UDC327.8(=82:=20:497.1): 949.71(=861)" 1940/1945" :329.21(=861)Original ScholarlyWorkVeselin DJURETICInstitute for Balkan StudiesBelgradeSOVJIET AND BRITISH NEGLECTOF THE SERBIAN SITUATIONAbstract: Thecausesfor thecontradictingSoviet and Britishviewson theSerbianexistential situation from1941-1945stem fromAustria-Hungary' spolicy and the ideological heritage of the Comintem and Stalinism. Thoughthe war inYugoslavia displayed anti-Serbianismfromthe occupier andQuislingsalike, the allies saw the cause for anti-Serbianismin the old"he-gemony" oroldunsymmetric Serbo-Croat positions. blindtothefact thatthe occupational reign of terror had beenimposed only upon the Serbs. Thisresulted in the discreditation of the national dimension of Serbian resistanceunder Gen. Mihailovic and the rise to power of Tito' s anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslavregime.Theideologicaldividing line between British andSoviet policy inthe inter-warperiodwas determinedbythe 1917overthrowof stateand revol utionin Russia. Henceforward, old imperial rivalries and con-flicts gainedimpetus, influencingboth bilateral andmultilateral rela-tionsbetween the two powers. One of the results of these conflicts wasanunhinderedconsolidation of Nazi policyinHitler'sGermany, giv-ingcapitulatoryexpressionin theMunichdictateof 1938 andStalin'srival response with the Ribentrop-Molotov accord of 1939.In theinter-war period, neither of the twowerean important eco-nomic partner to Yugoslavia, andjudgingby later developments inwar, neither was readyfor sucha partnership.After the World War I aliiance, Britaingave France, andthenGermany, priority in tradeduring the years preceding WorldWar II. Inbroader circles, particularlySerbian, Fngland lefttheimpression of anindifferent partner thatdid not displaymuchunderstanding for Serbia'snational, stateandlegal constituting, therebyobjectively helping large202 Veselin Djureticparts of thenationtobecomeassimilativeraw material for theexpan-sion of several neighboring nations.Soviet Russia, in a newworldof ideas, did not favoranyonewhostoodin theway of herideologicalecstasy, particularlynot theYugo-slav regime, which actively supported the numerous White Guardgroup, helping to organizeanti-Bolshevic activities.Bothpowersdid not apprehend the essence of Yugoslav socio-po-Iitical, and particularly nationalrelationships. They reasoned on the ba-sisof notions formedbyconstitutedandconsolidatednations or byunilateral ideologicalgrounds.Serbo-Croat differencesandconflicts sincethebeginningof theexistenceof theKingdomof Serbs, Croats andSlovenes centeredonthe national problem, a problem of the"Greater Serbianoppression ofother nations". This "bogey ofGreater Serbianism" became on theworldscenealandmarkforpolitical relationshipstowardYugoslaviaand a curtain for different forms of manipulation detrimental to the Yu-goslav nations, above all the Serbs. Forces of Austro-Hungarian nostal-gia and sentimentalism alwaysstressed Serb politicalpreponderance inthe leadership, raisingit to irreal proportions. This served to encourageschemerstoanti-Serbianismandanti-Yugoslavism, andthose whosechief goal was to destroy the Yugoslav state.The young Communist Partyof Yugoslavia enteredinto everyal-liance after the mid-20s, even with the extreme right, in the fightagainst "Greater Serbianhegemony",Thanksto Yugoslav communistsandindividualsfromother groups, this concoction, fabricatedintheoldAustro-Hungariankitchen, entered theComintem andSoviet gov-ernment, crucially affectingtheforming of Soviet politics. Thus theSoviet UnionviewedrelationswithYugoslavia not on the basisof tra-dition, but political propagandisticfiction. Theoldpostulatesof Rus-sian politicstowardfellowOrthodox Serbs dissolved, enablingvariousproj ectors of Serbian destruction to sneak in the void.On thelevel of emotionandvolitionof theSerbianpeople, theserelationsassumeddefeatist expressions from the beginning, in keepingwith theintentionsof thesocial wave, liftedwith theOctober Revolu-tion in Russia. After this, the relationship toward the Slavic and Social-istMother becamea corrective for differentiating"conservatism" and"avant-gardism", andfromdisunitingso-called"Greater Serbian he-gemony" fromthe"progressive projections of a federal reconstructionof Yugoslavia". Thelatterrestedonrather romanticizedandabstractSoviet and British Neglect of the Serbian Situation 203visions of nationalequality,launchedchiefly byCroatian political cen-ters. The right to citizenshipinsuchasituationwas grantedto Serbandseparatist groups, withabsolutizations of regional peculiarities, be-cause theywerebacked bya bigpower, which provided their schemeswithparticular ethnic, cultural andhistorical traits, eventhe characterof "newnations". These schemes assumed clear expression duringWorld War II,when on their foundations were built thefederativecon-structions of AVNOJ(National Anti-fascist LiberationCouncil of Yu-goslavia).Visions of Serbo-Croat relations perceived by Stalin and theCominternwere dispersed throughout theworld viainternationalcom-mumst channels, forming a manipulative "public opinion".Hereliethesources of Britain'sandSoviet pre-warandwar pol-icytowardYugoslavia. Observation of thecountry's problem of Insta-bilityasaresultof therelationshipbetweenthe "oppressive" Serbianand"oppressed" Croatiannations, was WIththe Sovietsaccompaniedbyassociativeillusions, that a"counterparttooldRussianautocracy"was the issue, andwiththeBritish, associationsresemblinga"Yugo-slavBelfast". Certain quarters were evenunderstanding about theanti-Serbian actions, as in their defense was "Serbian hegemony".Ignorance of Yugoslavia's ethnic, religious, culturaland historicalsitu-ation was profound; notionsof Serbs and Croats as nations differingwidelyprevailedeverywhere. Britainwas inthis respect best "repre-, sented" by Robert Seton-Watson, whoseviews met all Croatian de-mands at the account of Serbs.' SOVIet delusions about Serbia'spositioninYugoslaviawerea commonstand that determmedthepo-litical behavior of theKrernlin.?The startingpositions of the Britishand Soviet policies towardYugoslavia differed considerablyin thewar, as did theirlong-term aims.The Soviet Union establishedits orientation on class and ideologicalbases, seekingandfindingleversforitsimplementationintheCommu-nistPartyof Yugoslavia, asanorganizationthat fedonsuchsources.The linkwithBritishpolicywas astand that presupposeduncompro-misingcombativeness toall reasons, as theuniversal warlogic, and toideological and class motives. Apolitical platformwas built on thisRW. Set01\ Watsoni Jugosloveni, correspondence from 1918-194l.Z..agreb University -Institute for Croatian Hist)I)'- British Academy, Zagreb-London, 1976.2 1. Levin, Nacionaljni]vopros v poslevoenojJugoslavii, Moscow, 1934.204 Vese1in Djureticmutual interest, determining thefateof thewarringfactions in Yugo-slavia.Churchill's government sawclearlytheadvantageof theSerbs inthe protest and rebellionof march1941, but not clearlyenough the roleof national contradictionsin therapiddownfall inApril. It perceivedthecreationof theIndependent Stateof Croatia(NDH) as partof theoccupationalsystemto destroy Yugoslavia as a state(into zones of in-fluence), and unequivocably condemnedit. The U.S. adminstrationheld the same position. Croatia's illusions of independence wereviewedwithunderstandinginlate 1941andfirst half of1942. Thatwaswhenoldnationalist disputes reemergedon thepolitical stageoftheYugoslav Royal Government, inresponsetonewsof theUstashagenocide against Serbs, claimingalready hundreds ofthousands oflives.The Soviet Union encouragedand supportedevery anti-fascistsentiment in Yugoslavia even before thewar, and dunng the Marchre-bellion andApril war, propagandi stically, asamitigationof itsownpositions. It did not, however, perceive the truecharacter of inter-warnational contradictions, nor the true characterof their effects inthewar. Russianforeignministrydocuments bespeakthat certainorgansof Stalin'sgovernmentknewthis, knewwhatwasgoingonin Yugo-slaviaduringthewar, but themajority confirmedoldCominternno-tionsof "Greater Serbianhegernony't'However, thereisa vaguenessastohowthedeceptions on"hegemony" effectedcertainpost-Aprilpolitical vicissitudes: in regard to the Royal government and regardinghesitationswithintheleadershipof theCommunistPartyof Croatia.Though the fact that the policy of restoring Yugoslavia's independenceandterritorial integritywasacceptedin theKremlinsinceearlyJune1941evinces that the hesitation, if there had been any inthe pastmonth and a half, was overcome.Churchill'sgovernment was pushedin therear of Soviet politicswhen the formerwas convinced it held firmly all the reins of the Yugo-slavanti-fascist movement. The "legitimistic" principletowhich allthealliestookanoathlent it themost favoredrole. Britainheldthechief outposts of Yugoslavlegitimism-theKing androyal govern-ment. It reactedwith jealousy at any sign that the U.S. might seize this"advantage". Churchill'sgovernment believedit securedthroughthis3 Arhiv vnesnej po1itiki SSSR, f. 144, op.3, p.4, d.?, pp 31-36, 1 3 1 4 6 ~ op. 3a.d.2,pp130-146.Soviet and British Neglect of the Serbian Situation 205"legitimism" full control over the Chetnik movement and its com-mander, whichwas understandable, as Mihailovichadonjoiningtheroyal government linked hisdestiny to thegovernment and king.Soviet respect for Yugoslavlegitimism, demonstratedinregulardiplomatic relations and efforts to put "Titos partisans" under thecommand of the "moreseasonedandpreparedofficer" wasdeceitful.Near theend of 1941, after theinsurgent rift andabandonment of Ser-bia, andfirst half of1942, it seemedthe partisanshadforever disap-peared fromthepolitical scene. They had abandoned thealliance asanoptionaswell. Mentionof themwas madeinLondonbyChetniksinharshpubliccriticismsof their"leftist" activitiesinMontenegro, Her-zegovina, easternBosnia andSerbia, WIth longlistsof Serbiannation-alists brutallyexterminated.Ali indications were that Churchill's government heldthe mainlevers of Yugoslav policy. Owing to anextorted pacification of nation-alist passions InJovanovic'sgovernment (whichin1942replaced5i-movie's) a theoretical symmetry of Serbo-Croat war positions wasestablished, whichhelpedpushasideCroatianpro-fascistlayers. HSSleader Vlatko Macek wasseen as a counterpart to Mihailovic,at a timewhen theCroatian leader had no troops forcombat.This theoretical symmetry became propagandist reality, a basisforbuilding a fictivealliance policy toward Yugoslavia. Inthe shadowof this fictionwasamedia war among emigrants, waged withsuch fe-rocitythatthealliesweremorepreoccupiedwiththisbattlethanwiththewar thatraged onbattlefields throughout Yugoslavia. Inthepropa-gandist war, the Serbswerelosers apriori, havingnoally tosympa-thize with themand deliberate concrete notions oftheir existentialreality. Inthe country, they weretombetweenOrthodoxand SlavicRussia and thecommunist USSR. Outside, betweenwesternsuperfici-ality anda theoretic orientationfor a futureYugoslavia which ignoredtheirsufferingsandcountless sacrifices, and thetragicnational realitythat was becomingdisastrous. Thus the Serbs werestretcheduponamoral crossroads. Dexterousartisansof the Croatianpolitical scene-"invisible"externallybut visiblein the governmentandinemigration,incited troubledailyandironicallyprovoked theSerbs,inlight of theironentationfor afuture withthe allies, exhibitingtheir national and4 Veselin Diuretic, Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama I-II, fourth edition,supplemented, Belgrade, 190,2.206 Veselin Diuretictragicpreoccupationsasaplea tocontinuewiththeold"hegemonic"policy and an obvious resistance to the"general demands"."Mihailovichadlost months andyears provingthat his (Serbian)strugglewasconditioned on numerousdangers; heprovided numerousbloodytestimonies conducivetothis. Nothinghelped. Tito denieditall, withclaimsof his fightingspirit, his victories incombat, whichwere, indeed, considerably magnified, but nevertheless, always evi-dent. PerfunctoryChurchill tookthemseriously. At onepointhelentaneartoSerbsuffering - apparentlywithcompassion - but alwaysre-membering toadda bellicose tutoring thatconsidered the overall sceneof theallies.Mihailovicsmendefended themselves withthecharges of a per-fidious Albion, without takingany steps to rupturethe relationship.Theynever eventhoughtof breakingfrom"their" royal government,not evenwhen thelatter hadentered theorbit of allied reasoning aboutYugoslavreality. Not even when it was showeredwithpolitical "ex-pertise" markedby asymmetry ofSerbo-Croatianpositions, that is,levellingtheinstigatorand victim. Mihailovicspolitical centerclungto theyoung andinexperienced king, though he had obviously becomea symbol of a fettered governmental policy. It never occurred to him toset uphis own government inthe country, anindependent politicalcenter that would present authenticSerbian interests totheworld. TheChetnikpolitical centerthus sank into arift betweencertainSerbianmotives and interestsof Yugoslavpolicyandits government, whichhadduring theidlemaneuvering objectively conducted a policy of Ser-bianneutralization, enablingatthe endtheregrouping of itsdomesitcfoesto thewinning side.The cul-de-sac of Mihailovic's policywasmarked in mid-1942. Itwas disclosedbySoviet propagandist actionsonthelineof discredit-ing theChetnik leader. Manyof Tito ' s reports hadreached Moscow inthe first half of 1942, which, by disregarding Serbian war reality on thelevel ofYugoslavism, strengthenedalliedtheoretical judgments andprojectionsof afuture Yugoslavcommunity. Theywerefatal toMi-hailovic because theycreated illusions, before semi-literate alliesindif-ferent tothe Serbiansituation, that anarmedstruggleinYugoslaviawaspossible, despite thedifficult conditions.Theprincipleof combativenessbecamebythe endof1941theonlycriterion forsolidarity toward theallies. During thebrief period ofthe joint partisan-Chetni k struggle fromSeptember to November1941,Soviet and British Neglect of the Serbian Situation 207both left the impressionabroad that a struggle against the occupier waspossible. Thentheydisownedinitial beliefsbymany, eventheYugo-slav and Britishgovernments, that time was not ripe for such an action.Churchill's government saw neither then no later therevolutionaryim-plication inthe principle ofcombativeness, that the CominternandStalinwerecreatinga political platformfortheinternational recogni-tion ofYugoslavforces under communist leadership, that it was amoral curtain for seizing power via revolution.It appears, however, that the Soviet government in mid-1942vieweduncompromisingcombativeness froma purelycommunist an-gle, when the mortal danger in the battle for Moscow had ceased. Untilthenit was governed more by militaryand political realism, expectingbackingfrom Britamanywherein Europe, even in the Balkans. On theline of realismthenwas thecall forsinglecommandin theresistancemovement under Mihailovic. The Kremlin had due to international rea-sons avoideddirect attacks onChetnik commanders until rnid-1942,whenitset outtodiscredit them, bystressingthecontributiontothewarbythepartisansandpublishingreportsby"neutral"media totheeffect that Mihailovic was obstructing the partisanstruggle with his co-operation with the occupier.Britain's apprehension of the principle of combativeness departedfrom purelywar motives, varying aroundcombat tactics. Thus the For-eign Office and the War Cabinet on Yugoslavia had exchanged encour-aging and defeatistic instructions in their reasonings. And when itperceived ideological differencesandclashesamongtheSerbiananti-fascist parties, andsuspectedSoviet influenceonthebahavior of thecommunists, it did not infer on the level of analysis the phenomenon of"newsocialist revolutions". It sawthemas arealityonly within ananalysis of Soviet realityuntil the war. 5Relationsin theanti-Hitler coalitionpresupposed allcombat rea-sons to ideological ones, whereas British playing hostto theYugoslavroyal government poseda particular obstacle for Churchill, because ofthediscussionsabout Serbiannational and existential problems whichpersistently disrupted the Yugoslavgovernment throughout the war.Toallits cabinets -underSirnovic, Jovanovic, TrifunovicandPuric-theissuewas not toallow the opening of anotherfront of Serbiansuf-fering.The issue was not the usual fro-it. determined by the mere alter-5 Stanisa R. Vlahovic, Zbornik dokumenataiz britanske arhive, Anglo-jugoslovenskiodnosi 1941-1948, Birmingham 1985,57-167.208 Veselin Djureticnativefor or against the occupier, but a front that would on an anti-oc-cupier basis express two different tactics ofstruggle - one withoutcompromise (partisan)and the other mainly compromising (Chetnik).Inimplementingitspatronageover theYugoslav royal govern-ment, Londontookcare of its protegein relations within the great coa-lition.It didsorather unknowingly: itadjusted theYugoslavrefugeecenter totheoverall coalitionreasons, forcingittopushitsnationalreasons behind those of the allies. It thus triggered opposition inmainlySerbian agents in the government, who, owing to persisting Us-tashapogromsandGermanretaliation weregovernedchieflybyna-tional motives. The royal center thus dictated apolicy ofperpetualmaneuvering, adjustingtoChurchull'sunstablepolicy, instructingitsforcesin thecountry(the Chetniks)to consider national circumstancesand relationshipsamong the allies. But thiscourse, after theruptureoftheanti-fascist forcesduring theseverepartisan-Chetnikconflict, wasbound tolead tomanytrials, inconsistencies, compromising bothcen-ters. The othersidein the conflict (partisans) expediently presented itsfoes' makingconditional anystrugglewithSerbianexistentialreasonsas an obvioussabotageof theanti-fascist struggle, thuscompromisingraresentimentsamongsomeLondonofficialsconcerning theSerbiantragedy, renderingthemananti-Soviet character. TheBritishgovern-ment wasthusina situationprovingitssolidarityto thealliesbeforetheSoviets, withnewtutorial instructionstotheYugoslav pawns: toheed their behavior and not spoilrelations in the anti-Hitler coalition.Clever Croatianagentsin theYugoslavgovernmentandemigra-tion officesin the UnitedStates, confronted with Pavelic's"anational"policyand its destructiveeffects(particularlyin Dalmatia), wereexpe-dientin Britain'signorant maneuvering todiscredit theSerbianChet-niks asanewGreater Serbiancenter prescientof abloodyrevenge.Fromthesecircles,that is, from the circles of their back-stage patrons,national symmetries werelaunched, graduallywinningrecognition, sothat Pavelic' s racist, genocidal collaborationismwas equated withNedic's clerical collaborationisminthenameof "savingtheFather-land", althoughthelatterwasa necessarymediatorbetweentheoccu-pier and threatened populace. Anti-Serb circles were thus able topresent Mihailovic'stactical andpolitical agreement asagroundlesscapitulation, evenmarkit as an ideological yoke; to successfullycon-ceal the fact that it was based on the anti-communism aimed at the"in-stigators" ofGerman reprisals against Serbs andonanti-extremism,Soviet andBritish Neglect of theSerbian Situation 209determined bycnmes perpetrated bycommunists in Montenegro, Her-zegovina, and, onasmallerscale, inotherSerbianregions. Thisrela-tionshiponthe level of propagandaassumedpronouncedideologicalpostulates, where domestic subjectivistic deviations were linked toStalinistic ones, whichraised wideanti-communist sentiment through-out the country. Thealliesviewedit asasectarianpolicythatthreat-ened to jeopardize thecoalition withtheSoviet Union. Because of this"danger", Churchill's Yugoslav policyincreasinglyresembled Stalin's,whichwas most apparent in propaganda. Newssupplied byTitoor theCominternwerecasuallypublishedinwesternmedia, andthentakenover by Moscowto be presentedto the international public as the"voiceof the Soviet publicopinion". This deft "revolutionary" gamewould not havebeenpossiblewithoutgoodcoordinationwiththepar-tisan center in Yugoslavia. In the background, Tito playedhis pro-Croatian game withStalin.Croatiannationalist agentsinBritainandthe UnitedStates usedthe blindalleys ofSerbianmaneuvenngtoenterthe political courseconductedbytheallieswhichenabledthemtoomitthepast andSer-bianwar realityfilledwithnationalist challenges aimed against theen-tireCroatianpopulace, andtumallforcestoward a"Yugoslav future"Individuals that had until then openly expressed chauvinistic affili-ations (such as KInJevic) alsotookpart in these aspirations, which pro-vided an opportunity to occupy a position closer to the policyconducted bythegreatalliesthanthat of Serbiancentersat homeandinemigrationTheyevenapproached theSoviet policyfur which theyhaduntil then, owing toideological andreligious(Catholics)motives,felt muchenmity. Theyalsoadjustedmtothewave of sentimentalismthat rosethroughout thewestern world on account of Russia's immeas-urablesuffering. Arid thetriumphsatMoscowandStalingrad, aswellasthe oneof pan-Slaviccharacterskillfullyconductedbycommunistmedia in the western world (for insta....tee, the Canadian paper FreeWord). It createdgraduallyaSOCIal atmospherefor therecognitionofSovietism. The chiefmessageof the clime to the Yugoslavwarringpartieswas: ademandfor national unity towardacommonfuture, amessagethat SUItedthe main political streamof the anti-Hitler coali-tion. Evenpro-Croatiancenters, the Vaticanaboveall, whichsoughtways to savethe Croatianpeoplefrcrn possible Serb retaliationandconvey them to the\\!1lli'1C)"'S side."G Veselin Diuretic Vladu110 .'1j,.", ...l/ second edition.Belgrade19R3. 3i-10!210 Vese1in DjureticIn this way, a large part of the Serbian emigration, mostly thoseinthe United Statesand Canada, werein a different positionfrom theal-lies. Trust inthewidelycondemnedforcesof Mihailovicdiminishedamong apart of theemigration, owingsomewhat tosolidarity withtheirnewfatherland, and topatrioticandpro-Russiansentiment, withincreasing inclination toward the partisans. Imbibing the muddysprings of nationaltragedy, flowingperpetuallywith varying intensity,becomingareal prisoner of thenarrownational policy, thefirst partbecame at the same time a suitable target for propagandist gameswhich pushed it cunninglyin the anti-alliance group, that is, opposed ittothebroadcommitmentforthereconstructionof thenewYugoslavcommunity.Thepositionandbehavior of theYugoslavemigrationpresentedanimportant correctivefor theformingof theBritish andAmericanpublic opinion and, under that influence, theofficial policyof thesecountri es. Well awareof theprevailingsentiment, theSoviet govern-ment (throughtheCominternand otherintelligence postsin thewest-ernworld) regularlyused thepropagandisticand political impulsesofthis "public opinion" toearnrecognitionfor its communist strategy.Especially its policytoward Yugoslavia, which was conducted throughits Communist Party.It performed theseactivitiesina mannerthat re-centhistorywill recordas oneof themost original revolutionaryandpoliticaltactics. Continuallystimulating the partisans to uncompromis-ing combativeness, it followedthe commonorientation of the allies. Atonepoint soprovokinglythat thefoes oftheYugoslavcommunistswerebytheforceof circumstancepersistentlyput totrial andthrownoff course - to the position of military and political defeatism. Stalin'sregimeignored the Serbian reasons, thus compelling the Serbs with ad-ditional provocationstoprovetheir sufferings beforetheSoviets andoffer ideological proof beforethewesternallies. However, theworldwasbenumbed owingtovarious tricks, doubtingSerbian judgements,andwestern allieshadlongpresupposedtheir ideological reasons tothose of combat.Thestrategyof theCommunist Partyof Yugoslavia, inspired byMoscow,together with Tito's leadership, had new possibilities for con-tinuingat the end of 1941 its course to win acclaimfor therevolution-ary forces, assisted by their Yugoslavfoes, and with help froma"leftist" and otherwise influenced Yugoslavized public opinion: finally,with thehelpof westemgovernments, aboveall Churchill's, whichatSoviet andBritish Neglect of theSerbian Situation 211thetimedemandedYugoslavpolitics wihout anyof her national-suf-fering conditions.Britain's "expertisepreparation" considerablyhelpedunhinderedmovement alongthiscourse with its sociologizing about Balkan socialstrutures as unfit for introducing communism. This enabledpartisanforcestohidetheirtrueideological face, and, subsequently, withhelpfromthebroad headline "national-liberation forcesof Yugoslavia", toimposethemselvesas theonlycounter-balancetotheSerbo-Croatiannational obscurity. Particularly asa counter-balancetothemovementof Draza Mihailovic, who was chargedas the true successor of the"oldGreaterSerbianhegemonyand oppression", alleging that a "retaliatorymovement", not a liberation, was at stake, which wasresisting theYu-goslav policyof the emigrantsand allies.Thanks toSovietand pro-Soviet propaganda, Chetnikideologicalproof before theWest became increasinglytheonlyideological andprovocativepositionin Yugoslavia thatdisturbed joint combat efforts.The partisandemonstration before theirowncenterand ally, consider-ingit hadbeensincethebeginningsuccessfullyconcealedfromthewestemworld, hiddenbeneathinstitutional, personal andothersym-bols, whichpresenteditin thebroadest democraticsense, itwasout-side thelight of theinternational scene. Ignorance of this fact enabledthat the Chetniks' account of Yugoslavcommunismas"extremism"wereunconvincing, becausetheywerenot backedbythe uncompro-misingcombativenessof thepartisans, andtheywerealsounaccept-able because theydisturbedrelationswith the eastern partner who borethechief burdenof thewar. Thustheyfell intoa fresh rift inwhichemerged oldsuspicions of individual westernpoliticianstoward Serbsas the"Russianstronghold" andSoviet neglect of Serbiannarrow-na-tional motives. It wasa stateof fatal dilemmas, inevitablyleadingtonew divisions and conflicts.Mystificationsof thepartisanideological positionwereanover-ture to international eli screditation of the Chetniks andinternationalrecognitionof thepartisanmovement. Thelatter emergedas thesolewinner of the differencesand conflictsbetween the narrow-Serbian na-tional and existential reasons and the policyof the allies. Its truefight-ingspirit andassertive readinesstoaccept everyanti-fascist demandby theallies, regardlessof Serbiannational circumstances, entered thedomesticand worldpropagandist orbit as theonlyreal anti-fascist andYugoslav position. After gloriousvictories by the allies and Italy'scc-212 VeselinDjureticpitulation, such propaganda in thecountryencouragednew differentia-tion - withina victoriousatmosphere, and a sobering down for all peo-pleandnations, for thosewho hadowingto variousmanipulations byleaderships andforeignfactors beencast ontheprofascist side. Theepilogueof the processwas theexit of most Croatsand Muslims fromthenet of Pavelic'spernicious politics: aneutralizationof Yugoslavnational minority leaderships (ethnic Albanians, ethnic Hungarians),drawingthesepeopleout fromthenet of anti-Serbianpolicy. Thena-tional-liberation(partisan) movement emergedasaGod-givenhavenfor all those seduced, for their anti-occupier last-moment activation.Thenewdivision amongtheSerbianpeople, spurredby theglori-ous allied victoriesand their pro-partisan policy, was muchmore com-plex than the insurgent one. Fromthe moral standpomt above all:demands for turning toward the futurewere seen by most as a new pro-vocatorypolicy. Living with tragicmemories of hundreds of thousandsof innocent victims. theylooked more towardthe pastthanthefuture,or beheld thefuturewith theeyes of an embittered avenger. Theysawthepropagandisticdiscreditingof Mihailovicsmovement asabroadanti-Serbian conspiracy, and expressed theircaustic political obstinacyincondemningthe British and Soviet policy, rather than the occu-pier's.This obstinacyled to newexistential and tacticalyokeswith theretreating Germans, motivated by anti-communist and anti-British sen-timent, wherebythe adversarypropaganda won new trumpsto presentChetniksas traitorsto the world. This was the road to newSerbiantri-alsandtragedy. OtherSerbsfollowed thepath of political realismof-fered by the allies, partiularly the Russian bellicose wave movingirrepressiblytowardtheBalkans. Onepart, resentingChurchill'spol-icy, turnedtoward the future, led by faithin the greatAmerican civili-zation and democracy, or belief in the resurrection of staggeringFrance. Most of thepeople, however, wereconvincedthat thetradi-tional dimensionof a dozingRussia wouldfinallyspeakout indirectencounter with Serbian reality. By acceptingthe national liberationpartisanmovement alreadyrecognized by theallies, theysaw theonlyframeworkfor regrouping, that IS, an opportunityto win freedom withuncompromising engagement in combat, awaiting an end to the war onthe "right side". TheRussian factor, inconnection withthe socialistideology, whichbecamemore openlyand widelymanifest on the plat-formof thepartisanmovement, acquired euphoric strength, winningoverthe"small"man. Itsoldinsurgentanti-communist, as an anti-ex-Sovietand British Neglect of the SerbianSituation213tremist sentiment, dissolvedbefore proof of unusual social mobility,whichthe partisanmovement thendisplayedwidely, includinginitspolitical andmilitaryorbit morecommon folk- workers and peasants.Theybecametotheir fellowcountrymensymbolsof national revolu-tionand a new socialist era that would ensue.The Yugoslav "compromise", expressed in the Tito-SubaSicagreementinmid-I 944, wasthusprepared, witha seriesof actions oftheforces of revolutionaryorientation. "Compromise"boiled downtothe basicwarstructure - over theprinciple of combativeness as thecri-terionfor allvalues. Allpolitical forces that wereprisonersof narrownationalmotives and objectives became antipodal to theoverall policyof theallies, andassuchboundtofail. TheYugoslav"compromise"wasproof that Serbian national peculiaritieswerebeingsomewhat re-spected, those that were conducivetothepro-cornmurust part of thepopulace. But thiswouldnot havebeenpossible hadtherenot beenamajor crossover of Serbsneartheend of thewar to Titosside(whichthe" compromise"had hastened). It would not havebeen possible with-out thepolicy of theUSSRandthe westernallies whobackedtheseforces andappearedasguaranteesof thenewYugoslavia- "inwichfull equality of all its nations was warranted"Churchill'sgovernment, under theillusionsthat it was thechiefcreator of the compromise. dosed its Yugoslav war policywithnew il-lusions. In putting Titos forcesunder thecommand of King Petar II, itfounda formulaforan"uncommunist'' outcome, without realizing thecharacterof therevolutionarydimensionof Yugoslavreality, itsfirmlinkwiththecenterInMoscow. Itdidnot seetheroleof therevolu-tionaryforcesin steering Churchill tosucha policy, whichputall Yu-goslavstreamsandmovementsInto fatal alternatives: clingtotheoldpositionsanddisappear withtheoccupier oraccept Churchill's"com-promise"whichlentwidesupport to thenewYugoslav politicalcenterof socialist orientationandiISinternational recognition onthebasisofstate and lawful legitimism.Onlyafterthefait accompli, after thepenetration of Soviet forcesonSerbian soil, Britain became awareof thefact that thecompromiseit had backed was merelyan incorporate Soviet revolutionary strategy.TheU.S. received evident confirmation of its stands, but, respect-ing the partner supremacyin the Mediterranean - did nothing to reversethe course of events.214 Veselin DjureticChurchill'sgovernment was scarcelyawarethat theengagementof Ivan Subasicwas only anacceptanceof the non-Serbianpathto-ward "resolving"the Serbianproblem, andthat, by"employing" theyoungking inthe course oftalks with Tito was the realizationofStalin's plan to "somehow trick"England, in order to disarm, with helpfromthe"center of unity", its troops, theChetniks, whoweretherealrival to the partisan movement.WhenChurchill's government becameawareof their delusions,prior to the outcome,it did notevenattempt to carryout essentail poli-tial corrections:on thecontrary, it quickened its steptowardsits naivevisionof the" compromise". Confronted withtheSoviet fait accompli,therewas realistically no hopefor such a reverse twist.Nevertheless, the British government continued to express its lackof understanding fortheparticularStalinist aspect of "democracy"es-pecially expressed in its faith and hope that the Yugoslav peopleswouldannul allthat hadbeenaccomplishedthusfarinaplebiscitarymanner, considerablyandwithher militaryandpolitical help. It con-tinuedtobelieveinthat possibilityevenduringthePotsdamconfer-ence.COBJETCKO 11EPI1TAHCKO 11rHOP11CAJDE CPIICKEE311CTEHIJ,11J3JIHE IIOITI1T11KEPe3HMeArpecnjaHeMaqKIIXHaU;UCTa UI1TaJIlljaHcKIIX rpamncrana JyrOCJIaBlIjynorahana jeynpBOMpeA)'Cpncxn napon, IIpOTIIB Cp6a cyoxynaropn noxpe-nyJIU CBeHaU;HOHaJIHenMaIbUHCKecenapa'rncre,ynpBOMpe)l,y Xpaare. Ycne-)l,llOjecrpauran renomm,Cp6n cy6UJIU yrpcosean xaonapon nxao napon cy6I1Jlu06aBe3HH )l,acefipaae. Crora jeKO)l, IbIIX nojasaU)l,eOJIOIIIKOr llUHlIou;a, KOMyHlIcTa, )l,0qeKaHaxaoynap )l,eCTpYKIJ;IIjecaMoo)l,6paM6eHe xoxeanje naponaxao ornpan.ejomjenner rpponranpOTIIB Cp6a. To j enocefiaonOCTaJIO jacnonOCJIe Hau;nOHaJI-I1CTnllKOr (neraasxor) fiopfienor excnonapaa,a, sajenno ca KOMYHIICTlIMa(napraaaaaaa).Cypona nexranxa 0)l,Ma3)l,a Ha)l, Hap0)l,OM nCTaKJIa je y npnn nrraanOJIHTIPIII MOTIIB ocsajaua -)l,060JbIIX )l,aHa. 113an.e jecrajao napon,Sovietand British Neglect of the Serbian Situation 215AlII caBC3HIIlJ,IL COBjCTII II IIOHCCCHII IIpBIIM 60p6eHlIMyc-rrecnsra "Jyrocrronena " nncyBIlJl,e,lIl ocnonno- nacypenpecanuje (100sa jen-nor) YCJ10BibaBaJICCBaKOcpncxononaurau.e, a 60p6enoMrronatnaa.yJJ;aBaJIecxrncao rraunona.tneTlponarannanxr 6Imc cyCTBOpCHConTmlailIICTIPIKCBIl3IIjecaryanujcIITOnOJJ; yrnnajeiCTaJbHHCKO-TIITOBCKC nporraraane. I1nY3I1JC 0 xrorybnocm60p6e. xoje cy rrrnopacanecpnCKO crpauan,e. nocranecy0JJ;peJJ;HlJ,3caBe3HII'IKerrornrrnxenpexra 'f HOBOjJyrOCJIaBIIjH". 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