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FY2012-2015Prepared by:Bureau of Business and Economic ResearchUniversity of MontanaMissoula, Montana 59812
Prepared for:The Montana Healthcare Foundation and Headwaters Foundation
The Economic Impact of Medicaid Expansion in Montana
BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCHU N I V E R S I T Y O F M O N TA N A
April 2018
AcknowledgementsThisreportwasproducedandauthoredbyBryceWardandBrandonBridgeoftheUniversityofMontana’sBureauofBusinessandEconomicResearch.AllstatementsandconclusionsincludedinthisreportbelongtotheauthorsanddonotrepresentthepositionoftheUniversityofMontana.Wewouldliketothankthefollowingpartnersforsupportingthisresearch:
Formoreinformation,contact:BureauofBusinessandEconomicResearchGallagherBusinessBuilding,Suite231Missoula,MT59812(406)243-5113www.bber.umt.edu
TableofContentsAbstract.....................................................................................................................................................0
I.Summary................................................................................................................................................1
II.Background..........................................................................................................................................3
III.ModelInputsandAssumptions.......................................................................................................5A.NewSpending.................................................................................................................................................6
B.Pre-existingSpending.................................................................................................................................................8D.Trends............................................................................................................................................................12
1.Enrollment...................................................................................................................................................................122.Spending.......................................................................................................................................................................13
IV.REMIModelResults........................................................................................................................13A.Statewide......................................................................................................................................................14B.ByRegion.......................................................................................................................................................16
V.OtherEconomicEffectsofMedicaidExpansion..........................................................................16
VI.FiscalEffects......................................................................................................................................19
VII.Conclusion........................................................................................................................................22
Appendix.................................................................................................................................................24A.ChangeinUtilizationAssociatedWithMedicaidExpansion................................................................24B.ChangeinHealthCareSpendingAssociatedWithMedicaidExpansion.............................................25C.StateSpending..............................................................................................................................................26D.ShiftinPayers...............................................................................................................................................28D.FederalGovernment...................................................................................................................................31E.Employers......................................................................................................................................................33F.Individuals.....................................................................................................................................................33G.EnrollmentForecast....................................................................................................................................34H.SpendingForecast.......................................................................................................................................34
AbstractMedicaidexpansionhasasubstantialeffectonMontana’seconomy.Assumingthat
enrollmentplateausnearcurrentlevels,Medicaidexpansionwillintroduceapproximately$350millionto$400millionofnewspendingtoMontana’seconomyeachyear.ThisspendingripplesthroughMontana’seconomy,generatingapproximately5,000jobsand$270millioninpersonalincomeineachyearbetween2018and2020.Inadditiontogeneratingeconomicactivity,MedicaidexpansionappearstoimproveoutcomesforMontanans—reducingcrime,improvinghealth,andloweringdebt.Whilethestatepaysanominalamountforthesebenefits,thecoststothestatebudgetaremorethanoffsetbythesavingscreatedbyMedicaidexpansionandbytherevenuesassociatedwithincreasedeconomicactivity.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
1
I.Summary
Inthisstudy,wedescribetheeconomicimpactsofMedicaidexpansiononMontana’seconomy.Thatis,weinvestigate“HowmanyjobsandhowmuchincomestemsfromMedicaidexpansion?”Ouranalysiscoverstheperiod2016-2020.Assuch,italsoimplicitlyanswersthequestion,“HowwouldfailingtorenewMedicaidexpansionin2019impactMontana’seconomy?”
MedicaidexpansioninMontana,createdbytheHELPACTof2015,infusesasignificant
amountofmoneyintothestate’seconomy.Duringitsfirsttwoyears,Medicaidexpansionprovidedbeneficiariesmorethan$800millionofhealthcare.Thefederalgovernmentpaidformostofthis,andmostofthesefederaldollarswouldnothavebeenspentinMontanawithoutMedicaidexpansion.Approximately75to80percentofMedicaidspendingisnewmoneyinMontana.ThismeansthatnewspendingonMedicaidexpansionisapproximately33percentlargerthanMontana’sbeveragemanufacturingindustry(e.g.,craftbrewing,distilling,wineries,etc.)andonly10percentsmallerthanthetotalbudgetforUniversityofMontanasystem.
MedicaidexpansionspendingentersMontana’seconomyintwoways.First,itsupportsnewhealthcarespending.Nearlyonein10MontananswasenrolledinMedicaidexpansionasofMarch2018.Mostexpansionenrolleeswouldhavebeenuninsuredintheabsenceoftheexpansion.Assuch,Medicaidexpansionprovidestensofthousandsofuninsured,underinsured,andlow-incomeMontananswithhealthcaretheywouldnototherwisereceive.Second,Medicaidexpansionspendingreplacesexistingspending.EvenwithoutMedicaidexpansion,beneficiarieswouldhavereceivedsomehealthcare.Medicaidexpansionchangeswhopaysforthiscare.Withoutexpansion,thestate,thefederalgovernment,employers,hospitalsandproviders,andthebeneficiariesthemselvesallcontributedtopayingforcareforpeoplewhosecareisnowpaidforviaMedicaid.Withexpansion,thefederalgovernmentpaysfornearlyallofhealthcareprovidedtobeneficiaries.
Asaresult,Medicaidexpansionstimulateseconomicactivity.Weestimatethat,
between2018and2020,itwillgenerateapproximately5,000jobsand$270millioninpersonalincomeannually(seeTable1).1Thisrepresentsslightlylessthan1percentof
1Itisusefultonotethatouranalysisdoesnotsaythattheexpansioncreates5,000inoneyearandthenadifferentadditional5,000newjobsthenextyear.Manyofthejobsarecreatedinoneyearandthenpersist.Forinstance,anursingpositioncreatedasaresultofexpansionin2017thatpersiststhrough2020wouldbepartofthe(approximately)5,000in2020.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
2
Montana’semploymentandincome.Duringitsfirstfiveyears,Medicaidexpansionisexpectedtogenerateatotalofabout$1.2billioninpersonalincomeand$2.6billioninoutputornewsales.Consistentwithourmodel,betweenJune2015(whentheHELPActwassignedintolaw)andSeptember2017,Montanaaddedmorethan6,200healthcarejobs.Table1:SummaryofEconomicImpactsofMedicaidExpansioninMontana/YearandCumulative(incomeandsalesinmillionsof2016dollars) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Cumulative
Jobs 3,161 5,071 5,326 5,165 4,975 PersonalIncome $147 $241 $265 $272 $279 $1,204NewSales(i.e.,output) $336 $551 $587 $576 $566 $2,616Population 968 2,229 3,263 4,036 4,672
TheeconomicimpactsofMedicaidexpansionarenotlimitedtothejobsandincomeitdirectlyorindirectlysupports.MedicaidexpansionalsorepresentsasignificantinvestmentinMontanans’healthandwell-being,andtheseinvestmentspayoff.AsubstantialbodyofresearchfromaroundtheU.S.hasevaluatedtheeffectsofMedicaidexpansionandfoundthatit:
• Improveshealth.OnestudyfoundthatMedicaidexpansionwasassociatedwitha5.1percentagepointincreaseintheshareoflow-incomeadultsinexcellenthealth.2Thisisconsistentwithalargerbodyofliteraturethatfindsthatinsuranceexpansionsimprovementalhealthandreducemortality.3
• Improvesfinancialhealth.Forinstance,onerecentstudyfoundthatMedicaidexpansionreducedmedicaldebtby$900pertreatedperson,prevented50,000bankruptcies,andledtobettercredittermsforborrowers.4
• Reducescrime.Medicaidexpansionreducedcrimebymorethan3percent,generatingsocialbenefitsofmorethan$10billion-$13billionannually.5
2Sommers,B.D.,Maylone,B.,Blendon,R.J.,Orav,E.J.,andEpstein,A.M.,“Three-YearImpactsoftheAffordableCareAct:ImprovedMedicalCareandHealthAmongLow-IncomeAdults,”HealthAffairs36,no.6(June1,2017):1119-1128.3Sommers,B.D.,Gawande,A.A.,andBaicker,K.,“HealthInsuranceCoverageandHealth—WhattheRecentEvidenceTellsUs,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine377,no.6(August10,2017).4Brevoort,K.,Grodzicki,D.,andHackmann,M.B.,MedicaidandFinancialHealth(No.w24002),NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2017);Hu,L.,Kaestner,R.,Mazumder,B.,Miller,S.,andWong,A.TheEffectofthePatientProtectionandAffordableCareActMedicaidExpansionsonFinancialWellbeing(No.w22170),NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2016).5Vogler,J.,“AccesstoHealthCareandCriminalBehavior:Short-RunEvidenceFromtheACAMedicaidExpansions,”(November14,2017);He,Q.,“TheEffectofHealthInsuranceonCrime:EvidenceFromtheAffordableCareActMedicaidExpansion,”(2017).Foranexpansiverecentbibliographysee:Antonisse,L.,
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
3
Furthermore,Medicaidexpansion,alongwiththeassociatedHELP-Linkworkforce
developmentprogram,mayhaveimprovedlabormarketoutcomesforlow-incomeMontanans.Followingexpansion,participationinthelaborforceamonglow-incomeMontanansages18-64increasedby6to9percentagepoints.Similargainsinlaborforceparticipationdidnotoccuramonglow-incomepopulationsinotherstatesoramonghigher-incomeMontanans.ThissuggeststhatMedicaidexpansionandHELP-Linkimprovedlabormarketoutcomesforlow-incomeMontanans.
WhileMontanapayspartofthecostofMedicaidexpansion,thesecostsaremorethanoffsetbycostsavingsandincreasedrevenues.MedicaidexpansionhasallowedsomepeopletoswitchfromtraditionalMedicaidtotheexpansion.BecauseMontanapays35percentofthecostfortraditionalMedicaidbutlessthan10percentintheexpansion,thissavedthestatemorethan$40millionduringthefirsttwoyears.Medicaidexpansionalsosaved$7.7millioninFY2017byreducingthecostofinmatecare,andthroughincreasedeconomicactivityandstaterevenues.AsshowninTable2,costsavingsandincreasedrevenuemorethanoffsetsexpansioncosts.Thiswillremaintrueevenafterthestate'sshareofMedicaidexpansioncostsrisesto10percentin2020. Table2:FiscalEffectsofMedicaidExpansioninMontana/Year(inmillionsof2016dollars) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020TotalSavings $18 $38.9 $40.1 $41.1 $42.1TotalCosts $5.3 $33.0 $39.6 $43.0 $60.9NetFiscalImpact(revenuegrowthminusexpendituregrowth) $32.7 $48.7 $46.0 $40.2 $35.3
Net(savings+fiscalimpact-costs) $45.4 $54.6 $46.5 $38.4 $16.5
II.BackgroundIn2015,MontanapassedtheHELPAct,whichexpandedMedicaidundertheAffordable
CareAct(ACA).Startingin2016,Montananswithincomesbelow138percentoftheFederalPovertyLevel(FPL)couldenrollinMedicaid,andthefederalgovernmentwouldpaymostofthecosts.Specifically,thefederalgovernmentpaid100percentofcostsfor
Garfield,R.,Rudowitz,R.,andArtiga,S.,“TheEffectsofMedicaidExpansionUndertheACA:UpdatedFindingsfromaLiteratureReview,”(2017).
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
4
eligibleenrolleesin2016and95percentin2017.Itwillpay94percentin2018,95percentin2019,and90percentin2020andbeyond.6
TheHELPActaddedsomeprovisionstothetypicalMedicaidexpansion.Forinstance,it
requiredenrolleestopaypremiumsandmakeco-paymentsforsomeservices,andenrolleesmaybedisenrollediftheyfailtopaytheirpremiums.Italsoincluded12-monthcontinuouseligibility,whichallowsenrolleestomaintainMedicaidcoverageforuptooneyear,regardlessofchangestoincomeorfamilystatus.Additionally,theHELPActauthorizedaworkforcedevelopmentprogram(HELP-Link)toimproveemploymentoutcomesforMedicaidexpansionbeneficiaries.
Morethan40,000MontananshadenrolledinMedicaidthroughtheexpansionby
January2016,andenrollmenthasclimbedto93,950byMarch2018.MedicaidexpansionspendinginMontanawas$145millionduringFY2016(whichcoveredJanuary-June2016),$442millioninFY2017,and$215millionduringthefirsthalfofFY2018(July-December2017).Thus,duringitsfirsttwoyears,Medicaidexpansionspendingtotaled$802million.
ThisreportcomputestheeconomicimpactsgeneratedbyMedicaidexpansion.An
economicimpactanalysisisappropriatetostudyMedicaidexpansionbecause,fromMontana’sperspective,thedecisiontoexpandMedicaidbringsfederaldollarsintothestatethatarenotoffsetbyincreasedpaymentstothefederalgovernment.7Thatis,whenMontanaagreedtoexpandMedicaid,thefederalgovernmentdidnotimposeaspecialtaxonMontananstopayforthecostsoftheexpansioninMontana.
Therearetwowaystothinkaboutthemarginalcosttothefederalgovernment
associatedwithMontana’sdecisiontoexpandMedicaid.First,theACAwaswritteninsuchawaythatitraisedsufficientrevenuetopaytheexpectedcostsofexpandingMedicaidinall50states.Assuch,onecouldarguethatthemarginalcostsassociatedwithMontanaexpandingMedicaidiszero.ThefederalgovernmentdoesnotneedtoraiseanyadditionalfundsfromMontanansorotherstopayforthecostofMontana’sexpansion.Alternatively,if
6 ThesharepaidbythefederalgovernmentinMontanadiffersslightlyfromtheseamounts.InexchangeforallowingMontanatooffer12-monthcontinuouseligibility,thefederalgovernmentloweredtheshareitpaysbylessthanonepercentagepoint.However,someofthisisoffsetbythefactthatthefederalgovernmentpaysfor100percentofcertaincosts(e.g.,IndianHealthServices).7AlargeamountofliteratureestablishesthatMontana’sMedicaidexpansionspendinggeneratesamarginalincreaseineconomicactivitythatcanbeevaluatedusinganeconomicimpactanalysis.See,forinstance,Ayanian,J.Z.,Ehrlich,G.M.,Grimes,D.R.,andLevy,H.,“EconomicEffectsofMedicaidExpansioninMichigan,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine376,no.5(2017):407-410;DeloitteDevelopmentLLC.MedicaidExpansionReport:2014.CommonwealthofKentucky(2015);Chernow,M.,“TheEconomicsofMedicaidExpansion,”(2016)https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160321.054035/full/;Brown,etal.,“AssessingtheEconomicandBudgetaryImpactofMedicaidExpansioninColorado,”(2016).
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
5
oneviewsMontana’sMedicaidexpansionasamarginalfederalexpenditurethatmustbeoffsetwithhigherfederalrevenuesatsomepoint,theincreasedrevenuerequiredtopayforMontana’sexpansionwillbepassedontoallAmericans.GiventhatMontanansprovidelessthan1percentoffederalrevenues,morethan99percentofthefederalmarginalcostsassociatedwithMontana’sMedicaidexpansionarepassedontotaxpayersinotherstates.Thus,thetotalmarginalcosttoMontanansassociatedwiththedecisiontoexpandMedicaidislimitedtothesharepaiddirectlybythestateplus,atmost,Montana’sshareofallfederalrevenues.
MedicaidexpansionimpactsMontana’seconomyinthesamewaythataMontana
companywinningagovernmentcontract.ItbringsmoneyintoMontana’seconomythatwouldnototherwisebethere,andthismoneyripplesthroughthestate’seconomycreatingjobsandincome.
III.ModelInputsandAssumptionsWecalculatetheimpactofMedicaidexpansiononMontana’seconomyusingtheREMI
model,aneconomicmodelcalibratedtorepresenttheinteractionsinMontana'seconomy,leasedfromRegionalEconomicModels,Inc.UsingthemodelwecomputeabaselinemodelofMontana’seconomywithoutMedicaidexpansion.Then,wecomputethesamemodeladdingMedicaidexpansion.TheeconomicimpactofMedicaidexpansionisthedifferencebetweenthesetwoscenarios.
TherearethreeessentialcomponentstoestimatingtheeconomicimpactofMedicaidspending:● Directimpacts–Thespending(e.g.,benefitsandclaims)andactivitydirectlytied
toexpansion● Indirectimpacts–Thespendingofotherentitiesthatarecarriedoutbecauseof
Medicaidspending● Inducedimpacts–Therippleeffectsthatoccurasthedirectandindirectspending
impactspropagatethroughtheeconomy
Inthissection,webrieflyoutlinetheassumptionsusedtoquantifythedirectimpactsthatentertheREMImodel.AmorecompletedescriptionofourassumptionsandtheirjustificationareincludedintheAppendix.
WedividethedirecteffectsofMedicaidexpansionspendingintotwocategories.First,
thereisnewspending,whichincludesspendingonhealthcareservicesthatwouldnothaveoccurredwithoutMedicaidexpansion.Second,thereispre-existingspending,which
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
6
includesspendingforhealthcarethatwouldhaveoccurredregardlessofMedicaidexpansion.
A.NewSpendingExpandingMedicaidincreaseshealthcareuseandhealthcarespending.8Forinstance,
afterMedicaidexpansion,theshareoflow-incomeMontananswhoskippedcareduetocostfellby16percent.Similarly,thesharewhohadnothadacheck-upwithinthepasttwoyearsfellby20percent(seeFigure1).ThesedatacoveronlythefirstyearofMedicaidexpansioninMontana.AsimilaranalysisofstatesthatexpandedMedicaidin2014showsthattheseeffectsgrowovertime.
Figure1–ChangeinHealthCareAccessAmongLow-IncomeMontanansBeforeandAfterMedicaidExpansion
Source:BBERanalysisof2015an2016BehavioralRiskFactorSurveillanceSystemdata.
ThesedatasuggestthatMedicaidexpansionincreaseshealthcareuse,buttheydonot
speaktothetotalincreaseinhealthcareuseorspending.Toestimatethenetincreaseinhealthcarespending,weanalyzedtherelationshipbetweenhealthcarespendingper
8Sommers,B.D.,Maylone,B.,Blendon,R.J.,Orav,E.J.,andEpstein,A.M.,“Three-YearImpactsoftheAffordableCareAct:ImprovedMedicalCareandHealthAmongLow-IncomeAdults,”HealthAffairs36,no.6(2017):1119-1128;Mahendraratnam,N.,Dusetzina,S.B.,andFarley,J.F.,“PrescriptionDrugUtilizationandReimbursementIncreasedFollowingStateMedicaidExpansionin2014,”JournalofManagedCare&SpecialtyPharmacy23,no.3(2017):355-363;Antonisse,L.,Garfield,R.,Rudowitz,R.,andArtiga,S.,“TheEffectsofMedicaidExpansionUndertheACA:UpdatedFindingsFromaLiteratureReview,”HealthAffairs35,no.10(2016):1810-1815.
36%
29%29%
25%
Nocheck-upinlast2years Skippedcareduetocost
2015
2016
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
7
capitaandhealthinsurancecoveragebetween2008-2014.AsdetailedintheAppendix,wefindaclearrelationshipbetweenchangesinhealthinsurancecoverageandtotalhealthcarespending.Weestimatethatapproximately50percent($132million)ofMedicaidexpansionspendingin2016representedanetincreaseinspending.9Thisamountstoanetincreaseinhealthcarespendingofapproximately$2,500foreachexpansionenrolleeor$5,000foreachenrolleewholikelywouldnothavehadinsurancein2016withoutMedicaidexpansion.
Thenetincreaseinspendingcanbedividedintotwoparts.10Partofitreflectsspending
onmorehealthcare.Thatis,itreflectscarethatwouldnothaveoccurredbutforexpansion.Partofitreflectsareductioninuncompensatedcare.Thespendingdataintheaboveanalysisisbased,inpart,onnetpatientrevenue.11Sincesomeuncompensatedcareabsorbedbyprovidersisnotcounted,partoftheincreaseinspendingreflectsreduceduncompensatedcare.
Medicaidexpansionreduceduncompensatedcare.AforthcomingreportbyManattreportsthathospitaluncompensatedcareinMontanadeclinedbyover45%between2015and2016.Similarly,onenationalstudyfoundthat“Medicaidexpansioncuteverydollarthatahospitalspentonuncompensatedcareby41centsbetween2013and2015.”12
Formally,wemodelbothnewspendingandthereductioninuncompensatedcare
absorbedbyprovidersasincreasedhealthcareoutput.Economicaccountsdonotincludetheproviderportionofuncompensatedcareaseconomicoutput.13Thus,tomaintain
9Weestimatethata1ppdeclineintheshareofpeoplewithoutinsuranceincreasestotalhealthcarespendingpercapitaby$46.Montana’suninsuredratefellby3.5percentagepointsin2016.Non-expansionstatessawa0.7ppdeclinein2016.Assuch,weassumethatintheabsenceofexpansion,Montana’suninsuredratewouldhavefallenby0.7pp.Thus,weattribute2.8ppofthedeclinetotheexpansionin2016.Then,$46*2.8*1.028million(Montana’s2016population)=$132million.10Technically,thereisathirdpartthatincludesreductionsinhealthcarespendingrelatedtoshiftingpeoplefromhigher-pricedprivateinsurancetolower-pricedMedicaid.Throughoutthisreport,wefocusonthenetincrease,newspendinglessreducedprices.11Determiningwhopaysforuncompensatedcareiscomplicated.Someiscoveredbyfederal,state,orlocalprograms.Somemaybepassedontootherconsumersthroughhigherrates.However,evidencesuggeststhatasubstantialproportionis“paid”byproviders.Forinstance,onerecentstudyestimatedthatlocalhospitalsincurredcostsequalto$800peruninsuredpersonintheirarea.(See:Garthwaite,C.,Gross,T.,andNotowidigdo,M.J.,“HospitalsasInsurersofLastResort,”AmericanEconomicJournal:AppliedEconomics10,no.1(2018):1-39.)12Dranove,D.,Gartwaite,C.,andOdy,C.,“TheImpactoftheACA'sMedicaidExpansiononHospitals'UncompensatedCareBurdenandthePotentialEffectsofRepeal,”Issuebrief(CommonwealthFund)12(2017):1-9.13Seehttps://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/DSM-16.pdf.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
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consistencywiththedefinitionsusedinourmodel,wetreatreductionsintheproviderportionofuncompensatedcareasincreasedhealthcareoutputorincreasedsales.
ConsistentwiththeevidencethatMedicaidexpansionspendingspikesinthesecond
yeardueto“pent-updemand”effects,weassumenewMedicaidspendingroseto57percentin2017andwillthenfallbackdownto50percentby2019.Onaverage,weassumethat52percentofMedicaidspendingrepresentsnewspending.
B.Pre-existingSpending Asdiscussedinthepriorsection,about50percentofMedicaidexpansionspending
wouldhaveexistedwithoutMedicaidexpansion.Werefertothecarethatbeneficiarieswouldhaveconsumedregardlessofexpansionaspre-existingspending.
Intheabsenceofexpansion,avarietyofsourceswouldhavepaidforpre-existing
spending.Intheabsenceofexpansion,someexpansionbeneficiarieswouldhaveenrolledintraditionalMedicaid.Thestateandfederalgovernmentswouldhavepaidforthiscare.Somewouldhaveenrolledinanindividualinsuranceplan(e.g.,anexchangeplan).Thefederalgovernment(viaexchangesubsidies,forthosewhoqualify14)andtheindividuals(viapremiumsandout-of-pocketpayments)wouldhavepaidforthiscare.Somewouldhaveobtainedinsuranceviatheiremployer.Theemployer(viatheemployer’sshareofpremiumcosts)andtheemployee(viatheemployee’sshareofpremiumsandout-of-pocketpayments)wouldhavepaidforthiscare.
WithMedicaidexpansion,thefederalgovernment,stategovernment,andindividualbeneficiariespayforthecarethatbeneficiarieswouldhaveconsumedregardlessofexpansion.Asaresult,themoneythatthefederalgovernment,stategovernment,employers,andindividualswouldhavespentonpre-existingspendingcanbespentonotherthings.SomeofthisrepurposedspendingisnewspendinginMontanaandgenerateseconomicimpacts
Forinstance,consideranindividualwho,intheabsenceofexpansion,wouldhave
obtainedinsuranceviathehealthinsuranceexchanges.Withexpansion,thefederalgovernmentnolongerspendsmoneyonpremiumsubsidiesforthisindividual,andtheindividualspendslessonpremiumsandout-of-pocketpayments.Thefederalgovernemntcanredirectthespendingforpremiumsubisieselesewhere(e.g.,Medicaidexpansion).Theindividualcanspendthemoneytheywouldhaveotherwisespentonpremiumsandout-of-
14Individualswithincomesbetween100percentand138percentoftheFPLareeligibleforexchangesubsidiesandCSRsinstatesthathavenotexpandedMedicaid.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
9
pocketexpensesonfood,rent,etc.TherepurposedindividualspendingconstitutesnewspendinginMontana’seconomyandgenerateseconomicimpacts.
Toestimatetheeconomicimpactsoftheshiftinspendingonpre-existingcare,weneed
tounderstandwhobenefitsfromit.Unfortunately,itisdifficulttoestimatetheshiftinhealthcarespendingduetoMedicaidexpansion.TheavailabledatadoesnotdescribewhowouldhavepaidforexistingcarehadMontananotexpandedMedicaid.Thedatathatexistareincompleteandsometimescontradictory.
Figure2presentsourestimatefortheshiftsinexistingspending.ThebarontheleftrepresentsspendingwithMedicaidexpansion.ThemoneyspentonMedicaidexpansioninMontanacomesfromthreesources—thefederalgovernment,stategovernment,andbeneficiaries(intheformofpremiums).Whilethesharepaidbyfederalandstategovernmentsvarieseachyear,in2020,thefederalgovernmentwillpayapproximately89percentofthecost,thestatewillpay10percent,andbeneficiarypremiumsprovidetheremaining1percent.15
ThebarontherightrepresentsspendingwithoutMedicaidexpansion.Twothings
standoutwhencomparingthebars.First,thecoloredportionofthebarontheright(i.e.,thenon-whitepart)ismuchsmaller.ThegapbetweenthebarscapturesthenetincreaseinhealthcarespendingassociatedwithMedicaidexpansiondiscussedinsectionIII.A..Second,whopaysforpre-existingspendingdiffersfromexpansionspending.
Forinstance,regardlessofexpansion,thefederalgovernmentpaysforsomeofthe
healthcareconsumedbysomeexpansionbeneficiaries.Mostofthesefundscomefromtwosources—traditionalMedicaidandhealthinsuranceexchangesubsidiesandcostsharingreductions.16MoneythatthefederalgovernmentwouldhavespentonhealthcareregardlessofexpansionisnotnewspendinginMontana,butratheritissimplyatransferfromonefederalprogramtoanother.Weestimatethatapproximately19percentof 15During2016and2017,beneficiariespaid$6.7millioninpremiums.Thisrepresents0.84percentofthe$802millionintotalbenefits.ConsistentwithBachrachetal.,(2016),weassumethatpremiumspaidbybeneficiariesoffsetpartofthestate’sshareandpartofthefederalshare.https://www.statenetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/State-Network-Manatt-Assessment-Tool-State-Budget-Impact-of-Medicaid-Expansion-December-2016.pdf16TherearesomeadditionalsourcesoffederalspendingthatmaydirectlyrespondtoMedicaidexpansion,particularlyfederalpaymentsforuncompensatedcare(e.g.,DisproportionateShareHospital(DSH)payments).Theserespondincomplicatedwaystochangesinuninsuredrates,federalpolicy,etc.Forinstance,DSHpaymentswerescheduledtobecutbyspecificamountsaspartoftheACA.However,Congresshascontinuedtodelayimplementationofthecuts.(See:https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/disproportionate-share-hospital-payments/;https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Analyzing-Disproportionate-Share-Hospital-Allotments-to-States.pdf.)
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
10
Medicaidexpansionspendingrepresentsatransferfromonefederalprogramtoanother.Weexcludethesetransfersfromourcalculation.
Figure2:SpendingonMedicaidExpansionBeneficiaries’HealthCare“WithandWithout”ExpansionbySource
Thesituationforstategovernmentissimilar,albeitsmaller.Intheabsenceofexpansion,thestatewouldhavepaidforsomehealthcarethatisnowpaidforbytheexpansion.Forinstance,intheabsenceofexpansion,traditionalMedicaidwouldhavepaidforsomecareforsomebeneficiaries.DPHHSreportsthatmovingpeoplefromtraditionalMedicaidsavedthestate$40millionduringthefirsttwoyearsofexpansion.17Inaddition,theMontanaDepartmentofCorrectionsreportsthatMedicaidexpansionreduceditsspendingonhealthcareby$7.66millioninFY2017.18Thestatemayalsorealizesavingsfromreducedpaymentsformentalhealthservicesorsubstanceabuseservicesforlow-incomeindividuals.19ArecentreportfromManattthatlookedatsubstanceusedisorderspendinginMontanaarguesthatthestatemayrealize$3millionofannualsavingsasa
17Thesesavingsstemfromthefactthatthestatepays35percentofthecostsfortraditionalMedicaid,but0percent(in2016)or5percent(in2017)orlessfortheexpansion.18MedicaidexpansionallowedtheDepartmentofCorrections(DOC)toshiftmoreofitshospitalizationstoMedicaid.Priortoexpansion,DOCwaspayingratesdeterminedbyBlueCross/BlueShield.Withoutexpansion,DOCestimatesitwouldhavespent$12.3million.WithMedicaidexpansion,DOCpaysMedicaidrates.ItreportsMedicaidexpansionreducedpaymentsby$7.66millionduringFY2017.19Bachrach,etal.,RepealingtheMedicaidExpansion:ImplicationsforMontana,(2017):8-9.
0.89
0.19
0.10
0.08
0.01
0.12
0.09
0.52
With Without
Employers
Individuals
State
FederalGovernment
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
11
resultofMedicaidexpansion.20Thestatemayalsoseereductionsinpaymentsforuncompensatedcare.Onestudyestimatedthatstates’savingsfromreducinguncompensatedcarecouldequal13percentto25percentoftheirMedicaidexpansioncosts.21
WeestimatethatMedicaidexpansionreducesstatespendingforhealthcarebyan
averageof8percentoftotalMedicaidexpansionspending.ThisincludesthedemonstratedsavingsfromtraditionalMedicaid,theDepartmentofCorrections,andtheexpectedreductioninspendingonsubstanceusedisorders.WesubtractthisamountfromtheamountthatthestatepaysforMedicaidexpansion.
IntheabsenceofMedicaidexpansion,beneficiarieswouldhavepaidformuchofthe
caretheyreceived.Roughly15percentofMedicaidbeneficiarieswouldlikelyhavehadsomeformofprivateinsuranceintheabsenceofexpansion.Theseindividualswouldhavepaidpremiumsandmadeout-of-pocketpayments.Inaddition,thoseremaininguninsuredintheabsenceofexpansionwouldhavepaidforsomeoftheircareoutofpocket.Forinstance,onerecentstudyfoundthattheuninsuredpaid$500peryearoutofpocketfortheirhealthcare.22AdifferentstudyshowedthatMedicaidexpansionreducedout-of-pocketspendingfortheaveragenewlyenrolledMedicaidexpansionfamilyby$3,000peryear.23
Weassumethat12percentoftotalMedicaidspendingcoverswhatindividualswould
havepaidthemselves.Beneficiariescannowspendthismoneyonotherthings,andtheymayalsobenefitfromlowerinterestpaymentsondebtincurredtopayformedicalcareandlowerinterestratesforotherborrowing.Thesepathwaysmaygenerateadditionaleconomicimpacts,butwedidnotincludethesepotentialeffectsinouranalysis.
EmployersmayalsobenefitfromMedicaidexpansionbecausesomeofthosewhoenroll
mayhaveobtainedemployer-providedinsuranceintheabsenceofexpansion.24Assuch, 20Grady,Bachrach,andBoozang,Medicaid’sRoleintheDeliveryandPaymentofSubstanceUseDisorderServicesinMontana(2017).21Buettgens,M.,Holahan,J.,andRecht,H.,“MedicaidExpansion,HealthCoverage,andSpending:AnUpdateforthe21StatesThatHaveNotExpandedEligibility,”(2016).22Coughlin,T.,Holahan,J.,andCaswell,K.,“UncompensatedCarefortheUninsuredin2013:ADetailedExamination.2014,”TheHenryJ.KaiserFamilyFoundation:TheKaiserCommissiononMedicaidandtheUninsured(2017).23Glied,S.,Chakraborty,O.,andRusso,T.,“HowMedicaidExpansionAffectedOut-of-PocketHealthCareSpendingforLow-IncomeFamilies,”Issuebrief(CommonwealthFund),(2017):1-9.24SeveralrecentstudiesdonotfindthatMedicaidexpansionleadstolargereductionsinemployer-sponsoredinsurance.Thissuggeststhatcrowd-outeffectsarelikelysmall.SeeDuggan,M.,Goda,G.S.,andJackson,E.,TheEffectsoftheAffordableCareActonHealthInsuranceCoverageandLaborMarketOutcomes(No.w23607),NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2017);Frisvold,D.E.,andJung,Y.,“TheImpactofExpanding
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
12
theseemployerssavewhattheywouldhavecontributedtowardtheemployee’shealthcarecosts.Forpurposesofthisanalysis,weassumethatthesesavingsequal9percentoftotalMedicaidspending.Dependingonmarketconditions,employersmaypasssomeofthesesavingstoemployeesashighercompensation.Weassumethattheydo,butthattheyalsokeepsome.
D.Trends
1.EnrollmentMedicaidenrollmentgrewfrom40,000inthefirstmonthofMedicaidexpansionto
nearly94,000byMarch2018.BasedonevidencefromotherMedicaidexpansionstates,enrollmenttendstoplateauby24monthsafterexpansion(seeFigure4).Forpurposesofouranalysis,weassumethatenrollmentgrowsslightlyto94,000andremainsconstantatthatlevelforthenextseveralyears.Giventhatonecrudeestimateplacesthesizeofthepotentialexpansionpopulationatapproximately100,000,itseemsunlikelythatMontanacanenrollsubstantiallymorepeopleintheexpansion.25IntheAppendixsectionL,wepresentresultsthatassumethatenrollmentcontinuestogrowto105,000.Figure4:AverageMonthlyPercentChangeinExpansionEnrollment
Source:BBERanalysisofMBESEnrollmentReportdata. MedicaidonHealthInsuranceCoverageandLaborMarketOutcomes,”InternationalJournalofHealthEconomicsandManagement,(2016):1-23.25SeeAppendixsectionGforadditionaldetails.
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
%changeinmonthlyenrollment
Monthssinceexpansion
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
13
2.SpendingMedicaidspendingpernewlyeligibleindividualinMontanawasroughly$5,315during
2016androseto$6,387in2017.TheselevelsareroughlyinlinewithspendingobservedinotherMedicaidexpansionstatesintheirfirsttwoyears:nationally,expansionspendingperbeneficiarywas$5,511in2014and$6,395in2015.Thisinitialincreaseinspendingperbeneficiaryisexpectedtosubsideasindividuals’pent-updemandissatisfied.26ArecentreportbytheMedicaidactuarysuggeststhatspendingpermemberforthosenewlyeligibleforMedicaidexpansionwasexpectedtofallto$5,370in2018beforerisingto$5,981by2020.27Forpurposesofthisanalysis,weassumethatMedicaidexpansionspendingperbeneficiaryinMontanacatchesupwithandthenfollowsthefederalforecast.
IV.REMIModelResultsThediscussioninthepriorsectionoutlinesthenetdirectimpactofMedicaidexpansion.
Combined,approximately75percentto80percentoftotalspendingonMedicaidexpansionbenefitsandclaimsrepresentsnewspendinginMontana.Weallocatethesedirectimpactsacrossproviders,government,business,andindividualsasdescribedabove.NewspendingonhealthcareisallocatedacrosshealthcaresectorsinproportiontoreportedMedicaidexpansionspending.28WefurtherallocatespendingacrossMontanaregionsinproportiontoMedicaidenrollment.29
Tocomputetheindirectandinducedimpacts,weusetheREMImodel,aneconomic
model,calibratedtorepresenttheinteractionsintheMontanaeconomy,leasedfromRegionalEconomicModels,Inc.TheREMImodelisoneofthebestknownandmostrespectedanalyticaltoolsinthepolicyanalysisarenathathasbeenusedinmorethan100previousstudiesaswellasdozensofpeer-reviewedarticlesinscholarlyjournals.Itisastate-of-the-arteconometricforecastingmodelthatincorporatesdynamicfeedbacksbetweeneconomicanddemographicvariables.TheREMImodelforecastsemployment,income,expenditures,andpopulationsforcountiesandregionsbasedonamodelcontainingmorethan100stochasticanddynamicrelationshipsaswellasanumberofidentities.30 26CentersforMedicareandMedicaidServices.2016ActuarialReportontheFinancialOutlookforMedicaid,(2016).27Ibid.28http://dphhs.mt.gov/Portals/85/Documents/healthcare/MedicaidExpansionHealthCareServicesProfile.pdf29WeallocateMedicaidenrollmentbycountyintothefiveregionsavailableintheREMImodel.http://dphhs.mt.gov/Portals/85/Documents/healthcare/MedicaidExpansionMemberProfile.pdf30Afullexplanationofthedesignandoperationofthemodelcanbefoundin:Treyz,G.I.,Rickman,D.S.,&Shao,G.(1991).TheREMIeconomic-demographicforecastingandsimulationmodel.InternationalRegionalScienceReview,14(3),221-253.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
14
Weestimateimpactsusingthefollowingprocess.First,abaselineprojectionofthe
economyisproducedusingthemodel,utilizinginputsandassumptionsthatextrapolategrowthandconditionsofrecenthistoryintheabsenceofMedicaidexpansion.Themodelisthenusedasecondtimewithidenticalinputs,exceptthatMedicaidexpansionisadded.Thus,Medicaidexpansionproducesadifferenteconomy,reflectingnotonlytheexpansion,butalsohowtherestoftheeconomyreactstoit.ThedifferencebetweenthebaselineandalternativescenariosoftheeconomyrepresentstheeconomicimpactofMedicaidexpansion.
A.StatewideTable3presentsthestatewideeffectsofMedicaidexpansion.Undertheconditionsand
assumptionsoutlined,weestimatethatMedicaidexpansionadded3,161jobs,$147millioninpersonalincome,and$336millioninnewsales(oroutput)toMontana’seconomyin2016.Weprojectthattheseeffectswillpeakin2018andwillremainlargelyconstantthrough2020.In2020,Medicaidexpansionisexpectedtosupport4,975jobs,$279millioninpersonalincome,and$566millioninnewsales(oroutput).
Bytheendofitsfirstfiveyears,Medicaidexpansionisexpectedtocreateatotalof
about$1.2billioninpersonalincomeandmorethan$2.6billioninoutput.Weexcludejobsandpopulationfromthecumulativetotalbecausetheyarenotadditiveacrossyears.Theyrepresentthedifferenceinemployment(orpopulation)relativetonoexpansionineachyear.Thatis,weestimatethatMontanawillhaveroughly5,000morejobseachyearthanitwouldintheabsenceoftheexpansion.31
Table3:SummaryofEconomicImpactsofMedicaidExpansioninMontana(incomeandsalesinmillionsof$2016) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 CumulativeJobs 3,161 5,071 5,326 5,165 4,975 PersonalIncome $147 $241 $265 $272 $279 $1,204NewSales(i.e.,output) $336 $551 $587 $576 $566 $2,616Population 968 2,229 3,263 4,036 4,672
Table4showsthebreakdownofemploymentbyindustry.Asonemightexpect,thelargestimpactsareinhealthcare.OuranalysissuggeststhatMedicaidexpansionwill 31Ouranalysisdoesnotsaythattheexpansioncreates5,000inoneyearandthenadifferentadditional5,000newjobsthenextyear.Manyofthejobsarecreatedinoneyearandthenpersist.Forinstance,anursingpositioncreatedasaresultofexpansionin2017thatpersiststhrough2020wouldbepartofthe(approximately)5,000in2020.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
15
createapproximately2,000additionalhealthcarejobs.However,therearealsofairlysignificanteffectsonretailtrade(morethan800jobs)andconstruction(morethan600jobs).Table4:IndustryBreakdownofEmploymentImpacts 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020HealthCareandSocialAssistance
1,183 2,033 2,085 2,030 2,142
RetailTrade 469 788 828 814 825Construction 320 568 652 628 549AccommodationandFood 160 266 289 294 303OtherServices,ExceptPublicAdministration
152 266 289 294 303
Professional,Scientific,andTechnicalServices
95 159 172 171 168
RealEstateandRental 75 126 137 137 136AdministrativeandWasteManagementService
84 137 141 136 134
Other 261 418 405 364 337
Consistentwiththemodel,healthcareemploymentgrowthinMontanaacceleratedfollowingMedicaidexpansion(seeFigure5).Betweensecondquarter2015(whentheHELPActwaspassed)andthirdquarter2017,Montana’shealthcaresectoraddedmorethan6,200jobs.Furthermore,since2014,statesthatsawlargerincreasesininsurancecoveragesawlargerincreasesinhealthcareemployment(seeAppendixsectionI).Figure5:HealthCareEmploymentinMontana,Q12013–Q32017
Source:BBERanalysisofQCEWdataforNAICS62.
61,846 61,835
68,052
58,000
60,000
62,000
64,000
66,000
68,000
70,000
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
16
B.ByRegionTable5summarizestheeconomicimpactsofMedicaidexpansionacrossfiveMontana
regions:Northest,Southwest,Central,NorthCentral,andEast.32Medicaidenrollmentdoesnotdeviatethatmuchfrompopulation.Assuch,economicimpactsacrossregionsaresomewhatproportionaltopopulation.Table5:EconomicImpactsbyRegion,2018andCumulative(incomeandsalesinmillionsof$2016) NW SW Central
2018 Cumul. 2018 Cumul. 2018 Cumul.Jobs 1,920 1,190 1,091 PersonalIncome $89 $403 $61 $277 $59 $269NewSales/Output $202 $902 $123 $584 $130 $581Population 1,132 766 682 N.Central East
2018 Cumul. 2018 Cumul.Jobs 877 247 PersonalIncome $43 $194 $13 $59NewSales/Output $96 $427 $27 $120Population 547 138
V.OtherEconomicEffectsofMedicaidExpansionTheresultsabovefocusoneconomicimpactsanddonotaccountformanyother
expansionbenefits.Forinstance,Medicaidexpansionmayimprovehealthoutcomes.OnestudyfoundthatMedicaidexpansionwasassociatedwitha5.1percentagepoint(23%)
32TheNorthwestregionincludesFlathead,Granite,Lake,Lincoln,Mineral,Missoula,Powell,Ravalli,andSanderscounties.TheSouthwestregionincludesBeaverhead,Broadwater,DeerLodge,Gallatin,Jefferson,Madison,Meagher,Park,andSilverBowcounties.TheNorthCentralregionincludesBlaine,Cascade,Chouteau,Glacier,Hill,LewisandClark,Liberty,Pondera,Teton,andToolecounties.TheCentralregionincludesBigHorn,Carbon,Fergus,GoldenValley,JudithBasin,Musselshell,Petroleum,Stillwater,SweetGrass,Treasure,Wheatland,andYellowstonecounties.TheEastregionincludesCarter,Custer,Daniels,Dawson,Fallon,Garfield,McCone,Phillips,PowderRiver,Prairie,Richland,Rosebud,Sheridan,Valley,andWibauxcounties.
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increaseintheshareoflow-incomeadultsinexcellenthealth.33Analysesofotherinsuranceexpansionshavefoundthatprovidinghealthinsuranceimprovesdepressionoutcomesandreducesmortality.34
Medicaidexpansionalsogeneratesmajorimprovementsinfinancialsecurity.Itreduces
debtcollections,reducesbankruptcies,andimprovescreditscores.35Forinstance,onerecentstudyfoundthatMedicaidexpansionreducedmedicaldebtby$900pertreatedperson,prevented50,000bankruptcies,andledtobettercredittermsforborrowers.36Theinterestsavingsfromtheseimprovementswereworth$280pertreatedpersonor$520millionoverall.Thesefinancialbenefitsdoublethevalueofexpansiontouninsuredindividualsrelativetoasimplecalculationbasedonthechangeinout-of-pocketcosts.
MultiplerecentstudiesfindthatMedicaidexpansionreducedbothviolentandproperty
crime.37Onestudyarguesthesebenefitsmaystemfromincreasedmentalhealthandsubstanceabusetreatment.Nationally,thebenefitsofexpansion-inducedcrimereductionmayexceed$10billionannually.
SomeworrythatexpandingMedicaidwillreduceworkincentives.However,several
studiesfindnoevidencethatMedicaidexpansiondepressesemployment.38OnestudyevenfoundthatMedicaidexpansionincreasedemploymentamongpeoplewithdisabilities.39
33Sommers,B.D.,Maylone,B.,Blendon,R.J.,Orav,E.J.,andEpstein,A.M.,“Three-YearImpactsoftheAffordableCareAct:ImprovedMedicalCareandHealthAmongLow-IncomeAdults,”HealthAffairs36,no.6(2017):1119-1128.34Sommers,B.D.,Gawande,A.A.,andBaicker,K.,“HealthInsuranceCoverageandHealth—WhattheRecentEvidenceTellsUs,”(2017).35Brevoort,K.,Grodzicki,D.,andHackmann,M.B.,MedicaidandFinancialHealth(No.w24002).NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2017);Hu,L.,Kaestner,R.,Mazumder,B.,Miller,S.,andWong,A.,TheEffectofthePatientProtectionandAffordableCareActMedicaidExpansionsonFinancialWellbeing(No.w22170),NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2016).36Brevoort,etal.,(2017).37Vogler,J.,“AccesstoHealthCareandCriminalBehavior:Short-RunEvidenceFromtheACAMedicaidExpansions(2017);He,Q.,“TheEffectofHealthInsuranceonCrimeEvidenceFromtheAffordableCareActMedicaidExpansion(2017).Thesestudiesareconsistentwithresearchthatexaminedtheeffectsofpriorinsuranceexpansionsoncrime,e.g,.Wen,H.,Hockenberry,J.M.,andCummings,J.R.,“TheEffectofMedicaidExpansiononCrimeReduction:EvidenceFromHIFA-WaiverExpansions,”JournalofPublicEconomics154(2017):67-94.38Leung,P.,andMas,A.EmploymentEffectsoftheACAMedicaidExpansions(No.w22540).NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2016);Kaestner,R.,Garrett,B.,Chen,J.,Gangopadhyaya,A.,andFleming,C.,“EffectsofACAMedicaidExpansionsonHealthInsuranceCoverageandLaborSupply,”JournalofPolicyAnalysisandManagement36,no.3(2017):608-642;Duggan,M.,Goda,G.S.,andJackson,E.,TheEffectsoftheAffordableCareActonHealthInsuranceCoverageandLaborMarketOutcomes(No.w23607),NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2017);Frisvold,D.E.,andJung,Y.,“TheImpactofExpandingMedicaidonHealthInsuranceCoverageandLaborMarketOutcomes,”InternationalJournalofHealthEconomicsandManagement(2016):1-23.
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DatafromMontanaalsoshownoadverseeffectofMedicaidexpansiononthe
employmentoflow-incomeMontanans.Infact,Montanasawasubstantialincreaseinlow-incomelaborforceparticipationfollowingMedicaidexpansion.Laborforceparticipationamongnon-disabledMontanansages18-64withincomesbelow138percentFPLrosefrom58percentto64percent.AsshowninTable6,similarincreasesinlaborforceparticipationwerenotobservedamonghigher-incomeMontanansorlow-incomeresidentsinotherstates.Infact,laborforceparticipationfellintheseothergroups.Ifweassumethatlow-incomelaborforceparticipationinMontanawasexpectedtofollowthetrendsinotherstatesoramonghigh-incomeMontanans,thentheincreaseinlaborforceparticipationamonglow-incomeMontanansisevenlarger(8.5percentagepoints).
Table6–LaborForceParticipationAmongPeopleAges18-64,BeforeandAfterExpansion
Before(2013-2015)
After(2016-2017)
Difference(afterminusbefore)
DifferenceinDifference
(MTdifferenceminusrestdifference)
0-138%FPL Montana 58.2% 64.2% 6%
RestofU.S. 57.1% 54.6% -2.5%*** 8.5%*>138%FPL
Montana 86.2% 84.1% -2.0% RestofU.S. 83.4% 83.5% 0.1% -2.1%
Source:BBERanalysisofCurrentPopulationSurveyASEC,dataobtainedfromIPUMS-CPS.***=p<0.01,*=p<0.05.SeeAppendixforadditionaldetails.
WhiletheseresultsdonotprovethatMedicaidexpansionincreasedemployment,theysuggestitmighthave.ThispatternofresultsisconsistentwiththehypothesisthatMedicaidexpansionandMontana’sHELP-LinkprogramimprovedemploymentoutcomesforMontana’sMedicaidexpansionbeneficiaries.Theseeffectscouldreflecttheimpactofobtaininghealthinsuranceandanyassociatedimprovementsinhealth,theimpactofHELP-Link,acombinationofthetwo,orsomeothernotyetaccountedforfactor.However,wenotethatarecentanalysisofaprograminNevada,similartoHELP-Link,thatprovided
39Hall,J.P.,Shartzer,A.,Kurth,N.K.,andThomas,K.C.,“EffectofMedicaidExpansiononWorkforceParticipationforPeopleWithDisabilities,”AmericanJournalofPublicHealth107,no.2(2017):262-264.
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eligibilityreviewandjobcounselingservicestorandomlyselectedunemploymentinsurancerecipientsledtopersistentincreasesinlong-termemploymentandearnings.40
MedicaidexpansionrepresentsasignificantinvestmentinMontana’shealthcare
system,particularlyitscriticalaccesshospitalsandruralproviders.Italsosignificantlyimprovesthefinancialhealthofsafety-nethospitals.41WedescribetheeffectsofMedicaidexpansiononhealthcareprovidersinaforthcomingreport.
VI.FiscalEffectsMedicaidexpansionalsoaffectsthestate’sbudget.Whileitreducessomestatecosts,it
imposesothers.Asnotedpreviously,thestatecovereda0percentshareoftotalbenefitsandclaimsin2016,butthatsharewillriseto10percentin2020andbeyond.Technically,thecosttothestateismorecomplicatedthanthis.BecauseMontanaoffers12-monthcontinuouseligibility,itmustpayaslightlyhighershareofcosts.However,thefederalgovernmentpaysfor100percentofcertainexpansioncosts(e.g.,costsofservicesprovidedbytheIndianHealthService).Todate,thesecostscomprisenearly5percentoftotalexpansionspending.Premiumschargedtoexpansionbeneficiariesalsooffsetstatecostsveryslightly.Onnet,weestimatethatthestateofMontanawillpay10.24percentofMedicaidexpansioncostsin2020.
Thestatealsomustpaytoadministertheprogram.In2017,theLegislativeFiscalOffice
estimatedthattotaladministrativecostsassociatedwithMedicaidexpansionwouldequalapproximately1percentoftotalbenefitsandclaims.42Assuch,by2020,thestate’sMedicaidexpansioncostswillequalapproximately11percentoftotalMedicaidexpenses.
Thesecostsaremorethanoffsetbythecostsavingsandincreasedrevenues.As
discussedabove,MedicaidexpansionreducesthecostoftraditionalMedicaid,healthcarespendingbytheDepartmentofCorrections,andspendingonsubstanceusedisorders.Weestimatethatthesesavingsaverageapproximately8percentoftotalMedicaidexpansion
40Manoli,D.S.,Michaelides,M.,andPatel,A.,Long-TermEffectsofJob-SearchAssistance:ExperimentalEvidenceUsingAdministrativeTaxData(No.w24422),NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2018).41Dobson,A.,DaVanzo,J.E.,Haught,R.,andPhap-Hoa,L.,“ComparingtheAffordableCareAct'sFinancialImpactonSafety-NetHospitalsinStatesThatExpandedMedicaidandThoseThatDidNot,”IssueBrief(CommonwealthFund),(2017):1-10.42Theseprojectionsincludepaymentsforthethird-partyadministrator(TPA).In2017,SB261canceledthird-partyadministrationinanefforttosavemoney.Whilethischangewasintendedtoreducecosts,itremainstobeseenhowmuchthisshiftwillsave.Forpurposesofthisanalysis,wecontinuetoassumethatadministrativecostswillequal1percentoftotalbenefitsandclaims.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
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spending,andcouldenduphigherdependingontheextenttowhichthestateisabletoreducespendingforotherhealthservicesoruncompensatedcare.
AsshowninTable7,comparingcoststosavings,weestimatethatMedicaidexpansion
hadorwillhaveapositiveorclosetoneutralimpactonthestate’sbudgetin2016,2017,2018,and2019.Forinstance,in2017,Medicaidexpansionreducedthestate’sspendingontraditionalMedicaid,inmatecare,andsubstanceusedisordersbyapproximately$39million($2016),anditcostapproximately$33million.Thus,onnet,notcountingforrevenueorotherimpacts,Medicaidexpansionsavedthestate$6millionin2017.
By2020,however,savingsmaynolongeroffsetcosts.Onnet,thestatewillhavetopay
approximately2.8percentoftotalMedicaidexpansionspendingin2020.Thus,thequestioniswhethertheincreasedeconomicactivityassociatedwithMedicaidexpansionwillgeneratenetpositivebudgeteffectssufficienttocovertheseremainingcosts.Weestimatethattheywill.
UsingtheFiscalImpactAssessmentTool(FIAT),amodulethatestimatesstaterevenue
andexpenditureimpactsbasedontheoutputfromtheREMImodel,wefindthattaxesandotherstaterevenuesrisebyanamountsufficienttopayfortheremainingMedicaidexpansioncostsin2020.43
AsshowninTable7,totalstaterevenuesfromallsources(includingintergovernmentaltransfers)areexpectedtoincreaseby$40millionto$50millionperyear.Ifwerestrictthecalculationtoincludeonlytaxes,statetaxrevenuesrisebyapproximately$21millionperyear.Thesetaxrevenuesaresufficienttopayforthe$16millioninMedicaidexpansioncostsnotcoveredbybudgetsavingsin2020.
However,itisimportanttolookbeyondtheimpactofMedicaidexpansiononrevenues.OurmodelsuggeststhatMedicaidexpansionwillincreaseeconomicactivityandincreasepopulation.Theseincreasesmayalsoimpactstateexpenditures.Combiningbothrevenueandexpenditureeffectsstillyieldsalargepositiveneteffectonthestatebudget.44Thenetfiscalimpactin2020isestimatedtobe$35million.Again,thisismorethanenoughtocoverthe$16millioninremainingMedicaidexpansioncostsin2020. 43TheFIATmodeluseshistoricalaveragerelationshipsbetweeneconomicactivity(particularlypopulation,personalincome,andemployment)andstaterevenuesandexpenditurestoprojecthowrevenuesandexpenditureschangeinresponsetochangingpopulation,personalincome,andemployment.44Thenetfiscalimpactislargerthanrevenuesinthefirstfewyearsbecausethemodelassumesthatthegainsinemploymentfromincreasedactivitywillreducespendingonvariouspublicwelfareandinsuranceprograms.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
21
Table7:FiscalEffectsofMedicaidExpansioninMontana(allvaluesinmillionsof$2016) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020Savings TraditionalMedicaid 15.2 28.4 29.3 30.1 30.9Corrections 1.3 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.2SubstanceUseDisorders 1.5 3 3 3 3TotalSavings 18 38.9 40.1 41.1 42.1 Costs BenefitsandClaims 2.4 28.0 32.9 36.3 53.1Administration 2.9 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.2TotalCosts 5.3 33.0 38.0 41.2 58.3SavingsMinusCosts 12.7 5.9 2.1 -0.1 -16.2 Revenues(allsources) 22.2 38.4 44.1 46.8 49.1
Revenues,TaxesOnly 11.5 19.3 21.1 21.4 21.8Expenditures -10.5 -10.3 -1.9 6.6 13.9NetFiscalImpact(revenuesminusexpenditures)
32.7 48.7 46.0 40.2 35.3
TotalSavings+NetFiscalImpact 50.7 87.6 86.1 81.4 77.4
Net(savings+revenues-costs) 45.4 54.6 48.1 40.2 19.1
Theseresultscomewithanimportantcaveat.Theyarebasedonthehistoricalaveragerelationshipsbetweeneconomicactivityandstaterevenuesandspending.However,givenfederaltaxreform,statebudgetshortfalls,etc.,thesehistoricalrelationshipsmaynotaccuratelydescribehowfutureeconomicactivitywillaffectMontana’sstatebudget.Ultimately,theFIATtoolprovidesasimpleintuitiveanswertothequestion,“HowdoesMedicaidexpansionaffectthestate’sbudget?”However,wenotethatstatebudgetsareveryflexibleandrespondtoshockslikeMedicaidexpansionincomplicatedways.45Assuch,itisdifficulttoisolatetheeffectsofMedicaidexpansionthroughoutthewholebudget(bothrevenuesandexpenses).
OurfindingthatMedicaidexpansionpaysforitselfisconsistentwithseveralother
studiesthathaveexaminedtheimpactofMedicaidexpansiononstatebudgets.For
45AlongerdiscussionofthechallengesofestimatingbudgetimpactsofMedicaidexpansioncanbefoundinDorn,S.,“TheEffectsoftheMedicaidExpansiononStateBudgets:AnEarlyLookinSelectStates,”(2015).
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
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instance,arecentstudyofMedicaidexpansioninMichiganfound"state-budgetgainsoutweightheaddedcost.”46Similarly,ananalysisofbudgetsavingsandrevenuegainsacross11expansionstatesarguedthat“projectedexpansionrelatedsavingsandrevenuegainsareexpectedtooffsetcostsofexpansioninmanystatesforseveralyears.”47ThisstudynotesthatcomprehensiveanalysesofspendinginArkansasandKentuckyshowsavingsandrevenuegainssufficienttooffsetcostsatleastthrough2021.ANoteonWoodworkEffects
SomearguethatthecostsofMedicaidexpansionshouldinclude“woodwork”effects,whichmeansthattheavailabilityofMedicaidexpansionincreasesenrollmentintraditionalMedicaid.Ifso,thecostofMedicaidexpansioncouldincludethecostsassociatedwiththeseenrollees.
Wedonotincludewoodworkeffectsinthisanalysis,primarilybecausetheliteraturefindsthattheAffordableCareActincreasedenrollmentintraditionalMedicaid,buttheseincreaseswerenotrelatedtoMedicaidexpansion.Forinstance,onerecentstudyfound“similarly-sizedwoodworkeffectsinallgroupsofstates,regardlessofMedicaidexpansionstatus.”48Similarly,ourownanalysisofwoodworkeffectsinlate-expansionstates(seeAppendixsectionK)doesnotfindevidencethatMedicaidexpansionincreasestraditionalMedicaidenrollment.
Ifoneweretoincludewoodworkeffects,itwouldbeimportanttoincludebothbenefitsandcosts,suchastheeffectsofincreasedactivityassociatedwiththisspending.Furthermore,evenifoneassumesthatthereissomelevelofwoodworkeffectsassociatedwiththeimplementationofMedicaidexpansion,oneshouldnotassumethatendingMedicaidexpansionwilleliminatethesecosts.ItisnotclearwhetherthoseeligiblefortraditionalMedicaidwillreturntobeinguninsuredifMedicaidexpansionweretocease.Itseemslikelythatmanywouldremain.
VII.ConclusionMedicaidexpansionhashadasubstantialpositiveeffectonMontana’seconomy.While
effectsvaryfromyear-to-year,itbringsapproximately$350millionto$400millionofnewspendingtoMontana’seconomyeachyear.ThisspendingripplesthroughMontana’s
46Ayanian,J.Z.,Ehrlich,G.M.,Grimes,D.R.,andLevy,H.,“EconomicEffectsofMedicaidExpansioninMichigan,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine376,no.5(2017):407-410.47Bachrach,D.,Boozang,P.,Herring,A.,andReyneri,D.G.,“StatesExpandingMedicaidSeeSignificantBudgetSavingsandRevenueGains,”Princeton:RobertWoodJohnsonFoundation(2016).48Frean,M.,Gruber,J.,andSommers,B.D.,“PremiumSubsidies,theMandate,andMedicaidExpansion:CoverageEffectsoftheAffordableCareAct.”JournalofHealthEconomics53(2017):72-86.
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economy,generatingapproximately5,000jobsand$270millioninpersonalincomeineachyearbetween2018-2020.Inadditiontogeneratingeconomicactivity,Medicaidexpansionappearstoimproveoutcomes—reducingcrime,improvinghealth,andshrinkingdebt.Whilethestatepaysforthesebenefits,thecoststothestatebudgetaremorethanoffsetbythesavingscreatedbyMedicaidexpansionandbytherevenuesassociatedwithincreasedeconomicactivity.
Likeanystudy,thisstudyhaslimitations.Theassumptionsusedtoestimatethedirect
impactsofMedicaidexpansionmaybeunderminedbyreal-worldevents.SimilarlytheassumptionsthatunderlietheREMImodelmayalsofailtoaccuratelycapturetheeconomicrelationshipsatissue.Inordertoaccountfortheseweaknesses,weconductedseveralsensitivityanalyses.Thatis,weestimatedseveraladditionalmodelsusingalternativeassumptions.WepresenttheresultsfromtwooftheseanalysesinAppendixsectionL.
Ingeneral,theseadditionalanalysesyieldresultssimilartothosedescribedhere.
Medicaidexpansiongeneratesseveralthousandadditionaljobsandseveralhundredmillioninadditionalincome.Italsopaysforitself,sincethesavingsgeneratedplusadditionalrevenues(orotherreducedexpenditures)exceedthecoststothestate.WhiletheremaybeconditionsunderwhichMedicaidexpansionimposesnetcostsonthestate,weexpectsuchinstancestooccurrarely,assumingMedicaidexpansionretainsitscurrentstructure.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
24
Appendix
A.ChangeinUtilizationAssociatedWithMedicaidExpansion
ToillustratetheimpactofMedicaidexpansiononhealthcareutilizationinMontana,weobtainedBehavioralRiskFactorSurveillanceSystem(BRFSS)microdatafromtheCentersforDiseaseControlandPreventionfortheyears2013-2016.49WeimportedthesedataintoSTATA13.1andcompletedallanalysesusingSTATA’ssurvey(svy)commandstoaccountforBRFSSsurveydesignandsampleweights.
TheBRFSSincludesahandfulofquestionsthatmeasurehealthcareaccess.Specifically,
weexaminedtwoquestions:
● Wasthereatimeinthepast12monthswhenyouneededtoseeadoctorbutcouldnotbecauseofcost?● Abouthowlonghasitbeensinceyoulastvisitedadoctorforaroutine
checkup?50
Thesequestionsprovideaverycrudeindicationofhealthcareuse.ToidentifytheeffectsofMedicaidexpansion,werestrictedouranalysistolow-income
residentswhomaybeMedicaidexpansioneligible.TheBRFSSdoesnotreportMedicaideligibilityorincomerelativetopoverty.ToidentifypeoplewhomaybeMedicaideligible,weimputedincomeequaltothemidpointofthereportedincomecategories(fromvariable_income2).Wethencomputedhouseholdsizebysummingthenumberofchildrenandadultsinthehome(fromthevariableschildren,numadult,andhhadult).WeobtainedthepovertylevelbyhouseholdsizeforeachyearfromtheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices.51Then,wecomputedimputedincomeasapercentofFPLforeachindividualandexaminedresultsforallindividualswithincomeslessthan150percentFPL.52
TheresultsforMontanaandforstatesthatsawlargeMedicaidexpansionimpactsare
asfollows.MedicaidexpansioninMontanaledtoalargeincreaseinMedicaidenrollment
49https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/annual_data/annual_data.htm.50Werecodetheresponsestobothquestionstoexcludedon’tknow,refused,ormissing.Wealsorecodethetimesincelastcheck-uptoequal1iftherespondenthadacheck-upwithinthelasttwoyears,and0otherwise.51https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.52Giventheimprecisionofourpovertymeasure,weexpandtheboundsofouranalysisto150percentFPL.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
25
andacorrespondinglargedecreaseintheshareofpeoplewithoutinsurance.NoteverystateexperiencedeffectssimilartothoseinMontana.TheimpactsofMedicaidexpansionacrossstatesvary.SomestatesalreadyofferedMedicaidtoalargershareofpeoplepriortotheACA.Inthesestates,theimpactoftheexpansiononhealthinsurancecoverageandhealthcareaccessissmaller.Thus,tobetterillustratetheeffectsofexpandingMedicaidinanenvironmentmoresimilartoMontana,weexaminedeffectsinstatesthatexpandedMedicaidin2014andsawlargeincreasesinMedicaid(>5percentagepointincreaseinshareofpopulationwithMedicaidbetween2013and2016)andlargeincreasesintheshareofpeoplewithhealthinsurance(>8percentagepoints).Thestatesmeetingthesecriteriainclude:Washington,Oregon,California,Nevada,NewMexico,Kentucky,Arkansas,andWestVirginia.TableA1:ShareofAdultPopulationReportingHealthCareAccessinSelectedMedicaidExpansionStatesBeforeandAfterExpansion Montana OtherExpansion 2015 2016 2013 2016SkippedCareDuetoCost
0.29[0.25-0.34]
0.25[0.21-0.29]
0.33[0.31-0.35]
0.21[0.20-0.23]
NoCheck-upinLast2Years
0.36[0.32-0.41]
0.29[0.25-0.33]
0.28[0.26-0.30]
0.23[0.22-0.25]
Source:BBERanalysisofBRFSSdata,95%CIin[].
B.ChangeinHealthCareSpendingAssociatedWithMedicaidExpansion
ToestimatetheimpactofMedicaidexpansion(ormorepreciselytheimpactofprovidinghealthinsurance)onhealthcarespending,weobtaineddataonhealthcarespendingbystatefromtheCentersforMedicareandMedicaidServices(CMS).53WemergedthesedatawithdataonhealthinsurancecoveragebystatefromtheAmericanCommunitySurvey.54Toidentifytheeffectsofinsurancecoverageonhealthcarespending,weregressedtotalpercapitahealthcarespendingontheshareofpeoplewithanyhealthinsurance,statepersonalincomepercapita,andstate(andsometimesyear)fixedeffects.Thisspecificationidentifiestheaveragechangeinhealthcarespendingassociatedwithachangeintheshareofpeoplewithinsuranceacrossallstates.Weestimatedtwodifferentversionsofthisregression.First,welimitedthesampletoincludeonly2013and2014. 53https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsStateHealthAccountsResidence.html.54https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-260.html(datafromspreadsheetHIC-4).
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
26
ThisspecificationcapturestheeffectsassociatedwiththefirstyearoftheAffordableCareAct.Second,welimitedthesampletoinclude2008-2013(yearspriortomostACAeffects).WepresenttheresultsoftheseregressionsinTableA2.Bothspecificationsyieldsimilareffects.Aonepercentagepointincreaseinhealthinsurancecoverageisassociatedwithanapproximately$46increaseintotalperpersonhealthcarespending.
Montana’suninsuredratefellby3.5percentagepointsin2016.Thissuggeststhat
healthcarespendingincreasedby$166millionduetothereductioninuninsured.ThequestioniswhatshareofthedecreaseinuninsuredcanbeattributedtoMedicaidexpansion.Giventhatnon-expansionstatessawa0.7ppdeclinein2016,weassumethatintheabsenceofexpansion,Montana’suninsuredratewouldhavefallenby0.7pp.Thus,weattribute2.8ppofthedeclinetotheexpansionin2016.Assuch,$46*2.8%*1.028millionpeople=$132million.Giventhemarginoferrorforalloftheseestimates,thisnumberiscrude.However,itprovidesausefulbenchmarkforouranalysis.
TableA2:RelationshipBetweenChangeinHealthCareSpendingPerCapitaandChangeinInsuranceCoverage Pre-toPost-ACA
ExpansionandExchangesPre-ACA
2013-2014 2008-2013PercentAnyCoverage 45.7***
(10.8)46.4(26.0)
PersonalIncomeperCapita
0.11***(0.02)
0.05***(0.01)
Constant -1006(548)
811(2448)
N 102 306StateFixedEffects Yes YesYearFixedEffects No YesNote:standarderrorsin(),***p<0.01
C.StateSpendingDPHHSreportsthatmovingpeoplefromtraditionalMedicaidtotheexpansionsaved
$8.1millioninFY2016,$22.3millioninFY2017,andatotalof$40millionduringthefirsttwoyearsofexpansion.SplittingFY2017betweenCY2016andCY2017inproportiontototalMedicaidspendingyieldssavingsof$15.2millionin2016and$24.8millionin2017.Montanatypicallypays35percentofthecostsfortraditionalMedicaid.Ifthatrateappliestothosewhoshifted,andMontanapaid0percentforthoseintheexpansionin2016and5percentin2017,wecancomputetotalspendingforthosewhowouldhaveremainedin
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
27
traditionalMedicaidintheabsenceoftheexpansion.WepresenttheresultsofthisanalysisinTableA3.
Tounderstandhowthisspendingwouldevolveovertime,weassumethattotal
spendingforthisgroupwouldgrowat5percentperyear,roughlyinlinewiththeratestheMedicaidactuaryforecastsMedicaidexpansionspendingperbeneficiarytogrow.TraditionalMedicaidbeneficiariescompriseapproximately16percentoftotalspendingonMedicaidexpansioneachyear(e.g.,the$82.6millionspentin2017is16percentofthe$516millionintotalexpansionspending).Thefederalgovernmentwouldhavepaidapproximately10percentofthisandthestatetheremaining6percent.
TableA3:WithinMedicaidTransfersAssociatedWithExpansion Reported
SavingstoMT($millions)
ImpliedTotalSpending($millions)
State$ifTraditional($millions)
State$ifExpansion($millions)
StateSavings($millions)
SavingstoMT(2years)
40
2016 15.2 43.5 15.2 0.0 15.22017 24.8 82.6 28.9 4.1 24.82018 86.7 30.4 5.2 25.22019 91.1 31.9 6.4 25.52020 95.6 33.5 9.6 23.9
Asdescribedabove,MedicaidexpansionalsoaffectsspendingbytheDepartmentofCorrections.DOCreportsthattheexpansionsavedthem$7.66millioninFY2017.Wealsoassumethatthesesavingscontinueandthattheygrowat5percentperyear.
TworecentreportssponsoredbytheMontanaHealthcareFoundationandpreparedby
ManattsuggestedthatMedicaidexpansionalsoreducesspendingonsubstanceusedisordersandmentalhealth.55Thesereportsdocumenta$1.5millionreductioninspendingonsubstanceusedisordersinhalfofFY2016andapotential$1.3millionreductioninspendingintheMentalHealthServicesProgram.Theyfurtherarguethatthestatemayrealize$3millionperyearinsubstanceusedisordersavings.Giventhedifficultiesinherentinattributingshiftsinstatespendingtoparticularprograms,weassumethatthestaterealizes$3millionperyearinsavingsintheseareasfrom2017-2020.Giventhatthisrepresentslessthan0.6percentoftotalMedicaidexpansionspending,ourresultsarelargelyunaffectedbytheinclusionofthesesavings. 55Bachrach,etal.,(2017)andGrady,Bachrach,andBoozang(2017).
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
28
D.ShiftinPayers Tocompleteouranalysis,itisimportanttounderstandwhattypesofinsurance,ifany,
Medicaidexpansionbeneficiarieswouldhaveintheabsenceofexpansion.Howmanyofthosewhoenrollthroughtheexpansionwouldhaveinsurancewithoutit?Ofthosewhowouldhaveinsurance,whatkindofinsurancewouldtheyhave(e.g.,traditionalMedicaid,employersponsored,directpurchase)?
Thepriorsectionsuggeststhatapproximately16percentofMedicaidexpansion
spendingisatransferfromtraditionalMedicaid.Thus,weassumethat16percentofMedicaidexpansionenrolleesarelikelytransferswithinMedicaid.
Amongtheremainder,thevastmajoritycomefromthepoolofuninsured.FigureA1
providesasimplewaytoillustratethis.ThisfigureshowstheaveragechangeofinsurancecoverageamongtheMedicaidexpansioneligiblebetween2013and2016.AmongstatesthatexpandedMedicaidinJanuary2014(initialexpansionstates),16percentoftheMedicaideligiblegainedinsurancecoverageintheaverageexpansionstate.WhiletherewassomeincreaseindirectpurchaseinsuranceandMedicare,thevastmajorityofthisincreasecamefromgrowthintheshareofpeoplewithMedicaid.56TheshareofthispopulationwithMedicaidgrewbyanaverage16percent.
ThisisconsistentwiththeliteraturethatfindsthatenrollmentindirectpurchaseinsurancegrewrelativelylittleinMedicaidexpansionstates(averagegrowthof2percentagepoints)andthatMedicaidexpansiondidnotcrowdoutemployersponsoredinsurance(averagedeclineoflessthan1percentagepoint).57
56Thechangeinsharecansumtomorethanthechangeincoveragebecausesomepeoplereportmorethanonetypeofinsurance.57E.g.,Duggan,etal.,(2017)
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
29
FigureA1:AveragePercentChangeinInsuranceCoverage2013-2016AmongPeople0%-138%FPLAges18-64,byTypeofInsuranceCoverageandExpansionStatus
Source:BBERanalysisofAmericanCommunitySurveydata.
Weassumethat68percentofMedicaidexpansionbeneficiarieswouldbeuninsuredintheabsenceofMedicaidexpansion.Wecomputethisusingthefollowing:
ChangeinMedicare+ChangeinDirect+ChangeEmployer=0.007+0.023-0.001=0.029ChangeinAny–ChangeinMedicaid=.165-.155=0.01! assume0.01ofthe0.029ledtoincreasedcoverageand0.019switchedto
Medicaid! 1-(0.019/0.155)=0.88ofMedicaidcoverageininitialexpansionstatescomes
fromtheuninsuredHowever,MontanawaslatetoexpandMedicaid.Assuch,moreMedicaideligiblesgaineddirectpurchasecoveragefromtheexchangesbetween2013and2015.WeexpectmoreofthosewhogainMedicaidviatheexpansioninMontanatocomefromthedirectpurchasepool.Giventhattheaveragenon-expansionstatesawa3percentagepointgreaterincreaseintheshareofMedicaideligiblewhogaineddirectpurchaseinsurance(seeFigureA1),we
10%
3%
5%
3%
1%
16%
0%
2%
16%
1%
Any Employer Direct Medicaid Medicare
Non-Expansion
InitialExpansion
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
30
assumeanadditional3percentagepointsofMontana’sMedicaidexpansioneligibleswitchfromotherformsofinsurance:
! 1-((0.019+0.03)/0.155)=0.68.Combined,theseanalysessuggestthat68percentoftheincreaseinMedicaidcoverageinMontanamaycomefromtheuninsured.
Thisimpliesthat16percentofMedicaidexpansionenrolleescomefromeither
employer-sponsoredinsuranceordirectpurchaseinsurance.Weassumethat,intheabsenceofMedicaidexpansion,40percentofthesepeoplewouldhavedirectpurchaseinsuranceand60percentwouldhaveemployer-sponsoredinsurance.PriortoMedicaidexpansioninMontana(2015),amonglow-incomepeoplewhohadeitherdirectpurchaseinsuranceoremployersponsoredinsurance,40percenthaddirectpurchaseinsuranceand60percenthademployer-sponsoredinsurance.
Thissuggeststhatapproximately5,800peopleswitchedfromdirectpurchaseinsurance.Giventhatfollowingtheimplementationoftheexchanges,Montanasawa2percentagepointincreaseintheshareoflow-incomepeoplewithdirectpurchaseinsurance,thisassumptionimpliesthatallofthenetincreaseindirectpurchaseinsurance(plussome)switchestoMedicaidexpansion.58Asaresult,theshareoflow-incomepeoplewithdirectpurchaseinsurancereturnstoslightlybelowwhereitwaspriortoACAimplementation.Thisisaconservativeassumption.Onaverage,initialMedicaidexpansionstatessawa1.5percentagepointincreaseintheshareoflow-incomepeoplewithdirectpurchaseinsurancetwoyearsafterACAimplementation.Byassumingalargershiftfromdirectpurchase(i.e.,theexchanges)wereducethemagnitudeoftheeconomicimpact.59
Theremainingapproximately8,700Medicaidenrolleesareassumedtohaveswitched
fromemployer-sponsoredinsurance.Thissmallnumberisconsistentwiththebroader
58ThislevelofswitchingisalsoroughlyconsistentwithadifferentapproachtoestimatedlikelyswitchingbetweenMedicaidanddirectpurchase.Onaverage,accordingtoACSdata,statesthatexpandedMedicaidin2014sawlittleincreaseintheshareofpeopleages18-64withincomesbetween100percentand138percentFPLwithdirectpurchaseinsurance.Incontrast,statesthatdidnotinitiallyexpandMedicaid,likeMontana,sawlargeincreases.In2016,nearly17percentofMontanansinthisgroupstillhaddirectpurchaseinsurance,whileonly9percentofpeopleininitialexpansionstatesdid.IfweassumethatMedicaidexpansionbringstheshareoflow-incomeMontanansages18-64withdirectpurchaseinsurancetoalevelinlinewiththeaverageininitialexpansionstatesortothelevelinlinewithwhereMontanawaspriortoexpansion(10%),thenwewouldexpecttoobserveapproximately3,400fewerMontananswithdirectpurchaseinsurance.59Thisisbecauseweassume100percentofthesepeoplewouldenrollintheexchangesandreceivefederalsubsidies.Assuch,MedicaidspendingonpeoplewhowouldotherwiseenrollintheexchangesdoesnotgeneratenewfederalspendinginMontana.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
31
literature,whichfindstheMedicaidexpansiondidnotsubstantiallyreduceemployer-providedinsurance.
D.FederalGovernment
BasedonthecalculationshowninTableA3,thefederalgovernmentwouldhavepaidanamountequalto11percentofMedicaidexpansionspendingviatraditionalMedicaidregardlessofthedecisiontoexpand.
Inaddition,asdiscussedinAppendixsectionC,intheabsenceofexpansion,someof
thoseeligibleforMedicaidexpansionwouldhavehaddirectpurchaseinsurance.Iftheypurchasedfromtheexchanges,thosewithincomesbetween100percentand138percentFPLwouldhavebeeneligibleforpremiumsubsidiesandcostsharingreductions.Determiningthemagnitudeoffederalspendingontheseindividualsisdifficult.WeneedtoknowbothhowmanypeoplewhoenrollinMedicaidexpansionwouldhaveobtainedcoveragefromtheexchange,andhowmuchthegovernmentprovidedtoeachoftheseindividualsviasubsidiesandcostsharing.
AsdescribedinAppendixsectionC,weassumethatasof2018,approximately5,800
Medicaidexpansionenrolleeswouldotherwisehavedirectpurchaseinsurance.Weassumethat100percentofthesepeoplewouldhaveenrolledviatheexchangesandwouldhavereceivedfederalsubsidies.Assuch,weassumethatallofthesepeoplehaveincomesbetween100percentand138percentFPL.
GiventhatDPHHSdatashowthat10,994Medicaidexpansionbeneficiarieshadincomes
between100percentand138percentFPLasofMarch2018,weassumethat53percentofthoseeligibleforsubsidieswouldhavereceivedthemintheabsenceofMedicaidexpansion.
Forthosewhowouldhaveenrolledintheexchangeandreceivedsomeamountof
subsidy/CSR,itisdifficulttoestimatethemagnitudeofthesesubsidies.ForallMontanans,theaveragesubsidy(premiumtaxcredit)was$3,600in2016and$5,700in2017.60Inaddition,theaverageCSRforindividualswitha94percentactuarialvalueCSR(thosewithincomesbetween100percentand150percentFPL)wasapproximately$1,500.61However,theaverageexchangeconsumerandtheaverageMedicaidbeneficiarywith
60CMS2017EffectuatedEnrollmentSnapshot(June12,2017).61“HealthInsuranceMarketplaceCostSharingReductionSubsidiesbyZipcodeandCounty2016,ASPE,U.S.DepartmentofHealth&HumanServices.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
32
incomesbetween100percentand138percentFPLlikelydiffer.Therefore,itisnotclearthattheaveragesubsidyandCSRapplytotheMedicaideligiblepopulation.
Toestimatethesizeofthesubsidy,weusedtheKaiserFamilyFoundation’sHealth
InsuranceMarketplaceCalculatortoobtainsubsidyestimatesforsomeonewithanincomeequalto125percentFPLatfive-yearageintervalsfor2015,2016,2017,and2018.WeaveragetheseamountsweightingbytheshareofMedicaidexpansionbeneficiariesineachagegroup.62Tothisamount,weadd$1,500,theaverageapproximateannualCSRinMontanain2016.63Forfutureyears,weincreasethisamountby5percent.
TableA4presentsourestimatesforfederalspendingonsubsidiesbyyear.This
spendingrepresentsbetween4.4percentand8.3percentoftotalspendingonMedicaidexpansion.CombinedwithwhatthefederalgovernmentwouldhavespentontraditionalMedicaid,approximately19percentoftotalMedicaidexpansionspendingissimplytransferredwithinthefederalgovernment.Wedonotincludeanyofthistransferredmoneyinoureconomicimpactanalysis.TableA4:ChangeinFederalSpendingonExchangeSubsidiesinMontanaWithoutExpansionYear Assumed
FederalSpendingperEnrollee(subsidy+CSR)
AssumedPeopleWithSubsidiesw/oExpansion
TotalFederalSpending
FederalSpendingasShareofMedicaidExpansionSpending
2016 5,018 3,339 16,758,341 0.0592017 6,240 5,009 31,257,552 0.0612018 7,057 5,828 41,128,196 0.0782019 7,410 5,828 43,184,606 0.0832020 7,780 5,828 45,343,836 0.081
62http://dphhs.mt.gov/Portals/85/Documents/healthcare/MedicaidExpansionMemberProfile.pdf.63TheTrumpadministrationcanceledfederalCSRpaymentsfor2018.However,insuranceprovidersarestillobligatedtoprovidethem.Assuch,theyhaveraisedpremiums.Giventhestructureoffederalsubsidies,whichlimitpremiumstoapercentageofincomeforpeoplewithincomeslessthan400percentFPL,thefederalgovernmentstilleffectivelyfundsmostoftheCSRpaymentsbecausethegovernmentabsorbsmostoftheincreaseinpremiums.However,someoftheburdenforthehigherCSRpaymentswillfallonindividualswithincomesgreaterthan400percentFPLwhodonotqualifyforsubsidies.GiventhatMedicaidexpansionreducestheneedforCSRs,expansionmaylowerpremiumsforhigher-incomeMontanans.Wedonotincludethesesavingsinourmodel.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
33
E.Employers
SomeshareofMedicaidexpansionbeneficiariesmayhavebeencoveredbytheiremployerintheabsenceofMedicaidexpansion.AsdiscussedinAppendixsectionC,weassumethatby2018,approximately8,700Medicaidexpansionbeneficiarieswouldhavehademployer-sponsoredinsurance.
Weassumethattheemployershareofpremiumsequaled$5,075in2016.64Weassume
employerpremiumsgrowby4percentperyear.65Combined,weassumethatemployerscaptureapproximately9percentoftotalMedicaidexpansionspending.
It’shardtosaywhatemployerswilldowiththesesavings.Somearguethatthemarket
willforceemployerstomaintaintotalcompensation.66Assuch,reducedspendingononetypeofbenefitshouldincreasewagesorotherbenefits.However,itisalsopossiblethatemployerswillkeepsomeofthesesavings,particularlyinascenariowhereonlysomeoftheiremployeesareoptingoutofcoverage.Weassumea50-50split.
F.IndividualsIndividualsbenefitfromreducedout-of-pocketcostsandreducedpremiums.We
assumethatindividualscapture12percentoftotalMedicaidexpansionspending.Wederivethisnumberbyapplyingestimatesforpremiumsandout-of-pocketspendingfordifferentgroupstotheirestimatedpopulationsize.67
64ThisisbasedonMedicalExpenditurePanelSurvey(MEPS)data.Averageannualsinglepremiumperenrolledemployeeforemployer-basedhealthinsurance.(https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/single-coverage/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D)65Thisisinlinewithrecentgrowth.Collins,S.R.,Radley,D.C.,Gunja,M.Z.,andBeutel,S.,“TheSlowdowninEmployerInsuranceCostGrowth:WhyManyWorkersStillFeelthePinch,”IssueBrief(CommonwealthFund)36(2016):1-22.66Blumberg,L.J.,“Perspective:WhoPaysforEmployer-SponsoredHealthInsurance?”HealthAffairs18,no.6(1999):58-61.67Informationonpremiumsandout-of-pocketcostsobtainedfromCollins,S.R.,Radley,D.C.,Gunja,M.Z.,andBeutel,S.,“TheSlowdowninEmployerInsuranceCostGrowth:WhyManyWorkersStillFeelthePinch,”IssueBrief(CommonwealthFund)36(2016):1-22;Coughlin,T.A.,“UncompensatedCarefortheUninsuredin2013:ADetailedExamination(2014);andAverageAnnualSinglePremiumperEnrolledEmployeeforEmployer-BasedHealthInsurance(https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/single-coverage/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D).
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
34
G.EnrollmentForecastOurenrollmentforecastisbasedontheexperienceofinitialMedicaidexpansionstates.
Onaverage,Medicaidenrollmentplateausapproximatelytwoyearsafterexpansion.Assuch,weassumethatenrollmentwillresemblecurrentenrollment.SeediscussioninIII.D.1.
Wealsonotethatundercurrenteconomicconditions,Montanamayhavelimitedroom
toexpandenrollmentfurther.TableA5presentstheestimatedsizeofMontana’spopulationages18-64withincomebetween0percentand138percentFPL.AsofMarch2017,theCurrentPopulationSurveysuggestedthatroughly95,000Montanansmetthebasiceligibilitycriteria.Thesesurveyestimatesdonotgathersufficientinformationtopreciselyestimatethesizeoftheeligiblepopulation.Furthermore,with12-montheligibility,someshareofexpansionenrolleesmayfalloutsideofthisrangeduringthemonthofthesurvey.However,thesedatasuggestlimitedroomforcontinuedgrowthinexpansionenrollment.TableA5:MontanaPopulationAges18-64WithIncomeBetween0%and138%FPLYear MontanansAges18-64With
IncomeBetween0%and138%FPL[95%CI]
2015 116,331[102,865-129,672]
2016 109,617[98,656-120,579]
2017 95,334[84,782-105,521]
Source:BBERanalysisofCPSASECdata.
H.SpendingForecastWebaseourforecastforMedicaidexpansionspendingperbeneficiaryontheforecast
fromthe2016ActuarialReportontheFinancialOutlookforMedicaid.68However,wecondensethetimelinebyaveragingtwoyearsofMedicaidforecastfor2015-16and2016-17.I.EmploymentEffectsofMedicaidExpansion 68https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/MedicaidReport2016.pdf.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
35
FigureA2presentsanalternativeviewoftherelationshipbetweenMedicaidexpansion
(orincreasesininsurancecoverage)andhealthcareemployment.Itshowsthepercentchangeinhealthcareemployment(obtainedfromtheQuarterlyCensusofEmploymentandWages)betweenJanuary2013andJune2017plottedagainstthepercentchangeininsurancecoverage(obtainedfromtheAmericanCommunitySurvey)between2013and2016.Thefigureshowsthatstatesthatincreasedinsurancecoveragetendedtoseelargerincreasesinhealthcareemployment.Whilethisanalysisissomewhatcrude,itisconsistentwiththeresultsreportedbyourREMIanalysis.FigureA2:CorrelationBetweenGrowthinHealthCareEmploymentandGrowthinInsuranceCoverage
Notes:Blue=initialexpansionstates,Red=lateexpansionstates,Green=non-expansionstates
ArizonaArkansas
CaliforniaColorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Hawaii
IllinoisIowa
KentuckyMaryland
MassachusettsMinnesota
Nevada
New Jersey New MexicoNew YorkNorth Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Rhode Island
VermontWashington
West Virginia
AlaskaIndiana
LouisianaMichigan
Montana
New HampshirePennsylvania
Alabama
FloridaGeorgiaIdaho
KansasMaine Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
South DakotaTennessee
Texas
Utah
VirginiaWisconsin
Wyoming
05
1015
pct c
hg in
hea
lth c
are
empl
oym
ent 2
013-
2017
2 4 6 8 10pct change in covered 2013-2016
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
36
J.ImpactofMedicaidExpansion/HELP-LinkonLaborForceParticipation
AsdiscussedinsectionV,laborforceparticipationamonglow-incomeMontanans
increasedafterMontanaexpandedMedicaid.ThesefindingsarebasedonananalysisofdatafromtheCurrentPopulationSurveyAnnualSocialandEconomicSupplementobtainedfromIPUMS-CPS.69TheASECisadministeredinMarcheachyear.
Inthemaintext,wefocusonindividualsages18-64withincomesbelow138percent
FPLwhodonotreportadisability.70WereportthepercentageofpeopleinthisgroupwhoreportparticipatinginthelaborforcebeforeMontanaexpandedMedicaid(2013-2015)andafterMontanaexpandedMedicaid(2016-2017).
IntableA5,wereportresultsfromasimilardifferences-in-differencesanalysisthat
usesregressionanalysistoaddcontrolsforage,age2,sex,race(whitenon-Hispanic),region(censusdivisions),andyearfixedeffects.Theeffectsaresimilartothosereportedinthemaintext.Relativetolow-incomepeopleinotherstates,laborforceparticipation(LFP)increasedbynearly8percentagepointsmoreinMontanathaninotherareas.Thiseffectisnotobservedamonghigher-incomeMontanans,suggestingthatthechangeinLFPisnotaMontanaeffect,anditonlyappliestolow-incomeMontanans.Thefinalcolumnfurtherestablishesthis.Theresultsinthiscolumnarebasedonasimilaranalysis,butinsteadofcomparingthechangeinLFPamonglow-incomeMontananstolow-incomeresidentsinotherstates,wecomparelow-incomeMontananstohigh-incomeMontanans.Theresultsaresimilar.TheysuggestthatsomethingincreasedLFPamonglow-incomeMontanansin2016thatdidnotsimilarlyaffectotherlow-incomeAmericans(orlow-incomeresidentsofMountainstates)orhigher-incomeMontanans.MedicaidexpansionandHELP-Linkprovideaplausibleexplanationfortheseobservedeffects.
InTableA6,weshowthatAmericanCommunitySurveydatadepictasimilarpattern.
Weobservelargeincreasesinlaborforceparticipationamonglow-income(belowFPL)Montanansages20-64after2016.Weobservelargeincreasesamongpeoplewithandwithoutdisabilities.WedonotobservesimilarincreasesinLFPamonghigher-incomeMontanansoramongpeopleacrosstheUnitedStates.
69Flood,S.King,M.,Ruggles,S.,andWarren,J.R,“IntegratedPublicUseMicrodataSeries,CurrentPopulationSurvey:Version5.0,”[dataset]Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesota(2017).https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V5.0.70WecomputeincomeasapercentofpovertyusingIPUMS-CPSvariablesofftotvalandoffcutoff.
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
37
TableA5:Differences-in-DifferencesRegressionAnalysisofImpactofMedicaidExpansiononLaborForceParticipation LowIncome
(0-138%FPL)HigherIncome(>138%FPL)
MontanaOnly
Montana 0.006(0.027)
0.028***(0.009)
LowIncome -0.255***(0.027)
After -0.034***(0.006)
0.004*(0.002)
After 0.007(0.016)
Montana*After
0.078*(0.034)
-0.024*(0.011)
Low*After 0.076*(0.035)
Controls Age,age2,sex,whitenon-Hispanic Controls Age,age2,sex,whitenon-Hispanic
RegionFE Yes Yes RegionFE N/AYearFE Yes Yes YearFE YesN 93,988 442,652 N 6,969Note:Standarderrorsin(),***p<0.01,*p<0.05.TableA6:LaborForceParticipationbyPovertyandDisability WithDisabilities
WithoutDisabilities
Montana 2015 2016 Change 2015 2016 Change
BelowPoverty 24% 29% 6% 56% 64% 9%AbovePoverty 56% 56% 0% 86% 87% 1%
U.S. BelowPoverty 23% 22% -1% 57% 56% -1%AbovePoverty 47% 48% 1% 86% 86% 0%
Source:BBERanalysisofAmericanCommunitySurveydataobtainedfromAmericanFactFinderTableB23024.K.WoodworkEffects
Whiletheexistingliteraturegenerallyfindslimitedwoodworkeffects,mostofthisresearchexaminedinitialexpansionstates.Here,weexaminedchangesintraditionalMedicaidenrollmentamonglateexpansionstatesusingMBESdata,whichincludesmonthlyenrollmentbystatefor2014,2015,and2016.Specifically,weperformedadifferences-in-differencesanalysis.Thatis,weregressedthenaturallogoftraditionalMedicaidenrollment(computedastotalMedicaidenrollmentminusthenumberofnewlyeligible)onanindicatorequaltooneformonthsafterthestateexpandedMedicaidandzerootherwise,andstate,year,andmonthfixedeffects.TheeffectsinthisanalysisareidentifiedbycomparingthechangeintraditionalMedicaidenrollmentinlateexpansionstatestothechangeinnon-expansionstates.Wedidnotfindevidenceconsistentwiththe
TheEconomicImpactofMedicaidExpansioninMontana
38
hypothesisthatMedicaidexpansionincreasestraditionalMedicaidenrollment.Wefoundthatenrollmentinexpansionstatesincreasedby0.3percentrelativetonon-expansionstates.Thisresultisnotstatisticallysignificant(p-value=0.91notclosetostandardsignificancethresholdof0.05).L.AlternativeREMISpecificationsTableA7presentsstatewideresultsfortwoalternativeREMIspecifications.Thefirstspecificationshowsamuchmoreconservativeestimate,whereweassumethatthefederaltransferis25percenttototalspendingor32percenthigherthaninthebaselinespecification.Wealsoreduceenrollmentto92,000,whichfurthershrinkstheeconomicimpacts.Thesecondspecificationpresentsanestimatewithmuchhigherenrollmentof97,000in2018and105,000in2019-2020.Theconclusionsfromthesealternativespecificationsareconsistentwiththoseinthemainbodyofthereport.Medicaidexpansiongeneratesthousandsofadditionaljobsandhundredsofmillionsofadditionalincome,andcombinedsavingsplusincreasedrevenuesaresufficienttopayforthestate’sshareofthecosts.Therearemanyotherpossiblemodelspecifications,however,selectingmodelsfromwithinaplausiblerangeofassumptionsisverylikelytoyieldsimilarconclusions.TableA7:SummaryofEconomicImpactsofMedicaidExpansioninMontana/YearandCumulative(income,sales,andnetsavingsinmillionsof$2016)A.25%FederalTransfer/92,000EnrollmentPlateau 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Cumulative
Jobs 3,035 4,837 4,972 4,766 4,565 PersonalIncome $137 $223 $240 $245 $249 $1,094NewSales(i.e.,output) $324 $528 $550 $534 $522 $2,458Population 932 2,137 3,093 3,792 4,363 FiscalEffect:Savings+Revenue-Costs $43.6 $51.3 $44.6 $36.6 $15.9 B.105,000EnrollmentPlateau 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Cumulative
Jobs 3,161 5,071 5,533 5,668 5,492 PersonalIncome $147 $241 $275 $297 $306 $1,266NewSales(i.e.,output) $336 $551 $609 $633 $625 $2,754Population 968 2,229 3,330 4,247 4,999 FiscalEffect:Savings+Revenue-Costs $45.4 $54.6 $48.7 $40.4 $16.8