail, Plaintiff was taken out of a cell.

30. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi placed Plaintiff in a shower.

31. Plaintiff was placed face against a wall when Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi

pulled Plaintiffs head back, then slammed the front of Plaintiffs head against the wall.

32. Plaintiffs head was cut open and began to bleed.

33. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi then pulled Plaintiff back from the wall and

slammed Plaintiffs whole body against the wall.

34. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi handcuffed Plaintiff and Defendant Young

peppered spray Plaintiff in his face.

35. While handcuffing Plaintiff, Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi squeezed

Plaintiffs hand that had been previously injured, causing great paint to Plaintiff.

36. Plaintiff did not provoke Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young.

37. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his eyes and face from being pepper sprayed by

Defendant Young.

38. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his neck, head and back from being slammed against the

wall by Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi.

39. Defendant Young had the duty nurse, Defendant Doe, check on Plaintiff who failed

to provide medical care to Plaintiff.

40. Defendant Doe did not treat Plaintiffs head, despite Plaintiff later having stitches

applied to the wound on Plaintiffs head.

41. On March 14, 2012, after being released from the Jefferson County jail, Plaintiffs

mother took Plaintiff to the SSM St. Clare Health Center for treatment where he received treatment,



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including but not limited to, stitches being applied to the wound on his head.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS EXCESSIVE FORCE

42 U.S.C. 1983 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT AGAINST

DEFENDANT DAVIS, DEFENDANT GODI AND DEFENDANT YOUNGFOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES

AND ATTORNEYS FEES

42. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

43. Defendant Davis used excessive and unreasonable force when he slammed Plaintiff

against the wall.

44. Defendant Godi used excessive and unreasonable force when he slammed Plaintiff

against the wall.

45. Defendant Young used excessive and unreasonable force when he pepper sprayed

Plaintiff.

46. The right to be free from excessive force is clearly established1.

47. At the time of the use of excessive force by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and

Defendant Young, Plaintiff had not committed a serious crime.


Defendant Young, Plaintiff presented no threat to the safety of the officers or others.


Defendant Young, Plaintiff was not actively resisting arrest.


Defendant Young, Plaintiff was not attempting to evade arrest by flight2.

51. Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young used greater force than was

necessary in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them3.

1Howard v. Kansas City Police Dept., 570 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2009).

2Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002).

3Id.



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52. Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young acted in a manner, which

was objectively unreasonable.

53. A reasonable officer, without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, would not have used

such force under similar circumstances4.

54. This case is not in a hazy border, but is unequivocal5.

55. The actions of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young violated

Plaintiffs civil rights under the Fourth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, particularly

including, his right to be safe from the unreasonable use of force.

56. The actions of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young violated

Plaintiffs civil rights under the Fourth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, particularly

including, his right to be safe from the use of excessive force6.

Compensatory Damages

57. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Davis, in his individual capacity, Defendant Godi, in his individual capacity, and

against Defendant Young, in his individual capacity.

Punitive Damages

58. Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Youngs respective actions against

Plaintiff were reckless.


Plaintiff showed callous indifference toward the rights of Plaintiff.


Plaintiff were taken in the face of a perceived risk that the actions would violate federal law.

61. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Davis,

4Rahn v. Hawkins, 2006 WL 2707643 (8th Cir. 2006).

5Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).

6McGruder v. Heagwood, 197 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1999).



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Defendant Godi and Defendant Young, in their individual capacity, in order to punish them and to

deter others.

Attorneys Fees

62. Under 42 U.S.C. 1988, if Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation, then he

will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable attorneys fees, non-taxable expenses and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against

Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young in their respective individual capacity for

compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for punitive damages, for reasonable

attorneys fees, for and non-taxable expenses, for costs, and Plaintiff prays for such other relief as

may be just under the circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

COUNT II

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS DENIAL OF MEDICAL CARE

42 U.S.C. 1983 AGAINST

DEFENDANT DOE

FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES

AND ATTORNEYS FEES


64. While in the Jefferson County jail on March 13, 2012, Plaintiff had a serious need

for treatment of a laceration to his head that required stitches.

65. Defendant Doe was aware of Plaintiffs serious need for treatment of a laceration to

his head that required stitches because she was the duty nurse of the Jefferson County jail, was

requested by Defendant Young to examine Plaintiff and did examine Plaintiff.

66. Defendant Doe was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs serious need for treatment

of a laceration to his head that required stitches as she failed to treat Plaintiffs injury and failed to

order that Plaintiffs injury be treated immediately at a medical facility7.

7Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2006).



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67. As a result of Defendant Does actions, Plaintiff sustained pain to his head for an

extended period of time.


68. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Doe, in her individual capacity.

Punitive Damages

69. Defendant Does actions were reckless.

70. Defendant Does actions showed callous indifference toward the rights of Plaintiff.

71. Defendant Does actions were taken in the face of a perceived risk that the actions

would violate federal law.

72. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Doe, in her

individual capacity, in order to punish her and to deter others.

Attorneys Fees




Defendant Doe, in her respective individual capacity, for compensatory damages in a fair and

reasonable amount, for punitive damages, for reasonable attorneys fees, for and non-taxable

expenses, for costs, and Plaintiff prays for such other relief as may be just under the circumstances

and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983.



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COUNT III

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

42 U.S.C. 1983 AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AGAINST

DEFENDANT JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURIFOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES



1st Alternative Basis of Municipal Liability

Delegation to Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe

75. As the first alternate basis for liability against Defendant Jefferson County, the

policy maker for Defendant Jefferson County is an aldermanic board, the mayor, or someone else,

and that person delegated full authority and/or empowered Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi,

Defendant Young and Defendant Doe to make policy.

76. The delegation of authority by the actual policy maker of Defendant Jefferson

County placed Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe in a policy

making position, and acts of Defendant Jefferson County to liability for the constitutional violations

committed by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe.

2nd Alternative Basis of Municipal Liability Failure to Train, Supervise, Control

77. As the second alternative basis for liability against Defendant Jefferson County,

Defendant Jefferson County failed to properly hire, train, supervise, control and/or discipline

Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe.

78. Defendant Jefferson County was thus deliberately indifferent to the rights of others

in adopting its hiring and training practices, and in failing to supervise, control and/or discipline

Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe, such that those failures



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reflected a deliberate or conscious choice by Defendant Jefferson County8.

79. Those deficiencies caused Plaintiff damages9.

80. In light of the fact that it was Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young

and Defendant Doe who engaged in the constitutional violations, the need to correct deficiencies is

so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the

policymakers of Defendant Jefferson Countycan reasonably be said to have been deliberately

indifferent to the need10.

81. If Defendant Jefferson County had properly hired, trained, supervised, controlled

and/or disciplined Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe, the

constitutional violations committed by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and

Defendant Doe would not have occurred.

82. These failures by Defendant Jefferson County to hire, train, supervise, control and/or

discipline Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe subject

Defendant Jefferson County to liability for the constitutional violations committed by Defendant

Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe.

3rd Alternative Basis of Municipal Liability Pattern of Transgressions

83. As the third alternative basis for liability against Defendant Jefferson County, the

acts of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe were part of a

pattern of transgressions, of which Defendant Jefferson County knew or should have known.

84. The failure of Defendant Jefferson County to act proactively to prevent such a

pattern of transgressions, and particularly to prevent the constitutional violations outlined herein,

establishes the policy of Defendant Jefferson County to condone or otherwise tolerate such

constitutional violations.

8City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).

9Larson By Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996).

10Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).



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85. Defendant Jefferson County thus had a policy or custom of failing to act upon

prior similar complaints of unconstitutional conduct, of which they knew or should have known,

which caused the constitutional injuries at issue.

86. There was a prior pattern of unconstitutional conduct so persistent and widespread

as to have the effect and force of law11.

87. Defendant Jefferson Countys failure amounted to deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant

Doe came in contact, particularly including Plaintiff.

88. Those failures by Defendant Jefferson County to act proactively to prevent these

constitutional violations subject Defendant Jefferson County to liability for the constitutional

violations committed by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe.

Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

89. Upon information and belief, at the relevant time mentioned herein, Defendant

Jefferson County had purchased and had in effect a policy of insurance to insure itself against

claims or causes of action for damages caused by city employees engaged in government functions,

including torts as described herein.

90. The purchase of that insurance constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity by

Defendant Jefferson County12.

91. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Jefferson County.

Attorneys Fees



11Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 1996), citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978).12

RSMo. 71.180 and/or 537.610.



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Defendant Jefferson County for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for

reasonable attorneys fees, and non-taxable expenses, for costs and such other relief as may be just

under the circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

COUNT IV

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

42 U.S.C. 1983,RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AGAINST

DEFENDANT JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI

FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES


94. At all relevant times Defendant Davis was serving as an employee of Defendant

Jefferson County as a sheriff.

95. At all relevant times Defendant Davis was engaging in a government function.

96. At all relevant times Defendant Davis was acting within the course and scope of that

employment.

97. At all relevant times Defendant Godi was serving as an employee of Defendant


98. At all relevant times Defendant Godi was engaging in a government function.

99. At all relevant times Defendant Godi was acting within the course and scope of that

employment.

100. At all relevant times Defendant Young was serving as an employee of Defendant


101. At all relevant times Defendant Young was engaging in a government function.

102. At all relevant times Defendant Young was acting within the course and scope of

that employment.



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103. At all relevant times Defendant Doe was serving as an employee of Defendant

Jefferson County as a nurse.

104. At all relevant times Defendant Young was engaging in a government function.

105. At all relevant times Defendant Young was acting within the course and scope of

that employment.

106. Defendant Jefferson County is liable under a theory ofrespondeat superior13.

107. The actions of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant

Doe caused Plaintiff to suffer the damages outlined herein.


108. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Jefferson County.

Attorneys Fees




Defendant Jefferson County for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for

reasonable attorneys fees, and non-taxable expenses, for costs and such other relief as may be just

under the circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

13Plaintiff makes this claim based on the dissent of Justice Breyer in Board of County Comrs of Bryan County,

Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416 (1997).



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SUPPLEMENTAL STATE CLAIMS

COUNT V

ASSAULT AND BATTERY

AGAINST DEFENDANT DAVIS AND DEFENDANT GODI

FOR COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND AGAINSTDEFENDANT JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI

FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ONLY


111. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godis slamming Plaintiff against the wall

constituted an assault and battery14.

112. All actions by Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi were unlawful and unjustified.

113. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi had the apparent present ability to injure

Plaintiff and to complete the assault.

114. Plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the assault and battery15.

115. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery

against Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi.

116. At the time of the assault and battery of Plaintiff, Defendant Davis and Defendant

Godi were ostensibly acting (even though improperly) to benefit their employers policing function.

117. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godis respective actions were therefore within the

scope of their employment.

118. Defendant Jefferson County is therefore liable under a theory of respondeat

superior16.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment for assault and battery against Defendant Davis

and Defendant Godi in their individual capacity for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable

14Geiger v. Bowersox, 974 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Mo. App. 1998).

15Hall v. Martindale, 166 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1942).

16Clark v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Mo. App. 1986).



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amount, for punitive damages and for costs, and prays for judgment for assault and battery against

Defendant Jefferson County under a theory ofrespondeat superiorfor compensatory damages in a

fair and reasonable amount and Plaintiff prays for such other relief this Court deems just and proper

under the circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

SCHOTTEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

BY: s/James W. Schottel, Jr.James W. Schottel, Jr. #51285MO

906 Olive St., PHSt. Louis, MO 63101(314) 421-0350

(314) 421-4060 facsimile

[email protected]

Attorney for PlaintiffShane Bailey


Documents

Bailey v. Jeff Co Deputies