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BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP & CONTROL STRINGENT VERSUS FLEXIBLE RULES Erik P.M. Vermeulen 30 March 2012 Moscow, Russia

BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

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Page 1: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP & CONTROL STRINGENT VERSUS FLEXIBLE RULES

Erik P.M. Vermeulen

30 March 2012Moscow, Russia

Page 2: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Comparative Study

Page 3: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Shareholders

Delegate control

Employees

Creditors Customers

Society

Board of Directors

Supervisory Board

Managers

Non-executive directors/executive directors

Passive minority investors Controlling owners

Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance

(1) Dilutive share issues(2) Insider trading(3) Related Party Transactions

Market Efficiency

Page 4: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Identity & Control of Ultimate

Beneficial Owner

Questions? Who - and at which level -

should disclose/report a stake in

the company?

When should the disclosure be made

and to whom?

What should be disclosed?

Through which channels?

Who will have access to the

disclosed information?

Page 5: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

The Rules

Page 6: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Listed Company

Direct and ultimate shareholder

Nominee shareholder

Ultimate beneficial owner

Management

Omnibus Account

Ultimate beneficial owner

5% 2%

Page 7: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Pre 1997Asian Financial Crisis

1997/98 2005

Basic rulesLimited enforcement

Extensive regulatory intervention to address abuses

Relaxation and streamlining of rules to

address operational inefficiencies

2000Stock market

size:237.1 RM (bil.)

Source: Adapted from Nik Ramlah Mahmood, Options for Disclosure and Enforcement - A Malaysian Perspective, Presentation, OECD - Indonesia Policy Dialogue, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control, October 2011.

2010Stock market

size:1,246.7 RM

(bil.)

Page 8: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Shareholders

Delegate control

Employees

Creditors Customers

Society

Board of Directors

Supervisory Board

Managers

Non-executive directors/executive directors

Passive minority investors Controlling owners

Inside Blockholders

Shareholders

Directors

Managers

Outside Blockholders

Directors

Managers

Monitoring &

disciplining m

anagement,

reducing vertical agency problem

s

Costs of Disclosure & Reporting

Page 9: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

The Effect of Disclosure & Outside Blockholders

Source: Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance

Page 10: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Listed Company

Minority shareholder with controlling multiple voting

rightsDirect Shareholder

Subsidiary of subsidiary of ultimate beneficial owner

Subsidiary of ultimate beneficial owner

Ultimate benefcial owner - control with 21% of

cashflow rights in listed company{Control Enhancing Mechanisms

70%

60%

50.1%

{Derivatives

Short party (Investment bank)

Long party (Investor)

Pruchases shares as hedges

1. Fees2. Interest3. Making good for

decreasing stock price1. Stock price

increase2. Dividends

Cash-settled equity derivatives

“Hidden ownership” and “empty voting” problems

Voting rights exceeding cash flow rights

Separation between economic risks and control

Page 11: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Red-tape/pointless rules

Excessive compliance costs

Information overload / Over-

monitoring / Box-ticking

Discouraging (foreign)

investments

Lack of enforcement mechanisms

Costs of stringent disclosure rules!

Control/Proportionality

Italy

Flexible Principle-based Disclosure

Malaysia United States

Stringent Rules-based Disclosure

France

{Experienced Securities Regulator

{

Page 12: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Enforcement

Page 13: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Enforcement

Judicial

Page 14: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Source: www.afm.nl

2009

52 fines

1605 written or oral (norm-enhancing)

reprimands

AFM detects non-compliance

Formal sanctions

Formal sanctions

Page 15: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Non-Judicial

Speed, informal sanctions, experience

enhancing

Judicial

InformationrRequests

Norm-enhancing reprimands

Notice letters

Enforcement

Page 16: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Ecosystem

Page 17: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Information Ecosystem

Supervisory Agency/Securities Commission

Government Agencies (tax authorities, chambers of

commerce, etc.)

Central Securities Depository, custodians, intermediaries

Foreign Supervisory Authorities/Securities

Commissions/Government Agencies

Page 18: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Supervisory Agency/Securities Commission

Government Agencies (tax authorities, chambers of

commerce, etc.)

Central Securities Depository, custodians, intermediaries

Foreign Supervisory Authorities/Securities

Commissions/Government Agencies

Web-based system,

information sharing

Information requests

(confidential)

IOSCO, but information sharing also in national

laws/regulationsBusiness

Environment

Page 19: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Source: www.ato.gov.au

GovernmentTreasurer. Attorney-General, Minister of

Home Affairs, Assistant Treasurer, Minister for FInancial Services and Superannuation

PW CEO meeting (currently every six months)

ATO, ACC, AFP, CDPP, ASIC, AUSTRAC

PW Cross Agency Advisory Committee Meeting (monthly)

ATO, ACC, AFP, CDPP, ASIC, AUSTRAC, AGS

Australian Taxation Office

(ATO)

Australian Crime

Commission (ACC)

Australian Federal Police

(AFP)

Commonwealth Director of Public

Prosecutions (CDPP)

Australian Securities and Investments

Commission (ASIC)

PW Case Forum

(monthly)ATO, ACC, AFP, CDPP,

ASIC, AUSTRAC

Australian Transaction Reports and

Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)

Attorney-General’s

Department (AGD)

Australian Government

Solicitor (AGS)

Project Wickenby

Page 20: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Conclusions

Control (& Ultimate Ownership)

Flexibility

Mix of Enforcement

Dialogue between Regulators and Industry

Information Sharing

Non-Judicial Enforcement

Page 21: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONTROL · executive directors Passive minority investors Controlling owners Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance ues ng ty ns Market EfÞciency

Thank [email protected]