BATTLEGAOUI"ID

~EUROPE~ THE HINOENBURG UNE One of the stranges! defence systems the world has ever seen. Because of this it saw some of the fiercest fighting during World War One. The author, Peter Oldham, follows the whole length of the line from Arras 10 SI Quentin and describes the various actions against the background of conerele and steel still 10 be found toclay. ISBN 0-85052-568-3 208 pages E9.95

VlMY RIOGE Scars of the Great War dominate Vimy Ridge giving some indication of the intensive fight­iog, first by the French in 1915 and then by the British in 1916. The Canadians finally look the heights in 1917. Underground tun­nels riddle the hillside and huge overlapping craters fram mining explosions beg explana­tion - this book by Nigel Cave satisfies the casual inquirer and the serious historian. ISBN 0-85052-399-0 208 pages E9.95

RIQUEVAL The bridge over the SI Quentin Canal at Riqueval is one of the most readily recognized images of Ihe Great War. The bridge and its surrounding countryside witnessed many ferocious engagements in the period between the retreat to the Hindenburg Une in 1917 and the final assault against the canal's defences in September 1918. ISBN 0-85052-622-' E9.95

To lII'IIIIr any bIIok In lIIe lIIe III11epn1 series .. OIZ2& 734ZZZ

Olht'r guidt's irr Iht' Ba/rlt'grourrd Euro~ St'Tlt'S:

Ypru· Santluary Wood and "ooge b)' Nigel Cal"e Ypm • Passchendaele b.ll\"igel Ca'e

Ypres· Hili 60 b)' Nigel Cave

Walking the Somme b) Palll Reed Sommt • Mrrt by Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cale

Somme - Beaumont Hame! by Nigel Cave Somme· Thitp,"al by Michael Stedman

Somme • La Boissetle by MichaelStedman Sommt . Fricourt Mametz by MichaelStedman

Somme • P07.i~m b,. Graham Keech Somme· Gomm('("()urt by Nigel Cave

Somme · Courcelelle by Paul Reed

Arl'llli' \'im}' Rldge b.' Nige! Cave Hindenburg Line b) PeterOldham

Ba/llt'grourrd Euro~ ~rit's guidts irr prrparaliOlr: Walking the Sallenl by Paul Reed

Ypm · Pol)"gon Wood by Nigel Cave Ypm ·l\lesslnes Rldge by PeterOldham Somme • DeMlle Wood by Nigel Cal'e

Somme· Boom Ra,"ine byTll'vor Pigeon Somme· Camoy.~lonlauban by Graham Maddocks

Somme • High Wood by Terr)' Caner Hindenburg Une· Rique, .. 1 by Bill MitthinSOfl

Hindenburg Une· Epehy b) Bill Mitthinson lIindenburg Line - Cambral: Righl Hook by Jack Horsrall & l\"igel eale

Botr War. The Relief or Ladysmith. Colenso, Spion Kop by Lewis Childs Botr War · The Siege or Ladysmhh by Le .... is Childs

Battleground Europe

GUILLEMONT

Michael Stedman

Series editor Nigel Cave

x LEOCOOPER

umdon

I

l

ThiS book is dedicated 10 memory oflhe numberless soldiers who fough! on balh sides of the tcrrible divide and whose graves lie in profligatc waste al Gui llemont, unmarked and unknown. In particular I should like 10 fecal! the life of one such young subaltern, 2nd Lieutenant John Hayes (Jack) Feamhead, who was twenty ane years old when he succumbed 10 wounds on 13th August 1916. I should have liked 10 have met hirn in his old age. Jack was an effervescent and delightful chameler whose memory is sti ll recalled with great affection by his family. He served in the Il7th Battalion, the King's (Liverpool) Regiment

First published in 1998 by LEQCOQPER

an imprimof Pen & Sword Books Limiled

47 Church Strect. Bamsley. South Yorkshire 570 ZAS

Copyright 0 Michael Stedman ]998

IS BN 0 85052 591 8

A C IP cataloglle of this book is al'ai]ab le

from the British Library

Printe<! by Re<!I<'ood Books Umited

Trowbridge, Wihshire

For IIp-lo·dOle infomralion on OIlIu lil/es prodllced IInder Iht! uo Cooper imprinr, pieast! ft'lt'pllont! or ,,,,iEt {o;

Pen & Sword Books LId. FREEPOST, 47 Church Street

Bamsley. South Yorkshire S70 2AS

Telephone 01226 73.\222

CONTENTS

Introduction by Series Editor 6 Author's Inlroduction 8 Acknowledgements 9 Sens ible equipmenl and advice for visitors 10 How 10 use Ihis book. 11 On the subjecis of Maps 13

Chapler 1 Dur designaled ar-ea tods)' .______ 17 Chapler 2 The events wh ieh brought the Oritish

Army 10 Trones Wood 27 Chapter 3 The Battle Cor canlrol of Trones Woo(L ..... *. 37 Chapter 4 The Dallies ror Guillemont village. Part L 59 Chapter 5 The Dall ies ror Guillemont village. Part 2 97 Chapter 6 Cemeteries and Memoria ls 119 Chapter 7 Tours and walks within Ihis area .. _ .. _._.... 135

Appendix : GemlUn Maps 154 Index 157

lack Feamhead's life bero~ the onset of war had bftn C8rerree and happy. wlthin the Sli"Curity of a dose and lo,ojng ramily. Thcre Wtrt' 1"'0 sislers and he was the youngesl of rour brolhers. This pholograph sho,,-s Jack ,,-ith his pan'nts and youngcr slster.IHall l

Introduction by Series Editor

This latest volume in the Battleground Europe series is centred around the village of Guillemont. To go there now it is impossible to envisage the ghastly image that men like Fr Willy Doyle, Ernst Junger and the Master of Belhaven tried to describe in words. Now it is an utterly placid agricultural community, where the loudest noise is the barking of fannyard dogs and, in season, the sounds of shot guns echoing across the fie lds. It is no exaggeration to say that most of the traffk for a good proportion of the year consists of British vehides engaged in a pilgrimage to these terrible killing fields. How can one replace Ihis scene with the sights. smells and fearsome sounds of hundreds of guns, trench monars. machine guns and the tonured wounded; of the decomposing bodies of seemingly uncountable soldiers, their stench and mangled limbs ~ all in all a vista of desolation and despair? The answer for most, if not all of uso is that it is impossible, and beyond our imaginative capabilities, which is just as weil.

The book follows on from the comparative success that was gained in this sector. the southemmost part of the 1 July battlefield. by British troops, work.ing in immediate conjunction with their French allies. Various features of the ground, such as Trones Wood and the village itself, were vilal to the success of funher. and larger. operations dose by. such as the Dawn Attack on 14 July and the push using tanks for the first time on 15 September. It is the story of a struggle without any fonn of glamour; a large number of small (by the standards of the Great War) anacks. often hastily contrived against a detennined and resolute enemy defending extraordinarily weil prepared positions. There were numerous examples of great heroism, perhaps most famous ly amongst them being the actions of Noel Chavasse, which were to win hirn the firs l of hi s Victoria Crosses.

BUI the evenls at and around Guillemont during the summer and autumn of 1916 are characteristic of much that happened in what is now collectively known as the Battle of the Somme 19 16. It became, for the British, their first great gri nding down battle which was then followed by an almost unending series of similar battles that culminated in the Annistice of November 1918. It destroyed the na"ive enthusiasm that was the hall mark of many of the New Anny divisions that set off with such confidence on I July. and replaced il with a resigned and dogged detennination that ultimately resulted in an enonnously expensive victory. This great battle also cost the Gennan fighting machine much - it destroyed what remained of the great field army that was mobil ised in August 191 4. By the end of it all, brought 10 a halt by the onset ofwinter, both annies had become fully conversant with the concept - and reality -

Opposite: The 16th (Irish) Division 's memorial is um'eiled in G uillemonl in the 20s.

of that doom·laden word, allrilion. Falkenhayn had been the firstto preach its military possibil ities when he put forward his scheme for Verdun (though neglecting to tell his Army commander that this was what he had in mind); Haig realised that this was what the war was coming to. lt has become a word synonymous with the heanlessness of generals; yet it also means the destruction of the enemy's will (and ability) to fight. In the contex! of the time, it is difficult to see how the war was to be won by other means. and given that the war was one that not only had 10 be foughl but also had to be won, as very great issues were al stake. il is difficult to see how else things could be done. cenainly at this stage of Ihe war.

What cannot be denied is that the detail was more often than not poorly planned and poorly executed even allowing for the considerable practical difficulties that faced all levels of command. This book. by its nature, concerns itself with the detail involved in this relatively tiny part of the Western Front - of monumental significance to the men who were here. pan of ajigsaw 10 those who oversaw the operation. Thus this book - and others in the series - do not try and explain the why, except possibly in the broadesl sense. but the who and the where and the how. Since this is the way that most of those who foughl and were wounded or died or were shallered here saw things. it has both value and immediacy - but readers should be prepared to read funher and deeper if they want to undersland more fuHy the great tragedy that was the Great War.

Nigel Cave Ely Place. London.

Author's introduction

The history of the Great War is very much the people's history, a story with which we fec l affinity bccause the documentation and familial stories are so rcadily accessible to us all. In this contcxt a thought which has constantly engaged me wh ilst writing this small volume is the enormous number or infantry and supporting units which were drawn into the battles for Trones Wood and Guillemont. Of course, that was equally tme of both sides whose men rought here. It therefore proved impossible to name anything othcr than aproportion of those myriad battalions who came and were swallowed. their men tixed forever into the terrible black hole which Guillemont becamc. Thc omission of any regiments from the narrative is therefore in no way suggestive that its contribution had linie or no sign ificanee. But sadly. to attempt thc inclusion of cvery uni I into the story would have made this book, in the limited spaec available. linie more than a list or participanls. Instead I have sought to make clear thc taelical and topographieal faclors wh ich made Guil1emont such a tcrrible and unforgcnable plaee in thc summer and autumn of 19 16, illustrating that with what 1 hope are representative and illuminating eontemporary aceounts.

Michael SIedman. Leigh, Woreester.

Acknowledgements

Within the narrative record of events here at Bemafay and Trones Woods and Guillemont I have made considerable use of many words. orten penned in haste amidst terrible danger more than eighty years ago. To all of the soldiers who wrote at that time and those who penned their memoirs during the post war era I am grateful and can only stand in awe. However. it would have been impossible to complete this guide withoul the help of many of my contemporaries. In particular I should like 10 Ihank Nigel Cave who made a number of very helpful suggestions as 10 sources and who. as always, has undertaken a thorough review of this work: Derek Butler and other staff of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission at Maidenhead. John Baker of The Map Shop in Upton-upon-Sevem who kindly supplied a number of IGN maps: Geoff Thomas who has walked many miles of the Somme banlefield in all SOriS of wealher with me and in whose company the sun has always seemed to shine kindly. Sue Cox. Eisie Davis. John Garwood. Pam Hall. Jennifer Hartley. Simon Jones and the Trustees of the National Museums & Galleries on Merseyside -King's Regiment Collection for pennission 10 use the photograph of Sergeant Jones. v.c.. UeUienant Colonel Tony Moore of the King's Regiment and Bame Thorpe who is the Memorials Officer for the Western Front Association. Ralph Whitehead. The Mayor of Guillemont. Monsieur Dazin. Paul Reed has been generous in prov iding a number of interesting contemporary photographs which appear within th is guide. The staff at the Public Records Office in Kew and the Imperial War Museum have provided me with much help. assistance and considered judgement. Many other members of the WeStern Front Association ha\"e also helped in greatly enhancing my knowledge of the Guillemont area. To all of these people I should like to extend my sincere thanks whilst making clear that any errors wh ich remain within the text are solely of my own making.

Opposite: Stretcher bearers from the 5th Division near Waterlot Farm, 3 to 6 September 1916.

9

Sensible equipment and advice for visitors

There is nothing like getting outside in the fresh air and walking. Its good exercise. you can do it on your own. with 01 friend or as one of a large group. During the last decade the growth of interesl in the history of the Great War has led to many more organ ised tours which has added 10 the pressure which some siles. such as Tyne COI at

Passchendaele or Thiepval here on {he Somme. experience. Bul wherever you are on the Westem Front's miles of accessible battlefield history one of the greatest pleasures. and Ihe most salulary and moving of experiences. is 10 'walk the course' of an event in the extraordinary history of the Great War. Often the interest lies in reconstructing in our minds the encounters of the men who were there and shari ng Ihe chance insights and discoveries with friends. I cannot forget the first time I saw and walked many of these places, (he Salford Pals' attack on Thiepval on Ist July 1916. the tragie advance of (he Tyneside battalions of (he 34th Divi sion at La BoisseIle that same day. and fo llowing the story of the Manchester POlis here at Trones Wood with my great friend Vincent Sleigh.

But whoever you are following. or whatever you are trying to explain and understand. certain items are always likely to enhance your pleasure. It is wonh noting that here the trees of Trones Wood provide admirable shelter. The walks I have described should nevcr lake more Ihan IwO hours. The urea south-east of Maricoun is picturcsque and altractive. South of the Albert - Peronne road at Vaux. Fargny and Curlu there are wonderful places 10 laze away an aflemoon on the south facing slopes above the river Somme. In (he laIe summer of 1916. for a lucky few who found the time and opportunity to get down here to swill the chalk dust from their aching limbs. this was a haveo of tranquillity. Sun cream and plemy of drinks are absolutely esscmial. especially in hot summer weather. Stout shoes or walking boots al any time ofthe year are vi tal . Wel liogton boots and thick sacks in winter or soon afler rain are needed. along with appropriate outer c1othing. lncidentally. you could attempt to complcte the walks in the immediate vicinity of Guillemoot io one day. Therefore, for those of you inlem on spending just such a full day here 'in the field' and who want to record your visi t carefully some fu rther items are advisable. Take a sandwich. a camera. a peo and notebook 10 record where you took your photographs and perhaps to note YOU f visit in the cemetery registers. A pair ofbinocu1ars would be helpful, especially in 01 location such as Maltz Horn Fann where the views are extensive. However, and

10

finally. adecent penknife with a corkscrew. a first aid kit and a small rucksack capable of carrying everything comfortably should complete your requirements.

Here at Guillemon1. as elsewhere on the Somme. a metal detector iso lei us be frank. an embarrassment. Many people come here to the fields 10 sweep for any remnants of elothing, perhaps the occasional Manchester or Liverpool Pals' shoulder title. or whatever. But in my opinion Ihey are beller left 10 rest and awail a chance discovery. To be seen digging within sight of what should be places of peace and reflection near to the Guillemont Road Cemetery is almost to desecrate the memory of those whose names are recorded so starklyon those bare white headSlOnes. The speclaele of lone Britons sweeping their electronic plates across empty fields fills me with sadness. This should be a place where a more rewarding and meaningful history reveals jlself. withoul recourse 10 indignity.

No significant preparation is required to cope with medical requirements. It is however very sensible 10 ensure Ihat you carry an E 111 form which gives reciprocal rights 10 medieal and hospital treatment in France. as weil as all other EC countries. The necessary documents can be obtained free from any main post office. As in the UK where you are in a working agricultural area and may be scratched or cut by rUSly metals, ensure that your tetanus vaccination is up to date. Comprehensive personal and vehiele insuranee is advisable. In th is context it is worth noting thaI thefe have been a number of thefts frorn British tourists' vehieles in the area of the Somrne, even when parked near 10 the cerneteries and features around Guillemon1. To help arrange and plan your stay I have idenlified a lisl of campsites. hotels and B&B accornmodation within easy distance of the village in Chapter I. whieh deals with the designated area today. However. a fuller guide 10 the rnany excellent hotels. restaurants. auberges and ovemight accomrnodations available in the Picardie area can be oblained frorn the Comite Regional du Tourisme de Pieardie. 3 Rue Vineent Auriol - 80000 Arniens - Tel: 00 33 322 91 10 15.

How to use this book This guide can be used in preparation for your visil, in frolll of the

fire al horne on a cold winter evening. In thaI case il is perhaps best read from Slart 10 finish. 1 think you will have asound feel for Guillemont atthe end of one or two eveni ngs' reading and might be ready to book your cross channel ferry or tunnel for those days in March and Apri l when the wealher begins 10 elear, the fields are

11

ploughed and crop growth has not yet hidden the detail and topography of the ground. But the gu ide is also designed as a pocket reference. a quick supplement to your knowledge when you are 'walking the coursc', and need an explanation or clarification.

By far the best way to see thc Guillemont area is on foot or bicycle. At the end of the text you can find a number of suggested routes makillg use of the paths and tracks which are accessible to these mean5 of transpon. The Iwo chapters dealing with 1916's hi sloric events wi thin the designated area are obvious1y in chronological order. Although there was fighting here during 191 8 this guide is not intended 10 cover that conflict in great detail since it will be the subject of a funher volume in Ihis series.

I suggest that a tour by car or coach is the best way to get your hearings and to give an overview of the whole area. Again I have suggested a tour to highlight the main features of the area, along roads which are easily accessible. The roads covered on this route are usually quile satisfactory for coaches and involve no dangerous turns through 180"! This tour is 10 be found at the end of the book and is slrongly recommended 10 those of you not already conversant with the area. It is wonh noting that some of the tracks and smaller roads to be found on the IGN maps of the area are nOI suitable for couches. Cars without four wheel drive will find difficulty in getting along some minor tracks. for example those leading to and around Bois Favier. You wou ld be most un wise to allempt to drive around or through the confines of Trones Wood in any vehicle. although the track leading along the east of Trones Wood nonhwards to LonguevaJ is usually acccs5ible! Be prepared to walk i5 the best advice that I can give. but do take care to lock all vuluables. especially cameras and olher inviting items. out of sight in the boot of your vchiclc.

A lane in front of Guillemont showing the ha\"oc ",rough! by the British bombardment on the defences, 3 . 4 September 1916.

On Ibe subjecl of Maps

Unlike {WO of the previous villages abou! which I have wrinen in Ihis series. Thiepval and La BoisseIle, the village of Guillemont is located finnly within jusl onc IGN 1:25000 series map. ThaI map is numbered 2408 es!. Bray-sur-Somme. However. yall would also find 2408 ouest. Alben. a useful addition since Ihis covers all ofthe western approaches 10 thc Guillemont area from the direction of Alben. For geneml access 10 the area of the Somrne sheet 4 in the I: 100,000 IGN green series, Laon and Arras, is very useful. A compass is also an essential companion. For those of yall interested in detail beyond the northern pan ofthis guide Bapaume East and Bapaume West (2407 es! ct ouest) would also prove 10 be sensible purchases. Taken logether these four maps cover the entirety of the British sector of the 1916 Sattle of the Somme. Such maps. and many others covering the area of the Western Front. can be obtained by post from The Map Shop in Upton·upon·Sevem (0 1684 593146) or from Waterstones' Booksellers who maintain another exce llent special ist map dcpartment in Manchester.

I havc idcntified here the maps which appear within th is guide. For most navigational and walking purposes these wi ll be suffident fo r your cnjoymem of this area. However, for a really intimate knowledge of each location the I: 10,000 and 1:5.000 trench maps are indispensable to the serious slUdent or expert. I : 10.000 maps approximalc 10 ascale of six inches to the mHe. In order to gain detailed understanding a trench map is thcrcfore indispensable.

Map I. Page 25. Thc Trones Wood - Guillemont balliefield area. showing the pre·war geography of the area. This is taken from the 1:40.000 shcets which uccompanied the Officiaf His/or)' volume detailing the fighling leading 10 the first day of the S attle of the Somme.

Map 2. Page 28. The dispositions of XIII Corps' men in the vicinity of Maricourtl Montauban before and afte r thcir successful attack on I July 1916, Taken from the Officiaf HislOry series of maps. 1916 Vol I.

Map 3. Page 29 . The Objectives alJotted to the 7th, 18th and 30th British Divisions along with the Frcnch 39th und 11 th Divisions fo r I July. taken from thc Offiein' HislOl)' series of maps. 1916 Vol l .

Map 4. Page 31. The advance made by the French XX Corps (Sixth Anny) between Bois Faviere and Curlu on the moming of I July 1916. Offiein' His/ol)'. 1916 Vol I.

13

Map 5. Page 38-39. Taken from the I: 10,000 series trench map. corrected to 216ft 91 6. this is a segment of 62.c.NWI showing the area around the Briqueterie , Hardecourt and Maltz Horn Farm.

Map 6. Page 54. Maxwell's troop dispositions within Trones Wood. 14 July 1916.

Map 7. Page 64. Detail from the I: 10,000 trench map (corrected 10

2417/ 1916) showing the Trones Wood - Arrow Head Copse -Guillemont area in detail.

Map 8. Page 66. Map issued 10 19th Manchester offkers showing the fim stages of the operations launched against Gulllemont by the soldiers of 30th Division al 3.40 am on 23 July.

Map 9. Page 81. Detail from sheet 62cNWI - I: ID.oootrench map. corrected to 216/1916, showing Ihe Mahz Horn Fann - Angle Wood area at Ihe extreme southern end of the British seclor of the Somme battlefield.

Map 10. Page 85. The OH Map opposi te pp 190. Military Operations France and Belgium 1916. Vol 2.

Map 11. Page 108. Showing the 12th King's at Guillemont's final capture (3 September J 916).

Map 12. Page 115. Detail from the Wedge Wood, Falfernont Fann. Oakhanger Wood and Angle Wood areas, north of Maurepas and south­east of Guillemont, taken from two I: 10,000 trench maps.

Map 13. Page 123. The complex of trenches wh ich exiSled around the Gui llemont Road cemetery in the laie summer and autumn of 19 16.

Map 14. Page 129. Detail laken from the I: 10,000 Irench map. 62cNWI. showing the location of Caplain Heumann's grave.

Map 15. Page 136. A General Tour of the Guillernont area. Map 16. Page 140. The Bemafay Wood walk area. Map 17. Page 142. The Trones Wood walk area. Map 18. Page 146. Maricourt. Hardecoun. Mahz Horn area toc.lay. Map 19. Page 147. Detail from I: 10.000 trench map covering Ihe

Maricoun. Faviere Wood. Hardecourt. Mahz Horn Farm areas. 1916. Map 20. Page 150. Delnil from the I: 10.000 trench map. dated

corrected to 15/8ft916. 57cSW3. showing the captured Gennan positions at Delville Wood (Longueval). north Guillemont and Ginchy.

Vou shou1d note Ihat the trench maps, which are avaitable from the Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books (Tel: 0171 416 5348) or the canographer of Ihe Western Front Association (members only). follow a specific sequence and should be referred to by the numbers usually found in thei r top right hand corner. Unfortunately the Trones Wood and Guillemont area is covered by two sheels belonging

14

to the I: 10.000 trench map series. Those are sheet 57c5W3. entitled Longueval. which covers the villages of Longueval and Bazentin-le­Petit. Ginchy. Guillemont and Montauban: and sheet 62cNWI. entitled Maricourt. which covers Mahz Horn Fann, Marieourt. Hardecoun­aux-Bois and the area towards the River 50mme. Variously dated versions are available from both sourees. In the text I have sometimes referred to locations whieh are noted on such treneh maps. but not on present day maps. In such cases I have where neeessary given the relevant trench map referenee to help you identify the exact position. For example, 'Waterlot Fann' nonh-east of Trones Wood was located on sheet 57cSW3. at referenee 5.18.e.9.1.

One feature which the young or first time visitor might wish for is an easily aceessible reconstruction which gives an insight inlo the conditions which prevailed around Guillemont at the height of the eonflicl. One such souree of insight and empathy is to be found at Newfoundland Park. two miles north-wesl of Thiepval on Ihe Auchonvillers road out of Hamei, the D73. This is an area of preserved battlefield , purchased by the government of Newfoundland after the Great War. Further detailed insight can be obtained at the two quality museums which are within reasonable distance. The first, the Musee des Abris, aI Albert below the celebrated Basilica, is only twenty minutes away by car. The second, the Historial, at Peronne, is weil worth the longer joumey, but you should remembcr to set aside a good forty minutes travelling time, each way. Take the 0938 running south­east from Albert to Peronne, a route which will cnable you to follow the soulhem ann of the British front lines as they ex isted before the openi ng or the battle of the Somme.

One extraordinary fact about the Somme and Anere battlefield is that after the utter devastation of the Great War many of the tracks and other human geographical features were reconstructed in the 1920s with an uneanny similarity to their pre-war locations. Most detail shown on trench maps of the Trones Wood - Guillemont area still stand true today. Ini tially the processes of reeonstruction were almost insunnountably difficult. In order 10 help, many of the villages were adopted by some of Britain's towns and eities.

However, in the early 1920s. as more villagers returned 10 rebuild their hornes and lives with the reparations monies wrung from Weimar Gennany. every efron was made 10 find the exact location of their pre­war houses. Sometimes. when a viHager did not relurn that plot was left vaeant, in many cases still so today! But. we should remembcr that GuillemOßl is a working village. a eommunity whose roolS are based

15

in centuries of toil on the land which is also our place of interest. This is not open access land on the National Trust model. It is all too easy to let our two interests clash. During the autumn months. in panicular. be aware of the numerous shooting panies. The farmers will not welcome lhe sight ofyour tramping the fjelds with linie regard to crops and seeds. Please ask before you enter. Please keep to the paths and the edges of each field.

As someone said recently. 'My history but his land!'

L.IIte Autumn 1916 and the onsel of raill turns Ihe shell-torn l.II ndscllpe around Guillcmonl Into a quagmire.

Chapter One

OUR DESIGNATED AREA TODAY

Most people visiting the Somme battlefield for the first time join the straight road which runs between Albert and Bapaume, the 0929, along wh ich it was planned to execute the 'Big Push' , This raad neatly bisects the British sector of the first Battle of the Somme, However, the events which unfolded throughout the moming of the Ist July and on the following days meant that far greater emphasis wou ld subsequently be placed by the British army upon the areas south of the Bapaume raad rather than to its north, At the very eastem end of the southem arm of the British battlefront on Ist July lay the vi l1ages of Maricoun and Montauban, Here the New Army divisions within XIII Corps of Rawl inson's Founh Army joined hands with the French soldiers of XX Corps, A shon distance tO the north-east of Maricoun lies Favier Wood (Bois Favier), wh ich was one of the immediate fi rst day objectives tor the French anny, and the vil1age of Hardecoun-aux-Bois, '

From Hardecoun a raad leads north towards the village of

Hardccourt, photographed during Hs occupation by German troops, bt!ron damage wrought b~' the t' nßch artillery bombardments de"astated this place in JUlle 1916,

Guillemonl. Between Montauban and Guillemont lay two substantial areas of woodland. Bemafay and Trones~ . These two woods lay between the British army's fi rst day objectives and the main German second position whieh here ran from outside Longueval. past Waterlot Farm and in fronl of Guillemon1. The first of these woods to be captured by the British was Bemafay Wood. However, the subsequent allempts to capture Trones Wood resulted in far more severe fighting. The origins of thaI severity [ay in the fact that the capture of Trones Wood was seen as an essential precursor before the night attack towards Bazenlin, due on the moming of 14th Ju ly. cou ld be launched with any degree of confidence in its outcome.

East of Trones Wood the 0 64 leads past the Guillemonl Road Cemetery and into the vill age of Guillemont. North-west of GuilJemont is the forbidd ing outline of Oelville Wood which contains the South African memorial. As you look along the 0 20 towards the village of Longueval and Oelville Wood your li ne of sight passes Waterlot Farm whieh is dealt with within Ihis guide. East of the village of Guillemont lies Combles whilst to the north-east Ginchy can be seen, although outside the scope of this guide. only one kilometre away. If you are in search of refreshment on a hOl day then Combles has a number of shops and a bar where refreshment can be purchased. However, the most frequen lly used place to pick up supplies. some

The church and Guillemont \illage today.

distance to the west. is the town of Alben, familiar to almost every Brilish soldier who served during the first Battle of the Somme. Today Albert describes itself as being only the "3eme Ville de la Somme", but quite properly "la Cite d' Ancre". The Town Hall square in Alben often hosts a market and there are three small supennarkets nearby wh ich can all provide a sound array of food and refreshments.

However. away from the town of Alben. the area south of the Alben - Bapaume road in the quadrant east and nonh-east of Alben in the direction of Hardecoun and past Pozieres is distinguished by an enonnous crescent of substantial woodlands. Having been devastated by shellfire during the Great War these woodlands are, once again. mature and dark. completely dominating the atmosphere and IOpography of this areas. In almost every case these prominent woods have been allowed to re-establish themse lves on exactly the same sites as they occupied before war ravaged the area.

Leaving Alben the village of Guillemont can be reached in a number of ways. Each route has a very different character.

The first and most southerly roule is along the 0938 Alben to Peronne road. Continue along the 0 938 until you reach Maricourt which lies on Ihis guide's western boundary. Afler passing the sites of the Devons and Gordons cemeteries this road begins to rise up as it approaches Maricourt and fine views can be had along the southem arm of the Briti sh battlefront on Ist July. At Maricourt, where the British and French armies abutted. turn left along the 0197 for three kilometres until you reach the cross raads where Bemafay Wood faces you 10 the front right side. Turn right here along the 064 and after passing Bernafay Wood you wi ll pass Trones Wood on your left before continuing into Guillemont.

A second route starts along the 0938 Alben to Peronne road but then takes you through Fricoun and along the 064 past Mametz, Dantzig Alley Cemetery and the village of Montauban berore arriving at the cross raads j usl south-wesl of Bemafa y Wood . This route takes you through territory attacked by three divisions on the morning of Ist July. the 7th Division at Fricoun and Mametz. the 18th Division towards Pommiers Redoubt and the 30th Di vision towards Montauban. which all achieved some considerable degree of success in their attacks. When you arrive at the cross roads south-west of Bemafay Wood go straight ahead along the 064. past Trones Wood. towards Gui llemont.

A third possibility lies along the 0929 Albert to Bapaume road. Turn right into La BoisseIle and continue along the 020 through

19

Contalmaison. Bazentin·Je-Grand. Longueval und thence inlo Guillemont. This route takes you through much of the tcnitory captured duri ng the hOl summer wecks of July 1916. and especially nOlewonhy here is the area east of Mametz Wood towards Trones Wood where the extraordinary Dawn Attack took place on 14th Ju\y.

Alternatively, Guillemont can be reached very simply from the Bapaume area. Take the 0929 in the direction of Albert. Soon after leaving Bapaume take the road signed for ThiJIoy and Aers on your left. Follow Ihis road. which soonjoins the 010. inta Flers and thence alang the 0197 inlO Longueval and then GuiJlemonl. Ir you intend 10

study in the Guillemont-Ginchy-Combles area for any lenglh of time then an altemativecentre 10 Albert is the 5mall lown of Rancoun. east of Combles on the 020 past the AI motorway. where hotel accommodation is available.

There are no hotels within the area covered by Ihis gu ide and the first thing you might Iherefore need 10 arrange is accommodation and tomorrow moming's breakfast. I have therefore identified below some of the available hotels and a number of "English" B&B houses where you can base yourself during a visil. However. fo r those of you with a tent or caravan and a more adventurous disposition. the Bellevue campsite in AUlhuilie is a fine and central poi nt on the Somme battlefield which can be reached from Guillemonl via La Boisselle in twenty minutes by car. If you wish tO avoid travelling back through Albert, take the D20 Longueval. Contalmaison tO La Boisselle route thence across the 0 929 and take the road to Aveluy which is adjacent to La Boisselle's communal cemetery. From Avel uy follow the D I51 into Authuille. The campsite is quiet and orten frequemed by people who share an interest in thc Great War. The owner. Monsieur Desailly. and his family are always welcoming. The Bellevue campsite has been expanded 10 include a simple restaurant. reached th irty yards to the right as you look towards the mai n campsile entrance. where the food is both substantial and economical. Here you are within tWO minute's walk of the Authui lle Military Cemetery and not far from the Auberge de la Vallee d' Ancre on the banks of the River Ancre. For many years this bar and restaurant has served decent food and drinks for as long as you cared to stay! The Auberge has been taken into new ownership in 1995 by Oenis Bourgoyne who has already establ ished a fine reputation for the quality of his food amongst the local community. There is another campsile at the viHage of Treux in the Ancre valley south west of Albert. This alternative is pleasantly shaded from the summer's heat but is 100 distant from the Guillemont area.

20

However, it can be bitterly cold camping in February! Therefore, for those of you who are travelling in style or during these colder and wetter months of the year, a roof over your heads may be welcome. The list identified below may be of same help, but it should not be inferred that the order is one of descending merit! To call for reservations from the UK dial 00 33, fo11owed by the 9 digil number. In a11 these hotels, with one exception in Picquigny. you will find at least one person on the hote l's staff who can speak English.

Hotels : The Royal Picardie ***. Route d' Amiens, 80300 Alben. Tel 322 75 37 00. The Hotel de la Basilique **, 3 - 5 Rue Gambeua, 80300 Alben. Tel 322750471. The Relais Fleuri **, 56 Avenue Faidherbe, 80300 Albert. Tel 322 75 081 1. The Grande Hotel de la Paix *,43 Rue Vielor Hugo, 80300 Albert, Tel 3227501 64. Les Etangs du Levant *. Rue du 1 er Septembre, 80340 Sray sur Somme, Tel 322 76 70 00. Auberge de Piequigny **. 112 Rue du 60 R. J.. 80310 Piequigny, Tel 322512053. Hotel Le Prieure. 17 Route National. 80860 Rancourt. Tel 322 85 04 43. This hotel is particularly weil sited for access to the Guillemont area being located jusl six kilometres east through the small town of Combles.

B&B accommodation: Auchonvillers - Beaumonr Hamel. Comfortable and weil appointed

accommodation for up to eight people. Attraclive grounds and interesting walks nearby. Even ing meals and continental breakfast. Twenty minutes from Guillemont driving past Newfoundland Park, Thiepval and Pozieres. Mike alld Julie Rell slra w. Les Galets. Route de Beaumont, Auchonvillers. Tel: 322 76 28 79.

AuchOllvillers. Five good rooms wi th en suite facil ities and an interesting history, the centrepiece of which is the cellar still carved with the names of many soldiers who passed through in 1916. Bed, breakfast and evening meals by arrangement as weil as a Tea Room for non residents. Again, access to Guillemont best undertaken by car. Avril Williams. [0 Rue De[attre, 80560 Auchonvillers. Tel: 322 76 23 66.

21

COllrcelette. A distinctive farmhouse , self catering or mea[s provided. Situated right al the hean of the Somme Baulefields. This fine location provides the most straight forward access to Guillemont. less than ten minutes in a car. POlll Reed and KierOIl Murphy. Sommecoun. 39 Grande Rue. 80300 Courcelene. Tel: 322 74 01 35.

Martinpllich. A welcoming and comfonable house which can cater for up 10 eight people. Th is newly renovated house is situated at the hean of the 1916 Somme battlefield providing excellent and speedy access 10 Guillemont. Evening meals by request and continental breakfast. Co/bi and Lisa Gillard. 54 Grand Rue. Maninpuich, 62450 Bapaume. Tel. 321 50 1887,

The Guillemont Area Once you are established it is time to see the sUITounding locality

and 1 suggest that, soon after you arrive. you would enjoy following the general tour explained in Chapter seven. However, in this first chapter I have attempted to give some definition to the boundaries of this guidebook and give abrief commentary to illustrate the imponance of the area's history.

The boundaries to this guidebook run north from Maricourt, along the D197 unlil the cross-roads are reached, fae ing Bemafay Wood. The boundary then runs around the wesl and north of Bemafay Wood and north of Trones Wood to include the site of Walerlol Farm, north east

Guillemont \'iIlage cenlre before the Great War. [Reed]

Reconstruction wlthin Guillemont begins, soon after the Great War, ,R"', of Gui llemont. From there the boundary runs across the north of Gui llemont and thence southwards pastlhe east ofthe village along the course of the D20E towards Maurepas,

For some distance to the south of Guillemont the terrain raHs gently along aseries of knolls or spurs, past Hardecourt valley and the Bois Faviere and Bois d'en Haut in the direction of lhe great Somme River. The most noticeable of these knolls stands south-west of GuilJemont above and to the north of the Bois Faviere and Hardecourt-aux-Bois. At the nonhem end ofthis knoll in 1916 Maltz Horn Farm fonned an imponant defensive position for the Germans. south-east of Trones Guillemont \'i!lage cenlre, present da)'.

The baule arena of the summer of 1916. The Germans were pushed back from the woods to the village of Guillcmont from where they were dislodged in September. (eal'el

WoOO. But only when you arrive on the D938 Albert to Peranne raad is iI possible to appreciate jusl what a significant course the River Somme cuts across this area of France. South of the D938 the land falls away sharply and you can look down on the Somme as il meanders idly. a greal basin of water meadows. lakes. pools and canalised waterways which make a considerable nalOral barrier. The Bois Faviere objective was caplOred by the French on the moming of Ist Ju ly 1916. along with the village of Curlu which lies adjacent to one of the huge sweepi llg meallders wh ich charactcrise the Somme's sedate progress in Ihis area.

Five ki lometres north of the River Somme the chalk upland terrai n around Bemafay Wood. Trones Wood, Longueval and Gu illemom is on first glance seeming ly devoid of significam geographical fealOres. Over such porous base rock the fields are without streams. During the fighting for Guillcmont and Falfemont Farm the lack of water posed ever present difficulties fo r the men and their transport and supply un its. Here lhere are no sudden and impressive slopes such as those which provided such easily defensible positions to the Gem13n army on Ist July 1916 at the villages of Thiepval or Ovillers. From Guillemont a shallow valley. Caterpillar Valley. runs westwards. through Trones Wood, north of Bemafay Wood, thence past Caterpi llar Wood, south of Mametz Wood and then south-westwards towards Fricourt where il occasionally produces a triekle of waler known as lhe Willow Stream. In the Trones Wood-Guillemont area what higher

24

l\lap J. The Trones Wood - Gu illemont bauJelield area, showing the pre· war geography of the area. This is laken from the 1:40,000 sheel.S wh ich accompanied the Official Hislory ,"olume detailing the fighting leading 10 the first day or thc BuHle or the Somme.

25

ground is of discemible significance lies to the north, around Longueval and Delville Wood, where the highest elevations are a little over 150 metres above sea level. The advantage in height enjoyed by the German army at Delville Wood ensured that the capture of Trones Wood would be camed out amidst the most terrible ordeal of shell fire since the wood and its approaches were observed from that higher ground to the north. As the Official History put the situation so succinctly:

'Facing Longlle\'al, in rhe Gem/GII 2nd Position, Trones \Vood srretclles down rhe sOllrhem slope ofCarerpillar Valley asfaT as rhefoot of its norrhem slope; east ofthe wood rhe \'alley exrends as a shallow rrol/gh ro GI/illemom, I\'hich was also in rhe 2nd Position. TllIls rhe wood was commanded ar dose range borh from fhe norrh and lhe easr, and lhere was tiftle chance of holding ir IVhi/sr rhe enemy sm in Longlleval and GI/Wemom. Capwred il mlghr be, m a price, bllf ollly by permission of rhe Germans co1l1d Ir be held.'l

Second Lieutenant Jack f eamhead, tnth King's (lh'erpool), 55th (Territorial) Division, from whose diary abrief extracl appears opposite. He had enJisted, in September 1914, as a private.

Running north-west from Guillemont, past Longueval and Pozieres. the higher ground persists all the way to Thiepval in a great spine of elevated ground which overlooked the Briti sh positions at the outset of the Battle of the Somme, At Thiepval that elevated ridge falls away steeply into valley of the River Ancre and it was this height wh ich the Briti sh army sought so desperately to aUain during the long and bitter months of the Somme campaign.

l. I shnll subsequently LI$ually refer 10 HnrdecoLlrt-nux-Bois simply as Hnrdecourt IhroughoLit this guide. 2. Bois des Trones on your tGN maps ofthe area, nnd also on prc-war Freneh maps of the

3. Military Oper(JIions. Fror/ce and Belgium. /916. Vo12. pp37.

26

Chapter Two

THE EVENTS WHICH BROUGHT THE BRITISH ARMY TO TRONES WOOD'

Men had assembled for months berore the 1916 Somme battles commenced. Many had, at the time they were sucked inta its seemingly inexhaustibly grim appetite, linIe idea ofwhat terribleness they would face. Thousands ofBrilish soldiers thought the event would presage the end ofwar. Same, Iike Jack Fearnhead, were weil aware their departure from horne, and all they held dear, was a step into the unknown. As he left Southampton in the laIe evening of 26 May 1916, Ihis young subaltern with the 117th King's, 55th (Territorial) Division, recorded that:

'At IOp.m. fhe anchors were drawlIlIp, and sream pur Oll. and sllortl)' we left behind fhe last solid view ojSollthamplOn. a vista of (rees 0/1 each flank, broken Oll ,he right by the towers and chimneys ofOsborne, and dead astern by the chinmeys alld roofs and occasional masts of Southamptoll, oll si/houetled fiercely against olle of the most perfect sllnsets mall ever saw. Tlle sea astern a marvellOlls electric bille, no waves, a Jew vel)' small wavelelS not sllfficient to break the bille in tlle smallest degree. The sky above i1 an artist spalette of colour. brilliantjlamillg red immediately above tlre horizon, shading offgell1ly tllrollgll all the c%llrs kllown. and some for which lI'e have 110 words. throllgh yellows, greens, blues. to a deep IInknown pllrpfe overhead. I1 was trofy wOllderfuf, and Ille wllole effect inspired olle wilh an intense desire for something indefinite. somerhing intangible, perhaps for furtller kllowledge of the Creator of so 1I'0ndeljili a scene - ofGod.'I.

It was perhaps the last moment of beauty that these men would ever witness.

On the morning of I July 1916 the British army, in conjunction wi lh the French, launched a massive assault along a fron lage running continuously from their positions facing Serre all the way south to those facing Montauban. South of Montauban the British and French armies joined al the village of Maricourt and Ihe impact wh ich the Frcnch anillery made during their part of those initial bombardment was immensely helpful to the British. East and to the south of Maricourt the Freneh attack was due to continue past the River Somme.

27

Map 2. The disposil.ions of XIII Corps' men in Ihe vicinity of Maricourt I !\Iontauban before aod after I.heir successful aUack on 1st July 1916. Taken (rom the Offieial History series of maps, 1916 Vol I.

28

.1

The British unit whose attack was developed from thc Maricourt sector was the 30th Division, Their objective was the capture of Montauban. To effect Ihis advance the 30th Division employed the Liverpool Pals to make the initial advance across the German front line positions fac ing Maricourt whilst the Manchester Pals would secure Montauhan village itself in the final stages of the attack. Montauhan was one of many strongly fortified Intermediate Positions in this area between thc Germans' front lines and their main Second Position. On the right of the British 30th Division stood the French army's 39th Division whose first day objective was the capture of Bois Favier. The 30th Division incJuded among its ranks four of the Manchester Pals battalions and four ofthe Liverpool Pals1

•

Billon FII.tnl.. / .. 'Q" •.•• ~ :~(Q~ Q] \CI,"" .. :Q!

,. Maricourl \. /'-­

":/0.- / __ .

1\ / j., l

" I( //i) Map 3. The Objecth'es allotted 10 Ihe 71h , 18th and 3{)th British Divisions along with the Frt'nch 39th and 11th Dh'isions for the Ist July, taken from the Official His/ory series of maps, 1916 Voll.

29

The anacks made by the 30th Division, and that by the 18th and 7th Divisions 10 their left, were, by contrast with much that occurred elsewhere Ihis day, hugely successful. All along the southern arm ofthe British army 's fronlage , from Fricourt 10 Montauban, a very substantial advance was made whieh reflects enormously weil upan the resi lience and determ ination of the soldiers in this part of the battlefront. Elsewhere, with the possible exception of the Uistermen at Schwaben Redoubt north ofThiepval, thc story was one of unremitting disaster. The advance from Fricourt - Mametz aleng to Montauban was the ooly one of substancc whieh was consolidated and held by the end of that day. JUSI north of Montauban thc Manchester Pals had captured Montauban Alley whilst the Liverpool Pals held the Briqueterie, south­east of Montauban and south of Bemafay Wood.

As a consequence this southem sector of the British frontage, adjacent to those advances made by the French, would now become the focus of the British anny's attempts to wring some advantage out of their tragedy on 1 July.

Perhaps one of the most inexplicabJe issues which has since been debated at great length is why Rawlinson failed to capitali se on the success at Montauban on I July. Here the Manchester Pals had repelled Gennan counter attacks in the area around Triangle Point between 3 and 4 am on the moming of 2nd July and the village was secure. It seemed that most ofthe Gennan infantry reserves had been committed and that his artillery was in astate of disarray. One problem was that by the moming of 2 July the Maricourt area south of Montauban was very congested with troop movements, both British and French. The French Sixlh Army had issued orders at 8.30 am on the moming of I July pointing out thaI the attack of their XX Corps on the Gennan second positions inciuding Hardecoun would dcpend upon the British attacking Bernafay and Trones Woods. At 10.30 am on the 2nd a further French Sixth Army order simply instrucled their men on these locations to stand fast.

During the moming of 2 July the 30th Division's fie ld howitzers shelled Bemafay Wood with thennite shells in an attempt to set the woodland on fi re. Later in the day the wood was scoured by patro!s who captured a number of prisoners. Th is was the day that Haig had arrived early at Fourth Army HQ urging thaI the success al Montauban should be exploited and that attacks should be made along the whole southern arm of the battlefield, laking the lines of Gerrnan trenches facing weslwards, 10 the north of Fricourt, in the rear. However those attacks were not fot1hcoming as Rawlinson concentrated his efforts

30

Map 4. The advance made by the French XX Corps (Sidh Army) between Bois Faviere and Curlu on the morning of Ist July 1916. Off/dal HistoT)',

1916 Voll.

3 1

r" i' '.' "

~ ',.. . .::~, ...

,'.'-,

B 0

B

British and French lines abulted.

Ihroughout the day on frontal auacks being made in the Thiepval -Ovillers - La Boisselle areas. ey 3 Ju[y the divisions within XIII Corps were still occupied with consolidalion yet patrols in Bernafay Wood wcre still able 10 report that it was undcfended. 1I was only al 3.15 pm that Congreve, XIII Corps' cOInmanding officer, ordered the 30th Division 10 occupy the wood. ThaI attack was undertaken at 9.00 pm by soldiers of27 Brigade' operating under contral ofthe 30th Division

Bemafay Wood today, photographl'd from its southern asp«1.

Tr 0 n 9 S-

and was achieved with the loss of on ly six casualties! In terms of the subsequent history of attempts to capture woodlands on {he Somme battlefield this was an eXlraordinary lapse on the part of the Gennans.

At Ihis stage it was also dear that Trones Wood was held more strongly. However Rawlinson was sti ll stT"ingely reluctant to give emphasis to his troops success in the south, believing that the capture of Bemafay Wood had created an awkward re-entrant at the junction of the Sritish and French armies. Nevertheless, it was decided at the Corps commanders conference, held that afternoon of 3 July, that every preparation should be made fo r an anack on the German second position in the Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit area.

It was therefore self-evident that Trones Wood would have to be caplured be fore such an al1ack could take place.

4th - 8th July in thc Bcrnafa)' - Trones Wood area On 4 July it was abundantly dear that the German defences north

of La BoisseIle were still secure. By contrast, in the area between the Albert - Sapaume road in the north and the Amiens - Vermand road south ofthe River Somme the German position was relatively weak. In view of what had been happening at Verdun the German army had been surprised by the effectiveness of the French whose advance south of

33

The view towards Trones Wood from the south-east corner of Uernafay Wood.

the river had seeß the capture o r many German troops and anillery units. Here the French Sixth Army had al ready ad\'anced some lhree miles lowards Biaches and Barleux. However. lhis day. 4 July. the weather began 10 play havoc wilh the British auempts 10 press rorward 10wards the German second positions. Showers lurned to a

The view towards Maltz Horn Fann and the Hardef:ourt area from the sunken lant' south of Bernafay \\'ood.

MAILTZHO'" FARM

SUNKEN UNE

thunderstorm in thc afternoon and thc British trenches and supply roules became a quagmire. During these thrce difTicult days, belween 4th to the 6th inclusive. holh the British and French gave emphasis 10 preparing for their attack. duc on 7th, against the Hardecourt - Tranes Wood - Mametz Wood and Contalmaison positions. Allhough south of thc Somme things had gone weIl. te lhe nonh ofthe Somme thc French were clamped in thc same difficulties which beset the British. Thc fulcrum around which Ihis issue swung al the junclion of thc Briti sh and French armies was the problem of capturi ng thc Tranes woodland area.

As we have seen. the combined French - British Hardecourt -Tranes Wood attack was duc on thc 7th. However, on 6 July German counter attaeks at Bois Faviere, whieh sueeeeded in re-eapturing the northern edge ofthat wood, ensured that the attaek on !-Iardeeoun and Trones Wood was postponed until the 8th. Overnight, 7/8th July, the weather was wet and the underfoot eonditions eontinued to hamper the British and Frcneh troops prcparing to make Ihis attaek. The British would employ the 30th Division, eommanded by Major-General Shea, a unit whieh had already been in the area for months and whose men had performed so brilliantly on the morning of I July to effeet thc eapture of Montauban.

The plan 10 capture Trones Wood The Allied attaek would be in two stages. The first stage, timed for

8.00 am, would be undertaken jointly, in part by the Freneh who were due to eapture Maltz !-10m Treneh, in front of Maltz !-10m knoll betwcen !-Iardeeourt and the junetion between thc two armies, whilst the British eaptured the eontinuation of the Maltz Horn Treneh north towards Trones Wood and the sOUihern half of the wood itself. Later, at a time to be agreed upon by thc loeal eommanders, the Freneh would attack Hardecourt and thc Maltz Horn knoll to its nonh whilst the British would attack Maltz Horn Farm's rubble and capture the remainder ofTrones Wood.

Thc British faced a severe problem in that the distanee from the Briqueterie to the German held Maltz Horn Treneh was across 1,10010 1.500 yards of open and fire-swept land. Further south the Freneh faccd a much narrower prospect Congreve therefore deeided to capture Ihc southern part ofTrones as a preliminary operation. Trones Wood was effectively divided by the course of two light railway lines whieh passed through the woodland. Thc more significant \ine was the Albert 10 Peronne light railway wh ich passed between Montauban and

35

the Briqueterie, thence through Bernafay Wood, where thefe was a station in its south~westem corner, and Tranes Wood be rare passing Guillemont on the north side of that viJIage. The other lioc, effeclively a branch ofthe main line. approached from the confi nes of Caterpillar Valley jusl north of Bemafay and joined thc Albert - Peronne line juS! cast of Tranes Wood. Congreve's plan had the advantage that thc approach 10 Tranes Wood from the southern end of Bernafay Wood was nol observed from Longueval. Once the southern end of T rones was secured the arilish attack towards Maltz Horn Trench and Farm could be made in a south-easterly direetion across thc shallow head of Maltz Horn valley, which was hidden from thc German Second Position.

I. Whether by accident or design the military cartographers who mapped this area for the British Army in the )"ears both before and dl,lring the Great War ollen changed the

spelling of locations. Trones Wood is a corruption of Bois des Trones

2. Extract from lack Feamhead's Diary. May 26th. 1916.

3. The 30th Division consisted of: 21 Brigade.

18th Kings (Liverpool Pals). 2nd Green Howards 2nd Wiltshire. 19th Manchester (Pals)

89 Brigade. 17th Kings (Liverpool Pals) 19th Kings (Liverpool Pals) 20th Kings (Li"erpool Pals). 2nd Bedfordshire.

90 Brigade. 2nd Royal Scots Füsiliers. 16th Manchester (pals). 17th Manchester (Pals). 18th Mancht'Stcr (Puls).

Divisional Pioneers: II th Sol,llh Lancashire.

4.27 Brigade were pan ofthe 9th (Soottish) Division. The two battalions which eaptured

Bemafay Wood al so liule eosl were the 6th KOSBs and the 12th Royal Seots.

36

Chapter Three

T HE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF TRONES WOOD

T hc events of 8th July AI 8 am on the morning of 8th July the British anempt 10 capture

T rones Wood began. It was 10 prove a long and arduous proccss. For same hours prior 10 the infanlry assaul! the Corps' heavy artillcry and the field guns of halh the 18th and 30th Divisions had fired with relatively little impact on the Gennan positions. On the right thc French artillery barrage was rar more effcctive. reducing the II1/ 123rd Reserve Regiment 10 juS! two officers and 150 olhers. Thc initial British attack on Tranes Wood was undertaken by the 2nd Green Howards of 21 Brigade. Thc men moved forward through Bemafay Wood struggling with thc dense undergrowth and smashed trees which only served 10 worsen the trauma ofanillcry shells which were al ready falling around them. Leaving the confines of the wood the Green Howards began to cross the open ground towards Trones Wood, breasting the slight rise which initially shielded them from view.

As soon as the men came into view of the Germans in Trones Wood, the Green Howards ' men were caught in a curtain of fire from machine guns and two fie ld guns firing over open sights from the edge of the woodland. There were heavy easualties and the Green Howards were withdrawn, the 2nd Wiltshire being ordered 10 renew the attack at 10.30 am. In view ofwhat had happened, Brigadier Genera l Sackville­West arranged a postponement until 1.00 pm. Already the plan of a combined Anglo-French operations in the T rones - Hardecourt area was breaking down and a melange of local initiatives and Corps orders began to emerge as the norm wühin this area.

On the right of the British the French assault had gone ahead as

37

Major General Shea, the 30th Dhision's commanding officer.

Map 3. Taken from Iwo I: 10.000 series trellch maps, corret:led 10 1/611916 and 315/1916 which co\'er Ihe Briquetf'rie, Hardecourt and Maltz Horn

-- f~-"""'" ;' -"- .

.• ' "--''''-Her' -

!

Farm. To the north Longue,"al. ßernara~· Wood, Trones Wood and the Guillemont approaches.

planned al 10.05 am, capturing their sector of Maltz Horn Trench up to a position opposite the site of Mahz Horn Fann. Because ofthe failure of 21 Brigade 's men to get into Trones Wood the Frenchmen 's leß flank was complete ly exposed to machinc gun fire from thai wood. As a consequence, at 12.20 pm, Congreve ordered that Shea's 30th Division, in order to cover Ihe French left, auack towards Mahz Horn Farm and Trones Wood from the direction of the Briqueterie, as the OfTicial History pUl it, ' even ifhe had to employ his whole division.'!

Fortunately this proccss had already got off 10 a good stan on the initiative of the 2nd Wihshires, one company of which had worked Iheir way up 10 Ihe head of Maltz Horn Valleyl along Ihe sunken lane leading soulh-east from the Briqueterie. These men had then taken a part of Mahz Horn Trench allotted to the Brilish pan ofthe attack, and Ihey had been later reinforced by a company of the 19th Manchesters (41h Pals) who linked up with Ihe French on their right. Mahz Horn Farm was now Iittle more than a barely perceptible heap of rubble between the IWO lines facing each olher across the knolI , Ihe Gennans having wilhdrawn 10 the eastern slopes of the knolI. However, Ihere was still a gap between the two companies of Ihe Wiltshires and Manchesters adjacent to the French facing Maltz Horn Farm and the soulhern end ofTrones Wood.

Throughoul the rest ofthe afternoan of81h July a number of further British battalions were drawn inlO the attempts to capture Trones Woad. The first rnen to get into the wood reached that objective as a resull of an attack at about 1.00 pm by the rernaining thtee companies of the 2nd Wihshires from Bernafay Woad. Although, like Ihe 2nd Green Ho\Vards before thern, the Wiltshires suffered heavy casuallies, small groups of men reached the south-eastern edge of Trones Woad where Ihey entrenchcd themselves and bcgan to construct a funher trench 10 their right, fac ing nonh, 10 prolect their flank. Two further companies of the 181h King 's and one of the 19th Manchesters managed 10 get up 10 help \Vith this prQCess of consolidation and by nighlfall the 18th Manchesters of90 Brigade had arrived 10 prepare for an attempt, due the fotJowing moming. 10 renew the attack on Trones Wood.

The ewnts of 91h July By now it was clear that what had been described as prelirninary

operations, designed to ensure the success of the general attack on the German second position due soon1

, were taking on a severity and momentum oftheir own. Thc Official History cornmcn\s that:

40

'11 so happelled that in these preliminary operntions several days of hard allli costl)' fightillg did /lot achiel'e complete success: )'et. iftl/e three localities [Contalmaison, Mametz Wood and Trones Woodj had bee/l i/lcluded i/l the general allack lIgainstthe Gel'mlln 2nd Position. fhe)' might. ifstoutl)' defended. "al'e disorganised Ihe assault and desll'oyed its impetus before the main objeclil'es lI'ere approached. Cenain it is Ihar some penalty had 10 be paid for tlle failllre 10 take advantage of the oppommities which "ad offered themsell'es on this front immelliately after tlle first day of the offensive:J

The eosl of Ihal tardiness would be horn, in large pan, by the Manchester and Liverpool Pals units ofthe 30th Division.

The first evenls ofthis day were marked, al 3.00 am, by a suceessful advanee by the men of2nd Royal Seots of90 Brigade who again made use or the sunken tane leading south·eastwards from the Briqueterie. By Ihis route the 2nd Royal Seots gained the centre of Maltz Horn Treneh, rushing the ru ins or the farm and then bombing their way northwards up Maltz Horn Trench in the direction ofTrones Wood. By 7.00 am the Royal Seots had reached the Guillemont road whieh ran towards thaI vilJage from the south·eastern corner of the wood.

Looking towards Guillemont rrom the south·eastem corner or Trones Wood.

The second, and seemingly decisive event. was the attack made by the 17th Manchesters on Trones Wood. Th is atlack was timed at 3.00 am from Bemafay Wood. The men were greatly hampered by gas shells and the misting of their eye pieces in the damp drizz1e laden atmosphere. Consequently their advance across the ground between the two woods only took place some three hours after il shou1d have occurred! Nevertheless, the men passed successfully through Trones Wood, reaching its eastern border at approximately 8.00 am. There the 17th Manchesters joined wirh the 2nd Royal Scots and then pushed patrols into the northern end of the wood.

Trones Wood was now. early on the morning of9th July. in British hands.

The situat ion was soon 10 change. Within hours. soon after mid-day, the Germans had organised a systemat ic she lling ofTrones Wood and its western approaches. The 17th Manchesters sufTcrcd panicularly severely on the eastern limits ofthe wood and in view ofwhat seemed an imminent counter attack the men werc ordercd at 3.00 pm to withdraw. They began to fall back towards Bernafay Wood. Unfortunately one detachment, which the order fai led to reach, was left with in the wood's confi nes. At 3.30 pm the Germans began to develop a general counter attack from the Maltz Horn Farm area all the way to the northern limits ofTrones Wood. In view ofthe 17th Manchesters' retirement the 18th Manchesters were also forced to pull back, in their case towards the Briqueterie, leaving one company in the south-eastern corner ofTrones Wood. Bearing in mi nd what was happening to their north the 2nd Royal Scots then withdrew from Mahz Horn Trench joining with the company of the 18th Manchesters just inside the south-eastern corner ofTrones, leaving a block just clear ofthe wood. Although thc Royal Scots and 18th Manchesters drove ofTthe Germans facing them the Germans succeeded in penetrating the bulk of the northern end of the wood nonh of the Guillemont road. As the Germans pressed through the wood the isolated detachmenl of 17th Manchesters was ovetwhelmed after stout resistance.

Thus, by 4.00 pm on 9 July the greater part of Trones Wood was back in German hands. The German's artillery, arrayed in a great sweep from Maurepas, east of Hardecourt, to Bazentin-Ie-Grand, completely dominated the area and it seemed likely that any subsequent British counter attacks designed 10 recapture Trones would be costly.

Initially that counter attack was the responsibility of the 16th Manchesters, the Ist Manchester Pals. Their attack was launched from

42

A German observation post in Trones Wood.

the sunken lane. which ran from the Briqueterie lowards HardecourI, at 6.40 pm. Their objective was 10 re-secure the southern portion of the waod and cover the left of the Royal Seals who should have been in possession of Mailz Horn Trench. Thc 16th Manchestcr's attack succeeded in advancing 10 SUpp0rl the Royal Seals wel! but was unable 10 seeUTe the southern part of the waod. As a consequence thc 16th Manchesters dug in abau! 60 yards south ofTrones where they spent an uncomfortable and exposed night

Thc cvents of 10th Ju ly DUTing the early hours of the nigh! of 9/ 1 Olh the 16th Manchesters

sent patrols out inta Tranes Wood 10 attempt a clarification of the si tuation there. Progress in the pitch black amongst the devastation was tortuously slow. I1 was decided 10 make an advance soon after fi rsl light at which li me a preliminary bombardment was fired on the wood. AI 4.00 am the 16th Manchesters. 10 whom a company ofthe 4th South African Regiment had been attached', began 10 advance in seclions northwards through thc \\'ood. Thc advance proved almost impossible to co-ordinate and many men became disorientated. However. some

43

detennined groups passed along the whole length of the wood and rerurned 10 repon it clear of German soldiers. Those reports wcre mistaken since some Germans had not evacuated the wood when the preliminary bombardment had struck. Soon, on the western side ofthe wood, fighti ng broke out within the confines of Longueval Alley, a trench which ted from the northern end of Trones across the upper reaches of Calerpillar Valley into the north-eastern lip of Bernafay Wood. The foeus of this fight ing moved to Central Treneh at the northern tip ofthe wood. Whilst this struggle continued a targe number of Germans advanced from the Waterlot Farm area, capturing several ofthe 16th Manchesters' sections and re-occupying the western side of the wood.

By 8.00 am on the morning of 10th July only the south-eastern part ofTrones Wood remained in British hands again. Corpses littered the smoking woodland's wreckage and the smell of putrefaction hung heavily in the air. The men unfortunate enough to be within Trones Wood were plagued with flies and the awful sights and stench of corruption. Concern was mounting that failure 10 caprure Trones Wood might compromise the chanees of sueeess of the imminent attaek on the German main Second Position east of Longueval. However, the remainder of the day was quiet and the 30th Division took the opportunity to relieve 90 Brigade by 89 Brigade under the cover of darkness.

Thc c\'ents of 11th - 12th July On the morning of 11th Ju ly the dec ision was made by the British

that Trones Wood should be flallened by an overwhelmingly heavy artillery barrage. Aceordingly the south eastern portion of the wood was evacuated and the 2nd Royal Seots replaced by the 20th Kings in Maltz Horn Trench. The plan was that, as soon as the bombardment ended the 20th King's would bomb their way northwards into the south-eastern corner of Trones Wood. The 2nd Bedfordshires were arrayed in the sunken lane south-east ofthe Briqueterie and they would advancc into the southern part ofthe wood tinking with the King's who woul d join on the Bedfords' right flank. At 2.40 am XIII Corps' heavy guns, as weil as allihe available divisional guns in the area , opened an intensive bombardment ofTrones Wood.

Three quarters of an hour after the bombardment began the 20th King's began Iheir attempt to bomb northwards along Maltz Horn Trench. Initially all went weil , many German soldiers were killed and two mach ine guns captured. Unfortunately the 20th King's did not

44

Tangled undergrowth, shattered lree stumps and branches of Trones Wood made it difficult for ImopS of both sides in the fierce fighting fOT its possession.

reach their objective, stopping a linie short of the strong-point' on the eastern side of Tranes where the Guillemont road lay. Thc 2nd Bedfords' advance was also inconclusivc. They advanced against heavy machine-gun fi re which drove their two right hand companies 100 rar 10 the right. Thc two Icft companies did make the western side ofTrones berween Trones Alley and thc Albert - Peronne light rai1way line. These mcn tried 10 work northwards and eaSlwards but fauod the Germans resolute in defence behind an impenclrable tangle of unerly shattered timbcr, undergrowth, tom Iree rOOlS and entangled barbed wire. MeanwhiJe the two right companies ofthe 2nd Bedfords worked their way from the upper reaches of Maltz Horn valley imo the south eastern side of Tranes Wood, but were unable to progress past the German held strong-point on the Guillemont road.

Throughout the rest of the morning fighting continued wühin the wood and to the south in [he confines of Maltz Horn Trench. By midday the Germans, who had been reinforced, cleared the northern end of Trones, forcing one company of the Bedfords back into Bernafay Wood. Fortunately the British were able to fend off further German counter allacks planned for later that evening. Information

45

A carrying party of ßritish troops mo\·e rorward with supplies ammunitiOIl and grellades, from Bemafay Wood. during July 1916.

47

about this planned allack was found on a German officer capturcd by the French in the afternoon and, as a conscquence, a constant defensive artillery barrage was maintained bctwcen Guillemont and Trones Wood as weil as east of Gui llemont with the intention of breaking up the assembly of German units in those vicinities.

That e"ening the 17th King's attacked the southern end ofthe wood from the confines of the sunken lane, south-east of the Briqueterie. These Liverpool Pals successfully took control of the southern end of the wood from Gennan soldiers of the 182nd Regiment, re-wiring and re-digging their trenches along the south-eastern side of the wood.

The following morning, 12 July, the process ofconsolidation went ahead with the utmost urgency. With the help of the divisional engineers a new trench was begun to link the 17th King's with the Bedfordsh ire's positions. The process was made almost impossible by the depth of shattered timber, tom undergrowth and wire. Nevertheless, this new trench took shape, running intennittently south­westwards across the wood from the Gui llemont Road junction in the east, dividing the small British controlled southern end of the wood from the north which was still in Gennan hands. Whilst Ihis digging was in process German counter attacks against Mahz Horn Trench and Trones Wood were launched at 8.30 pm but were effectively driven off by the prompt use of anillery. Ouring the hours of darkness ovemight on 12/13th the trench was funhcr improved but al best the situation was described by incoming troops as 'only a shaJlow trench with a low parapel held in patches.'

This panorama shows both Bemafay (left ) and Trones Woods. German shells are bursting in the vicinity of Bemafay, 10 the centre·left of the pbotograph. Allhis time Gennan troops were occupylng Trones Wood.

It was at this stage that the 30th Division \'.'as finally withdrawn from the Trones Wood area. The Division had been engaged in the Maricourt - Montauban sector all year. They had effected the successful capture of Montauban and the Briqueterie on I July and had fought desperately for control of Trones Wood. In the five days fighting between 8 and 12 July the division had lost over 2,300 casualties amongst all ranks. They were replaced by Major General Ivor Maxse's 181h Division, which fough t on the 30th Division's lef! on I Ju ly and had suffered 3,300 casualties that day.

13 th and 14th July - desperate measures to capture Trones Wood It was now agreed between Rawlinson and Haig that the attack on

the Geman main Second Position bet\veen Longueval and Bazentin­le-Petit would take place on 14th July at first light, 3.20 am. The plan for this atlack was necessarily complex, the troops' assembly would have to take place at night. Men drawn from fo ur divisions would participate and it was imperat ive that the minimum of disruption which might corrupt the chances ofthis bold initiative's success should occur. It was thus essential that Trones Wood be captured as soon as was humanly possible.

It was now the turn of SS Brigade, 18th Division, to take their place in the ebb and flow of events al Trones Wood and Maltz Horn Trench.6

Two further baltalions, the 12th Middlesex and the 6th Northamptons, were anached to 55 Brigade as support units. They would be vital in thc foJlowing three days fighting. Having laken ovcr these positions, be fore dawn on thc 13th, 55 Brigade was ordered to make a new attempt on thc northcrn end of thc wood at 7.00 pm, after a two hour bombardment by the 30th Division·s artiltery. The barrage was

concentrated upon Central Trench and the area facing Longueval Alley. At 7.00 pm the 7th Buffs began theiradvance along Maltz Horn Trench but again, as with the 20th King's before them, failed tO reach the strong-point on the eastern side of wood astride the Guillemont road. Meanwhile the 7th Royal West Kent anacked from the new trench running across the wood. In the chaos oftumbled timber and the onset of darkness the attack quickly lost any sense ofunified direction. From their nonh, German survivors in Central Trench opened fire at very short range. Same 150 ofthe West Kents found their way to the eastern side ofthe \\'ood just south of the strong-point, and imagined that they had succeeded in reaching the northern apex of the wood and that the wood was therefore in British hands! Throughout the night isolated groups of the West Kents found themselves fighting for contro! of small palches of woodland out of contact with their comrades or the Brigade HQ. On the north-west ofTrones Wood an attack made from Longueval Alley by the 7th Queens was repu!sed by a combination of rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, the last being eo-ord inated from the higher ground which the Germans still enjoyed along the Longueval to Bazcntin-le-Pctit ridge. One small group of bombers from the 7th Queens commanded by Lieutenant a.C.Haggard did however manage to get into the northern tip ofthe wood, having fought their way up Longueval Alley, and here they stayed throughout the night.

lt was not unti! after midnight that XIII Corps' commander, Lieutenant General Congreve. was told by Maxse, 18th Division's commanding officer, that 55 Brigade's allack on the nonhern end of Trones Wood had fai led. The general attack on the German Second Position was now due in three hours, less than 300 yards away from Trones Wood. The men involved in that attack were already engaged in their extraordinary and silen! assembly by night. As yet Ihey had not been seen.

At 12.45 am, amidst the drizzle and dank mist of morning, 54 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Shoubridge, was told by Congreve that his brigade would have to capwre Trones Wood. The success oflhe 9th Division's attack on Longueval was dependant upon that fact. Meanwhile, the Gennan gunners ' continued to shell the wood heavily, not caring apparcntly if Ihey killcd their own men as weil as ou"

There was no time for rcconnaissancc. Shoubridge dccided that onlya simple plan would stand any chance of success. His men would sweep through from south to north, establishing a defensive flank on

50

The terrain due south ofTrones Wood across which the 6th Northamptons ad\·anced on the morning or 14th July. Pholographed (rom close 10 Maltz Horn Farm Crucifix.

thc right, thc eastcm perimeter or the wood, as they progressed. Thc 12th Middlescx would lead thc way, the 6th Northamptonshires WQuld follow up aud establish the defensive flank. However, in thc chaos or troop movcments, around the sunken Jane south-easl or thc Briquctcric, thc Middlesex batlalion were glow 10 gel up and Lieulenant Colonel F.A.Maxwell oflhe Middlesex, in IDeal charge of the operation. dec ided 10 pul the Northamptons in thc lead and use his own Middlesex men 10 make the flank guard as and when they could be assembled. In support of Ihis operation the 7th Bedfords and the 11 th Royal Fusiliers were moved up from Trigger Valley to positions in Dublin Treneh and Maricourt vi1lage .

Advancing from the sun ken lane at about 3.00 am the Northamptons covered the 1000 yards of open ground south ofT rones Wood under a terrifying barrage of 5.9' shells, the survivors gaining the southern perimeter at 4.30 am. This was just minutes be fore the Dawn Attack on the German main Second Position was begun, less than three hundred yards to the west ofTrones Wood. By 6.00 am the Northampton's men werc in control ofmueh ofCentra l Trench. Greatly thinned in numbers the Northamptons nevertheless continued to advance northwards but became increasingly disorientated amidst the debris and ruination whieh surrounded them. Eventually the men halted at the small copse' which projects from the eastern side ofthe wood - believing this to be the northern apex ofTrones. The men then

51

lined the easlem edge of the woad from the railway track down 10 the strong-point on the Guillemont road.

There now followed one ofthe most original and memorable events of the Great War. Its instigator was Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Maxwell who had moved into the woad at 8.00 am with the bulk ofhis

banalion, the 12th Midd1esex.' These scene within what linie was lefl ofthe wood was

one of horrendous imagery. Great shards of splintered timber stood as grotesque reminders ofwhat had once been a proud woodland. Sodies were everywhere, many crushed by the weight of falling timber and tom by the effects of the thousands of shells which had been pumped by both sides into the confines of Trones Wood. The stench of decay was awful. Gennan snipers lay in wail, many taking advantage

of remnants of leafy canopy to disguise their aerial presence. Initially Maxwell established hirnself near

the shallow trench at the south west corner of the wood, keepi ng two companies of the Middlescx lhere at his

disposal. In front of him soldiers were crawling around trying to identify friend or foe, firing blindly. It was a hellish cauldron. Now, al 8.00 am, Maxwell wen! boldly forward to reconnoitre the situation himsclf. He found

F.A.Maxwell, V.c., C.S.I., D.5.0., after his promotion to the rank

of Brigadier. scatlered groups of the 7th Royal West Kent's men

around the south eastern corner. They had been there all night! Nearby were other groups of Middlesex and Northamptons who were exhausted and disorientated.

Nevertheless, by dinl of extraordinary powers of organisation and leadership Maxwell inspired these men to the final capturc ofTrones Wood.

Onc company ofthe Middlesex were detailed 10 attack and capture the strong-point on the Guillemont road. This they would do in conjunction with the 7th Suffs who were in Maltz Horn Trench. This manoeuvrc was successful and completed by 9.00 am. Within the wood Maxwe ll sent an officer from the groups he had found in the south eastern corner across thc wood on a compass beari ng unt il he reached the western perimeter. Behind him a great crocodile of Maxwell's men were strung out across the wood. As the officer reached thc perimeter the order was given to face right and the advance began, shouldcr to shoulder. The wood was so devastated that any nonnal signs of direction were utterly missing. The men moved ahead, guided at evcry

52

step by compass. To maintain the men's nerve in the face of constant sniping Maxwell ordered them to f ire from the hip in to the undergrowth and branches ahead of them. At the point where the Albert - Peronne light railway entered on the western side ofthe wood a machine-gun post was encountered and Maxwell, wirh perhaps 70 of his men, surrounded and capwred the post, killing alt its occupants. For a while no Germans were seen but more serious opposition was met at the second of the two light railway lines. In a letter, written to his wife, Maxwell gives an insight into this extraordinary story:

'I had meallf only ro organise and start the line. and Ihen get back to my loarhsome ditch, back near the edge ofthe lI'ood, so as 10 be in comm/llzicarion by runners wirh the brigade and world outside. Bur ... I immediately found rhat wil/zout my being there the Ihing would collapse in a few minutes. Sounds vain, perhaps. bllf there is 1I0llzing of \'anity abour il. really. So off I went with the line, leading ir, pulling it Oll. keeping irs direction, keeping itfrom its hopeless (and humanly natural) desire LO gel illto a singlefile behind me, instead of a long line either side.

'500111 made tlzem advance withfixed bayoners. and ordered them. by wo)' of encouraging themselves, to fire ahead of Ihem illto the tangle allthe way. This was a good move. and gave Ihem con./idence ... The Germans couldn 'I face a 10llg line oJJering 1/0 scattered groups 10 be killed. and they began to bolt. first back, then, as the I\'ood became narrow, they bolted our 10 fhe sides, and wirh rifle and auromalic guns lI'e slew tlzem.

'Righlup to the very top Ihis Iren( on, and I could hal'e had a milch bigger bag. except that I did not wallt to show my people out ofrhe wood, or too much ollt,for fear oflelling Ihe German artillery know /zow we Izad progressed, and so enable them fo piaster the 1I'0od parri passu wilh our advance ... "J

During the fi nal sweep towards the apex ofthe wood Sergeant WilJiam Ewart Boulter of the 6th Northants showed enormous courage in putting a machine gun out of act ion. In so doing he became the first man ofhis regiment to \Vin the Victoria Cross. The official account of his action [London Ga=eue. 26th October 1916] reads:

'Durillg the capture ofTrones Wood one company (lnd a portion of another company was held up by a machine-gun II'lticJl was causing heavy casualries. Sergeam Boulter. realising the situation, with complere disregard of his per­sonal safety and in spite of beillg severely 1I"01lllded in fhe

William Ewart BoulterVC

53

!/

,~:'.' .. /::

KEY B = Buffs M = Middlesex N = Northants R = Royal West Kents

"

"

/

54

shouldel: adl'aneed alone across fhe open in Jrom 0/ ,he gun wider heavy fire ami bombed fhe team from ,hei,. position, Ihereby sOI'iug ,he !il'es o/lIIall), ofhis comrades all" materially O};sistillg tlle adval/ce whieh el'emually c!eared Trolles Ubod:

A fiel' the fighting at Trones Wood Sergeant Boulter was hospilalised in !he UK unlil March 1917, after which he was promoted 2nd Lieutenant on 27 June 1917. Berote the war William Boulter had worked in the haberdashery department of the Co-Operative Stores at Kcncring. Afterwards it was said of hirn that it was always difficull 10 persuade hirn 10 describe his exploil. As a rule, ar! he would say was that he had with hirn that morning a revolver that kepl going off; and so he killed Germans!

By 9.30 am, more than six hours after the attack on the German Second Position had begun, the genu ine northem apex ofTroncs Wood was gained.

Finally the British had taken the advantage here at Trones Wood. To the east of the wood Germans had fled from the confines of its northern end whcre they had become trapped by Maxwell's advance. As they ran desperately towards Waterlot Farm and Guillemont and the protection of their Second Positions there these men were gunned down in great numbers by the soldiers of the Middlesex and Northampton battalions, which werc now in complete control of the eastem perimeter ofthe wood, and by the rines ofthe 7th Buffs which now controlled the strong-point on the Guillemont road.

The capture ofTrones Wood secured the right flank ofthe advance of the 9th Division's men towards Longueval. The phrase 'better late than never' might be employed to describe the events here at Trones, but I prefer to think that 'cometh the hour - cometh the man ' might be more appropriate to describe Maxwell's remarkable achievements here. Perhaps, under different circumstances he might have become the second soldier to win one of two Victoria Crosses here facing Guillemont.

Post Scdpt. The Dawn Attack on 14th July The capture ofTrones Wood on the morning of 14th July cannot be

said to have ensured that all which occurred during that day's Dawn Attack went weil. Trones Wood was the scene of preliminary operations which initially wem badly wrang. The cause was, as we have seen, the delays which mounted during the first week of the Somme offensive. It is, however, all too easy to say that these deJays resulted in Trones Wood being Jeft isoJatcd when its capture couJd have

55

The scene adjacent 10 the southem end of Bemafay Wood looking east in the direction ofTrones Wood. Supplies liUer both sides ofthe route in this photograph taken in the mid summer of 1916. Below: The same stretch of road today.

been efTected without great loss. The reality is thai Trones Wood could cenainly have becn captured on Ihe 3rd or 4th July but, j ust as cenainly, the cost of holding il aga insl superior ani llery would have becn enormous. What is true is that the final desperate attempts to

capture Trones Wood on the 13th and 14th July did divert Gennan attention from what was happening to thc west and north-west of the wood. As thc four divisions assembled beneath thc Longueval ridge that night the sounds of the struggle within Trones Wood's confines masked any noise which those thousands oftense soldiers made. In this contcxt thc preliminary operation to capture Trones Wood became a successful diversion and one which. at the very last moment, was certainly bencficial to the Dawn Attack's chances of success.

In effecting the wood's capturc on 14th July the 18th (Eastern) Division proved itself to be a highly competcnt and formidable flghting force. Maxse's reputation as an effective organiser was greatly enhanced. His New Army division's fighting reputation was then ensured. That it would be used on a number of further occasions when lesser divisions were rejccted as unsuitable was inevitable.

The Dawn Attack on the Longueval to Bazentin·Jc·Pctit ridge was a

A break for officers of the Manchesters after fighling in the area leading to Guillemont.

triumph. The most significant factor in the morning's success was the forward and silen! deployment of the assault tmops in No Man 's Land in readiness for the attack. North ofBcrnafay Wood and east ofTrones Wood it was the soldiers of the 9th (Scon ish) Division who were able to benefit from the capture ofTrones, moving the British front forward from thc northern perimeter of Bcrnafay imo Longueval village. Adjacent to the site ofLongueval Road cemeterylO the 8th Blaek Wateh had been chosen as the right Oank unit at the eastern end of this massive asscmbly of men. The fac! that this assembly and assault was carried out under the most arduous and dangerous eircumstanees, almost exclusively by other New Army troops, meant that its innovative mcthodology wou ld fo rever be uscd as a point in argument to suggest that, had similar taclics been possible, on the morning of I July the great disaster wh ieh befell thc British could have been avoided. ll However, Ihe purpose of Ihis book is not to address that question - but now 10 eonsider the course ofthe fighling fo r the village of Guillemont, in the German main Second Position, to the east of T rones Wood.

I. On your IGN maps Mallz Horn Valtey is denoted 3S the 'Fond des Maras·. The vallcy's trench map refrrence 15 sheet 62cNW I. ASb and A6a. The very upper limit of Mallz Horn Valley is found Oll sheet S7cSW3. S30C and it is this map whieh also covers the Trones \\'000 - Longucval - Guillcmonl area. Maltz Horn Valley WliS sometiroes referred 10 in contemporary British accounts as 'Dealh VaJley·. 2. thai allack eventually took plaee. "ery sueeesfully from the British perspectiw. on the morning of 14th July. 3. Military Opern/ions. Frnnce und Belgium. 19/6. Vo12. pp 43. 4. From 9th Division. The 9th (Sconish) Di,'ision consisted of 26 and 27 Brigade as weil os the South African Brigade. Amongst thc South Africans the 4th Regiment was known as the 'Seottish·. S. Located at 57eSW3. S.30.3.5.4. 6. A full and detailed aceount ofthese events can be found in: 18th DiI'ision in the G'l'UI ]Iar, G.H.F.NichoJs. BlaekY:ood & Sons. 1922. 7. Located at 57cSW3. S.24.c.4.0. 8. Maxwell had won the VC whilst serving in South Africa. He tater serve<! as Kitchener's ADe. ouring September 1916 he was instrumental in the 18th oivision's suecesful attempl5 to complete the capture ofThiep\'a1. Undoubte<!ly 3 fine and brave omcer. Maxwell was kil1ed at Third Ypres whilst commanding 27 Brigade. 9. 181h Division in /he G'l'ut IIar. pp 64/65. 10. Next to the eemetery a smal1 shrine is the subject oflocallegend whieh suggests that Julius Caesar addressed one of his legions here during the Roman subjection of Gaul. 11. On I July a night time assembly was not an oplion fOT the British sinee the French

wante<! a 7.30 am attatk. and had original1y "''llnted il e\"en laler in the day.

58

Chapter Four

THE BATTLES FOR GUILLEMONT VILLAGE

Part I. Ju ly and August 1916

Before the war Guillemont village had a relatively unprepossessing place in the li fe of the Somme region. Its main thoroughfare, the Rue d'En-Bas, was the backdrop for a typical collcction of Somme farm building and dwellings. Numerous agricultural implements, ploughs, harrows and seed drills littered the street. The centre ofthe vi llage was a rather gaudy church whose architcclurc sccmcd rooted in inappropriate style for such an agrarian and tranquil backwater.

Guillemont's topography and location would not lead you to suppose that 11 could provide a thorn in the side of British progress weil into the third monlh of the Somme baules. Guillemont stood at the shallow head ofCaterpillar Valley which wound its way from Frlcourl, past Mametz Wood and then the northem end of Bemafay Wood into Trones Wood. By this stage in the valley's course il is of little

The Rue d ' En.Bas, Guillemonl 'S main street, in pre·war days. [Reed)

signifieanee but the upper reaehcs ofthe valley, noted as the Vallee du Bois des Trones on your IGN map, are quite diseernible to the lefl of the Guillemont road as you look from the east ofTrones Wood towards Gui llemont vi llage. On the immediate lefl of ehe roadside stands the im­pressive portal of thc Guillc­mont Road Ccmctery whieh is a fine loeat ion from whieh to view this area of the Somme battlefield. There is linie differenee in elevation between Guillemont and Trones Wood. The south ­eastern tip ofthe wood stands at 142 metres above sea level - Guillemont's elevation exeeeding that by one metre! The more dominant loea­

Guillemont church, photographed during the tions, in terms of elevation in German occupation in the winter or 1915-16. this vicinity, are Ginehy at By the late July or 1916 the structure had 154 met res and Delville vanished into pul\'erised brick dust and Wood at 156 metres. Sut rubble. [Reed) Guillemont's interest lies in

the fact that it is loeated towards the south-eastern end of the great Thiepval - Pozieres ridge whose lesser spurs run down through the Ginchy - Guillemont area as they lose height towards Hardeeourt ami, eventually, the River Somme.

Onee Trones Wood had been secured on 14 July there now elapsed aperiod of some days before conditions favourab le to the ehanees of a suecessful assault on Guillemont were ereated. Although only a short distanee from Trones Wood any attempt to capture it at the start ofthe third weck of fight ing would only have served to make even more prominent a Briti sh salient in the Waterlot Farm - Longueval area. Any attempt to capture Gui llemont would also have sufTercd from enfi lade fire directed from Delvi lle Wood 10 the north-west and it was therefore deemed essential that at least those parts of Longueval and Delville

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Wood which overlooked Guillcmont be in British hands before thc attack on Guillemont was undertaken. During this time the focus of the British efforts on the Somrne batt lefront were therefore directed against Longueval and Delvi lle Wood together with High Wood and thc Pozieres defences.

One of the first and most pressing tasks to secure the left flank of any anack upon Guillcmont lay at Waterlot Farm. In pre war years this dominant structure had been a sugar refinery. Now, in the centre ofthe most enonnous conflagration the world had yet wimessed, the fa llen brickwork of its many buildings, its extensive cellars and earthworks had been developed by the Gennans as a featu re of their main Sccond Position, a linie way south-east of Longucval on the road towards Guillemont. At dawn on 15 July an attack was made down this road by a company ofthc 5th Cameron Highlanders, later supplcmented by two companies ofthe 4th South African Regiment. After fierce fighting the Gcnnans were driven out but it proved quite impossible to maintain a hold on the refinery in view of the terrible and intense shelling which was then poured into its confines by thc Gennans. Not unti l 17 July was Waterlot Fann finally consolidated into British control.

The main road into GuiJIemont. Thc shatlercd trees are those nanking the route from Watetlot Farm to Guillcmont , c1early shown on the conlemporary Ircnch maps. This pholograph was laken in September, soon arter Guillemont 's caplure.

Private Clifford Hicks, 17th Lancashire Fusiliers, a soldier from the 35th (Bantam) Division. His brigade, 104, consisted of men ra ised in south Lancashire and l\'1anchester. Clifford Hicks survi\'ed the war. For the rest of his life (he died agcd 74 in 1970) he could nc\"Cr spcak of thc horrors hc ..... itncssed at Trones Wood or Guillemont. [Harlley]

A mere stone's throw to the north­west, throughout this period the South Africans were engaged in the most desperate fighting for Delville Wood. That fighting replieated many of the eireumstanees whieh had made the eapture ofTrones Wood such a misery. Nevertheless, on 17th Ju ly an importan t eonferenee was held at Dury. where Rawli nson and General Foch met to diseuss the immediate fu ture of combined operations in the Somme area. It was ag reed that Guillemont and Ginehy be anaeked by the British on the 19th. and that the following day the whole German front between Falfemont Farm' and the Somme be subjeeted to a eombined Franco-B ritish attack. Guillernont, it was ant icipated would therefore became the scene of a prel iminary anaek, undertaken by the British, 10 secure a more general and combined advanee planned to the south. In the event Ihis plan carne to nought in the grip ofbad weather and the exhaustion which had seI in am idSI those divisions which had been committed throughout the first three weeks of the attacks on the Somme. One extraordinary ex­ample of such endurance was the 18th Division whieh was still loeated in

positions around Trones \Vood, Maltz Horn Farm trench and the Briqueterie having first been engaged almost three weeks before, during thei r assault towards Pommiers Redoubt and Caterpillar \Vood. On the night of 18 July the 18th Division were relieved from their locations around Trones Wood and Maltz Horn Trench by the 35th Division - the Bantams.

At th is time both Haig and Rawli nson were worried that any success ful Gennan counter attack from the Longueva l positions would plaee in jeopardy the many British batteries whieh were now

62

British stretcher bearers bring in the wounded amongst many German prisoners of war. This scene was photographed on 19th July in 8ernafay Wood d ose to the dressing stations located there. Note the waler eart being manha ndled by the German prisoners. Sumdenl fresh waler supplies were an on goi ng problem for the 8ritish.

concentraled within Caterpillar Valley. On 19 July Rawlinson, in consultation wüh General Fayolle and General Foch, therefore agreed that the British and French would attack, simultaneously on 23 July, a11 Gennan ma in Second Positions from Waterlot Farm 10 the River Somme.

20 July saw the Bantams in action to covcr thc advance of the French who were expected 10 make a major effort this day, astride both banks of Ihe Somme. In fact there was no discern ible French movement on the Bantam's right, but the Bantams ncvertheless stuck 10 their task, whieh was thc capturc ofGennan trenches belween Mahz Horn Farm and Arrow Head Copse. Arrow Head Copse lay a linie east ofTrones Wood. soulh oflhe Guillemont rond (at 57cSW3. S.30.b.3.3). The purpose behind this anack by Ihe Bantams was 10 create a more advantagcous position from wh ich thc general aUack upon Gui11emont and the German Second Position could be launched. The Bantam's anack resulted in no progress and 450 casualties from concentrated mach inc-gun, rine and shcll fi re. However. further soulh the French did achieve some progress. reaching the western slopes of the Maurepas ravine beyond Hardecourt as weil as the station on the Hardecourt - Maurcpas road and further south-eastwards towards the River Somme.

63

See German map page 154

!\'lap 7 Detail rrom the 1:10,000 trench map (corrected to 24n/l916) showing the Trones Wood - Arrow Head Copse - Guillemont area in detai l.

64

Thereforc, at Ihis stage, 20th July, thc British front ]jnc facing Guillemont was still located on the eastern perimeter ofTrones Wood down 10 Maltz Horn Farm, although beyond the northern tip of thc wood 's wreckage the front Hne swung north-eastwards towards Waterlot Farm. On the 21st thc 17th Lancashire Fusiliers replaced another bantam unit, the 18th Lancashire Fusiliers, in these front [ines. A measure of thc severity with whieh the Germans were sheJling these positions can be gauged from the casualties which the 17/LFs suffercd during the period 21-24 July during which they simply garrisoncd thc front lioes without making any attacks; five ofTiccrs wounded, 32 other ranks killed, 147 wounded and 2 missingl

, Thc parts ofDelville Wood under British control, and Waterlot Farm, therefore existed as a pronounced and insecure saHcnt in the British lines. Rawlinson's hope was that progress past Ginchy, Guillcmont and Falfemont Farm would straighten the British lines, removing the insecurity of the Delville Wood - Waterlot Farm salient and securing thc safcty of those many batteries exposed in Caterpillar Valley.

French participation in the plan to capture Guillemont and Falfemont Fann on 23 July was extensivc. Thcir artillery was to be deployed to destroy the Falfemont Farm defences before its occupation by British troops. XIII Corps would assault the whole line between Waterlot and Falfemont farms, the German majn Second Position, jn dose co-operation wilh the attack of the French XX Corps on ils left and the British XV Corps on its left. The reality proved very different in the complexity of arranging what Rawlinson, Congreve (XIII Corps) and Horne (XV Corps) hoped would be a general attack timed to coincide with the Gough's Reserve Anny's attack on Pozieres as weil! On 22 July the French announced that they could not be ready for their pan in this enonnous enterprise until 24 July at the earliest. As a consequence the plans of XIII Corps were scaled down and il was decided that, on the right, the 30th Division would capture Guillemont whi lst on the left a further attempt was to be madc to complete the capture of Delville Wood by the 3rd Division. It is worth noting here thai the 3rd Division's objectives stretched from Longueval and Del ville Wood allthe way south-easl 10 Guillemont Station and it was therefore unfortunate that, at such a cruciallocation, the impetus ofthe attack should be complicated by the conjunction ofthese two divisions.

As a preliminary 10 the assault on Guillemont, now due at 3.40 am on Sunday 23 July, attempts were made on the 22nd to secure more advantageous positions for those attacks to be made the following day by the 3rd and 30th Division's men. At 1.30 am the 35th Division made

65

) ' ' "

I "'~J' . .,f{r>I:

another unsucccssful atlemp' 10 carry thc German trcnches between Maltz Horn Farm and Arrow Head Copse. whilst halfan hauT later men of thc 3rd Division also attempted thc capture of Guillemont railway station (locatcd at S,24,d,8 .9) by attack from Waterlot Farm. Thc 3rd Division"s men werc forced back undcr a hail ofmachine-gun fiTe.

23rd July's attacks againsl G uillemont village On thc morning ofthe 23rd attacks on Guillemont were undertaken

by units of the 30th Division from thc direction of Waterlot Farm and also from thc northern segment of Trones Wood above thc rai lway linc's point ofexit on its castern perimeter.

Thc reason why these attacks werc devcloped from thc direction of Waterlot Farm and thc northern end of Trones Wood was simply 10 avoid the wide expanse of open and exposed glacis due west of GuillemOnl (in the vicinily of what is now the Guillemont Road Cemetery). The 19th Manchesters (4th Pals) were the key unit and their attack was supported on their left by the 2nd Green Howards. The 19th Manchesters ' atlack was preceded by a massive art illery bombardmenl. Apart from devastaling the village, and its trenches being manned by the l04th Reserve Regiment's men, the heavy guns also placed standing barrages on the eastern side of the vi llage, the southern end of Leuze Wood, the southern face ofGinchy vil lage, Wedge Wood and Falfemont Farm - all places which might provide the cover for German reinforceme nts to assemble within and advance from. A further protection was to be derived from a barrage on the fl ank south of Arrow Head Copse. The barrage on the village ilsclf was due to lift through the village in four stages, com ing to rest on the eastern and soulhern limits forty f ive minutes after zero.

The 19th Manchesters attacked from the eastern perimeter of Trones Wood with three companies in line. Only when the men reached the German wire did they realise that it was uncut. After fo rcing the wire the Manchesters thcn entered the village and were immediately engulfed in very fierce fighting. Some parties of the Manchesters got as far as the eastern limitsl where they initially surrounded the batt le headquartcrs ofthe 1II/ 104th Reserve RegimenI. However, those men who penetrated furthest eventually found themselves cut off and those who could do so were eventually forced 10 w ithdraw. No reinforccments were able 10 cross the area of No Man's Land west of Guilternont and the attack fai led as the 19th Manchesters were gradually exhausted. On the left of the Manchesters the allack of the 2nd Green Howards. made from Longueval Alley, was a shambles, the

67

men being confused by their own smoke barrage which was blown across their path by a northerly wind! Some groups of the Green Howards crossed the advance of the Manchesters and found themselves against uncut wire south·west ofGuillemont before falling

back to Trones Wood. Others from the Green Howards' attack did manage to capture a trench just south of

the railway line but were themselves ejected and forced to fall back towards Waterlot

Farm where the 2nd Green Howards' men then managed to disorganise the attacks

being made by the 3rd Di vision. lt was a sorry tale.

That part of the 3rd Di vision 's assault. directed south·eastwards down the Longueval to Guillemont road. known as Hi gh Holbom. on Guillemont Station failed to make a secure advance and the men \vere also forced back into the Waterlot Farm area.

This failure to capture Guillemont on 23 July now meant that there was a

large question mark hanging over the prospect of any joint Anglo· French attack

north of the River Somme. Undaunted at 6.15 pm on the 23rd Rawlinson issued further

instructions for the conti nuance of General Sir Henry Rawlinson operations. XIII Corps' orders

continued in exactly the same vein as before: clear Longueval and Delville Wood in conjunction with the next French attack north ofthe Somme and to assault the German main Second Positions be!\\'een Falfemont Farm and Guillemont inclusive. For the village ofGuillemont that meant another pause until the events of 30 July.

The e"ents of 30th July in thc Guillemont area Ovemight on the 29/30th July the 30th Division's soldiers were

again moved up to positions in the Trones Wood - Maltz Horn Trench area. The plan envisaged that these men would attack through the 35th

ma::~:;';~ (Bantam) Division's men who were still garri soning the front Jines'. Inll \56 Whilst the 30th Division was being brought fon",ard in darkness the

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Pril'ate C.W.Cope, X Platoon, C CO)" 18th Manchesters. Prh'ate Cope was killed near Guillemont on 30 July. His bod}' was found, somewhere between the northern end of Trones Wood and the Station, b)' aburial party belonging to the U4th Loyal North Lancs. In a letter datcd 5 August 1916 one of thc party, Prh'ate J. Collier, wrote to Prh'ate Cope's family:

'Dear Friend, Please f!Xcuse me II'rüing 10 )'0/1, as

I am Ille sellder of~'ery bad news, I a", eXlremel)' sorry 10 illfor", )'011 of Ill e death of Pri\'ute C. Cope. I do 1101 know /!im personalI), but me Ulld a chum of mine were out bur)'ing ,he dead and lI'e found him I)'ing in a sllell hole, by tlle look of him he cOllld not hal'e suffered /10 pai/l, so we paid the best respetls H'e could a/ld bllried him!

like man)' similar burials that simple gra\'e was nel'er located after Guillemont's final caplure and Prh'ale Cope's name is now inscribed, s long \\llh many others from his regiment, on the Thiepval 1\'lemorial to the Missing.

[AlexanderlDavis]

Gennan barrage on Trones Wood increased in intensity and a number of the units were very badly affected by bolh gas and high explosive shells. Zero hour was set for 4,45 am but as dawn broke it was apparcnt that thick fog had reduced visibility 10 less than forty yards. However, the attack was launched with 89 Brigadc's objeetive as Falfemont Fann and the German lines north-west to Guillemont and 90 Brigade's objeelives as Guillemont village, Guillemont Station, and the trenches north-west of it towards Waterlot Farm, was to be earried by 5 Brigade of the 2nd Division.

In the murk ofthe mist whieh lay thiek in every hollow Mahz Horn Fann was eaptured and some men ofthe 20th King's then reaehed the Hardeeourt - Guillemont road. In Guillemont soldiers ofthe 2nd Royal Seots had advaneed along the Trones Wood to Guillemont road and entered the village, taking many prisoners. The Royal Scots wcre then joined by the 18th Manchesters who had moved forward from the

69

eastern side ofTrones wood towards the nonhern half of the village. This attack was given ftesh impetus by the support ofboth the 16th and

17th Manchesters but again no secure lodgement wühin the northem portion of the village could be achieved. The soldiers confined within the Guillemont locality were now in great danger of being cut off. Many German counter attacks in the area were being developed and runners, attempting to eonvey reports to brigade and battalion HQs in Trones Wood were being shot down after the fog began to clear at 9.00 am. lt was in this eontext that CSM George Evans of the 18th Manchesters won his VC for his gallantry in delivering messages' .

Gradually the 19th King's began 10 suceumb to the

CSM George E\'ans, vc. pressure of German counter attaeks on the south of Guillemont and were foreed to pull back. The British artillery was faeed with the dilemma of what to do

about the 2nd Royal Seols in Guillemont itself. In the event the village was not shelled and the Royal Seots foughl on, unsupported, until they were all killed or captured.

Further north the attacks made by the 2nd Division were a failure and the troops were eventually withdrawn to their assembly positions. The on ly gains from the events was the capture of the trench leading from Arrow Head Copse along the sunken part of Ihe Guillemonl to Hardecourt road to Maltz Horn Farnl where the right flank ofthe 30th Division was in touch with the Freneh. The losses ofthe units had been depressingly heavy. In 89 Brigade those losses amounted to 1.314 casualties. 90 Brigade losl 1,463. The 2nd Royal Scots had been virtually wiped oul, losing 17 officers and 633 other ranks, comparable with the losses of almost any unit engaged on day one of the Somme battles.

The outcome of 30 July's attacks had almost exact1y mirrored those which preceded them on 23 July. Guillemont was simply a very strongly defended location surrounded by an open glacis, utterly devoid of cover bolh to the west ofthe village and over the Maltz Horn knoll 10 the south-west of the village. The depth of dug-ouls and the many interconnected tunnels meant that any limited British infantry advance into the vi llage could then be isolated and dealt with as the German defenders emerged 10 take these unils in the rear. The British front line facing Guillemont was still the eastern perimeter of Trones Wood. As day ended XIII Corps commander, Lieulenanl General

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Congreve, relieved all the forward troops of the 35th and 30th Divisions and replaced them with the newly arrived 55th Division's men6

•

T hc c\'ents of August 1916 More than four wecks into the campaign the German Second

Positions at Guillemont still held firm. Haig was adarnant that the fight be continued, but thai the present stage of operations should be regarded as a 'wearing out' battle in whieh subsequent operations should only bc delivered using the greatest economy of men and material so that, as the Official Hislory so suceinelly put it: 'the Allies should have al their disposal the 'Last Reserves' when the crisis ofthe fightiog was reached.'

Even so, the first inSlinet of Haig and Rawlinson was 10 help the French Sixth Army get forward by securing the positions at Guillemont, Ginchy and Falfemont Farm. Whilsl Ihe French did attack on 7 August it proved impossible to make comparable arrangements for Congreve's XIII Corps, especially the 55th Division, who were hampered greatly by the strength of artillery which the Germans used 10 oppose every move opposite Guillemont. However, the 55th Division's men used every opportunity during the f irst week of August to dig preparatory trenches sufficiently forward to bring them to within assaulting distance ofthe German positions around the Station and the western limits ofthe village. Tbe 55th Division's attacks on Guil lemont would start on 8 August in tandem with attacks made by the 2nd Division between Waterlot Farm and the northem end of Guillemont by the Station. During 7 August a number offeints were carried out by the artillery simulating the final preparations for an assault by the infantry. The purpose of these feints was to keep the German defenders on edge and in doubt as to when and where the final attack would occur.

There was rea11y no need fo r such subterfuge. The final barrage would leave no one in doubt as 10 when, where or how the assault on Guillemont would occur. The artillery plan was similar to a11 those which had been employed during July's failed attacks. Throughout 7 August the arti llery fe ints continued, and on the 8th the heavy artillery ofXl 1I Corps lifted from the German front lines fifteen minutes before zero at 4.20 am, and began to pound the trenches cuning across the centre of the vi llage. The morning was characteristically misty with very limited visibility. Twenty minutes later the heavy arti11ery would lift towards the village's eastem limits. Thereafter the heavy guns

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would place a standing barrage on positions east ofGuillemont around Wedge Wood, on the slopes between Ginchy and Guillemont and finally in front of Leuze Wood. The divisional field guns would concentrate their fire on Guillemont village, lifting through the village in five stages, ten minutes apan on each lift.

Amongst the infantry the most elaborate preparation were made to keep every member of each unit fuU y informed as to his role. That perhaps begs the question as to whether or not individual soldiers were denied such information in earlier anacks. Whatever, there was a huge depth of suppon made available to every unit, contact planes to spot the advance, ground flares , miTrors, lamps and even a radio station in a trench nonh-east of Faviere Wood. But just to keep within the norms for the time pigeons were taken forward and the men were obliged to wear reflective tin discs on their back as a further aid to observers.

As soon as the atlack got underway all the men disappeared from view in a dense c10ud of dank mist, smoke and dust. The Gennan barrage began to search No Man 's Land and for an hour and a half 00

news of the attack was heard at the 55th Division 's HQ. In that time some progress was made by the men of I/5th King's (165 Brigade) across the spur east of Maltz Horn Fann to Ihe south of Guillemont. Unfonunately this advance proved to have no substance in that it was unsupported on either flank. It nevertheless represented the sole British gain ofthe day. On the left ofthe I/5th King's the I/4th King's Own (164 Brigade) was repulsed at the wire on the south-west corner ofthe village. Although these men bravely tried to dig in, almost within bombing range of the Gennan defenders, they were eventually forced to retire 10 their assembly trenches. It was during Ihis action thaI 2nd Lieutenanl Gabriel Coury of the 1I4th South Lancashires, the 55th Division 's Pioneer battalion, would win the Victoria Cross.

Gabriel George Coury was bom on 13 June, 1896, at Sefton Park, Liverpool , son of Raphael and Marie Coury, of Liverpool. Hi s father was a col1on merchant. He was educated at Slonyhurst College, where he won many prizes for sports, before being apprenticed to one ofthe many cotton firms in that area. He joined the Army in August 1914, as a private in the 6th King's. Coury was given a commission in the 3rd Bal1alion The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment) in April, 1915; then served in the 4th South Lancs until August 1916 from which he joined the RFC as an observer, returning to England in May, 1917. He was promoted Lieutenant on 8 August 1916, and Captain during September 1918. He was awarded the Victoria Cross [London Gazette, 26 OCI.1916] ; Gabriel George Coury,

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Bringing up an 18 pounder during the attack.

73

Lieutenanl (then Second Lieutenant), 3rd Battalion, The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment).

2nd Ueulenant Gabriel George

Coury. VC

'For IIIOSt conspicuolls brallery. Dilring an adval/ce he was in commalld of {wo platoolls ordered to dig a commUllication trenc!, fi'Om (he old firing fine ro fhe position WOll. By his fine exampfe and /Irrer comempt of dallger he keprllp the spirits ofhis men, and complered his rask IIl1der intellse fire. Later, after his baf/alioll Iwd slt/fered sel'ere casl/alties and rhe commallding officer had been wOl/llded. he wem Ouf il/ from of ,he adllallced position in broad daylight. and in full view of the el/emy found his commanding officer alld broughl him back 10 fhe /lew adllanced Irel/ch Oller ground swepl by machine-glil/ fire. He nor ollly carried 0111

his original task, and salled his commcmding officer, bul also assisred in rallyillg Ihe arracking troops when they were shaken and in leadil/g (hem fonvard:

The officer referred to wühin the citalion was Major lL.Swainson, commanding officer of the I/4th Kings Own, 164 Brigade, who had been wounded during the earlier attacks.

The difficulty which all the assaults on Guillemont were labouring under was the inabi li ty ofthe British artillery to locate and destroy the many machine-gun nests scattered within the wreckagc of the village. Whilst the Gennan machine gunners retained the will to continue, and the Briti sh anillery failed to winkle out these astonishingly resilient and brave men, the machine gun continued 10 dominate the Guillemont battlefield. In reality the subterranean tunnels made the anillery's task an impossible one. Typical of the circumstances this day was the fate which befe]] the Ist King's. This banal ion was attacking to\vards The Stat ion, Brompton Road and High Holbom and the position knovm as Machine Gun House.' The King's soldiers had been Iying out in the open be fore advancing at 4.20 am. In the dense cloud of dust and smoke the men had gone too far south, missing the strong points around the station and only entering High Holbom via the confincs of Brompton Road, although almost immediate ly the Germans had then re-occupied their front line from their still intact dug-outs and tunnels.

When the three attacking companies, B, C and 0 were later supportcd by A Company Ihis last company was therefore met by heavy machine gun fire and a shower of grenades as they tried 10

approach the German front lines. Nevertheless, by 5.20 flares signalIed

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Ihat Guitlemont had been captured and Lieutenant Colonel Charles Goffoflhe ISI King's sem back Ihe news, by pigcon, Ihat:

'First, \\·e "ave taken from lilie ami station and I think High Holborn. EI'eryrhing is rather mL.ed. Machine gllllS arefirillg at IIsfrom Guillemont alldfrom ol/rleft. I am at pl'esem i" German from lilie and am goingfonmrd ro deal' IIp rhe sit/lation.'

The words are so typical of the laconic style and immense bravery whieh personified the Regular soldier's approach to his duty. They are Goff's last testimony sinee he was soon to be killed along with his seeond·in-eommancl Major McErvel. and many of the banalion's subalterns and roen.

South of the Ist King's the situation in Guillemont had been ehanged by an inspirational anack made by the 1/8th King's. the Liverpool [rish, 164 Brigade. who fought their way into Guillemont past bOlh sides ofthe quarry. Problematieally the situation could not be made secure and a company ofthe 1/4th Loyal North Lancs who were sent up to hold the old German front line behind the 1/8th King's mell, were bombed out of it by coumer attack from the south, thus isolating the 1/8th King's withill the village. That counter attack also ensured the Germans' suecess in eutting offthe Ist Banalion's mell, who were Ihus

Guillemonl village showing the lolal deslruclion by Brilish sheillire. Enlrances 10 lunnels made by Ihe Germans. and which ran under Ihe '"iIlage alld surrounding areas. conn« ling wells and pro\'iding shelter. can be discerned.

also trapped. Worse, the German machine-guns were now sweeping the origina l No-Man's-Land west of Guillemont making any communication wilh, cr reinforcement of, the King's an impossibiliry. The whole of the 2nd Division's attack, of which the 1 SI King's were a 5mall part, being made balh frorn Trones Wood north of the light railway line and from the north-west from WaterJot Farm, was therefore founde ring again in the area of Guillemont Station. Wilhin Ihis maelstrom of dealh the King 's regiment oew had balh a regular and territorial unit within the confines ofthe vi llage. The ether units of the 2nd and 55th Divisions fonvard ofTrones Wood had a very tough time during these exchanges. Crowded into assembly tfenches, suffering an imense artillery bombardment, uncertain of the outcome 10 the east, these men took heavy casualties whilst frozen in astate of suspended activity.

Although orders were issued by XIII Corps for these units to advance to the support ofthe Ist and I/8th Kings it proved impossible within the confines of such chaotically overcrowded trenches to organise such movemems on the 8th. Eventually Congreve ordered the two divisions to replicate their atlack the following moming, 9 August, at 4.20 am, with the same objectives. Whilst this process of organising further attacks went ahead the mixed units of the King's regiment fough! on within Guillemont umil, 36 hours after their initial attack, the remnants were killed or captured at the quarry and later fighting in the vicinity of the Station' . 164 Brigade's diary records that the nature of the problem was oow understood.

:4s soon as Ihey had got infO Ihe village it appears thaI Ihe enemy came IIp OUf 0/ the ground belmv them and eU! fhem off emirely by means of maehine guns. This is praetieally wllOl happened 01/ the previous auack Olf Guillemom on 30th July. and il is possible tllal Ihe village is an underground warren 0/ passoges in wllieh Ihe garrisoll is immune from shell fire, and /rom whieh Ihey can emerge I\';th their maehine guns after the attacking in/amT)' has passed over.·

lnterestingly the date 8 August marks one of those few moments when Haig's hold on his command might have wavered. On Ihis moming the monarch travelled to France, lunching at GHQ in Montreuil before driving 10 meel with Haig at Beauquesne, Haig's advanced HQ. The King, who was weil disposed towards Haig and his style of leadership, wanted to discuss Winston Churchill's9 critique of the Somme Offensive which had given rise to disturbing questions amongst the Cabinet's membership. The events at GuiJIemont during the previous

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month were a perfce! example or why Churchilrs conccrns had surfaced. Haig was fortunate that the King was so weil attuned 10 thc Commanrler-in-Chief's thinking. In fact , as events in London unfolded Ihis day, the c.I.G.S. Sir Wiltiam Robertson, sent a message 10 Haig ' assuring hirn that he might count on full support from horne:

However, back at Guillemont, on thc moming or 9 August, thc replica attack was made, again at 4.20 am, by those men ofthe 2nd and 55th Divisions who had now been exposed 10 ordea! by shclJfirc for the best part oftwo days in their trenches within and south-west ofTrones Wood. Many or thc men wcre in adesperate state, unfed and short of sleep, dazed by the conslan! detonations whieh seemed 10 accompany their every movc. Thc whole area surrounding Trones Wood and Guillemont was now infested with a haze of fat flies, bluebottles, whose maggots gnawed at the wounds of any man Iying out in the open for any lengthy period of time. Qne uni! whose aetions Ihis moming deserve elose scrutiny is the I/l Oth King's, the Liverpool Scottish, whose men tried desperately 10 elose with the German defenders on the left ofthe 55th Division's advanee.

Ouring the night of 8/9 August the Liverpool Seollish had moved up from their reserve positions, moving past the south of Trones Wood towards Arrow Head Copse. The journey had been very difficult. No guides had lumed up and when replaeemems finally did arrive Iheir knowledge ofthe route proved sketchy. Eventually 166 Brigade 's men Wefe in place, astride the Trones Wood to Gui11emont road. On the right, south of the road, were the I/ 10th King's with the 5th Loyal North Lanes on their left to the north of the road. The Liverpool Scots had been granted just minUies to prepare themselves for the attack and the men's sense of direction and familiarity with Ihe terrain was nOI firmly grounded. The bombardment which preeeded their advance was weak and, as soon as the men rose 10 advanee, they were met by scemingly unsupressed machine-gun fire. In these terrifying circumSlances the attack was constantly rallied by Lieutenant Colonel Davidson, his battalion making four charges in a11, each to no avail. Amongst the Liverpool Scots the easualties wcre heavy. Fi\'e offieers killed, five more missing, seven wounded, 69 men killed, 27 missing and 167 wounded,

This action was the scene for those events surrounding the winning ofthe Vicloria Cross by Noel Chavasse, thc IIlOth King's inspirational medical officer. During the day he watched three of the banalion's doomed charges. Thai evening Caplain Noel Chavasse look a group of his streicher bearers out into No Man's Land in front ofGuillemont and

77

began the process of trying to ident ify the dead and succour the wounded. Throughout Ihe night Chavasse's team worked on, inspired by his cool and good nalured manner. As he searched the shattered terrai n Chavasse brought his characteristic qualities of human ity and ded ieation to the grue50me lask in hand. Eventua lly dawn fo rced abandonment and Chavasse returned, laler to find that he had been wounded. His words on the subjeet wcre the epitome of his typically reticent understatement. ' ... the merest particle of shell just frisked me. I did nol even know about it till I undressed at night." o

The subsequent eitation. published in the London Gazette on 26th Oetober 1916. spoke in fine terms of the dignified and detcrmined valour which Noel Chavasse had shown whilst carrying out his duties.

During an alfack he (ended (he \\"ounded in fhe open all day. under heavy jire. jrequem/y ;11 I'iel\" of fhe ellemy. Dur;lIg the el/suing I/ighf he searchedfor 1I'0l/lu/ed on the grol/lld illfrolll of the ellemy S lilles for fOllr hO/lrs. Nexf day he lOok olle strelcher­bearer 10 file adrallced frenches. (md. IInder heal')' fire. carried all urge'Jt case fo/" 500 yards imo safet)', beillg wOllllded in tlle side by a she/l splinler during Ihe jOl/me}'. Tlle same niglll he lOok up a party of !l"IIst)' \'ohmteers. reSC/led !hree 1I'0lmded men from a she/l-hole tll"emy-jive yards from the enemys trenel/, buried rhe bodies of um officers. and collected mall)' idenrity discs. altlloughjired Oll by bombs a"d machine gUI/S. Allogether he saved the lil'es of same /Wem)' badI)' wounded men. besides rhe ordil/my cases whic" passed through his lumds. His courage and self-sacrifice were beyolld pmise.'

One important post war publication, The Victoria Cross 1856-1920. written by Si r O'Moore Creagh, devotes a greal deal of space to biographieal details covering Chavasse's life. I have reproduced some ofthat below in a ralher condensed manner:

Noel Godjrey Chavasse. M.B .• Capraill, bOn! at Oxford. 9 Nov /884. SOli of the Righ! Reverend The Lord Bishop of Li\'erpool alld of Edilh Jalle Chal"Osse, daughter of Callon Maude, Recror ofCh;rk. He was rwill brother to Ihe Reverend C. M. Cltal'Qsse. M.C.. TemporOlY Chop/ain ro Ihe FOI·ces. Noel Cha\'asse was educated ar Magdalen College School (1896-/900). U\'erpool College Schoo/ (1900-1904). and at Trillir)' College Oxford (1904-1908). and was a well-known atMete. Chav(lsse roll in atMetic cOllfeslsfor Oxford agaillst Cambridge, both ill 1907 alld 1908. /11 Iheformer yea,. he rall a dead-heat ill the 100yards witl! K.G. Macleod illllnder 11 secollds. alU/was

78

second ro his twill brother. C.M.Chal'asse, in the quarter mi/e. Noelllrls 1I0t so sllccessjlll ill 1908, /"IIp/ilring a Ihigh ml/sc/e in the Illmdred yards. Howel'er. he also represemed Oxjord at Lacrosse, botll ill 1904-5 amI 1905-6. Capr. Chollasse was a Medieal Officer at rhe Royal Somhern Hospital. Live/pool, beJore the lI'ar. He joined the Royal Army Medieal Co/ps ill 1913. beillg attached to the 10rh (Lil'erpool Scottish) King S 011'11. and sen 'e(/ lI"ith them in rhe Ellropean m,r in France. He \I'OS flImn/e(/ the Mililary Cross beJore beillg awarded fhe Vicloria Cross JOl" gallallt!)' at Guillemol11. Noel Cha!'asse was sl/bseqllemly all'onle(/ a bar ro the Vieroria Cross [London Gazette, 14 Sept.1917J: The ciWlioll swres tlml: "His Majesry Ihe King hos beeil graciollsly pleased 10 applYJl'e oJ fhe award oJ Ihe Vicroria Cross to Captain Noel GodJrey Chavasse, V.C, M.C, laIe R.A.M.C. Noel Cha\'asse VC and Bar attached Lil'erpoo! Regimellt. Though severely IrOlll/ded early in the actioll II'hilst ean)'ing 0 1I"0ullded soldier to the dressing star ion he reJl/sed to lem'e his post, and Jor (WO days not only continued ro peiform his duties but ill addiliOIl went 0111 repeatedly ulIder heav)' jil"e ro search JOl" and allelld ro the 1I'0unded II'ho were I)"illg Ollt. During these searches, a/rhough pmerieall)' lI'ilhollf Jood dllring this period. worn withJotiglle andJaimwilh his wOlllld. he assisred ro eany ill a number oJ badly I\"OI/Ilded mell ol'er hea"y alld diJJicult ground. By his exrmordinary el/ergy and inspiring example he was instrumental in rescl/ing many lI"oun(/e(/ 11"110 1\"OIIId have othen,·ise IfIIt/oubtedl)' sllccllmbed under the bad wearhel" condiriolls. This del'oted and gal/am officer subsequemly died oJ his \I"oullds.

At a memorial senke ill Lil'erpoo/ll'hich was COlldllcted by Arclu/eacOIl Spoolle/: Canon LaI/ce/at gOl'e all address. AI/uding to rhe late Coptoin Noel ehal'asse, v.c.. he said ir was 110 wonder thar rhe Killgfelt that fhe II-ho/e AI"m)' \I"ould 1110 111"11 rhe dem" oJ so bml'€ and distillgllished (l brotlter. Illal his Brigadier tlec/ared him ro hal'e beeil the most gal/am on(/ lIIodest lIIall he had el'er

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mel. Ihal Ihe Major-General commanding (he Dil'ision should say that his devotion was magnificelll, 01" that the IIhole barralion, sm01hered ill mild as 1hey lI'ere, alld ready 10 drop Jrom exhaustion, paraded Jor his fimeral. Captain Chal'Qsse might hal'e been a great surgeoll, 01' a I"eally great clergymal/ and medical missiollm)'.'

It would be inappropriate for me to add furt her to such a tribute or commentary,

The 2nd Oivision 's al1acks againstthe north ofthe village and the station on this day, 9 August, were again a failure.

Further Plans for G uillemont By 9 August Haig was expressing concern about the strain which

events at Waterlot Farm, Guillemont and elsewhere on the buttlefront were placing on the staff of XII I Corps. The Corps commander's son, the inspirational Billy Congrcve VC. OSO, MC, had been killed before High Wood the previous month. Accordingly, on 10 August, Lieutenant General Congreve rel inquished his command, being replaced by lieutenant General the Earl of Cavan, Cavan brought with hirn the staff of XIV Corps and frorn midnight on 16/17 August the old XIII Corps was renarned the XIVth. However, be fore Congreve departed, his immediate superior Rawlinson had agreed with General Fayolle of the French Sixth Army that there "'ould be a combined attack on 11th, the Freneh attacking Maurepas whi lst XIII Corps seeured the rising ground on thc spur south of Guillemont. In the event this attack was postponed until 12 August on the grounds of inclement weather. Subsequently, Guillemont and Maurepas would then be attacked and captured as soon as both armies were sure this could be achieved. Meanwhile all units were ordered to work forward to their objectives by: ' .. digging, by the seizurc of enemy posts, and by advancing their lines towards the enemy whenever an opportun ity occurred.' " This was the most unimaginative siege warfare. One of Congreve's last contributions to the events at Guillemont was to report to Rawlinson. on the morning of 10 August, that XIII Corps would be ready to capture the vi llage on 17 August.

Ouring the late afternoon ofthe 12 August, amidst fine hot weather. the 55th Division attempted another al1ack on the Maltz Horn knoll south of Guillemont. Thc objcct ive was to seeure the higher ground on the Gui llemont to Hardecourt road (from east of Maltz Horn Farm at 62cNW1, 8.l.a.5 ,5 northwards to 57cSW3, T.25.cA.9 and thenee 10

S.30.b.6, I) in order to ensure that further frontal attacks on the viUage wcre not cxposed 10 enfilade fire from thcir right. On the left flank of

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the British lines facing these positions the trenches were being held by the Il7th King's men who heard the divisional art illery begin its bombardment at 3.30 pm. Almost immediately the German anillery fire increased in intensity. Neverthe less, the attack was made successfu lly at 5.15 pm under the protect ion of an intense bombardment. Unfonunately the expected French advance at Maurepas and the ravine failed to materialise and the I/9th King's men who made the advance were eventually fo rced to withdraw since their right flank was utterly exposed. Late on [3th the King's sold iers in this vicinity were rel ieved.

Earlier that same day, at [0.00 am, the young Sccond Lieutcnant Jack Fearnhead was hit, possibly by two bullets, one of which

penetrated his lung. The trenches were so shallow from the devastating shelling that it proved impossible for

him to be removed in daylight. The stretcher bearers of the 5th South Lancs dressed Jack's

wounds whilst he was conscious, probably believing it to be superficial and promised 10

return that night 10 evacuate him. The likel ihood is that the 5th South Lancs men were very hard pressed that day and Jack Fearnhead slipped into unconsciousness unnoticed. On the stretcher bearers' return he was found 10 be dead. Like so many other young men who were killed here at Gui llemont his grave is unmarked. Jack's company commander, Captain R.G.

Thompson, said in his letter of condolence that;

'They buried him on the spot, alld collected his idenlily disc alld personal

belollgings ... I Gm ajraid thai ir is Ilorlikely rhat file burial party will have been able to mark the

gral'e. bllt it was at a spot a bare half mile sourh ojGuillemom.'

2nd Lieulenant Jack Fearnhead, February 16th 1916, [Hall)

Funher discussions about the nature of combined Franco- British operat ions in the area nonh of the Somme continued unabated. The British pan of the plan was again to allempt the capture of the Hardecoun to Guillemont road before pressing fo rward to the non hern apex of Angle Wood (localed at 62cNW [, B.l.d.7,8).

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On thc nigh! of 14/ 15 August thc 55th Division was relieved of dUIY in the Guillemont seclor. Since its arrival thc division had 10SI Qver 4,100 casualties amongst all ranks. Thc best thaI thc Official Hislory could find 10 say about its endeavours was that ;if i1 had failed 10 caplure GuiJlemont. [the 55th] had at least pushed forward thc British right 10 wirhin elose assaulting distance.' In my opinion il is a sadness that thc 55th Division 's men have 00 memorial here at Guillemont. Thc aren is littered wilh thc unmarkcd graves of so many young men like Jack Fearnhead that not 10 mark their passing in same meaningful manner seems a tragedy in its own right. Thc 55th were replaced in thc line by thc 3rd Division whose attacks thc followiog day were anticipated as having a good chance of success.

On 16 August the anacks were timed to occur at 5.40 pm. The weather was hot and clear, the bombardmcnt thorough and the infanrry anacks delivered punctually. AlIlooked set for an auspicious advance. On the right Ihe 2nd Suffolks cleared Cochrane Alley as far as the Hardccourt to Guillemont road and then bombed forward along the trench by the side ofthe road in the direction ofGuiliemont, capturing part of the Irench but were unable to reach Ihat part overlooking the south of the viUage. Unfortunately the isolated German position known as Lonely Trench, just west of the Hardecourt 10 Guillemont raad, was not taken by Ihe troops in support ofthe Suffolks who had to be withdrawn al nightfall. Other attacks Ihis day directed against the north of Guillemont by the 24th Division failed, as did the French 153rd Division's attacks in the Maurepas - Angle Wood area to the right ofthe 3rd Division.

The slrain was intolerable and the following day Lord Cavan, who hadjust succeeded to the corps command, was himself obliged to quit because of iU health. Cavan was replaced by Moreland who had been commanding X Corps. That evening the British front lines west of Lonely Trench were cleared in order 10 facilitate a heavy howitzer bombardment of the Lonely Trench area. Two hours after that had ceased a surprise attack by the 10th Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 12th West Yorkshires failed to get in. Six houTS later another allempt to capture Lonely Trench, by men drawn from no less than four battalions, was also unsuccessful.

There could be no clearer indication ofthe futi1ity ofallacking weil prepared and determined defenders without recourse to a wider frontage than these wasteful and ill considered altacks south of Guillemont.

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The attacks made on Guill emont bern'een 18th & end of August The ineffectiveness of those piecemeal artacks made on 16 August

detennined that subsequem assaults on Guillemont should be more foc used in their approach 10 the vi llage's capture. On the morning of the 17th Rawlinson and Fayolle decided that the caplure of the village should occupy two days, the first ofwhich would see a parallel French assault on Angle Wood 10 the saulh of Guillemonl.

11 was believed that, with the French in possession of Angle Wood and the British in contrel of the higher ground 10 the saulh of Gu illemont, il would be feasible 10 imagine that Guillemont woul d fall on the 19 August.

On the 18th the wealher proved to be dull and damp. As day broke the German positions at Gu il lemont, southwards in the direction of Angle Wood and further north towards Ginchy, had already sustained almost twenty fo ur hours of steady unremiui ng homhardmenl. Throughoul the mom ing thai artillery fire continued until zero hour. fixed for 2.45 pm. As the final minutes ticked away the rate of f ire never altered, in the hope that such a policy would prevent the Germans anlici pating the auack. Amongst Ihe gunners who were supporting the infantry, hack at Maricourt, Ralph Hamilton described the cacophony of sound with awesome precision.

'Exactly 10 the secGnd hell broke loose, and thousands 0/ guns went off at the same moment. Never have I heard anything like it, or coufd have imagined such noises possibfe. 1I is quite impossible 10 describe to people who have not experienced it. It actually hurt, andfor a time Ifelt as ifmy head would burst. All ta/king was impossible, and rhe telephones l\'ere use/ess. After a time I retired to my telephone-pit. wllieh we have dug 20 feet down into the solid chalk. and 30 feer infrom the entrance. There maUers were almost worse, the noises were not so violent, but the vibration was so great thar arftrst I thol/ght my heart was going 10 stop. from being so jo/ted. !f one could imagille fhe vibration ofthe serew of a ship intensified a thousand times it miglu give some idea of my sensations.'

As the whistles blew the field artillery brought thei! fi re hack inlO No Man's Land, no more than one hundred yards in front ofthe attacking soldiers. As the men approached towards Ihis curtain of f ire the field artillery then began to !in forward in increments at the rate of f ifty yards per minute. In fro nt of Guillemont village these attacks were undertaken by the men of the 24th Division, whilst on Iheir right, JUS!

to the soulh of Arrow Head Copse, the 3rd Division employed 9

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Map 10. XIV CorpS attack, 18 August 1916

Brigade and then 76 Brigade in touch with the French. In the centre of the anacks, in front of Gui11emom, the troops were

unable to advance their positions in the vicinity of Arrow Head and the Trones Wood - Guillemont road. A lin ie to the nonh ofthat raad some progress was made when the left hand companies of the 7th Nonhamptonshires managed to gain a foothold in the German lincs adjacent to The Quarry (57cSW3, T.19.c.l ,4). Thi s was an extraordinary feat on the pan of these men who were later reinforccd by a company ofthe 9th Royal Susscx . As darkness fe ll engineers werc brought forward to help in the process of consolidation here on the western outskins ofthe village.

However, hy far the most significam advance of the day was achieved by thc men of 3rd Rifle Brigade 'l on the nonhern, left, side of the attack upon the village.

The Rifle Brigade's men north of The Quarry advanced with the greatest speed to take a number of German pri soners from the devastation at the Station. This banal ion managed to capture a section of the Waterlot Farm raad 10 the north-west of the station where they joined up with soldiers from the 8th Buffs who had advanced successful1y into the area ofZZ Trench, west ofGinchy.1l

On the right of the British attacks against Guillemont, in the Arrew Head Copse area and further south towards the junction with the French army, the 3rd Division employed 76 and 9 Brigade's mcn in attacks lowards the Hardecourl road and the higher ground south of Guillemont. A segment of the Hardecourt road to the east efCochrane Alley was captured, as was the southem part of Lonely Trench. These positions were terribly exposed and the Germans began to pour an enormous weight of artillery fire into the area, counter anacking the French who had taken ground in the Maurepas ravine. Some ofthe 1st Gordon Highlandcrs in the Lonely Trench area were forced back 10

ma intain their right flank in comacl wilh the Frenchmen. Neverthe1ess, the fo llowing morning it became clear that the Germans had themselves withdrawn to the Falfemont Farm - Wedge Wood lines. The now empty Lonely Trench was thus immediately re-occupied and the men began the consolidat ion of thc Guillemont - Hardecourt raad (in the areas 57cSW3. T.25 .c and 62cNWl. B.l.a). Throughoul that evening and inte the night thc artillery rumbled on:

'Houl' after 1I0ur il wem Oll \l'illlolll a secolld s pause. Somelimes Iilel'e seemed 10 be a compal'Glive lull. alld rilell immediately ir was off agaill 1I'0l'se r/zan evel: NoIV ar midlligllr lI'e arefiring milch slowel; a sheJl evelJl minwe. bw liiere are so

86

many hundreds 0/ batteries engaged thai even that rate is olle continuous rom: The /lien are \'ery tired, and fhe layers /learly exhausled, although lI'e have changed {ll em os often as possible. My glfllS IIm'e already fired nearly a thousand rounds eaeh and are red-hot. Ife hove 10 keep slI'illing {hem 0111 wirh our preciolls

lülle stock ofll'orer. EvelY 1I0W and (hen I have 10 srop one gun {o aUow it to cool. meanwhile increasing thefire ofthe others.'''

During the nigh! of 19/20 August the 3rd Division 's frontage and part of the frontage previously occupied by the right of the 24th Division was taken over by the bantam soldiers of the 35th Division who once again faund themselves facing the forbidding village of Guillemont. Early that morning whilst the bantams were settling uncomfonably imo their ravaged trenches Fourth Army commander, General Rawlinson, was in conference with his corps commanders. Apart from disseminating information about the imminent arrival of the ' tanks', and the possibility of using these within a major September initiative, Rawlinson lOok the opportunity of making it known that he expected the western side of Guillemont to be captured the following day, 21 st August. The remainder of the village would be taken three days later on the 24th, then moving forward across the spur towards Angle Wood whilst the French would capture Angle Wood and Maurepas. The British right flank unit was the 17th Lancashire Fusiliers; their operation orders make interesting rcading, revealing that the battalion took over from the French 127th Regiment d ' lnfanterie in the Angle Wood sector, thus extending the British fromage south of Guillemont. This attack was part of the preparation required 10 ensure that the tanks, when their time came, could be launched from the main ridge running across the battlefield from Leuze and Bouleaux woods, past Ginchy, High Wooel, Pozieres and onwards towards the east of Thiepval.

On 21 August the 35th Division were due 10 make two attacks opposite Guillemont. The first was at 5.00 am when they made an attempt 10 capture German positions opposite Arrow Head Copse. Whilsllhis proved unsuccessful , further north the meo ofthe 8th Buffs and the 3rd Rifle Brigade again scored a success by taking that greater part of ZZ Trench lendiog into the northern part of the village. Later in the day the 35th Division's role in the attacks planned for 4.30 pm was reduccd to the discharge of a smoke diversion whilst soldiers of the 24th Division effected a frontal assault on the western face of Guillemont. However, these attacks made 00 progress since aoy positions captured proved impossible 10 hold onto.

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Hauptmann Ernst Junger and Captain F.C. Hitchcock, MC Atler the war both these \WO otficers wrote very different acoounts 01 their experi&nces here at Guillemont. Junger's book. $tonn 01 Siee/. became a wicIety read dassic. HHchcock's book, Srand Tol. never anained such dlsbnction but is, nevenheless, an interesting and detailed account 01 life with an in1anlfy battalion. Ihe 2nd Leinsters. 60th men describe evocatively the trYlIlg circumstances of ba!tle. I llave placed !helr aeeounts olme terrible sheI1ing which OCCUJTed around Ihe 23rd AlIQUst siele by siOe, editll'og theso 01 extraneous detail.

G.rm.an Iroopl, on ehlln::h paradl, In Iha vIIIag. 01 Combles beloftllhlltVlnls 01 Augllll1916 radueld 11 10. bloody and Ihattlrld Ih.mbill. An der Somme

Junger's day slaried with his arrival at Combles whieh was under the most intense and indiscriminate artillery bombardment whieh utterly devastated thc village, killing many ofthe dvilian population who had stayed on theTe, believing it 10 be a safe dislance behind thc ]ines. Junger caugh! 5igb! ofa 'linIe girl dead in a pool of blood on thc threshold of aße of thc doolv,ays' . Everywhere thc sickly scent of death abounded. Ernst Junger and his men were about 10 relieve troops in the centre of Guil1emont village. They assembled within the square and .... "tre feSlooned with ilems destined for the front line.

Then lI"e mQI·ed off in single file. El"ery man had the strictest orders ta fal/oll" closely on the man in front. Next

A Brlll.h Inlanlry battalton movlng acroll blttllflald In plaloonl, advancln" In lUpport 01 operallonl lo tna sout" of GuiltemOfit In 1916. Tayforübrary

On 23rd August. Captain Hitchcock who was serving with the 2nd Leinsters, part of 73 Brigade, 24th Division. had also been ordered te relieve a front line position that el"ening. He .... '3$

to replace the men facing the south-westel1l fringes ofGuillemontto the fight ofthe Trones Wood to Guillemont road, It\'el wilh Arrow Head Copse. His route up 10 the from lines took hirn along the lane leading north-eastwards from Camoy lowards Monlauban. Arriving in what he described as ·the Val1ey of Death' [Maltz Horn I"alley]the 2nd Leinsters came under sustaiMl and accurate shellfire.

23rd AuguSI ..... there lI"e Irere lI"ilh our transport oll round us! Sergl. McCarlhy. Tronsport Sergeant. gal"e Ihe order to trol,

Ernst Junger

we wert following, mostl)' allhe double, 0 while band loid down ol'er Ihe open ground 10 gire Ihe dirtelion, II was shol infO small bits. Often lI'e had 10 come (o 0

hall 01 fhe "vnl moment, when our gulde losl his wo)'. Ta /je dowlI \t"Os forbiddell, in eose lI'e 10Sllouch

In spile of Ih/s, Nos. land J platoons suddeni)' I'onished, On again.! Jl e got 10

o sunken road, much shelled. II'hert Ihe seetions stowed Ihemsekes. 'Lie down' was Ihe order. A nauseous and oppresslve seent worned us Ihol Ihis road had elaimed man)' arietim, After a ron that Ihreatened dealh al el'ery slep we reaehed 0 seeond sunken road in whieh battle heodquarters wert' eoneealed ...

On and on! Same of the men col/apsed os Ihey ron, far lI'e were compelled tO force Ihe losl ounce from Iheir exhausted bodies. " aunded men called 10 us on left and righl from Ihe shell-holes, and were disregarded, On and on, wirh our e;res flXed on Ihe mall in front, olollg a Imee-deep Irtnchformed o[ linked-up shell.' holes of enormaus si:e. where Ihe dead wert almosl louching, Our feet fOU/ld fillle purchase againSI fheir soft alld yielding bodies, EI'e1l Ihe "vunded who feil by the woy shared Ihe same fOle and \t1?re mx/deli belleolh Ihe boots oflhose who slill hunied 011.

And ol1\'o)'s Ihis siekl)'smell, Erell m)' orderl)" IWle Sehmidl, m)' compalIIon In mony a dangerous pafrol, began 10 red. Allasl 1\'e reached Ihe front lilie, It was held by mell eowering elose in fhe shell­holes, and Iheir dead roices trembled wilhjoy when Ihe)' heard Ihat we were Ihe rtlief A Bamnan sergeonl-major briej1)' handed ol'er fhe seelor ond Ihe lere)' Lighf pislOl.

My plaloon front formed Ihe right wing oflhe position held b)' Ihe regimem, II consiSled of a shalluw sunken road which had been poullded b)' shells, Ir was

89

F.c. Hitchcock

and I rhen heard R,S.M. Smirh:S "oice: 'This way, C Company.' He gOl'e greal assislollce thaI nighl, standing Olli/mder 0

heoL)' barrage dirn:{ing Ihe c()1Ilp«llier os Ihe)' eame up, The mell Ifere splelld/d. alld dld nol budge - jusl slood up lI'ilh heods bel1l. no rushillgoboullo lookforCUl'er: Tom Monissey olld Reid wert superb. kneelillg out under Ihe barrage ollellding 10

Mcfxmnell, "ho wos jllsl d)'ing. He left Ihem theTf!. while Gen)' LislOn led Ihe Compan)' up fhe shollow C. r Oll Ihe risillg ground.

The c.o. met us lIeor Baltalion Heodqllarters alld cOllduefed Ihe Compan)' across Ihe open and behind Ihe from line ro the sunkRn road junclion, Here "'f' enlertd fhe lrenen alld proceeded to take ol'er or fTlie ... e Ihe isolated semry posts in our area, On aml'al, we leoml /hol Poole and Barr)'. who had golle on in adl'ance 10 reconnoitre Ihe lilie. hod been wounded, Jli? acruall)' reliel'ed tliV unils, bolh of whieh were Bantam Ballalions.! The umpleenth ballalions o[ Ihe Glollasler Regiment. and Shuwood Foresten", Ollr men chalfed fhe fit/le Ilesl Counll)'men II'Ilh uproarious Irish badinage, The BOl/aUon fOllnd itself aslride Ihe SUllken rood wilh Gllillemolll sante 150 yurds uwuy. Ife were in Ihe e.wel line Ihat "'e hud held on Ine night 181h-191hAugusl. A Company was on Ihe left in fronl o[ Arroll' Heod Copse, IIe, C Company, were on Ihe righl. BOlh eOll/panles joined UI Ihe borrier on Ihe sunken rood ,,'here the BO/laliOIl bombers und a seclion o[ ,he Maehine-Gun Corps were posled'·. C CompallY ulso [ound u delOched POSI uwuy on the right flank, Loler: I wos 10 get "'eil ucq/loil1led wilh Ihis isolured delOchmenf. BOlid D Companies wert in support and rese,.,,'e fTspeerirely, Bal/aUon Heodquuners "'US behind A Contpany ond parallel ,,'ilh Ihe sunken road, On dury oll nlghl, os LiSlon

Ernst Junger

a few hundred metres left of Guillemont and a rother shorter distance right of Bois-de-Trones. IIe lI'erepartedfrom the troops on our right. the 76th Regiment of Infantry. by 0 space about 500 metres wide. This space was shelled so violent(r that no troops could maintain themsehes there.

The Bamrian sergeant-major had mnished of a sudden and I stood alone. the r~rey light pistal in m)' hand, in the midst of an IIncann)' sea of shell-holes ol'er which lay a while mist whose swalhes gare il an even more oppressive and myslerious appearonce. A persislelll, IInpleasanr smell came from behind. As I had no idea hall' far off Ihe enemy were, I warned my men fO be ready for the warst. He all remained on guard - I spenr the nighl lI'ilh my balman and nl'O

orderlies in a hole perhaps one yard square and one yard deep.

When da)' dall'ned we were aSfOnished 10 see. b)' degrees, whal a sighl SllrTOunded IIS. The sunken road now appeared as nothing bw aseries of enormaus shell-holes fllled with pieces of uniform, weapons. and dead bodies. The grollnd all round, as far as Ihe ere cOllld see. was plollghed by shells. YOII eOllld search in l'Oin for one wrelched b/ade of grass. This chllrned-lIp baulefleld was ghasll)'. Among /he /i1·Ing lay Ihe dead. As lI'e dug ourselves in we faund them in layers stacked one I/pan the tap of anQ/her. One company after ano/her had been shored inro Ihe dn/m­fire and steadily annihilaled. The corpses Il"ere cOI'ered lI'ith Ihe masses of soi!wrned IIp by the shells, and Ihe nexl company adl"Onced in Ihe plaee of lire fallen.

The sunken road and the ground behind was filII of German deud; Ihe grollnd in front of English. Arms, legs, and heads stllck out stark abol'e Ihe Iips

90

F.c. Hitchcock

feit rery ill, blllwould nOlleal'e Ihe /ine. I lI'alked all nighl. visiting /he seil/ries. It mined harn. and we got shelled sel'i'rely eI'ery halfhour. J mted for some time on a nmddy fire slep. lI'ith 8464 Corpl. Broadbent. Primle 0 'Leary. Jim Marslands scout of Hooge da)'s. 11'05 slOnding up on the fire slep on sentfY-go beside me. lieft thell! In that position. and in len minutes rewrned to find a colossa/ shell-eroter in /he pampet. or where it had been. Poor Broadbell/ was dead. and badi)' smashed up. and 0 'Lea'}', Ihe !reen sentl)' of len minlltes previol/s/y. was le"ibly Cllt abow Ihe hl!ad and bad)' - and was ml"ing. Mo"issey und Reid took hirn away- nel'er did I expect to see him again". IIe spent the night deepening the treneh. and blli/ding up the parapets. Whal cover mited Ihe Ball/anIS of 4 feet 8 inches to 5 feet did not sllil the 2nd Leinsters, uI'eraging 5 feet JO inches! 24th August ... At 5 a.m. J met Ihe CO. II'ho had come IIp to inspeci Ihe fine. He was par/ieu/arl)' sympathelic abolII Ihe casuaJlies. lVe laI/red the who/e Company front, including the detached post. To gel to il we had to CIII across the open. Howl!l"er. as it wasfoggy. the Huns did not observe IIS. 11'1>

fa/md Jameson and his plaloon IInder deplorable conditions. all arol/nd thern were enemy dead. and (he Hllie ditch of a trench filII of mild, lI'ith pieces of eqllipment and halfburied corpses. Jameson was cheel)'. bllr complained of being shor{ of rations. This post on the right of Ihe Company was at least 200 yards away from Ihe main line. 1t had no C T. or lI'ire entanglemenrs. blll was echeloned back facing Leu;:e IlQod. Loter in rhe day I got in touch lI'ilh the unit on Jameson s righl. II~ were silbjecl to heavy shell-jire all 1I!0rning. c.s.M. Ke"igan got badly 1I'0linded in Ihe arm: also Sergl. Dignam und a few men.

From Baf/alion Headquarters lI'e

Ernst Junger

of Ihe cralers. In from of our miserable defences Ihere were IOm.off limbs and corpses ol'er man)' of which cloaks ond ground.sheets had been thrown 10 hide Ihefixed slOre of their dislOrted feotures, III spill' of the heat no olle thought for 0 moment of cOI'ering them wilh soil. The dUage of Guillemont wos dislillguished from Ihe londscope oral/lId il onl)' Mcause Ihe she/l·holes Ihere Irere of 0 \lhiler colour b)' reoson of the houses \lhich had been graund 10 powder. Gl/illemOll1 rai/wo)' slaliolllo)' illfranl of us. It was smashed to bils Iike 0 child's p!aYlhing ...

JUSI before len at nighl Ihe left j1all/r. of Ihe regimemal franl was hearif)' shelfed, ond after /Wem)' mimltes we came in for it toa. In abrief space we were completeil' col'ered in dliSI alld smoke. olld )'el mosl ofthe hils werejusl in fraIlI or jllSI behind. Whife Ihis h/lrricane was raglng I Irem olong ml' plaloon frolll. The men were swnding, riße in halid, os Ihough coned ill stolle, Ilreir e)'es fixed 01/ Ihe grolllld infrolll of l/rem. No\\' and Ihen b)' Ihe lighl of 0

rockel I sall' Ihe gleom of heimet after heimeI, baronel after baroneI, al/d I was !iffed wilh prille al commal/dillg lhis hal/dful of men Ilral miglrl "e'}' Met)' be poul/ded illlo Ihe eartlr bllf could nOI be conquered. 1I is in such momellls Ihal lire human spirillfiumphs ol'er lire mlglrliesl demonslrations of material force. Tlre fragile bad)" sleeted by the 11'11/, stands up 10 Ihe most lerrific pllnislrmem:

After a shon period in such squalid and terrifying circumstances Junger was relieved. Hours later he was wounded by shrapnel whilst at Combles. Junger \\'as evacuated 10 hospital whilst his unil. the 73rd Hanovarian Fusiliers. were lateT reintroduced 10 the horrors of GuHlemont. They lIere Ihere on 3rd Seplember when the \lillage was finally captured by the soldiers of the 20th Division.

r.c. Hitchcock

IlIIderslood anO/her unit was loking ol'er Ihis detaclred poSI. Shell:fire was heflish oll afternoon. Bo.l barroges were pUl down oll round, and Ihe eorth was going up /ike I'olconoes, completef)' smolhering us, The heal lI'OS imense, ond os we were oll SII'foling prelf)' freel)', we 801 imo a !illhl' SIOle. Crollching ;'1 Ihe lrench, hugging Ihe fonrord side, one cOIM feel tI'el}' millllle smol/ Slones olld Illmps of earth ricachel off one 's heimeI. Now and Ihen olle would be almost smotlrered bl' Ihe pampeI beillg blq)l'n in, The dirt j1yillg aballl and Ihe fumes from Ihe Iyddite odded 10 our discom!iture, Dllring a bombardmem Olle dtl'eloped 0 cra:e for 1lI'0 Ihings: water olld cigoreues. Fell' could el'er eal IlIIder an intellse bombardmem, especia/l)' on the Samme, whell tI'el}' IIOW olld Ihel/ a she/l would bIo\\' pieces of morta/ir)', or complele badies, wlrkh hod been plllref)'ing in No· Man 's·Land slap imo olle S lrench. SIrelI· fire, 100, alwa)'s srirred up lire SII'orms of blackfl{es, ofll'hich IhefT! IIW an absolute plague on Ihe Samme battle:fields. The bombardmem was Imellse, ar limes il reminded me of Hooge exaclly one yeor prel'iollsl)" I had beeil in command of the Compan)' all da); alld os part of our fronl line Oll Ihe righl of Ihe sllnken road was compleIei)' oblileraled ond IlIIlenoble, I golthe plaloons 10 side,slep 10 the j1anks. Our whole fine lI'as one cloud of smoke, tI'idenll)' the Huns anticipaled an attack os Ihe)' senl all kinds of colol/red SOS leI}' lights up, I got Ol/r Lewis gllns imo posilion ond gare the order 10 fl.l

bayonels. (In sl/ch a cose Ihis is always good for the momfe.). Througholll Ihe bombarc/mem Ihe men were splelldid. 1101 (J senI')' shirlr.ed his dut)':

Lalcr. on the 25th, having suffered nwnerous casualties from the persistent shelling Ihe 2nd Leinslers were relieved by soldiers of the 20th Division,

Onee again the timetable for the capture of Guillemont had been thrown into disarray.

The instructions which Fourth Anny had intended 10 issue relating 10 the 'final' capture ofGuillemont on 24 August therefore had 10 be modified quickly. On (he right il was anticipated that the French would advance the whole of their fromage north of the River Somme, and thai the 35th Division would advance in step" - bOi not anack the German secondary positions. Meanwhile the 20th (L ight) Division. which as we have noted had taken o\'er from the 24th Division in front of Guillemont and south·west of Ginchy. were expecled 10 capturc the nonhern part of Guillemont and the German tfenches on the south· west of Ginchy.

Events had overtaken the attacks planned for 24th August. Throughout 23rd and 24th the Germans persistently bombarded the British positions opposite Guillemont und Ginchy making any preparation impossible to contemplate. The utter lack of any surface water posed an enormous problem for the attaeking troops. One banalion. due 10 attack alongside the French. knew that its men would have to stay out in exposed positions all day prior 10 the assauh. Their records state thaI:

Tlle \\"tl/er slIppi)" is a mafler of grem difJiclIl~r: tllere is 110

wate,. ill the lilie alld all water Iws ro be carried from about Brigade HQ ar Ilight. Men /lIlISt therefore be wamed that olle borrle ofwater has ro last themfor the whole 14 hours. and /IIUst accord;IIg6' be IIsed sparingl)':"

Nevertheless. during the dark early hours of August 24 the bantam soldiers ofthe 17th Lancashire Fusiliers in this area were able to make their assembly on the extreme right of the British frontage, across the north-east face of Angle Wood from B.2 .cA,3 to B.I.d.3,6. Weil be fore dawn the men were concentrated in shell holes, in advance of their front lines, where they stayed eoncealed throughout the day. At 5.45 pm the French I Corps attacked and succeeded in getting into the German's main Second Positions south-east of Falfemont Farm, up to B.2.d.4.8 and also making good their control of Maurepas. Thc 17IL Fs innovative assembly and coneealment taetics enabled the men to advanee alongside the French with few casualties. reaching the 110 metre contour al the south-westem end of the Falfemont spur"'. Falfemont Farm. with its strong defences amongst the surrounding copse and wühin its extensive cellars and outbuildings, was thus finally within realistic assaulting distance.

The suceess on the right flank was good news for Rawlinson and his

93

Corps commanders who were coming under increasing pressure from Haig, The Official History reports that:

'Conferring with his CO/ps eommunders on fhe mO/"lling of 25111 AUgUSf, GelIerai Rall'lil/son /"ead a GHQ letter, receil'ed Ihe pre\'iolls e\.'ening, \\hich emphusised fhe eXfreme imporlance of securilzg Ginclly, Guillemolll alld Falftmollf Farm wir/Will dela)'. The Commander-in-Chief considered fhe rask weil wifhin the pOIl'er of tlle troops and artillelY al'ailable, prol'iding that file higher commanders, bearing in mind fhe s/(llldard of training which existed alllong tlle tlVOPS and sllbordinate leaders, gal'e fheil" personal attemioll fO fhe derails of preparafioll.' zi

As a consequence the attacks upon Ginchy were allotted to XV Corps whilst XIV continued to pil itsclf against Guillemont. The 5th Division was added 10 XIV Corps for the attacks 10 be made on 29 August. However the tactical situation fo r the British was worsening as rain on

The objecth'e - Guillemont \'iIIage - a de\'asted \\3steland,

the afternoon of the 25 th began 10 lum what were already badly churned trenches into a nightmare ofmud and whieh made thc digging of new communication trenches a torlUOUS process. Thc storage of ammunition and thc preservation of food and drinking water suffered accordingly. Thc Gennan artillery was süll very active and the British troops were now experiencing the very worst that summer weather and the German army could throw at them. As thc wcather worsened Haig prevailed on the French for a postponement, initiaHy 10 the 30th. When the bombardment for these allacks began on thc morning of 29th poor visibility made anillery observation impossible and another oße day's postponement became inevitablc. Thai afternoon a vcry heavy thunderstorm broke in [he Somme area, causing the French to delay further - this time detennining 3 September as their preferred date -although Haig and Rawlinson werc in no position to argue against Foch's wishes since their own positions in fron t of Guillemont were in astate of considerable devaslation.

3 I August was the first fine day for nearly a whole week. The scene was therefore set for the final battle for Guillemont village.

I. Originally speI! as Faffemont on eontemporary French maps. 2. Amongst the wounded were the baltalion's oommanding offieer, UeutelUlnt Colonel A.M.Mills. and his second in command Major Sir H.S.M.Havelock-Allan. 3. Guillemonl village was bisected in an eaSll\\1:st manner by its main street. identified on British treneh maps as 'Mount Street". The eastern limits orlhe village were defined by a road running nonh/south. The segment of that road nonh of Mount Stect was Iherefore identified on trench maps as 'Nonh Street' and that 10 the oouth as 'Soulh Street". Mount Street ran cast away from Guillemont past the village communal ~melery en route tOI' .. ards Combles. 4. Many detachments of Bantams \\1:re attached 10 units wilhin 89 Brigade to serve as carrying panies. moving forv .. ard with the 4th waves of assaulting infantry. 5. See Manches/er Pals for more detail of this and other attacks made here by the Manchester Pals battalions. 6. A Territorial Division raise<! in west Lancashire. 7. High Holbom was the stretch ofthe Guillemont to Longuc\"al road to the nortb-\\1:st of Guillemont. Brompton road was the track which ran across the nonhem side of the viUage from S.24.d.8.5 to T.19.a.8.2. Machine Gun House \\"aS located at S.24.b.7.4. 8. The 1I8th Kings battalions casualty list gives 5 omcers and 10 OR killed. 8 omeers and 47 ORs wounded. 502 Olt;; missing. The Ist King's rollcall on 2nd August eounted just 120 survh'ors in total. 9. Churchill \\"aS not then a member oflhe Cabinet. His critique expresscd concern about the profligate \\"aste of life in the pursuil of minimal strategie. and even taeliea!. gain. This document had ben circulatcd to all Cabinet members during laIe July. 10. Cbavassc Double Vc. Ann Clayton. Loo Cooper, 1992. pp 161. This excellent volume details the whole e:maordinary story of Nocl Chavassc's life. 11. The His/ary' of/he Kings Regime", (Lil"erpool). Wythall. pp 311. 12. The litle 3rd Battalion ofthe Rille Brigade is a 11Ither confusing one in tha1 Ihe Rille Brigade was in fact a regimen1 of the British Anny. OuTing the 18th August attacks on

95

L.ooking norlh-easlwards in Ihe direclion of Dch'ille Wood from thc l\Ialtz Horn Crucifix.

Gui1lemont the 3rd Rille Brigade were the right hand battalion of 17 Brigade. 13. There is a very fine and now weil maintained private memorial to one of the 3rd Rille Brigades subalterns. 2nd Lieutenant George Futvoye Marsden-5medley. who was killcd in action hereon 18 August 1916. 14. Ilor Diar)" of Ihe .\las/er of Be/haren. LI.Colonel Ralph G.A. Hamilton. 1924. lohn Murray. RepubJished 1990. Whamcliffe (Pen & 5 ..... ord Books. Bamsley). 15. Men of 105 Brigade. 35th (Bantam) Division. 16. NB. This is not the Trones Woo<I tO Guillemont road but a smaller farm track. still walkable today. \\hich ran from 57e5W3. 5.30.b.9.7 to the south­II.'eSI. The pan of this sunken lane where the two companies met was locatcd at 5.30.b.6.0. 17. In a footnote to the original te:<t

Captain I~ i tchcock says tha!: 'Years afterwards Iran across this man whom 1 had believed to havc died of

soulh-wesl of GUillCntOIlI, on Ihe Hardcourl 10 wounds. walking across the square at Trones Wood road. Fon 51. George. Madras:!

18. On the night of 22/23 August the 35th DiVIsion had taken (!Ver Angle \\'00<1 from the French, thus extending the right of the British frontage. 19. 17tb Lancashire Fusiliers' War Diary. PRO W095 2484. 20. Later in the day the Germans launched a heal'Y bombardment against the 17fLF's new positions and the battalion ended the day suffering almost 100 casualties. 21 . OjJieial His/Ory: Military Opera/ions in Fronee und Be/girlm. /916. Vol 2. pp 202.

The Rue d ' En-Bas. Guillemont's main s ireei, loday. Comparc wilh piclure on page 49.

Chapter Five

THE BATTLES FOR GUILLEMONT VILLAGE

Part 2. September 1916 - Thc Baute orGuillemont

The weather during the first days of September 1916 was greatly improved. As the forward troops' trenches began to dry the men's morale improved, aided by the commencement of the Bril ish bombardment al 8.00 am on 2 September whieh in some way compcnsated fo r the persistent German shctting of the British forward positions; circumstances which had so drained the spirits of the British

The positions on the right or the British XIV Corps whieh were 10 be atlaeked by the Freneh on the morning or 3rd September 1916. This photograph was taken looking north-eastwards aeross the Combles ravine (marked as Vallet! de JIobureplIs on your IGN map). On the right is the

97

AbO\'e: German howitzer gun crew and below a trench mortar team operating rrom a dugout.

98

soldicrs in the Longueval, Delville Wood, Ginchy and Guillemont vicinities, The British advance was planned to take place beh ind a roll ing barrage, advancing at the rate of 50 yards per minute, The 5th Division, which was to attack on the right of the attack, issued orders that its men should keep as close as humanly possible to within 25 yards of that cunain of fi re!

The objective of XIV Corps' attack was identified as a line across thc north­eastern edge of Leuze Wood a position which it was hoped would dominatc and secure any subsequent attack upon the important vil lage

of Combles. The junction with the French would be whhin the steep sided valley or ravine south of Falfemont Farm. The plan envisaged that Falfemont Farm would be captured by the right of XIV Corps, during a preliminary attack in advance of the main assault which would begin at noon.

The pre1iminary attack on FaIfemont Farm was undertaken by the 2nd KOSBs at 8.50 am but this gallant attempt was an utter disasler. The French, on the KOSB's fight, were unable to gel forward in the face ofheavy machine-gun fire. To compound this problem the French artillery had been redirected away from the ravine and the attack about 10 be undertaken by the KOSBs, in order to deal with a German allack to the south. ThaI redireclion was never transmitted to XIV Corps HQ and the attack therefore proceeded withoul anil1ery protection. Hundreds ofthe KOSBs were cut down.

At 12.00 noon the anacks of95 Brigade, 5th Division, 10 the south of Guillemont began. The brigade's most important task was the capture of the spur (at 57cSW3. T.25.c central) to the south of Guillemont village on the Hardecourt road. This task was enlrusted to the 12th Gloucestershires on the right and Ihe 1st Cornwall Light Infantry on the left. The men carried the German front Hne and then pressed on during the next stage, at 12.50 pm, to caplure the German main Second Position between Wedge Wood (at 57cSW3. T.26.c.O,3) and the southern extremities of Guillemont ilself. The greater proportion of the casualties incurred during this second stage of the

Falfemont farm \'iewed across Ihe terrain where the 2nd KOSBs were dedmated on the morning of 3 September 1916. (From 62cNWl. B.2.c.4,3 just in front of Angle WOOO.)

attack were suffered by the Gloucesters who were taken in enfilade from the Falfemont Farm positions which were still. at this stage, in Gennan hands.

At the same time that the Gloucesters were advancing towards the nonh-east of Wedge Wood anOlher attack upon the Falfemont Farm posit ion was undertaken by the 15th and 14th Royal Warwicks. The anillery fire provided for this assault was laid down by British units, but was st ill described as 'feeble'. Unfortunately there were stil l German troops on the right flank of this attempt to get fonvard and their enfi lade fire therefore prevented a successfu l British assault on Falfemonl Farm. However, furthe r to the left. the 14th Wanvicks did gain a footho ld in the trench just south of Wedge Wood.

Lalcr that afternoon, at 2.50 pm. the soldiers of 95 Brigade then continued their advance eastwards and made good the Wedge Wood to Ginchy road on the rising slope 10 the nonh of Wedge Wood. Ouring this process a large number of German prisoners were laken. notably men belonging to the 73rd Fusiliers and the I 64th Regimem. As soon as the British troops could reach the top of that rise and look down upon the devastation whieh was Guillemont village they saw an extraordinary sight. The wreckage was now in the hands of the 20th Oivision's men who had finally achieved what. up until this time. had seemed an insurmountable task.

Ouring the subsequcm hours of the afternoon of 3 September 13 Brigade was replaced in the line by 15 Brigade whose attacks towards Falfemont Farm and the Wedge Wood position had mixed fortune. On the right, at Falfemont, the Ist Cheshires and 16th Wanvicks were unable 10 get fonvard, again because of machine-gun fire from their right flank. However, on the left the I SI Bedfordsh ires reached and look Wedge Wood and made conlact wi th 95 Brigade who nQW overlooked Gui llemont to the north ofWedge Wood. To the men in that small wood and those dug in along the Ginchy road it seemed that German resi stance east of Guillemont had collapsed. However. an advance towards Leuze Wood the brigade's final objective, was denied on thc grounds that the 20th Division's capture ofGuillemonl had been compromised by the failure ofXY Corps to capture Ginchy al the same time. Any advance upon Leuze Wood would therefore have created a very exposed and untenable salienl.

Thc Capture of Guillcmont by thc 20th Dh'ision ' Although the village of Guillemont retains a greal deal of

associat ion with the 20th (Light) Oivision's success in capturing the

I()()

Aerial pholograph of the Wedge Wood - ""alfemont Farm area. S« map 12 on page 11 5.

village on 3rd September. the division was in a parlous state on that day. even before the final attacks commenced. Casualties beforehand had already reduced the effective rifle force of 59 Brigade tO just 1650 whilst 60 Brigade was so affected by sickness and casualties that its replacement by 47 Brigade, drawn from the 16th (Irish) Division, had been a necessity. The objectives set for the 20th Division's attack was the Wedge Wood to Ginchy road, east of Guillemont. In front of the British fon."ard positions the village had been reduced to liule more than a lunar landscape of interconnected shell-holes. Gennan trenches had ceased to have any visible line, but beneath the rubble a number of deep dug-outs had withstood the shelling. Still deeper. a number of tunnels which connected the village's weUs had been constructed by the troops who had been in occupation for the previous two years. These tunnels were still viable and provided the opportunity for soldiers to move safely, more than ten metres beneath the surface.

The British anillery preparation of the area was complex and thorough. As with the area south of the village attacked by 5th Division's men, the assault on Guillemont was to be made in three stages, each progressing behind a creeping barrage, that running through the village at a rate of just 25 yards every minute. A feint bombardment, fired as if 10 presage a British attack, occurred at 8.15 am and the area between Guillemont and Ginchy also received a special bombardment at 8.33 am. The final attack was to be made at 12 noon after a final and heavy bombardment of the Gennan positions in front of and within the village.

The southem pan of the village was the objective of 59 Brigade, and wühin that brigade the men of the 10th KRRC had presscd fonvard as elose as possible to their own barrage even before zero hour at 12.00. Although casualties were thus incurred from their own anillery, the men's initiative enabled them to take the Germans by

Thomas Hughes VC

surprise. On the left of the 10th KRRC the 6th Connaught Rangers had also caught the Germans unaware by using the same tactic. The Irishmen were howeve r more than impetuous and swept fonvard without putting an end to a1l signs of resistance in the area around the quarry. thus obliging one company of the 10th KRRC 10 mop up after the lrishmen in that vicinity as the morning unfolded. Moments later, at 12.00 precisely, the rest of the line advanced from their trenches and within minutes the Gennan's front positions up to the Hardecourt road and the \vestem end of Mount Street' were overrun by 59 Brigade's

102

men. In the conlext of this action one notable distinction was won by Private Thomas Hughes of thc 6th Connaught Rangers who hailed from County Monaghan. Ireland. He was awardcd the Victoria Cross [LaI/don Go=ette, 26 Oc\. 1916]:

'Thomos Hughes, No.3/5027, Pril'ate, Connouglll Rangers. For most conspicI10IIS brave,)' ami determination. He was wOllnded ill 011 al1ack, bllt returned at once to thefiring line after havillg his \\·Olmds dressed. Loter, seeing a IlOstile machine glll1.

he dashed out in front of his compan)', shot the gl/lIlIel; ond sillgle-handed caprured the gun. Tltouglt agaill woullded Ite brought back three or Jour prisollers:

His own account is as fo11ows: 'Ollthe 3rd ofSeptember lI'e wellt ol'er the top. After beillg hit

il/ fOIll" different ploces. I noticed 0 machille gl/n firillg il1 the Germalllilles. So I /"Ilshed IIp. shot botl! the chaps ollthe gun ond broug"t iI back. I remember 110 more IImil I fOlllld myselJ dowlI in fhe dressing statioll. Ps. - I forgot /0 "'ellrioll I brought Jour German prisallers lI'it" the glln."

Thc len flank of Ihe 20th Division's attack was delivered in a south­easterly direction by the 7th Leinsters of 47 Brigade. These men's attack had been delivered from Iheir assembly trenches dug adjacent to the north side of the railway line, nonh-east ofGuiliemont station and east of the road from Longueval and Waterlot Farm. The assault had been pan icularly successful and owed much 10 the courage of the battalion's bombers. who were ted by Lieutenanl John Vincent

Present-day 1";1'", eastwards from ;the quarry" on the Germa n main Second Position trench. looking pasl ' MounI Slree!' which ran towa rds the ccntTt' ofGuiJlemont.

Holland. Holland was anolher lrishman, born in July. 1889, at Athy, County Kildarc. He was educatcd at C[ongowes Wood College. and at Liverpool University. Holland was somcthing of an adventurer and travelled extensively in Brazil, Argent ine, Chile and Bolivia, where he was engagcd in ranching. rai lway engineering and hunting. He relUmed 10 England on the outbreak ofwar and enlisted in the 2nd Life Guards on 2 September 1914. He was gazened Second Ueutenant in the 3rd Battalion Leinster Regiment, in February 191.5. After arriving in France, Holland was attached 10 the 2nd Banalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers. He was wounded at the Sccond Battle of Ypres. After recovery from his wmmd he went back 10 France and was thcn attached 10 the 71h Leinsters as Batfalion Bombing Officer. He then saw service at Loos, Hullueh and the Somme in 1916.

Holland was awarded the Vietoria Cross [London Gazette. 26 Oct.1916), the citation reading as folIows:

'John Vil/cellt Holland. Lielll .. 3rd Balln. Leinster Regt .. allached 7th Battn. Date 0/ Act of BrQl'ery: 3 Sept. /916. For most conspicuous brm'e/JI during a heavy engagement when, not comen! \\'irh bomhing hostile dug-ollls lI'ithill fhe objectil·e. he feadessly led his bombers through our Oll'n artillery barrage and c1eared a greal part ofthe village infront. He slarled out with 26

J V Holland bombers alld fillished up Wilh ollly fi\·e. after capruring some VC 50 prisoners. By {his very gal/am action he ulldoubtedly broke

the spirit of/he enemy, and I/'IIS saved IIS mallY casualties whell Ihe bartalion made a furrher advance. He was far fro", weil al Ihe time. and later /'ad ro go 10 hospilal.' J

It was clear 10 the Roya l Flying Corps' observers thaI the German resistance in Guil1emont was being overwhelmed. By 12.50 pm the advanee to the seeond objeetives began on sehedule, the leading battalions of 59 Brigade now being reinforced by the 6th Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry and the 7th Somerset Light Infantry. The soldiers of ihe 6th Connaught Rangers were leapfroggcd by the 8th Royal Munsters. These soldiers then advanced eastwards alollg Mount Street and began to consolidate along the line of NOrlh Street and South Street whieh derined the castern perimeter ofthe village. To the east it was difficult to see evidence of likely German resistance and to many of the soldicrs and officcrs on the spot it seemed that German resistance had broken do,",m. This was one of the few oceasions when signallers were ahle to operate without interference, allowing the divisional commanders a rare opportunity to control events without interminable delay.

104

View eastwards towards Leuze Wood rrom the si te of the 20th (Light) Division's memorial.

At 2.50 the advance to the third objective, the Maurepas to Ginchy road, was made - within an almost surreaJ calm. In the area of 47 Brigade the 6th Royal Irish actually moved forward to the sound of

Looking towards Ginchy rrom the Guillemont to Combles road. This near seclion or the road was consolidated by the soldiers or 47 Brigade, allached to the 20th Dh'ision rrom the 16th (Irish) Division. b)' the artemoon or 3 September. Further north the 7th Division's attack had initiall)' succeeded in enlering Ginchy, onl)' to be expelled during the artemoon's fightin g.

spoils or battle - German prisoners being marched off 10 capth·ity. : The task before those a5signed 10 clear up - collect, idenlify. bury and

their battalion pipers. Brigade HQ wired 20th Division's HQ that theTe seerned 10 be 'nolhing in front'. Very considerabte numbers of prisoners were captured, Same of whorn seemed more Ihan g lad that their ordeal was over. Thc British captured more Ihan 700 hundred wounded and unwounded men in thc confines of Guillemont Ihis day, the German dead lying in profusion 311 around the vicinity. During thc aftemoon the soldiers of 59 Brigade made cantae! with the men of95 Brigade, 5th Division, on therr right. Unfonunately il was on the left of the 20th Division, at Ginchy, wherc problems were emerging.

Thai Ginchy silualion was creating much nervousness amongst the stafT at 20th Division's HQ. The divisional commander, Major General W Douglas Smith, forbade any general ad\'ance towards Leuze Wood and sent forward the 12th King's to reinforce the men of 47 Brigade astride the Ginchy to Guillemont road. As afternoon deepened two German counter attacks from the Ginchy area were repelled by machine-gun and rifle fire organised by these detachments of the 12th King's on the somh-western fringes ofGinchy. Amongst these men was Sergeant David Jones whose deeds were to bccome the stufT of legend in his home city, Liverpool.

Newspaper reports ofthe action, soon made available in Liverpool, paid great tribute to Sergeant Jones' coolness and determined quali ties.

·Sergl. Jones was Ihe righll1/a1l illlhe right place allhe righl moment: was holl' a fello\\' 1I01l-commissiOlled officer of Ihe Lil'erpoo! Regl. summed Mlllup. 'lfe walked righl into hell by Ihe back doOl: a"d sllJJered lerribly. All 0111' officers bowled 0111. The /lIeIl were like sheep wi,hollf a shepherd. Thillgs lI'ere all ill a

107

l\'lap 11 . Showing th~ 12th King's at Guiliemont. ITabn rrom The lIisloryollhr Kin, ,, Rtgimrnl (J";,y:I"pOOf). ppJ20. E,'frard \\")1 ha ll . Pub. AMlold . London. 193(1.

muddle. Nobody seemed to knoll' what to do. Sergeant Jones splUllgJonl'ard alld gave orders. The /li en quickly recm'ered their temporQ/J' disma)\ alld IInder his directiOlls the)" resllmed the rush 011 the ene",y s position. The maehine guns played hel/with IIS. bllf the Sergeant led IlS straight to the goal. 1Ii> car/"ied ,he position lI'i,II a rllsh. ,hollgh lI'e lI"ere grelUly outlllllnbered. Tlle enemy flet! in ponie. and we losl 110 time ill makillg ollrselves at home ill Ihe posilion. Allllight long the enemy deiliged IIS lI'ilh

108

shell fire. and rwice rhey arracked wilh grear Jury, They were delermined 10 ol'enl'helm IIS by sheer weighl oJ nllmbers, bill under Ihe orders 0/ Serg" Jones we plll our backs '-mo il und drO\'e off Ihe Hllns each lime, He had IIeilher Jood nor waler. and {he circllmsrances were abo/Ir as depressillg os tlley cOIl/d be, bul Jones mn'er despaired, He was so cheerJII/ himself Ihat el'erybody Jell ashamed 10 be anYlhil/g else, So I,'e held Oll like grim dealh Jor (wO da)'s, Ite smashed the enem)' I/P t?\'ery time Ihey ,ried (0 D, Jones VC o\'enl"helm IIS, I1 was I'el}' hord fighting indeed, but the boys slllck il weil Imlil relieJ come, He had been gil'en IIp Jor 10Sl, Nobody t?\'er expecled 10 see IIS again, Thot I\'e had come Ihrollgh the ordeal safe ond lI'ilh hOl/ollr was dlle emireil' 10 Sergeant Jones s hal/dling oJ the men, al/d nobody will begrlldge him fhe hOl/ollr he !ras I\'on '

[Nahonal M~lIms&

Gallcries 00 Mcrscysldc • Kmgs RcgLlncnl Collcclion]

' He oughl 10 be an offi cer,' was the remark of a private who served under Sergeant Jones during the two days' siege:

'He led /lS wirh grear skill, and complerely baffled rheJoe 01 el'el}' I/lrn, Norhing cO/lld disrnay hirn. AI rimes Ihere II"OS el/ol/gh

Resling, near to Waterlot Farm, after the flerce fighting for the ,'ilIage of Guillemont.

eft: This \'i" id pholograph or a dead Hrilish soldier was taken a t rui llemonl in ellrly September 1916.

10 make one 5 hearl sink 10 the bOOls. but Sergeam Jones was os chirpyas cou/d be. and ""s cheerilless was infecliolls. We al/fell sI/re Ihat 1I0lhing cOIl/d go Ilnmg with I/S /Inder his leadership. am/ll'e were right.'

Sergeant David Jones, NO. 14951. was born on 10 January 1891. He was the son of working class parents and was educated in a loeal coundl school in Everton. Before the war he was an employce of Blakes Motor Company as an appremice fitter. FOT his bravery and dcvOIlon 10 duty at Guillemont on the Ginchy road during the 3rd, 4th and 5th September 1916 he was awarded the Vietoria Cross [Landon Ga=ette. 26 Oct.19161. The citation reads:

·Dal·idJones. No. /4951. Sergt .. 12th Baltll. Lil'erpoo/ Regt. For most COllSpiclIOIiS bml'el}', demtion to dmy, and abilit)' dis­p/ayed ill the halldling of his platooll. The platoon to whieh he belonged was ordered to a fonl'ard position. and dur/ng tlle adml/ce ccmte IInder heavy machine-gun jire. the office/' beillg killed and the p/atoon sujJering heal')' losses. Sergt. Jones led fonrard the remaillder.occupiedtheposition.alld hefd iI fo/' {II'O days alld {WO lIiglllS lI'ithollf food 01' water. Imtil refiel'€d. Oll the seCOlld day he dl'ove back rhl'ee cOll1l1er-arracks. injlicring heavy lasses. His coollless II'(IS most {J/'aiseworthy. Ir lI'as due elltirefy 10 his resoll/'ce and example 11/01 his men retailled conjidellce and held (heil' post."

Onee Guillemont had been eaptured, and the lines between the 7th

Th!' shalfered t rees or Trones Wood rorm a background 10 Ihest' Imops in rront or GlIillemonl,

Division in the north around Ginchy. through the 20th Division's positions east of Guillemont lOwards the 5th Division's men west of Falfemont Farm linked, the men began to senle for the night. It was tO be a IOrrid experience. JUSI before nightfall a number of Gennan planes overtlew the area and within minutes a very accurate bombardment of the British positions was begun. Rain began to settle in as darkness shrouded the area. At 11.00 pm Rawli nson ordered that the allack should continue the following day, at 3. 10 pm, and that the artillery should commence a preliminary bombardment at daybreak.

ThaI day, 4 September, dawned damp and cool. After the customary artillery bombardment a number of important local corrections were undertaken 10 ensure the securi ty ofthe British success at Guil lemont . Valley Trcnch'. north of Falfelllont Farm, was captured by two companics of the Ist East Surrcys. A similar detachment of men from the Ist Devons passed through Valley Trench later that afternoon en route fo r the near edge of Leuze Wood, which they reached at 7.30 pm, 500n afierwards bcginning a consolidalion just inside its south·western fating perimeter.

Norlh-east of Gui llcmont thc situation was still shaky. Thc whcreabouts of the 7th Division's forward troops in parts of Ginchy was uncerta in, although it was clear that Ihe Germans had considerable troop strenglh in the area between Ginchy vi\lage and Ihe 'Quadri lateral' - a loop of trenches cast of the vi llage (Iocated at 57cSW3, T. 14.d.9,5.). Some patrols from the 7th Somerset LI managed to get into the western corner of Leuze Wood, joining the Ist Devon's men Ihere, subsequently establishing aseries ofposts from the western corner of Leuze Wood nonh-westwards to the Gu illemont - Combles road. However, on Ihe left il proved impossible tO make any fu rther progress along the rai lway line. past Ihe south of Gi nchy towards the Quadrilatera l, because of accurate sniping from the confi nes of the village. Thc day closed in miserably heavy rain.

Out in his post. south-west ofGinchy, Sergeant Jones and his group of meo from the 12th King's were still exposed and hungry. They would st ill be Ihere on the mOTrOw. His regiment, the King's Liverpool, had been engaged here at Guillemont throughoul 311 anempts to caplUre the village. The regiment's senior battalion, the Ist, along wüh its cOlnmanding officer, had been swallowed up and wiped out wilhin the fighting. Numerous Territoria l uni ls, ordinary Service banalions and Ihe loca lly raised Liverpool Pals units had a11 been here. The rcgiment's hislory rccords that:

'Al CI modes/ estimare fhe King s Rcgimcm (,Iollc in rhc scvcra{

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allempts 10 caplllre /he \'ilIage had losses II'hich came near 3.000 officers and o/her ranks: '

The capture of Falfemont Farm As we have seen, 4 September was a day ofmixed weather, windy,

squally showers and alternating periods of bright sunshine. It was expected that, at 3.10 pm, the 5th Division would carry the attack past the German Second Position from Point 48·, through Falfemont Farm and north-westwards to \Vedge Wood. A subscqucnt advance was to be made at 6.30 pm on the Leuze Wood positions by the 5th Division's men, an objeetive whieh the 20th Division would also be seeking to reach from their positions east of Guillemont.

The attack on Falfemont Farm was made by Ihree battalions of 15 Brigade, 5th Division. The Ist Norfolks were immediately handieappcd by the inability ofthc French on their right to leave their trenches. The right of the 1 st Norfolks was thereforc devastated by machine-gun fire from the Combles ravinc (Oakhanger Wood) and the

This \"e r}' fine pholograph sho"'s Hrilish support lroops wailing 10 ad\'anee from Iheir Irench near to Guillcmonl on 3rd September.

Falremont Farm toda),. Don ' t be conrused by the Ferme de f afTcmont 's location on ),our IGN maps, a Iittlc way south-west or Conlbles, Thc original Falremont Farm was located within the confines or tbc Bois dc FafTemont west or the present farm, On )'our trench map that location is 62cNWl , B.2.a.9,6. Falrcmont Farm was Ihus on the German main Second Position, just south-east orGuillemont, and was surroundcd by an enclosure or trees, today regrown as the Bois de FafTemont.

banalion's anacks fai led. However, on the left ofthe 1st Norfolks one company ofthe Ist Cheshires managed to work their way round to the north-western face of the farm enclosure under the prolection of the spur's shelter. From the north-west the Ist Bedfordshires bombed their way down the German trench, captur"ing many Germans who were driven towards the ISI Cheshire's men. The 1st Bedfords captured 130 prisoners, mostly from the l 64th Regiment, as weil as a number of machine-guns. By 4.00 pm the northern and western parts ofthe fann's enc!osure had been captured. A furthe r anempl to storm the farm al 5.30 pm was a failure and il was then dec ided that the 16th Royal Warwicks would sap towards the farm overnight. Whi lst Ihis process continued the Ist Norfol ks pushed into the remaining parts of lhe fa rm not yet eaptured and then sent patrols to elear the area down towards Point 48 to the south-east.

Thus the positions in contac! with the French were made secure and the south-eastern aspeet ofGuillemonl could be said to be finnly held. During the period 26 August to 7 September the 5th Division's easualty lists revealed that 133 offieers and 4,100 other ranks had been lost. Within the 20th Division the situation was revealed as similarly coslly.

114

Map 12. Detail from the Wedge Wood, Falremont Farm, Oakhanger Wood and Angle Wood areas, north of l\'laurepas and soulh-east of Guillemont, taken from Iwo 1:10,000 trench maps which join 10 each other in Ihis location. Shaded rectangle corresponds wilh the aerial photograph on page 101.

115

Between 22 August and the 8 September that division's casualty toll had mounted by 129 offieers and 2,830 other ranks.

A postscript to the battles at Guillemont The aftermath of these banles at Guillemont was the revelation of a

most unspeakable eoncentration of death. The dead were trampled underfoot, pulverised as further units moved eastwards towards the sound offighting at Leuze Wood and Combles. The terrain was littered with the remains ofsoldiers who once contested Guillemont. One man who witnessed the scene, on 4 September, was a padre serving with the 16th Division, Father William Doyle. His aecount of that terrible passage is a harrowing indictment of the terrible human suffering whieh the village beheld.

'Thefirst part of our journey lay through a narrow trencll. fhe floor of which consisred of deep rllick mud, and rlle bodies of dead men troddenullderfool. Ir was horrible beyond description. bur there was no help for it, and on the halfrotten corpses %ur own brave men we marched ;n silence, everyone busy wilh his own thoughls ... Half an hour of Ihis brought IlS out Oll rhe open infO rhe middle of the battlefield of some days previous. The 11'0ullded, al least I hope SO. had all been removed. but Ihe dead lay Ihere Slif/ alld slark. wilh open storing e)'es. jllSI os fhey lIad fallen. Good God. such a sight! I had fried to prepare myselffor Ihis, bw all I had read 01' piclUred gave me tirrle idea of fhe reatity."I

Sergeant David Jones of the 12th King's who had done such sterling work in rallying and commanding his detachment of soldiers on the north-east of Guillemont survived the ordeal. But David Jones' life was, almost inevitably, soon to be cut short. He was killed on 7th Oetober 191 6. Searehing desperately for informati on, Jones ' newly married wife, Elizabeth Dor01hea Doyle, thcn inserted a number of appeals within thc local Liverpool press asking for details of her husband 's service career.

One offieer wrote to Mrs. Jones: 'I have seen your adverrisemenf abollt Sergeant Jones, Vc. , ill

the 'Echo '. and though I am not able 10 fhroll' much light on Ihe sllbjecf. I feel sure )'ou willnof mind a line 0/ condolellce and cOllgratulal;oll from olle who Iws knOl\'11 him since No\'embel; 1914, and Iws Iherefore been ahle to appreciare fh e magnijicem qllaliries your IllIsband possessed. I1 was on aClive service Ihal his merils came oul so stmngly. He was a wondeiful scout. and

116

did same magnificelll parrol work, which combined brain and bmvery 10 a high degree. His fearlessness had a very grem influence fOT good on fhe men 01 his platoon and cOn/pany. Cap/ain Ballom)'ne more thon any other officer was able to appreciate Ihis. being Jor so lang his Platoon COn/mander. EI'el/wall)', after being a bombing officer Jor several months. I retumed tQ cOn/mond my own Company, and 10 find Sergeant JOlles ,he Sergeant 0/ my old platoon, No. 12. I am so proud to rhink ilWQS 111)' old platoon thar was wirh hirn 01 fhe time. When a Lewis Gun Sergeonl become necessory. I chose him. and a better choice could /lOt have been made. I am so proud. if very sod. And, Mrs. Jones, you,. greal SOTraw will, I am sure, be tempered by )'our great pride. thougl! yOIl will alll'oys say it \\'ould have beeil easier 10 bear if he had only known. I was in the attack on 7 Oe!. , and. as Senior Officer, became a little anxious as to what were the casualties. I remember asking my orderi)' a60llt 8 p.m., Ilhink and hisfirsr words were: 'Sergeanr Jones, he Ihal did so weil 01 Ginchy, has been killed: I feit very eilt up, as I had known him so long. Alas, many analher brave manfelllhal day. Among Ihem Sergr. Andy White, also in No. 10, fell. Bill the bartalion, yes, the whole Division, did wonderfully weil. I know )'ou will exeuse Ihis writing when you know my right arm is all 60und up (not badly hurt), and I have to use my left hand. Mr. Fred Auslin, 75. Bagot Street. Wavertree, Sign Writer, knew your husband I believe, 60th being conneeted wirh coaeh­building. He is a grea/ friend of mine. Accept my deepesr sympathy for yourself in your irreparable loss of as brave and uprighl 0 man as one could wish for.'

After the war, at his school in Heyworth Street, Sergeant Jones' bravery and sacrifice was commemorated by a marble tablet. now a part of the Museum of Liverpool Life. His was jusl one of the thousands of individual tragedies thai went 10 make the extraordinary story of Guillemont. But, writing soon after Ihe war in Gennany, one Olher young soldier who had passed through the same stonn as David Jones wrote eloquently aboul how the baule fo r Guillemont had changed his generation and all that he had thought was fine within civilised Europe.

'For I eamlOl 100 often repeat, a hattle was no longer an episode that speilt itself in blood and fire; ir was 0 condirion of things that dug itselfin remorselessly week after week and even mollth after month What II'as a man s life in this wilderness

117

II'hose vapOllr was laden lI'ith the steneh of thol/sands IIpon tholIsands ofdecaying bodies? Dem/! lay ill ambushfor eaeh one ;11 e\'el)' shell-hole. merciless. and makillg olle mereiless ill turn, Chivalry here lOok a final farewell. Ir Iwd 10 yield 10 fhe heigh fened inrellsiry ofwar, jllst as all fine wul personal feeling has 10 yield when maehinery gefs fhe IIpper halid. rhe Europe 01 lo-day appeared herefor thefirst time on Ihefield ofbattle."

It took a funher quaner ofa century before Junger's 'Europe ofloday' could be banished from Ihe face of the 20th century.

L 20th (Light) Division: 59 Brigade

10th K.R.R.C. 11th K.R.R.C.

60 Brigade 6th O&B.L1, 6th K.S.L.1.

10th Rille Bgd 12th K.R.R.C. 11th Rifle Bgd 12th Rifle Bgd

Pioneers: 11th D.L.1.

61 Brigade 7th Somerset L.I. 7th D.C.L.I . 71h K.O. V.L1. 12th Kings

2. Mount Stn'et was the main sueet in Guillemont. nmning eaSliwcSI. that pan 10 thc easl running past the village communa1 cemetery and thence to Combles. 3. Holland survived to become a Staff Instruclor at an OmCeT Cadet Baualion based in North Wales 4.Valley Trench ran from 57cSWJ, 1.26.c.4.0 to T.26.a.8.5. This day. 4 September, also marked the death of Corporal Ed"''lud Dwyer V.C. Ist East Surrey. ~')'er was said to have been the youngest winner ofthe VC when he \\115 awarded it. althe age of only 18 )'ears, following se\'ere fighting al HiJI 60, Vpres. during April 1915. Edward Dwyeris buried at Flat Iron Copse cemelery. 5. The HisIOIJ' O/Ihe King-i" Regime'" (Lh·erpool). \\'ythaJJ. ppJ21. 6.located at 62cNWI, B.2.d.4.8. 7. Fa/her IHl/ianl Dorle, S.J. A O'Rahilly. Pub: Longmans & Co. 1930. 8. Junger. Slarm ofSteel. pp 109,

After Ihe baUlej the ,'ktors of the baUle ror Guillemonl village are taken out of the line ror a rest.

CEMETERIES AND MEMORIALS

ehapler four

The ce mete ries and memorials in this area

There are, in real ity. only two ccmeteries which properly fa ll wlth in the scope of this guide, Bernafay Wood and Guillemont Road. in the details of the \va lk from Longucval 10 Guillemont and return via Ginchy I have also mentioned the importanee of Delville Wood as the resting place of many men who were killed fighling at Guillemont during the July to September period of 1916. However, the General Tour and same ofthe suggestions made within th is guide willlead you, of necessity. slight ly outside this guide's limits and I have therefore mentioned a small number of other cemeteries which you mighl like 10 take in whilst visit ing the area covered. These include Hem Farm and Longueval Road.

Bernafay Wood Cemeter)' The cemetery can be reached along the 0197 Maricourt to

Longueval road and lics opposite the north-western face of Bernafay Wooel, overlooking the upper reaches of Caterpillar Vallcy. A short distance a[ong that valley to the wcst lies Quarry Cemelcry whi[st Longueval Road cemetery can be seen on the opposile. northern. side

ofthe valley. Thc cernetery provides a fine vantage point, in particular towards the site of thc Dawn Attack made towards the German main Second Position on 14th July 1916.

Thc bare details within the register record that the wood was taken on 3 aod 4 July 1916, by the 9th (Scoltish) Division. On 25 March, 19 18, in the relreat 10 thc Ancrc, thc same Division was driven from thc Wood but recaptured it for a time. On 27 August, 1918 il was finally regained by the 18th Division. Thc cemetery was begun by a Dressing Station in August 1916, aod used as a front-line cemetery until the followiog April. Today Bemafay Wood cemelery contains the graves of 945 men.

Sy thc end of hoslilities Bernafay Wood cemetery originally contained 284 graves, but it was thcn increased by Ihe concentration of 80 graves from Bernafay Wood North Cemetery and 558 from the battlefields immediately cast of the wood facing Trones Wood. Bernafay Wood North cemetery was located opposite the north edge of the wood, a linie way cast of the Longueval - Maricourt road. It was begun by an Advanced Dressing Station, and used from July to OClober 1916. Apart from those 80 soldiers from the United Kingdom this cemetery also had the grave of one German prisoner. The great majority of the concentrated graves in Bernafay Wood eemetery. or 417 out of the whole number, are those of unidentified men. Special Memorials are erected to 9 soldiers from the United Kingdom and 2 from Australia, known or believed to be buried here as unknown; and other special memorials record the names of 12 soldiers from the United Kingdom, buried in Bemafay Wood North Cemetery, whose graves were destroyed by shell fire.

Guillemont Road CemeteT}' Guillemont Road Cemetery. which during the war ycars was often

called Trones Wood cemetery, lies between Guillemont village and Trones Wood, on the north side of the road 10 Montauban overlooking the very shallow upper reaches ofCaterpillar Valley. Before and during the war the area just south of the cemetery was the site of Arrow Head Copse.

The cemetery register records only the briefest of summaries, saying only that the village was an important point in the Gennan defenees in July 1916, and that it was taken by the 2nd Royal Seots Fusiliers on 30 July of that year, but that the ballalion was obliged 10

fall back; and it was again entered for a short time by the 55th (West Lancashire) Division on 8 August. On 18 August it was reached by the

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The magnilicent archileclure or Ihe enlrance 10 Guillemont Road cemelery.

2nd Division, and on 3 September, during the Batt le of Guillemonl proper, the village was captured and cleared by the 20th (light) Division and part of the 16th (lrish) Division. It was losl in March, 191 8, but retaken on 29 August by the 181h (Easlem) and 38th (Welsh) Divisions.

Interestingly the register also mentions that the '20th Division erected a Memorial at the cross roads 450 metres east of the village; whieh has now been replaced by a permanent monument near the same spot'. That memorial has itself since been replaced by a further one, making the curren! memorialthe third in succession! The register also suggests that a permanent Memorial to the 16th Division has been

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Map 13. The trenches whieh exlSled around the Guillemont Rond cemetery In the late summer snd autumn of 1916. As Ihe British Army tightened Its grip on Ihe ,-ilIage orGuillemont (he Geml3n defenders were progressinly ringed with a compte:< network of trenches snd I ha"e gh'en here a map whieh shows the location of those positions prior 10 the (lnal capture 0' lhe ,·iI!age. The cemelery Is located alongside 'Gulllemoni Alle)" (adjau'nl 10 the Guillemont Rond) and south of ' lo\;CI8 Alley'.

123

Guillemonl Road c('m('lery during Ihe laie 1920s when Ihe concenlralion of outl)'ing grlH'es inlo Ihis cemeler)' was complele. Piol 8 is thai jusl 10 the righl of Ihe enlrance porlal. [Garwoodl

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erected between Guillemont and Ginchy. However, that is now located within the village of Guillemont.

The cemetery was begun by fighling unils, mainly of the Guards Division. and Field Ambulances after the Battle of Guillemont, and was closed in March. 1917. It then contained 121 burials, besides a number of regimental memorials. [I was greatly increased after the Armislice by the conccntration of 2,139 graves, almost all of the July - September 1916 period, from the battlefields immediately surrounding the village. It now contains the graves of 2,259 soldiers from the United Kingdom, one from Canada, one from AustraJia, one from Soulh Africa and one from Newfoundland; and IWO Genuan prisoners. Thiny-nine French graves have been removed !O Freneh eemeteries. The Registers record partieu lars of 740 War Dead. Thc unnamed graves in the cemetery therefore number a very high proportion, being 1.523 in total. A few other men are ident ified as groups but not individually. Special memorials are erected to eight soldiers from thc Unitcd Kingdom, known or bel ieved to be buricd among the unnamed graves. Thc cemetcry is very extensive in size, eovering an area of 8,344 square metres. I! is the third larges! on the British seetor of the SOllllne baltlefield.

The only cemctery of any size from whieh British graves were brouglu 10 Guillemont Road eemetcry was Hardceort Village Freneh Military eemetery. The village of Hardeeourt was eaptured by Freneh troops on 8 July, 1916, and again by the 58th (London) and 12th (Eastern) Divisions on 28 August 191 8. Five Bri!ish Artillerymen were buried by their unit in the Freneh Military Cemetery, in the middle of the village, in September, 1916; and in 1918 thc 12th Division buried in thc same cemetery 14 men ofthe 9th Royal Fusiliers and two of the 7th Royal Sussex.

The original battlefield burials !ie just inside and to the !eft of the eemetery entranee. In this section of the eemetery, amongst the first two rows, theTe are a number of weil known and oft visited gravcs including those of 2nd Licutenant William Stanhope Forbes - the son of a Royal Aeademieian; Lieutenant Raymond Asquith - the Prime Minister's son and Lieutenant Honourable Edward Wyndham Tennant - thc son of Barron G!eneonner. Both the last two mentioned were associates of Rupert Brooke and shared their families' nctwork of relationships as part of London high soeiety's 'Souls'. Many of this grouping's sons were killed during the Great War. But perhaps the city whose anguish is most frequently represented amongst the multitudc of headstones is Liverpool, whose King's Regiment was so closely

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associated with the capture ofGuillemont and whose regimental badge appears so very frequently arnong the headstones.

Hern Farm (La Ferme at Hern-Monacu) on the banks orthe Sornrne The great sweeps and meanders of the River $omme providc a

dramatic backe 10th to a number of interesting British military cemeteries. One of the best known is at $uzanne where many of the early casualties belonging to the Liverpool and Manchester Pals ofthe 30th Division are buried. But at Hem-Monacll there is one small cemetery which is completely offthe regu lar track ofBritish vi si tors 10 the Somme battlefield area. This is a pity because the ccrnctery is full of interest and is weil siled for a summer lunchbreak! To reach this cemetery follow the 0938 Peronne road east of Maricourt until the junction with the Dl46leading 10 Monacu. The cernetery is close 10 the river 10 the west of Hern-Monacu.

Hern Farm British Military Cemetery at Hem-Monacll.

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Around the cemetery is a great deal of cvidcnce pointing 10 the severity of the fighting here, both in July 1916 and during the two campaigns in 191 8. The British lOok on this sector in January 1917 and the adjacent farm became the localion for a Dressing Station. At thc end ofthe war this was a liny cemetery but later more than 500 graves were concentrated here.

Today there are therefore almost 600 graves, including those oftwo mcn who werc thc rccipicms of thc Victoria Cross, bOlh poslhumouslyl. Many men were killed during the Somh African Brigade's attempts to defend the Leforest position, east of Maurepas, during the German spring advancc through this area in 191 8. The most frequently given date of dealh is 24th March. The Australian representation here is also strong, although in their cases almoSI invariably from the period August - September 1918.

Longueval Road Cemetery This is also reached along Ihe course of the D 197 Maricourt to

Longueval TOad, north of Bernafay Wood. 11 lies roughly two thirds of the way aeross the No Man's Land of 13 July 1916. On that date the British held the north of Bernafay Wood whilst the Gennan main Second Position defences ringed the southern parts of Longueval. On the night of 13/ 14 July the 9th (Scoltish) Division's men were assembled in forward posilions in readiness for their successful assault

Longue\'al Road Cemelery looking towards Trones Wood on Ihe left and Bemafay Wood 10 the right.

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on those Second Positions. Whilst that assembly was taking place the final stages in the Battle forTrones Wood were unfoldingjust yards 10 the cast. Thc right hand unit ofthe 9th Division, the 8th Black Watch, were deployed here at the site of thc shrine adjacent 10 the present day cemetery.

In fact the men buried hefe are mostly drawn from the casualties incurred during the fighting cast of hefe in the Leuze Wood - Combles area during September 1916. The explanation is that Ihis loeation became the sile of a Dressing Station, known as Longueval Alley cr Longueval Water Point. One hundred and seventy oue men were buried hefe, a small number being from 1918. Duriog 1923-24 a further 49 were addcd, as a consequence of battlefield clearances in the Longueval arca and eoncentration work, making a total of 220 graves.

Tbc eemetcry provides a very eentral loealion from which a number of interesting views can be obtained towards Bernafay and Trones Woods as we!! as Longucval, and Montauban.

Maurepas and ehe Frfnc h National Cemeeer)' Within Maurepas village, easily reaehed from the 20th Division 's

memorial east of Guillemont, are two places of Interest. Sitcd at the village green in the centre of Maurepas is the memorial to the soldiers of the ISI Regiment d ' lnfanterie who died whilst capturing the village in 1916, On the south eastcrn side ofthe vi11age is one ofthe many large Freneh National Cemeteries in this area, this one containing the graves ofmore than 3,600 Frenehmen killed during 1916. The largest of these National eemeteries in the area, indeed on the Somme, is located at Rancourt, east of Combles on the far side of the AI mOlorway ~ AulOroute du Nord. l1 is just a short drive south ofhere 10 thc sile ofthe interesting but linie visited British Military Cemetery al Hem-Monacu.

The CWGC isolaeed gra"e ae Falfemont Farm This lonely and infrequently visited spot lies between the site ofthe

original Falfemonl Farm (Bois de Faffemont) and its post war replaccmcnt whieh is now situated closer 10 Combles. Buried here are the bodies of Caplain Riehard Heumann, Sergeant Major B.Mills and Sergeant A.W.Torranee, a11 of the 1I2nd London banalion. When Ihe three men were killed, on 10 September 1916 during an action elose to Leuze Wood, the bodies were buried on the spot. This is righl on Ihe boundary limits of Ihis guide but I have included a liule detail here sinee many people will be walking rhis area in search ofunderstanding

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l\1ap 14. A detail taken from the 1:10,000 trench map, 62cNW I, showing the location of Captain Heumann 's gra,'c .• The prescnt day Faffemont farm is located at 8.3.a central. See photo page 114 relating to events concerned with the capture of the German main Second Positions in the Guillemont area. After the war Captain Heumann 's family purchased Ihis plot of land from the farmer, having rcquested that thc grave not bc removed to one of the ever growing concentration cemeteries elsewhere on the Somme. A stone cover was set above the grave and this, along with the border. is still maintained by the CWGc.

Captain Heumann had been Mentioned in Despatches and was described as a very popular and capable company commander. CSM Mills was thc holder of thc Volunteer Long Service Medal. The three ruen were killed whilst engaged in a company officer's conferencc within a shell hole. Apan from the three men buried here three funher casualties were incurred from the same shell burst - Ueutenant Attenborough, Second Lieutenant UrseIl and Second Lieutenant Childs who subsequently died ofhis wounds.

The most sensible way 10 get to Ihis location is through the village of Combles. Leavc the village in a south-westerly direelion following the signs for the Guards Cemetery but continue past that cemetery unlil you rcach FafTemonl Farm. Ahhough you have the right ofaccess 10 whal is a rccognised War Grave ir would be a sensible idea to ask at the farm. 'Je l'Olulrais I'isirer la tombe des soldats Ang/ais dans \'Olre champs. 5 'jf VOIIS plait' should sufTice - although I lake no credit for

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such indifferent French! This is also an ideal opportunity to walk a small pan of thc German main Second Position in the vicinity of thc original Falfemont Farm. The map here. a detail from 62cNW I. squares 82 and 83, shou ld he[p

20th (light) Dh isio n's memorial, cast of Guillcmont This wonderfully siled memorial recalls the central part played by

the di\'ision in the final capture of Guillemont in early September 1916. The original memorial commanded the ground east of Guillemont until 1993 when its stonework's deterioration could no

longer be ignored. In that year the venerable but fraclUred edifice was demolishcd and rcplaced with a far less vu[nerable stone upon which the original bronze plaques were re-instal1ed. The finance for the new memorial was raised and arranged through Ihe Royal Greenjackets. Thc memorial was re· dcdicated in 1995. Locating the site is very simple and you will be rewarded with some fine all round vicws from its vantage point.

The autumnal and early winter phascs of the 8anlc of the Somme were a busy and costly period for the 20th Dh-ision. Apart from thc Sattle of GuiJlemont thc division

The 20th (Light) Di ,'ision's memorial east of Guillemont before subsidence and the erret'ts of" eathering necessitated that it was pulled dO\\ß and rebuilt.IThorpe)

also then look part in the Bantes of Flers-Courcelette, Mor"al and the Transloy Ridges. The division stayed on the Somme during the biuer winter of 1916-17 until the German pull-back to the Hindenburg line in March.

16th (Iri sh) Di vision's memori al in Guill emont

The memorial was originally located on the Guillemont - Ginchy road north­east ofGuillemont and commemorated the division's extensive involvement in the fighting in the Guillcmont - Ginchy area. Here in Gui11emont this simple stone recalls the facl that the caplUre of Guillemont. on 3rd September 1916. was greatly aided by the altachment of one of the 16th Oivision's brigades to the 20th Division. Thc memorial can be found adjacent to the village church.

Thc 18th (Eastern) Divi slo n's memorial on the south face ofTron es Wood

This memorial Is easily located on the sidc of the 064 road at the southem end of Tranes Wood. The site overlooks the Maltz Horn valley and farm area to the south. 11 was sited here in commemoration of the sacrifice made by the 18th Oivision's soldiers who finally captured Trones Wood on the morning of 14th July 1916. The prcvious week's fighting here costthe Brilish Army in the region of 4.000 casualties, thc German Army a simi1ar number. As with many locations on this part ofthe Somme battlefield thc area was the scene of fighting during 1918 as weil

Q>

... . ,r, !PISH fjl W,ION

~

as 1916. Coincidentally it was the 18th The 16th (Irish) Dh'ision's mCllloriul Division again who look part in thaI re- near 10 GuillClIlont church. capture in thc September of 1918 at the start of thc last 100 days of the Greal War. Almost all of thc 18th Oiv1sion's memorials on thc Western Front have the same

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charactcrist ic shape. that of a siender poi nled obelisk . This onc carries thc unusual phrase: 'The Grealcst Thing in the World' at 1tS base • leaving the startled on looker 10 finish the sentence by his or her own appropriale words.

Thc 18th ([astcrn) Dh·ision's ßlClIIorllll: ~' (a) Early post·war cross;

(b) Ncwly errecled memorial in the 19205: (c) Present day.

Pipers 3t the memorial to 2nd Lieutenant Marsden-Smedley. ln Ihe background the Irees or Trones Wood ean be seen c1early. (Thorpe]

The private memorial 10 Second Lieutenant Marsden-Smedley, 3rd Riße Brigade.

Second Ueutenant Marsden-Smedley served with the 3rd Rifle Brigade. 17 Brigade. 24th Division. He was killed, aged 19, during an attack against thc Station on 18 August 1916. Apart from being an intelligent and assured young man. and belonging to his schoors OfTicers' Training Corps. George Marsden-Smcdley was an outstanding sportsmall. captaini ng Harrow school 's football and cricket teams. Had he survived the war George Marsden-5medley would have letl his horne in Lea Green. Matloek. to start dcgree studics at Trinity College. Cambridge.

The si tc is best rcached from the Longucval road leaving Guillemont to the north-wcst. Thc memorial is particularly poignant in that. apart from the seeming youthfulness of its focus. the inseription rccords that George Futvoye Marsden-Smcdley fell 'and lies near here in an unknown grave. Lovely and pleasant in li fe - in death serene and unafraid - most blessed in remembrance: There is another very fine memorial to this young man's memory in the form ofa unique stained glass window wühin the ehureh of SUohn the Baptist at Dethiek, Derbyshire.

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I e 11Qn um t nl ~UK SolJa15 tun~aiJ mu:!< le ;)1 Aufa !914

Individual French private memorials Within the southern sector ofthis guide that area

attacked by the French during the 1916 Somme offensive has given ri se to a number of individual private memorials whieh you will come aeross. All are within a short distance of each other. The first of these reImes to Captain A.Cochi n whose memorial is located half a kilometre along the road leading northwards out of Hardecourt towards Guillemont at a j unetion where a left fork diverts towards Trones Wood. The second of these memorials lies adjacent to the Ol46E Hardecourt to Maurepas road and is dedicated to the memory of Gaston Chomel. The third memorial , that of Y. Hallard, is within the village of Maurepas. As already noted, Maurepas is the site of a substantial Freneh National Cemetery to the south-east of that village

'Le Monument aux SoJdats Francais morlS Je 28 Aout 1914' , This substantial stone monument, which testilies to the seH~rity of the tighting he~ during the fi rsl month of the war, was photographed soon after its construction in the mid 1920s, The monument is Jocated opposite the communal cemetery, east of Guillemont. [Reed]

I.Sccond Lieutenant G.E.Cates, 2nd Rifle Brigade and Private R.Mactier. 23rd Victoria

Baltalion. AJ .F.

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Chapler Seven

Tours and Walks

This section of Ihe guide provides aseries of lours and walks. The fi rst of these is a general tour, tao long 10 undertake excepl by cycle, car or coach, designed 10 make you familiar with Ihe main geographie features and siles of historie inlerest 10 be found within Ihe area. Primarily this guide is concerned with Guillemonl and Ihe Iwo woodlands on its western approach , Tranes and Bernafay Woods. Because Ihe area cal/srad by this guide i$ extensive those of you with cyeles might consider bringing Iham alang. The locations around Guillemont certainty lend themselves weil 10 exploration on two wheels, especially during Ihe summer months. As a general rule of thumb a walk described as taking roughly three hours should be capable of being completed on a mountain cycle in one quarter of that time, depending entirely, of course, on how long you care to dweil at the many places of interest. The detailed walks described here will allow you to develop a more intimate understanding of the particular locations described. Whilst stopping at places of interest I suggest that you periodically cross reference with the relevant sections of historical narrative and cemetery - memorial entries.

A general tour 01 the area to lamiliarise yoursell with the main features around the area covered by this guide

This tour is suitable for cars and coaches. If you stop al all the suggesled locations the circuit may weil take lour hours 10 complete. I suggest that you make use 01 the relevant IGN maps. The Green series 1:100,000 Laon - Arras sheel will suffice, but more detail can be gleaned by making use of the Blue series 1 :25,000 sheets, the one covering the Guillemont area being 2408 est, covering all areas described wilhin Ihis guide. However, the map below will help If you have been unable 10 obtain the IGN sheets.

Coming Irom Albert you can reach a suitable startlng point for this tour al the village 01 Fricourt. I suggest this since Fricourt was attacked, on 1 July 1916, by Ihe 7th Division's men which included the 20th Manchesters. From Fricourt almost all the way along the southern arm of the Brilish sector of the battlefield that day there were Ihousands of men, representatives of Kitchener's New Armies, raised in the industrial towns of Manchester and Liverpool. As you pedal or drive eastwards along the D64 you will pass through Mametz and Montauban, both villages where the association with the Manchester Pals battalions is very strong, but nowhere is that association more notable, or better recorded, than at Montauban where the initial attack

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~ IBP 15. A General Tour ofthe Guillcmont BreB.

south of the village was undertaken by the Liverpool Pals (King's Regiment) and where the final capture of the village was made by units drawn form the Manchester Pals (Manchester Regiment). Within the village you will come across the very fine Portland stone memorial erected to the memory of both the Liverpool and Manchester Pals , raised there during the early 199Os. The link between the cities of Liverpool and Manchester and their Regular, Territorial and Pals batta1ions with the area covered by this guide continues into the two woodlands east of Montauban, Bernafay and Trones, as weil as to the village of Guillemont itself. More recently the King's Regiment

The \"e rr fine memorial. dedicated to the memory of the Lirerpool and I' lanchester Pals. which is to be found in :\10ntauban.

(wh ich raised the Liverpool Pals) and the Manchester Regiment have amalgamated into a unified organisation and it can be said without concern of contradiction that the King's regiment's part in the story of Guillemont is unique.

From Montauban contlnue eastwards, still on the 064, in the direction of Guillemont. You will soon come to a cross roads where, facing you on the front left, is Bernafay Wood. Turn left and travel north in the direction of longueval along the 0197. En route to longueval you will pass along the western side of Bernafay Wood which was, at the start of the Somme battles, roughly mid-way between the German front line positions and their main Second Position. In this area the distance between the front lines and the German main Second Position was considerable and Bernafay Wood was therefore not within the British infantry's objectives on 1 July. Nevertheless, Bernafay Wood was organised for defence by the German army and a number of significant trenches had been dug, both within the wood's confines and between Bernafay and Trones Wood further east. As you approach the northern end of Bernafay you will come across Bernafay Wood military cemetery on your left. The cemetery slopes from left down 10 right as you look at it and those slopes lead down into the shallow depression of Caterpillar valley. Continue along the 0197 and you will pass Longueval Road British Military cemetery on your right with its relatively small number of graves. Four hundred metres past that cemetery turn

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right, by-passing the southern end of Longueval. The village was a vital feature on the German main Second Position . TM area to the west of Longueval was that attacked by the British infantry during their remarkable Dawn Attack on 14th July.

Travel for three hundred meters before turning right again , heading in a soulherly direction lowards the northern tip of Trones Wood. On your left is Waterlot Farm which was also an importantlocation on the German main Second Positions. Continue southwards passing the eastern perimeter of Trones Wood on your right. Fifty metres before Ihe small stand of trees which juts out from Ihe eastern limits of Ihe wood pause tor a short while. This is where Ihe two light railway lines which passed through Trones Wood emerged on ils eastern perimeter. The two lines then joined and ran across Ihe open ground al Ihe head of Caterpillar valley lowards Guillemont Station whose site is slill plainly visible just to Ihe north of Ihal village.

At the 064 turn left along the Guillemonl road , travelling pasl Guillemont Road Cemetery. This is a fascinating cemetery with a most impressive enlrance. The cemetery slopes downwards, away to the north, and into the last eastern vestiges of Calerpillar valley's long course from Fricourt 10 Guillemont. As you enter Guillemont stay 10 the left and pass Ihe ehurch on your left, crossing straight over al the cross roads and heading towards Longueval along the 020, This will take you past the site of Ihe Station, adjacenl 10 Ihe grain silo, which lies on the left of Ihe road some 300 hundred metres past Ihe Ginchy turnoff. Travel past the sile of Waterlot Farm and Ihen turn rlght al the communal cemetery in Longueval. This is a litlle outside the area covered by this guide, but the route is worthwhile in thai it brings us past the South African Memorial al Delville Wood and thenee inlo Ginehy vitIage.

As you enter Ginchy turn left and then very soon right onlo the D20E. The 020 runs due south. AI Ihe cross roads with Ihe 201h (light) Oivision's memorial go straight over and follow that sunken road and the signs for Maurepas. One kilometre after the cross roads you will be able to see a stand of trees on your left whieh is Wedge Wood. Just past Wedge Wood you can look up the slope of the Falfemonl spur, to your left, towards Ihe original sile of Falfemont Farm. The area in front of you south-eastwards in Ihe direcl ion of Maurepas and south-westwards 10 Hardeeourt lay within the eonfines of the French army's sphere of operations during Ihe Somme batlles of 1916. Continue Into Maurepas where Ihere is a nolable and large French National military eemetery on Ihe soulh-eastern side of Ihe village. The village also provides the loealion for an individual and private memorial to a Freneh soldier, V.Haliard.

From Maurepas take Ihe o0146E in Ihe direction of Hardecourt. En route , on the left hand side of the road, you will see anolher private memorial 10 Gasion ehome!. The vilJage of Hardecourt is roughly two

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and a half kilometres south of GUiliemont, Iying half way between the German front line positions (Iocated between Bois de Maricourt and Bois Faviere) and Ihe German main Second Position in the Falfemont Farm - Maurepas area. On 1 July 1916 Hardecourt lay outside the objectives allotted to the French XX Corps north of the Somme, although the wood 10 the west of Hardecourt, Bois Faviere, was due 10 be captured as was that to the south of the village, Bois d'en Haut. In the evenl bolh woods were taken as the Frenchmen, on the right of the Brilish 30th Division , swept forward 10 Curlu on the banks of the Somme by the evening of 1 July.

In Hatdecourt take the Montauban road crossing the valley south of Trones and Bernafay. (In some contemporary accounts this valley is referred to as Death Valley. There were of course a number of other locations so called. The Official History refers 10 this vaJley as Maltz Horn Valley and I have used thai nomenclature throughout.) The latter part of this road is a sunken lane and is that from which most of Ihe early attacks upon Trones Wood were made. AI Ihe junction wlth the 0197, just south of Bernafay Wood, turn left in the dlrectlon of

Looking north tO\Hlrds ßernafay Wood from the Chcmin des Anglais. north of Maricourt, whieh was the jUllction betwcen thc British and the frcnch armies on I July 1916.

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Marlcourt. Almost immediately, on your fight, is the site of the Briqueterie which was captured on 1 st July by No.4 Company of the 20th King's.

The road 10 Maricourt is close 10 the junction between the British 30th Division and tM French 39th Division on their right. Five hundred metres south of the Briqueterie ran the important German reserve position known as Dublin trench which was both the British and French objective for 1 July's attacks here. The German front line was roughly 1,500 metres south of Ihe Briqueterie whilst the British - French front li ne facing them was level with the northern tip of Bois de Maricourt which is the large woodland afea on your left as you approach the village of Maricourt. Interestingly there is a track which runs due east from the road across the tip of the Bois de Maricourt which is called the ehern;n des Anglais (the English path] .

From Maricourt return 10 Albert afong Ihe 0938 .

Walk One. Bernafay Wood This is a pleasant stroll around the wood taking in Ihe two

cemeteries to the west and north. It is quite possible to complete the fOUf kilometres of this walk in an

f.. hour and a half. A suitable

i\ lap 16. The Ekmafay Wood walk.

startlng point Is the cross roads near the south·western corner of the wood. Jus! to the south of here was the site of the Briqueterie which was captured on the morning of 1 Jury 1916 by the 20th King's. Adjacent to the Briqueterie was Chimney Trench which connected Nord Alley with the sunken lane leading towards Hardecourt. The sunken lane just a few yards to your south was thus the easternmost and most forward position captured by the British army during the first day's fighting of the Somme offensive. Patrols from this vicinity on both 2 and 3 July revealed Bernafay Wood as empty. The wood was eventually attaeked and captured at 9.00 pm on 3 July with only six casualties\ The two battalions which undertook this capture at so little cost were the 6th KO$Bs and the 12th Royal Seots.

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Leave the cross roads in a northerly direction keeping the perimeter of Bernafay Wood on your right. Although the wood lay between the front lines and the main German Second Position it had been organised for defence. Eight hundred metres walking will bring you to the British military cemelery west of Bernafay Wood. II is a very attractive and intereslingly sited localion, overlooking Caterpillar valley, marked as the Vallee de Longueval on your IGN maps, and being constructed on the sile of a very important German Irench known as Monlauban Alley. This trench ran from Pommiers Redoubt along the high ground north of Monlauban, Ihen proceeding Ihrough Ihe northern end of Bernafay Wood before heading northwards towards LonguevaJ, where it was known as Longueval Alley. If you look to the west trom the cemelery that is the part of Montauban Alley which was captured by the Manchester Pals on the morning of 1 July 1916.

Continue along the 0197 in a northerly direction until you reach Ihe small cemetery on your right, Longueval Road Cemetery.

Turn back to the right at the site of the cruclflx and follow the track running southwards to the eastern perimeter of Bernafay Wood. As you approach the northern limit of the wood you will cross a smaU depression which is where one of the light railways trom the west passed Ihrough this area. Thai line then ran acress the fields on your left in the direction of Trones Wood. Those fields were the scene of reconnaissance patrols made, on the night of 3/4 July, by Ihe 6th KOSBs and the 12th Royal Scots whose men discovered thai Trones Wood was held by a number of machine-gun detachments. Whilst here il is also worth noting the unsuccessful attacks made lowards Trones Wood across these fields on 8 July, by 2nd Green Howards and 2nd Wiltshires (see Chapter 3).

Continue to walk soulhwards down the eastern perimeter of Bernafay Wood. Three hund red melres short of Ihe road you will find a palh cut in the woods to your right. This was the site of Ihe other light railway, this one coming from the direction of Albert past Mametz and Carnoy before passing through Bernafay Wood and then running across the open space before disappearing into Ihe confines of Trones Wood and thence lowards Guillemont. These light railways were a vital part of Ihe Somme's economy, both before the Great War and up unlil the early 1960s when many were finally dismantied.

It is quite possible to walk back 10 the cross roads via this path through the woods. Alternatively stay outside the perimeter and continue to walk towards the road. Roughly half way between the sile of the railway's exil trom the wood (1:10,000 trench map reference 57cSW3, S.29.c.5,9) and the road was a very important trench known as Trones Alley which connected Ihe south east of Bernafay wilh the south·western corner of Trones Wood. Along with Maltz: Horn Trench the existence of Trones Alley created an important intermediale position Iying between Ihe German's Front Une and main Second

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Positions. The Trones Alley trench continued within the confines of Bernafay, exiting half way along its soulhern boundary and Ihence joining up with Chimney Trench in Ihe vicinity of the Briqueterie. Continue walking southwards until you reach the D64 where you should turn rlght and relurn 10 the cross-roads where we started the walk.

Walk Two. Trones Wood This is one of the most interesting of the $omme's woodlands. II was

Ihe scene of fighting Ihroughoul Ihe second week of Ihe battle and from

Map 17. The Trones Wood walk.

r I I i ~ '-J

ils perimeter there are a number of interesling and significant views to be had. The circumnavigalion of the wood is approximately Ihree kilometres and can be completed on fool comfortably within the hour. It is also possible 10 walk wilhin Ihe confines of the wood along a number of the foresl rides which cut Ihrough in a north­south and east-west axis. If you intend to walk into the wood Ihen set aside two hours.

I suggest that this walk is besl commenced from Ihe memorial at Ihe southern end of the wood. The memorial to the 18th (Eastern) Division stands adjacent to the 064. Immediately behind and north of the memorial are two rides wh ich disappear inlo Ihe woodland. Thai on Ihe righl is Ihe central ride and would lake you almosl all Ihe way to Ihe northern lip of Ihe wood if you care 10 follow it. That on Ihe left leads up to a small railway

embankment in the western quadrant of Ihe worn:!. However, al this slage I suggest thai you will see much more by staying outside the wood , walking round its perimeter in a clockwise direclion. II is worth nOling here thai immedialely soulh of Trones Wood the land begins to fall away into Ihe upper reaches of Maltz Horn Valley, from which direction many of the British attacks upon Trones were launched because of Ihe relative ease by troops could approach the wood

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withoul being observed'. Maltz Horn Trench ran soulhwards along Ihe road towards Hardecourt, then leading away in a south-westerly direclion towards Bois Faviere.

To begin our walk set off westwards, briefly, along Ihe 064 before turning right along the wood's western boundary. This seclion of Ihe walk is rather rough and yeu should slay outside the boundary of the weod. On 81h August 1916 German machine gunners and artiUery units firing fram this western side of Trones Wood caused terrible casualties amongst the men of 2nd Green Howards and the 2nd Wiltshires. I have quoted below at length from Ihe Otficial History's account of Ihis action.

'rhe Aflied attack, starling at 8 A.M, was 10 be in two stages. First the French would capture the trench, «Ma/tz Horn Trench", covering the knoll norlh of Hardecourl, whilst the British secured the continuation of this trench as far as Trones Wood and the southern half of the wood itseff, "as far as the rai/way line ~. So much, it was hoped, would be accomplished by 9.45 AM; at an hour to be agreed upon by the divisiona/ commanders concerned, the French would attack Hardecourl vil/age and knoll and the British Ma/tz Horn Farm of which there remained only a few heaps of rubble. After some discussion Lieut.General Congreve issued an order at 8 A.M., the hour at which rhe first assault was to be delivered, for the completion of the capture of Trones Wood in the second stage.

The re-entrant ar the junction of the two Armies presented a problem of its own. To make the attack tru/y "jointive", as the French desired, the British would have to advance trom La Briqueterie to Ma/tz Horn Farm across 1, 100-1 ,500 yards ofopen fire-swept ground: opposite rhe French, No Man's Land was only 800 yards wide. It was therefore decided to secure the southern half of Trones Wood as a preliminary operation, since part of the approach thereto from rhe southern part of Bernafay Wood was not exposed to view from Longueval, although ir was commanded by Ma/tz Horn Trench. The attack on Ma/tz Horn farm and trench could then be made south-eastward across rhe shal/ow head of the Ma/tz Horn val/ey which was entirely hidden from the German 2nd Position.

In the early hours of rhe 8th the objectives were bombarded by the XIII Corps heavy artil/ery and the batteries of rhe 30th Division, the 18th Division artil/ery firing on rhe southern edge of Longueval. The 2nd Green HowardS, of the 21st Brigade (8r.­General Hon. C. J. Sackvil/e-West), which formed up for the assault behind Bernafay Wood moved through the wood at 7.15 AM, being much impeded by fallen trees and thick undergrowth and subjected to considerable shel/ fire.

At 8 am the leading company, with the battalion bombers, advanced from the eastern edge, covered by the fire of rhe 26th

143

Brigade (9th Division) trom the left flank. The way to Trones Wood led aeross a slight erest, and when they had breasted this rise the assailants ware shelled by two field guns, firing over open sights, whilst maehine-gun fire trom the wood began to do great execution among them. The advanee was eheeked, although attempts were made to bomb along Trones Alley and so into the wood; some men, in a gallant rush over the open, reached the edge, but they were not seen again. The Green Howards were now withdrawn, and the 2;Wiltshire was ordared to renew the attack at 10.30 am; the brigadier, however, seeured a postponement until 1 pm. '2

suggest thai you conllnue to walk northwards outside Tranes' perimeter until you reach the second of the small projections on its western side, roughly half way along thai side of the wood (1:10,000 Irench map reference 57cSW3, S.29.b.5,9). This was the location of the southern-most light railway's entrance into the wood. II is quite possible to walk acrass this ride until you emerge on the eastern side of the wood, opposile Guillemont. However, for those of you with more determination I suggest keeping oulside and wa lk ing 10 the northernmosl point of the wood, facing Ihe village of Longueval. This part of Ihe walk is conducled along a definable path and reveals just why Ihe capture of Trones was such a nacassary adjunct 10 Ihe success of the Dawn Attack on the Longueval - Bazentin main Second Positions on the morning of 141h July. Without the capture of Tranes Wood thai advance would have been dangerously enfiladed from the east by direct fire from Tranes Wood. Looking from the northern tip of !he wood you are just 500 metres from Waterlot Farm, the site of which can be seen in a north-easlerly direction. Just 10 Ihe north of Walerial Farm you can see the cemetery al Longueval, Ihe visitor centre and Ihe entrance to the South African memorial within Delville Wood.

Now turn to walk in a southerly direction down Ihe easlern side of Trones Wood. On your left you can see Ihe site of the notorious Guillemont Station, eight hundred melres to the east. Jus! inside Ihe wood on your right here is the scene of the action which resulted in Sergeant William Ewart Boulter being awarded Ihe Victoria Cross for his valour on the morning of 14 July 1916. As you approach the small stand of trees which juts out from the eastern side of Tranes Wood you will come across the ride fram which Ihe southernmost light railway emerged en route for Guillemont Station. It is quite possible to walk westwards into the woodland tram this point (1:10,000 trench map reference 57cSW3, S.24.c.3,1) along the course of that railway line. Contemporary trench maps show Trones Wood as having a minimal defence system organised by mid May 1916 consisting of a central Irench running north-south, linking up with the Trones Alley Irench running between Trones and Bernafay woods. In the south-eastern

144

corner of Trones there was a considerable strong-point at the junction between the Guillemont and Hardecourt roads. By July thaI pattern of defence had not been strengthened within the wood.

II you choose to walk into Ihe wood follow the ride for roughly 200 melres unlil you come to the central ride running north-south. Turn left onto that ride and continue walking until you emerge from the southern perimeter 01 Trones Wood adjacenl to the memorial f,om where we started. This would be a suitable location 10 consider Ihe material reterring 10 Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell in Chapter 3.

Alternatively conlinue to walk down the eastern perimeter unlil you reach the junction wilh the Guillemont and Hardecourt roads. From Ihere you can look south along the upper reaches 01 Maltz Horn Trench and east along the Guillemont road past the British military cemetery. The quadrant between Ihose two directions is the scene 01 Noel Chavasse's deeds which resulted in his being awarded the Victoria Cross. His battalion, the Liverpool Scottish, left their mark on the trench maps of this area by being responsible for digging and improving a number of trenches such as Hooge Alley and Scottish Alley in that area between Maltz Horn and Arrow Head Copse.

Walk Three. Maricourt Wood - Hardecourt - Maltz Horn - Trones and return

This is a more prolonged walk lor those 01 you with an interest in seeing the area which was on Ihe right flank 01 the British army's attacks on 1 July 1916. I1 is approximately seven kilometres in length, covers some open and rough lerrain and is not advisable in wet or inclement condilions! I would set aside two and a half hours to complete this walk.

A suitable starling point would be the Chemln des Anglals. This was the French fronl line adjacent to the 30th Division's men facing Montauban north of Maricourt. The German front line opposite this location was known as Faviere Trench and a little way 10 the north, in their reserve position, was an importanl German redoubt known as Dublin Redoubt (the Lochner Werk). It was here al the Chemin des Anglais that one notable moment signifying the 'jointive' nature of the attack was played out at 7.30 am on the morning of 1 July. Here the commanding officer of the 17th King's, Lieutenant Colonel Fairfax, and his opposite number Irom the 153rd Regiment d' lnfanlerie , Commandant Le Petit, linked arms and led the attack northwardS, together.

Continue walking eastwards down Ihe valley which runs between the Bois Faviere and the smaller woodland area 10 the south, the Bois Brule. The western perimeter of Bois Faviere was protected by a strongly constructed trench but this was soon overrun by Ihe Frenchmen of the 39th Division, these soldiers pushing on eastwards

145

Map 18. The Maricourt, Hardecourt, Maltz Horn area today.

146

Map 19. Detail from Ihe 1;10.000 lreneh map eo,·ering the Maricourt, Hard«ourt and Maltz Horn Farm area. 1916.

147

until they had captured the eastern side of Bois Faviere. As you walk past the southern end of Bois Faviere you will see a valley re-enlrant on your left. From the north eastern end of Ihat valley Ihe important trench known as Maltz Horn Trench ran northwards past Maltz Horn Farm towards the south-eastern tip of Trones Wood.

Walk on into Hardecourt, keeping to the street which runs north­eastwards paS! the church on your right. This is the GuilJemont road and half a kilometre north of the church you will come to a fork where a private French memorial , wrought in iron of florid and elaborate design, marks the death of Captain Augustin Cochin. Not far away is Ihe simple stone marker commemoraling two men belonging to the 153rd Regiment d'lnfanterie, Mareel Boucher and Romeo Lapage, both of whom died here in laie July 1916. Keep 10 Ihe left at thls fork and follow Ihe rising ground up onlo Ihe high ground of Ihe Maltz Horn plateau (the Hardecourt knolI). This location possesses one of the finest panoramic vistas on the Somme battlefield , that to the soulh across the French sector of the 1916 battlefield being especially extensive. Here Ihe sile of Ihe original farm is marked by a magnificent crucifix, Calvaire de Maltzkorn on your IGN maps. This reveals the origin of the military map makers' error - the inscription eommemorating Ihe passing of this farm into history recalling thaI Ihis was lhe site of the farm, belonging to Maltzkorn Ouclercq, which was destroyed in Ihe fighting here. Two hund red yards north of this location the Maltz Horn Trench which came up Ihe valley on your left side (west) joined the road, Ihen running northwards to Trones Wood. This is lhe location where two companies of the 2nd Wiltshires and Ihe 19th Manchesters got up onlo the French left flank during the in itial attacks made on Trones Wood on 8 July 1916.

Walk down towards Trones Wood. The length of road you have just walked was that part of Maltz Horn Trench captured by the 2nd Royal Scots of 90 Brigade on 9 July. At the junctlon with the Gulllemont raad turn left along the southern perimeter of Trones Wood. Jusl before you reach the 181h Oivision's memorial turn left Into the flelds above Ihe Maltz Horn Valley. This is marked on your IGN maps as a farm track but thaI soon peters out. 1I would be sensible 10 fix a compass bearing due sauth-west and follow that for almost ane kllometre inlo Maltz Horn valley. This was Ihe valley within which many of Ihe 30th and 18th Oivision's men were moved forward along prior to the numerous attacks on Trones Wood during the period 7th - 141h July 1916. The first road which you slrike will be Ihe sunken lane running south-east from Ihe Briqueterie towards Hardecourt.

Turn rlght along Ihe sunken secUon in Ihe direction of the Briqueterie, bul then first left, some half a kllometre befare you reach Ihe 0197, along Ihe farm track which runs sauth, parallelto Ihe 0197 Maricourt - Bernafay Wood road. You can see the course of this track stretching away lowards the northern tip of the Bois de Maricourt and

148

the Chemin des Anglais from where we started. The important German redoubt known as the Lochner Werk (Dublin Redoubt) was astride this farm track level with the northern end of Bois Faviere. The western end of that redoubt marked the furthesl advance made by the 17th King's by 8.30 am on the moming of 1 July 1916. On their right Commandant Le Petit's men were in control of the Lochner Werk and some way to the north a detachment of the 20th King's had captured the Briqueterie, but were isolated there.

One interesting postscript 10 this walk is one of the mosl impressive and weil sited private memorials on the whole of the Somme battlefield, located wilhin a kilometre of the easlern side of Maricourt on the 0938 Peronne road. The granite memorial is dedicated to the memory of Lieutenant Robert Brodv, 224th Regiment d'lnfanterie. His memorial is still maintained in good condilion , and lies within the ground over which Ihe men of the French 11 th Division attacked on the moming of 1 st July 1916. To the south there are very fine views over the Somme and down to Curlu and Hem-Monacu where there is a very infrequently visiled British cemetery.

Walk Four. Longueval to Guillemont, returning via Ginchy This is an opportunity 10 walk along the German trenches which formed their main Second Position north of Guillemont. It will take perhaps an hour and a half to complete, being just four kilometres in length , but full of interest. The most interesting aspect of this walk is the way in which it reveals Ihe care which was taken to provide a panoramic field of fire for the machine-gunners whose positions were in or near to these main Second Position trenches. I1 is also revealing of just how closely the post·war reconstruction, fortunately for us, followed the pre·war layout in this area.

Start at the communal cemetery, looking down the 020 from Longueval lowards Guillemont. Before the battles for Guillemont altered the layout of the original trench system here, the German's main Second Position lay on Ihe south·western side of the road looking lowards Trones Wood. As you walk along towards the site of Waterlot Farm you can imagine Ihe beils of barbed wire on you right hand side. Waterlot Farm was never a working 'farm' as such . Before the Great War this was the localion of a suger beet refinery, and was rebu,'t for the same purpose afterwards. By the 1990s it had long since ceased to function and Ihe derelict buildings had become a seemingly ever presenl eyesore in the area between Longueval and Guillemont. Fortunately these crumbling and grim main buildings were demolished in the mid 1990s.

Half way 10 Waterlot Farm the switch line running from Trones Wood

149

Map 20. Detail from the 1:10,000 trench map, daled corrected 10

1518119 16,571.'8\\'3, showing the captured German positions al Deh'ille Wood (Longuc\'al), north Guillcmont and Ginchy. Note Ihe swilch li ne lreneh (whieh came (rom the north·east of Bemafay) whieh runs (rom the Dorthern end of Trones into thc main Sf'Cond Position north·wesl of Walerlot Farm. To the west of Trones Wood Ihis trench was known as Longueval Alley a lld it was a continuation of l\Iontauban Alle)' tnmch.

150

entered the trench by the road's side. At Ihe lar end 01 the site of Walerlot Farm, on the right of the road, a track turns off to the rlght and you should follow this for a short distance belore turning left. This track, marked as Le Chemin Neuf on your JGN maps and which was idenlified on the British trench maps as 'Fleet Street', will take you southwards, for a short distance along the exact site of the German main Seeond Position trenches. As you approach the site of the Station, on your left by the silo, you will see the private memorial dedicated 10 the memory of nineteen year old Second Ueulenant George Futvoye Marsden-Smedley, 3rd Rifle Brigade, who was kiUed in action here on 18th AuguS11916. The memorial is loealed 10 the Trones Wood side 01 the track where the light railway line approached the barbed wire entanglements in fronl of the German trenches here. Before the war George Marsden-Smedley had been a student at Harrow where he had captained the cricket and football teams, being described by his teachers as an outstanding sportsman. The young man had only joined the 3rd Riffe Brigade as a newly drafted subaltern in July, only to be killed here al Guillemont during his first terrible taste of action one month later. Tragically George's body was never identified and he is commemorated at Thiepval, although four of his companion subalterns who were killed with him were recovered and are buried at Delville Wood cemelery. The inscriplion on the memorial is one particularly revealing of the sense of tragic loss feit by his family. Also noteworthy are the great efforts which have been made 10 maintain and restore this memorial in very recen! years.

Before the final capture of Guillemont Ihe British had constructed a series of assembly trenches in very forward positions which lay both to the north-east of the station as weil as 10 ils south-west in the direction 01 Arrow Head Copse. It was from the Irenches north-east of the station that lieutenant John Vincent Holland, 3rd Battalion, Leinster Regiment, attached to the 7th Battalion, set forth with his team of bombers on 3 September to win his Victoria Cross within the confines of Guillemont.

Continue to walk past the site of 2nd lieutenant Marsden­Smedley·s memorial in a south-easterly direction, moving across the shallow depression in front of Guittemont where a track on your left was identified on the trench maps as the Bromp!on Road untit you come to the site of The Quarry on your right. This loeation was part 01 the main Second Position and was Ihe scene 01 hand to hand fighting on a number of occasions during the early attempts to capture the village on 30 July, both the 8/9 and 18 August as weil as the village's final caplure on 3 September! On that day this localion was Ihe scene of Thomas Hughes' gatlantry which brought him the award of the Victoria Cross.

Jusl pas! the Quarry turn Jett. This track will lead you into the centre of the viUage along the slreet referred 10 on the relevant !rench maps as Mount Stree!. A short delour from Mount Sireet is absolutely essential. Turn right and walk down to the viltage church. Adjacent is

151

a simple memorial dedicated to the memory and sacrifice of Ihe 16th (Irish) Oivision's sOldiers, here al Guillemont, during Ihe final hours of its caplure. East of Ihe church al Ihe soulh-eastern end of Ihe viUage is a small paslure where dug-outs can slill be seen. Interestingly their entrances were buill 10 Ihe north, suggesling that the Germans rather misjudged Ihe way in which Ihe battles here were likely 10 develop. Relurn 10 Mount Street and follow its course through the village , pasl Ihe communal cemelery on your right. The 20th (Light) Oivision's memorial at the cross roads was an imposing structure. Ouring the post Second World War years il had begun 10 show the ravages of time and its structure was crumbling . However, re-slructuring work, carried out during 1995, has restored this weil siled memorial to heallh and in a form less likely 10 require expensive maintenance in Ihe fareseeable future.

AI Ihe cross roads on Ihe Ginchy - Maurepas road by the 20th Oivision's memorial turn left, northwards, along the D20E in Ihe direction of Ginchy. This road, 100king soulhwards in the direction of Wedge Wood and for a short distance northwards in the direction of Ginchy, was Ihe furthest point reached during the attacks made on 3 September which finally made good Ihe capture of Guillemont village. Three hundred metres north of the cross roads, as you walk towards Ginchy, you will come 10 Ihe point where Ihe light railway crossed Ihe road en-route towards Cambles. From here Ihe Brilish li ne of advance an 3 September ran back 10 Ihe wesl Ihen swinging north-wesl around Ihe weslern side of Ginchy. If yeu look 10 Ihe north-west, across the sunken lane which leads from Guillemont to Ginchy, you will see Ihe area wilhin which Sergeant Oavid Jones of the 12th King's cemmanded

One of two entrances to a Ge rman dugout near to the centre of Guillemont \'iIlagc. This was later used by the British during both 1916 and 1918,

his detachment of machine gunners so determinedly during those Ihree days without food cr water during Ihe period 3-6 September, and which led 10 Ihe award of his Victoria Cross .

You have now passed Ihe north-eastem limits of this guide. However, your return 10 Longueval will take you into Ihe most fascinating surroundings of Delville Wood. At Ihe cross roads within Ginchy turn left and then rlght after a further ane hundred and fifty maires 10 take Ihe road back 10 Longueva1. This will lead you past Delville Wood Cemetery, Ihe South African memorial in Delvitle Wood and Ihe visitor centre adjacent 10 thai memorial. In summer Ihe visitor centre is perpetually busy. 1I boasts an excellent small bookshop, toilet facililies and a eafe which would provide an admirable place to rest your feet awhile after this walk. These facilities mean that many people are drawn here and you will often have the chance to speak with visitors f,om all over the globe who find the interest and appeal of the Somme irresistible. The Delville Wood cemetery is not a battlefield cemetery but was created entirely by the process of concentrating graves from outlying smaUer burial grounds. II is therefore worth noting thai many bodies recovered trom Ihe Guillemont battlefield were concentrated during the immediate post war years into this cemetery. I have not identified aseparate section in this guide 10 deal with Delvilie Wood, since the location is outside the limits of this text, but you should note that Delvilie Wood cemetery is the third largest on the British part of the Somme batlJefield, containing more than 5,500 graves, 65 per cent of which are unknown>. Of those thai are identified almost every man was kiUed in the period late July, August and September when the fighting at Guillemont was at its heighl. Those of you who have come to find the grave of an antecedenl are most likely 10 find Ihe graves of men kilied al Guiliemont here in Delvilie Wood , or al Guiliemont Road Cemetery, the bulk of which is also a concentration of graves made in the immediate post war years.

1. See Chap!er 3 01 !his ~ for an outIine o1lhe attacks upon TrOlleS Wood malle duriog Ihe period 8th - 14th JuIy ß;tJsive. Many o1lt1ose attacks centred around Ihe Manchester paJs"WlvoIYemertt and lha1 is discussed at Iength wittWI my booII MllIIChester Psis, Leo COoper I Pen & Sword Bocks. 1994. The LiverpooI Pals (Kng's AeguTlenl) invo/vemenl as part of the 3O!h DiYisioo is CO\IeIed in Graham MaclOocks' book.1..NerpooI Pal$. l80 Cooper I Pen & Sword Books, 1991 2. 0friciaJ Hislory. MiJit8ry ()perariom i1 Fl1IIIOfIand 88fgiurn. 1916. VoI2. pp 37·38 3. The secorld latgest ceme1&ry is Ca1e~ar VaBey. comaining a l"IarodfIA more graves that DeIviIIa Wood. The latgest is Sene Aoad Number 2.

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APPENDIX

German Maps Somme Nord. 11 Teil. Die Brennpunkte Der Schlacht. Im Juli 1916. Oldenburg 1.0. Berlin 1927. Courtesy of Ralph Whitehead.

Guillemont -Maurep-a: R.133 20.7.16.

154

Guill emont- Maurel1a 5 30.7.1916.

155

~ a.

~~ __ ~ __ L-~ __ ~N"

Pk'ler )RIO?

J'oIIIKfllln.5'~r

K"rIJdl~r

T •. IivUMOrodt

SI. .sf~&lrll JVCU M. Mllhl

Ho. lug I/on.rpqdf )R.Jti:P IJ Fr;' liilJeh.!

Alben, 19. Angle WOOO. 81. 82. 83. 8-1. 87. 93. 101. 115. ArTO\\' Head Copse. 39. 63. 64. 67. 70, 77. 8-1.

86. 151. Asquith. Lieutenant Ra)'mond. 125. Bed & Breakfast. 20-22. Bemafay \\'000.18.32.33,38.40.42.48.

56.63.140,141.143. Bois Brule. 150. Bois d'cn Haut. 23. 146. Bouller. William E\\'an. V.C" 53, 55.144. Briquercrie. 28. 30. 38. 41.42, 141. 14l Brompton Rood. 74. 123. 151. Camping. 20. Caterpil1ar Valley. 24. 59. 63. 120. Caterpillar Wooo. 62. Ca\·an. Earl of. Lieutenant Gener:a\. 80. 83. (ba,lISse. Captain Not\. v.c.. 77-80. ehemin des Anglais. 139. 140. 145. Churchill. Wimton. 76. 77. CombJc5, 18. 20. 129. Congre\"e. Lieutenant General. 32. 35. 36. 40. 5{),65, 71. 76. SO, 143 Congrevc, Bill y. v.c.. 0.5.0 .. M.C.. SO Cape, Prh-ale c.w.. 69. Coot)'. 2nd Licutenant. V.c., n 74. Curlu. 10.24. Dal·idson. Licutenant Colonel. 77. Da",n Anad: (14th My). 20, 51. 55·58. Delville \\'000. 18. 6S. 150. Dolle. FatherWilliam. 116. Dug-oolS in Guillemom. 152 Elevation & bigher ground, 25. 60. EI·ans. CSM. George. v.c., 70 Fairfax. Lieutcnant Colonel. 145. Falfemont (Fafferoont) farm. 62. 69, 81. 86. 93.99.100.101. 112. 1\3-116. 128. 129. Fargny.IO. Fa\"iere Wood. 17. 23. 32. 35. 39. 148. Fayolle. General. 63. SO. 84. Fcamhead. 2nd Lieutenant Jack. 27. 82 Foch. General. 62. 63. F~s.1nd Lieutenant W.S .. 125. Ginchy. 18. Goff. Licutcnant Colonel. 75. Gough's Rcserye Ann)'. 65. Guillemonl Chun:h. 18.60. GuiUemont Station. 65. 68. 69. 71. 7·t 92. 10l Hagganl. liculcnanl B.C. 5{) HaiS. 76. SO.

Hamihon. Ralph. Lieulcnant Colonel. 84. Hardecoun·aux·Bois. 17.23. 34. 35. 63. 145,

148 Heumann. Captain Richard. 128. 119. Hicks. Pril"3.te Clifford. 61. High Holbom. 68. 74. 123 Historial at Peronnc. 15. Hitchoock. F.C.. Captain, 88·91. Holland. licutenant John Vincem. V.c.. 103·

4.151. Hotels. 20. Horne. Lieutenam General. 65. Hughes. Private Thomas. V.c.. 101, 103. 154. Joncs. Sergeant Dal'id. V.c.. 107·112. 116-

117.152. Junger. ErnSt. Capcain. 88·91. 117·8. Killg·s lh·trpoo! Regimem. J 12. 125. 137. 1.euzc \\'000. 98. 100. 112. 113. Ul'erpool Pals, 28. 29. 30. 41. 137. M.l!;hineGun Hoo>e. 74.123. Maltz Horn Farm (Malzzkorn). 10. 34. 39 . ..w. 65.67.68.70. SO. 81. 96.143.148. Maltz Horn Vatky. 36. 39,..w. 45.14-1,1·41. Maltzkorn Duc1ercq. 148. Manchester Pals. 28. 29. 30. 41. 137. Maps.l l Map shops. 13. Maricoun. 10. 17.51. Marsden SmedJey, 2nd Lieutenant G.F .. 133.l5l. Maurepas. 23. 83. 87. 93. 97.128,139. Maxse. Major General. 49. SO. 57. Maxwell.lieutenant Colone1. 51·55 MeEr.el. Major, 75 Mill s. Sergeant Major B .. 128. 129. Moreland. Lieutcnant General. 83. Montauban. 18. 19.28.19.30.38. 137. Moont Streel, 102. 103. I(}..\. 15l. MusttdcsAbris.15 NC\\"foondland Park. 15. NQnh Street. 10·'-Oakhangar\\'ood. 113,115. 129. Petil. Commandam1.e. 145 Quarry. the. sec Trenches and Redoubts. Railways, light agricultural. 35-6. 149 Rancoon.20. 128. Ravine (at Maurepas . Comblcs. See also Oathangar \\'ood). 63. 82. 86. 97. Rawlinson. General Sir Henry. 30. 62. 63. 68. 84.87.9--1. Reslllufllßt.10.

158

Robc:nson. Sir William. c.J.G.S .. 77. Sachille·Wes!. Hooourablc. Brigadier

Geoera1.37.IH Shea. Major Geoer.d. 35 Shoubridge. Brigadier General. 50. Smilh. W.D .• Major Geoeral. 107. SOUlhSIn:e\.I~

S,,-ainsoo. Major. 74 Tennant. Honourable. Lieulenam E.W.. 125. Torrnncc. SergeamA.W .• 128. 129. Trenehmaps.14. Triangle Poin!. 28. 30. Trones Wood (Bois des Trones). 18. 26. 33.

J..t. 35. 37·58. 6-1. 65, 67. 68. 70. 142·145.

Tunnels. 76. 102. ValU.1O Walcrlot Farm. 61. 6-1. 67. 71. 76.149.150 Wedge Wood. 86. 99. 100. 101. 102. 113. 115 WiIlO\< SIream. 25 Memorials:

16th (lrish) Di,·ision. 7. 131. 152. 181h Di,·ision. 131·2. 142. 2Ü1h (Light) Division. 105. 130. 152. Lherpool & Manchesler Pals 31

MonI3uban.137. Le Monumenl au~ Sold:lI.s Francais

mortS le 28Aout 1914 .. IJ..t. Marcel Baucher & Romeo lapage. 148. Bml>. Lieulenanl Robc:n. 149. Gasion Chornet. lJ..t. Captain Cochin. lJ..t. 15 1. V.H:J.llard.I34. 200 ürulenan\ Marodm Smcdky. 133. 151.

Ct mettrifs: Btmafay Wood Cemelery. 12Q.I Bcmafa) Wood Nonh Cernelery. 121. [)cl"illc Wood. 153. Falfemont Farm isol!lled gra'·es.128-130. Guards Cemelcry. Combles. 119. Guillemonl Rood.. 18.41. 60.121·126.138.

15)

Han.I«oun ,illage French MililaJ). 115. Hern Farm (al Hem Monocu). 126-7. Longuc'"lI1 Road Ccmelcry. 58. 120.

127·8.137. ~burep:1s French CemeteT). 128. QuarT) CcrnClery. 120.

British and Empirt mi lita ry uni t5: Corps:

Xlii Corps. 17.32.44.65.68. 71. 76. SO. 147.

XIV Corps. SO. 85. 94. 97. 99. XV Corps. 65. 9-4.

Di"isions: 2nd DiVision. 69. 70. 71. 76, 77. SO. 3rt! Di,·ision. 65. 67. 68. 83. 84. 86. 87 5th Di,·ision. 9. 94. 97. 99. 107. 112. 113.

114. 7th Di,·ision. 19. 29. 30. 112 9th IScouish) Division. 50. 58.121. 128.

147. 161h (1rish) Di,ision. 102. 116. 122. 181h Division. 19. 29. 30. 37. 49. 50. 57.

62.1H Wlh (Light) Di,·ision. 93. ](XH 13. 114.

118.122. 241h Di'ision. 83. 84. 87. 93. 30th Di,ision. 19. 28. 29. 30. 35. 36. 37.

40.41. 44. 49. 65. 67. 68.140. 351h (Bamarn) Di'·isioo. 62. 63. 630 68.

87.93. 55th (Tcnitorial). 27. 71. n. 76. 77. SO.

83.121 Brigades:

5 Brigade. 69. 9 Brigade. 85. 86. 13 Brigade. 100. 15 Brigade. 100. 113 21 Brigade. 37, 40.1 43 26 Brigade. 147. 47 Brigade. 102. 103. 105. 107. 54 Brigade. 50. 55 Brigade . ..\9. 50. 59 Brigade. 102. I~. 107. 60 Brigade. 102. 76 Brigade. 85. 86. 89 Brigade. 4-1. 69. 70. 90 Brigade. 40. 41. 44. 69. 70.152. 95 Brigade. 99.100.107. 16-1 Brigade. n. 7..\. 75. 76. 165 Brigade. 72. 166 Brigade. 77.

UallaJions:

159

1,1 Bedfonh;hires. 100. 114. 2nd Bwford;:hires • ..\..\ . ..\5 . ..\8. 7th Bedford,him;. 51. 8th Block Walth. 58. 128. 7th Buffs. SO. 52. 5th Cameron Highlanders. 61. 1;:1 Cheshires. 100. ! 14. 6th Conrtaughl Rangers. 102. I~. 1,1 Com""lI1l Lighl Infanlry. 99. ISI [)c'·ons. 112

Ise Ease Sumys. 112 Ise Gordon Higllianders. 86. 12m (iloocrsten. 99. 100. 2nd Green Howaros. 37. 67. 68. 141.143. Ist King·s. 74. 75, 76. 1/5ell King's. 72. Inth King·s. 27. 82. 118th King's (Liverpool lrish). 75. 76. 119th King·s. 82. IIIOth King's{Lh-eIJlOOI ScoUlslI), 77. 12th King·s. 107. 108. 112. 17th King's, 43.145.149. 18111 King's,4O. 19111 King's, 70. 20th King·s. 44. 50, 69.140.149. 1I.\1h King·sOwn. 72. 7.\ 2nd KOSBs. 99. 6th KOSBs. 141. 142. 10th KRRC. 102. 17th La.ncaslli~ Fusiliers. M. 87, 93 181h Lancashire Fusiliers, 65. 2nd Leinslers. 88. 7th Leinsters. 103. 1~. 11200 London. 128. 1/4111 Loyal North Unes .. 69. 75. 5th Loyal Nooll Lancs .. 77. 16t/1 Manclles1ers. 42. J3. 44. 70. 17111 MancheMers. 42. 70 18111 Manchesters. 40. J2. 69. 70. 191:11 Manchesters. 40. 67. 148. 12th Midellesex. 49. 51. 52. Ise Norfolks. 113. 114.

6111 NorthamplO/lS. 49. 51. 52. 53. 7tll NonhamplOßs. 86. 6th Oxfool & Bucks üght InfanU). 1O.t, 7tll Queens. SO. 3rd Rille Brigade. 86. 81. 11tll Royal Fusiliers. 51 6th Ro)'allrish. lOS. 8tll Royal MUllliters. l{)·t, 2nd Ro)'al Scoo. 41. 42. 43. 44. 69. 70.

m. 12th Royal Scoo. IJI. 142. 9t1l Royal Sussex. 86. 14th Royal Warwicks. 100. 15th Royal WaI"A'icb. [00. 16th Royal Warwicks. 100. 114.

10th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 83. 7th Royal Wcst KenlS. SO. 52. 7th So~t Lighl lnfanuy. 104. 112. 4th Soolh African. 43. 61. 1/4th Soutll Umcashires. 72. 3th South Lancs .• 82. 2nd Suffolks. 83. 12th Wesl Yorbhires. 83, 2nd WiIßhires. 37,40. 141.143. 144. 148

f n>ncll miUllIry unl lS: Armies:

Sixth Army.)(). 11. 8{),

Corps: xx Corps. 17.30.31.63.

Di"isiOlls; 11111 Dhision. 29.152. 39th Di,·ision. 29.140.145. 153rd Di\'ision.83.

Banalions: 127m Regiment d·lnfanterie. 87. 153rd Regimen! d· lnfanlerie. 145, 224th Regimentd· lnfanterie. 152.

Gtrman military units: 73rd Fusiliers.91. 100. 104m ReseT\'e ReseT\'e Regiment. 67. IIVI23rd Resef'!'f Regiment. 37. 1&1m Regiment 100. 114. 18200 Regiment.

Tl'l'nchl's & Rtdoubl5:

160

BriQuctcric T~och. 28. Ccnlflll Trencll. SO. 51. 123. ChimneyTrench.28.141 ClXhranc Alley. 83. 123. Dublin Rcdoubt (Lochner Werk). 28.

145, 149. Dublin T~nch. 28. SI. IJ1. Flett Stret\. 123. 151 LDnely Trench. 83. 86. LDnguc\'lIIAllcy. SO. 67. 123. Malu Horn Treoch. 33. 39. 40. 41. 42.

44.45.48.49.52.143, 148. Montauban Alle}'. 28. Pomrn~rs Rc:doobi. 62. Tranes Alley. 142. 144 Quarry. the. 86. 103. 15 J. ValleyTrencll.1I2. ZZ Trench. 86. 87

The 8attlflground Europe series cf guIdes • desIgned Ior both lhe battlefield visitor end Ihe atmehair lraveller. There IS exten­lNe guIdance on how 10 make lhe most cf your battlefield vt$It. The hi$torical signifi­cance cf each IIte IS described in detail WIIh Ihe ald cf mapI and photographs.

For nine wee«s cf JuIy, August and earty September Gulll.mont, on the German main MCOOd position. withstood aJ ItIat the British Army couId throw against its Iortifications. SV the tinle Guillemont Iel 10 the 20th DMskln the notoriety of Ihis village was assured. This guidfl also encompasses Bemafay and Trones Woods as weil as Waterlot. Maltz Horn end FaHemonl Farms.