Battle Experiences #5

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 31 31 AUC 1944

Nmttle mperiencesm a r e guL11 she6 regul&rl j r by this h e e d q ~ w r t e r s t o enable u n i t s i n t ra in ink- t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t o c ~ m b ~ t experiences r,f cur t r c ~ ? s now f i g h t i n g t h e Germns i n France. ~ l t h o u g h t h e nxperiences of c e r t a i n 1xi:-ts et a p r t i c u l ~ r l oca t ion are not n e c e s s a r i l y hpp l i cab le t c a l l u n i t s i n h l l situations, the i t e m r lut l ished wi l l be those based cn p r a c t i c c l exper iecce an3 t r e recwxended f o r ceref u l cons ide ra t ion by wi ts w h ck- m y eacounter siz.ii1e.r arcblens. Reports of cor robora t ive or con t r a ry experiences are p e r t i c u h r l y des i red in order t h ~ ~ t h e v a l i d i t ? o f t h e ind ica t ed b ~ t t l e less011 may be determined.

By commnd of t h e =my woup Conlmnder a

Brigadier Genertll, USA Ad ju tont General

The fo l lowing ob%ervations a r e e x t r a c t e d f r o n a recer,t r e p o r t of t h e war Depert- ment Observer Board to t he Comrmnding Gsne t r~~ l , ~ r m y mound p r c e s .

1. Location of Di rec t suppor t A r t i l l e r x o UCGirect s u p ~ o r t a r t i l l e r y battaJ.lons should not be c l o s e r than 3000 o r 4000 y a r d s t o t h e f r o n t l i n e s . If they a r e up e s c l o s e as 1500 o r 2000 yards , a s t r o n g coun te ra t t ack wi th ta~ks and armor w i l l overrun the pos i t i on , and t h e heart of your c o m u n i c e t ~ o c i s l o s t , a s is l i a i s o n wi th supported regiments. ~ t t a c h e d b a t t a l i o n s may and o f t e n ~ h o u l d be c l o s e r thhn 3000 c r 4500 yards t o t h e f r o n t without t h i s r i s k , a s a l l c m u n i c a t i o n is c l e a r e d through t h e d i r e c t support. Di rec t support ba tte l i o n s m a t know r~hex~e our i n f a n t r y is a t a l l times. g a f e t y of f i r e s i a c l e a r e d through therne@--Wippdier General Reese M. Howell, A r t i l l e r y Off icer , 9 t h Division.

2e Conduct of mrward Observers. wuti l ! .ery forwerd observers b . v e been eo ing t o o f a r forward i n many ceses. 'They cannot tag along with the company comnc ie r . ~f they do, they a r e pinned t o t h e ground and cannot see whet is going on except i n a very sml sec tor . Often they can Bee noth ing a t a l l acd a r e unable to perforni t h e i r m i s s i o ~ s . I know of one forward observer who went along with the po in t of the advance, where he should never heve been. The l i a i s o n o f f i c e r and not t,he a s s a u l t commander must handle t h e forward observeraw--Rrigadj.er General Reese M. Howell, a r t i l l e r y Of f i ce r , 9 t h Divi- s ion .

3. Cub Planes on Air ~ l e r t . nwe always keep a Cub p l e n e up on p a t r o l even dur ing qu ie t per iods when no missions a r e h e i n g f i r e d . yes te rday (7 ~ u g u z t ) our p a t r o l ob- eerved a Germn tank parked on t h e edge of a -11 patch of woods. He c a l l e d fo r a b a t t e r y (6 guns) and f i r e d on the l o n e tank. When t h e f i r s t rounda landed, t h e ob- s e r v e r spo t t ed s i x more tanks bunched up i n the same area. He then c a l l e d f o r t h e

b a t t a l i o n , we got f i v e of the seven tanks, ~t t h e conclusion of this mission, which didn* t l a s t long, the came observer spo t t ed a German moto r column on a nearby road, which'was inmediately taken under f i r e . By ac tua l count we s t 25 vehicles. I n a l l w e got f i v e tanke and 25 motor veh ic les very quickly, which shows what a n e l w t observer can do i n a cub planes'--Captain James B. Gregory, A i r Officer, 4th Division A r t i l l e r y .

I1 TECHNIQUE OF blOTOR MOVEMENT WlTH A I R SUPPQ(T.

NOTE* - observers f r o m t h i e headquarters have been di rec ted t o transmit information regarding coordination of a i r , armored and other ground forces i n f a s t moving operat ione i n as much d e t a i l &nd a e r a p i d l y a 3 possiblee The informa- t i o n given below is contained in the f i r s t r epor t on t h i s subject. other repor t s w i l l be disseminated a s promptly a s poss ib le a f t e r receipt .

1. S i t u a t i o n o I n a recent m t o r i z e d advance, the 79th ~ n f a n t r y Division used the following methods far maintaining con t ro l and c lose a i r support. A cavalry group was pro tec t in& t h e division*^ f ron t and r i g h t f lank, and an ar&red d iv i s ion was-marching on the l e f t flank.

2 , Communication. The 79th ~ i v i s i o n moved i n two columns with sec t ions of the d i v i s i o n reconnaissance group a t tacbed to the heads of each column and to the &lored d iv i s ion , s o tha t contect could be maintained through t h e ' s m 506. ~ h f 2 s(=R 508 i n the hE-8 armorea cars of t h e sect ions were s e t to the frequency of the a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n planes which covered the columns. I n some ins tances these planes determined the method of advance t o the columne.

3. control . The CL) comnanders were i n d i r e c t contact w i h the d iv i s ion commanders through the sCR 193. Combat teams mved from point t o point on order of hieher au thor i ty , usually t h e d iv i s ion ccmmntler with one col~unn and the a s s i s t a n t d iv i s ion c o m n d e r with the other.

4, In fan t ry Movement. Truck c o ~ z n i e s egd t rucks from the d ivis lon and at tached a r t i l l e r y were u t i l i z e d t o m v e t h e infactry. I n some inatences the motorized infant ry moved so r a p i d l y t h a t there was an intermingling of columns with the erroored division on the f lank, and a t other times they had t o h a l t and wait f o r the cavalry t o rega in i t s distance ahead. The &vis ion chief of s t a f f recomraends t h a t the covalry i n such a s i t u a t i o n be given an awle head s t a r t , e.g. cavalry s t e r t i n g a t daylight , infant ry a t 1300.

5 . A i r Support. The a j r support pa r ty usually remi-md wj. th d iv i s ion h e a d q u r t e r s , al thou& i t occaelonally mved t o the un i t wh=e the g rea tes t d i f f i c u l t y was expected* CL) commanders or the recclnnaissat~ce troop could get a i r sup2ort almost irmedietely by r a d i o reques t t o the armed reconneissance f l i g h t s which were covering t h e edvancicg columns. Requests of ten went from t h e cavalry grcup t o oin reconneiseance troop t o the d i v i s i o n a i r support p a r t y to the planes. The armed reconnaissar.ce f l i g h t s a l s o covered a r e a s a s requested by corps and &vis ion a i r suppor t per t ies . The missio~ls usually were flown by four or eight a i r c r a f t car rying 500 pound general purpose bombs and .5O c a l i b e r mck~ine Wse

,kcproduce& the ing/neer Re~ro, fief /2tb Amy, &t?;;a

TWELFTH ARMY C R O U P

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No, 32 31 A U C 1944

'Batt le ESperiences* are published regular ly by t h i s headquarters t o enable un i t s i n t ra in ing t o p ro f i t from the l a t e s t combat erperienoea of our troops now fighting the Cennans i n France. Although the experiences of cer ta in un i t s a t a par t icular location are not necessarily applicable t o a l l un i t s i n a l l situations, the items published w i l l be those baaed on prac t ica l experience and are recommended for careful consideration by uni t s which may encounter s imilar problems. Reports of corroborative or contrary experiences a re par t icu la r ly desired i n order tha t the va l id i ty of the indicated ba t t l e lesson may be determined.

Ey conmiand of the Group Commander:

L

H. B. LGIIISL Brigadier General, USA

Ad jut a ~ t Gener a1 - -_ - - . - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I USE OF CUB PLANE3 FOR PHOTO WSSIONS:

1. .We improvised a photo laboratory and dark roam by making ply-wood aides and top f o r a 1-ton t r a i l e r . In t h i s laboratory r e do the e n t i r e proceesing including enlarge- ments and can normally del iver about 20 photos two hours a f t e r request f o r a photo mie- sion. A l l photos a r e oblique and a re taken from l i a i son planes with the regular K-20 camera.

2. Win addition t o the usual uae of these f a c i l i t i e s f o r a r t i l l e r y purposes it is poasible t o reproduoe suff ic ient copies fo r delivery t o and use of infantry bat ta l ions a r a qeans of supplementing maps o r i n the absence of maps. Concentrations uan be figured, plotted, end numbered on regular arepa, transposed t o the photoa, and uaed by any infantry of f icer t o c a l l f o r specif ic f i r e when required. They may a l so be used f o r general orientation. Of course more time is required t o tu rn out such large quant i t i es , the f a c i l i t i e s of the improvised laboratory being quite l imited, but the supply neaessary for a divis ion can be produced i n lees than 24 hours. Such photoa were supplied for the 29th Division fo r t h e i r a t tack on Hi l l 192 a t St. Lo.

3 . *An enlarged (10 x 14) photo waich shows the locat ions or any suspected wmtm hoat i le a r t i l l e r y is uaed by Cub Observer while in the air. Should the enemy open f i r e , upon radio c a l l of observer, our f i r e is delivered on the suspected location nearest t o the point indicated by the observer. This point is usually within a few hundred yards of a suspected location. Often the f i r e so delivered has been r igh t on the hos t i l e a r t i l l e ry .

4. WSorne information as t o the e f f ec t of our f i r e is a l so obtained from oblique photos taken by our cub planes thereby supplementing data l a t e r obtained from A i r Force reconnaissance s ~ r t i e a . ~ -- Major W. M.. Smith, Counterbattery OTfioer and Lt. D.J. Gray, Bsst. 5-2, X I X Corpa Art i l lery.

.In this Corps re ley a d i rec t l i n e t o Group Headquarters and Mvis ion Ar t i l l e ry Heaaquartera from our f i r e di rect ion center, i n addi t ion t o the normal l i ne s f r au Corps Ar t i l l e ry t o those headquarters. This d i r e c t l i ne is a l so connected t o ouk normal l i ne s through t h e i r witchb board and by remote control may be plugged i n t o the Radio net . Group and Division Ar t i l l e ry Headquartera a l so have s imilar d i rec t l i ne s , i n addit ion t o the normal l i ne s , t o each of t h e i r subordinate headquarters. This eystem makes i t possible fo r Corps A r t i l l e r y t o exercise imnediate control over al l its subordinate u n i t s and t o bring i n f i r e of any or all elements i n an absolute minimum of t i m e . l i r e is much f a s t e r and be t te r than radio,m--Major I. M. W t h , Counterbattery Officer and Lt. D. J. Grey, Asat, S-2, XM Corps Art i l lery .

On the morning of 7 Auguet an infantry regiment belonging t o t he XM Corps s t a r t ed an advance. A t 1000 hours the s i tua t ion was a s shorn on the accompanying sketch. For two hours the 3rd ba t ta l ion made no attempt t o mote forward. They were being f i r e d upon by machine guns from the r i gh t but t h e m could hare b e n outflanked by a small force with l i t t l e trouble. One reason f o r t he inac t iv i ty was tha t negotiations were U e r way t o bring about t he surrender of t he German forces, Even the morement of German forces which could be o b s e m d w a s not f i r e d upon. The regimental commander f i na l l y ordered the ba t ta l ion forward preceded by an a r t i l l e r y preparation, and Ccrppany K sent a platoon t o outflank the machine -8, These t a c t i c s resul ted i n taking the position8 wi,bhout d i f f i cu l ty , but our un i t s i n the draw were extremely for tunate i n eeaaping the hos t i l e mortar and a r t i l l e r y f i r e which i r a uaually brought d o m during such a delay.--0bserosr's Report based upon personal observations.

INITIAL OBJECTIVE ,

\ Fr & , u c e d by ."re Engineer Rep~oducf~on i l e f , /2fh Army

No. 33 Ak:c r2,9&$, - d 3

n m t t l e m e r i e n a s o * g'&Dkfehee re&uPwLy @y r&i-e h@d$~u*tms to enable u n i t s i n t r a in ing t o p r o f i t 9jrm the l a t e a t combat ~x-psrzencee of our $mops now f igh t ing t h e Germane i n F r m ~ e . Although the ex.fl~ben,ss ~f cer ta in u i t s a t a. par t i cu la r Pocation e r e not necessarily applicable ss ell u i t s in a l l a i tua f iom, the irema published rill ba thoee based on praotical a ' ~ g e ~ f @nee mad we rec f o r carefuP consideration ny mi.cs whluh may O ~ C O L L , . ~ BM~W p r ~ b l e m ~ R8p@rx8 of corroborat irs o r contrary erperiencea cue particulei-,y bssLzeQ %a orbe2 s h e -;)L~,, v a l i d i t y or ths indicated ba t t l e lsseon m y be determinepc!

camend of t k a k m y Group @-&or: / -%

I JEADEGHP EPISODE NO. 1.

Notat In an e f fo r t t o build up s p e c i f i c astuwa '60 the q?~co%fon sf vhat e o m t i t u t e ~ good leadership, i t 28 p % a ~ e d t o inelude i n t h i s g n b l f ~ a " ~ ; c n a se r2 . s~ ci agecii8i: instancee, giving i n d e t a i l ac t ions or words s f a individual which have &sen eon- sidered t o cons t i tu te good leadership i n a specif ia s i tua t ion , The fxz-s% af thsss , extracted fran an 8 t h Infantry documen%, i a g9vex~ bcrlsw.

P. On 24 June, trra ~ l e u % a ~ ~ s a r d ~ u & u 2 % & g iihi -* 2 :: L--O Li a 30upa.1~: : z - r s v s t rongly f o r t i f i e d Cennarp p081LioKia eonslatin& of a tf tunaeP~, d i ~ g O./{S 725 gun emplacements. The crmpany~ w a s pinned down by dlevastrrtizg a r t i l l e r y , ~-.%ki~s and mall arm f i r e a b u t 139 yards froma the g ~ 8 i % i e n , Heavy casua l t i e s :'c-cad 4 t 80 withdraw.

2. r n p p ~ p t f ~ &-k-i'r&a, %;.$& ?:mpw C B ~ ~ @ L % e i ~ k . ? ~ ~ t:. :?FOZ

the Q.m atrong point , r a f l i ed hfu 5 8 ~eimiriing man who wem dieorganloso =, ..;- luctant . The acmpany ccrlpmaader tcs$ oae d f t he tenks and calmly etood b s i d e the t u r r e t a8 it advanued, Th@ m a folbowad, .& t:8@ battle hemfa hand-to-hand, the c m p q camandsr ( f i ~ ~ c ~ 2 ? ~ ~ , P r a tb; P B : ~ fa ,;bf $ 2 3 men with rifle bayonet--literally sarvf ng lbj 2 i~&y i n t o tb( Ge- as;rr, 4 3 . ; n~~r&oEd -

1. The After Action .3eysit of &he :&&t ' a ' d & e f i i & P i c i ~ i;: Z a y E30k 'Li~e~i-ibgb t h e ef feut ive m e of i t 8 light tank coqany aa a mopping UP "mix i i ~ ~vomecG,isa aith the a t tack i n euppsrti of elemteato of* the 2nd DSvfaion i n %Esv area mosthetaut of St, Lo,

2. Canpany B of the teak ba t t a l ion wee as% ~ d % ~ e d mtil 28 July, two days after t h e opaning of the offenaim. With referenom t o its aotioa, the repor t makes t h i s

etatement* DThe light tanka prwed t o be ereellen& i n t h i s e i tua t ion, where t b main resiatanoe had been broken and the operation waa e@mntialLy one of loopping up, They were able, a le0 t o kaep up r i t h the advancing infant ry , even through difficult t e r ra in . They w e d 37 mn oanls ter very effectively w a i n s t h o s t i l e

Reoent obsarration by a War DepaftEmnt obsermr of' the action of an t i a i rc ra f t u n i t s egainst an at tack by approrimately 75 German planes, has led him t o make the f ollowing comments:

1. aSearahlignts went i n t o aation but were wholly ineffeot ive as the planes wen, a h the cloude Bnd a t no tlm r i s i b l e frcm the ground, They might well hare remained out of ac t ion en t i r e ly , as they m m d only t o disclose ground ineta l la t ioas .

2. #Although the at tacking planes could nat be seen, autamatic weapons un i t s were delivering barrage f i r e . It appearedthat the attacking planes ware well outside the range of automatlo weapons. I n t h i s inetance, autanatic weapons ba t t e r i e s could hare determined tha t the target was not i n range frm the data of adjoining gun bat ter ies , and f i r e mould have been held.

3. camanders w i t h whcm the mattar w a s discuseed were unanimous i n t h e i r opinion that the need for searchlight illumination for gun8 no longer exlate, and tnat they etrould be wed only u l t h aprsad beam f o r AW, as beacon l i g h t s , and f o r the i l l u - mination of air s t r ips ,

4. *The ru lee of wnen and when not t o open f i r e ahould ba brought home with greater emgneeis t o see t ion leadere i n training. It i e a great mistake and a waete of ammu- ni t ion f o r a gun cnmmnnder t o open f i r e bofore a target is within range.#

IV G~SUIWI TRICK.

German U S ' mines ham beau found s i x t o eight iaehes apart with one igniear above ground but with a threa-prong ign i t e r buried soms distance away. Amine detector operator san e a s i l y detec t t h i o mt-up by tha double warbling on tne sound indicator.-- lkcaa After Action Report, 4th Infantry Mvlsion.

a w e f e e l tha t the 4.2 mortar h a a d e f i n i t e d s s i o a of it8 o m and does not tales the plaee of a r t i l l e r y . It is moat effeet ivo far quiak f i r @ upon t a rge t s of opportunity, including personnel, m h i c l e r and buildings. It i e not an o f fee t i r e weabon f o r fiblaat- ing outs misoione. We a m bring f i r e on a target more quickly than een a r t i l l e r y . OPT greates t service is instantaneous f ire on quickly appearing targetr.n--Et Col H. B. Bst t , CO, 07th Cml Battalion.

- 2 - Qepduccd by the Enp/neer Reproduct/on Drf, /Z fh Army Group

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


-Bat t l e Experiences* a re published regularly by t n i s headquarter8 t o enable un i t s i n t ra ining t o p r o f i t f x m the l a t e s t canbat experiences of our troops now f igh t ing the Cernana i n France, Although the experienaes of cer ta in u n i t s a t a pa r t i cu l a r location a r e not necessari ly applicable t o a l l un i t s i n a l l s i tua t ions , the it- published rill be those baaed on prac t ica l experience and a r e recoimrsnded f o r careful consideration by un i t s which may encounter similar problems, Report8 of corroborativs o r aontrary experiences a r e par t icu1ar ly desired i n order that the va l i d i t y or' the indicated b a t t l e lesaon may be d e t e m n e d .

By camand of Lieutenant General BRADLEY: /I

Ekigadier General, USA Adjutant Ceneral

I TROOPS WANT THE * P I m m .

*Troop8 sad lower headquarters desire a oi tuat ion map and glimpse of the big pic- ture more than -hi- except d l f r m -. 1% seems that spec ia l d ie t r ibu t ion of mah i n f m t i a n , l imited a s pecoasary far secur i ty , could be rapidly disseminated t o d iv i s ions o r rrgimsntr for.reporduction,m-- En CO, 35th Division.

Noto: Itu Xn Corps 0 2 Seation hao prodded exeel lent *big p ic turem G 2 repor t s far dimtribution to u c h company i n the Corpm.

The sucoassful, though unplanned, use of an a r t i l l e r y l i a i son plane aa part of an advance guard f o r foot t m p s wcu described by a canpany c-der of the 83rd Infantry Mrisicm as follows: .Our capany waa the advance guard f o r our ba t t a l i on , when the poi1 suddenly msde aontact with a group of enemy r i f lenun. Two squads and a BAR team from tL advance pa r ty dea l t with t h l e resisterice. Then an a r t i l l e r y l i a i son p i l o t flew ovsr, cut h i s motor, and to ld ua t he mJerrlesm were a t a r t i q t o r e t r e a t 500 yards t o our front. Wf a t once resrrppsd t b advance, t h w p revsn t iw e delay of the main body. An we moved for - ward, the l i a i son plane continued t o keep us infomad regardinq the enemy:

*Tlu rhino dedcee solved a tank problem i n hedgerow country. Tho t rouble with d.rolitionm w a s that they gate arrag our 'pos i t iona and the infantry would receive mortar i H t h tb rhino i n use n need only one tank dozer per campany, ins tead of one psr p1etoon.m--C0, 747th Tank Battalion.

ISOIL d i v i s i o n s have had a l o t of t rouble with bomb8 l a t e ly . That brings out t h e importance of e e l e c t i n g proper CP s i t e s . Stay out of those b ig v i l l a s . The Germans have used them a l l and have them p l o t t e d ; a l s o s t a y out of open f i e l d s because they are d i f f i c u l t t o camouflage and soon wheel t r acks w i l l g ive you away. The bes t p lace f o r a CF is i n these l i t t l e peasant farmhousee and barna. There the CP can operate much more e f f i c i e n t l y . Ue simply sandbag t h e doors and windows.*--G3, 4 t h Division.

*Be c a r e f u l t h a t only t h e f r o n t l i n e s d i sp lay panels. Once our orn planes s t a r t e d s t r a f i n g our CP1a and everybody s t a r t e d pu t t ing out panele. The a i r never did know where t h e f r o n t l i n e s were. I f you .have t o use smoke, red amke i s bes t . * - - 6 3 , 4th Div

*The key t o t h e whole show is good ba t t a l ion commanders. J u s t th ink of the number of th ings he has t o do. He haa h i s B r t i l l e r y o f f i c e r , tank o f f i c e r , tank decltroyer o f f i - c e r , $2, S-3, cammunication o f f i c e r , t r anspor ta t ion o f f i c e r , heavy weapons o f f i c e r , and l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , a l l along wit:^ .hlm i n h i s party. He must know how t o use all h i s weapons and t o c a l l f o r t h e i r support ing f i r e e . He i s t h e most important commander i n t h e burinesa. Ba t t a l ions f i g h t a s a amall combat teem, and we need more s t r e s s on t h i s type 9f t r a in ing . B a t t a l i o n crrmvlnders muet h o w and apprecia te t h e d i f fe rence between a sun- p l e envelopment and a wide envelopment. The Heinies simply w i l l not f i g h t any longer when you g e t behlnd tnem.*--Asalt Mvis ion Commander, 9 t h Division.

SCREENING FORCE.

*In a f a s t moving s i t u a t i o n , when we do not have armored o r cavalry u n i t a i n f r o n t , re hare organized a regimental t a s k force t o a c t an a acreaning force. This f o r c e is oauposed s f one motorized r i f l e cmpany (mounted on ha l f - t r acks ) , one p la toon of medium tanka, one platoon of M-10 tank des t royers , one platoon of the cannon campany, and two o r th ree reconnaieeance vehic les . This f o r c e is able t o n e u t r a l i z e o r f i x enemy r e e i s t - ance encountered, thereby permi t t ing t h e advance of our foo t t roops m t h o u t f e a r of unexpected a t t a c k fram the f r o n t . This force se rves rn our advance guard, while d i r i n i o n reconnaiseance u n i t s p r o t e c t any exposed flank.*--Rsgtl Exec 0, 1st Division.

PI11 SPECIAL USE OF THE 6 0 U WITPAR.

*lCs use the 6OPlm mortar without base p l a t e , e spec ia l ly on p a t r o l s , up t o e lgn t hundred yarda. One man c a r r i e s the tube and two rounds of amnunition. This use ot' the mortar l a l imi ted t o h ignly experianced personnelOD--Regtl Exec 0, 1st Division.

IX IdARKIMti TARGETS WITH SAAOICF;.

gEue t o t h e uncer ta in ty a s t o the e r a c t t ime of a r r i v a l of a i r c r a f t over a t a r g e t , psaplanned t a r g e t marking by smoke is not g r a c t i c a b l e and amoke must be placed a f t e r VHF r ad io ccmmunication between t h e BSP Officer and the a i rcra i ' t . Only as a l a s t r e s o r t and upsan f a i l u r e of the VHF r a d i o should smoke be placea when the planes a r e seen t o a r r i v e In the t a r g e t 91'ea.*--G-'j f ir, 4 th Divisione

End . -2-

TWELFTH ARMY CROW

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 35

*Rat t le wper i ences* a r e published r egu la r ly by t h i s Beadquartart! t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e e t combat experienaes of OW t roops n m f i g h t i n g the W r m m i n France. ~ l t h o u g t i t h e experienoee sf c e r t a i n units a t a p a r t i c u l a r l oca t ion a r e not necessa r i ly applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n e , the i tems published w i l l be thoae based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are reconmended f o r o w e f u l aoneidertlt ion by u n i t e which may encounter similar problems. ~ e p a r t e of Corroborative or contrary experiences a r e p a r t i a u l a r l y des i red i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indica ted b a t t l e loseon may be determinsd.

By a-nd of l i eu tenan t ~ e n e r a l W I E Y :

Brigadier ~ e n e r a l , USL M ju tan t ~enaral - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

wgandbags have proved a n acceptable s u b s t i t u t e f o r add i t iona l o r spaced arrmr i n scrme TD unite. m e bn r e p a r t a an ~ 1 0 , so protected, rece ived a d i r e c t h i t from an 88 nm without danrage. m o t h e r TD u n i t r e p o r t s t h e bae ;~ e f f e a t i v e l y pro tec ted a n wlO against h o s t i l e rouket w o j e a t i l e e . ~ o t h these u n i t a have added rocks t o hold the sandbags i n plaae. I n p l ac ing bags on the t u r r e t , care is taken t o avoid in t e r f e renae with e f f i c i e n t ope~ation.#-41D observer 9 8 Report. ( m E r Sane u n i t s have expressed t h e belief t h a t aandbage w a i s t penet ra t ion by prevent ing riaocrbst.)

#One TD unit hae modified its .5O c a l i b e r h Z mount by p lac ing it low on the r i g h t f r o n t of t h e t u r r e t , lowerine t h e handlee, nmnllnition box, and t r i g g g r , and aiming with cr standard p r i m . Th i s makes it possible t o defend t h e daetroJer aminat inf f i r e and bazookae, which have been u e d very e f f e c t i v e l y by t h e enemy in c l o s e t e r r a in . - 4 D O b s e m e r * ~ Report.

I11 M'X;RBSTVBJBSS AT DIBK AM) BEFORB IYRN.

1. *yt WEIS discovered t h a t t h e - m a , when being a t tacked a t duek, withdrew t h e i r main dsfense about t h r e e hedgerows, l eav ing only l i g h t covering fmcea . gy continuing the pressure a t t h i s tim, an apprec iable gain would be made d t h l i t t l e loss .

2. *m accounts indica ted tha t the GWIIIBM a l m y a expected an a t t a c k t o follow an a r t y preparation. ~f there w a s s u f f i c i e n t time f o r dayl ight rcn, a t t a a k e w e e arranged

t o t ake place one hour befare day l igh t , u i n g no preparat ion and no d l arm f i r e , but leav ing t h e ID with f i x e d bayonets, and upon meeting oppoaitfon, u d n g hand &re- nades freely. t h r e e eucceesive occasions, t h i s method proved a f f ec t ive , and the t roops had grea t oonfidence i n i t . ~ )u r ing the hour of semi-darknees, a l imi ted object- i v e advance a s made of about t h r e e f i e l d s , and a t dayl ight our t roops w e r e on t h e enemy main position.@--Eom CLftar Combat Report of t h e 29th D i r .

1. Destruct ion of ~anka. @our experience hae been t h a t me .tank w i l l not a t t a c k another t h t i e i n poei t ion wai t ing f car it. ~lr; ' bazooka men inmobil ize t he Tiger@ and Ranthere by f i r i n g a t the t raoke and wheels, Then our infantrymsn surround than end the crew8 alwaye surrender. The r i f l e gremde i s 8 b s t aa good as t h e bazooka.

2. W k i n g mon t L;lnes. rThe bes t method of -king f r o n t l i n e 8 f o r t he a i r is t o cut up t h e r e d f luoreecent panels i n t o emall panels. T h i s has worked ti- and agbin and i s b e t t e x than coXared smke.@--CG, 29th I& Div.

@Our m n llloe W grenades a great deal because they get the Heinies out of t h e i r holea. ~f you hold your r i f l e a t about 30 d e g e e s , you can ge t a i F b u r s t s by u i n g the g e n a d e p ro j ec t ion adeptera. gur men have learned t o bura t theae g e m d e a over the Hciniea holes , and Rlls aay they r e a l l y h a t e it.'-4-3, 29th Dir.

V I COMt/lENIIS OF CO, 22D

1. More about Tank rid in^ I n f a n t r m . @we r i d e e igh t mer on a medium tank and e ix on a l i g h t tank, a l l on t h e r e a r deck. It only takes ten mlknutes t o t r a i n t h ~ we f F r s t send out a wave of tank8 buttoned up, put time f i r e from t h e a r t y them, and follow with the tanks car ry ing the men. The e r t y observer r i d e 8 with the l ead ing rave end con t ro l s t h e fFre, s e t t i n g h i s fuees a l i t t l e high. To in su re con t ro l by t h e inf CO and t h s tank CO, I put them both in t h e eame tank. The i n f CO hangs h i e sCR 300 r a d i o on t h e ou t s ide of the tank and works d i r e c t l y w i t h t k a t p a r t of h i e bn rh ioh fo l - l m a , i n t ruck8 or on foot. 1nf co cornmnders can t a l k t o tank p l a t oomnander~ by tel* phone8 hung on the back of the tanks. we fought t h i s way f o r e igh t day8 and n ights , and t h e f o o t s o l d i e r s love the scheme. ~t doe8, however, have one dieadvantage, i n t h a t i t does n o t c a p i t a l i z e on the f u l l s t r e n g t h of t he i n f r e & , s ince i t f a i l 0 t o uee m e t of the crew-served weapons.. we e r e going t o t r y t o u t i l i z e the heavy weapons oo by r i d i n g it on tanks.

2. atr role. 'we have another acheme that works well. we c a l l them r a i d e r s and U g h t hawke. Eight men a r e s e l ec t ed from s e c h r i f l e p l a t for t h e i r endurance, i n i t i a - t i v e , u ight v i s ion , and a b i l i t y t o read rmpe. They do no f i g h t i n g during t h e day and no ~ p , guard, f a t i g u e , e t c . They are s p e c i a l l y t r a ined n igh t f i g h t e r s only. They have a two-fold miaeionc first, t o go t o a a p e c l f i c place and eccmpl i ah a e p e c i f i c thing; second, having accanplished t h e i r rnisaion, t o haraaa the enemy a e much aa possible , even shoot ing captured G e r m burp gun8 (schmeiseer p i s t o l s ) a t them. when t h i a happens, the @wmana come r u ~ i n g out y e l l i n g end a f r a i d t o shoot t h e i r o m men. ~8 en t3Xarnplt3, last n ight f o u r r ad io p a t r o l s of f i v e men eech brought back 33 German pri8aners.fl

TWELFTH ARMY CRQUP


#mt t l e fPperiences# a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i a headquarters t o enable u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from'the l a t e s t combat experiences of our t roops n o r f i g h t i n g the Gerrmns i n France. ~ l t h o u g h the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r loca t ion a r e not necessa r i ly app l i cab le t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o m , the i t e m published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l considerat ion by u n i t s ~ h i c h may encounter similar problems. Report s of corrobora t ive or cont rary experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y des i red i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indica ted b a t t l e l e s son may be determined.

By camnand of Lieutenant General mDW: n

B r i ~ d i e r w n e r a l , US Adjutant General ----.-.--------.---.----.--------.-.-------

I ONE WAY CF FIXITG S N I P E R S .

1. The fol lowing i a f r m a m i t i ~ h publ ica t ion: flgnipers i n hayetacka were more e f f e c t i v e l y e n ~ g e d by s e t t i n g f i r e t o the hay-

s t a c k with t r a c e r s and then shoot ing the sniper a 8 he r a n out,

1. Rcn, HThere is a n absolute necess i ty f o r personal rcn. AS an example, I ,ggt - l o s t on a cow path one day and near ly got captured, The next day my knowledge of t h e cow path enabled me t o work a co t o the enemy18 r e a r , whereupon t h e e n t i r e enemy posi- t ion surrendered.

2, Use of Personnel. #There is a tendency over he re t o employ too many geople t o do a job. Once I cut t h e number of men a t taoking a c e r t a i n pos i t ion from a p l a t t o a squad, and they went and captured it anyway,@--C0, 22d Inf ,

I11 DIVISION T R U C W D S .

The G-4 of the 2d m d Div f i n d s t h a t supply is f a c i l i t h t e d by t h e establishment of a div truckhead f o r each combat conrmand ins tead of one f o r the div. They a re eatab- l i s h e d f a r 'enough farward s o t l ~ t the us ing t roops w i l l not have t o haul t h e i r gasoline and a r ~ m i t i o n mare than f i v e o r six miles. The canbat commands r e p c r t the system of cons iderable help,

Cooperation betwesn our combat connnand and the s u p p o r t ~ n g a i r has been excel lent . &qp 0 and our 3-3, hir , r i d e t o g e t h e in a t ank in the l e a d i n g echelon, his tank

has the VHF equipment for camnunication t o planes and a l s o ha8 a crypton l i g h t t o per- m i t t h e p i l o t t o i d e n t i f y t h e tank t o wUch he is talking. We have one t a ~ per bn

l i s t e n on t h e a i r frequency and give t h e dnforxmtion obtained t'o t h e CO, we a l s o use colored pane l s t o i d e n t i f y our tanks f o r t h e planes, but we have t o change t h e color f requent ly , a a t h e Cerrnens soimtimes use t h e sarm color. The planes flu'nish us exce l l - ent i n t e l l i g e n c e and rcn informetion, a s well a s p r o t e e t i o n . w ~ ~ - 3 , Combat comuand, 2d ~ m d Div.

'Pie had t roub le us ing s l idex when we depended upon one person t o operate it. 'llhere were so meny mistake8 t h a t i t wae a d e f i n i t e hindrance. We remedied t h i s f a u l t by hav- i n g two persom--one t o check t h e other. This has el iminated mistakes, end we now con- s i d e r s l i d e x our bes t code. n-groop Connander, 6 t h mv.

V I AUXILIARY CFARGER CAR. ~ 8 0

awe have found t h e t ogera t iou of t h e r a d i o i n the zrmd c a r M-8 r equ i res such a heavy output *om the ba t t e ry that i t is d i f f ' i c n l t t o keep the b a t t e r y charged. me remedied t h i s by mounting a wriny Timn charger between t h e r e a r wheels to keep t h e b a t t e r y up and save running t h e c a r engine while us ing the radioow--Troop Cornwinder, 6 t h Cav.

V I I REMOTE CCNl'ROL FROM M O B I I E CP.

*we have s e t up a m b i l e CP i n a one-ton t r a i l e r . I n f r o n t of the fender on each s ide we have placed a r e e l of heavy cable wire f o r renote rad io control . This permits d i s p e r s a l , and one opera tor can operate two radios from inside.#--?rroop cornwinder, 6 th Cav.

and TD u n i t s a r e s t i l l incl ined to sight t h e i r guns down roads. Pos i t ions on f l a n k s genera l ly a f f o r d more concealment and produce more e f f e c t i v e f i r e a m i n s t f l anks and r e a r of advancing tanks.m--Bn CO, 1st ~ i v .

IX Q.UICK PUNCH.

U I have organized a fo rce composed of two r i f l e squads, one un squad, and one 60 mm laortar squad, t o use where a quick hard punch is needed. T h i s provis ional p l a t is composed of s e l e c t e d personnel and is assigned to Hq d i r e c t l y under m y control , s o t h a t I can employ i t on shor t not ice . During a march t h i s p l a t a c t s a s a point of the advance g~ard.w--Bn CO, 1st Div.

X INFOFUdATION FROM H S .

#It has been found t h a t m a w i l l not po in t out t h e i r C p s on an m e r i c a n m p due t o t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o read t h e s e mags, but genera l ly rill r e a d i l y i n d i c a t e t roop loca- t ions , e t c . on a G e m n map. l e have furniehed all our in te l l igenue aec t ione with copies of GtU-man mps which have been raprodwed by our carpa. This ha8 g r e a t l y faui- l i t a t e d t h e tranamiasion of information in a d d i t i o n t o a i d i n g i n interogation.w-;Report by XLX Cmps.

#A G e m n prisoner of war was found wearing c i v i l i a n c l o t h e s under h i s uniforme He r e p o r t d t h a t when observing f o r martar f i r e i n forward a r e a s , he would remove h i s uni- f o r n and move about i n c i v i l i a n c l o t h e s . # - d f t s Action ~ e p o r t of 4th Div.

ma

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 37 I SEPT 1944

w t t l e mperiencesa a r e published regular ly by this headquarters to enable uni te i n t r a in ing t o prof it from the l a t e a t combat experiencee of our troops now f i # t i n g t h e GarlBane i n Fence. glthough the experiences of c e r t a in unita a t a par t icular looation are not neceaaari ly applicable t o a l l un i t s i n a l l e i tuat ione, the items published w i l l be thoae baaed on p rac t i c a l experiences and a r e recommended fo r careful aonsideration by un i te which m y encounter similar problem. Reports of corroborative or contrary erperienaee a r e par t i cu la r ly deaired i n order t ha t tha va l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e leason rney be determined.

By command of Lieutenant w n s r a l

wi gadier General, US Ad jutant General

- I - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - . - - - - . - - - O - - -

NOTE1 U1 of t he c o m n t a given below were m d e t o an observer from t h i s head- - quar tera by a oourageoue young l ieutenant of the 5 t h ~ i v only a feu hours after he had l o s t both lega in combat. In sp i t e of t h i s f a c t , he not only was ab le t o give t h e m conatruetive and connected cements upon timely mi l i t a ry subjects, but h e aleo informed the obeerver that he Bad already made plans t o complete h i s s t ud i e s and reaume h i e chosen career i n c i v i l l i f e . He a l s o told the observer t h a t he always t r i e d t o do h i e beet aa a p l a t lea&, becaws h i e p l a t m e composed of a cross sec t ion of the f i n e s t type of -ican yough who inapdred and were e n t i t l e d to the higheet type of leaderahige

1. Bayonet u e a u l t . fl m e old f i r e and move~obnt doctr ine ending with a bayonet asaaul t is most af fec t ive a m i n s t the enemy in the preeent phase of operatione. I n one a t t a ak of my p l a t i n which I placed heavy f i r e on h i e poeitiona with w e and r i f l e s and followed with a bayonet aesau l t , we counted 306 Germans dead while loaing 0d-Y eight nmn k i l l ede This action occurred in the ~ n g e r s eectore*

2. D i s t r u d of t h e maq, men have learned, because of various rusres and tr iuka, not to trust the ~erman.8, ~n mms instance6 t h e Gemmns have hidden t o avoid our f i & t i n g echelon8 and-then eurrsndsred t o r e a r echelons, who a m incl ined t o t r e a t them more kindly. mont l i n e troops deplore the a t t i t u d e towards prisoners displayed by r e a r echelons, such a e giving them c igare t tes , candy bare, and other f ami l i a r i t i e e . Our aoldiera must be endowed with a hatred and d i a t r u t of t h e enany i n order t o sut- cesaful ly pursue the war .#

3. Badmahip. o f f i c e r s have t o be leaders. Discipline i n combat dependa la rge ly upon the knowledge by the men that the 0 leadingthsm knowa h i s buainees and l a not re luotant t o take ri8ks.r

4. ~nfantry-Tank @ordination. infantry-tank coordination, I use an NO t o d i rec t each tank by mama of a telephone at tached to eaoh tank. The target derignatione follows t h i s eequ&ce #Target scriptio ion)^--* 'Ihree o pclockw --*watch ray tracerw. The infantryl~an f i r e s the t r e se r and then the tank inmediately opsrrs f i r e w i t h UP followed by HE, This system has worked very e f fec t ive ly against enemy poe1tions.a

5. Booby ?Tape. W X have had no caaualt iea from booby t raps in my pla t due to the f ac t tkt I do not permit w- men to pick up anmy weapons, watcheo, and other a r t i c l a a from enemy k i l l e d by ac%iona

6. menoh Collaboration8 Vhe naquie have been most halpful and cooperative r inee re hr&e out of the Narm~ndy psnineula. ~n the -re sector, the maquis supplieC each of our p l a t laadars with accurate and helpful mapa showing detailed enany positions, ineludlng enipers, l& empla,cs;~ents, and other poa1tiona.a

7. mdics. # m e m d i e s arc b i n g a uondrrful job in t h i s - 0 They have - @eat courage and exercise a high d e s e e of t re in ing and s k i l l i n the perfarnrance of their dut ies of ten under heavy memy f t m . I owe ~qy l i f e t o the aomage and s k i l l of a co a id rmn, who ran to rn under heavy mrtar f i r e and, together with one of q u a d leaders, applied tourniquete t o xiy and then carried nu^ t o oomparative aafety in a ditch some 75 yarb t o %he rear.@

8. I&iscellaneouo Camperits. a. WThe Gernrane invariably attempt t o gst OR pow f lank with small groups of men with nraahine guns.

b. #plat acouta nust be very thorough in acouting an area, or t h e en- rill l i e lor u n t i l you get on top of them M o r e they open f i r e .

c. WMen ebould be t r a b d t o pay l i t t l e a t ten t ion t o the machine p i s t o l of aburpw gun, but t o l i a t e n caraful ly for t h e f i r i n g of morWs.

d. WRecently, approxiarately one-third of the Gemmn aaiperr have bean officers. They no longer t rua t h a v i n g en l i s t ed men behind, a8 they w i l l soon abandon t h e i r gosi- t ion and follow the re t rea t ing forcea.

e. hedgerow fighting always deny t h e enemy the use of the next hedgerow i n rear by laying mortar f i r e on it.

f . q generally use two squads in a t taok and one i n support. I attempt t o f i nd from which flank he is advancing h ie r~aneuvering farue, then attauk tha t flank. ~t is mo& Important t o m i n t a i n contact w i t h adjacent un i t s and t o keep flank8 well protected.

g. @The ensmy does moert of h i s pa t ro l l ing i n the ear ly marning. He w i l l f i r e h i s aburpw gun i n t he a i r I n an e f fo r t to amke us reveal our position. We have learned t o di 8regard t h i s , and i f he gets close enough, we throw a few grenade8 a t hi&

he W I have used 60 mn mortars both i n battery and attached t o plat. When attached to p la t , I generally uae it without h a 8 plate.

1. "nits on l i n e should be given re l ief- t i ts prolonged pariodg i n eornbat cause pabn to tmome care lem, largely through fatigue.

J e '1 have f i r e d the nmrtar she l l from the r i f l e , but I do not think it is worth the extra weight of agrrmlni tion. Two fragmntat ion hand grenade8 rill obtain about %he same r e a u l t s when f i r e d by the r i f l e 1auncher.w

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 38 3 SEPT 1944

'Batt le Experiencesn a r e published re&ularly by t n l s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from the i a t 2 s t m D a c experiences of our t r o o p no,i f i g h t i n g the Germans i n France. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r loca t ion aro not necessa r i ly appl icaole t o all d i ; s in a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e itm published w i l l ~ t . those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are recornended f o r careful comidel .a t ion by u n i t s which m y encounter similar groblem, Reports of col.roborative o r contrary experiences a ~ c : p a r t i c u l a r l y des i red i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e les.son may be determined.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY :

He Be LEmS Brigadier General, USA

Adjutant General m - m s - - - - . - - m - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - w - w . . - - - - - - . - - -

I A I R SUPPORT OF ARrdORD LOLW.DLS.

NOTE1 The fo l loh lng is ext rac ted f s o n an account of very successful air support of Combat Ccrmmand A of t h e 2d krmd Div, given by L t Col J m e s L. Zirranerman, who was air support party 0 w i t h t h e Canbat Camand. The d i v hau th ree air support parties-- one wi th the d i v cnrrrm~ndes, and one with each cmbat c o m ~ ~ ~ d column.

1. '1 w&9 m u t e a in an M-4 tank. A l l of t n e tar-k crew except the t a ' c corn- mander were a i r force personnel. The t& com-=der communicated with the coluun commander by means of an SCH 528. I had an SCR 522 t o comunicate w i t h the planes, I had changes made i n t h e i n t e r i o r of the tank s o t h a t I cccupied tne a s s i s t a n t d r i v e r ' s s t a t i o n , from which I had ou t s ide v i s ion and could -+ark radio.

2. 'Column cover of' four f i g h t e r bombers t o each column was maintained zheneves we moved i n daylight. The f l i g n t s were re l ieved a t about 30 ninute mtervale . The l eader of each f l i g h t contacted mt: as he approacned, givlng h ie c a l l sign.

3. "The planes workeu q u i t e c lose t o us, g e n e ~ . a l l y wisn excel lent r e s u l t s . For exmplt: , on 27 Ju ly we were held up b y ~ h o s t i l e r e s i s t ance , I d k e c t e d the planes aga ins t i t , and they dived so c lose t h a t they made me nervous, However, not a b d l e t h i t our tanks, and t h e res i s t ance w a s knocked out. During the e n t i r e p=riod, 25 Ju ly t o 6 August, the,.e were only two ins tances of bombs f a l l iw mar. our troops. I n Gne of these instances t h e banb was aroppzd by a s i a g l e plane f r a n some other area. I kept i n constant contact with t h e cover ard kept them notif'ied of t h e locat ion of the head of our c o l m . The planes located my tank by a yellow panel which I had placed. acr-s it a t t h e extreme rear. They always checked i n with me Sef ore attackir.g doubt- f u l t&-gets.

40 *our best a i r rcn i m oimat ion came rran the column cover. on occasions ~ 4 2 asked ms f o r specific i n f o m t i o n , and I asked t h ~ planes t o get it. I n most cases the p i lo ts furnished inr'orllation t o me without request, e s p ~ c i d l y t h a t of enemy mtar navments. Before liaving, the f l i g n t leader would report t o ma on l ike ly pros- pective targeta, aM I would pass the information on t o the incacing f l i g h t ccnrmander.

50 .On one occasion we mile an unexpected move f o r which no a i r cover had been p ~ r l d e d . Information was received of a group of hos t i le tanks i n some woods three or four miles away. I called direct t o a plane o p e ~ a t i n g in the zone of another corps and asked him t o relay a request t o f ighter control center fo r sane fighters. mithin 15 minutes about 12 planes reported i n t o me. I located my tank fo r the plane can- mander by t e l l ing him of the yellow panel, then vectored him on to the woods whare the enemy w a s reported. When'he seaned t o he uver .tMe tarce t , I told him t o c i r c le and aheak the woods under him. IB located the tanks, and they were attacked successfu l ly~

6 . .I thinlc the air support party 0 with amd columna should perform f o r the a i r much the same function as the perform f a r arty. He should be in a tank and must have outside vision and control of his own radio. Assigning a tank fo r t h i s purpose does not reduce the tank strength of the axmi unit. Our tank was habitually immediately in rear of the attacking wave of tanks, and in many cases we actually took part in the f igh t .a

AR'11Pra.m An? OP'S.

10 .We handle a i r Opes by coordinating levele wed by div ard corps planes. For example div planes f l y t o 1000 f e e t an$ c o r p a b v e 1500. Th i s procedure is essent ial i n attack of a s m a l l area. We also l i m i t the number of planes in the a i r a t aqy one time by having FA Group planes patrol on a timb schedule.

2. "We back up cav rcn with a i r OP patrols. ~t one time we organized a t ac t i ca l rcn f o r the corps commander t o report on t r a f f i c and bridge conditions, location of leading e l e ments and t o cover exposed f lante, etc. G-38s sole data a t one stage cam from a i r OPls. Ve a l s o reported locat ion of enemy tanka t o our own tank elements, who then deployed and surroundad the enemy.

3 . We ran a counter-flak progran over Brest with a h OP's observing arty f i r e on host i le AA guns, especially during bcmbing attacks.

4. "Corpe arty planes have had only one fatality-that through col l is ion in the air. Flying technique on shrr t f i e l d s should be stressed. Green p i lo t s arriving hwe not had enough of t h i s t y p training. We send p i lo ts back t o the rear t o re- practice in a d e r t o avoid lmmess i n f ly ing and hold down the accident rate.

5. W e w pi lo ts and observers are weak on oanruunicatians-they f a i l t o think out what they must t r d t t o give the FDC ccmplete information far rapid a t h c k of targets.

6 . W r e tao t i ca l training, especial l r on operati- in t h i s war, should be given young O*a so that they may observe more intelligently.

70 .Replacement p i lo t s should be attached t o corps f o r training pendbg assignment. --VIII C o r p Arty m 0.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


aBattle ~ e r i e n c e s ~ are published regularly by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t ra ining t o p rof i t from the l a t e s t caubat experienoer of our troops nor f i gh t ing the Germans i n France. Although the experiences of ae r t a in unita a t a par t i cu la r location a re not necessarily applicable t o all unite i n a l l e i t u a t i o n ~ , the item publiehed rill be thoae based on praa t ica l experience and are recamended f o r careful consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problem, Report8 of corroborative or contrary expwiencea are par t i cu la r ly desired i n order tha t the va l i d i t y of the indioated ba t t l e lesaon may be d e t e d n e d .

commnd of Lieutenant General BRADLEX:

H. B. Lmcs b5gadier General, USA

Adjutant General

I KEEPIN3 W O N 3 I N ACTION.

n C r e r served weapons, par t i cu la r ly t he BBR'a and the bazookas, hare not been kept i n ac t ion err they should by member8 of the a r e r when the gunner becamen a caaualty, o r when the weapon has been s l i g h t l y d q e d , Idmy enl is ted men have not been taught that supply i n combat consis ts t o a large degree of repair o r the issue of repaired items, Crew8 must keep weapons i n act ion as long a s there i a a man left, o r i f the weapon i e damaged, the crew must i n i t i a t e repair8 or replacement pereonnally or by reporting the location. Weapons replacement became sa t i s fac tory i n one uni t only a f t e r a salvage o f f i ce r and d e t a i l were s e t up t o recover the combat loneas. This crew e i t he r made minor repa i r s o r evacuated the weapon throvgh the uaual channe1a.a--0'8 of the 134 Id.

1. m t t e r i s a . aDaily issue of radio ba t te r ies with ra t ions w a 8 found t o be the beet man8 t o insure keeping radios i n action.

2. Time for reconnalsaence and ordere. .Time for reconnaissance and issuing of orders sti l l is not provided by higher echelons. Ttus, when the un i t s i n turn attempt t o take it, the lower un i t s have no opportunity e i t h e r fo r proper planning or the or ientat ion of t he troops.

3. Radio Interception. RRadio interception, both for secur i ty and location, is considered impracticable f o r t h e enemy ineofar as small unite are concerned i f s inp le prearranged code8 are used. Good ju-nt a s t o how f a s t the information became obso- l e t e determines the necessity f o r ueing rarioua types of codes.

4. m t o r pool Conmunic ation. 'When the d tua t ion doe8 not permit t h e motor pool t o be forward, an SCR 300 gives prompt vehicle service.*--0's of t h e 134 Inf.

PI1 CLEARIN3 STATIONS AND FIELD HOSPITAIS.

1. Hospitals. "1 am convinced t h a t t h e f i e l d hosp i t a l , s e t up by platoon8 i n the v i c i n i t y of c l e a r i n g stations, i e t n e best place f o r e f fec t ive surgery. These units, however, mwt be well forward. The l e s s the dis tance between t h e place of i n j u r y and the f i e l d hoapi ta l f o r a l l non-transportable cases, the g r e a t e r the incidence of re- covery, We have received aeveral severe ly wounded m n whom we were able t o save by prompt surgery and by administering plasma and p e n i c i l l i n within an hour ard a half from time of in jury . These cases could not have been saved had t h e time lag been four o r f i v e hours. I f we can always s t a y within f ive milea of t h e f r o n t , t h e death r a t e can be much reduced.

2. C l e a r i ~ S ta t ions , nsome d i v i s i o n s keep t h e i r c lear ing s t a t i o n s e n t i r e l y too f a r t o the rear . On one occaaion we were forced t o remain f i f t e e n miles benind the l i n e s o r s e t up forward of the c lea r ing s t a t ions .

3. Red Crosa Respected. DSo3ns medical u n i t s a re re luc tan t t o keep well forward because of a r t i P l e r y f i r e and bombing. My experience has been t h a t the G e m s have c a r e f u l l y respected hosp i t a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n t h e i r act ions. We have avoided locat ione near main highways and bridges.'--C0, 2nd P l a t , 51st F ie ld Hospital.

1. # I n t h e e a r l y operat ions there was a tendency t o make pat ro l8 too large. Once a p a t r o l of th ree squais w a s sent out t o obtain i n f o m t i o n . It was too big f o r secrecy and too amall f o r a ra id . It; suffered many c a s u a l t i e s and obtained l i t t l e information. It is believed t h i a e m o r w i l l o f t en occur ~ i t h green troops and green canmanderer.

2. ~ I n i t i a l l y , pa t rc la were not giwa suPfi , ieat de ta i led information and ins t ruc - t i c n a regarding the oaissjor;, I n one instance, a patxol leader mas not no t i f i ed u n t i l 2100 hwus t h a t he wotid ? lea6 a p a t r o l during the n igh t , although i t w a s know much e a r l i e r i n the day t h a t t h i a p a t r o l was t o be dispatched. P a t r o l s now are genera l ly well briefed and well Lsu~,13s4 with maps.

3 . "The mechanimd r8ya l ry should receive more traaniog i n diemaunted scoutin~g and patrol1ing.r--G-2, XLX Corpe.

V GERMAN GUN POSITIONS.

.We have found tha t the German8 place SP and l i g h t AB ~~ t o cover long, s t r a i g h t s t re tohe8 of main roads t o enf i l ade troops end transprt. Where roads are l ined with t r e e s t h e enemy f i r e 8 i n t o these and i n t o hedges f o r a i r bursts. To meet thi8 r e s t a y off these long s t r e t c h e s and detour our leading e l e m n t s around them. Method of reducing these t h r e a t 8 i a t o advance on a broad f r o n t so - t o outf lank road blocks.*-- Brig Gen A. D.. Warnask, Barrt D i r Comdr, 5 t h Div,

PI TEUWHOMES TYPE -88 AND EX-8~..

*Scens telephone use r s have a tendency t o turn the switch t o CB (co~rmon bat tery) . This causes generator ts t u n hard and the opposite party phone w i l l not r ing. Tele- phones have been eent t o ua f o r r e p a i r when there r a e nothing mong except tha s u i t a h w c ~ e turned t o CB. Keep switch turned t o LB."-CO, 69th Sig Bn.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 4 0 8 SEPT 1944

.Battle Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable un i t a i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our troop8 now f igh t ing the German8 i n Europe Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a p a r t i c u l a r loca t ion are not necessar i ly appl icable t o a l l u n i t s i n all s i t u a t i o n s , the items published nil1 be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e reco~lrmended f o r ca re fu l considerat ion by un i t a which m a y encounter similar problems. Reports of corroborat ive o r contrary experiences a re p a r t i c u l a r l y des i red i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.

Bg connnand of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

H. B. LBWIS Brigadier General, USA

~d jutant General

ROTE: On 14 M y , the 92nd Cml Bn was a t tached t o the 35th I d Div f o r the d r ive soutl toward St. Lo. The following desc r ip t ion by t h e ba t t a l ion c m a n d e r of t h e operat ions of t h e mortar bn damonstrates various p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e employment of t h i s weapon:

1. *In t h e l a t e afternoon of 14 July , the bn moved i n t o pos i t ion t o f i r e a con- t r o l l e d barrage i n support of t h e 134th Inf Regt which was t o make t h e i n i t i a l push on the d i v l e f t f lank. Reg i s t ra t ion of one mortar w a s accrpnplished by our own observer 11 the d i v a r t y o b a e m t i o n plane.

2. .Fire mieaion began a t 0600 hours 15 July , with a l l cos f i r i n g preparatory firc and con~inued with a control led r o l l i n g barrage i n f ron t of t h e advancing inf u n t i l 20C hours--a four teen hour continuous shoot expending 6953 rounds of smmtlnition. During t l whole time f i r e w a s control ied by t h e assau l t ing in f . They ca l l ed through t h e i r a r t y who had d i r a c t communication t o the mrtar bn HM; which i n t u r n control led the f i r e of the t h r e e cos. Throughout the day, r a t e of f i r e , r a t e of advance, and changes of direc t i o n were made whenever des i red by the aseau l t ing inf . A t one period f i r e waa held on a l i n e f o r four hour8 with t h e r a t e of f i r e determined by the reorganizing i n f .

3. "On 16 July, the a t t a c k of the 134th Inf having been successful, t h e mortar cor were attaoked t o t h e various regiments f o r independent d i r e c t eupport missions. Co C continued i n aupport of the 134th; Co B was aeaigned t o t h e 137th and Co A t o t h e 320tl During t h i s period each co s e n t forward FO p a r t i e e with t h e leading element8 of the id and f i r e d mission8 deaired by t h e bn commander on t a rge t8 of opportunity. Co C , f o r example, accounted f o r f o u r machine guns with an exgenditure of 26 rounda. The tiw, lapse from ' t a r g e t s i g h t e d t u n t i l 'mission accamplished* was eleven mlnutes.

4. "At a l l time durFng these independent missions, each co had a t l e a s t two platoon^ i n f i r i n g posi t ion. glthough platoons were normally assigned t o support the assau l t bna, the f i r e of a l l platoons was controlled through the Co FDC and the co could always mme f i r e on the regimental f ron t . Normal defensive f i r e s were assigned each night with mortars l a i d and ammunition prepared. The attachment t o regiments fo r d i rec t eupport l as ted 2 days and a l l coa reverted t o bn control a t 1800 houre 17 July.

5. "The complete operation gives a c l ea r p ic ture of the f l e x i b i l i t y of 4.2 ztortare. In the f i r a t phase, the bn of 36 nmrtars moved i n t o pos i t ion t o give maximum concentrated f i r e support f o r the f i r s t punch; i n the second phaae, the supported regiment having broken through, the mortar coa l e f t bn oontrol and were attached t o the regiments f o r independent missions. I n the l a t t e r phaae mortar platoons were 'leaped-froggad' forward t o maintain continuous support f o r assau l t bns.m

1. "1 have learned not t o place mgr 57-nm~ AT guns too close together. On 26 August east epd nor th of FONTENAY 3 P1IWl.E. we were attacked by tanka. I had two 57-mn aT guns ebout f i f t y yarda apar t with an observer i n a straw stack. The enemy s e t the s tack on f i r e and jockeyed h i s tanka so tha t he kept h i s heavily armored f ront towards both gune so t h a t ne i ther could ge t a shot i n t o t he flank. One gun was put out of action before ,

I a h i t through the t read end f ron t aprocket immobilized the tank.*-40, 1st Bn, 314th Id.

I 2. "In a counterattack by enemy id, 26 August, AT gun8 rnasistgd i n breaking up the ,

a t tack by uee 6 i f HB 8hePla in 5'7-rum g~lae. The ground naa s o f t from r a i n and s h e l l s aciillq not explode on impact, There was a hard surface road t h a t the en- had t o croee, 8c r e I

f i r e d a t t hh t , causing considerable casual t ies . b o t h e r t h e , the enemy employed 6 how.$ as a strong point . We wrecked the w e l l s with annor p ie rc ing sne l l s and then used EE causing a b u t taenty amua l t i ea out of about t h i r t y Germme using the bui1di~a.A--GO, , AT Co, 314th 1D-f.

III . 1, 'Young officir~ should be t a u t t o f i r s precis icn adjustments, Forward obaer-

s a t i ~ ~ z methods ax-e ns$ ea e f f ec t i ve as prec i s ion methods i l a f i r i n g at ensmy conerate g g

emplacements. W s t y a w of f i ce r s cannot f i r s precision adjutnsgnte.

2. "Op'n 8hod.d bo c o m t m t l y manned and observers taught t o be pat ient and always om the a l e r t t o a t tack enemy guns while ac tua l ly f i r i ng . Otherwise, the en- is safely underground when we fire.'--Arty Executive, PIII Corps.

*One of the grea tes t t r a in ing needs i s i n night scouting and patrol l ing -- especial lk i n the maintenance of contact with the enerqy. Around Vire contact waa not maintained a t night and the enemy succeeded i n withdrawing. We muat a180 s t r e e s and re-streea f i r e and movemeat i n a l l training.*--C0, 116th Inf, 29th Div.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No 41 I I SEPT 1944

*Battle grperienceo8 an published raguParly Bhir headquarters t o enabla rraitr i n t ra in ing t o prof i t from the la taot cambat ergerienaer of our troop8 nor fighting the dermane i n m o p e . Although the ergeriancee of c e r t a i n units a t a p a r t i c u l a ~ locat ion a re not necasrar i ly appliaable t o all uni te i n all eituation8, the i t m a publinhad rill be tho80 basad on prac t iaa l experience and are recammended for aareiP1 aondderat ion by unit. rhich may encounter r imilar probl-. Reports of corroborative or oontrary axparionoar are par t icu la r ly desired i n order t h a t tho val idi ty of tha indicated b a t t l e leseon nay be datermined.

By aamnRna of Lieutanant General BRPDLW:

H. B. LmIs Erigadier Oenernl, U S

Adjutant Oensral - - I I I I I ~ o ~ - I - - - - o o - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ o o ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ o ~ ~

*Recently planted minefield8 i n varioue ereae have been marked by two rows of warn- ing boards, the outer row painted black with white l e t t e r ing , and the inner row painted white with black le t ter ing. The spaaa between the rows is f r ee fromndnes. In other areas the presenue of mines i e reported t o be indicated by lengths of barbed wire wound around the wooden poets of the bopadary fences. Anti-personnel miner are indicated by a length of wire p r o j e a t i ~ about three inches frca! the top of t he post while two hoops d wire forming a d o r ~ on top of *he post indicate anti tank mines..*--MIS, VD Bulletin.

*k t r i e d echeloning one 105 id how up t o a defiladed posi t ion behind the inf f ron t l iner t o f i r e at en- eonerete p i l l boxes. The cannon co cormnander f i r e d with exaellent r e ru l t r ueing forward obeervation methods and very mall corrsctione. Wb found tha t HB armor piercing shell i r nmre e f f a u t i m ~ againat g i l l boxes than concrete piercing ahell.8-- S-3, 115th Id, 29th Div.

1. ~ D I t h i s div all nalvage clothing and individual equipment i e ea r s fu l ly norted by the QM. That which is serr iceable is then cleaned, rosized, reclaseif ied and reismed. This procedure not only s a w s ti-, labor and material, but u t i l i z a r the f a u i l i t i e s of tha corpr Q)d laundry at t h m s when it i e not othemiee h e y . About 70 par oent of tho aa l rag . i e sarriceable and reiseued t o the troops.

2, 8Salvaged blankets a re a l so cleanad and supplied t o the clearing s t a t i on , which uses a very large number of blanketa, thua eliminating necessity fo r clearing s t a t i on t o obtain blankets from medical eupply.8--gxecutive 0, 30th Mv ~ b d .

~ o t e * The bn at tack described below resul ted i n the oapture of an fmportant and well protected German position. Its auoaess w a s a t t r ibuted by the D i r G3 t o i n i t i a t i v e , aggresaiamnaae, am3 leaderahip whdch achieved the ideal t a c t i a a l smplopmsnt of id.

1. German rnfenaa8: dl1 154 was a dominating t e r r a i n feature whiah had k e n highly organized by the German8 with strong forward and reverse rlope goeitions on a North-South l ine. merqp posi t ions included 8 aoncrete, steel-a=efn.forced, p i l l bore8 and o complete network of c i rau lar trenches around the e ree t connected by a network of iateraanmunication trenchse and protected by an outer defense r ing of single apron barbed wire, The te r ra in was rocky with a minimum of cover a d concealmsnt. The defensea vers gslrrieoned by an estimated 508 enemy troop8.

2. The Attack: Cos I and L were the aasault cos, I on the r igh t , .and 60 K ras i n r e e e m , The assault coa, each with a section of heavy E s attached, advanced i n column of glat8, Co f advanced under f i r e over the north elope ~f the hill, dropping its heavy a section a t the crest t o a s s i s t Co L, and reached position8 200 yard8 down the reverse mlope where i t etogped. Co ~ * a advance w a 8 pinned down by heavy f i r e on the eastern elopsr of the h i l l u n t i l dark, A gap of soape 600 yards @fis ted between Cos I and L, Under the eover s f d a r h e s s Co K waa moved in to the gap. -1y in the mornfgg @o L resumed tbs advance, the i i r o t p l a t f ron ta l ly , the second p la t maneuvering t o the south. One squad of the f i r s t p la t was committed on the r igh t f ront t o i n f i l t r a t e i n t o tha enemy lines. T h i e aqua8 succseded i n penetrating the enemy posit ion unobserved and began attacking tha re8iatastre with grenade, eutslmatio weapon and r i f l e f i r e , A t Q6W the enemy counter- attacked tne euppomed gap betwese Cos I and L i n co strength. Co K k i l led or captured the en t i r e oounterattaaking force ard than moved up on the l e f t flank of 60 1 and opened f i r e om enemy posit ions on top of the h i l l . Under cover of the attaok made by the squad $fa the f i r s t p l a t and the f i r e fram Co X the rcm~~inder of Co % mmel up and the bn aap- tured the h i l l by 1600,

3. Result of Opsration~ Bnetay casualtie8: 154 PW8, I00 known dead, an estimated 300 kil led o r wounded, C u r aaaualtieso '7 ki l led , 26 wounded.

1. par-apB 4 Section ff BE 15 c,s. t h i s Hq s ta ted tha t an M Gun BB with the VIfI Corps while being olrsgd aa f i e l d a r t i l l e r y obtained its f i r e data i k a n the FA FDC. The f o l l o w i ~ statement of the mthode aatual ly ueed has been received tram the 60, 119th ALA Gun RI (I) whfah wan the uni t involreel.

.No f i r i n g data waa furnished the unit frcm outside. A l l omputatione wera mado i n the unit m, Qll teat any other FDe furnnishmd ua was air observation f o r r e g i ~ t r a t i o n end same ground a r l f laah obsielzration f o r reg is t ra t ion and miesionr. One battery of the unit stood by as an a l te rna te FIX, i n case the Bn Hq got shelled out. FA uni t s assiated i n posit ion surveys,.

2. The iaagortanoe of a i t i z g AAA was ale0 8trees.d by the saw off icer as follora: . n e n umd i n a ground ro le , p r i a r i t g i n miting a r t i l l e r y xtmt be given t o f l a t t ra -

jectory WefQOXI8. They cannot just sit down anywhere. There i 8 only one propelling charge fo r these guns. Reoonnaisranee f o r sui table position8 is a long dram-out job especially i f other types of weapons have arrived ahead of the 90tm..

END

Reprodocedby fnpr Repro Det. /2 A Gp

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 42 12 SEPT I944

*Bat t le Experiencesr a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquartera t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t roops nor f igh t ing t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n j t s a t a pa r t i cu la r loca t ion a r e not necessar i ly app l i cab le t o all u n i t s i n all s i t u a t i o n e , the item published w i l l be those baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r ca re fu l considerat ion by u n i t s which may encounter s imi la r problem. Reports of corroborat ive o r contrary experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.

By command of ~ i e u t e n a n t General BRADLEf:

H. B. LEWIS Brigadier General, U '

Adjutant General

w i n g a recent pause i n operat ions of t h e 7 th &mil Mv near Vmdun, Major General Lindsay M..D. S i l v e s t e r , t h e d i v commander, ca l l ed a meeting of c e r t a i n cannnanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s a t which the opera t ions of t h e d i v were discuesed.. Certain comments a r e summarized below a8 they ind ica te the phases of those opera t ions which impressed them- se lves most c l e a r l y on the minds of the pa r t i c ipan t s .

1. Tac t i c8 i n Advance, a. *In t h e e a r l y s t ages the d i v o f t e n hal ted i n a column extending more than 40 miles. I do not th ink r e f a n out' f a s t enough. I l i k e combat cannnands t o more i n mult iple columns..~--A genera l o f f i ce r .

b. rDo not stand on t h e road 2 or 3 hours while some one t r i e s t o g e t i n touch with h i s senior . Make up your mind and do something. When a column s tops f i n d out what is stopping it,"-A genera l o f f i ce r ,

c. '1 agree about using mul t ip le columns, even t h o u g h . i t does complicate the supply s i t u a t i o n and report8.n--Division G-.!t.

d. 'Our d i f f i c u l t y is having enough reconnaissance i n f r o n t of us. We went s t r a igh t down the road and f requent ly the f i r s t 2 o r 3 veh ic les were knocked out. I f we have t o keep going dom roads and through towns, we w i l l use advanced guards of inf and a p l a t of tanks t o f ind out t h e situetion.."--Lt Col of a combat command..

e. "he armor should go around c i t i e s and the inf fo l low up and go i n and take them. The main th ing I want t o impress on you i s -- keep moving fo17oard.n-- A genera l or'f i cer .

2. ~ d v a n c e Planninq. "The g r e a t e s t t rouble I had is g e t t i n g commanders t o th ink a- head of what they w i l l do when they run i n t o trouble. The advance guard especially must hare soms plan f o r immediate a c t i o n when f i r e d on.."--A genera l o f f i ce r .

3. Use of Ar t i l l e ry . a . nAlways have one b a t t e r y c lose t o t h e f r o n t , k t y on the road is no good. AS soon a s r e s i s t a n c e i s met the ba t t e ry co~~lmander should put h i s guns

i n pos i t ion ao they can be useden--Lt Cole , F ie ld Ar t i l l e ry . be T o u r bes t weapon agains t AT guns is ar ty , Do not t r y t o a t t ack them d i rec t ly .

Get a r t y f i r e on them and then pprn your tanks around, come i n behind, and overrun them. It is SOP and I know it work8.n--An armored f o r c e 601.

I1 AIR-GROUND W e

Members of t h e s t a f f of t h e 7 th Armd Div and of tho 9 t h A i r Force who have been operating with that d i v s m ~ a r i z e same 0% t h e mutual ob l iga t ions between air and ground forces as fo$lows:

1. Reports. The a i r should report immediately on a l l troop movements, both f r i end ly and enem, regard less of the s i z e of tne elements involved, The repor t s ehould include time observed, locat ion, s t r eng th , cmpos i t ion and d i rec t ion of movement.

2. Panels. When ground elements dismount they must d isplay panels t o insure against g e t t i n g s t r a f e d by f r i end ly planes.

3. Routes of Movemnt. The a i r must be kopt informed of t h e missions and rou tes of sll ,ground elements. With t h i s knowledge they can furnish appropriate information without s p e c i f i c request . This was exemplified a t the seizure of t h e bridgehead a t Chateau Thierry. The a i r did not know tha t the bridgehead was t o be seewed and made no repor t regarding t h e bridges over the blame and Aisne u n t i l i t was ca l l ed for .

III WSCELLANEDUS COABENTS.

1,. m a t i o n of Radios. @Stor ies of Germans spot t ing our radios a r e untrue. I n our first aampaign we did not use the rad,io;. now we would not go without i t . We keep our CP c lose enough t o use the t s l e p h ~ n e or the SC,R-30Q with telephone connections t o cos i n t h e l ine . Tho SCR-284 i s used only from the r e g t Back. The rad io a l s o permits con- s t a n t control of foo t o r motor columns.."-Col. J, P. J e t e r , 60, 121st Iaf.

2, German Infant ry Organization, A captured document from t h e German 275th Inf Dio g ives a new d iv organizat ion, It i s streamlined t o meet the ex i s t ing shortege of personnel and material.. 1n.f cos we seduced t o 90 men end 2 of'a"icers. Armamect is 11 l i g h t Es and one heavy b E per eo, f i b excess equipment and personnel a r e t o be t m e d over t o a d i v reserve depot,

3. Civ i l i an Cooperation, wLf c i v i l i a n s were informed a s t o t h e closeness of succeeding echelons they would cooperata more f r e e l y with advanced elements, such a s a r m r e d un i t s . On several ocaasions the Germans have returned t o town a f t e r armored spearheads had passed through and @severely handled' those who openly a s s i s t e d us.*--Lt Jones, 746th Tank Bn.

4. Minee, *PWe s t a t e t h a t minea a r e being l a i d hurriedly on the ins ide and outs ide - of curves i n the roads, The theory being tha t tanks and amd vehic les rounding t h e curves hug the s i d e t o get a good view i n an e f f o r t t o spot enemy positions and vehic les and do not watch f o r mines,*--6-2 Report, 30th Dio.

5. Uae of Germ= Mines i n blocking a road, rnPWa say t h a t T-35 mines hove been used t o block roads a s fsllowa: A t rench about 10 inchee deep is dug acroea the road. Three o r 4 mines are placed in it. A s t e e l connecting bar i a bolted across t h e pressure p l a t e s of t h e mines. A f l a t i ron p l a t e is then placed on top of the connecting bar. Pressure a t any point w i l l detonate a l l mines,n--G2 Report, 83rd Inf Mye


rga t t l e ~ p e r i e n c e s ~ a r e published r e g d g l y by t h i s hesdquarters t o enable units in t r a b h g t o prof i t fram the l a t e s t combet experjences of our troops now f igh t ing the Wrmans i n m o p e . ~ l t h o u g h the experiences nf cer ta in uni te a t a p e r t i a u k l a a t i o n are not necessari ly applicable t o a l l uni ts i n e l l s i t u a t i o m , the i t e m .published w i l l be those based on practice1 experience and are recormended for aaraf ul consideration by uni ts which may encounter similar problems. mpor t s of aorroboretive or contrary experiences q e par t icu la r ly desired i n order tha t the naf id i ty of the indicated be t t l e lesaon may be determined.

iCBP& A. Be IJmIS

&igadier General, USA Adjutant General

- - ~ - - ~ - ~ , 0 ~ ~ - - ~ - - ~ - " - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SUPPLY WITHm TRE BnISION. (Rote 8 The following discussion of the operation i n oombat cd supply in divia ians and lower u n i t s i e extracted f'rcan a number of repor ts oa the subject.)

1 c w 1 SUPPLY.

1. plrpcibildty. a. - Since r a t i ons reach the using unit 48 hours a f t e r re- Quiait ion, it is manifestly impracticable t o eeize unexpected opportunities t o

e bet ter type ra t ion, such as may r e s u l t fram a 2-dey r e l i e f frm the l i n e of a oertaini =it. OUT 3-4 t r i e s t o keep on hand a PO-in-1 or B r a t i on far t h i s PWpoee, eddition, we t r y t o meet the deeiree and apecial s i tua t ions of sub- =dinate units. rneguently we i ssue two-thirde of a C r e t i o n and one-third of a K ra t ion, or vice-versa, for a s ingle day. -(Sf i ce re of the 137th ~ n f , s t h Df. Diva

b. - We maintain (r reserve. C an mezpe&ed opportunity s r i a e s for a unit t o use a B ar 10o.i~-1 r a t i o n and they $ a m d r a m another kind, we e%chan@ with them and adjust by the use of our reaeme. -EL. C o l . Van ~ o t t e n - - 30th pf. Dir.

Reparati-. a. - When w e sem6 e i the r the @ or the 18-in-1 r a t i on , they a r e f b e t heated in the kitohens. We uua lPy serve them hot far k e a l b a a t end e u - Per ~t noon t he msn ea t a cold K rat ion. - ~ t , esl. m r , G-4 Pat Dive

b. we nark thie eyetem t o serve hot c rations+ Tke r a t i ons , still i n e m s , a r e heated i n b o m g water. They are then i e t o marmSte m n a , d o preheated in b o U n g water. They reach CYbe troops hozs -Mi '.cers of the 137th ~ n f , 35th Ini. Div.

3. ~ ~ w m s n t p m a r d . a. - 91 Tne are alwaye released t o units. They care moved vmn f m a r d befare dark. Rations ueruaffy i e s w d between 0600 and 1280 - not during hours of darknees. - zt. Cole G-4 1st Dive

b* Rations m e moved f m d in] ton trucke %o bn am dps, where so jeepa Biak them up and take them aa aloee t o the l i n e s as practiaable - seldcrrP more than 500 yards array, p l a t w y i n g g a r t i e s take them t h e r e a t of the way. r he e m a @ tireb f r m kitchen8 t o troope is about two hours. - df icera of the 137th Info

1. veepone. a. - we have a medium ord ao i n d i rect support of the dim* we obtain mapan replscemente throu& t h i s co, d i rec t f r m Ups. - ~ t . 1201. mr, 0-4 lrat Diva

b. gm a while we reported weapon repa i r and replecemnt needs ea& night through 9-4. ~ o r m a l time of replauenrsnt was two dayao mter we de ta i l ed a d v a g e of f iae r with several men with the Bnty of handling t h i e e~ork, w e b improvement has been noted. ie believed a amell stock af weapons m d spare parta in the service oo would be a ereat help. - Lt. co l a o ~ ~ a ~ e l l , C8, 2nd an 3-3 L37 W.

clothin . principcrl d i f f i au l t i e a i n the resupply of ulothinpt were d w t o t h e r a p i d 7 - a d m a e and the shortage of transportation. 08 d the 137th X n f m auggusted nabtenance of a emall stock af clothing i n t he M%PV 00 d80.

d. mhia lee . ~ e h i c l e replacement e have been obtainad i n t h e tigb neoesaary t o send t o t he ~ g p end re tu rn them. y~ost of the vehicles l oe t m e jeeps. 1f the d iv were authorized t o stock a few of these vehiclee f a r immdiate replacement, I th ink t he eyetem would be improved. - mjcr Huff, ~ e e t e 4 , 9th mr. 111. CIICISS 111.

1. a. - Eaah r eg t and sep bn and co &are d i rec t from the ~X'W dace 111 truckbead, ~ o r m e r l y t h i s was 6 t o l5 milee back. Now it is a s much a8 150 t.0

w5 milee. Tho d iv oar r ies a reserve of 4000 ml lone of @wofinem To save the lower un i te the long haul, we iaaue t he div r e8 and then r e f i l l it - Maj R e Me m y , O - 30th 1nf Div, we

b. - he Dip ~ b b tranrsporte @ m e III supplies f r o m ASP^ t o aiv dps, d w a they a r e pioked up by u i n g unite. m c e n t l y we have ~ B P o t t e d an e n t i r e t ruck campany t o moving forward these supplies, but they .a re ketwina up 0 n . l ~ with di f f i - culty. - mjur Huff, Aeet G-4. 9th ~ i v .

IB. C U S S IV.

1. u1 repa r t e indicate t ha t class IV supply aervicea have operated well and are well etooked. ~n some oases, they have f a l l e n too far behind.

1. None of the m i t e of t h i s d iv have es tabl ished am dpa. hey with baeic loads. NO am is aar r ied on div ord truoks. Far resupply, unit traneporta- t i o n passee beak through the div am dp, where they obtain mdere on the w. - ~ t . co la mr, G-4, let Diva

2 , 0ur reginwnts r a r e l y dump am and bna dwnp a s i i t t l z a8 possible. &n is usually t ransferred from bn am t n vehiclee t o co jeepe and t r a i l e r a . Bn A and P p l a t e break open chests of ea an, including t h e liners, i n opdetr t o aave time for t h e combat coa. - Lt. col. ~ ~ C o n n e l l , CO, 2nd gn and gda jor Fr-, S-3, 137th 1nf. 35th Diva

3. &n is transported d i rec t f r o a n bgpe t o ueine units. We' use no dumps.

Reorohced by Enqc Repro Def. /2 A Gp

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 44 I6 SEPT 1944

r g a t t l a Dper iencesn are published r e g u l a r l ~ by t h i s headquarters t o enable unity in t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r c ~ n t t h e l a t e s t combkt ex!?eriences of our t roops n m f i g h t i n g t h e Gem.n.9 i n p o p e . ~ l t h o u g h t h e exper iences of c e r t a i n u n i t s at a p a r t i c u l a r l c c a t i c n &re not n e c e s s a r i l y app l i cab le t o a l l umi t a i n a l l s i t u a t i c n s , t h e items published will be t h o e e based on ,meet i c a l experience and are recommended f n r ca re fu l ccrnsiderat ion by u n i t s which may encounter s imi l a r problems. Reports of corroborat ive or cont rary exper iences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y des i r ed i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c ~ t e d b ~ t t l e lesson may be determined.

By comr.wnd of Ij eut e m t ~ e n e r a l EWkDms

He B* LEWIS Brigadier General,

Ad ju tent Generd

I &I&~IPEJ=ISCDES NO9* 3 , 4 and 5 . ( N ~ S : The f e c t s and opinions given be9ow were obteined by personal interview with Lt. co l . J. E. Rudder, @Q ?d R b n g e r gn, m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h a t Bn has completed 17 days of c m h t a 3 a par t cf s t a a k f o r c e of t h e 29th Div assigned t o t h e reduct ion of ~ c : Crmquet p o n i n e ~ ~ h - t h e southwest por t ion of t h e mest peninsula. w i n g t h a t per iod t h e f o l l o a i n g were c e p t u r e d ~ The main b h t t e r y e a s t of Locriat conta in ing four 280 m and t h r e e mn guns; an AA b a t t e r y o t Ploumoguer; a 5 mn b a t t e r y a t pt. de corsen; 75 m batter;. e t pt. de st. m t h i e u ; a b a t t e r y a t ~ a r v i l l o u with f o u r 20 f i guns and two 75 mm c o s t a l guns; and 1213 prisoners . The ~n l o s t e igh t k i l l e d during t h e e n t i r e perlod. These f a c t s , toge ther wlth the incidental d i sc losu re , through h i s interview, cf t h e th ings t h a t Lt. c o l a Ruddar t h i n k s about as Bn Comdr, appear t o e n t i t l e him t o a r e s p e c t f u l hear ing when he d i scusses the sub jec t of Leaderahip. )

1. L e e d e r ~ b l p pzmdaxental. --- prm my opinion, leaderahip r e q u i r e s t h a t bn, co and p l a t comilrs cons tan t ly keep up with t h e men i n the l i n e and encr.)ura&e them by example. The week l eade r must be promptly rep laced or t h e r e a c t i o n w i l l gc on down t o t h e last man and t h e u n i t w i l l not move. Leadership i s a c . iest ion of l i f e o r death t o t h e men i n t h e ranks.

2. An memple. one n ight t h e Germns opened with two 280 mns on our personnel. ------ The 280 has very large. sheJ.1 f r a p n t s ~ n d is not an ant ipersonnel weepon, but t h e bb . s t i a t e r r i f jc. he Germna m d e no d i r e c t h i t s . we had no se r ious c a s u a l t i e s but two men were buried j.n t h e i r fo f i . o l e s end hkd t o be dug out. hqorale wae seve re ly s t r ~ i n e d . However, t h e men stood t o t h e i r foxholes; l e s s wel l t r a i n e d me11 might have r e t i r e d .

3. m c t h e r m a m ~ l e . Lt. ~ d l j n provided what I consider a good example of leadership. He l e d a p a t r o l of 10 men i n t o the 280 m (Uwaf SpeeM) ba t t e ry neer Lomis t . He entered the tp of the German b t r y comdr with a h c ~ d grenade i n his hand and de- mended surrender. he Garroan ce l l ed colonel Furs t , i n c o m n d of t h e &mmne on the p e n i n a u k , then offered t o a r b i t r a t e . m l i n i n s i s t e d upon inrmediate surrender. 1 had a r r ived i n the meantime and colonel Furs t r eqr~es ted we corn t o h i s Cp, 3000 yds away. I moved t roops around wst 1s C? then took Edlii l ts p a t r o l i n with me. m a t surrendered t h e fmt and we took about 500 prisoners.

4. HOW t o ~ a v e Infentry. a.- 1nf sometimes takes heavy lossea when a l i n e ie - b u i l t up t o o s t rongly and t h e enemy a t t a c k s with a r t y and mccrta. We ahould keep moving and f lanking out posj.tions. If I cannot f i n d a flank, I hold t i g h t and bui ld up i n s ~ . o t h e r place by a t e a l t h o r under cover of darkness.

b.- In one. case where we were b u i l t u!, etrongly, we suffered 30 caeua l t i ee among 240 men i n two hours - more than our C R R U ~ I t i e s f cr any other two deye. The next dey we f lanked the posi t ion and gained 2000 yds with only 21 casual t ieso

c.- when warking with t k s we should use minimum numbers of inf around the tke - only enough t o protec t the t k s from bezooka f i r e f r o m both flanks. 1f we plaoe a l o t of inf around the t k e , they t s k e c a s u a l t i e s from w t y and mort fire aimed a t t h e tks .

5 . m o t h e r =emplea ~ t . W n s k i ran onto a Gerrmn outpost. He h s d li&ht t k a h i t it frc,m t h e front . ~e and t e n men then went arvund and behind t h e poei t ion and wiped it out while the Garman8 were concerned with the t k s t o t h e i r h'ont.

6. Dealina; with W r m n pat rols . The @irmans s e t up t h e i r p a t r o l s as we do, with some men intended t o ~ * t t,ck with information a s t o the posi t ion from which t h e p e t r o l received f i r e . They then put a r t y and m o r t f i r e on the position. ~ f . a memher tff R h ~ s t i l e pa t ro l get s away a f t e r contact ing one of our poeitions, the pos i t ion should be moved imnediately aevwal hundred yards. The best procedure is t o l e t the whole pa t ro l get ins ide our pos i t ion and then eurround it, t o insure that none escapee.

wmont l i n e s can be p lo t t ed qu i t e well if panele a re displayed a t specifiect time8 and observed from the In plane by e i t h e r t h e a r t y obsr o r I n 0 f l y i n g f a r t h e purpose. F l i g h t s of 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 hours were standardized. he obar p lo t ted h i s obans on a photo m p . * - - ~ $ c o l o ~ c o n n e l l , CO, 2d Bn, 137th Inf, 35 th Inf Dive

RND

- 2 - Pepmducedby rhe Lng~neer Reproduction Det, /2th Army Group

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


ngat t le S p e r i e n c e s r a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e a t cambat experiences of our troops nor f i g h t i n g t h e -mans i n m o p e . ~ l t h o u g h t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t e Par t i cu la r loca t ion are not necessa r i ly app l i cab le t o a l l un i t8 i n a l l e i t u a t i o m , the items published rill be those based on p r a c t i c a l eorperience and e r e reconmended f o r ca re fu l considerat ion by u n i t e which m y enoounter s imi la r problems. ~ e p o r t s of corrobarat ive or contrary experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y deeired i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e leaaon m y be determined.

ICBPYs-, H* B. m1s

B r i m d i m General, U ~ A Adjutant General

1. saving gpark plugs, By increasing t h e normal i d l i n g r a t e of about 400 rpo!

t o about 1000 r p carbonization of spark pluga ie g e a t l y reduced. 3ince replaae- mente a r e d i f f i c u l t t o obtain, t h i s g e a t l y reduced a t r y i n g problem. I3 i a doubt- f u l i f t h i a p rac t i ce wastee gas i n the long run , s ince fouled engines consume fwl a t s a e s e i v e =ate.

11. WACUTIW CiE' TANK WOWllEDe

1. In every a c t i o n t o d a t e we have had t k s a t tached t o our bns. A t o t a l d 15 tankers have been wounded. We haw had a t tached one t k rned a i d man and o m half- t r ack ambulance. These were not needed. The ha l f - t r ack drew f i r e desp i t e i t s Red (=roes ~lrarkinge.

2. The pr incipal problem has been t h e removal of wounded and treatment of very eevere burne, we had our a i d men p rac t i ce these two opera t iom before our inf r en t i n t o a a t i m . Th i s t r a i n i n g ha8 proved e f f e c t i v e and invaluable. The rounded tankars r e r e eiven f i r s t l a i d by our r i f l e co a i d men. They were moved from t h e point of in- jury by a l i t t e r boarer q u a d xmde up of men from t h e regtl sect ion, p l u s a few msn from t h e bn sect ion, mcm t h e a i d s t a t i o n they are evacuated by norm1 methods.

111. FFtUI'ECTION FOR TANK C O W .

Re do not #button up* om' d r i v e r s and a s s t d r ive re except hnder heavy a r t y fire. The t k comdr~s t u r r e t a t ays open. To give him s u m p o t e c t i o n we devised a v shaped ahield which was welded around h i a e ta t i an , ( see eketch)

SHIELD

The s h i e l d i a made of 3/8 o r 1/2 inch s t e e l , slit8 1/2 inch wide and 6 t o 8 inches long Permit vision. This device provides good pro tec t ion agains t 9A f i re and has g e e t l y reduced the number of m i p e r v i c t ime.--I;t ~ o l C.O. R a k e r , co 1st gn, 66th - Regt. IV A I R c o r n .

O u r a i r cover has been excel lent and has helped ua out of many t i g h t spots. ~t g9 ~oeuf they knocked out 8 German m r k v and W k Vi tanks t h a t were giving us a peat deal of t rouble. They a l s o helped ue a t Teasy-aur-Vfre by knocking out tanks. hey are on c a l l by any un i t down t o a p l a t , c a l l i n g through co and bn, and giving t h e loca- t i o n of' the t a rge t . Then the ~ g m contacte t h e a i r cover and get8 a e t r i k e within a m t t e r of minutee. I have seen the a i r s t r i k e within 3 minutes a f t e r t h e c a l l was mde. we l i k e t o know the a i r is there . We want it a l l t h e tinn.--Et Col C.O. Parker, cs 1st m, 66th AFRU~ Re&,; concurred i n by Lt c o l E.C. Herkness, Co 2nd Em and rnj R. o l p r r e l l , co 3d m.

our a r t y FO, who fol lows the leading p l a t , rneintaina corn with our cub plane while it is i n t h e a i r , and while we aro moving. He thus gains valuable i r & o m t i o n of h o e t i l e elements which might hinder our mverr~snts.--mj R. o s p a r r e l l , CO 3d gn, 66th mmd Regte

1. Forward observere with c m e d Units. The id and t k s should each have an lpo.

The Fols should work separa te ly but be i n constant cam with each other. In t h i e way fire can be p h c e d promptly on t a r g e t s picked up by e i t h e r t k s o r id. he t k lpo must be well forward.

2. Road gLocka. when you h a l t prepare r a i d blocks. Dig 2 holes about 15 yde apar t , one on each s i d e of t h e road, and put 3 o r more men i n each hole. 3 t r i n g mines on a rope and on t h e apprm.ch of h o s t i l e veh ic les draw the minea i n f r o n t of them.

3. macua t ion of Armd Wounded. I n combat it is often imposeible for the medics t o evacuate wounded i n t h e normal way. I n such c a s e s we put a s t r a t c h e r on the back of a l i g h t t k and evacuate wounded by t h a t means. The e n t i r e re@ uses t h i s system. - - ~ t c o l C.O. Ilarkar, co l,et gn, 66th ~ r m d Re&.

4. F m ~ . r d Observation vehicle. To secure obsn f o r my a s s a u l t guns and mrts, t h e a s s a u l t gun p l a t l e ~ d e r i s mounted i n a l i g h t t k instead of t h e assigned half-track. Using t h e l i g h t tank h e can go wherever t k s go and ?erforrn e f f i c i e n t i ~ the du t i es of an FO, which he csnnot do i n a half-track.--lt c o l L.C. Herkness, C O 2d Bn, 66th u m d Re@.

5. Targets on ~ u n d a r i e s . speedy piecing of f i r e on t a r g e t s locs ted on div bound- a r i e s is a problem, clearance must be obtained from t h e adjacent div. The Germena seem usual ly t o heve important t a r g e t s on or near d iv boundaries.--Col R. R. Raymond, jr, Arty Exec, 8 t h Inf Div.

- : - 2 - A%pmducer?&~ +he Engtneer .?eproduct,on Del, /Zfh Army Groq

TWELFTH ARMY CRCUP


W h t t l e Experiences# a r e p u b l i d e d r c g u l s r l y by t h i s hssdquar te rs t o enable u n i t s i n t r n i n i n ~ t o ?profit from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t roop8 now f ightin~ t h e Gems i n Ei~rofle. Althoti& t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c ~ t i o n Eire not neces sa r i l y a p p l i ceble t o a l l . u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t iona, t h e i tems publi..shed w i l l be those baaed on p r a c t i c a l ex?erience and a r e reconmended f o r ceref u l aons idera t inn by u n i t e which m y encounter s i m i l a r problems. ,Reports of cor robora t ive or con t r a ry experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y des i r ed i n order t h a t t h e y e l i d i t y of t h e ind ica ted b e t t l e lesson may be determined.

By cammand of Lieutenant General EIRADUY:

C. R. L4NDm Colonel, AGD

Ad j u t a n t General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I WIRE CO~LIIMKNICATIQIJ U\J FAST MdVIIJG SITUAT IONS.

T h e r e c e n t 15 t o 75 m i l e d a i l y advances m d e by t h e d i v p r ~ s e n t e d a s i t u a t i o n in which it was beyond the c s p a b i l i t i e s of t h e d iv personnel and equipment t o main- t a i n continunus wire aomun ica t ion with f i e l d wire. Extensive reconnaissance wae c ~ i r r i e d out y i o r t o t h e movanent of t h e C P s o t h a t a wire n e t could be qu ick ly la id . A l l a ~ a i l ~ b l e French c m e r c i p . 1 wire and _noam l i n e s were used; i n one in- e tance R ne t of 70 mi les o f o?era t ing c i r c u i t s was i n s t a l l e d i n 3 h o w with only 1 2 mi l e s of f i e l d wire. It wag found beat t o decld-end c i r c u i t s a t each end of a v i l l a g e ~ n d l a y f i e l d wire t h r o u ~ h the-town. T h i s e l imins ted t h e n ~ e d of c u t t i n g numeroils l e ~ d - i n s t o bui1dings.L-Reports from u n i t s of 9 t h 113 Div.

Mach TD h a s e chamel on t h s a r t y air-ground net. b . c h TD co c o d r has t h i s chsnnal monitored dur jnp: hnura of dFlylioht. When t h e A i r OP s p o t s 3 TD t a r g e t he c n J . 1 ~ *Hello ?9# ~ i v j n , ~ t h e c0ordimte.s. The TD cc camdr nea res t t h e t e r e t ans- wera ~ n d n o t i f i e 3 t h e p l e t concerned. The ? l ~ t c!~nd.r checks i n on t h e a i r - g c t m d net, an3 hncs his I ! TD3 l i s t e n in. The ? 1 ~ t thsr! rpverees t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i c n psne ls on theij . veh ic l e s for i . d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t b a a i r OP and engages t h e t a r @ . The e i r OP k e n s the p!?t informed of t h e movements @f t h e t a r g e t .#--Reportj f r 3 m u n i t s of 9 th D i v .

Y\Vhen we f i r e p r e p e r p t j o n w i t h m 1 2 r t s t h e l a s t r n l ~ n d . f r r v e r c h wy: i s smoke. When t h e inf see t h e ~ m k e t h e y a d v ~ n c e . Even i f t h e enemy c c t c h e s on t o t h i s s y s - tem w e h ~ v e t h e jump f o r he czn never be sure t h a t t h e fire h a s l i f t ed . " - -L t Col. JOE. G:lden, Exec 0, 1 2 t h Inf , L~th Div.

N CO~IDDiATi'I3PJ GF RCN 'L'ROUP 2.145 I-& R PLi;r WTrH --- -----

"he r e e l I & R p l a t s awl t h e d-iv r c n t r c we t r e i n a t ! t o ~ d j u s t a r t y f i r e . When A i;lst of t h o r c n t r y i s working wi th 2 crrnbat t y z m i t ]?eves an M-8 wi th r o d i o at t h e CP. If t h e remainder of the p1.t i s s t , ~ p p e d by elleiny r e s i s t s r c e i t r a d i o s b l c k t h c l o c ~ t i . o n of t h e t ea rge t erld t h ~ t it w i l l ~ _ d juet . fire. &?endent upon t h e ran@, e i t h ~ r t h e c v co i>r t h e a r t y bn msy hc? u3ede I n t h i s W ~ > I o p ; ~ g s i - t i o n i s o f t e n c l e a r e d o ~ ~ t r i o r t o t h e ~ r r i v n l of t h e f ~ o t troo.-#am#--Col Framer T h o m a , ~ / 3 , '79th Div.

1. Tanks. flTho b e s t t h i n e a s o l d i e r cen aee on t h e f r o n t i s h i s o m t k s . We w ~ n t t h e t k s r i g h t on e l i n e with 113, n o t 150 y a r d s t o OUT rearen--Men of Co I, 1 0 t h Inf, 5 t h Div.

2. Iieep Movins. "when c r n s s i n ~ open t s r r a i n !inder *.::I1 crms f i r e kee? mcving forward. If' one h i t 3 t h e g o u n d h e bscomss 3 s t i l l t a r g e t f o r smll R r m s , mnrter end a r t y f i r e . T h i s co m r c h ~ i l 3 mile3 ~ c r o 3 , s ope1 grol~nil a t La C h s r e l l e f i r i n g from a n u ~ i g h t p o s i t i o n . We kep t J e r r y down hy c '?ns tsr . t f i r e and d id n c t hf~.ve a s i n g l a c g s u ~ l t y . ~ - - M e n of CO I, 1 0 t h Inf, 5-th Div,

3. --- P r i s o n e r s --.--.- of Yier. *n0 not s e p e r s t o p r i sc>ners and t h e documents t h e y cmry. b y t i m e s w e get m r k e d u p s snit document ,~ t h ~ t m e need t h e pr i scners t o expla in . --Lt Col. M . r r a y , G-2, 7 t h A m d Div.

4. S t a ~ . e r i n Me91 Holu-s. *In R d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n n2s r Eb l le rgy we h ~ d our ki s h u t 7;p--" 00 yerd.s f rom t h e f r o n t 11ne. Hot meal? w e ~ e s e r v e d a t (3600, 1200 and 1700 hr3urs. As a r e s u l t we -re s b e l l q d d a i l y a t t h c g e h o u r s . Meal h o u r s near t h e f r o n t should he s taggored. '--3/3@ T r a i n o r , Ikss Spt , Co I, 10 th I n f , 5 t h Div.

5. Tank D e s t r o y e r s i n Supgort of F i e l d A r t i l l e r ~ . "When s u p p o r t i n g t h e arty wt im-~rovised AD FDC from t h e co hq. The a r t y f l i rn i shed s l ~ r v e y and obsn. #--Lt Col Cole, CO 629th TD Bn.

6 . Imtzrovised Antennae f o r 3CR-300. "Rep1 ecemcnt s hi ng s c e r c e we i m p o v i eed a n a e r i a l f o r t h e SGt-300 by . s o l d + r ~ . n ~ t o t h e o r i g i n a l b a ~ e of t h e AN-1304 a l e n g t h of Wench tran.smiasion w i r e , p u p 8 o r 10, equa l t o t h e o r i g i n a l antenne. T o s u p g a r t the t r ~ n . s m i s s i o n w i r e i n t h e baae, s e l z i n g wi re waa wound 2 inchea above ~ n d below t h e j o i n t e n d t h e n so1dered.u--Reports from u n i t s of 9 t h Inf Div.

4t 9

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


* B a t t l e B p e r i e n c e a Q r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquar te rs t o enable un i t a i n t r a i n i n g t o *prof it from t h e l a t e s t combat exper iences of our t r o o p s now f i g h t i n g t h e Germns i n Burope. Although t h e ex,periences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t e p a r t i c u l a r l oca t ion a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p 2 l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recornended f o r c a r e f u l cons ide ra t ion by imits which m y encounter similar 2 rob lem. Reports

of co r robora t ive o r con t r a ry exper iences a r e g a r t i c u l a r l y des i r ed i n o rde r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e ind ica t ed b a t t l e lesson may be determined.

Co R. LANDON Colonel, AGD

Ad j u t ant General -- ---- ---,------- ---- .................................................. ---------- CLASS I SUPPLY 11\1 CCMBAT

1. 3ourcea. During t h e pas t two weeks d e t a i l e d r e s o r t s on the o2ercltion of c m b a t s l ~ p ~ 7 l y w i t h i n t h e d i v heve been r ece ived from o number of u n i t s i n combat. h o n e those f u r n i s h i n g inf ormation are t h e fo l lowing; G 4 3 r d Armd Div; G-4 2d I d Div; G-4 1st Inf Div; G-4 3 0 t h Inf Div; Asst G-4 9 t h Inf Div; Aset G 4 6 t h Armd Div; CO 102d Cav Gp Mecz; S-l; 134th Inf; 3-4 314th W; 3-4 121s t Inf; 3-4 119th I d ; 5-4 13th Inf; S-4 28th Inf .

2. Treatment. A summary of t he information obtained with r e s p e c t t o Class I supply i s given i n succeeding paragraphs. A more or l e s s t y p i c a l d e e c r i p t i o n of t h e genera l methods of ope re t ion is followed by a desc r ip t ion of c e r t a i n exped ien t s or methods adopted t o minimize a d i f f i c u l t y i n the system o r otherwise t o improve the s e r v i c e t o the combat t roope . Other c l a s a e s of supply w i l l be di?cuseed i n f u t u r e iesuea of Q t t l e experience^^.

3, Method. SOB u n i t s attempt t o f eed 2 hot meals d a i l y , e a advised i n cu r r en t b7D manurils. Some, however, h a b i t u a l l y f e e d only K r a t i o n s while i n combat. A f e w of t h e l a t t e r have obta ined s u f f i c i e n t one-burner cooking o u t f i t s t o permit p r a c t i c a l l y a l l men t o hea t t h e s e r a t i o n s before. t hey a r e eaten. Hat ions a r e i s sued by the d i r

t o r e g t l 3-4 by unit d i s t r i b u t i o n from t h e d i v t ruckhead end i n t u r n by the r e & l 3-11 t o co k i s under r e g t l c o n t r o l , by t h e r e g t l t r a i n bivouac. Both of t h e s e i ssue8 a r e normally made i n day l igh t . The r e g t l 3-4 then determl-nes, from h i s knowledge of t h e s i t u a t i o n whether t h e morning and evening meals rill be served i n day l igh t o r under cover of darkness. 3ometirne between breakf'ast and e a r l y a f t e rnoon , t he bn 9 4 s r e p o r t t o t h e r e g t l 3-4 t h e i r f e e d i n g p l ans , based upon the s i t u a t i o n of t h e i r un i t s . T h i s i n f o r m t i o n is passed on t o t h e k i a which p lace t h e meals i n c o n t a i n e r s accord ing t o requirements. Sonae r e g t s send one 24T t r k _wr bn t o t h e bn motor pool o r o ther s e l ec t ed r e l e a a e poin t , The meals a r e t h e r e picked up by co jeeps and t r anspor t ed t o

a po in t Prom which they are hand-car r ied fo r f i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i e method re- q u i r e s about one t o one and one-half hours . Other u n i t s have t h e co jeeps with t r a i l e r s go t o t h e r e g t l k i b i v at a prescr ibed time. Using t h i s system, the tiwa from ki t o t r o o p s i a s a i d t o be only about 30 minutes. Where' the C r a t i o n is prepared i n t h e k i , m e t u n i t e preheat t h e cans and p l ace them i n s i m i l a r l y preheated m a r m i t e cane t o be t r a n s p o r t e d forward. The time f o r f eed ing a f t e r a r r i v a l a t t h e t r o o p a r e a v a r i e s from 40 minutes t o one and one-half hours. Water ueunl ly is sen t forward with the meals.

4. Unit Reserves. A number of u n i t s r e p o r t t h e p rqc t i ce of main ta in ing a r o l l - i n g r eee rve , u s u a l l y of one of t he more d e s i r a b l e types of r a t i on . The ~ r i n c i p a l ob- j ec t of t h i s i a t o permit t ak ing advantage of unexpected oppor tun i t i ee t o s e rve o m of t h e b e t t e r t ypes of r a t i o n . In t h e 30 th Div, t h e d i v QM t r a i n c a r r i e s a r e s e r v e of B and X r a t i o n s and can a d j u s t on sho r t n o t i c e t o g ive a u n i t t h e best type it can use. The 314th I n f , which normally serves K r a t i o n s when i n combat, c a r r i e s a 10-in-1 r a t i o n i n r e s e r v e , In a d d i t i o n , each of i t s bns keeps a f i e l d k i wi th the bn t r a in . T h i e k i has a u f f i c i e n t cooking u n i t s and personnel t o cook a hot meal f o r a u n i t which h a s t he op-portunity t o use it. The 134th Inf keeps on hand one C r a t i o n , one K and one 10-in-1.

5 Feeding I s o l a t e d Groups. I n t h e 28th Inf, 6-11 i s o l a t e d groups, such as o u t p o s t s o r guerda f o r road blocks, a r e given one dcy I s uncooked r a t i o n and prepare t h e i r own hot food on smll ind iv idua l burners .

6 . Cleaning of b a s Kits, In gene ra l , t he c l ean ing of mees k i t e seems t o be working s a t i a f s c t o r i l y . These two methode ore i n u se i n t h e 8 t h Div. F i r s t , hot r a t e r o r e s t e r i l i z i n g s o l u t i o n is c a r r i e d forward with t h e m a l s and a mess k i t c l e a n i n g l i n e i s formed i n t h e co a r e a ; seccnd, the mess k i t s a r e kept a t the c o k i , aent forward with the meel and i ssued ind i sc r imina te ly . They o re c o l l e c t e d a f t e r t h e meal and taken back t o the k i f o r washing, The f i r s t of t h e two methods descr ibed i s eornewhat no isy and involves a danger of drawing h o s t i l e f i r e . The 13th Inf of t he 8 t h Div, on those occas ions when hot water o r a c l ean ing so lu t ion cannot bs aent forward, f u r n i s h e s t h e men with napkins f r o m t h e 10-in-1 r a t i o n s t o p lace i n t h e i r mss k i t s . The 6 t h Armd Div r e q u i r e s i t s co 0s t o supe rv i se c l o s e l y t h e c l ean ing of mesa k i t e end a l s o r equ i r e6 a d a i l y spot check by a bn medical 0.

7. a t r a s . A number of u n i t s dur ing t h e long days i ssued an extrci X r a t i o n t o t h e men i n the morning t o be ea t en i n t h e l a t e a f t e rnoon and t i d e over the gap between t h e noon meal and a supper which t h e y might not r e c e i v e u n t i l elmost midnight. S t i l l o the r u n i t e t r y t o economize on o r a r range f o r e x t r a f r e s h bread and cof fee t o p r m i t a e rv ing hot cof fee and sandwiches l a t e a t n i g h t , on t h e theory t h ~ t a - h o s t a l l men i n f r o n t l i n e u n i t s a r e awake dur ing much of every n igh t .

h'e,roducedby fnqr Repro Def ./2 A Gp

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


8Battlo $rparienaes8 are publimhed regularly by t h i s headquarters t o enable uni t r i n t ra in ing t o psofit frcm the latert ooprbat exxmrioncrea of our troops row fighting the Gsrmanr i n ICuFope. Although the euprrienoer of ccr ta in unitr a t a pcrtioular location are not neoesaarily applicable t o all unit. in a l l s i t u e t i o ~ , the it- gublirhed w i l l be thors b a r d oa practioal uper ieace .rrd are rearrmraniled for uareful connidaration by units rhieh m y ~ o ~ t a r rlmlar ~ o b l o m . Report8 of oorroborative or C O ~ ~ ~ U J

a p a r i s n c e s are psrt ioular ly desired in ordar t ha t the va l id i ty of the indicated ba t t l e lemon may be d . t d n e d .

S, R. PINDChI Colonel, UID

U @ t ~ l t k m b l - - - - - - - ~ ~ s B ~ - - ~ o ~ c . = ~ u - w ~ ~ ~ ~ o , - - ~ - ~ - < . - ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ ~ - ~

1. Source@ of &tea:. Aa o3as.r ? r m !i~ re< ) S : . A ~ ~ ~ e ~ t . m n g 8 B a&% 0%' co Cia and hQa of a bm of an inf re& e-ged ia %&at segmdmg t h s i s idear as La the esasn- tial qual i t iee of lmdermhip, The r e a u l t a d eenpori8 p i e t - ~ e i e giren b e l m a

2. QUllltra. Derired. The rocumnoe of demmds fos a e r t s b qual i t ies t he i r leaderr nrake t hem qual i t ies appoar t o ba of outstanding inrportanoe. They are as fo l - lowor self-eonfidoace and decision; a e w e knoaledlge o f hie job; f s l m e e r , eelf- eontrol; a t tent ion t o the safety and welfare of h ie subordinates; exmplaPy conduct; a ra ther vague laa~letbing rhiuh oan beat be a i l l e d 8 p ~ o o ~ l b t y ~ ~ A nunbar a leo r t r e r a d the importace of a leader keoping h i r msm aontiauallg in2 d 0% the a b f ~ t i o x a , The rucaeeding psragraphar deal with eaoh of there qual%ti*eo :as tba language of the ~ B B who were qwrtianed.

3. 3 e l f - o o a i i d a n w ~ $ deoisioa. He must be able %o d e cpui& dec i e io~a . He must be c a b an2 L L ~ A A C I ~ I . c i n hi% dacieisns when t h e gajag i-8 FOU@, Be met mke h i8 own decisions withc~ut hesite "-ona Be m u % iarw: wr-aara ~ a t h em apperaaca, c r f c-n- fidence in h i 8 own judgmrt,

4. bowled=. He muat have a ~$WSI.@ if ~ X S jobs He lps~t BLILQw h i s t ao t ics , H e mat &AVO -thing whid a w r himi t o "MI aukmatical ly accept@$. b~ h k r men a8 B a t f s t t d t o gude thm, He m u t b 3 v h l r j2k % - & g6L?@+

5. Bairnear. He m u t r o t a t e duties and m i s s i o a s ~ He muat show no pa r t i a l i t yb He narst be f a i r minded. He mast hava a o a u e of beireaer. Be muat be h w but mt allow personal amtions t o affect the perfar~~ance of him duticas.

6. Se l f -cont ro l . He must show a cheer fu l f r o n t under the most t r y i n g condi t ions . He must never g e t exc i t ed . He must not show h i s r e a l f e e l i n g s a t t h e end of a hard day. He must be ab le t o keep from blowing h i s top i f something goes wrung. He must have t h e utmost c o n t r c l of h i s pe r sona l emotions. He must be c l e a r thinking.

7. Care of h i s men. He must make t h e men f e e l t h a t 'he is doing h i s bes t t o he lp > 2 them. He must s;ieak up (another one s a i d ' s t i c k up*) f ~ r hit! I?&L, E3 - - A :J>

i n t e r e s t e d care of h i s men.

5, U J ~ C Z : rie nelsc ? - x i .: E-3 *mn : > L ~ B B rwg~r t l t i ons . He must never a s k h i s men t o c a r q - o u h e;*111~~-3n he mauld not be w i l l i n g t o undertake himself. He must be a b l e t o c a r r y out any t a s k he a s s igns h i s men. Be must be with the men a t a l l t imes i n combat. He must not, expose himself unnecessar i ly o r permit h i s men t o do so. H e need not expose himself f o o l i s h l y but must be i n t h e f i g h t with h i s men. He must have courage and sometimes purposely d i s p l a y i t a s an example.

9. Pe r sona l i t y . He must i,S?'- the confidence and fr iendt ihip of h i s men through sha r ing t h e i r common l o t . We :.ika t o f e e l that he is one of us. He musb know n i s Len personal ly . He must understand L ~ B job of every man under him. If Lhe men d o not f'eei f r e e t o come t o him, he i s nut a ieader . He must no t caup l s in or b e l i t t l s o r a t t a c k h i s s u p e r i o r s t o h i s men. He ,lz:isr; encoilrage, r a t h e r than nsg.

10. Keepigp, men i rformed - He should o r i e n t the men 8.s t o %he s i t u a t i o n and mis- s i o n , One of t h e best p l a t k a d e s e we ever had always t o l d us everythi i lg he knew absut what was going on.

BATTLE EXPERIENCES

p . & t $ l c i b,+.~*iene,rs~'. $ ~ ~ . e publish& reN-13 69- f3;i.s he i ,5 ; i ,~ r$m8 emblts iia.Q.&e 2% % r a u i n g t a $.l.t.~a t h e &te@t s r p e r h o ~ e e s id Q%= :-roopr nm! %f&&R,~g ::h

&L~hou& t he experaseces 02 c a - t s h u i be rr-t a par t icular Pacat n >;,n

ne.n~sm.~iHy a p p % ~ a b B e t o a l l u d t ~ i.5 ehtihatiags, &he itams publishei-: w ~ i ' be thoso -b&e& pegt ioa l snpsrianoe gz;, rec a d d far;. 3zardul e o a e i d ~ a r : ~ n b y - u h t a , wDi& m;; e n m u t a r BMLW p r ~ b l w , 3 e p ) ~ ~ t ~ 2 f carr i i ixrat i re or coatrmg ex- parianoes m e par t icu la r ly deeired i n order e h e the L.,-&2idfty r P the indicated beit%%@

C. R. UNDON Colonel, AGD

Ad jutant General w D - _ - O _ - e - - _ - _ _ - * - - w - - - ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - ~ -

1. Redu~ t ion af illb bore^, a t t m p t i n g t o enlarge 8- pil lbox e a a u r e e , tho enaiy hare weakened $he &aswe side8 rpo t k t 10- and 3# gum can pieroe t h e con- c r e t e r i t h iP ua and U5'r r i t h ordinary am. Since r e m d e t h i s diecorerr pil lboxor ha76 been dea l t w i t h offee t i re ly by mneurar i sg SP wpna t o get a d i r e s t a t the anbraaure, Otherr hare beon neutralized by a r t y or a i r . The hnf then r o r h up and put8 a aatchel aharge throu& the embraare. When a pil lbox i a captured t o prevent i t 8 reoacupatioa by the an-, it muat be a m l e d or denolished. or a guard left .

20 Hosti le p.rsoruw1. @It is becaPPiog inoreaalngly apparent tha t every avai lable ~ a a n is being lued in the defenuo. E l i t e 23 troop. have been ancountered a s w e l l a s men only recen t ly releaaed from horp i ta la after being neriouely roundod. The inte l l igenoe of plany is qui te lor and t h e ps~oenta* wm-age mon i a high. A h a s t i l y o r e n i z e d bn of 0 candidaten alm ha8 beon encounterad,

3 9The eloae a i r euppost s f the id B l r s haa producod ex- eelloxi% s e a l t s a e i n r t heavy enamy a r t y whi& has been def in i te ly located.

4. @These t k obr taolsr have beam dmmliahed by f ixed &gee placed by inf ar e n s s War o o r w of f i r e or darkness. Chargee dislodge the abr tac les rfhP& are then pu8h.d aaide by t k doma.--0s of V Cmpn.

1. The 3d lulPd D i r reported that on 17 Sapt t he i r a t t ack received stubborn remist- 6nce from e q givilialqg and soldiers.

- III FUUW?l! aRCU a H DIVISIW

1. We& r e e i r t a n ~ e . r e reached the Sie-ied l i n e , 10 Sept, our patrole walked

- - - -

t h o u & without opposition. By 12 8ept the mnmay had col lected usotqb troop. t o ouetrm the buakgl'. d-ting the roa--rely* on our tePdency t o be roadbound, 9inae then amugh troop8 hare e r r i r ed t o oauupy a m j o r i t y of the pillboree. Horerec, reeiatanaa h a bean weak in wet aa.er and the garrieon w i l l tuual ly rusrsndaa? f f rigorou8ly attaakad.

2. Poorly orgapizd pereonnd, @The two unit. facing uo hare beeta reinforced by groups of straggleso oollected pa they beuame available, Saae ~10lditW4 and 01 have no kcaaledw o f tb; o s g ~ e-e %bas m d amstma C L E L D ~ t :&ar:iA', tBr neat ha&= @ d, As $$.BY W E &.a@edt>led, a guide take. thea t o a louation aad order8 than t o oceugy the pj.1Bbax3e ic the arm and defend them t o the b a t h , S-t-s wpn. a r e oarried in, otkes 3-s they a r e $surd Fn the pomitioru. The remulting gwrieomr its a hod-podg. of mixed unite. Cour~tasattacks, howwor (m of whiuh a r e only r a i d . of mtro- patrol.) a r e generally ataged by good troop8 -- a11 33 and from t he w unit, The MJM a t a t e of dimsrganis.aticn did not meam t o ex ia t in the a~ty.--0-2. 28th D i r e

1, We avoid the strong d a f a u e a of dragonf. teath, a t e e l gatem. dace end other p a w e d dsdeneaa by uring ran patrols ts locate the lanes through such defenaer~ scm8ioned by t a r r a i n feature. auuh aa streems and ravines. Through finding rueh @ a @ , building bridges, and qreparing f o r b , w@ wers able t o get through with l i t t l e intcrrference from e m f i r e .

2. R I ~ ~ Y m t r o n ~ point^. @Our m p ovtnprintm ahor only part of tha pillboxem aat- ua l ly present, Strong points a r a generally located 80 a8 t o c w e r roada, t r a i l . aad f i r * breaks i n forest., A alzong point ueualu aonsist. of a pillbox, 88m gum and entranehad i n f a a t r m n equipped with autmmtic wpm and r f f lee . The p i l l box i. umed prlnaipally an a mhelter f r a a our fire.. Yoat en- f i r e is delivered fram 8umounding dug in pomitiona. The G m n s fear being trapped i n pillbore. and do not l i k e t o f i r e from than. One GtrcPan 0 murrendsred him s o u p of 20 men, .tat* that they beceme hyster ical in the p i l l ba r uadar s h e l l fir*.

3, Yrthoda of attaak. @We manemor t o a f lank of a l i n a of pil lbore8 and throw a l l t h e lead we a t m e U s use a r t y far t ree burat. mar due i n poeitioee around pillboxem wherever poeeible, I n general a bn attack. with two con abreast and on* i n .uppart mpping UP. If a un i t i. pi& dom, a kma of f i r e i m eatabliohed while mother 8qd or plat nmnouvera t o t he r a m of t ha en- position, Ua w r e en t i r e ly aura.. aountry, b . h M our om a r t y fire., 8taying away f r a m r o a b , trail8 md f i r e break.. Our f l r a a u8ually drive the snsrql i n t o the pillboxem. If they f a i l t o m~rrarrdor we bring up t b , TDe, IT gunr, hzookaa and 15- (SP) wm and open f i r e a t dwaeures . Thia u u a l l y b i n g o them out but if it doem not we use t k dozars t o s ea l the doore and embraeurea with d i r t .

4, New ~ X % W X ~ weeDon. @We have oaptured a new Geraran 888811 pieoe tha t can be mr& handled and w h i d hadl only cs 2 foot s i lhoue t te above g o u r d when i t a oarriage wheels a r e ~eamved, We have found 2 of theee in the r i a i n i t y of on9 pillbax.

5. U.s of illb box^, @The J s r r i ea uae g i l l b o u o for mrt and a r t y OPs, It l a a mistake t o ueo the pillboxaa f o r our CPa o r Wm, a o Jerry knowo exactly where they are.

6. G m beliefa. primonera ray we have two doctrines of warfare upon d i c h they can re ly : 'Americana mrar a t tack a t night and g & e r i c a ~ f igh t along rsoda I.

a 9 8 @We have had d e f i n i t e indksatione of a i r i l i a n a bekind our line. supplying mi l i ta ry information t o tmmgy u n i t a . @ - - ~ ~ and 6 3 , 60th 1n.f.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. SO 2 8 SEPT I944

# b a t t l e Experiences# a r e published regu la r ly by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from tho l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops nor f igh t ing t h e Germans i n Europe.. Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a re not necessa r i ly appl icable t o all u n i t s i n a l l s i tua t iona , the item published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recammended f o r careful considerat ion by. u n i t s which may encounter similar problems. Reports of corroborative o r contrary experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of ' t he indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined,

Ry command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LANDON Colonel, AGD

Ad ju tant General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I FIGKTING IN THE CITY OF BReST

Note: The following is ext rac ted from camnents of Maj Gen Walter M. Robertson, CG* 2d Inf Mv. on the f igh t ing wi th in the c i t y of Brest.

1. S t r e e t F i ~ h t i n & ; . a. The term " s t r e e t f ight ing ' i s a misnomer, f o r t h e s t r e e t was the one place we could not go. S t r e e t s were completely covered by pillboxes and rap id - f i r e 4 h guns, ~ i t h each s t r e e t corner swept by a t l e a s t four p i l lboxes . Our procedure was t o go from house t o house b las t ing holes through the walls with s a t c h e l charges.

b. The biggest problem was i n reducing f o r t i f i e d apartment houses s ix t o seven s t o r i e a high; i n a number of cases we b u i l t f i r e s and smoked the enemy out. Another problem was t o c ross s t r e e t s and ge t i n t o the next block, I f poss ib le we found a b l ind a l l e y o r a defi laded access. I f not, the TDws f i r e d a t point blank range and knocked a hole i n the wall a c r o s s the s t r e e t , We than covered the pi l lboxes with hD f i r e and i n f i l t r a t e d across, preferably under cover of darkness.

c. The Boche adopted a c l e v e r expedient t h a t slowed u s down the l a s t t h r e e o r four days. If they saw u s about t o break i n t o a house, they s e t i t a f i r e and delayed us from six t o twelve hours while the house burned out. This delayed us more than any o the r s ing le t h i n g they did. When a house was burned, a sunken p i t was l e f t , i n the basement, and i t was necessary t o f i l l i t with rubble before TDts could be taken i n t o the next block - another time-consuming operation..

d. A moat su rpr i s ing th ing t o me i n the house-to-house phase i n the Ekest opera- t i o n was our extens ive use of d i r e c t f i r e guns including 15- (SP) guns f i r e d a t ranges a s c lose a s 500 t o 600 yds.

e. Another i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e l i g h t on c i t y f i g h t i n g - I t r i e d i n i t i a l l y t o keep f a i r l y uniform progress along the l i n e t o cover the f l a n k s , but found t h a t it made l i t t l e difference i n the c i t y . Unequal progress d id o f f e r oppor tuni t ies f o r outflank- ing - jus t a s i t does anywhere e l s e - without t h e same jeopardy t o our f lanks .

2. Assault of Walled City. a. Another I n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e was t h a t when we got aga ins t t h e wall i t s e l f - an old f o r t i f i c a t i o n with modern pi l lboxes surmounted by shrubs and turf - we had t o do a l o t of shooting t o uncover the p i l lboxes before we could knock them out. We cal led it * a g r i c u l t u r a l shooting'. In the f i n a l a s sau l t of t h e walled c i t y , i t w a s t h e d i r e c t f i r e wpns r a t h e r than t h e normal a r t y which sup- pressed enemy f i r e on t h e wall. I had the pldce ringed with d i r e c t f i r e wpns which completely dominated the pillboxes.

b. Before the a s s a u l t , I kept a slow concentrat ion of a r t y and mort f i r e going wi th in the c i t y f o r 60 hours. It was a l i g h t concentration. The r e s u l t was t h a t in- t e r n a l corns, hence, the enemy command set-up was absolute ly hocked out and normal supply could not be e f fec ted . In other words, we ran them i n t o deep pi l lboxes and tunne l s and kept them there . When the a s s a u l t was made, there was no change, i n the tempo of a r t y f i r e except t o l i f t it at the point of penetrat ion,

c. The a c t u a l r e s u l t 8 were b e t t e r than I had hoped fo r . We e f fec ted the pene- t r a t i o n , f inding t h e s o f t spots f o r which I was searching, and pushed a whole bn th ro tgh .before the Boche, except those i n the immediate l o c a l i t y , were aware of it. We knocked out a p i l l b o x and p i l e d r i g h t on through without meeting r e a l r e s i s t ance u n t i l we reached the center of the city..

d. This a s s a u l t was made a t dusk, and w e moved i n under cover of darkness. This was one of four separa te assaults. . The Eoche expected an assau l t from the e a s t r a t h e r than t h e north, and w e had t h e i r a t t e n t i o n diver ted ,

3. Sumary.. I f e e l tha t the d i v came out of t h e Brest opera t ion f a r be t t e r t r a i n e d than it went i n , p a r t i c u l a r l y because of t h e house-to-house f igh t ing , which was e s s e n t i a l l y a squad l eader ' s b a t t l e . To i l l u s t r a t e - a t n ight when we 'buttoned up' f requent ly it would take t h e co camdr from three t o four hours t o locate a l l points occupied by h i s squads i n apartments, basements, e t c . Leadership of NCOts was develope t o an as tonishing degree. I found t h e Brest opera t ion an in tensely i n t e r e s t i n g one, and I th ink t h a t t h e men did too, because they were able t o supply e f fec t ive ly a super- i o r i t y of f i r e power and see the inmediate r e s u l t s ,

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

No. 51

BATTLE EXPERIENCES 29 SEPT 1944

*Bet t l e Experiences* are published regular ly by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from the l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops nor f i g h t i n g the Germans i n ~ u r o ? e , Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r locat ion a r e not necessar i ly applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , the item8 published rill be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l considerat ion by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports of corroborat ive o r cont rary experiences a re p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indica ted b a t t l e lesaon may be determined.

camnand of Weutenent General BRADLEY:

C . R . I.ANmN Colonel, AGD

Ad ju t a n t General

I FlEmPmY OF 4.2 MDFfTAR BATTALIONS

nWe have established dpe f o r 4.2 mort, when atohd, due t o the d i f f i c u l t y t h e cml coa have i n resupplying themselvee.. They have only i - ton t r k s and t r a i l e r s and t o send these back f o r am would be an uneconomical use of T. We use d i v T t o bring am from the ASP f o r these wpns and. e s t a b l i s h a IIP c lose t o the r e g t l f i e l d t n of the r eg t t o which t h e mrts a r e atchd.a--hj . T.M..Andrewa, G 4 , 40th Inf Mv..

"1 have m y o m m i n t u n i t which has functioned very e f f i c i e n t l y . I hare only l o s t one vehicle. ~ l l o t h e r s h i t have been returned t o a c t i o n within 24 hours. The more m i n t done by forward u n i t s t h e g r e a t e r the number of vehicles t h a t can be kept i n act ion. .a--~t C O ~ . Dunnington, CO 486th Aaa a.

I11 PRflECTm SANDBAGS FOR TAKE

Personnel of the 749th Tk Bn, inc luding t k crews, t h i n k t h a t sandbags a r e worth while even a t the erpenee of the added weight,

1. On 20 Sept a t k of Co "Am roceived a d i r e c t h i t from a l a rge c a l AT wpn on the f r o n t of the t k between the d r i v e r ' s and a s s i a t a n t d r i v e r ' s bulges, The sandbags seemingly de f l ec ted o r re tarded t h e p r o j e c t i l e . The armor p l a t e was cracked and a s izeable nwell* was made but only minor i n j u r i e s were s u t a i n e d . The same t k received a d i r e c t h i t on t h e r i g h t sponson a month ago and i n t h a t case a180 t h e projeot ' i le glanced off causing no Ynjur i e s becauae of t h e sandbags.

2. On the same day a t k of Co "En received a d i r e c t h i t on the f r o n t elope p l a t e t o t h e r i g h t and s l i g h t l y above the a s s i s t a n t d r ive r ' a bulge. The p r o j e c t i l e m a def lec ted though i t gougsd out a l a rge furrow. In t h e same ac t ion Co .Bn received AT gun h i t s on the t u r r e t of another t k which was not sandbagged. The p r o j e c t i l e pene- t r a t e d the t u r r e t , k i l l i n g the gunner and loader and i n j u r i n g the t k comdr.

JNFANTRY TJNK COOPERATION

Some t k bn c-s have reported t h a t t h e inf u n i t s t o which they a r e atchd do not g e t maximum effec t iveneea f r m the t k s because they do not include the t k comdr i n s t a f f confereaces and planning. Use of a t k comdr a8 an advisor of the i n f c d r can o f t e n prevent committing t k s t o unsuitable t a ske and other e r r o r s which may cause c a s u a l t i e s of t r a ined personnel and a lack of mutual confidence between inf and armor, i n t h e opinion of these t k comdrs. Lack of accuracy and dependabil i ty 01 information gs t o the p o s i t i o n s of our o m troops and of t h e ground t h e enemy i a holding, have sometimes handicapped the t k u n i t e , they report.--C0, 7th kmnd Group.

1. M-10 Tank Destroyer. #The high r o a r of t h e M-10 motor can be considerably si lenced when operat ing i n c lose proximity t o the enemy by using second Gear with RPM of 800. This i s hard on the motor, but almost s i l e n t operat ion is obtained," --Cole L.E. Jacoby, CO 5 t h TD Group.

2, Bazooka Bat ter ies , B a t t e r i e s f o r t h e bazooka have not always been avai lable , but we have ample f l a s h l i g h t ba t t e r i e s . By enlarging t h e hole i n the stock t o hold f l a s h l i g h t b a t t e r i e s and rearranging t h e connections t o f i t we can use them,--S-3, 120th Inf.

Note: The fol lowing comments a re extracted from a repor t of b a t t l e experiences of t h e 823d TD Eh..

1. The Right Weapon. Choose the wpn f o r the job. Too o f ten M; posi t ions a r e d isc losed by f i r i n g on t a r g e t s more s u i t e b l e f o r r i f l e f i r e .

2. Reconnaissance bv F i r e . During an inf a t t a c k w a i n s t gun posi t ions use your MSs t o f i r e a t any suspected l o c a l i t y . I n o ther words reconnoi ter by f i r e . I f h i t , t h e e n e q w i l l scream and d i sc lose h i s location.

3. Use your Ar t i l l e ry . Remember, i f you cannot reach a t a r g e t , a r t y may be ab le t o do so; g e t your p l a t comdrs a r t y conscious. The a r t y has helped us a l o t ,

4, Defending Towns, Defend a t o m from the outs ide , not from within.. The enemy w i l l i n f i l t r a t e i n t o buildings over-looking your gun pos i t ions and knock out your personnel.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 52 3 0 SEPT 1944

'Ba t t l e m e r i e n c e s n a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from the l a t e s t conbat exheriences of our t roops now f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n Unit8 a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a re not necessa r i ly app l i cab le t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , the i tems published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e r e c o m n d e d f o r ca re fu l cons idera t ion by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports of cor robora t ive o r con t ra ry experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y des i red i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of the ind ica t ed b a t t l e l e s son may be determined.

Ey command of Lieutenant General BRMILEY:

C. R. IARDCN Colonel, AGD

Adjutant General

I RECONNAISSANCE PWTOCNS OF TANK DESTROYER BATTALIONS.

1. The two r c n p l a t s provided by T/O f o r t h i s Sn a r e inadequate s ince a l l t h r e e gun cos are i n v a r i a b l y committed and each needs a r cn p l a t .

2. Ye have organized a t h i r d p l a t , t ak ing personnel from the maint , T and hq p l a t s . The r c n 0 cornmcmds i t . To equip it we robbed our r e a r echelon and CP of jeeps, r a d i o s , wpns, e t c . We f e e l t h a t t he b e n e f i t s have f u l l y j u s t i f i e d the e f f o r t .

3. Though t h e primary mission of t h e r cn r l a t s i s t o l o c a t e enemy t k s , we use them a l s o t o determine t h e l o c a t i o n of our own f r o n t l i n e s . They perform t h i s t a s k by t h e following methods. The r c n p l a t sends a s g t t o each f r o n t l i n e inf bn of t h e u n i t i t is support ing. The r c n p l a t reader r e c e i v e s r e p o r t s from these s g t s a t r e g t l hq and checks them a ~ a i n s t t he r e g t l s i t u a t i o n map. The information i s then furn ished t h e gun co comdr and re]-ayed by him t o bn where i t i s checked aga ins t t h e informution rece ived by t h e dive--Report of 823d TD Bn, 3 0 t h Inf Div.

I1 BAZOOKA TEAMS.

Te f i n d t h a t i t i s a good idea t o holcl f r e s h bazooka teams i n r e s e r v e , so tha t when t k s are loca ted t h e f r e s h men can be sent forward t o engage them. Often t h e f r o n t l i n e bazooka teams are not aggressive enough because of fat.5gue. We have l o s t s eve ra l of t h s se teams because h e y were t o o exhausted t o use proper cover and movement t a c t i c s . The bazooka i s de f in e l y e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t t h e t k . H i t i t on t h e s i d e , do not shoot st t h e f r o n t . Af ter i 6 is stopped work around t o t h e r e a r and l e t him have one, : a d the t k w i l l normally c a t c h fire.--Rsport of 1st Bn, 119th Inf t o 3 0 t h Div.

AS a i d t o c o n t r o l v i t h i n p l a t s , we have been lay ing wire t o each gun p o s i t i o n , provid ing t h e p l a t comdr with r a p i d sure cam t o each gun sg t . We f i n d t h i s more r e -

l i a b l e than r ad io . Also a te lephone can be opereted from a foxhole. When we use r a d i c we dismount an SCR-610 and p l ace it i n t h e foxhole with t h e operator.--Report of 823d TD Bn t o 3 3 t h I n f Div.

1. Prepared Mortar Firea. Always arrange prepared mort f i r e s , t h a t can be f i r e d without obsn. Send ovs r l ays t o t h e f r o n t l i n e cos s o they can reques t those f i r e s when necessary. I n o r d e r t h a t r eques t f o r fj.res can be promptly ec t ed upon, t h e r e should be com from t h e mort p l a t t o t h e bn Be--Report of Co D, 119th In f t o 30th In f Div.

2. Harassing F i r e . The Germans o f t e n f i r e ha ra s s ing a r t y f i r e on a ti- schedule, Check your watch o f t e n t o determine i f t n i s is t a k i n g place. It w i l l l e t you know when t o g e t low, However, do not depend upon it t o o much a s J e r r y w i l l o f t e n change h i s time schedule.--Report of Co D, 119th Inf t o 3 0 t h Inf Div,

3. Hip S h o o t i q . "We need t r a i n i n g i n f i r i n g from t h e hip. I n shoot ing t h i s way I found t h a t my tendency was t o shoot t oo high.."--Rifleman of 119th I n f , 3 0 t h In f Div.

4. c l ean &munit ion. "lave t h e r i f lemen check t h e am they have c a r r i e d f o r days. We have had many jsms caused by r u s t y ca r t r i dges . This always happens a t t h e c r i t i c a l time."--Sgt 9 . A . Yawes, 119th I n f , 3 0 t h Inf Div.

5. mzooka T e r n . "When s t z l k i n g t k s bazooka teams should be m l l covered by f i r e . The teams should be kept t oge the r nea r t h e co hq s o t h e y can be moved t o t he po in t of need readi ly."--0s of 3d Bn, 119th I n f . 30 th Inf Div.

6. Counter l:?ortar F i re . n60mm morts should be a t chd t o t h e p l a t and should move w e l l forward f o r obsn. Af'ter f i r i n g f o r e f f e c t t h e morts should change pos i t i on by a t l e a s t 100 yds f o r t h e e n e w w i l l u sua l ly r e t u r n t h e mort fire."-0s of 3d En, 119th I n f , 3 0 t h Inf Div.

- 2 - Reproduced 4y /he fng~neer Reproduct/on Det, /2fh Army Gm;o

$ $ e.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 53 I OCT 1944

'Battla Prpeaisncae@ nra published r a & a r l ~ b7 t h i r h m d q u t r r s t o om- unit8 In training t o profit frar the latut earbat u p a i m o a r of our troopr acrrr righting tha Ogaanr in Brrop.. Uthough tha apariancar of uertain unik a t a pal'tioular location ara not moaraarily appliarbla t o a l l &tr in a l l sit~ti-• the it- publiehod w i l l be tho- head on polaatiml apor i - and ara roe- far ~ e f u l sonsideration by unit* which m y aeountrr .irilar problmmo. Rapact8 of aoerobarativa or aontrary arpgiamea ma particularly &airad in ardrr that tho Validity cd the indicated batt le lorron may be datrsninad.

C. R. IISQMBl Co10p.1, AaD

Adjutant bamral

Th@ following aoaount of the actiaas of 8 It, a ?A ?O with the 36 Div, in action nssr Bmsa, Frsnaa. in Ipid-Augut, ir utzaated f t ~ an aacount givon by Ur btry oaPdr, While tha 0 rar not uaraia ing lem&ahip a t the t i r e ha dlap-d a t i r a l e m -1, init iat ive, rarouradulaarr aad a m1uulat.d williaqwra t o h i r own l i f e in cedar t o gegrota the rua8088 of hi8 unit, which appmr t o ba w & b j OS rmlZati~nr

7 A part d t b batt le group to whioh tha it bdonq.d -8 taff i'ru a 1 friandly troops. Tha It rolunt.rr.8 t o a e o w an inf patrol* Thi8 Paw01 loeatad r.sr iaf and a a o l m of niP. trkm. Tha m t r o l r i thdra bpt tb. 1s rmiU in &PI and oallad fur a r ty fire. Thir firm dartroyod four trb and far-&

troop. t o a m tha raaipdor. Them troops to& ama. In th f i a l d *- r h i a the It . a m obrraing, oot m a than SO yda fraa h k . h a p i t a tbir o l m m ~ e ha 0all.d f o r a r ty rim w thmm a d obtained a birwt h i t in the middla of th@ S W e

killing 19 t b 20.

2. 8.cord mitirat% Vpon h i r raturn t o tho CP ha war rmt t o m i d to ohm. a r r i m l % r a 1urn.d tbt a patrol war aboe t o im 4- a d nq- pamiamion t o amampany it* inf at thi r patrol in t+o* Tho It* who -8 with tha l a d i x half of tbe split mtrol , u m d f.r a n o w fo01ud t o ohm data- u .nq road Uoolr and than workd hi8 ry baok tbro- th. uq t o N J O ~ I his unite Opn him rot- ha atatad hi8 Mi& t&t ha eould -t r o L to a pod t i=

f r ~ m &iah he a o a d direot obsmed $We oa t he road bS0~kr bccaapanied by a r a a& he mcb Ma way ba& em3 located two W k B Qgarsa tka scneaerPw the r ~ a d and apprar- i.iaata9y a g k t s% id ammd with B1000kQa. HB a d J ~ ~ t e d a r t y fire and Premgdiately tbs%ropd arcl diaperwed t h s iePI Be obtained two direct h i t s on saah t k , but with- s%% hocking them outs Be then mdls h i s m y baok t o the Q.P, reported the e r a o t loma- thoa o f t b B b a d f a row8 d red t o spot them %or air a t t a d , Dire b d - spa dsletroyad bath tks*

The eamants below are er t raa ted fraa en aecouat @ran by &jar AasIPe CO. 1st h, &%h e of h i e etadf a f t e r a period Qf attaahPent t o the 33d %B@,

1, Opmar . le we the inf t o d~temains rhat poaitione ape s . e m d and t o tanka aan be b r o w t up t o fkFO om them, We .eve

2 a Fight* 1~ tamas, IA t&e ~ t r e e t fighting in U a p b Bad a wat d f& Lmf waseda the h f - t k %am By about a half bloek. Tha leading tk s f'olPored with fd mehirag os the eideualksa The t k s ooveeed the inf by firlng Mh in to the a ~ m e a The winc ipa l r e a b t a a a e encountered aoneietad of W e and AS f i r e s from the

e a t &set mo~i rmga aodl junctionsa We oreraam t h i s by mrrsurering t o t he i r fhxdta and rear, U grenades were used affectivaly i n t h i s fighting, Marta waFe n ~ t r o effective b e ~ ~ ~ u s s of poor sbmo

3 * men arm3 urni t a upearhead a n a t taak f ol- Smad b Blockr acmered by f e e a t a r i t i a a l point6

ewmt re-onntsy by %is%@ en- bdme &.Be reaches the m a . 1% is %rrpeciaUy t a t tha t key BPidgm Be so grotgatedo At Liege one at niy p la t s and a p l a t of

If&% tku wwe left W i n d t o guard an w o r t a n t I b r i Q e . The G g a a n e a leo had left a plat t o destroy it, mile tbe Cbmmns wars drinking i n a ode, my p la t eeized the kid@ end, with the aas i s t ene~ sf Belgian white &my forcee, held it for two b y 8 up- ti1 the 9th Div rrrir& A f a z r w s to 3".r. ?e bat- would probably ham rerul ted ia e eonriderable delay.

8. &tt& c9loW. The a b i l i t y t o fdl.ntify and die% mh ba$tl. rormdr is ab eumm importurse. The ol& pabn i n my Bn aae readi ly t e l l by ths uoud of an arty a e b l l ar b w ~ t f'rm a E f l it i r % h a t o h i t tha p o m d or aontinue t o a& Ymw. l l ~ ~ w i l l umnlly t a b aarer n e d l a u e ,

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES

'Bat t le Experiencesa are published regu la r ly by t h i a headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experience8 of our troops now f i g h t i n g the ~ e r m a n s i n Burope. Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r loca t ion a r e not necessar i ly applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e i t e m published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recamended f o r c a r e f u l considerat ion by u n i t s which may encounter a imi lar problems. Reports of corroborat ive o r contrary e x p r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesaon m y be determined.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LANDON Colonel, AGD

Ad jutant General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

a. The 112th Engr C Bn i n p i l lbox demolitions on the Siegfr ied l i n e has obtained good r e s u l t s by tanping with sandbags 40 l b charges of TNT againet each end of 4' embrasure p la tes . Several boxes of captured 8 h mort s h e l l s , or two l 5 h s h e l l s were ueed with the TNT charges i n each case, With t h i s arrangement t h e embrasure p l a t e was e i t h e r b l o m out o r badly damaged and t h e concrete arcund t h e emharaure badly ruptured. Two l5Om ahe l l a standing on end at each end of t h e embrasure with 4 pounds of TN? faetened t o than yie lded good r s s u l t e without tamping aga ins t 12' concrete and 3/8r embrasure p la te .

be The Third Amy harr used 400 pound charges of TNT. captured am o r explosives with t h e r e s u l t t h a t the doore are blown off and the roof shattered. The des t ruct ion is usual ly s u f f i c i e n t t o render them unusable. Another method which requ i res only one pound of explosive is t o lock o r .jam a l l openings frm t h e ins ide and then lock the door and blow the handle o f f a i t h a amall charge. Thie is not foolproof a s the charge sometimss blows t h e door open. A t h i r d method is t o eover the & i l l b o x with e a r t h by us ing a bulldozer. This d3 c p + i s f a c t o r y but is r e l a t i v e l y slow,

Rote* The Xngr SBC. t h i a hq oonsidere t h e w e of 400 pounds of exploeive exceasivs m d does not reccamnd f t f o r general usme

"It i s of ten fmgraoticable f o r a TD t o move fo r ra rd t c engage enemy t k e bec&we of dug i n AT guns. On m c h o c c a a i o n s t h e f i r e by an 1610 on a rgverse s lope has been di rec ted by an ober on t h e o r e s t holding up hie hand i n Pine between the TD and the target . The obsr then moves r i g h t o r le f t un t i l a cor rec t de f l ec t ion is obtai~m4, Sensing of over o r short m e relayed by voice u n t i l t h e t k i s destroyed. If t h e o h is i n o r n e m a hgd$erow BP s h e l l 8 can be ubed a s BE may axpiode i n tb B e + Po~.~--Col.. L.E. J a c o b , CO, 5 t h T@ Gsoug.

1. Mortar F i r e s . "Be need 1/25,000 map8 wi th t h e phase l i n e s marked on them i n every sqd of t h e m o r % p l a t . Then by c m m m i c a t i n g wi th bn we could f i n d out where our t roops were by G?laie l i n e and d e l i v e r harass ing f i r e even when we could not g e t oban. We seldom kn:-'- f o r sure how f a r forward our r i f l emen a r e and of course we c a n ' t fire."-Cpl. A.;,. p i o r , hvy wpns co, 119th Inf, 30th Inf Dive

2. Machine Guge, "Make s u r e t h a t all men have f i r e d t h e hvy ba3 us ing t h e l i g h t IVG t r i pvd - we u a e ~ it o f t e n e r than t h e hvy t r i p o d i n t h e hedgerowsew--Lt. M.G. Rright , XIG P l a t Leader, 119th I n f , 30 th In f Div.

3. mnke Shoes. nWe cannot g e t brake shoes f o r our jeeps. We have retmved t h e 3rake shoes fram t h 3 +-ton t r s i l e r s and i n s t a l i e d them i n our jeeps.*--Lt. E. Johnson, Motor 0, l!.qth Inf, 30 th Inf Div.

4. Cannon Canpany Observer. " I n hedgerow country s t a y with t h e a a a a u l t co; i n open country s t a y a t t h e bn C O s CT a s long a s you can gs t obsn. Be prepared t o ad- ju s t your f i r e c l o s e t o t h e f r o n t l i n e t roops but s t a y i n the f r o n t l i n e s when you do. Keep ccans a t a l l thesew--Lt.L.J. Kraus, P l a t l eade r Cn Co, 119th I n f , 30 th Div.

5. Communications f o r t h e 8 b Mortar Platoon, We found t h a t by providing t h e 8- mort p l a t wlth an SCR 300 we could g e t mort f i r e i n any s e c t o r on t h e bn f r o n t . R i f l e co comdrs hove SCR 300s and can contact t h e mrt p l a t and bring down and a d j u s t f i r e wi th in a very shor t time."-Cnpt. C.P. Wayne, Exec, 1st Bn. 119th Imf, 3 0 t h D i r .

6 . Control After Dismounting Frcan Tanks, *One of our g r e a t e s t problems was t h e conf'usion when we dismounted from t k s t o a t t a c k on f o o t , To prevent t h i s r e a l t e r e d our orgn t o f i t the number of t k s we were t o work with and pu t a complete unit on each tk. T h i s ~ y a t e m helped g r e a t l y . n - - ~ / ~ g t J.E. Carver, Sqpad Leader, 119th In f , 3 0 t h Inf Dive

7. Don'ts i n t h e Anti-tank Gun Sauad. a.Donlt set up on a crossroad - J e r r y has them a l l zeroed in .

b. Don't l e t t h e sqd r i d e i n t o t h e gun pos i t ion . Dismount and m a n handle t h e gun. One s h e l l almost g o t our t r k , gun and sqd.

c. m n l t have unneceseary movement around t h e gun pos i t ion . A German t k ear one of our men, and though t h e gun waa hidden, became suspic ioue and got away.

d. Don't go i n t o a gun p o s i t i o n bl ind. Make a thorough reaonnaiesanoe. Mare than once if I hadn't reconnoitered I ' d have l ed my p l a t i n t o an enemy e t rong point.*-- T/S& Anaya, P l a t Sgt. AT Co, 119th Id , 3 0 t h MI.

END

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 55 3 OCT 1944

aBattle Bperiencas. are pttblished regularly by this headquarters t o enable units i n training t o prof i t frcm the l a t e s t cambat experience8 of our t r ~ o p a nor fighting the German8 i n 1Rrrope, Although the experisnces of certain units a t a par t icular~locat ion are not neceaaarily applicable t o all units i n all situations, the itsme published rill be tnoaa based an praatiaal axperisnce and are reaammnded f o r aareful consideration by uni ts which lpay enaotmter 8iBlilar problems, a p o r t 8 of corroboratim or contrary erperienees a r m part icular ly desired i n ardar that the val idi ty of the indicated bat t le l e s m 8ey be detenuined.

C. R. LANDOM Colonel, AGD

Adjutant General -----.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- c u s 3 11 ~SSD III m a y m COW

Hotat There is given below a mmariza t ion of reports regarding C l a m XI and 111 supply i n combat colleoted from a number of units over a pariod of f r o two t o three wwka.

1. laa as 11 apply , a. - Ikapons. (1) Praetiually a l l unit8 reporti- adoptad sa~rs sy6taa dasigned t o a p e d up the replaaemont of wpm, In amid unlts the supporting ord heavy araint ao g i n s aonsiderable assistanoe alorrg this line. The m r d TD Bn reported that replaeemonts generally were reaeiwd in from two t o three days, In the 3rd Amd M r , the Ord medium m i n t co is kept r ight up with the dir and ~ ~ e i n t a i n o a f a i r stock of arailable item, aa does the d i r ord itself. The maint ba of the 6th Ud D i r aarriee a mall number of extra Es. fram wnich i m d i a t a re. plaeamont oan be mad..

(2) Inf units reported the adoption of rarloua expedients t o speed the process of rpn replaasmbnt. Sam of them followt

(a) In the 28th D i r bat t le oaeualtiea of rpns a re phoned in by r e g t l S-4a t o the d i r ord coo lbsn replaoemnta are reaeirsd the ragt is notifiod by phone end pick8 the rpm up hmediately.

(b) The 2mi Inf M r 00 o8rrIu 8 &l otoak of r p ~ , includirrg one 5- gun and one 10- bow, ma-a are repartad by r e g t l 9-48 diraa t t o d i r ord mapply 0. If Bb does not Bars a rsplaorolont In stock he contacts the a d #upply 0 and arrang.8 t o gat a replaaetmnt in tins t o deliver it t o the rsgt the aana day. When isnues are mde f r a stoak, requia i t iom fo r repl-msnt are auhaitted iaPsdiately.

( 0 ) ¶'ha l3kth Iaf bas worked out a i l a n for the u m of an o r a ~ ~ e t r e n g t h ~t and mmorer-artiflaor of the 8amlw oo t o operate a upn repai r ahop. The 3-4 c l w that t h i s acheme mws the evautratioo of a larga manbar of rpm.

b. - Other C l ~ a I1 Item, ; Tb. operatian of the oupply of 0th- Claa8 11 itam i' -1-

than rpna uorka alosrg nonnal l ine6 and seem8 t o function s a t i d a e t o r i l y when tho nod& mppliea ero available and eupply points o lom enough t o tho front. Certain speaial atepa ham bean t a h n by mm units an follara:

(1) The 13th fai plaaes heavy anghaais on .upply disoipl ine end bs l ia r ra tha t t h i a ha8 resrrlted in a lare saving of equlp~bnt by reduuing t h e amounts thrown away.

(2) Tha 121st Inf s t ressea the r e m r e r y ob i nd iddua l and organizational etpipnasnt fra ea6ualties by m d i e a l and graros registration personnel. In the 314th X i the re- oupply of shoes poasd 3 s e r i o w problem f o r a tW when a lo- period of operatian on foot through & and water resulted i n exwsai ra failurorn of shoes. Their solution, which ras reasonably mcwssful, ras t o pool a l l extra p a i r s amd issue them t o tho m in great ea t n e d .

(3) In t he 3 4 t h Inf the Ila 3-48 e r e required t o make constant cheaka on drag. in the forward arecu, ass i s tad by Psrnbers of t h e bn A & P plat . Clothi= aal-d is examined f o r eer r icaabi l i ty and a anal l stock of unit-laundered itom is kept on hand t o mat emergemlea.

a. Clasa Su~plz. a. - In armcrod units. (1) The 6th Anad D i r follows the- methods of resupply of tuel and lubricants, aceording t o the situation. Whon a p p l y points avai lable t o the d i r are aloae, re-aupply i8 effected by abord ina te uait trb on a can-exchaqp barnis. In a moving s i tua t ion the d i r establishes a C l a s s I11 sapply point i n its d i r t r a i n area.

(2) In the 3rd Armd Mr. d i r t rka w u a l l y k i n g forward the supplies from the U P and de l ive r tam t o the using unlts about dark. T'he d i r f u e l t r k s tnen return t o the supply po f i t fo r a r e f i l l .

(3) I n the m d TD En the bn fuel t ruck is sent forward an a a l l from the 008. The t r k is met by p l a t guides who lead it t o the p l a t CPs o r t o individual vehicles, i f practicable. Normally the d i e t r ibu t i i n is from p la t Bs by hand-carry when the unit is engaged.

b. In inf units. (1) The 2nd MI QM draws suppliee from a carps or ASP and estab- l i shes o m o r more dir dp8. The regta &an from them dps and establ ish r e g t l dpa. Vehicles fram loner un i t s r e tu rn t o the r e g t l dp f o r r e f i l l or , on oocaeion, the neoded supplies are sent forward on a l i gh t t rk .

(2) Both the 13th Inf and the 3 U t h Inf conebnt an tne f ac t that no f u e l t r k i a organically available t o id regts. Making one available f o r normal supply a c t i d t i e s causeo no epecial concern, but i n f a s t wring aituatione, when two or three t rke i r e needed, considerable d i f f iou l ty i s oncotmtered.

(3) The 134th Inf repor t s using 2 2) T t rka with t r a i l e r s (not explaining where the t r k s came fran) t o haul tho supplies frcm the BSP t o the r e g t l f i e l d t n b i r ~ . En m i n t vehicles there exchange empty for f u l l can8 end all vehicles oaning i n to the biv are directed t o f i l l up t o save transportation. The bns usually have t o ground sane gasoline, i n order t o use the d n t vehicles, but seldom very narch.

- 2- ,&~roduced by fhe Eng~neer k'eproduct;an Det, /Zth Army Group 4'

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 56 4 OCT I944

mBattle Eqmrienaosm are publiahad regular ly by t h i s headquart&. t o onable unit. in t ra lning t o p r o f i t from the latoat a d a t erperioncem of our troop. nor f ight ing the (krmn. in Wrrope. Although tho oxpsrioncom of se r t a in unit8 a t a partiuular looation are not neuomscrrily appliaablo t o a l l uni t8 i n a l l s i t u a t i c w , the itam published w i l l be those bn8ed on praot iaal orperienoe andame reaapsndod for oareful aonsideration by unit8 rhieh n y ornountar 85ailar p r o b l m . Roportm of corroborative or contrary oxg.rienoes a m pad luu la r ly desired In order tha t the va l id i ty of the indloated b a t t l e l o u o a be doterained.

C. R. UmOH Colonel, AGD

Adjut ant 6enerdP

'=ellent mccosr haa been reptr ted by tho 813th and 607th TD E m i n delivering harasriq f i r e on long s t ra ight roads. A p l a t of TPI -8 plaood i n position i n pro- longation of t he tangent. A cub plane would conduct an adjuetment dai ly a t rangee betwoen eerrn and twelrs thousand yd., m i n g tho p la t i n f o r dir.ction. k, 24 hour harassin& f i r e at odd in ta rva ls and varying ran408 ma f i r e d with BE. After the road had been oaptured an oxmination disalwod tha t t h i s f i r e had boon very offoctivo, Roadaide t r ees had oawed air bursts; rounds s t r i k i n g the hard roadway had rieoohoted oausing heavy aasual t ies t o vehicles and personnel on tho roadom--C0 5 t h TD Gmup.

wmy nmn do not rea l ize the power of t he i r own SA biro. Recently on. of our outposts of 4 men, located about 20Q 4- i n front of tho m, maw a Cernan nigh* pa t ro l of 8 xmn mars aurore t h e i r f ront only about 30 yda away. Another group of 5 enemy went i n the other direction. The outpost personnel said tha t they did not f i r e beeapse they were out-nubared and f i r i q would discloae the i r position. BQth group. could have been ellmlnated by a few b lae ts from the BAR and with two o r three penndes.. --PM: M. T. Didelot, DLi Rif le Co, 30th Mr.

1x1 FIGHPrnG IN OPEN COUm'RY

*Aiter f igh t ing i n tbe hedg~rows our uni ts , back i n open country, did not appreci- a t e a t f i r e t tha t the en- could. by lang range f i re ' , catch the en t i r e eait r i t h one burst, Now it is neceeaary t o hare the scout6 and flanker8 well out. I n o m action th r Garmans l e t the aaauts get within 50 yd8 boiore f i r ing . Aa tho p la t waa too alose

it w a s pinned down while still i n column and could mt develop enough f i r e power t o engage tbe e m , If we had not had t k s present .&Be careualtlee would Bare been heaqr,a - - ~ n i GO c e , 30th mv.

'on one occmion during the recent operat iom, our three r i f l e aos were attaaking the en- posit ion " *cat three s ides , Wire aoer w a s available and the o m l i n e t o eaah co wars put on a conference c i r cu i t . The bn eolpdr Inatmcted the co e c d r s tha t he would monitor the o i r c u i t and ase i s t where possible, but t ha t the ehow def in i te ly belonged t o t h s co comdrs. By w e of the conference eironi* the oo caadrs were able t o exchange in- formatiaar &ad coordinate t h e i r effor ts . A l l coppdps concerned believe that t h i s prooe- d w e gmatxy aided i n the weedy reduction of the en- pasi t ion.*-40 2d Ea, 28th Id.

"Senior gs of un i t s sapported by TIb a - t h s c a r t a i l the effiaienay af tbir suppost by insisting upon preacr ib iw detail83 of the methods the TD hall use t o ac- campliah t h e i r Paissions, even t o the point of t e l l i n g a sect ion when t o B i g . end when not t o f i r e , The TD O. ehauld know the capabi l i t i es aad limitations of their o m weapons and ahsuld bo pemdtted t o employ the i r own mthods i n c w i n g out -signed missione t o the grea tes t extent practicable.*--Regort of 701at TD Bn.

1. Repla~s lpsn ts~ Olio matter h o w badly m n a r e needed r e p l a c m n t a sholihd not be ruahed i n t o batt le. They 8hould be brou43.8 i n during a m e t period i n order t ha t they may l ea rn t h e i r leaderslB A t one tima we received reglacemonta when we were mn- gaged i n heavy fighting. The new men became bswildered, f roze i n p a i t i o n and miff-- ed heavy cama l t i e s ,* -~Sg t Wolf, inf aqd leadwr, 30th Inf MI,

2. U B ~ of Tank Daatroyers M Tsnk.. "TIM 8hould got be ueed e4 t ka ; they omnot firs while moving and do not hare the U)s and naneurerabil i ty of the*--Repcart of 701at

-,,

TD Bn*

3. Bezceka Fire. "The bazooka i8 an excellent rpn a g a i ~ t th, hooser and p i l l - boxe8. Frequently enemy machine gunners located i n boasea wil l withdraw .h.n bazooka f i r e is directed against them. Every ran ahould be ab le t o f i r e t b bazooka i n %he event t ha t the regular bazooka man becoma a casualty.*--3gt %. Si-r, inb r i f l e eo, 30th EElf MI.

4. ? l a n . k i ~ ~ Fire. "The Gsrmma put t h e i r mall AT guns direot lg t o your f m n t t o draw your a t ten t ion while h i s 88's h i t yow. tk8 f r o m tha flank. W-a ham ferns lwses when the morts smoke our f lanks aa we jmp off.*--Lt, 31at Tk a.

5. Jnfornation t o Reaervm Wt. *Information m a t ge t baak t o the reserve u i t i n an at tack. l& pla t bas pa r t of the reserve oo i n the a t taak on CHUEMS. wa were thrown i n t o plug the gap ereated by diaorganizat im of mother unit , my flu wore etoppsd by the stmm AT d i t ah whiah had stopped it* I uould ham avoided thi8 ob8taels had I h o m o f its presence.*--Lt, 31et Tk Bn.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


* m t f 10 m r i e m O 8 a pub1i.M F.ad~'u thi8 h O C d ~ w t W 8 t o e d l 0 un i ta in tralnihg t o p ro f i t ear the l a t e s t oaabat expsriencaa of our troop8 nor f igh t ing tho Ci.rranr i n m o p . . ~ l t h o u g h the orp.rienco8 of aorta in unit8 a t a par t icu la r looation an not w m 8 8 a r i l y applicable t o a l l un i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o ~ , tho it- published w i l l be thoam bsrwd cm p r a o t i c i l exporieme and an reoara6pd.d f o r oaroful ooamideration \mit8 d i o h may enaourrter a i r i l a r problsr~e.. Reparta of corroboratir , o r contrary o ~ i o n a e 8 are par t iodlar ly desired i n ordm that tho va l id i ty of tho Indicated battle loaaon rag k detuminod.

C. R, LlrblDON Colonsl, AGD

Ad Jut ant General - - - I D I I - - n - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

R(rrE1 The fol lor ing, &rat ted f r a r t he roport of an 0 of a separate t k bn on an operation i n tho I t a l i a n theatro, contain8 an unusually detailed desariptlon af tho mchanias of proparing and conducting a combined d n o r effor t . Tho caaplete- noas of the planning and preparation I8 par t iaular ly notewartby. The act ion in- rol-d a roinforcod r i f l e 00, a p l a t of adiu tka, an ellgr dot and nino bn8 of -7.

1. )etiom om r o a e i ~ t of cod-. Dpoa m o i p t of ord-a f a r t h e operation, on 0-4, I went i r r d 1 a t . u a f t o r dark t o tho CP of tho i n f bo CO WQO a leo had jwt b e n aot i f iod. rn r d o a ton ta t iva outlimo of t b plapr of act ion and ngx-088 upon a request t o higher hq t o change tho tins of a t taak frca 1800 hours t o dam, i n order t o permlt tho approaah t o be nade r i r t u a l e undor aorsr of darkneae, but with sP i f ic ien t light t o permit t ho tankarm t o m e the f r iendly inf in f ion t of theaa. The recommendation w e 8 approved.

2. plnnniwz and reconnaissanue. A t our f i r s t conference the inf bn CG and I discuesed and %reed upon cer ta in de t a i l . connected with the following preliminary ~ t l P i t i ~ a r

a. Patrol l ing t o d e t e d n e the hos t i l e strength, obstaclee, mlne f i e l d s and avanuee of approaoh f o r both inf and tks ,

b. The preparation of gag8 in obstacles and mine f i e l d s , both f r iendly and enemy, and msrlring lanes through then.

c. Personal r cn by combs t o locate the prepared gape, become familiar with the t e r w i n and ensay positionm and,select tentat ive routes f o r the attack.

d. lS8tabli6hment of a aca a y s b betwoen l n f and t k camdra.

e. brr-enta f o r m k e oorsr f o r wi thdrsn l . f . ~ l o o t i n g locratiorrs f o r #pare t k m $0 taka tha glrcre of eq -ah l i g h t k

dieabled durlng the action. g. prepe r iw and distribut* omrlay8 of tho f i r e -port ,plan. h. lrixing a timb acbdu le fo r t he mo-nt fraa rear t o fornerd a8-bl3 4uoa8,

ao tha t t he t k m wauld not i n t d e m with the rarohiPq inf.

3. peconnalsaar ,~, ch b-3 I rent r i t h the t k oo o a r d r , p l a t e a d r , eeoh of U8 t k aorpdrs and the t k ran 0, t o tho iaf bm CP whore t k and inf a-8 disouaeed p l a ~ and operations. a l l went togqtbsr l a t e r i n the evening t o t b poaition from rhfeh the i n f would launch i t 8 attaok. Ik t h e e ohom. lmat iono f o r the t k rire gap and f o r a dug-in t k position, mob t k o c d r w a 8 8hom the ob jee t im , the maspeated loeation of enemy gun positiona and the approximate position eaeh t k rcmld take after p.seing through the wire. moh t k ctmdr w a s i rp re8d with the i rgortanw of keeping hi8 f i re In f ront of t h e advanaing id. The inf 0 rho rss t o pror id . the ' t k gaides worked with the t k ran 0 on their looatiom. le returned t o the inf CP and disauemd the at taak further i n the l ight of what we hed learned.

4. pehearnala, OIL D-2 rehmar8aln w e r e held i n a r e a r area om t e r r a i n vow sinilar t o that over whioh the a t t m k mu t o ba made. The moond reheareal w a a held a t dwk in order t o aonduct it under l i gh t oonditiona @mra l ly sirilar t o tho80 whioh would grerail during the actual operation. A l l obtained a r e w n a b l y exact p ic ture o f t & attaok plan, t o include the mthod of withdrawel. That night re a l l m e t again and disoused a number of questions that had uri8on a n g the r o h a ~ f ~ l , a r r iv ing a t a eat isfactory conolumion on a l l . Uter t h i e dlaclwion, my rcn 0 took Us gulden over the route and actual ly placed than i n the positiona they w o r e t o take.

5 J ? ~ e ~ k i m W e r -1- the night of O11 the g q 8- Pado in o\lr wire. T b t k ran o w a i n rent t o the forward posi t ion t o r w b a k the route and t o make cer ta in that the gape w e r e properly mde,

6. p n a l Dtaiis, On the night before the aetaok my t k p l a t cardr wont t o the inf ba CP and discuaaed l a s t minute d e t a i l s r i t h the inf co c c d r . Q q 8 i n the mlne f i e l d s w e r e albo made during tnis night and rarM r i t h white e w tape.

7. Eontrol, The t k co oomdr wont with the inf tm c o d r t o tho forward CP. fraa that point the inf co cumdr raa i n d l rec t radio oaa r i t h the tm and the t k oo coadr had d i rec t radio contaat r i t h the p l a t c c d r .

8. withdraral, The en t i r e operation worked eroothly end raa mooesaful. W the inf began i t a withdrawal the tks sometined i n posi t ion u n t i l not i f ied that the withdrawal had been cgmpleted. One t k rae h i t during the witMraral and ierobilizad. Since the mission of the operation had k e n aocaagliahed, i t waa decided t o destroy t h i s t k , r a the r than attempt t o re t r ieve it,

9. As8aul.t Gnn StlP~ort . l@ aaeerult gun p l a t , organizad in to two f i r i n g btrys each of three 103m home and three medium tk8 i n ind i rec t f i r i * posit lone f i r ed under the direation of tne d iv a r t y FDC u n t i l S h o w . It then reverted t o the tk bn control.and brought inmediate prearranged concsntrationa i n aocordanw r i t h reqwet8 of the wmdrs tranasritted through the t k bn campdr. The u e a u l t gun8 as well tw tbe tks aidad i n the withdrawal by f i r ing smoke t o f i l l gaps tha t developed i n t b a r t y a m e n .

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


#Battle m - r i e n o e s l a r e published regularly by t h i s headquarters t o enable un i t e i n t ra in ing t o prof i t from the l a t ea t combat erperiencas of our troops now f igh t ing the Germans i n Wlrope. Although the experiences of cer ta in un i t s a t a par t icu la r location e r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l un i t s i n a l l s i tuat ions , the item8 published w i l l be tnose based on p rac t i ca l experienea and are rec-ndrd f o r aareful consideration by u n i t s which may encounter s imi la r problem. Raports of' comoborative o r contrary erperienoes are par t icu la r ly desired i n order t ha t the va l id i ty of the indicated ba t t l e lesson mW be determined.

By command of Lieutenant General EUDLEYt C* R . X b C. R, wmW Colonel, AGD

Ad jutant Gexm~al ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------.- FIGHPrn IH TEIE s1- LINE

Note: Thia isaue of *Bat t le Ehperiences* consists en t i r e ly of obsm of 08 and m n of the 28th Div i n contact with the enemy i n t he Siegfried l i n e since 11 Sept, The t e r - r a in i n uhioh they have been operating contains many s teep h i l l s , samo a s high a8 515 msters, woods with thick underbrush, aad streaam, Consequantly it is generally poor t k country. Pillboxes a r e of 3 types - some w i t h one aperture, some with the AG emplacements and 2 apertures, and others used a s troop shel ters . Pil lboxes a r e of a density of approamately one per 100 yda i n width and depth and are mutually supporting. The en- has had excellent oban and an abundance of a r t y and mort support,

I RIFLE COMPANIES (Comments of four R i f l e Canpan. Cammenders)

1. Wvement. *Most of the pil lboxes seam t o be s i t e d f o r long range f i r e s , and onoe you get f a i r l y close there a r e qui te a feu dead spacea through which troops aan f i l t e r . Routes shouid e i t he r be viewed the previous day from a good OP o r a thorough map rcn made. It it3 best t o move across t he open ground from ridge t o ridge during tne hour just before daylight. Aa an example, Co B fought a l l one day and gained only 100 yds due t o extremely heavy mrt and' M: fire.. I n the hour before daylight the next morxing they covered 1000 yds without losing a man and took b pil lboxes wlzhout the a id of supporting wpns.

2. Supgort iw Weapons. ~ T k s o r TDs are excellent supporting q n s f o r t h e a t tack of pillboxes. They must, however, be closely followed by inf . The bazooka is a good upn and sometimes w i l l penetrate the a tee l doors on a pillbox.. The fleme thrower is a heavy piece of equipment and only good f o r a short time. It only takes a short squir t t o do t h e job. Conserve it and use it only when receseary. It may be needed on another pil lbox fur ther on,

3, Cooperation with mechanized s u ~ s ~ o r t . *$men tka o r TIM a re used, inf ahould be deployed i n posit ion t o r i s e and advanse with them a8 they paas t h r o w the inf position.

Inf m e t not be allowed t o s top because of mort o r a r t y f i r e f o r i f tw loee close contact with the tka they are more rulnarable and the demoraliziqg &feat ugon the enemy of an i d - t k aasau l t is los t .

4. assault tesars. .Re urn a 12 t o 16 man aaeault team. Bach man muat know h i s wpn and job, plus the rpn and job of everyone e l se i n the team (fl- tbrower, dam- l i t i o n charge, rocket launcher, e tc ) . We som9timbs ass ign eaoh r i f l e p l a t e fixed zone

'

of responsibi l i ty . Each p i l lbox bcorsra a phase l i n e f o r coordination and reorgani- zation. In many ins tances one p l a t can cause 2 or 3 pil lboxes t o wbutton upB by f i r i n g ' a t the embrasures, but the en- often oan continue t o f i r e through 8 m a l l slits i n the embrasure. h n must not forget tha t pil lboxes are mutually supportirrg. Inalude i n your plan f i r e on flanking pil lborne a s well as on those t o be cusaulted,

5. Use of e ~ o k e . .Never forget tha t a blind m a cannot .hoot s t ra igh t . Xake ttee of the 81mm mort and a r t y f o r UP and snroke, Smoke ean be uaed before the u ~ a u l t t o save the l ive8 of your men,

6 . Infantry and d i rea t r n v o r t i n g f i r e s , "he supporting d-at f i r e rpns ( t b , e t c ) should cease f i r e on p i l lbox apertures without s ignal when the inf oat106 within 25 yds of t h e pillbox. The infantrylnen nearest the aperture must iaPlPediate1.y take the aperture under f i r e t o insure i t s beily kept closed. Two flanking poupa of 3 o r 4 men each ehould take poeit ion i n r e a r of the p i l lbox t o cover the r e a r entrance and apertures. The support sqd must look f o r , and cover with f i r e , the embrasures i n the pil lboxes which are a i t ed t o support the pi l lbox being attacked. The re8 t of the co or p l a t should move past the p i l lbox and securethe ground beyond i t t o protect the assau l t team while it does i ts job.

7. ploee UP action. .A man should be worked i n close t o the pi l lbox t o throw i n a fragmentation o r RP grenade. When there i n a quiet manent he should ahout, WHemeradPW and B W i r schutzen nichtm (We won't shoot).. I f the en- doesn't surrender, uao r i f l e grenades o r the bazooka againat the steel door. o r q o r t u r e s . While a l l t h i a is under- way, other riflemen mast cover a l l f i r e port.. I

8. Dim- ~ 1 f the enemy doen not eurrender, some men mu8t work to the blind side of the pi l lbox and blow the embrasure with TNT. H t e r this, it is beat t o work f ran the top t o place a pole chargu againat the door. l e v e r allow anyone t o enter the excavated area t o the r ea r of the pi l lbox an i t is always cwered by a amall an- braeure b u i l t especial ly f o r t ha t purpoae, W e r no circumstance allow anyone t o enter the pil lbox t o take prieonera;, make t h u come t o you, Socnetiresta t m y rill claim t o be injured, but we have found tha t a f t e r a 8econd aharge of TWT they samebow manage t o walk out. When approaching these pil lboxes all persona should '6s warned againat 'ointment box' mines. They are very a m a l l , but very dangarous, (NOTE: This mine is a metal box 2w i n diameter and 1' thick, It telescope8 when 8bpped on, thur act ivat ing the 3 oz charge . )

9. other methods of knocking them a. ' If the above measure8 f a i l , a demoliticm charge can be used, t k s can b las t i n the rear of t he pil lbox, o r a t k doter ean oover the door and embrasures with d i r t . The UBO of t k dozer. may not prom m ~ c e s s f u l i n the future because the J e r r i e s are plant iag minea, some of them activated by remote control , a s a counter remsdy. The f l a a s throwor and pole charge method of a t taak proved qui te successful the one tim we w d it, The combination a t m t e d a f i r e i tr the i n t e r io r of t he pi l lbox among som am and the reeul t ing con fu ion made it eeay t o clean out.

iO. The 'W grenade. a Je r ry w i l l o f t en remain i n r i i u ho le a f t e r an embrasure :-as been blown out u n t i l persuaded t o leave by a flame thrower o r hand grenade. A hand grenade i n t h e v e n t i l a t o r of a p i l l b o x sometimes s t u n s the aoche but a KP grenade i n t h e same a i r s h a f t is a g r e a t l i t t l e r ev ive r ,

11. Precaut ion on sur render . * I f t h e eneay sur renders do n o t fo rge t t o keep the p i l l b o x covered and throw a grenade i n each room befcre e n t e r i n g ; t h e r e may be some men who d i d n ' t come out.

12. bkke them use less . n P i l l b ~ x e 3 should be demolished i i n e a i a t e l y a f t e r taking'as they m y be reoccupied. S i x p i l l boxes i n ou r po r t ion of the l i n e have had t o be taken t h r e e times. Blowiig of t h e ape r tu re and aoors does not ruake i t untenable. The p i l l b o x has t o be con2le te ly destroyed, r i g h t 5own t o t h e ground. Otherwise i f one wall is l e f t s tanding i t l eaves a p l ace t o f i g h t from, Tnerefcre, saieorie shcula fol low c l o s e behind with the equ ipm~nt t o c m p l e t e l y des t roy thaae pillboxes.

13. Prepare f o r countera t tack . * a f t e r t h e p i l l b o x i s taken everyme ~mst deploy t o the f r o n t and f l a n k t o guard aga ins t countera t tack and be prepared f o r the r a i n of mort and a r t y f i r e t h a t always follows. Con I t bunch up around pr i soners . Send most of then t o t h e r e a r a s quickiy a s p o s s i b l e , because we have had J e r r y shoot h i s own men r a t h e r tnan l e t thern b e taken pr i soners .

14. When t o prepare, 'Attacks should s top i f poss ib l e a t l e a s t one hour before d a r h e s s , even earlier i f poss ib l e ao a proper defense can be s e t up; the Ze r r i e s w i l l push a s t r o n 9 countera t tack ju s t a f t e r dark and i f you a r e no t organized they w i l l pash you o f f your hard-won ground.

15. .Where and how t o prepare. nIf you a r e t o occupy t h e pos i t i on d ig ycur men i n &-cud and i n between t h e pillbc,xes. Zae t h e ; i l l box : as 5 r . s s f 2osiLion tc r e l i e v e y=?r men from t h e i r f i gh t ing pos i t i ons . Can't l e t the enand c c x i t e r a t t a s k m d z a t c k ysu bmched i n a p i l lbox . Enemy combat p a t r o l s may send one c r two men around your f l ank tc kncck out your M G e when they a t t a c k from the f r o n t , Do not become so i n t e r e s t e d in f i r - h g pa t h e m i n a t t a c k t h a t yc;a neglec t t o wa"Yrk 3:mr f l d i z ~2 re=.

10 . Smashing t h e counterat tack. "man c o u r t e r s t t a c k s have been made a u r l c g dark- neaa and preceded by a 1st of s c r e m i n g and t a l ~ i i g , It I s ~ e r v a - r a c k i n g t c t roc?s t h a t know they do no t have a well organized p o s i t i o n . I f , however, t he t roops a r e i n a stxmong p o s i t i o n and experienced, i t inerely makes them a l e r t and -she a t t a c k u s u a l l y su f fe r s . oCm i l l u m i n a t i n g s h a l l a a r e good against t n e s e a t i acke . hold your f l r e u n t i l , ' c r y canes i n c lose , then cut h m down in your FPL. Use 2 l e c t y of grenades, f ragmextat ion axd

Wken he r e t r e a t s fo l low h b with f i r e and y o o r i f l e fr-entation grenades#

17. General rules. Tlie r e g t has found tne follc,wir;g gene ra l r u l e s applicable in our zone 1

a, P o l e o r s a t che l charges must conta in a t l e a s t 3 C l b s mT. b. Besaul t teams cannot be given just one p i l l b o x but rrarst be prepared t o t ake what-

ever p i l l b o x e s a r e i n t h e i r zones. This is because m p a do n o t skow a l l xhe pi l iboxea. c, SP TDs a r e e s p e c i a l l y valuable i n f i r i n g 0:: l;i41boxes f a r t h e r away than tkose un-

der immediate a t t ack . Towed TDs and AT guns are of Less use due t c enemy a r t y anC 30rt f i r e ,

6, Smoke i s d e s i r a b l e only i n sane ina tances , e. Light a r t y f i r e has no e f f e c t on p i l lboxee , b u t time f i r e causes persc:rael arc!m2

t h a n t o r e t i r e ina ide . f . The flame thrower i e used very l i t t l e . Er m o s z cases t h e meo carrj-ing it are ~ o i

a b l e t o ge t w i th in good f i r i q dis tance. - 3 -

g. ,Qsssult cos cannot t a k e t g e t b e t o d e s t r c y o r occupy p i l l b o x e s ; t r c o p s i m e d i - a t e l y i n r e a r c% t h e a s s a u l t bn should mop up and occupy t h e grcund.

16. E;xEtnple. The f o l l o w q example o f a r i f l e co a t t a c k occurred on l j Sept : a. UWe a t t acked a h i l l on which were 3 p i l l boxes . Due t o heavy fog , ou r TLs could

not f i r e b u t by 0730 we were w i th in 50 yde of t h e p i l l b o x e s , b. V e t hen moved c lose encugh t o t h e p i l l b o x e s t o b r i n g f i r e on t h e a p e r t u r e , caus-

iw i t t o c lose. Tiis t w k e BWSi and a couple of rifleoler,, '#hen t h e a p e r t u e was closed we moved around t o the back o f t h e p i l l box . Thoee men not gar% o f t h e a s s a u l t s e c t i o n mved out beyond t h e p i i l b o x e r and secured t h e h i l l which was o u r ob j ec t ive . The assau l t teaa3e were l e f t t o reduce t h e p i l l b o x e s . Tha teams then c losed i n on t h e p i l l b o x e s from t h e rear. We c a l l e d f o r t h e Germans t o su r r ende r but they fired a few s c a t t e r e d s h o t s in r e t u r n . We t h e n f i r e d two bazooka rounds i n t o t h e doors e t t h e rear of the box. T t e ba- zooh and a couple 3f hand grenades thrown through the aoc r s b s o ~ g h 2 tkim oilt i n t h e oper. T~2i.a happen& t o t a ~ of t h e p i l l b o x e s , We had f o u r p r i sone r s from cne and six from t h e o the r .

c. "Ttle $bird p i l l b o x , however, p resen ted a b i t of a roble lea because t he e n m y re - fused t o come o u t of it. A couple of bazooka rounds f i r e d a t t h e doors and a couple of hand g r s r ades thrown through t h e door drove t h m f r o n one room t o a c o t h e r . F i n a l l y they were d r i v m i n t o t h e room h e r e t h e ape r tu re was and a s n o r t b u r s t cf t h z flame thrower b-wught trim c;ut. We l e f t t h r e e men i u t he v i c i c i t y cf the : i l lbox and. t h e r e s t of the men m v e d up with t h e i r p1atoon.u

1. Tracers. V y us ing only a few t r a c e r s a t t he begimi,ag cf each b e l t w e have fom.d t h a t t h e gas draw l e s s a r t y and rnort f i r e than by us ing the usual 4 anc Z load. Sane NCOs b e l i s v e we should e l imina t e t r a c e r a l t oge the r .

2. Close suppor t ing machine wns. 'In t h e a t t a c k we have used a s e c t i ~ n of heavy i n support cf each a s s a u l t co. The i r miss ion i s to p r o t e c t %k.e $lark2 of t h e bra. When the atttzlck succeeds they may come up c l o s e r t o ccursr t h e s s o r g ~ - ; i ~ w i t i o n cc t h e ob j ec t ive . *en t h e aTtack is resumed they drop back t~ carry out t h e i r f l d s ecu . r i t y mission. If they get t-,:,q close t o t h e a s s a u l t co t hey cannot accomplish t h i s and they draw nort. c r a r t f i r e on t h e a s s a u l t t roops . Af t e r r e a c h i w a f i r a i o b j e c t i v e we l i k e t o draw t h e B I G aec- t i ona into t he cen t e r o f t h e two E o r a ~ r d cos mL l ~ t t h e U C s take t h e f l . e ! a ,

3 . brig rawe machine guns. BThe o t h e r p l a t of I-lhriCa should i f m s s i b l e foPlvw t h e a s s a u l t cos n e a r o r i n *cnt of t h e support co. 'Ihey should be g i v m the missior? of i o n g range and cverh-d fire, They mst not f i r e u n l e s s they have a t a r g e t ; t h e y .mst c o t u s e t r a c e r s ; they must change p o s i t i c n a . f t e r a few b u r s t s ; t h e y n u s t gu t one s e c t i o n abcve t h e o+,her when ground pr;:.its; t h e supp9r-L co rmsi. p ro t ec t i L a - c w i t h a sqd fro= she aup- por t p l a t ; t h e p l a t lcn' mist bs given f reedon of m v e m e ~ t and tec i s -or? by tkie cc ccn(&, e s p e c i a l l y as t o a i s p l a c i r i forward.

4. Lacnine wns f ~ r sdppcr t r i f l e company_. V f t h e s u 2 p ~ r t c c i s cor,mittcd w e seize-

t imes a t t a c h the loog rerize and overhead p l a t o r &t least a s e c t i c n o f i t t c ; t h i s cu , ~f one s e c t i o n gces with t h e s a p ~ c r t co the remaining s e c t i c n can cont inue t h e lorig ra-nga GI:

~ v e r h e a 6 rnf.esicr, ~ r ' 2(5 ~ i l ~ v e 2 forward t o tLe c : ~ de le j rec . ky :;,",,c heav ie s t f ~ e , r:r sL:p~c.rt; i t by f i r e from vhere i t i s ,

5. bhchine gun3 io defense. When i t has b e 5 2 necessary t c defead we have fo~xid it q u i t e difficult t o establisl: f 'icah gro tsc t l .ve i i r ss b e c a ~ s ? r,f the h i l l y terraii;. Ue have placed t h e M u t o p r c t e c t file flanics a;d evexoes o f a&i.rsacb i ~ t c a u r positicns, .& ,

rear s l o p e defense seems t o be t h e zest p r a c t i c a l as extremely e c c a s a t e a r t y f i r e a a k e z a forward s l o p e almost untenable ,

6 . Contro l of mortars . ~ c o n t r b i of t h e 8 h mort4pla t 1s by SG? 300. Giving tfie p l a t l d r one of these sets pe rmi t s each mort obsr with a r l f l e so comLr t~ c a l l f o r f l r e d i r e c t , over t h e r i f l e co SCR 300. The hv wpna co conidr e x e r c l s s s any necessary con- t r o l by us ing t h e SCR 300 of t h e bc c m d r ,

7. Displacement. MThe mort p l a t l d r rmst be given g r e a t freedom of 5 e c i s i c 2 a8 t o movement. He d i sp l aces q n s forward only when necessary t o remain i n c l c s e support as t h e movement of am i e a d i f f i c d l t problem.

8. Mortars i n reorganizat ion. Vpon r e o r m n i z a t i o n t h e 81mm p l a t moves up D e a n .

t h e cen te r of t h e bn zone and is immediately prepared t o l a y pro tec , t ive f i r e s , o r h i t t a r g e t s of opportuni ty. W k e is ready i f needed and r c n is made f o r f b r t h e r moveme~it. I f t h e f i n a l o b j e c t i v e is reached, de fens ive f i r e s a r e g i o t t e d acd s e c u r i t y - espec ia l - l y t o t h e r e a r and f l a n k s - i s gu t ou t o r requested.

9. E f fec t iveness of mor ta r f i r e . W e have found our HE heavy w i l l no t e . l W n a t e p i l lboxes . I have eeen d i r e c t h i t a on them ine f f ec t ive . Hcwever, a round o r two of smoke around them wi th a far rounds of l i g h t r i g h t behind causes c a s u a l t i e s among t h e enemy whc seams t~ always p lace a gun o r twc o r a few covering P i f l e n e n around a p i l l b o x o r an em- placement, Also we f i r e on t e r r a i n above o r dominating a p i l l b o x - t h e enamy w i l l be found t h e r e alcro. It i s a l s o a good idea t o throw some smoke on a hays tack o r z l u r q o f bushes on a r idge . We have loca ted seve ra l enemy OPs i n t hese harmless looking p laces ,

10. 3 s e of p e r s c u e l . U t h e a t t a c k we use t h e instrument c p l s f o r In . The p l a t s do not send a runner t o co. They 'need every man. We use the T c p l s and d r i v s r s as car ry ing p a r t i e s when needed."

1, Targets. #!The 57mm AT gun has been used t o p l ace f i r e on the r i a g e l i n e t o the Fear of t h e a t t a c k i n g i n f and on embrasures of p i l l boxes and t a r g e t s of o p i o r t u n i t y , Targets o f opport imity included h a l f - t r a c k s , personnel , M G s , AA g u n s , morts and AT wpz6.

2, P repa ra t ion needed. WThe towed AT gun has l i t t l e chance of g iv ing any close- in support to t h e a t t a c k i n g i n f un le s s t ne amount of enemy f i r e frm mort8, a r t y , AT gum, and AA guns can be g r e a t l y reduced by a thorough a r t y p repa ra t ion and vigorous counter- b a t t e r y f i r e .

3 . HE needed. I f i r e on t a r g e t s of o p p o r t u ~ i t y r e q u i r e s a cont inuous supply of FA. The use of Qp f o r t a r g e t s of t h i s n a t w e is ra s t e f i a l axid x u a l l y of l i t t l e e f f e c t . @

IV INFAKEFtY GAKNON (Cornants of W r L o n b p a n y Commander).

1. S e l e c t i o n of pos i t i ons . 'It rnust be remembered t h a t when a p o s i t i o n is s e l e c t e d i t must be one t h a t provides a wide s e c t o r of f i r e and a l lows d e l i v e r y of c lose- in f i r e f o r t h e f r o n t l i n e . I n one ins tance R mask prevented u s from f i r i n g c lose- in f i r e s , making necessary a change i x i g i n pcsiotcns, We s l a c s e l e c t our p o s i t i o n s so t h a t i n t h e event of a countera t tack we ca;l p iaze f i r e on the p s i t i o n occupied by our t roops. A l t e r n a t e p o s i t i o n s must be se l ec t ed b:cal~.~€? i f m c h n igh t f i r i n g i a done t h e enemy w i l l soon l o c a t e your pos i t i on .

2. Use of time f i r e , @We have Fized a, hzrge encunt of time fuze. It i s a n e x c e l l e r t method of a d j u s t i n g fi-rs ic ~ o o d s and in t k e e a r l y morning, e s p e c i a l l y if t h e fog i s t h i c k . We have had t o use ire I -,e faze GL; aue t o t h e s c a r c i t y of WP smoke, Time f i r e i s e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t open e:qlece--s:-~~s 7h;t stirround almost every p i l l box .

In one instance one of our FOs f i r e d with 6 4 fuze with the plan i n mind of aausing a graze buret i n f ron t of the pi l lbox, causing the f r q p e n t s t o en te r the aperture of the box. This has proved suacesaful but demands a precision reg ie t ra t lan . She l l heat rill not crack the pil lboxes i n our sector.

3. &Laison. *It i e most important t o maintain conatant In betreen the gun posi- t ions and the bne - especially a t night. In the event of enemy ac t iv i t y a t night the C n Go In O can o f f e r suggestions t o the bn S-3 a8 t o which concentrations can be f i r e d with bent e f fec t . The Cn GO comdr should contaat the bn S-3's eaoh day and o f f e r aug- geations a s t o f i r e s f o r the night and in te rd ia tory f i r e s . He should a lso g e t t he bn plan of p a t r o l s and other night ac t i r i t i e e .

4. Forward Obeervsrs, 'FO's tend t o get too f a r forward - with the foremost elements of t he r i f l e coa. When pinned down the FO cannot observe and often cannot use the SCR 300 because the long mtenna draws addi t ional f i r e . We ham used the method of l eapf rogging from one point of oban t o the other and have been able t o d i r ec t f i r e on enemy ~ p ~ . - ~ ~ t i o n when it presents i t e e l f . W; have adjusted f i - e through FO1s ex- clusively since we arrived i n France.

5. Pire aontrol. 'The SCR 300 is very ea t i s fac tory f o r com 'between obsr and gun position. A r e l ay s ta t ion was necessary only when the radios were masked by gul leys or denae mode. We are experimenting with 610ea, mounted i n jeeps, a s re lay a t a t l ons one 610 a t the gun posit ion and one near the bn CP a8 r e l ayon

V PKE3OI;LINC AND JXlTLJJGBJCE (Comment8 of Inte l l igenae Officers)

1.. Canmon mistakes, flm have f omd camon pa t ro l l ing e r ro r s t o be: a. Returning without accomplishing mission. b. Engaging i n a f i r e f i g h t contrary t o ordere. c. Failure t o send prompt repor t s of resu l t8 t o higher echelons.

2. Remedies, .To eliminate these d i f f i c u l t i e s , the reg t ansigned pa t ro l l ing missions f o r each night - simple ones a t f i r s t , gradually inareaaing i n d i f f i c u l t y and importance. Schools ware conducted behind the l i n e s t o t r a i n inexperienced men.

3. Help f r o a p r i ~ o n e r e , 'BP?, found 2% valuable t o w e the 1/25,000 map with the defense overprint t o f a c i l i t a t e gin-poin%fna?; of posi t ions by Geman prisoners. They could point out +heir pil lboxes and tho- oacapied By t h e i r comrades.

4. Observer information. @Our CP 0-8 have watobd Oeneanr rePDain in pi l lboxer fo r aeveral days, c d n g out only t o get food from f i e l d s m d farmhauses. The Gowan8 w i l l get careless i f t h q do not know you are observing and w i l l start f i r e s i n t he pillboxes and mods. They occasionally shoot f l a r e n f r a n the pi l lboxes t o help them spot patro1s.n

VI AMMMITION AND PICSES4 PUTOOlQ PRACTICILS (Camento of Platoon ~ a d e r )

1. Battal ion distributinct ~ o i n t r , .We keep eaoh c o t s em loaded on t h e i r o m wpn carr iers . In t h i s way we can es tab l i sh a forward D1P and a r ea r DP. The forward CB is usually close t o the bn CP. The r e a r is some distance behind with the balance of the bn vehicles.

2. W r y i n g part iee. *We t r i e d pack boards but the men did not l ike thsm. The carrying p a r t i a s can carry as much i n both arms, and i f it beaomsa neaesaary t o f i gh t , i t is easy t o drop t h e i r load8 and take up the f igh t . Carsying p a r t i e s hare been iolraed fram replacements going forward t o the cos.

3. Ammuftion reserve. m~ever- l e t your feessve am g a t lor on the ta, bt om time the ASP was ninety miles from our posit ion,

4. ? i r i s ion of dutiae, divided the mi end pion pa a t 2nto three groups. Ore sgd operates the m$ne &teetors , One is w e d as %Q am sqd ant) the o t h r is used for other p i m duties* The En Cot's vehicle and m d l c vehicle ' k t P e a mine deteator . The drivere have been t rained i n t h e i r uss 80 they aaa aheck suepected meas.?

1. Snpplp ser~eaxats, *We found i t adaisable t o have supply agte r i a i t t h e i r co CP once daily regardless of the d i f f i cu l ty i n getting h a k and fcrth*

2. Supply by carrying parta . *%he s i t ua t i on generalby required ~amyiag 8uppPPea fran 400 t o 1500 yds t o the troopr. A p r i o r i t y of supplies waa eet up rn follorrrg 0x4 , am, ra t ions , PX ra t ions , blanketa and she l te r halrss , K - l materiale, new clotlnirig, and water. Water raa given l o r p r i o r i t y baause of i t 8 weight, The water augply problem was ~ o l v e d by t&hg forward empty eaaa and a chlorinating s o ~ u t i o n . tSss f i l l e d these water a m 8 from nearby streams cnad p u r i f i e d their r a t e r with the c h l s r i n a t . 3 . ~ eolution. RigB: lossee i n water cans waa experienced as a r e s u l t sf shell fragments and P4: f i re , .

3. papply requests. *Requests f o r supplies by carrying party m a t b m a d s 24 honra in advance; the i n d i d d u a l making the reoatzest m u t be i a f o m d of the p r i o r i t l e a a s tha t ha can properly proportian Ufl rrsqueata,

4. Formation of carrying par t ies , *Normalby carrying g a r t l e w COKB be mde up Of separate co d e t a i l s bat due t o h e a v c m a l t i e s i ~ ons h i t w w neceeaary t c form a bn carrying par ty , comiet ing of drivers, s t raggle re , and men replaaemento, It wae found by t h i s $n tha t it t w k 60 nrsn t w o t r l p a night ly t o raeupply t h e i r unit. TBs idea cf using replacements f o r carrying par t iea for ra rd p s a ~ s d eucaesaful as it Boon aacustorned them t o opwatlng in the d m h e s e end to f r o n t :lac f:+~n.'*f tiom,

5 . Farrying blanket r o l l s , *The practioe of going i a t o a s a i t i a l p~aess of ac t ion without a one blanket r o l l a t l e a s t , i n t h i s reather , proved a 8~rioue h-iaag. !&ken i t became necsseary t o mve r o l l s forward under combat conriitisns it was found t h a t the m a t e f f i c i e n t system was t o r o l l a s m n y blaakete and nisceklaneoua s i z e s of ahoes, i f neceeaary, i n t o a one-man load ra ther than s ing l e blanke% r o l l s o r sqd r o l l s . Yer- sonal a r t i c l e s mmt nevor be included i n rolls since the r o l l s c r s frequenzly re-ra l ied by personnel other than the owner.

6. E e c t f o n f o r aarryina par t iee . *Carrying pa r t i e s saould aeves be allowed ts operate without riflemen f o r protection and these r i f l e guard8 should not be cargo bearera of any sor t . One bn operated carrying p a r t i e s succeesfully by organizigg them for ra rd and sending thcrm t o rear, ra ther than t he reverse.*

VIII MEDICAL ~A~ EXPB?3ENCE3 (CoPrments sf Roglmenta Wgeon)

I. A I ~ e t a t i s n radios. *We h a e a radio i n eech m aid a ta tas9 operating i n t h e i r reepeotim bn netr . This has enabled us t o pe-t l i t t e r bearers t o r e s t f rapuent ly and remain on a d 1 at the aid s t a t i on inr taad of continuouely esarshing the f i e l d f o r cas - ual t ies , ~ a c h co l a able t o a a l l f o r l i t t e r bearera as required. The l i t t e r bearerr

r i d e fcrward an t h e jeeg as f%r aa poee ib l s , then go on f o o t t o t h e c a s u a l t y and br ing him t o t h e jeeg - which g e t s the c a s u a l t y r a p i d l y t o t h e e i d a t a t i o n s If t h e r e are nnny c a s u a l t i e s t he l i t t e r bea re r s e s t a b l i s h a c o l l e c t i n g po in t a t a p o i n t a c c e s e i b l e t o t h e jeep, and t h e jeeg ambulance then Can quickly t r a n s p o r t t h e P a t i e n t 8 t o t h e a i d s t a t i on .

2. p a c u a t i , , , , a h o t h e r of our p r a c t i c e s i s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e bn a i d a t a t i o n where the ambulances ce- come t o it, I k r i n g p e r i o d s of heavy c a s u a l t i e s t h e l i t t e r bea re r s of the o o l l co a- used ahead c f the a i d a t a t l o n t o he lp clear t h e f i e l d . We bs l i evu i t would be dea i r b l e t o have r e g t l corn t o t h e sugpor t ing c c l l C O D Such can would a l low more a c c u r a t e co, -t t han the u n c e r t a i n method of ambulance I n which is aot .a lwaya s a t i s f a c t o r y in r ep id moves,@

bX COLBEJNICAl'IOE.' (Comente of R e g b e n t a l Chxamnicatioe Off icer

Addi t iona l F ~ ~ O B @ 'We issue two e x t r a ~CR'300s t o each bn, one f ~ r t h e AT p l a t of t ha hq co a&. one f o r each bn a i d s t a t i o n . %en cn p l a t s are a t ehd t o bna each p l a t i s g iven two 300s and they e n t e r t h e bn n e t . 'Ibia p u t s t he cn p l a t s wi th in reach of a l l co csmdrs a s wel l a s t h e bn comdr. We are going t o g i v e our r e g t l s u g an 284 t o c a l l t h e c o l l co f o r o x t r a ana aces when neededsa

1. Generrl. #The g r i n c i p l e s of a s s a u l t i n g f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s as tal-lghe a t t h e lhg ineer School and at Assaul t Tra in ing Center i n t he :J;.K, are sound. This was damn- a t ~ a t e d when s n a t t w k p i n which i n f , a r t y , t k s , SP Bw-bl?l$, .mi! engra ware we19 coordi- na tad , succeeded beyond expec ta t ions , It d i f f e r e d from our a s m u - l t t r a i n i n g fa two r s s p e c t s , the J a r r i a s were t h e r e and the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s were more than p i l l b o x e s , they were f o r t s ,

2. Desc r ip t ion of l a r g e p i l l box . #In large p i l l b o x e s , wall8 aad roofa a r e s i x t o seven f t t h i c k and t h e rmofs are r e in fo rced w i t h 128 1-beema. There a r e u s u a l l y f o u r t o seven rcoms, al-th heavy c ~ m e c t ~ n g s t e e l doorsh . & b r a s c a .p lates are 4)~ a t e e l , h pole charge won't eAuays d r i v e t h e J e r s i e s cu t . 'iTe b:ew one box f r w t h e i n s i d e , u a i n g 330 l b s of TlfjT placed i n an inner room, and after t h e explosiora a J e r r y walked out .

; I Use of explosives. WThe d e s t r ~ i c t i o n of ficnt line m g l a c m e ~ t s i a e lon , h c k - 'nrea;rir,b work f o r t h e eag r s , kxplosives mst be cs r r i ed i n , u m a l l y crawled in. We ha-gs dsea packboards borrowed from t h e i n f , 1.Be haversack f o r denu l i t i on block bl-I. - these a r e e x c e l l e n t - ar?d sand bags s lung i n p a i r s cvsr t h e _shoulders."

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP


mmmttla bcperisnom. a m publinlted regular ly by t h i r headquarters t o ennbla unit8 la t r a in l ag t o p ro f i t f r a tbe 1ata.t oombat argariencas of our troops now f ight ing the c 3 o n ~ 1 ~ i n m p a . Although the eqxwioncea of cer ta in uni t8 a t a par t icular loaation a r m not n a a a ~ a r i l y applicabla t o a l l un i t8 in all 8i tuat iona, tbb itam pnbliahod rill k tho80 batad on pract ioal axperienoe and an raegp.ynded fo r carafn l oonsidaratioa units which aay enocmntar aimilar problem. RaPQFt8 of wrrobora t i r s or contrary eqnrriencas are par t icu la r ly &sir& in o r d a tht t b r a l i d i t y of the 1ndioat.d b a t t l e leraon re^' be QtaFsliW.

a- of ~ i e u t e n a n t General ERADLQr

C. R. m n Colonel, YID

Adjutant General , , , , , , - , - - , - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - L L L L L L - - -

1. .When a t k on whiah id ir r id ing I8 Inroekd out thm id ahcmld i r p e d i a k l y mmnt a w t h e r tk. So more than 4 parp rhould r i b on one tk. A greator ~umbor rry prersat mvammnt of the turmt When tk8 attnek i n r a m 8 the machine g~nnas i n the r e a r t k s must be careful to amid h i t t i n g tho m n on the 1- tk8.m--GO Co .B., 33d - mw m.

2. .when m w inf on th. r a a r do& of 7atr tk8 through tomu k mre that the t k r la r ea r do not f i r e their borr garu 88 the bu l le t8 rill gl8noo o f i bulldl438 .and i n f l i c t o rnra l t i e8 wly your o m id..--Lt, 31nt Tk B4.

1. *The a f f ec t of delay fuse on prepared e n s q p o a i t i o n a wan not appreciatad -ti1 reoantly. Obnra reported tha t when delay fuze w a s naed i n a coneantration it brought the en- out i n t he o m end enough ricocbstr were present f o r aama l ty effact . It is k l i e r s d tha t i n f i r i n g against dog I n pori t ions a t l aaa t 9% d e l q should be used - especially i n the lwditm and hoary oaliberr. The enemy dwouta with overhead corsr could aa s i ly w i t h 8 t . n d the e f fec t of tbe and impact b u r ~ t e , bnt the delayed aation bursts t o re i n to t h e posi t iolu and brought.tbb epaqy out.

2. .A medim a r t y tm and a l igh t bn t a d ug on s e m r a l oeaaaionr f o r greater caaualt7 effact . liter looating a bunker tho ~ I X M bn would f i r e a r o l l e r of delay tuze t o dsirs the anew in to the open. The list bn would f i r s tW a h a l l i n to the area about 30 second8 1atar.n--LC?.ktoard Report from I ta ly .

nmery effor t wna made t o have FOB n n l i z o tha a r a i l a b i l i t y and ralw o f t b varied cal iber wpm within their mator . Pmaision a d j u s W n t 8 of U n horn w e n mada, durfng pamrw8 In tne attack, an pi l lboxer , bunkered h o m e and o t m r obataclae that would hold qg tne next advanoe of the in?, Light and medium a r ty would have l i t t l e e f f aa t OR streh tug.ts. A t f i r e t obers seldcm tnought of ar realizod tne aaa i l ab i l i t y of any guns exmpt tnose of the i r o m unizs. Latar they callad f o r a aaliber t o taka ear@ of the job t o be done. The i n f oaught on too, and on 8mver.l oaoasiona requested f i r e by aaliber. The use or hear~l ca l iber a r ty i n c lose o?qporting destruction a s - aiona i e a bQ help i n breakin& dom en- resietanae.*--AGF Board report from I ta ly .

1, n- and mart smoke are inraluabla doring daylight, but I am a f i n a believer i n the uao of n n a t u r a l amke', 1.0.. the periods of low r i S i b i l i t y i n ear ly morning and l a t e e rsn iw. The en- f igh t8 stubbornly a t longar r6mgos. but his rill t o f i g h t quiokly diaappeara a t the bqonet point. The choapeet way t o get from IC range t o bayonet range is us- the omer of darkness of ear ly morning a+i l a t e evening d a t a , I am not r e f e r r ing t o a caaplicatad night a t taak, but d the t a e t i a of using perioda of l o r r i s i b i l i t y fo r approaching en- posit ions. I& bn aomdrs are enthu- s i a s t i o over tais aye t s r and f ind t h a t it lessens the e f fec t of the enemy's mutual support- f i r e s and prevents ear ly dirreipation of our e t r iking forae.

2. *In one inetanoe I had two Goen r i f l e cos which needed a shor t , auccesaful f i gh t t o weld them in to ccmbat units . I del iberate ly held then i n reoerrs although t h e i r objective was obrioru moat of the day, because the open t e r r a i n thFough which they had t o pass t o reach tha t o b j e o t i n mas c-ded by the f i r e of a etrong point i n the zone of an adjoining rogt. Ilhen l a t e i n the day t n i e strong point had f a l l e n , these t w o new coa quickly and cheaply pursed through tho open t e r r a i n under corer of l i a i t e d r i s i b i l i t y and took t h e i r o b j e e t s ? . ~ ~ l i ke an experienced out f i t . They a re good r i f l e cos now--both they elad I know.l--CO, 121et In?.

1. mchlne gunners, 'kst machine gunners f i r e too long b u r s t s . This r e su l t8 i n exoesaivu e k e , duet, and scamtimea steam, thereby diaolosing the gunner's poei- t i an , Suoh l o w burst8 a l so r e s u l t i n wild f i r i n g unleea followed by re-laying. The r a t e of f i r e rhould not be reduced, but b e t s of not more than 5 rbunde are Bpore e f f ec t i t s .

2. Eot i f icat ion of jumboff timq. 'Higher hq should always not i fy adjacent m i t e i f a ce r t a in un i t doer not jrrap off on ti- when making a coordinated attack. Fai lure t o do t h i s haa remilted i n near d i sas te r t o uni te which at tack on time. Ano.ther mistake often made i e t h a t of attaoking a t the samg hour every day fo r aamraa4. days --Jer'ry soon g e t s r i m and ge t s set a t tha t hour.*--C0 1st Bn, 26th Inf, 1st Diva

Repmducedby Engr Repro Def . 12.4 6 ,

TWELf TH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES No. 6 0 8 OCT 1944

'Bett le Experiences* are published regularly by t h i s headquarters t o enable uni te i n t ra ining t o p r o f i t frcra the l a t e s t combat experience8 of our troops now f igh t ing the Germane i n IPurope. Although the experiences of cer ta in u n i t s a t a par t icu la r location a re not necessarily applicable t o a l l units i n a l l e i t ua t iom, the items published w i l l 6e those baaed on pract iaal experienae and are recamended fo r careful consideration by un i t s which may encounter similar probluu . Reports of corroborativm or contrary experience8 are par t icu la r ly desired i n order tha t the va l id i ty of the indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.

camand of Lieutenant General BRADLEY*

C. R. .LANDON Colonel, AGD

Adjutant Oeneral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

* W i n g an at tack against a f o r t i f i e d hill the ao c d r of the reserve co brought h i s co in to the l i ne a t 0700 hours. He personally led a t tacks with SA, hand grenades and bayoneta u n t i l wounded i n the aplp a t 1000 hours. Refusing t o be evaouated he led another a t tack and waa cut off . Tha Germans demanded h ie surrender and upon h i s re- fusal attaaked. Standing up hs ki l led four Oennans, f i r i n g hi8 aarbine with hie good hand. He continued t o lead the a t taak u n t i l 1800 houre when moat of the h i l l w a s clear , and then went t o the OP and adjusted a r t y f i r e for two houre before he allowed himself t o be evaauated-*--Extracted f run an 8th Inf document.

OPrnbTI014S IN THE SIEFRIED LD'q

1. Prior planning. *Using the mosaic eupplied by corps, supplemented with oblique photoa, eaah co i n the bn.conetructed a sand tab le rep l ica , t o scale , of i t 8 zone of action. lill 08 and HCOs studied it u n t i l thoroughly faml l ia r with every de t a i l . bssault teams were a l so rehearsed on s imi la r t e r r a in i n the rear. 'Fhia t ra in ing proved invaluable..*--C0 1st Bn, 117th Id.

2. p iver croaaing. *In our area tba WURM River has very ateep bank. 6 t o 7 f e e t high and i a about 3) f e e t deep and 10 t o 15 f e e t wide. To f a c i l i t a t e cronsing by troop8 several three-section foot bridge. were construated, 12 f ee t long and 2 f ee t wide. m o seationa were placed a t a s l an t , one on each bank, extending from the bottom of the r iver t o the top of the bank. The t h i r d sect ion wae plaaed ae a bridge between the other two.*--CO, 1st Bn, 117th Inf.

3. Breechiwc wire. *The only r i r e obstacle found along the German border con- s i s t ed of two rows of double apron fenae with concertina between the rows. We blew gaps i n it with 4.2 morte using 703 rounds of HE t o make two gaps.'-4-3, 30th XIS Div.

4 Trenches outs ide of pillboxes. * W s t p i l lboxee had foxholes f o r We dug on t h e t h r e e a ides not covered by an embrasure. Riflemen were found i n most of tho- occupied -- our a r t y and mart- f i r e apparently having prevented the W 8 from being b o u g h t up.l--+3, 30th Inf Mv.

5. ~ e f e n s i r e f i r e e . *I frequently have my a r t y bn CO prepare the f i r e plan f o r the employment of a l l upns l a rge r than t h e 81mm mort, t o include the i n d i r e c t f i r e s sf t h e 4.2 m o r t , AT co and TDa. Thi8 procedure saves dupl ica t ion of e f f o r t and make8 f o r b e t t e r coordination of f i r e s . * - 4 0 9th Inf Regt..

*Regardless s f the i n i t i a l formation, it i s not e e e e n t l a l t h a t tke and inf keep t h e i r r e spec t ive pos i t ions i n an assaul t . A t k must s t o p t o f i r e e f f e c t i v e l y but t h a t i e t h e time f o r the in f t o prese on. The in f x& be stopped by bG f i r e and i f the enemy AT defenses are i n e f f e c t i v e t h e t k s should p ress on. Both armrs must r e a l i z e tha t the f a c t t h a t one s t o p s is not necessa r i ly a reason f o r the other t o atop,*-- Report of XIX Corps..

IV ~gcmT3NM)US COMMENTS

1. Snipers r i f l e , # I f e f fec t ive use l a t o be made sf t h i s wpn t h e sniper must be considered a e p e c i a l i s t -- not a f r o n t l i n e rifleman. Snipers 8hould be oarefizlly sc lec ted and not allowed t o t rede t h e i r r i f l e f o r an M-1 b e c a u e of its grea te r f i r e - power ,* - -~~ , 1st EZI, 26th 1nf.

2. Successive enemy a t tacks . ' I f an enemy a t t ack againat a unit on nty f lank is repulsed, I always ge t out my em a s he rill usually h i t my pos i t ions next. On one occaaion when I w a s defending a large h i l l the enemy a t tacked succeeeively every ps- s i t i o n on the hill.*--CO, 1st Bn, 26th Inf ,

3. K1 r i f l e . *The Oermans have a very healthy r s spee t f o s t h i s wpn. Markmara- ship t r a i n l a g should emphasize well-aimed shote , increaeed r a t e of f i r e , and the use of erlings i n aombat. If you see a J e r r y rho doee not s e e you, the re is no reason f o r haaty unaimed fireel--CO, 1st Eb, 26th Inf.

4. Use of a t a a l t h , *A surpr ise a t t a c k by the inf without t k s w i l l o f t en catch the enemy unaware -- e s p e c i a l l y when i n c lose contact. The noise of the t k s warmfng up warns him of t h e impending at tack. On one occasion after a tk-ixd a t t a c k had f a i l e d , I at tacked the next morning i n a s l i g h t ground haze withaut t k s o r a r t y m d caught most of t h e enelqy asleep..l--0, 1st Bn, 26th Inf .

5. Telephone l ines , , *We always cut a gap in t h e enemy s i r e . Usually r e a r e ab le t o p ick up a pr isoner who is eent out t o r e p a i r the line..*--CO, 1st Bn, 26th Id.

6 . J,eaderehi~. *The preaence of high ranking 0s -- bn, r e g t l and d f v comdfs -- well forward gives men confidenee. They reason t h a t ' i f t h e o ld man l a up t h i s f a r , We should be f u r t h e r ahead ,r--C0, 1st a, 36th drnd Regt.

7. ~ e r m a e iv i l i ane , 'It ie SOP in t h i e un i t t o aend a l l m i l e civilieuns t o the p1 aaage f o r questioning. Recently I aent back two men who were peasaing through our l in - m n d at turrmd out they ra re both German 8oldiers.n--C0, 1st Eh, 36th b- %gt,

Documents

Battle Experiences #5