BERNT JONSSON THE AMBITION TO BOTH HONOR …

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"ON THE ROAD TOWARDS LIBERATION” RELATES A UNIQUE PERIOD IN SWEDISH POLITICS. SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS IN

FOCUS FOR STUDENT MOVEMENTS, CHRISTIAN AND POLITICAL YOUTH MOVEMENTS, AFRICA GROUPS, TRADE UNIONS, WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES. ALSO MEDIA PARTICIPATED, INITIALLY VIA COLUMNISTS AND IN THE END IN THE NEWS.

THE AMBITION TO BOTH HONOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROMOTE A MORE PEACEFUL AND JUST WORLD SOMETIMES APPEARED HAVING TWO FACES IN THE GOVERNMENT POLICY. NOT EVEN WITHIN THE SOLIDARITY GROUPS WAS THE LINE ALWAYS CLEAR.

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DIFFERENT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS VARIED OVER TIME AS WELL AS THE KIND OF SUPPORT GIVEN. ONLY WHEN THE ISOLATE SOUTH AFRICA COMMITTEE, ISAK, IN THE 1980S ENCOMPASSED ALMOST THE ENTIRE CIVIL SOCIETY, A COMMON STRATEGY DEVELOPED THAT WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO FORCE THE POLITICIANS TO INTRODUCE COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS DESPITE NO UN-SUPPORT.

“ON THE ROAD TOWARDS LIBERATION” IS A TRANSLATION OF THE LAST AND SUMMARIZING VOLUME OF A SERIES OF FIVE SEPARATE BOOKS IN THE SERIES “THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOLIDARITY WORK WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE BOOKS COVERING THE ISOLATE SOUTH AFRICA COMMITTEE, THE AFRICA GROUPS OF SWEDEN, THE LABOUR MOVEMENT, THE CHURCHES AND PRACTICAL SOLIDARITY (EMMAUS GROUPS AND THE BREAD AND FISHES) ARE SO FAR ONLY AVAILABLE IN SWEDISH. THESE ARE STORIES WRITTEN BY ACTORS THEMSELVES.

THIS SUMMARIZING VOLUME DOES ALSO INCLUDE WHAT THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SIDA, WERE DOING AND PICTURES SUCCESSES AND FAILURES AS WELL AS THE DEMANDS ON GLOBAL SOLIDARITY TODAY.

SWEDISH CIVIL SOCIETY

AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERATION

OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

ISBN 978-91-983617-3-5

LIB

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AT

ION

ROADON THE

KYRKORNAOCH SÖDRA AFRIKA

1960–1994

ARBETARRÖRELSENOCH

SÖDRA AFRIKA1960–1994

KYRKORNAOCH SÖDRA AFRIKA

1960–1994

ARBETARRÖRELSENOCH

SÖDRA AFRIKA1960–1994

BERNT JONSSON

On the Road towards LiberationSwedish Solidarity with the Struggle

for Freedom in Southern Africa

BERNT JONSSON has worked as a journalist at newspapers, radio,magazines and TV, both locally and at national level, with focuson politics, culture and religion. During the 80-s and 90-s he worked at the Foreign Office and at the Life & Peace institute inUppsala with international issues, particularly disarmament, peaceand reconciliation. Nowadays he is a freelance journalist focusingon the Middle East.

By Bernt Jonsson

On the Road towards Liberationswedish solidarity with the struggle

for Freedom in southern Africa

translated by Madi Gray

The book is part of the series Popular Movements and Swedish Solodarity with Southern Africa.

Produced by Afrikagrupperna together with Olof Palme international center, Practical Solidarity, Christian

Coundcil of Sweden with support from Sida via the Nordic Africa Institute.

© The author and Afrikagrupperna

Cover: Niklas Alveskog

Layout: Ingrid Sillén, Migra Grafiska AB

Pictures: Bertil Högberg

Project coordination: Bertil Högberg

Publisher: Nielsen & Norén förlag

this puBlicAtion is a translation of the sixth and fi-nal book in the Swedish series Folkrörelsernassolidaritetsarbete med södra Afrika (Popular Move-ments and Swedish Solidarity with southern Afri-ca). In a factual and accessible way, the aim is tosketch a comprehensive picture of the grassrootswork in Sweden for a free southern Africa and of itsrelation to official government policies in this are-na. At the same time the reader should be aware thatthe selection and presentation of historical eventsand developments is never totally objective butalways “carries the fingerprints of the interpreter”(Alan Munslow in Deconstructing History). My personal experiences of the student move-

ments of the 1950s and 1960s and from many yearswithin the peace movement, the non-conformistChurches and the Christian Social Democrats (Bro-derskapsrörelsen) form part of my frame of reference.My professional background as a journalist in vari-ous roles and as an actor in international affairs – inthe Foreign Ministry and the Life & Peace Institute –form other parts. This framework influences my per-spective and will unconsciously colour my presenta-tion. Without being weighed down by footnotes, the

presentation draws heavily on Tor Sellström’s exten-sive study in three volumes called Sweden and Natio-nal Liberation in Southern Africa, Nordic Africa Insti-tute, 1999 and 2002, and on the five books publishedwithin the framework of this project during2006–2007:Karl-Gunnar Norén: Under ISAK’s paraply. Isolera

Sydafrikakommittén 1979–1995 (Under the ISAKUmbrella: Isolate South Africa Committee).Anja Björk: Den stillsamma vreden. Praktisk soli-

daritet 1969 – 1994 (Sedate Wrath: Practical Solida-rity)Birgitta Silén: Uppdrag solidaritet. Arbetarrörelsen

och Södra Afrika 1960 – 1994 (Assignment Solidari-ty: The Labour Movement and Southern Africa).Rune Forsbeck: ”Gör ni då inte åtskillnad…?” Kyr-

korna och Södra Afrika 1960–1994 (“Do you notDifferentiate …?” The Churches and Southern Afri-ca).Mai Palmberg (ed.): När södra Afrikas frihet var

vår. Afrikagrupperna 1968–1994 (When SouthernAfrica’s Freedom was Ours: Africa Groups).

These five books are self-portraits, i.e. written fromwithin the movements by people who took partthemselves. In contrast, my text is written one stepremoved, partly from the outside, close to theircommitment and yet with an approach from theoutskirts; with impressions gained from a threemonths trip as a journalist in Southern and EasternAfrica in 1971 at the back of my mind, but withoutany direct experience of the hub of the movements’work for the liberation of southern Africa from co-lonialism and apartheid; with the ambition of, asfair as possible, sketching people and groups, theirsuccesses and failures during a unique period inSwedish politics; and with a certain longing for a time when international solidarity informed Swe-dish debate and activities to such a degree that ANCpresident Oliver Tambo could justifiably describerelations between Sweden and southern Africa as “anatural system … from people to people”.

Uppsala april ⁄English version March

on the road towards liberation 5

Foreword

6 on the road towards liberation

cont

ents

“Many activists in the Africa groups spend off their time awake on solidarity work. It became an important part ofour lives. The liberation of Southern Africa was also about out liberation from racism and oppression.”

FOREWORD 5

THIS IS WHEN IT HAPPENED 8

SWEDEN’S INVOLVEMENT BEGINS 101. We all come from Africa

2. The scramble for Africa

3. The rise and fall of colonialism

4. Sweden as an unsuccessful colonial power

5. Swedish public opinion emerges

South Africa’s race laws

6. Forced removals

The Apartheid bible

7. Race laws and Swedish public opinion

1960-65 VIOLENCE ESCALATES 258. The massacre in Sharpeville and its after-

math

9. Coup in Gothenburg for Nobel Peace Prize

winner

African writers reach Swedish readers

10. The first decade of the Thirty Years War

WHAT IS A LIBERATION MOVEMENT?

1965–1970 FOCUS ON PORTUGAL’S COLONIES 37

11. Late 1960s – public opinion fragmented

When did African countries gain their

independence?

12. No tennis in Båstad

13. Drama at the water gate

14. Cabora Bassa – political dynamite

15. Sweden’s two faces

Hunted politician and embarrassed generals

1970–1975 PORTUGAL PHASES OUTITS EMPIRE 55

16. From Khartoum to Lusaka

A divine South Africa committee?

17. Swedish sardines irritate the Portuguese

military

18. Early support but late recognition

19. Success for Frelimo

20. Divisions in and about Angola

The brothers who disagreed

21. MPLA’s deep crisis and new start

22. Silk, satin, rags, junk – for solidarity

1975-78 WHITE ON BLACK – RENEWED STRUGGLE 75

23. The country that disappeared from sight

24. Black division complicates the picture

25. Detente with hindsight

26. After detente

27. The Church of Sweden Mission and the

liberation movements


28. South Africa returns – through the

churches

29. Throw out the priest!

30. Massacre in Soweto

31. Political majority for sanctions

32. The Africa Groups gird their loins

1978–1983 STAND UP FOR SOUTHERNAFRICA 97

33. Rhodesia becomes Zimbabwe

The many faces of the trade unions

35. LO’s campaign for southern Africa

36. Art, dance and music

37. South Africa’s fifth province?

The union man who sold bibles

38. Isolate South Africa!

A mighty wave of solidarity and its sources

39. Campaigns begin to take shape

40. ISAK presses the politicians

41. Pockets of resistance in industry

1983–1988 THE CRUCIAL YEARS 12542. The third wave of opposition

Secret funds – and open transfers

43. Boycotts and sanctions

The Foreign Ministry’s secret agents

44. Treason trials and reactions

45. A major break-through

46. Forming public opinion in South Africa

47. No business with apartheid

48. Swedish People’s Parliament against

Apartheid

49. The Shell Campaign – success or failure?

1988–1994 TIME TO BRING THE HARVEST IN 156

50. Namibia is liberated

51. Retreat of the apartheid regime

52. Mandela at the Globe

An activist reflects

53. Black townships and violence

54. New roads to peace

55. The route to the elections

56. Mission accomplished

57. An impatient patience

58. What happened then?

59. What is happening now?

The documentation project “Popular

Movements and Swedish Solidarity

with Southern Africa”

contents

1912 ANC is born.

1948 The Nationalist Party takes power in

South Africa.

1954 Herbert Tingsten publishes Problemet

Sydafrika (The South African pro-

blem).

1959 Blacks are divided into eight ethnic

groups each with its own “homeland”.

The Fund for the Victims of Racial

Oppression is started.

1960 The Sharpeville massacre

ANC and PAC are banned.

SWAPO is formed in Namibia.

Per Wästberg’s Förbjudet område

(Forbidden Territory) and På svarta

listan (Blacklisted) are published.

LO/TCO/KF call for the first consu-

mer boycott.

1961 MPLA and UPA (FNLA) take up arms

in Angola and the ANC in South

Africa.

Albert Luthuli awarded the Nobel

peace prize.

The Swedish South Africa committee

is formed.

1962 Oliver Tambo addresses a 1st May

rally in Gothenburg.

Local South Africa committees are

formed.

1963 PAIGC takes up arms in Guinea-

Bissau.

ZANU breaks away from ZAPU.

ANC’s leadership is imprisoned.

Södra Vätterbygden’s South Africa

Committee publishes precursor to the

Africa Bulletin.

SUL calls for a new consumer boycott.

1964 Frelimo takes up arms in

Mozambique.

The Commission for Humanitarian

Assistance is set up.

Eduardo and Janet Mondlane pay

their first visit to Sweden.

1965 The Smith regime declares Unilateral

Independence in Rhodesia.

First parliamentary motions on eco-

nomic sanctions against South Africa.

Olof Palme supports liberation move-

ments in significant speech in Gävle.

1966 ZANU takes up arms in Zimbabwe

and SWAPO in Namibia.

1967 Frelimo appoints a representative in

Sweden.

Southern Africa Information Bulletin is

now printed.

1968 Davis Cup match against Rhodesia is

stopped by demonstrators.

1969 Frelimo’s president Eduardo

Mondlane is assassinated.

The World Council of Churches laun-

ches the Programme to Combat

Racism.

Conferences in Khartoum and Lusaka

analyse liberation movements.

Widespread support for campaign

against ASEA’s role in Cabora Bassa

hydro-electric project.

Parliament’s OK to direct humanitari-

an support to liberation movements.

Trade with Rhodesia embargoed.

Emmaus groups start sending clothes

to the liberation movements.

1970 First Sida contributions to PAIGC and

ZANU.

MPLA appoints a representative to the

Nordic countries.

1971 International Court decides South

Africa’s occupation of Namibia is ille-

gal.

SWAPO appoints representatives to

Scandinavia, among other places.

First Sida contribution to SWAPO.

Africa Groups start a collection for

MPLA.

1972 First Sida contribution to MPLA.

Africa Groups’ first study book:

Imperialism och befrielsekamp

(Imperialism and liberation struggle).

SEN publishes Kampen mot rasismen

(Struggle against racism).

1973 PAIGC president Amilcar Cabral

assassinated.

UN/OAU Conference on southern

Africa and ILO conference against

apartheid.

First Sida contributions to ANC and

ZAPU.

1974 Coup in Portugal against fascism and

colonial wars.

Guinea Bissau independent.

Frihet åt förtryckta (Freedom for the

oppressed) is the topic of the ecume-

nical development week.

1975 ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo killed

by a car bomb.

Mozambique and Angola indepen-

dent.

LO/TCO delegation pay controversial

visit to South Africa.

Africa Groups in Sweden form a

national organisation (AGIS).

Church leaders create a debate on

South Africa at company AGMs.

1976 Massacre during peaceful protest

march in Soweto leads to nationwide

uprising.

South Africa’s troops forced out of

Angola temporarily.

ZANU and ZAPU form the Patriotic

Front.


this is when it happened

1977 Black Consciousness Movement,

Christian Institute et al. banned.

Steve Biko killed in prison.

Beyers Naudé banned.

SACTU gets official Swedish support.

AGIS publishes Befrielsekampen i

Afrika (The Liberation Struggle in

Africa).

SEN adopts Programme of Action

against Apartheid.

1978 UN’s International Year against

Apartheid.

South African attack kills over 600 in

refugee camp in Casinga, Angola.

UN’s Security Council adopts

Resolution 435 on Namibia.

Major LO campaign for ANC,

SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU.

AGIS- congress re-evaluates its negati-

ve view of LO.

1979 ISAK formed on 15th January.

Sweden bans new investments in

South Africa and Namibia.

1980 Zimbabwe independent.

Strategically important companies in

South Africa forced to have their own

militias.

Brödet and Fiskarna (Bread and

Fishes) initiate a Sida supported health

care project with SWAPO.

New consumer boycott started by

ISAK.

1981 Many homeless because of major

South African invasion in Angola.

Western powers veto sanctions against

South Africa.

1982 Western powers, Front Line States and

SWAPO unite on constitutional prin-

ciples.

1983 UDF new umbrella organisation for

opposition to apartheid.

Mugabe regime crushes uprising in

Matabeleland.

NIR publishes Sydafrika och Svenskt

Näringsliv (South Africa and Swedish

Commerce and Industry).

UDF awarded newspaper Arbetet’s Låt

Leva Pris (Let Live Prize).

1984 Nkomati Accord between

Mozambique’s government and apart-

heid regime.

Black townships in South Africa pro-

test against new tricameral constitu-

tion.

Desmond Tutu awarded Nobel Peace

Prize.

Media breakthrough for ISAK.

1985 Newly formed COSATU organises

South African trade union organisa-

tions.

Treason trials begin.

Secret “talks about talks” begin betwe-

en the apartheid regime and the ANC.

ANC galas in Gothenburg and

Stockholm.

Ban on import of agricultural produce

from South Africa.

Nordic “Operation A Day’s Work” col-

lects 26 million kronor for the ANC’s

refugee schools.

1986 Mozambique’s president Samora

Machel killed in plane crash.

USA’s congress adopts partial econo-

mic sanctions against South Africa.

Impressive Swedish People’s

Parliament against Apartheid.

Controversial campaign for boycott of

Shell.

1987 Swedish trade embargo with South

Africa.

1988 UN’s Namibia Commissioner Bernt

Carlsson killed when plane blown up

over Lockerbie in Scotland.

1989 F.W. de Klerk succeeds P.W. Botha as

South Africa’s president.

Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu and other

ANC leaders released.

SWAPO wins an absolute majority in

UN organised elections.

1990 Namibia gains independence.

Banning of ANC, PAC, SACP revoked.

Nelson Mandela released.

Tributes flow to Mandela at solidarity

gala at the Globe.

1991 CODESA negotiations start.

ISAK exhibition Den Svarta Förstaden

(the Black Townships) tours Sweden.

1992 Whites support negotiations in refe-

rendum.

ANC leaves negotiations after

Boipathong massacre.

Peace accord between Mozambique’s

government and Renamo.

VEETU formed with support from

Sida. ISAK starts fundraising for the

elections.

1993 Accord on democratic elections to be

held in April 1994.

Mandela: Revoke economic sanctions!

CODESA agreement on provisional

non-racial democratic constitution.

Mandela and the Klerk share Nobel

Peace Prize.

EMPSA and PEMSA formed.

1994 Landslide ANC victory in South

Africa’s first free and fair general elec-

tions.

Mandela elected president.

66 peace observers sent from Sweden

to help limit violence.

1995 ISAK closed down. Network for south -

ern Africa launched.


this is when it happened

Apartheid a crime against humanity. ! May rally 1963.

1.SWEDEN GETS INVOLVED


1. We all come from AfricaWhen does history begin? And where? With Adamand Eve and the myth of creation in the MiddleEast or with palaeontologists’ famed Lucy in EastAfrica, or with a yet to be named early hominid inChad? The answer – as far as we know – is Africa, so-

mewhere in Africa. When did humankind leave Africa and conquer

the world? Probably in stages, in several waves ofmigration and each time as an increasingly modernhominid, i.e. biologically more like ourselves. Weare all Africans.It is a historical irony, that re-immigration to

our original home in Africa led to, amongst otherthings, apartheid – policies for separate develop-ment and differentiation. In practice the immi-grants’ descendents oppressed the heirs of the ori-ginal inhabitants. People with the “wrong” skin co-lour were cheated of their full humanity. Oppres-sion was systematic. Its primary instrument wasbureaucracy, while discriminatory legislation wasupheld through direct physical violence. None of this is particularly new. Apartheid was

an offshoot of colonialism, a logical continuation, aconsequence of colonialism’s basic myth: the mythof white supremacy, the arrogance of regardingoneself as superior and thus having the right to ru-

le and, in practice, to oppress. When the colonialpowers could no longer rule from the outside, a do-mestic ideology was developed to justify and thuspreserve white supremacy. This solution was apart-heid.The liberation struggle in the different countries

of southern Africa was thus concerned – althoughthe political structures and the political oppositionlooked different – with one and the same thing: li-beration from colonialism and racism. In time the-se efforts elicited growing international support.This book deals with Swedish participation in thisglobal movement.

2. The scramble for AfricaIn all periods strong states have tried to build uplarge countries and create empires. Unique to theWest European empire builders is that they sailedover the oceans. After men like Columbus and Vas-co da Gama “discovered” other continents, theirappetite grew. Rival superpowers were driven tocontrol territories that were as large as possible.Even if economic motives like access to raw materi-als and potential markets played a role, politicalmotives were possibly more important. Economi-cally, colonisation was a doubtful business in thelong run, but through colonies states could displaytheir grandeur and power. Thus they were able to

reinforce feelings of nationalism and dampengrowing class contradictions. Imperialism could toywith the same sentiments that fascism later did.When necessary, egotistical motives were gilded

with arguments like “Raising the inferior races’educational level and technical skills”, “SpreadingChristian civilisation”, “Stopping the Arab slave tra-de” etc. Perfectly voluntarily Europeans shouldered“The White Man’s Burden”; interpreted by Kiplingin a poem as the difficult role of Europeans as rulersand teachers of foreign races. Even if one or otherindividual actor may have had noble motives, theunderlying racism was an important precondition.Africa was the continent worst affected by colo-

nial imperialism. It lay nearest Europe. In addition,“discoverers” like Livingstone and Stanley, driven bycompletely different motives, laid the foundationfor the military conquest of the interior of the con-tinent. Africa had already been badly weakened bythe slave trade, first the Arabic in East Africa and la-ter the European, trans-Atlantic traffic in West Afri-ca. There is considerable disagreement about its ex-tent – from 8 to 25 million people in the former ca-se and from 12 to 40 million in the latter.In the great scramble for Africa between 1870

and 1914 the whole continent was cut up exceptEthiopia and Liberia. The butchers were Belgium,France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain andGermany. The Berlin Congress in 1884–85 set therules. Its ban on the slave trade in no way put anend to slavery in, for example, the King Leopold’sBelgian Congo.

The modernisation of weapons in the 1870s and theuse of machine guns from the 1880s made conquest atechnologically simple affair. If Africans tried armedresistance to the colonisers, they could be brutally shot

down before the battle even began. The conquerors vi-olated Africans’ humanity, whereas ivory and rubberhad economic value.Africa remained a “European” continent until af-

ter the Second World War. The colonial powers see-med unassailable.

3. The rise and fall of colonialismColonialism triumphed but suffered from internalcontradictions. Humanitarian arguments for its ci-vilising role could also be used against the system,when it was seen as far too brutal, as in King Leo-


Colonial powers 1914.

pold’s plundering of the Congo. Most missionariesreflected the values of their time and had close rela-tions to the colonial powers. Some – like the blackAmerican William Sheppard – nevertheless becameawkward spokesmen for the domestic population’sopposition to European businessmen and colonialofficials. Two types of domestic churches emerged on Af-

rican soil: the “Ethiopian” – sister churches to thoseof the missions, but with African leadership – and

“Zionist” or charismatic churches, often led by aprophet with special religious gifts. The latter wasparticularly common in southern and central Afri-ca, where social tensions were strongest. By stan-ding for a perspective from below and criticising ca-pitalism and colonialism, they were often seen asposing a threat to the colonial power. Thus they we-re attacked, sometimes with considerable force. Tre-atment of the Kimbanguist movement in Congo inthe 1920s is an example of this. After the First World War, the loot – the German

possessions in Africa – was shared. France got Togoand Cameroon, Great Britain took over Tanganyika(now Tanzania, after union with Zanzibar in 1964),and South West Africa was ceded to South Africa,at the time a British dominion. Formally the areaswere taken over under a mandate from the Leagueof Nations to lead these countries to self-governan-ce, but there was little intention of fulfilling thistask. Only after the Second World War did libera-tion become a reality, in most cases long after theend of the war. The UN constitution of 1945 was the beginning

of the end for the West European colonial powers.Winds of change began sweeping over Africa. TheUN denoted 1960 as the Year of Africa and the Ge-neral Assembly adopted the Declaration on theGranting of Independence to Colonial Countries andPeoples (Resolution 1514), which declared the colo-nial system to be illegal. Among those behind thisdecision were the USA and the Soviet Union,though for entirely different reasons.No fewer than 19 African colonies gained their

independence in 1960. Apart from Congo-Kinsha-sa (Belgian) and Nigeria and Somalia (British) allwere French. In many cases – though not in all –decolonisation proceeded without bloodshed.


Africa 1980. Year of independence.

While those who were liberated regarded themsel-ves as having gained their freedom through struggle– often peaceful – the old colonial powers sawthemselves as having given “the natives” their free-dom and in addition the knowledge to carry it off.The new states tended to inherit the colonial bor-ders and populations, where no consideration wastaken of ethnic and cultural differences, which pa-ved the way for new conflicts. The blood-soaked treaties led to the liberation of

the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea Bissauand Mozambique, which occurred in the mid-1970safter a revolution in Portugal. Zimbabwe becameinternationally acknowledged as independent in1980. Namibia’s independence was delayed to 1990,and South Africa’s black majority did not receivefull citizenship rights until 1994.

4. Sweden as an unsuccessful colonial powerSweden was in luck! Its period as a colonial powerin Africa lasted only 15 years, from 1649 – 1664. Inall it had five small colonies on the west coast of Af-rica with Cabo Corso in today’s Ghana as the centreof the first and last colony. At the time Sweden wascertainly a great power in Europe, but the Dutchand English tolerated no competition and thus sa-ved us from playing a dubious role as colonial mas-ters. Instead it was said in the 1930s: “the only lightin this failed enterprise was the Negros’ affection forthe Swedes, who tried to help them”. (GerhardLindblom in Röster i Radio (Voices on the radio)1933.)This does not, however, mean that Sweden’s in-

terest in Africa disappeared completely. King Gus-tav III (1771–1792) believed in gold in Senegal,

whence the philanthropist Carl BernhardWadström moved to build a utopian society in thespirit of the Swedish mystic and seer, Emanuel Swe-denborg, though it came to a similar disappointingend as in the previous century. Great honours wereheaped on students of the Swedish scientist CarolusLinnéus who explored South Africa, namely AndersSparrman and Carl Peter Thunberg. Other Swedesacquired leading positions or made fortunes forthemselves in the Cape Colony in the early 1800s. Nineteenth century Swedish seamen and soldiers

could talk about their meetings with Africa. Amongthe latter, some were grim participants in Leopold’sreign of terror. Thanks for the well-developed fee-


The Linnaeus disciple Sparrman documented not only South African Zoology.

ling in Sweden for Africa should above all go toSwedish missionaries, who were in Eritrea andAbyssinia/Ethiopia since 1865, and in South Africaand Congo since 1876 and 1881 respectively. In ma-ny quarters their letters and illustrated lectures cre-ated a sense of identification with Africans, who we-re given names and identities. In the internationalcampaign against King Leopold’s tyranny in theCongo a Swedish missionary, F V Sjöblom, played asignificant role.Swedish horror after Italy’s bombings in 1935–36

of Abyssinia (and a Swedish Red Cross ambulance)should be seen against this background. The parti-cipation of Swedish UN troops in the Congo duringthe years of decolonisation later reinforced Swedes’feeling of community with Africa. Carl Gustaf vonRosen’s airlift of food to relieve the humanitariandisaster during the Biafra conflict in the Nigeriancivil war from 1967–70 drew media attention thathad a similar effect.As a country and a people without a colonial past

and situated between East and West, Sweden waswell-qualified to become involved in the struggleagainst colonialism and apartheid.

5. Swedish public opinion emergesAt the end of the Second World War, when the UNwas young, a new desire to change the world emer-ged among power holders. The genocide of Jewsand others had put racism in the spotlight, and in1948 a UN commission was given the task of analy-sing and finding methods to prevent it. Twelve yearslater its twin, colonialism, was declared illegal. In South Africa, however, developments went in

the opposite direction. The Nationalist Party (NP)won the elections in 1948 on the promise of safegu-arding white supremacy. It did not only have the

support of white Afrikaans speakers, but also ofmany English-speaking whites. The whites had longheld the economic power. With political power theNP could, through far-reaching racist legislation,exclude blacks from more and more of social sec-tors. They were only permitted to stay in the towns,mines and other “white” areas as migrant workersand a labour force for the whites. In all other casesthey were banished to their so-called “homelands”,economically unviable areas, where in many casesthey had never set foot.If discrimination had been limited to the econo-

my and the bureaucracy, apartheid might have hada longer lifespan. However, a strategic mistake wasmade by making the oppression visible, throughprohibiting whites and blacks from taking the samebus, sitting on the same park benches, playing sporttogether, etc. This “petty apartheid” showed howabsurd the system was. International public opinionwas eventually roused.


Gunnar Helander. Per Wästberg.

In Sweden, publicists, like editor-in-chiefs IvarHarrie, Expressen (1949) and Herbert Tingsten,Dagens Nyheter (DN, 1953) continued to influencepublic opinion. In articles and the book ProblemetSydafrika (The South African problem) (1954) thelatter also turned his attention to the opposition, i.e.the African National Congress (ANC) and the com-munist party. Despite his strong anti-communismTingsten described it as liberal, and despite his well-known anti-clericalism he denoted Swedish missio-naries as “the greatest liberal group in South Africa”. Important for this stance was the fact that Tings-

ten had met Gunnar Helander, sent by the Churchof Sweden Mission (SKM) to South Africa from1938–56. In 1941 Helander had already sent articlesto Swedish newspapers criticising race policies –initially without a response. After a while he waspublished in Gothenburg’s Handels- och Sjöfarts-tidning (Trade and Shipping News), in novels likeZulu möter vit man (Zulu meets white man) (1949)and in innumerable lectures at folk high schools, inchurches, at social democratic and liberal partygroups, and at universities. The apartheid regimeresponded to his outspoken criticism with grossslander. As Dean of the cathedral in Västerås – incooperation with writer Per Wästberg – Helanderbecame one of the most zealous figures in the firstmajor wave of criticism of apartheid.

As a Rotary scholar in Rhodesia in 1959, PerWästberg was responsible for a series of critical ar-ticles in DN and was thus deported, which led himto South Africa and further reinforced his commit-ment against racism. The articles were expandedthe following year into two books: Förbjudet områ-de (Forbidden Territory, Zimbabwe) and På svartalistan (Blacklisted, South Africa), in which he de-scribed Christians and Marxists “as the only ones

who dare to practice what they preach”. Public re-sponse was enormous, and in Sweden alone 90 000and 80 000 copies were sold respectively.Struggle against apartheid never became an anta-

gonistic right/left issue (with the exception, for acertain period, of the issue of sanctions). Instead itbecame broadly rooted among the general public inSweden, because those who pursued these questionswere from the beginning religious, liberal, tradeunion and intellectual actors. With few exceptionsthis also came to applyto the national libera-tion movements.Perhaps the most

basic reason can befound in the fol-lowing, by the writerAnders Ehnmark:

Africa, likeAmerica, is closeby. The upperclasses in Swedenhave lookedtowards the Euro-pean superpo-wers, Germany,France or Eng-land, but the peo-ple have turnedtowards America,because of the emigrants, and Africa, becauseof the missionaries. They have always found anAunt Eleonora in America or a Cousin Agneswho was a missionary in the Congo.(Resan till Kilimanjaro. En essä om Afrika efter

befrielsen Trip to Kilimanjaro. An essay on Afri-ca after liberation)


struggle against apartheidnever became an antagonisticright/left issue (with theexception, for a certain period,of the issue of sanctions).instead it became broadlyrooted among the general publicin sweden, because those whopursued these questions werefrom the beginning religious,liberal, trade union andintellectual actors.

Not all Swedes agreed. The majority of the SwedishAlliance Mission and some of the Church of Swe-den missionaries in South Africa were conservati-ves, as were diplomats of the old school. Despite theUN General Assembly’s arms embargo, Swedish gasmasks were exported to South Africa in 1963. ASEAdirector Åke Vrethem hailed South Africa as the “fo-remost outpost of civilisation in Africa” and Cap-tain Lars Saltin on Transatlantic’s ship Sunnaren be-trayed a political refugee. The Moderate Party con-sistently stood outside joint political actions againstapartheid, and the reactionary rightwing paperNordvästra Skånes Tidningar stood out through itsdefence of the apartheid regime.

6. Forced Removals After implementing the Group Areas Act, mass for-ced removals began in the 1950s. They continuedup to the 1990s and according to certain observersmay have affected over 3,5 million people. Amongthe victims of these policies were:• black tenants on farms owned by whites;• residents of “black spots”, areas owned by blacksbut surrounded by white farms;

• working class families in townships close to ho-melands;

• “superfluous” people (i.e. unemployed blacks) inurban areas.

The most notorious of the 1950s forced removals


If I see the colour of your skin, I can tell you which hu-man rights you have – might be a summary of theideological basis for South African apartheid poli-cies. To be white was to have a winning ticket, to beblack meant drawing blank lots. For coloured andseveral Asian groups small lottery prizes could bewon.As early as the 1910s–20s laws were promulgated

that in principle entailed that the towns and citiesbecame white by night, except for blacks with (of-ten domestic) work. When the NP came to powerin 1948 they passed a series of apartheid laws of va-ried weight and consequences, inter alia the fol-lowing:The 1950 National Register, defined a person’s

racial identity. Residential areas were classified ac-cording to race; those who lived in “the wrong”group area were forcibly removed; (Group AreasAct).

In 1952 new pass laws demanded that blacksmust always carry their detailed ID-documents/passes with them; there were heavy pe-nalties for forgetting – all to increase control.In 1953 a special department for “Bantu Educa-

tion” was started to develop a syllabus “suited toBantu nature and potential”; the expressed inten-tion was to prevent Africans from gaining the kindof education that might encourage them to applyfor posts from which they were precluded underapartheid.In 1959 blacks were divided into eight ethnic

groups, allocated a “homeland”.The 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizens Act in

principle deprived all blacks of their South Africancitizenship and forced on each of them citizenshipin a “homeland”, irrespective of whether or notthey had ever lived there.

South Africa’s race laws


People thrown out of their houses when the racially mixed township Sophiatown is demolished.

was when 60 000 people were forced from Sophia-town in Johannesburg to the new and later very ne-wsworthy Soweto (South-Western Townships). Inthe 1970s a similar number were forced to leaveDistrict Six in Cape Town.Up to 1955 Sophiatown was one of the few sub-

urbs where blacks could own land. It was one of theoldest settlements and was in the process of develo-ping into a living multi-ethnic community. Herewas the only swimming pool for black children inJohannesburg. Growing numbers of industrial wor-kers came to live, close to the growing industries inthe city. Despite a forceful protest campaign by the

ANC and despite international publicity, heavily ar-med police forced residents out of their homes onthe morning of 9th February 1955, loaded their be-longings onto lorries and transported it all to anarea twenty km outside the city. Sophiatown wasbulldozed, and a white suburb called Triomf (tri-umph) was built in its place.The pattern was repeated over the whole

country. In all, 600 000 coloureds, Indians and Chi-nese, 40 000 whites, plus at least two million blackswere forcibly removed under the above-mentionedlaw.


The leader of Frelimo Eduardo Mondlane studied on a Swedish scholarship after the Apartheid government denied himstudy possibilities in South Africa.

7. Race laws and Swedish public opinionThe growth of Swedish public opinion against theSouth African apartheid regime was naturally con-nected to the increasingly oppressive race laws. Thewithdrawal of government study grants from blackstudents at the University of Witwatersrand, Johan-nesburg, led for instance to the Swedish NationalUnion of Students (SFS) starting a bursary fund forblack students in 1950, partly through a campaignto donate blood. It was an answer to an appeal byNUSAS, the National Union of South African Stu-dents, and SFS’ counterpart in South Africa, which

campaigned for “everyone’s right to freedom of ex-pression and equal educational and economic op-portunities”. The campaign did not, perhaps, raise a great deal

of money, but one of those who had use of it wasEduardo Mondlane – future president of Frelimo.He had lost his bursary, since he was – in a some-what illogical apartheid phrase – “a foreign native”.More important in the long run were possibly thearticles that SFS’ international secretary Olof GTandberg wrote after a study trip to South Africa in1956. In five long reports in Stockholms Tidningen


The author SaraLidman raisedpublic awareness


In 1857 the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africadecided that whites and blacks should have separatereligious services because of white “weakness”! Inthe1930s white theologians began to look for theolo-gical arguments to underpin apartheid, and summa-rised them in a report in 1948. On the whole, the whi-te Dutch Reformed Churches in South Africa suppor-ted apartheid policies, the largest to such a degreethat it was described as “the Nationalist party engros-sed in prayer”. An international ecumenical conference in 1960 in

Cottesloe, South Africa, repudiated every form of ra-cial discrimination, which led the above churches todisassociate themselves from The World Council ofChurches. In 1982 the World Alliance of ReformedChurches (WARC) declared apartheid theology to bea false doctrine. Two Dutch Reformed ministers, Bey-ers Naudé (white) and Allan Boesak (coloured), wereleading and outspoken critics of both the regime andthe churches. The former broke with his church and refrained

from following a flourishing career, devoting himselfinstead to combating apartheid policies in various ro-les, inter alia as the founder of the Christian Instituteand as General Secretary of the South African Coun-cil of Churches. Naudé was under house arrest from1977–84 and, after the banning of the ANC when itsleaders were either in prison or in exile, he became aninformal leader of the opposition to apartheid. The latter was a liberation theologian, Chairman

of WARC from 1982-91, one of those to take the initi-ative to start the United Democratic Front (UDF), abrilliant speaker and later a prominent ANC politici-an. In 1999 Boesak was sentenced for embezzling aid

funds but was later pardoned and is again in serviceas a pastor. His political career seems to be on hold.Both Naudé and Boesak had close contacts with

churches in Sweden; Boesak also with the social de-mocrats.How could South African Christians justify apart-

heid? Clearly through carefully selected and interpre-ted biblical texts, so that they together formed a who-le – an Apartheid Bible. The most popular text con-cerned the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9), wherepeople’s attempt to build a tower to reach the heavenswas confounded by the sudden appearance of manylanguages, after which people spread all over theworld. This was the Lord’s will, and that is the way itshould stay – according to the advocates of apartheid.They also referred to Deuteronomy 32:8, where it saysthat “the Lord gave land to the people and separatedthem from one another”. The description of the first Pentecost says that

“every man heard them speak in his own language.”(Acts 2:6). In a traditional Christian interpretationthis is usually seen as a new start for a common hu-manity, where the Tower of Babel and the time ofchaotic languages is past. In one of Revelations’apocalyptic visions (7:9) one can read, that “a greatmultitude, which no man could number, of all na-tions, and kindreds, and people, and tongues, stoodbefore the throne, and before the Lamb, clothed withwhite robes, and palms in their hands”. Where otherChristians regard this as an expression of absolutecommunity, followers of apartheid regarded it asproof of the correctness of separating people fromeach other.

The Apartheid Bible


(Stockholm’s Newspaper) he sketched a dark pictu-re:

One left the Union of South Africa with a bittertaste in one’s mouth…, shame over one’s whiteskin… In the course of a few years a white policestate has been created, which in the name of“Christian Nationalism” conducts a cold-bloodedand intentional exploitation of the non-white po-pulation groups.

After 1959 no black student was permitted to regis-ter at the four earlier racially open English-speakinguniversities without special permission from theDepartment of Education. White students whotook part in classes at black institutions of higherlearning could be sentenced to up to six months inprison. The Minister of Bantu Education becameresponsible for the black Fort Hare University Col-lege, i.e. in practice it meant a downgrading of ad-vanced tertiary studies for blacks. Professors inStockholm protested in a letter to South Africa’s go-vernment against this segregation of higher educa-tion. Late in the same year Gunnar Helander and Per

Wästberg took the initiative to start a fund for thevictims of racial oppression in South Africa. After

active lobbying SFS succeeded in influencing thegovernment, so that in his address to the UN Gene-ral Assembly in 1959 the social democratic ForeignMinister Östen Undén raised the issue of the non-white students’ deteriorating situation. It was thefirst time Sweden talked about apartheid in the UN. Among the laws passed by the regime that revea-

led the absurdity of apartheid policies were the Pro-hibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Im-morality Amendment Act against sexual relationsbetween whites and blacks (1950). That Swedishseamen were sentenced to whipping in 1960-61 foroffences against the sex laws did hold apartheid le-gislation up to ridicule, but it hardly caused a publicoutcry in Sweden. When, however, the writer Sara Lidman, together

with Peter Nthite, formerly an organisational secre-tary of the ANC Youth League and already accusedof treason, were arrested in Johannesburg for offen-ces against the same laws, there were big black head-lines both in South Africa and Sweden. The punish-ment could be up to ten lashes and seven years inprison. Sara Lidman defended their relationship,but she had to leave the country before the trial, af-ter which charges against Nthite were withdrawn.


Apartheid meant completely different living conditions for black and white.

2.1960 – 1965VIOLENCE ESCALATES


8. The massacre in Sharpeville and its aftermath

In the late 1950s international solidarity acquiredan increasingly prominent place among both theunions and the social democrats. In late 1959, forinstance, the blue-collar confederation LO started acollection called LO assists over borders collecting 7,4million kronor (today valued at over 75 million) inthe first year. The salaried employees central orga-nisation TCO took similar initiatives. In January1960 LO decided to launch a consumer boycottduring April and May. It was supported by the Coo-perative Federation (KF), which at the time was re-sponsible for 10-20% of the fruit import fromSouth Africa and regarding oranges 20-30%.On 21st March 1960 thousands of people gathe-

red in Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, in a pea-ceful singing demonstration to protest and ask thelocal police to arrest them for breaking the passlaws. The response was bloody. 300 police openedfire. The result: 69 killed and 186 wounded mostshot from behind.The massacre escalated the conflict. On the part

of the regime: the African National Congress andthe Pan Africanist Congress (PAC, a more militantbreakaway group, formed in 1959) were bannedand sweeping powers were extended to the securityforces, who arrested 18 000 people. On the part ofthe liberation movement: initially extensive strikes

and consumer boycotts, and from 1961 the armedstruggle began in the form of sabotage and bombsagainst power supplies, railways, police stations andgovernment buildings.Sharpeville roused international public opinion.

In Sweden reactions were strong throughout thecountry. Trade unions organised spontaneous mee-tings in factories and on building sites. Often for-mal resolutions were adopted condemning theapartheid regime. In 1960 for the first time, the la-bour movements’ 1st May demonstrations focusedon the liberation struggle in Africa. Because ofSharpeville the LO/TCO/KF boycott was extendedto last five months.Private importers and shops did not participate,

which led to the demand for political decisions oneconomic sanctions. Like nearly all Sweden’s parlia-mentary parties the social democratic governmentwas cold-hearted to this demand, which was repea-ted at regular intervals in the following decades andbecame increasingly strong even among Social De-mocrats. Leaders of companies with interests inSouth Africa described the boycott as “irresponsib-le”. In the South African press “the Swedish people’shostility towards South Africa” was seen to have re-ached new heights, which made the ANC happy;the attacks on Sweden informed the opposition inSouth Africa that it had international friends.The economic effects on South Africa were limi-

ted; this later became a weapon – both for and

against – in debates on sanctions. As an expressionof solidarity the boycott was a success. Its main in-structive value was that it broadened and deepenedawareness of the consequences of apartheid polici-es.In March 1961 the Swedish South Africa Com-

mittee (SSAK) was formed with widespread sup-port in trade union, cultural, liberal and social de-mocratic circles and spearheaded by Gunnar He-lander and Per Wästberg. Only the Moderates didnot join. Encouraged by the World Assembly ofYouth (WAY) and on the initiative of Swedish soci-

alists and liberals the National Council of SwedishYouth Organisations (SUL, now LSU) started botha collection and a consumer boycott of South Afri-can goods on 1st March 1963. Over 200 local actiongroups were started all over the country, and pres-sure from below grew strongly, particularly whenindividual activists joined in the work.ICA, Tempo, EPA (private importers) and KF de-

cided to stop importing South African goods, andSystembolaget (state-owned liquor outlets) stoppedselling wines from South Africa. Imports fell by10%, but exports increased by 16%, since Swedish


The massacre in Sharpville March 21 1960 awakened the international opinion.


Not only Swedish writers and journalistspaved the way for strong public opinionin favour of the liberation of southern Af-rica. A number of African writers alsofound a voice – in several cases, interes-tingly enough, translated and publishedby church owned publishers. A probablecause was that many African writers in oneor another way belonged to or came from aChristian tradition.African Nationalism, 1960 was the title of

the first book by reverend Ndabaningi Sitho-le, later president of the Zimbabwe AfricanNational Union (ZANU). Africa Narrates, ananthology of short stories edited by PerWästberg and dominated by South and WestAfrican writers came out in 1961. AndersEhnmark and Sven Hamrell edited Africanson Africa, 1962, a collection of essays by well-known political leaders. Albert Luthuli’s 1962, Letmy People Go! was published in the same year. Am-nesty-inspired The Anatomy of Apartheid, 1964 wasa collection of texts by critical white and blackSouth Africans edited by Marion Friedman. Nel-son Mandela’s No Easy Walk to Freedom, 1965 in-

cluded his famous Rivonia trial speech. In Rhodesia (1967) Judith Todd (daugh-

ter of Garfield Todd, a Protestant missio-nary from New Zealand and prime minis-ter of Southern Rhodesia from 1953–58)sketched the conflict from a ZAPU (Zim-babwe African People’s Union) perspecti-ve. Alan Paton was a South African writerand leading liberal whose The Long View,1969 was a selection of articles from ajournal, Contact. Kenneth Kaunda’sZambia Shall Be Free, 1963 was followedby A Humanist in Africa, 1969, letters toColin Morris, a missionary who madethe previous white regime feel uncom-fortable and later became one of Kaun-da’s counsellors.Wästberg’s anthology was printed in

16 000 copies and though none of the ot-her books reached these figures, the Swedish deba-te was influenced by them. African leaders becamedirectly and indirectly known to a broad publicthrough these books, which led to an understan-ding of their message and a willingness to supportthem.

African writers reach Swedish readers

companies obstructed the boycott. After a while itcame to an end, although KF maintained it up to1969. Other issues – like the Vietnam war and the li-beration struggles in the Portuguese colonies – tookover. Nevertheless, the first wave of South Africacampaigns had an influence on Swedish commit-ment in other international questions.

9. Nobel Peace Prize winner interceptedin GothenburgA Christian Social Democrat, Evert Svensson sug-gested in 1960 – with support of members of parli-ament from the Centre and Liberal parties – thatANC president Albert Luthuli should be awardedthe Nobel Peace Prize. The suggestion was well-re-ceived, but partly because of the war in the Congo


“Worthy of a Zulu Chief” wrote GöteborsPosten about the tributes to Luthuli.

the prize was handed out the following year, at thesame time as the 1961 peace prize to the late DagHammarskjöld. Both SUL and the Christian SocialDemocrats invited Luthuli to come to Sweden inconnection with the prize giving in the Norwegiancapital, Oslo. The apartheid regime refused. EvertSvensson said:

Luthuli was confined to the village of Groutvil-le and had to apply for special permission toleave South Africa and then only for the pur-pose of visiting Oslo. He was not permitted tostop anywhere else, not even in other parts of

Norway. We in the Christian Social Democra-tic movement asked the Foreign Minister, Ös-ten Undén, to help us so he wrote a letter toPretoria but it did not help. We knew that Lut-huli’s plane would touch down at Torslanda –at that time planes from Copenhagen to Osloalways landed in Gothenburg. Then I had an idea. I asked the airport ma-

nager for permission to greet Luthuli on thetarmac. He agreed and we immediately startedworking with the social democratic students inGothenburg to organise a meeting. We riggedup a rostrum and found an orchestra. Luthulihimself did not know that he would be met inGothenburg until shortly before he landed.

When the plane landed 500 people stood on the tar-mac. They were from the Christian Social Democ-rats, the Social Democratic students and 20 tradeunions. Luthuli was both surprised and moved, andthe event attracted considerable media attention. “Areal live Christian Zulu Chief”, the press wrote.

10. The first decade of the Thirty YearsWarIn Swedish history the period between 1618 and1648 is often referred to as the “Thirty Years War”,which ended with the Peace of Westphalia. Mainlyfor older Swedes perhaps, the name is associatedwith an illustrious time. Sweden was a great Euro-pean power, and Swedish King Gustavus II Adolp-hus saved Protestantism despite losing his life in themist at the battlefield of Lützen. Others, however,do not regard the period as being one of high ideals,but as full of misery, violent outrage and the furtherimpoverishment of the already poor, both in Swe-den and on the continent.


“Many eyes follow you. Don’t by South African” Posterfrom the Swedish Youth Council.

Irrespective of one’s values, the concept is misle-ading on one point: There was not one war, but ma-ny. Nevertheless they were closely related. One candescribe the armed struggles in southern Africa thatbegan in 1961 in a similar way. Even here the “Thir-ty Years War” has been launched as a collective con-cept (John S Saul: Recolonization and Resistance:Southern Africa in the 1990s). It was also not onewar but many, yet they were closely related, in thefirst hand in two blocs or – using a musical term –in two clusters:On the one hand the white minority regimes in

South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, on the otherthe Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea Bissauand Mozambique. The last-named country was regarded as strategi-

cally important by both sides and a reason for theregimes in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Portugal tocoordinate their intelligence services. The liberationmovements in the Portuguese colonies cooperatedclosely with one another and with those fighting thewhite regimes.This Thirty Years War was preceded by the vio-

lence of the colonial powers and the white minorityregimes. In South Africa and the Central AfricanFederation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) blackdemonstrators were shot to death. In Guinea Bissauthe Portuguese police killed 50 striking dockwor-kers in Pijiguiti in August 1959. In Windhoek in Na-mibia, South African police in December 1959 shotand killed 13 people who opposed forced removals.In Angola a series of assaults culminated in a mas-sacre in Catete (June 1960), where over 30 demon-strators were killed and 200 wounded by Portugue-se troops. That month the Portuguese mowed down500 unarmed demonstrators in Mueda in northernMozambique.

THE ROAD TO SWEDISH COMMITMENTThe liberation wars in southern Africa began in An-gola in February–March 1961, when the MPLA(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola),attacked the prison in Luanda armed with clubs andknives in a vain attempt to free their imprisoned le-aders. At the same time, the UPA (Union of the Po-pulations of Angola). later called FNLA (NationalFront for the Liberation of Angola), inspired a po-pular uprising in the northern provinces. In re-venge, the Portuguese massacred several hundredAfricans in Luanda’s slums. The uprising coincidedwith the hijack by a Portuguese captain, HenriqueGalvão, of the cruise ship Santa Maria, in protestagainst colonial violence and Portugal’s fascist regi-me.International media saw a connection here. Ma-

ny journalists thus gathered in Luanda, amongthem Sven Aurén from Svenska Dagbladet (conserva-tive daily). He was critical of this “revolt of the unci-


What is a liberation movement?A national liberation movement is defined as a) a political organisation which b) strives to attain independence and forma government for

c) a colonised people or otherwise oppressed pe-ople and which

d) is recognised by the United Nationsand/or the Organisation of African Unity(OAU) as representing that people.

Tor Sellström: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa


vilised against the civilised”. The alternative to Por-tuguese rule was “chaos” and opportunities for in-ternational communism. Thus it was “Portugal’sduty to remain strong in Angola, both for the sakeof the black population and for the Western world”.Similar sentiments were echoed in the Modera-

tes’ theoretical journal Svensk Tidskrift (SwedishJournal), where all was peace and joy in Angola. Theeditor, Professor Erik Anners, a member of parlia-ment from 1963, said it was “amazing” that the gre-ater part of the Swedish press was “prepared to beli-eve in anti-colonial propaganda run by the Sovietbloc”. His views were criticised even within the con-servative press, and public opinion did not backPortugal.In July–September 1961 Expressen ran a collec-

tion called Angolahjälpen (Assist Angola) to supportAngolan refugees in Congo. It was a response to anappeal by CONCP (Conference of Nationalist Or-ganizations of the Portuguese Colonies), an organfor the cooperation of MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC(African Party for the Independence of Guinea andCape Verde). 4,5 tons of medicines were collected –mostly penicillin – and reached the refugeesthrough MPLA.On 16th December 1961 – the day after Albert

Luthuli returned from the Nobel Peace Prize cere-mony in Oslo – a number of bombs exploded at po-

wer stations and govern-ment buildings in SouthAfrica. Umkhonto we Sizwe(MK, Spear of the Nation),the ANC’s newly formedarmed wing, claimed theseactions. At the same timethe ANC explained in amanifesto spread over all

South Africa, that its non-violent line had been re-garded as an expression of weakness and as a greenlight for the regime’s use of violence; thus one mustnow adopt new methods. Round that time a groupof young liberals launched a secret sabotage group,later called the ARM (Armed Resistance Move-ment). Subsequently the liberal party was also ban-ned.The change in the methods of opposition did not

have a great impact on Swedish public opinion, as itwas already very critical of the apartheid regime.The Peace Prize to Luthuli placed the ANC in every-one’s consciousness as the movement of hope inSouth Africa.In Guinea Bissau there were only 2 000 Euro-

peans, which was probably one explanation for thePAIGC’S rapid military successes after starting itsarmed struggle in Ja-nuary 1963. Anotherreason may have be-en that the PAIGChad a well-laid stra-tegy, based on thepolitical mobilisa-tion of farmers insouthern GuineaBissau combinedwith civil disobe-dience and sabota-ge. They were alsosystematic in theadministration ofthe liberated are-as. PAIGC beca-me “an ideal kindof organisationfor us”, an official

Umkhontho weSizwe. The armedwing of ANC.

Amilcar Cabral made several high profilevisits to Sweden. Poster from a public mee-ting in Uppsala 1968.


at Sida said later.Swedish contacts with PAIGC were broad, inten-

se and positive, and came to include both the go-vernment and its critics, like the extra-parliamenta-ry left. This was, to a large degree, because its presi-dent, Amílcar Cabral, had a great measure of diplo-matic talent, but he was murdered in January 1973.A number of journalists, writers and politicians vi-sited the liberated areas in Guinea Bissau, and thesecontacts eventually led to an important breakt-hrough on the principle of direct humanitariansupport to liberation movements.In September 1964 Frelimo started its armed

struggle in northern Mozambique and a year laterwas able to establish “semi-liberated areas” there. Aswith PAIGC, they could set up their own administ-ration with schools, clinics and trade. At the sametime – and more so after the meeting of the Inter-national Socialists held in Stockholm in 1966 – theytried to improve their contacts with the Swedish So-cial Democrats, without having to jettison theirgood contacts with the Liberal Party. The interestwas mutual.During 1968–70, there was a deep crisis in Freli-

mo as it had to deal with an internal revolt with ra-cist overtones. Its president Eduardo Mondlane wasmurdered in February 1969, while Portugal escala-ted its military activity, and held half the populationin the most northerly provinces behind barbed wi-re. The internal crisis was first overcome with theelection of Samora Machel as president and Marce-lino dos Santos as vice- president in May 1970. If official Sweden hesitated to support Frelimo

during the difficult years, university students andschool pupils did not waver in their support. JanetMondlane was Eduardo Mondlane’s widow andprincipal of the Mozambique Institute, Frelimo’s

school in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Inspired by her,SECO (Swedish Pupils’ Central Organisation) col-lected over 2 million kronor in 1969 (about 15 mil-lion today) for the Institute through Operation aDay’s Work (Operation Dagsverke). At the same timemany Swedes got to know Frelimo.The Central African Federation was dissolved in

1963. In 1962 the editors-in-chief of all the majornewspapers in Stockholm (except for conservativeSvenska Dagbladet) together with other leading libe-rals and social democrats backed Kenneth Kaundain Zambia and his party UNIP (United National In-dependence Party), to the irritation of Swedish bu-siness interests. On his visit to Sweden in 1963 hewas given a warm reception and strong support pri-or to negotiations with Great Britain. In 1964 Ma-lawi and Zambia gained their independence. An important effect of the media campaign was

that the Centre and Liberal Parties later began tosupport liberation movements in southern Africa.Rhodesia’s white minority regime banned both ZA-NU and ZAPU in 1964. By chance, ZANU’s formergeneral secretary Robert Mugabe was adopted as apolitical prisoner by Amnesty Group No. 34, led byjournalist, Eva Moberg. In November 1965 Rhodesia declared Unilateral

Independence (UDI). It was not accepted interna-tionally. In November the Security Council recom-mended that member countries introduce a com-plete prohibition on trade, which Sweden immedia-tely implemented. Further, Great Britain was exhor-ted to act to achieve majority rule, which the La-bour government did not do. Sweden vainly tried toget the Security Council to introduce mandatorysanctions. As a front line state, Zambia was forcedto pay the price for the Western powers’ passivity.Together with 2 000 political prisoners, the lea-

ders of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe we-re kept in prison, generally for about ten years. Theyand their families received support from Sidathrough the Church of Sweden (Lutheran), TheWorld Council of Churches and – on the ground –from Christian Care. Representatives of ZAPU maintain that they be-

gan the armed struggle in 1965. It is, however, morecommon to regard the Battle of Sinoia on the 28thApril 1966 between ZANU and the regime’s securi-ty forces as the start of the war of liberation in Zim-babwe. At the same time representatives for bothZAPU and the more militant ZANU came to Swe-den, in part to address May 1st rallies and take part


Woman Frelimo solider under training.


in the Socialist International’s meeting in Stock-holm. The latter led them and other liberation mo-

vements to a harsh confrontation with BritishLabour, which, in turn, contributed tothe beginning of a more independentattitude by Swedish social democra-cy. Inga Thorsson, president of theSocial Democratic Women’s League,had in 1962 already condemned Bri-tish and French party members as

“supporters of a conservative order”.After years of fruitless appeals for UN

action, the first armed clashes occurred betweenSWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization)

and South African security forces inOvamboland, northern Namibia inAugust 1966. Two months later theUN General Assembly decided torevoke the mandate from SouthAfrica and formally – though wit-hout practical effect – make Na-mibia the direct responsibility

of the UN. In 1969 the Secu-rity Council declared that

South Africa’s continued presence in Na-mibia was illegal. This was confirmed in1971 by the International Court of Justicein the Hague, but the superpowers refusedto take any action. Instead the regime in Pre-toria could focus on combating SWAPO militarily,

seeking to create internal support in Namibia for aninternationally acceptable solution, and, throughdiplomacy, play for time and block negotiations.They succeeded with this strategy up to 1988, whenSouth Africa suffered a major military defeat in An-gola.Years earlier, strong ties had developed between

Namibia and Sweden, partly through the LutheranWorld Federation and the Swedish Church(80–90% of Namibians are Christian, mostly Lut-heran), and partly through Namibian bursary stu-dents in Sweden who, alongside their studies, werepolitically very active. Aftonbladet and Arbetet (socialdemocratic papers) had already in 1966 run a cam-paign to collect money for the liberation struggle inNamibia. In line with the Security Council’s resolu-tion in August 1969 for all states to “increase theirmoral and material assistance to the people of Na-mibia in their struggle against foreign occupation”,Sweden gave economic assistance for legal defenceat political trials and to the families of prisoners.

In 1972 Aftonbladet published an open letterfrom Bishop Leonard Auala and Reve-rend Peter Gowaseb of Namibia to Pri-me Minister Vorster, in which they,with some sarcasm, asserted that SouthAfrica “has failed to become informedon Human Rights … in respect of the

non-white population”.

The old Portuguese pirate has his foothold in the colonies. Cover fromSouthern Africa Information Bulletin 1974. Published by the AfricaGroups of Sweden.

3.1965–1970FOCUS ON

PORTUGAL’SCOLONIES


11. Late 1960s – public opinion fragmentedIn the early 1960s in Sweden the media, politiciansand organisations generally rallied round demandsfor radical political changes in southern Africa.SSAK, (Swedish South Africa Committee) was for-med in 1961 and had considerable political sup-port. SUL’s fund raising for South Africa andits consumer boycott, beginning in March1963, had a great impact. Pressure on thegovernment and parliament increased toget them to decide on economic sanc-tions, which they consistently refused onthe grounds that it was a task for the UNSecurity Council.In the mid-1960s the campaign began to wa-

ne, even though certain gains could be noted: Swe-dish rock artist Little Gerhard cancelled his appea-rance in South Africa, many counties and munici-palities decided not to buy South African goods(Wrong, said the Swedish Supreme AdministrativeCourt in 1969; they may not pursue foreign polici-es), and South Africa banned the troubadour Cor-nelis Vreeswijk for having donated his fees to SSAK.The organisations backing the SSAK and SUL cam-paign returned to their day-to-day work. Only theactivists remained. In 1966 for example a folder ofwork by artists and writers was produced includinginter alia Gert Aspelin, Jörgen Fogelquist and Lage

Lindell as well as Peter Weiss and Sara Lidman. 200folders were sold for 300 kronor each to support thecampaign. It was used to print the previously cyclo-styled Southern Africa Information Bulletin (Södra Af-rika Informationsbulletin). Among its regular con-tributors was the journalist Rolf Gustafsson, laterforeign correspondent for TV2 and Svenska Dagbla-det (conservative).

Nevertheless, the pattern was clear: in 1963,225 editorials on South Africa werepublished in the 13 largest newspapers, in1966 they were nearly halved to 119, whi-le by 1969 they had fallen to 21! Outsidethe media, fewer than before were invol-ved in shaping public opinion. Two events

broke this pattern, namely stopping Rho-desian tennis players in the Davies Cup match

in Båstad in 1968, and the campaign that forcedSweden’s ASEA to withdraw from the building ofthe Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique in 1968-69.These spectacular actions created great media in-terest, reflected in both news and public opinion.Two processes complicated the solidarity work –

the liberation movements’ armed struggle and theVietnam movement. It was not a result of a strongpacifist current in Sweden. There was none: on thecontrary, in many places there was a romantic viewof guerrilla struggle. Those who raised the Budd-hists’ non-violent opposition in Vietnam tended tobe thought of as disloyal, as not showing enough

solidarity with the Vietnamese people and FNL(NLF, National Front for the Liberation of Viet-nam).Several groups sympathised with the liberation

movements’ goals, but had difficulty in backingtheir change of strategy. The government, with 85%of parliamentarians behind it, supported majorityrule in all these countries but preferred peaceful so-lutions. It was politically inconceivable that Swedisharms could be donated or sold to liberation move-ments. To a varying degree – in public at least – theliberation movements were critical of this, sincethey thus came to be militarily dependent on theEastern bloc.

In February 1966 SSAK declared its support ofthe armed struggle, but many activists in the anti-apartheid movement had already left or were ontheir way to FNL-groups. Organisations in Sweden


The flags from the three liberation movements that both the govern-ment and the Africa Groups supported. From a poster exhibition by theStockholm Africa Group in 1974.

When did African countries gain their inde-pendence?

Malawi 6.7 1964Zambia 24.10 1964Botswana 30.9 1966Lesotho 4.10 1966Mauritius 12.3 1968Swaziland 6.9 1968Guinea Bissau 10.9 1974Moçambique 25.6 1975Cape Verde 5.7 1975São Tomé and Principe 12.7 1975Angola 11.11 1975Namibia 21.3 1990South Africa 10.5 1994*

* Nelson Mandela sworn in as president; theday chosen to symbolise the ”new” SouthAfrica. Formally South Africa stopped being aBritish colony 31.5 1910

coordinated their criticism of the USA’s war in Viet-nam through the Swedish Vietnam Committee, butthe Vietnam movement was dominated by theDFFG (The United FNL-Groups) and their thous-ands of activists. The movement had Maoist leadersand anti-imperialism as the mode of interpretation.According to its “focal point theory” the struggleought to focus on the weakest point of the enemy –USA’s imperialism – and that was seen to be In-dochina. One was regarded as a sell-out if one con-

tinued to work with southern Africa.For others, opposition to Portugal’s colonial em-

pire was central. The visits to Sweden of PAIGC’Spresident Amílcar Cabral and Frelimo’s presidentEduardo Mondlane contributed to this, as they ma-de a good impression on both activists and the Swe-dish establishment. The movements’ representativesin Sweden also played an important role in this con-text: Onésimo Silveira, PAIGC, and Lourenço Mu-taca, Frelimo. In 1970, MPLA’s president Agostinho Neto and

its vice-president Daniel Chipenda visited Sweden.Their meeting with, amongst others, the Social De-mocrats’ international secretary Pierre Schori con-tributed to MPLA being allowed to open an officein Stockholm, which it shared with the StockholmAfrica Group. In the same year the first Portuguesedeserters arrived. They were given political asylumand participated actively in imparting informationon fascist Portugal. An important factor underlyingsupport to the three above-mentioned liberationmovements was that many Swedish leaders of pub-lic opinion visited liberated areas during the yearsaround 1970 and could give eye-witness accounts ofthe movements’ work.The DN journalist Anders Johansson went into

northern Mozambique with Frelimo; the AfricaGroups’ Rolf Gustavsson and Bertil Malmström,writer Göran Palm, photographers Knut Andreas-sen and Jean Hermansson, social democratic politi-cians Birgitta Dahl and Gunnar Hofring as well aspolitical scientist Lars Rudebeck all visited GuineaBissau with PAIGC, while journalists ElisabethHedborg and Hillevi Nilsson went in to eastern An-gola with MPLA. In addition, the liberal party’s Ol-le Wästberg visited Angola together with FNLA.At roughly the same time as the Africa Groups


Hillevie Nilsson from the Stockholm Africa Group interviewing PresidentAgostinho Neto in Dar es Salaam in connection with her second trip to theby MPLA liberated territory in Angola.

were formed, similar solidarity organisations werestarted in other Western European countries and inNorth America. By and large they regarded welfarein the West as being largely built on colonial plun-der, that the liberation struggles in southern Africawere, in the final analysis, directed at the USA’sworld hegemony, and that one should only supportanti-imperialist liberation movements. In Angola this meant the MPLA, but not FNLA

nor UNITA (National Union for the Total Indepen-dence of Angola). In Mozambique, Frelimo met thecriteria, but not Coremo (Mozambique Revolutio-nary Committee). In South Africa it meant theANC, but not PAC. It was significant that the UShad friendly relations with the PAC, which, unlikethe ANC, depicted whites as the enemy rather thanracism, but which repudiated ANC links to com-munism.Dick Urban Vestbro, for years a driving force in

the Swedish Africa Groups, says:During my stay in Tanzania in 1968-69, beforethe Africa Groups were formed, I had madecontact with a number of people in the solida-rity movement. Among them I met Prexy Nes-bitt with roots in Christian and radical blackgroups in USA (later employed by the WorldCouncil of Churches’ international campaignagainst racism); the Canadian political scien-tist John Saul, who later started the Toronto-based solidarity group TCLSAC; the Italian po-litical scientist Giovanni Arrighi, who had con-tact with left groups in Italy; Peter Meyns, whocame to participate in the West German solida-rity movement; as well as Mikko Lohikoski andBörje Mattsson, who worked with Finnish pea-ce activists and the World Peace Council.During my time in Tanzania I had regular con-

tact with the liberation movements Frelimo,MPLA, ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU, all of whichhad offices in Dar es Salaam. I also establishedcontact with the radical student movement atthe University of Dar es Salaam.

The Angola Comité in the Netherlands invited thenew solidarity groups to the first joint conferenceover Easter 1970 in Driebergen. Seven from Swedenattended, including Dick Urban Vestbro. An inter-national network thus became feasible, and theytook the decision to exchange material. The Dutchwere publishing the fortnightly Facts and Reports, abulletin of press clippings, an invaluable source ofinformation on developments in southern Africa.The second conference was held in Valkenburg,Holland over Easter 1971, and Mai Palmberg led theAfrica Groups’ delegation. Unlike many other soli-darity groups, the Angola Comité had good con-tacts with churches and other established organisa-tions. Dick Urban Vestbro:

I regarded this with a certain scepticism, but atthe same time was forced to realise that theysucceeded in affecting public opinion in Hol-land while we remained within the student left.

Prior to the UN’s Conference on the Human Envi-


”At roughly the same time as the AfricaGroups were formed, similar solidarityorganisations were started in other Westerneuropean countries and in north America. By and large they regarded welfare in the Westas being largely built on colonial plunder.”


ronment held in Stockholm in June 1972 the AfricaGroups were one of the organisers of the Alternati-ve Environment Conference. One of its main topicswas environmental degradation due to the USA’swar in Vietnam. In line with this topic, Stockholm’sAfrica Group compiled a publication on the use ofnapalm and herbicides in Angola and Mozambique.By using the UN’s definition of genocide one wan-ted to show that similar things were happening inPortugal’s colonies. Most of those who participated in these joint so-

lidarity conferences belonged to the new left andwere critical of the Soviet system. There were, ho-wever, some who were more kindly disposed to theSoviet Union, like the French Committee againstRacism and Colonialism, a Belgian South Africa

Committee and Finnish activists in contact with theWorld Peace Council’s office in Helsinki. Even inthe new left it was tempting not to be too critical ofthe Soviet system, since the liberation movementsreceived crucial support from the Eastern bloc.When China broke with the Soviet Union, pro-Chi-nese groups in the West wanted the solidarity mo-vement to support movements in Africa favouredby China. They were few and weak, and these de-mands did not seriously threaten the unity of thesolidarity movements.

12. No tennis in Båstad1968 was the year of youth revolt: Paris, London,Rome, Berlin, Tokyo, Cape Town, yes, even Stock-holm, which felt it was a part through a pseudo-re-

The press cutting bulletin Facts and Reports from the Nederland was an important source of information. It was partlyfunded from Sweden via Sida.

volutionary occupation of the student union. ThePrague spring blossomed; there was hope for the fu-ture and new political energy. In January Sweden was drawn to play tennis

against Rhodesia in the Davis Cup. In March theSmith regime executed three freedom fighters, de-spite international protests. In Sweden the govern-ment strongly condemned this. In parliament, Libe-ral Party leader Sven Wedén maintained that to playthe game against Rhodesia would conflict with “the

views of a very broad Swedish public”. The SocialDemocratic government did not plan to prevent thematch, though Sweden had broken with the regimein Salisbury. They maintained that it was up to tho-se close to the sponsor Enskilda Banken – the Swe-dish Tennis Association and its spokesman, MatsHasselqvist – to take a stand. In different ways ZAPU and ZANU declared

their resolute opposition to the match. The SouthAfrica Committee in Lund took the initiative to


Big variationin the viewsby differentnewspa-pers.”Eggs,oil on thecourt inBåstad.” “Oilbombs stop-ped the mat-ch.” “Topsecret newvenue.” “Thepolice didthe rightthing.” “TheBattle ofBåstad.” De-monstratingnun asha-med of hergeneration.”“The Battleof Båstad.”“We saw po-lice beatyoung girls.”


start “a temporary anti-fascist, anti-imperialist uni-ted front of individuals”, who saw it as their task tostop the match. In southern Sweden they mobilised,did recognisance in Båstad, planned the tactics, andkept contact with the mass media and with otherdemonstrators like the youth leagues of the Liberal,Centre and Social Democratic youth (FPU, CUFand SSU). Although the profile was lower in Uppsa-la and Stockholm, mobilisation was similar. On 3rdMay 1968 everything was in place, the police andthe 500 – 1 000 demonstrators, mainly students.The demonstrations were successful. The matchwas stopped, before it had even begun.Reactions were strong. “Double fault in Båstad”

wrote Liberal Party politician Hadar Cars in DagensNyheter. Almost without exception excited journa-

lists and politicians ac-cused activists of intro-ducing violence into thepolitical arena. Thishardly correspondedwith what actually hap-pened. When several ofthe political youth orga-nisations later expressedtheir support for the de-monstrators, public opi-nion began to swing

towards a greater understanding of the “heatedcommitment” of the youth. Prime Minister Tage Erlander said that if the

Swedish Tennis Association had simply asked thegovernment for advice, they would have been advi-sed against playing the match. Instead he invited theyouth organisations to a discussion on 14th May.Six ministers with Erlander in the lead had a five-hour session with representatives of 59 youth orga-

nisations from the whole political spectrum andfrom other sectors. Zimbabwe was hardly mentio-ned in the debate, as it instead focused on the rightto demonstrate, the rules of the game in a democra-tic society, and the Vietnam War.Both FPU and SSU gave economic support to

ZAPU after Båstad, while the government increasedits humanitarian support to Zimbabwe.

13. Drama at the water gateWhy was media reporting from Båstad so exaggera-ted and misleading? One reason was their never-en-ding need for dramatic, saleable news. To some ex-tent it was also due to a simple misunderstanding.The main troop of journalists had first gathered atthe southern gate. All was calm there, but when theygot to the northern one, they arrived in the midst ofchaotic events. Bertil Malmström, a leading activistfrom Uppsala, explains:

Shouting the slogans, “Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe,Zimbabwe” and “Stop the match! Stop thematch!” we arrived at the narrow street leadingto the northern entrance of the tennis stadium.There no one seemed to know what to do. Afew people shook the gates that slid upwardsand outwards. At first only three or four policestood in front of us, but then several rushedforward to close the opening. Turmoil arosewhen those of us in the front did not backaway and police began to hit us with their ba-tons. I could not just remain faceless in thecrowd. I managed to get the people at the backto sit down, forced myself further forward andsoon virtually all were sitting down in front ofthe police. But the police wanted to close thegate, while some were sitting in the way andthey came at us with a new baton attack.

”six ministers with erlander inthe lead had a five-hour

session with representativesof 59 youth organisations from

the whole political spectrumand from other sectors.”

I came face to face with a policeman. Weeach pulled at either side of the gate while awoman was being squashed as she was lying onthe ground in front of him. There was only adecimetre or so between our faces when I bel-lowed: “Let go! Stop! You’re hurting her!” I canstill feel the anger inside me when I yelled. Thewoman was freed without serious injury. Onlyat this point did photographers and journalistsarrive. They saw a violent confrontation at theopening of the gate and interpreted it asthough we were trying to attack, “storm in”.

That would have been an idiotic tactic. We on-ly wanted to block the entrance.Suddenly there was water! Never before had

water been used against demonstrators in Swe-den. Riot police in Berlin or Paris used watercannons. Here the fire brigade in Båstad spray-ed us to drive us away. The pressure drove backthose of us who were sitting at the front andthe right side of the gate was closed again. Sud-denly the stream of water stopped. Klas Hell-borg from Lund was part of a group of acti-vists who had gone in early with tickets and sat


The police tries to close the gate. Bertil Malmström to the right.

on the stands. He sprang down and cut off thefire hose. Yet the water returned and soon thepolice even began to use teargas. This wasanother novelty in controlling Swedish de-monstrations. The teargas spread further withthe stream of water and the whole of our dren-ched crowd gave way. Their eyes burning, mostran away but after a while we gathered in acompact group again in front of the gate thatwas now completely closed. Although the gate was now locked, the fire

brigade continued to shower us for another fif-teen minutes. Those with placards used themas shields, others angrily tore down the barbedwire and net fence to the right of the entranceand upturned a ticket box… in the tumult andstruggle we had been welded into a dynamiccollective. This expressed itself in slogans: “Do you smell the stink from the Enskilda

Bank?”, “Hasselqvist is racist” (they rhymed sowell and there was some basis for the charge inthe clumsy statements he made). “Warm your-selves, comrades” someone began to chant andsoon all 300 of us were hopping up and down.We sang “The Red Flag” and the Vietnamese li-beration song “Liberate the South” and we cri-ed, with laughter and self-irony: “Nothing canstop the people’s tidal wave!”

At the other gate a peaceful and dry sit-in blocka-ded the entrance. At a legal distance the politicalyouth leagues watched from a hill. Nothing drama-tic. Bertil Malmström:

From the loudspeakers in the stadium weheard the message that the match was cancel-led. We were sceptical … On the other hand, Irealised that it was essential not to allow any of

the power we had just created to slip awayfrom us. I waited a while, then I hopped uponto the stone wall and yelled: “Comrades wehave won! We have won here and now!” Itmight have seemed as though I had new andmy own information, but I didn’t. I took achance.We broke the blockade and, orderly, more or

less four to each row, wet and shivering, we fi-led back to the place where we’d met, wherecomrades from the “dry” gate applauded us.Afterwards many newspapers tried to portraythis as a “sad retreat”, but in his book FalletBåstad (The Båstad Case) Bo Lindholm wrotethat there was a fantastic atmosphere: “They were jubilantly happy, laughing and

singing youths (a few were middle-aged), whoreturned from the tennis stadium. That is whatone sees in all the pictures, that was what weourselves saw when we went to Båstad.”The entire action had taken no more than

two hours.

14. Cabora Bassa – political dynamiteDid Båstad have an impact? As a youthful revolt itwas soon overshadowed in the media by the occu-pation of the student union house in Stockholm atthe end of May 1968. A week after Båstad, activistsfaced a new tactical question: Rolf Gustavsson inSouthern Africa Information Bulletin and AndersJohansson in DN raised the alarm about plans tobuild a hydro-electric power dam at Cabora Bassain Mozambique.The idea was to produce enough electricity to

supply nearly all of southern Africa. A huge dam –the fifth largest in world – and a power stationwould be built on the Zambezi river by ZAMCO


(Zambezi Development Scheme Consortium). Itwould supply South Africa’s mining and manufac-turing industries with electricity through 1 420 kmlong lines. Sweden’s ASEA (now ABB) joined ZAM-CO, which consisted of companies from 15 countri-es with South Africa’s Anglo-American at the helm.ASEA’s share of the order was only 10 per cent butstill was one of the largest orders ever placed. ASEAwas a world leader in its area and thus an attractivepartner.Frelimo was very negative towards the project;

both Portugal and the white minority regimeswould gain economically. At this time half of Portu-gal’s budget went to the military. Membership ofEFTA (European Free Trade Association) led to gre-ater foreign, even Swedish, investments, and thetourist industry was growing. Pierre Schori (s) hadin the social democratic journal Tiden (1967) writ-ten that “last year 12 500 Swedish tourists contribu-ted to financing the war”. A stronger Portugueseeconomy would protract the war. Eduardo Mondla-ne had cultivated close contact with the social de-mocrats. That did not prevent him from criticisingthe Swedish government for its refusal to subjectPortugal to economic sanctions. He had personalrelations with DN’s editor-in-chief, Olof Lagercran-tz, and had contact with liberals like David Wir-mark. In an interview published in Liberal Debatt(Liberal Debate) in 1966, Mondlane pointed out:

You are too neutral in Sweden at present … IfSweden’s words about solidarity with us are tobe taken seriously, it is logical that we can ex-pect Sweden to put pressure on Portugal.

Expulsion from EFTA and economic boycott wereMondlane’s demands, and they were supported byliberals like Per Ahlmark and by VPK (Left Party


Cabora Bassa is the theme in Uppsala 1979 of a Teach-In, a mobilisingmethod of several short lectures developed by radical movements inUSA.

Communists, Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna). InMarch 1967 the First Chamber heard an unusuallytough debate between Per Ahlmark and the Minis-ter of Trade, Gunnar Lange, where the latter pro-pounded the thesis of industrial development as alever for democracy. The news about ASEA, ZAM-CO and Cabora Bassa triggered the same debatewithin the social democratic party a year later.In a series of DN articles in April 1968, Anders

Johansson was the first international journalist toreport from liberated areas in Mozambique, therebyundermining Portugal’s credibility. A few monthslater he could show how Rhodesia was also involvedin the Cabora Bassa project. Among leading acti-vists on the left, like Dick Urban Vestbro, there wasconsiderable scepticism towards Frelimo for quite a

while, which he later self-critically admitted:We in the South Africa committees … believedthat our work against imperialism and capita-lism was as important as Frelimo’s, if not moreso… We saw ourselves as true revolutionaries(and) had criticised Frelimo for being officiallyrepresented by an American middle-class wo-man (Eduardo Mondlane’s wife, Janet) … a house-wife from Chicago.

SSU Stockholm was one of the first to demand thatthe government should stop ASEA’s participation inthe project. SSU was backed by Aftonbladet. On theother side stood the government and LO and itsmember Metall, the union that organised the metalworkers at ASEA in Västerås. For them the issueconcerned 300 jobs over three years.The government was certainly critical of Swedish

investments in Mozambique, Lange argued, butASEA was not an investor, only a seller. In addition,a trade war was not the right way to oppose SouthAfrica and Portugal. As previously, only the Securi-ty Council was seen as having the mandate to takebinding resolutions about sanctions. The govern-ment chose to ignore information in mid-1968 thatRhodesian companies would be among the suppli-ers to the ZAMCO project. In the South AfricaCommittee in Uppsala this was taken as evidencethat, for the social democrats, “class cooperation le-ads to … structural fascism”.As the government continued to defend ASEA’s

role in ZAMCO, the UN General Assembly (No-vember 1968) passed a resolution regretting theeconomic interests that operated in the Portuguesecolonies. They “stand in the way … of self-determi-nation, freedom and independence and … strengt-hen Portugal’s military efforts”. This was in line


Fake headline poster by the Uppsala South Africa committee. “Genocidein Mozambique. ASEA profits. The government silent” This triggered thereal one “ The coup against the headline poster of Expressen a politicalflash action”

with the arguments of Swedish critics. Ten days later, Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson

declared that the government had contact with anumber of African liberation movements and was“prepared to help … with humanitarian support”which would make it easier for their members “tocontinue the struggle for the liberation of their peo-ple”. A few weeks earlier PAIGC’s president AmílcarCabral visited Sweden for the first time to seek Swe-dish support. Before Christmas the Foreign Mi-nistry began to explore how the government in Gu-inea-Conakry, where PAIGC had its external base,would interpret such support. The reply was positi-ve.In May 1969 parliament’s Standing Committee

on Finance declared that support to African libera-tion movements was consistent with internationallaw, since the UN had taken a clear stand against theoppression of people who strive for national free-dom. It also approved the support to PAIGC, if onlythe practical questions could be resolved. TherebySweden became the first country in West to givedirect official humanitarian assistance to liberationmovements in the Portuguese colonies and in sout-hern Africa. Economic support was thus okay, but not econo-

mic sanctions – not even against Portugal.Government policies were contradictory, which

was pointed out by representatives of Frelimo andZANU. Possibly it reflected internal contradictions.In any case, the Social Democratic Party was deeplysplit. At a party meeting in Stockholm in early 1969,which Tage Erlander addressed, a resolution wasunanimously adopted that accused the party lea-dership of double moral standards. This initiativewas taken by parliamentarian Oskar Lindqvist. In late 1969 ASEA withdrew from the project, af-

ter parliament in Mayratified UN sanctionsagainst Rhodesia.Through this the go-vernment would havebeen able to stopASEA. Now the lawwas never tested, sin-ce the companydropped out of itsown accord. Parliamentary de-

bate on the Rho-desia law neverthe-less gave an indica-tion of the line theSocial Democratswould follow withOlof Palme as partyleader. Severalmembers – bothsocial democrats li-ke Jan Bergqvist andliberals like Per Ahl-mark and Ola Ulls-ten – advocated increased control of private invest-ments abroad. Birgitta Dahl (s) appealed for thecoordination of trade, international developmentcooperation and foreign policy to foster internatio-nal solidarity. Therefore development assistancepolicies ought to be aimed at progressive countriesand support should be given to social liberationmovements.

15. Sweden’s two facesSince the 1920s and the League of Nations, interna-tional law has been the foundation on which Swe-


“ASEA pulls out from Cabora Bassa. The go-vernment relieved.” September 3 1969 ASEA gi-ve up. At the same time the poster declare thedeath of Ho Chi Min in Vietnam.


“It was dramatic,” Birgitta Dahl described her visitin 1970 to areas in Guinea Bissau liberated byPAIGC. Then she was a new member of parlia-ment (s) and the first democratically elected parli-amentarian to pay such a visit:

The Portuguese undertook a major attackwhile we were there. We walked at nightbetween the villages, since they were pursuingus. We waded to our waists in dirty water, andactive vaccines against all the risk factors didnot exist. So I was affected by lice and diarr-hoea. We visited hospitals and schools and slept

in ordinary huts on wooden bunks. We inter-viewed people and saw how it worked. Con-versations and discussions sometimes had tobe interpreted in three or four steps: Portugu-ese, French while in the villages they onlyspoke their local languages.I met PAIGC-president Amílcar Cabral

and he became my friend for life, as did ot-hers who I met there. In 1972 Cabral was theguest speaker at the party congress – just halfa year before he was murdered. He was one ofthe greatest ideologists of the twentieth cen-tury, with a clearly thought-out ideology onhow society should be constructed with re-spect for human rights and the country’s cul-ture. He broke with the traditional view ofwomen’s position.

In 1975 two generals came from the arena of thewar in Guinea Bissau to Sweden as representatives

of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) – the Por-tuguese government. Birgitta Dahl was asked byOlof Palme to host to them for a day.

I was a young woman in a floral outfit, andthey flirted shamelessly with me in a very ma-le chauvinist way. We stood on the lawn atHarpsund and waited for Olof Palme, andthen I thought that I must put an end to it, soI said: “Do you know that we have somethingin common?” – Oh, yes, they thought and be-lieved something else. “We have all been inGuinea Bissau,” said I. Then they blushed,from their toes upwards.One had been commander-in-chief and

the other head of security, and responsible forattempts to capture me dead or alive. Nowthey realised that I was the same person andstood before them. In the end one of themsucceeded in stammering: “Is it true, Mada-me, that you wore uniform?” “Yes”, I replied,“we were naïve enough to think you wouldrespect international law.”

Hunted politicians and embarrassed generals

Brigitta Dahl visiting PAIGC in Guinea Bissau.

dish foreign policy has rested. It was defined as“non-interference in the internal affairs of indepen-dent states”. The most prominent advocate of thisattitude was Östen Undén (Foreign Minister1924–26 and 1945–62), who combined it with acautious policy of strict neutrality to the powerblocs. The UN Security Council was regarded as theguarantor of peace and security – even for smallcountries – which in turn should maintain a mo-dest international profile. This line was broken in December 1959, when

Sweden was the first Western country to vote for Al-geria’s right to self-determination. The Undén planthat aimed to stop nuclear proliferation (adoptedby the UN General Assembly in 1961) was anotherstep in the same direction.International law continued to be the basis of

Swedish foreign policy, but its interpretation beca-me increasingly activist. The world drew closer. Fo-reign policy ought thus not simply to respect inter-national law but foster “peoples’ right to self-deter-mination”. Thus, from being an argument for non-policies, international law became a reason for anactive foreign policy. Several factors interacted tomove Swedish foreign policy in this direction:• The role of the Swede Dag Hammarskjöld – andnot least his death in a plane over the Congo –while General Secretary of the UN, (1953–61);

• The 6 300 Swedish UN peace-keeping troops inCongo (1960–64), of whom 18 were killed;

• The dramatic decolonisation of Africa and sout-hern Africa’s struggle for liberation;

• Swedish – particularly social democratic – poli-ticians close relations to leaders of the Front Li-ne States and liberation movements in southernAfrica from the mid-1960s;

• The Vietnam war;

• A new generation of social democratic politici-ans gradually taking over, and Olof Palme beingelected party chairman in 1969.

In 1965, Palme held an epoch-making foreign poli-cy speech at the Christian Social Democrats Con-gress held in Gävle, where he spoke about an “ex-plosive force of unbelievable strength… a tidal wa-ve” posed by nationalism in Asia and Africa. “Thesestrivings for liberation… We must learn to live withthem and perhaps also for them.” At the same timehe highlighted the catalogue of sins of the old colo-nial powers:

While proclaiming ideals of freedom for the ci-tizens of ones own country, one practised quitedifferent policies in the foreign countries, exer-cising power over people that became increa-singly oppressive… There is an illusory beliefthat one can meet demands for social justicewith violence and military force.

In Gävle, Palme did not use the term human rights,but it was implicitly there, as a given condition forpeople’s right to freedom and self-determination:


The engagement for Africa bythe Swede Dag Hammarsköldas the UN Secretary Generalhad a great influence on therole of the Swedish govern-ment.


Olof Palme and the trade union leader Arne Geijer meets the president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere 1969.

The basic values of democratic socialism obli-ge us … to stand on the side of the oppressedagainst the oppressors, on the side of the mise-rable and the poor against those who exploitthem and their masters.

It was perhaps an anti-imperialist speech, with theUSA as the primary target (without letting the Sovi-et Union off the hook), and with consequences forrelevant policies on both Vietnam and southern Af-rica.Two articles in the journal Tiden can be said to

stand for the state’s two faces, and similarly for theold and new faces of social democracy. The parlia-mentarian Kaj Björk (s) maintained in Sydafrika ochvi (1965, South Africa and us), written at the re-quest of the board of the party, that support to libe-ration movements conducting an armed strugglecontradicted the principle of non-involvement inthe international law of nations. This argument didnot reduce the criticism of the government. In 1968Pierre Schori, then social democratic internationalsecretary, wrote Befrielserörelserna och vi (Liberationmovements and us). His main message was the re-verse; that the movements ought to get support ontheir own conditions. The same argument was laterpursued by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson in ahistoric speech in December 1968. The cautious li-ne of the old guard had lost – in principle. While this created conditions for a political dia-

logue with radical younger groups in Sweden, it st-rengthened the ties to the liberation movementsand thus also the opportunities of influencing themin a democratic direction. Perhaps it also, as diplo-mat Mats Bergquist pointed out, had:

“… a positive side-effect on security policies,when, through this, one gave a country a clearinternational profile. The country became vi-sible, as a result of which the threshold for ex-ternal political pressure was raised and the li-kelihood of international support actually inc-reased.”

In 1965 Palme had been heavily criticised by the op-position for his speech in Gävle, but early in 1969there was another mood. In a liberal party report,Stöd åt Motståndsrörelser (Support for Liberationmovements) it said that “our feelings of sympathyought not to be linked to some kind of diplomaticcaution nor take cognizance of trade relations”. Inits view of the liberation movements’ violence it wasclose to the Lusaka Manifesto (see below) and wascriticised for this from both the right and the left. Inpractice the principle “no military support butdirect humanitarian support to the movements”became the guidelines not only for the liberal party.All members of parliament – except the moderates– wanted to regard themselves as friends of the libe-ration movements in southern Africa (on the ques-tion of Vietnam public opinion was very different,which may be linked to the USA being an actor the-re while it did not appear to be in southern Africa).Contradictions remaining regarding economic

sanctions against the Portuguese and southern Afri-can regimes nonetheless showed that Sweden hadnot yet come to terms with its two faces.



Portugal did not mange to crush the liberation movements despite the backing from NATO.

4. 1970–1975PORTUGAL PHASES OUT ITS EMPIRE


16. From Khartoum to LusakaIn January 1969 an international solidarity confe-rence was organised in Khartoum. With strong sup-port from the Eastern bloc, over 200 delegates from50 countries participated. The majority were com-munists, but there were others like the British La-bour Party and the International Defence and AidFund (IDAF). On behalf of the liberation move-ments Eduardo Mondlane explained that the “libe-ration movements believe that the shortest and on-ly path to freedom is to be cleared by fire” – a decla-ration fitting the times. It was of greater political significance that the de-

cision was made to exclusively recognise MPLA,PAIGC, Frelimo, ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU. Thelast-named in time led to considerable problems,since ZANU revealed itself to be the stronger move-ment. Sweden’s government never formally took aposition on the “Khartoum Alliance” but – irrespec-tive of the political majority in parliament – inpractice supported them, with the addition of ZA-NU. This attitude also came to be reflected in popu-lar support to liberation movements.Three months after Khartoum the representati-

ves of thirteen independent states in East andCentral Africa attended a meeting where Zambia’sKenneth Kaunda presided and Tanzania’s Julius Ny-erere had a leading part. It resulted in the LusakaManifesto on southern Africa, in which the tonediffered. Based on the principle of human equality,

they explained that they had always preferred toachieve liberation without physical violence, andthat they did not advocate violence, but an end tothe violence … perpetrated by the oppressors of Af-rica:

The presidents Kaunda (left) and Nyerere played a big ro-le in supporting the liberation movements.

In March 1970 Senegal’s president Leopold Sédar Senghorblocked transport routes for PAIGC at Guinea-Conakry’snorthern border and closed their hospitals on Senegalesesoil – a major setback for the movement. In April he lan-ded in Sweden on a tour of Scandinavia. He was expectedto pay an official visit in Uppsala on 6th May and lectureat the university on “African Socialism”. This was a situa-tion that called for action, the South Africa committeethought. In the words of activist Bertil Malmström:

When president Senghor arrived his first stop was atthe University library, Carolina Redeviva. At the footof the stairs the president was met not only by the vi-ce-chancellor of the university and the head librari-an, but also by innocently resting students who sud-denly became demonstrators, spread out a bannerand raised posters. A film team on site was actuallyour own. Inside, in the quiet of the reading room,people also silently raised signs with French text.The main action took place at the public meeting

at the university that evening. When Senghor and hiscompanions walked into Hall IX, I walked past thechairperson of the Association of International Af-fairs, climbed onto the podium before him and toldhim: “I’ll just say a few words”. From the other sidePelle Jacobsson and Bert Fridlund came. We had allchanged our usual casual jerseys for jackets and ties.I opened the meeting and introduced Pelle and ittook a while before everyone grasped that we did notrepresent the association nor the respected Senghor.

Krister and Stefan, both largemen, had joined us and were stan-ding on either side of us. Theywere to act as gentle bodyguards,stand in the way, and talk calmlyto anyone who wanted to interfe-re. The association’s chairperson

tried to switch off the micropho-ne and the Vice-Chancellor wal-ked up to me below the stageand with a red face he cried,“Stop this nonsense!” but the au-dience showed their support andcalled out “Let him speak” and answered “Yes” to thequestion of whether we should have a discussioninstead of a lecture. We naturally did not know whatwould happen at the meeting, we were prepared tohave a debate, but it seemed as likely that we wouldbe arrested. Surprisingly quickly, Senghor, his escortsand hosts decided to leave the hall, the audience app-lauded and our people opened out their hidden ban-ners. According to police dressed in civilian clothes,who stood right at the back of the hall, it was all overin three minutes.

The reaction of the Upsala Nya Tidning (Uppsala New Pa-per) is expressed in the headline: Does the Uppsala SouthAfrica Committee believe it is divine?

A divine South Africa committee?

When president Senghor left the meeting the banners were unfolded.

A screen-printed pos-ter seen everywherewhere president Seng-hor came.

If peaceful progress to emancipation were pos-sible (now) or … in the future, we would urgeour brothers in the liberation movements touse peaceful methods of struggle even at a costof some compromise in the timing of thechange. But while peaceful progress is blockedby actions of those at present in power…, wehave no choice but to give to the peoples ofthose territories all the support of which weare capable in their struggles against theiroppressors.

Even if the manifesto was not exactly what the libe-ration movements desired, it later gained supportfrom both the Organization of African Unity(OAU) and the UN General Assembly. In March1970 Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson praised theAfrican leaders for their high principles “to the gre-at provocation by the white oppressor regimes” andcalled the manifesto “a Magna Carta for all who livein southern Africa”.

17. Swedish sardines confound the Portuguese militaryIn May 1969 parliament had approved direct huma-nitarian support to the liberation movements. InJune, Curt Ström at Sida could report on his mee-ting in Conakry with Amílcar Cabral, “a cheerfulyoung agronomist, elegant, intellectual [and] with aquick and lively way of talking. No pathetic appealsor solemn declarations”. The need for support wasimmeasurable, but PAIGC did not ask for arms, mi-litary resources or stipends from Sweden. Insteadthey requested food, material, blankets, pots andpans, crockery and cutlery, and resources for healthcare, education, etc. “within and outside the areas of

fighting”. Most of it ended up in Guinea Bissau, andonce it was there the clinics and food supplies bene-fited both villagers and freedom fighters. During Cabral’s visit to the Social Democratic

Party Congress, the first delivery left on 29th Sep-tember. This paved the way for support to several li-beration movements, but PAIGC continued to befavoured until Guinea Bissau was free in 1974. Inthe liberated areas 80% of the population was illite-rate, children, in particular, suffered from malnutri-tion, the whole health sector was problematic, andthe supply of necessities was under constant threatof Portuguese bombings. For PAIGC – in practicewith government responsibility for these areas –Sweden’s assistance not only filled a humanitarianbut also a political function. “With schools and hos-pitals we can win the war,” declared Cabral.For activists in the Africa Groups this was not

enough. In 1972, when no military assistance wasgiven, it was taken as evidence of paternalism and ofgovernment attempts to “achieve a neo-colonial so-lution” in the Portuguese colonies. In practice, hu-manitarian assistance acquired a fairly broad defini-tion, as civilian or non-military. So Sida deliveredtwo large trucks furnished with mobile radio trans-mitters and studio equipment to support PAIGC’S


”the need for support was immeasurable,but pAiGc did not ask for arms, militaryresources or stipends from sweden. insteadthey requested food, material, blankets, potsand pans, crockery and cutlery, andresources for health care, education, etc.“


educational programme, as well as hundreds of ra-dio receivers. With them one could start broadcas-ting in September 1972 – and reach the whole ofGuinea Bissau and Cape Verde – naturally also withpolitical propaganda.It turned out that even a non-military commodi-

ty like Swedish sardines in tomato sauce could beutilised in psychological warfare. Stig Lövgren men-tions that Sida once bought 400 000 tins (about 100tons of tinned fish) from a Swedish factory that as-ked if they should print a special label. Lövgrencontacted Onésimo Silveira, PAIGC’S representati-ve in Sweden, who was very enthusiastic:

It was not until later that I realised why hebecame ecstatic. He decided on a label with thePAIGC flag and with the text, “From the libe-

rated areas of Guinea Bissau”. Years after I wastold that [PAIGC] had arranged for these tinsto appear in different places where the Portu-guese still held power. They even distributedsome of the tins in Bissau, the capital. You canimagine what an effective psychological wea-pon this was.

18. Early support but late recognitionIn April 1972 a group – sent by the UN SpecialCommittee on Decolonization of which Swedenwas the only West European member – visited theliberated areas in Guinea Bissau. The assignment,conducted in an “underground” way, led to strongPortuguese protests and intensified bombing of theliberated areas. Folke Löfgren, a Swedish diplomat

The leader of PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, pulled large crowds to his speech in the university hall in Uppsala October 3 1969.

at the UN and one of the three in the group, laterremarked, “We were naive enough to believe that itwas not possible for Portugal to treat the UN in thatmanner”.The UN delegation was “impressed by the enthu-

siastic and whole-hearted cooperation that PAIGCgets from the population in the liberated areas andof the extent to which they participate in the admi-nistration that the liberation movement has set up”.Their conclusion was that PAIGC effectively con-trolled the liberated areas. Though they recommen-ded recognition of an independent Guinea Bissau,the Decolonization Committee contented itselfwith rapidly recognising PAIGC as the “territory’ssole and genuine representative”. For the first time in the history of the UN, in this

period, the liberation movements were invited toappear in the UN General Assembly. The idea wasfor Amílcar Cabral to have been given that honour,but Swedish and Nordic objections of a legalistic ty-pe frustrated this. In consideration to them he dec-lined: “Look, the Nordic countries are our friends.They have supported us through thick and thin,and we do not wish to embarrass them.” Cabral’spragmatic diplomacy was, however, badly rewardedby the Swedish government, which acted judiciallyrather than politically. After elections in the liberated areas, Guinea Bis-

sau was declared a sovereign republic on 24th Sep-tember 1973 with Luís Cabral as president. Theevent was portrayed in a unique documentary forTV, En nations födelse (Birth of a nation), by thefilm team of Lennart Malmer and Ingela Romare,who later filmed a number of programmes on Gui-nea Bissau. After only a few weeks the new state hadbeen recognised by over 60 governments, and on19th November 1973 the republic of Guinea Bissau

was recognised by the OAU, though not by a doub-ting Sweden. The reason: PAIGC did not control theentire territory of Guinea Bissau.The social democratic government was severely

criticised for this position not only by the AfricaGroups and the Left Party Communists but also byparty members like Birgitta Dahl. The political di-lemma was resolved through the Carnation Revolu-tion in Portugal in April 1974 by MFA (Armed For-ces Movement). It paved the way for democracy anda declaration in July on national independence forthe colonies in Africa. On 9th August 1974 the Swe-dish government recognised the Republic of GuineaBissau. A month later the republic was formally


“Amilcar Cabral murdered 20.1.73. The strugglecontinues. Crush imperialism, support FRELIMO.”Poster from the Uppsala Africa Group.

declared independent and Guinea Bissau became amember of the UN.Cape Verde’s declaration of independence was

delayed until July 1975, and in January 1981 theislands left the union with Guinea Bissau.

19. Success for FrelimoAt its most, Portugal had 70 000 troops in Mozam-bique. It meant an unbelievable amount of suffer-ing for the local population. SSU (Swedish SocialDemocratic Youth) thus had strong arguments inits information campaign “Portugal out of southernAfrica” and for its collection for the liberation mo-vements PAIGC, MPLA and Frelimo. On the Sun-day in 1970 when the Christmas decorations wereset up, demonstrations were held throughout Swe-den.Frelimo had come to grips with its internal crisis,

relations to Tanzania were resolved, and the Mo-zambique Institute had reopened at a new site. InNovember 1970 Joaquim Chissano, one of leadersand a future president of Mozambique, was in a de-legation visiting Sweden to meet the Foreign Mi-nistry, Emmaus Björkå, the social democrats, theAfrica Groups and others. Discussions with Sida ledto a formal application for support. Particular emp-hasis was placed on needs in relation to educationand health care and for “people’s shops” in the libe-rated areas.Anders Forsse, Vice-General Director of Sida,

met Marcelino dos Santos, Frelimo’s Vice-Presi-dent, in Dar es Salaam in February 1971, but Forssewas not impressed. In a report to the Board for Hu-manitarian Assistance – where decisions on supportto liberation movements were taken – he maintai-ned that the movement had developed “from Dan-ton to Robespierre”, that Janet Mondlane was “a

cooing ornament”, and that dos Santos was rumou-red “recently to have received a high Soviet decora-tion”. His conclusion was that Frelimo’s interest in“material support from us is strikingly weaker thanour explicit interest in giving such support”.The Board, which was started in the 1960s, was

made up of people from various parts of Swedishsociety; popular movements, organisations andknowledgeable individuals there in their personalcapacity. As vice-chairperson, Forsse and his reportshould have weighed heavily. Despite this, it was re-commended that support of 750 000 kronor shouldbe disbursed through the Mozambique Institute toFrelimo – in line with Chissano’s intentions. A de-termining factor was probably that Per Wästbergdid not share Forsse’s view. He wrote in DN: “It is aliberation to cross the border”, a conclusion he drewfrom a visit to the area at the beginning of the year.Support to Frelimo grew rapidly but never reachedthe levels of that to PAIGC. Initially it was materialsupport, but – after trucks shipped by boat were“hijacked” in Beira by the Portuguese security poli-ce – cash support became a growing part of the assi-stance.More than any other liberation movement, Freli-

mo wanted military support, in vain. For this thegovernment was criticised by the Africa Groups and– a surprising echo – by Maji Maji, the organ of theTanganyika African National Union Youth League,which wrote about “Swedish imperialism”. Moreimportant to the Swedish public was that LennartMalmer and Ingela Romare in November 1971 ac-companied Joaquim Chissano for three weeks inthe Cabo Delgado province. Their TV documentaryI vårt land börjar kulorna blomma (When bullets be-gin to flower) was broadcasted in early 1972.1973 was the year of Frelimo’s breakthrough in


Sweden and the Nordic countries as a whole. InApril a major conference was held in Oslo on colo-nialism and apartheid, organised by the UN andOAU. The result was a victory,Marcelino dos Santos main-tained on his visit to the Fo-reign Ministry afterwards.The liberation movementsparticipated on the sameterms as government repre-sentatives. Representatives ofeight liberation movementscame to Stockholm fromOslo. There was a goodshowing by the media, an offi-cial reception at the ForeignMinistry and diverse mee-tings with popular move-ments. In addition there was aspecial working lunch withForeign Minister KristerWickman and dos Santos aswell as MPLA’s presidentAgostinho Neto and LucetteAndrade Cabral, PAIGC.In July the world press was rocked by dramatic

news from Mozambique. To coincide with the visitto London of the Portuguese Premier Caetano, theBritish priest Adrian Hastings published eyewitnesstestimony from Spanish missionaries of a massacrein Wiriyamu, a village south of the provincial capi-tal Tete. A year earlier Portuguese paratroopers hadslaughtered 400 villagers there. Four days later Wickman launched an appeal in

Aftonbladet to “initiate broad political action againstPortugal’s colonial wars in Africa”. At the same timehe criticised private companies’ investments in Por-

tugal and described them as repulsive and a result of“suspect and short-term speculation”.Strong reactions also came from the liberal party.

Most biting was Per Ahlmark,who in an open letter in Ex-pressen said to the executivedirectors of Swedish compani-es with significant economicinterests in Portugal:You contribute to prolongingthe bloodbaths in three areasin Africa. In practice, you eco-nomically assist the Caetanoregime to commit genocide.

News of the massacre firedpolitical public opinionagainst Portugal, which wasdescribed by the Swedish go-vernment in the UN as “a tot-tering and tumbledown empi-re”. Sweden also reiterated thatthe future of Angola, Mozam-bique and Guinea Bissau mustbe determined by their people.

20. Divisions in and about Angola Divide and rule – the classical doctrine of domina-tion – seems to have lived a life of its own in Ango-la. Portugal did not need help, but got it anyway.From the first there were two movements that clai-med to have started the armed struggle in 1961:MPLA, with Agostinho Neto as president and FN-LA, with Holden Roberto as the leader. For a shorttime Angola gained a great deal of attention in Swe-den, but the struggle against apartheid soon absor-bed most of the interest.


“1973 was the year of Frelimo’sbreakthrough in sweden and thenordic countries as a whole. in

April a major conference was heldin oslo on colonialism and

apartheid, organised by the unand oAu. the result was a victory,Marcelino dos santos maintainedon his visit to the Foreign Ministry

afterwards. the liberationmovements participated on the

same terms as governmentrepresentatives.”


Five years later Angola came into focus again: Lund’s South Africa Committee and its informa-

tion bulletin South and South West Africa supportedMPLA and laid down guidelines for the AfricaGroups’ understanding of the conflict. With their helpthe writer Peter Weiss later wrote the drama Sångenom Skråpuken (Song of the Scarecrow), which dealswith Portuguese colonialism and Western accomplicesand had its premiere at Stockholm’s Stadsteater in Ja-nuary 1967.In 1966 a third liberation movement appeared;

UNITA, headed by Jonas Savimbi. Initially it hadgood contacts with the Social Democratic Party.The party later developed contacts with MPLA,

uniquely close for a Western country, probably un-der the influence of Amílcar Cabral and EduardoMondlane. Both UNITA and FNLA regarded that asOlof Palme’s fault: all he wanted was to counteractthe USA influence.Savimbi was previously close to Holden Roberto,

but growing ethnic tensions ruined their coopera-tion. While Roberto had his base among the baCon-go people in northern Angola, Savimbi was part ofthe Ovimbundu in southern and central Angola.The break with FNLA, according to close colleagu-es, resulted from Roberto “becoming far too depen-dent on the Americans and in addition not appear-ing inside Angola”.

Marcelino dos Santos with Sören Lindh (left) and Hans Persson from ARO (The Africa Gorups) 1982.


David Wirmark (fp) got to know Roberto earlier.In the early 1970s together with Olle Wästberg hemade strong appeals for Swedish support to FNLA,perhaps because of anti-communism; MPLA had

good contacts with the East. In parliament theCentre and Liberal parties vainly advocated supportto both MPLA and FNLA using the argument thatboth were recognised by the OAU.

A demonstration organised by the Stockholm Africa Group in support of PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO 1974.

Divisions among the opposition also led to splitsupport from the neighbouring states. Congo-Kinshasa under Mobutu (Zaire 1971-97, afterwardsthe Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) stoodclose to FNLA and did not want to give space for anMPLA base in the country. After UNITA attackedthe Angolan section of the Benguela railway – es-sential for Zambian exports – several times in 1967,Zambia once again only gave support to MPLA.Nor did the OAU recognise UNITA.In the Swedish debate UNITA was

marginalised. As late as the end of1970, the journal Tiden publishedan article which described MPLA ascommunist-oriented and describedUNITA positively. According toLund’s South Africa Committee thiswas a manifestation of “political ig-norance” in the editorial board or el-sewhere. By that time Agostinho Neto had alreadyvisited in Sweden as the Social Democratic Party’sguest. Subsequently UNITA only gained supportfrom small Maoist groups.Relations between the three movements were

tense the entire time. Occasionally the friction spil-led over into direct armed conflict. In March 1967twenty MPLA members, who were returning fromnorthern Angola to Congo-Kinshasa, were arrested.They were transported to FNLA’s base at Kinkuzu –“Africa’s Buchenwald” – and executed. When Olle Wästberg visited the camp a few years

later, his impression was positive. Three Portugueseprisoners were “humanely” treated. Roberto’s clo-sest colleague and chief of security, José Manuel Pe-terson, was “baptised and brought up by Swedishmissionaries” (according to others he was hardlycharacterised by Christian ethics, but instead

known for ruthlessly getting rid of political oppo-nents).According to Wästberg, Roberto himself often

maintained: “Struggle unites Angola. A people whogain freedom through armed struggle will not laterdevote themselves to egoism and tribalism”. In addi-tion to having liberated sparsely populated parts ofnorthern Angola, FNLA established itself as a “go-vernment” for about half a million Angolan refu-

gees in Congo-Kinshasa. Since MPLA at the same time clai-med control over the same libera-ted area, there were many –amongthem Africa expert Basil Davidson– who questioned the veracity ofWästberg’s portrayal. AgostinhoNeto maintained that he had onlybeen marched round in the LowerCongo and had not set foot in An-

gola. A decade later Anders Ehnmark published asatirical novel, Ögonvittnet, inspired by this incident.Olle Wästberg’s reports had a negligible influen-

ce on political decisions in Sweden. A motion inparliament in January 1971 by Birgitta Dahl and Le-na Hjelm-Wallén (s) paved the way for a decision togive direct humanitarian support to MPLA, but itremained modest (of the 10 million kronor alloca-ted between 1971–75 not even a quarter was paidout – mainly because of MPLA). Political supportappears to have been more important for the lea-dership of the movement, and this was strong fromboth the Social Democrats and the Africa Groups. The latter – together with the socialist monthly

Kommentar, founded by intellectuals in Stockholm– presented political analyses of the situation in An-gola. Their conclusion: Support MPLA! EmmausBjörkå supplied MPLA with 60 tons of clothes


Sticker “Support MPLA”.

worth 1,1 million kronor. The voluntary sector col-lected about 1,7 million kronor (today over 10 mil-lion) for MPLA in 1972. As Alberto Ribeiro (“Kabu-lu”) from MPLA later testified:

The support always began through the people,students, workers and trade unionists. … Inthe socialist countries, the support camedirectly from the governments and from parti-es in one-party states. In the case of the Nordiccountries, it first came through contacts frompeople to people. It was the civil society thatwas in touch with us. It made a big difference.

In addition to information and lobbying for MPLA,the Africa Groups supported radio and telecommu-

nications inside Angola and thereby also MPLA’smilitary work. This included both procurement ofequipment and handbooks in breaking codes. Offi-cial support soon came to include means of trans-port, trucks and motorcycles, as well as four-wheeldrive ambulances.

21. MPLA’s deep crisis and new startThe split between the three liberation movementsin Angola muddied the opportunities for giving as-sistance. In 1973 Zambia suddenly brought UNITAinto the picture again, Tanzania invited Roberto todeliberations, and the Soviet Union began to sup-port a breakaway group within MPLA. In practice itbecame more complex to give assistance.


In the debate on southern Africa and its liberationmovements the Wästberg brothers were promi-nent. Both became editors-in-chief – the older, thewriter Per (1933- ), for Dagens Nyheter (1976-82),and the younger, journalist and liberal party politi-cian Olle (1945- ), for Expressen (1994-95). Theirbasic views differed considerably.With early personal experiences in Rhodesia

(deported in 1959 and 1971), South Africa andMozambique – depicted in books like Förbjudetområde (Forbidden area) and På svarta listan(Blacklisted) – Per saw the conflicts from a Southperspective. Like the broad solidarity movement,he thus identified largely with the “genuine” libera-tion movements and supported them both openlyand through secret channels. Active from an early stage within the Liberal

Party Youth (FPU) Olle viewed the conflicts in

southern Africa more from an anti-communistEast-West perspective. This was noticeable aboveall in his attitude towards the liberation move-ments in Angola. After covering an imposing 1 500kilometres in 39 days during his visit to an FNLAarea in northern Angola in 1969 he pleaded in ar-ticles, in the book Angola, and with the help of fel-low party members in parliament for FNLA to re-ceive official Swedish support.Olle presented FNLA’s president Holden Rober-

to as a sympathetic, “almost modest” man ofsimple habits, a non-smoker and teetotaller, rearedby British missionaries. Whereas to Per, Robertowas untrustworthy: “I immediately thought thiswas a person with whom one could not have adeep relationship.” A man marked by tribalism, heand his comrades were “often dressed in smartclothes”.

The brothers who disagreed


A military coup in Lisbon in April 1974 deposedthe Caetano regime and created a new situation.One motive for the coup was the colonial wars, butthe junta were no angels of peace. It was most dif-ficult to give up Angola – the jewel of the Portugue-se empire. Oil was there and strong internationaleconomic interests. In January 1975 neverthelessthe three liberation movements and Portugalagreed on a transitional government to prepare forAngola’s independence on 11th November 1975. Itcollapsed in mid-1975.Late in 1975 the Africa Groups published a book-

let För ett fritt Angola! En studie av MPLA, FNLA ochUNITA (For a free Angola! A study of MPLA, FNLAand UNITA). The writer was anonymous but sheturned out to be Hillevi Nilsson, who at the time ofpublication was already in Luanda working for MP-LA. It was virtually a collection of arguments whyonly MPLA could be regarded as a genuine libera-tion movement, an attitude many embraced in thebroad solidarity movement, though for varying rea-sons:Only MPLA was national and revolutionary and

could mobilise the people. Clearly its leaders werenot without problems, but the movement had“built up a democratic social structure with consci-entised members and functioning contacts betweenthe different levels”. In contrast, FNLA and UNITAwere ethnically based – the baCongo and the Ovim-bundu – autocratically ruled and dependent on Zai-re/USA and/or South Africa. In October 1975 a force of 3 000 men from South

Africa/UNITA/FNLA and a breakaway group fromMPLA invaded Angola from the south, movingalong the coast and up towards Luanda, at the sametime as a joint Zaire and FNLA force attacked fromZaire. According to the CIA plan, the aim was to

prevent MPLA from taking over Luanda. In this si-tuation MPLA asked Cuba for help, and thesetroops landed on 10th November; in addition MP-LA again received support from the Soviet Union. When Agostinho Neto on 11th November 1975

proclaimed the People’s Republic of Angola, repre-sentatives of the Africa Groups in Sweden were alsoat the celebrations, an expression of the close rela-tionship. In February 1976 in an important articlein DN, Olof Palme propounded the principle thatthe “war in Angola does not stand between the freeworld and communism… It is fundamentally a conti-nuation of the long liberation struggle that began adecade and a half ago.” Thus all foreign interventionwas an abomination.This basic attitude was confirmed in a speech by

Foreign Minister Karin Söder (c) in late 1978, when

Agustinho Neto.

she pointed out that the “West must treat Africa as acontinent in its own right… not as an object for su-perpower politics”. Nevertheless, USA and SouthAfrica continued to assist UNITA militarily, withintermittent war as a result, first up to 1990 andthen after 1992, when UNITA refused to accept theresults of the presidential and parliamentary elec-tions. The war only ended with the death of Savim-bi in 2002.In March 1976 South Africa was temporarily for-

ced to withdraw to Namibia, but Angola remainedone of the bloodiest theatres of the Cold War andthus is more devastated than any other country insouthern Africa. The number and the proportion ofpeople mangled by landmines is perhaps the grea-test in the world. These hidden killers still continueto wreak sacrifices.

22. Silk, satin, rags, junk – for solidarityThe most popular man in France died in 2007 – thepriest of the poor, Abbé Pierre, 94, who in 1949founded the Emmaus movement, now spread in 50countries. The name refers to a village on the WestBank where, according to the Bible, Jesus gave newhope to his disciples after the resurrection. Since theexpulsion of 2 000 Palestinian villagers during the1967 occupation the village became a recreationalarea for Israelis and is now called Canada Park.Inga and Stellan Sandberg were among those

who formed the first Emmaus group in Sweden inLund in 1960 in the spirit of Abbé Pierre. The ideaspread and in the early 1970s there were about tengroups, of which four came to focus mainly on sup-port to liberation movements: Björkå (EB) outsideÅseda, Fnysinge outside Enköping, Emmaus inStockholm and Bread and Fishes (BoF) in Västerås.EB was the largest, followed by BoF.

In the 1960s the Emmaus groups were characte-rised by the movement’s original ideas: that oneshould not turn away a stranger, that one shouldnot quiz him on who he is, where he is going orwhence he comes, and that one share what one has.Believers added: “Never turn a stranger away, itcould be a travelling angel.”The fundamental idea was that the best kind of

help to give is to give him/her something to live forand not merely something to live off. To stretch outa helping hand is great, but to give a needy personthe opportunity to in turn stretch out his/her handto another person in need is greater. This applies toboth individuals and groups.In the 1970s the first three Emmaus groups had

their main sources of inspiration in the left move-ment and Marxist theory, while Bread and Fisheswas largely inspired by radical Latin American libe-ration theologians. Common to all four groups wasthe conviction that support can only be meaningfulif the basic cause of the injustices is attacked. Sup-port was thus directed to movements and peoplewho were working to change their situation and theunjust structures. This meant a transfer of resourcesin the form of clothes, material and money, resour-ces collected in Sweden through the widespread col-lection of the affluent society’s discarded but fullyfunctional products. Recycling was the key to prac-tical solidarity.Its day-to-day activities were often all but glamo-

rous work in a dusty and dirty environment; the or-ganisations were and are dependent on a livingcommitment to be able to continue to develop theirwork. The practical efforts were combined with ac-tive participation in the work of shaping public opi-nion for the liberation movements and against co-lonialism and apartheid.


From 1973 EB drifted in the direction ofKFML(r) (Kommunistiska Förbundet Marxist-Leni-nisterna/revolutionärerna; Communist League Marx-ist-Leninists /the revolutionaries/), which madecooperation with other left groups more difficult. Italso kept some sympathisers at bay, among themGunnar Björberg (who worked first at EmmausGothenburg, later at Björkå, 1965–70):

People with a less dogmatic view of life, among

whom I counted myself, were ideologicallyfrightened off by the aggression that was revea-led vis-à-vis society and its institutions …Even if I was more or less born a socialist andwas a little amused and fascinated by the rhe-toric of tribute/homage, in time it became, soto say, “too much of a good thing”.

In 1969 the first clothing from EB and Emmaus


Emmaus Björkå.


Abbé Pierre at a visit to EmmausStockholm 1971.

Stockholm was sent to FNLA. In 1970 clothes weresent to PAIGC. In 1971 clothes were sent to as manyas seven liberation movements but most went toFrelimo. After consultation with the Africa Groups,it was decided only to send clothes to MPLA in thefuture; thus, in this case, the evaluation of the libe-ration movements in Angola coincided with the go-vernment’s.The liberation movements’ priorities varied over

the years, and this also applied to material support(hospital equipment, school material, kitchenequipment, spectacles, etc). In the 1990s huge volu-mes of about 1 400 tons of clothing/year were sentto southern Africa. A major problem was the cost ofshipping, but from 1972 Sida contributed to freightcosts. EB showed it was capable of great expansion.From 15 people in 1965, by 1993-94 as many as 66people worked there. The total turnover was over 21million kronor, of which Sida contributed onethird.In 1972 the initiative to start BoF was taken by

Bernt Kviberg, a youth instructor in the Baptistchurch, and Lennart Bendix, a practical visionary,employed by the cathedral in Västerås. A paintingon glass in the latter’s flat inspired the name. It re-presented the miracle in the New Testament whereJesus managed to feed thousands from five loaves ofbread and two fishes.

Bernt Kviberg was inspired by Ny gemenskap (NewCommunity), just formed in Stockholm. It was anorganisation linked to the church and directed atsocial drop-outs. Among their other activities it or-ganised Alternativ Jul (Alternative Xmas). On twooccasions he also attended Emmaus internationalsummer camps in France and Switzerland and wasinspired by Latin America. Subsequently he worked

for a year at Emmaus Fny-singe.The first Ekumeniska u-

veckan (Ecumenical Deve-lopment Week) was heldin 1973 and was followedby several others up to the1990s (see below). Theywere organised all overthe country and becamea source of inspirationand knowledge for BoF,specially during the1970s, when the topicsof the weeks were closeto BoF’s support for li-beration movements insouthern Africa. Be-hind the developmentweeks were SEN (Swedish Ecumenical Council),SMR (Swedish Mission Council) and SKU (SwedishChristian Youth Council). Bertil Högberg, later veryactive in the Africa Groups among other organisa-tions, was organiser of studies for the Free ChurchStudy Association (Frikyrkliga Studieförbundet) andcharged with rooting the development week in thecounties of Västmanland and Dalarna. He came in-to contact with BoF through this job and over timeworked more and more with them.In 1975 BoF defined itself as an anti-imperialistic

organisation, but its source of inspiration was still“the Christian message of love and justice betweenpeople”. BoF had an open character and put priori-ty on cooperation with other organisations. A ma-jor crisis in 1977–78 led to the basic Christian ideasbeing relinquished. There was a high personnel tur-nover and, faced with the threat of closure, former


Emmaus Stockholm collecting clothes forthe refugee settlements of ZANU.


Sorting at Emmaus Björkå in the early 70-s. Marion Sobeck left.

staff members like Bertil Högberg and Eva Strim-ling took over various tasks to save the organisation.During the 1970s BoF started cooperating with a

number of local Africa Groups, and shipped medi-cal and dental equipment to Mozambique and toSWAPO, amongst large consignments of other ma-terials. Things like baby kits (starter packs for thenewborn) were produced together with the Västeråsdiocese of the Church of Sweden, a project with alarge mobilising effect (they are still being producedtoday). It was part of the important work of influ-encing public opinion. With regard to clothing sup-port, the most BoF collected was 1 000 tons. In theearly 1990s there were 25 full-time jobs, and turno-ver was almost 9 million kronor, just over one thirdof which was contributed by Sida.

Income from sales among the organisations inc-reased in time, but the most efficient venture toearn their own income and streamline their workfirst came during the 1990s, as a result of substanti-ally reduced allocations from Sida. The ability toadapt was what was crucial and still determines thesize of solidarity support and thus the organisa-tions’ right to exist.In 1989 the national organisation Praktisk Solida-

rity (Practical Solidarity) was formed. At the timeEmmaus Björkå and Emmaus Stockholm advoca-ted a fusion of the organisations. Bread and Fishestogether with Emmaus Sundsvall (Fnysinge’s heir)pleaded for independence but close cooperation.The latter line prevailed.


Bertil Högberg and Eva Strimling (Tånneryd) on themountain of unsorted clothes at the Bread and Fishes1980.

A wooden container with hospital beds and other medical equipment, isopened by SWAPO in Angola. The containers are then assembled ashouses.

The noose is tightening around Ian Smith andthe white minority regime in Rhodesia.

5.1975–1980

WHITE ON BLACK– RENEWEDSTRUGGLE


23. The country that disappeared beyond the horizonAfter Båstad all was quiet on Rhodesia. The countrydisappeared from sight in the Swedish debate. Per-haps – and paradoxically – it was because of thecomprehensive sanctions Sweden introducedagainst Rhodesia in 1969 after the 1968 SecurityCouncil decision. The question was no longer acontroversial political issue, neither between the go-vernment and opposition nor between the govern-ment and the Africa Groups. Sanctions also entailedthat there was no longer a Swedish embassy in Salis-bury (now Harare). The only Swedes who could fol-

low developments on site were missionaries, butthere was no Gunnar Helander among them. Most missionaries sent by SKM came from disci-

ples of the eighteenth century Swedish priest Schar-tau, whose doctrines had a great influence on thewest coast of Sweden. As a result they were conser-vative, and some were clearly racists. They had twoarguments for not becoming involved in Rhodesianpolitics: • They did not have the British background of theRhodesian whites.

• Theologically they embraced the doctrine of twospheres – the division into a worldly rule and aspiritual realm; citizens should obey authority,which is appointed by God (Rom 13). “Onemust obey God more than people” according tothe apostle Peter (Acts 5:29) and thus to defendthe principle of all people’s equal worth beforeGod was not a sufficiently important motive forthem to become involved.

The Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, independentin 1963, in 1964 became a member of the newly for-med Zimbabwe Christian Council, which had closerelations to the World Council of Churches. Toget-her with the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Lut-heran Church developed increasingly severe criti-cism of the Smith regime, particularly on the ques-tion of its land and educational policies. Very littleof this emerged in what was being discussed in Swe-den. In 1966, SKM’s Africa Secretary Holger Benetts-

son published the book Problemet Rhodesia (TheRhodesian Problem) through NAI (Nordic Africa

Tore Bergman, missionary in Rhodesia and later Africa secretary at Churchof Sweden Mission. Here with a student during a chemistry experiment in Chegato 1957.

Institute, formerly SIAS, Scandinavian Institute forAfrican Studies). He maintained that the problemwas rooted in white contempt for Africans, at thesame time as he regretted the split between ZANUand ZAPU. This clear break with previous missio-nary reports confirmed that progressive Swedishmissionaries who sympathised with the struggle forliberation did exist. Their influence on public opi-nion in Rhodesia and in Sweden was, however, limi-ted. The Catholic Church in Rhodesia was most out-

spoken and paid a high price. A bishop, 23 foreignmissionaries and a local priest were killed by the re-gime’s forces and by guerrillas. A bishop and 18missionaries were deported and over 60 missionstations, schools and hospitals were closed. In the1960s and 1970s the Catholic Church had a modestfollowing in Sweden, and news of its Rhodesian sis-ter church’s great problems never reached the Swe-dish public.It was not much better in the media in the early

1970s. With the exception of the odd series of artic-les on the cultural pages, very little attention waspaid to Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front. LikeSouth Africa, it subsequently evolved increasinglyracist policies, even if they were not as far-reaching,judicially. The situation in Rhodesia was absurd. 240 000

whites ruled over 5 million blacks through “just di-scrimination”, which was seen to mean “to recogni-se the differences that exist among people” and toadminister them “so that harmonic relationshipsand growing welfare is assured for all”. In realityblacks were subjected to continual humiliation andeconomic difficulties.Great Britain was hesitant, despite being charged

by the UN to deal with the regime. For Smith the

Catholic Church was a problem; it did not soundreally credible to call it communist. It was easier todo this with The World Council of Churches. Whenthey decided in 1970 to support the liberation mo-vements, some protestant churches in Rhodesiabecame anxious and toned down their criticism ofthe regime’s school policies. In turn, this reducedthe inclination of the mother churches in the Northto sound the alarm. There were, however, excep-tions. At a Nordic Conference of church leaders inOslo in January 1972 on the Africans’ struggle inNamibia and Rhodesia, the Finnish theologianFredrik Cleve declared:

The church’s fear of polarisation has in practi-ce meant that it easily ended up on the side ofthe oppressors. Polarisation as an instrumentfor integration and justice was disregarded.Racism is a class problem; discrimination is away of crucifying Christ anew.

He gained support for this interpretation, and thechurches criticised Western industrial investmentsin southern Africa “because of their general tenden-cy (to function) to the detriment of the African po-pulation”.


”this clear break with previous missionaryreports confirmed that progressive swedishmissionaries who sympathised with thestruggle for liberation did exist. theirinfluence on public opinion in rhodesia andin sweden was, however, limited.”


24. Black division complicates the pictureAs the first of the liberation movements insouthern Africa, ZANU received direct sup-port from Sweden as early as 1969; where-as ZAPU received support not until 1973.The black opposition to the white regimewas split by repeated internal conflicts.Some of these had ethnic roots: Shona(±80% of the population) dominated ZA-NU, and Ndebele (±10%) dominated ZAPU.Internal power struggles were one cause,another was historical outrages between theethnic groups. In addition the conflicts mayhave been stronger because ZANU leaderslike Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe as wellas ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo were imprisoned betwe-en 1964 and 1974.In December 1971 – with the Methodist minis-

ters Abel Muzorewa and Canaan Banana as its lea-ders – the African National Council (ANC) was for-med to unite opposition to the proposed Anglo-Rhodesian settlement. The Swedish governmentsaw the proposal as “a hard blow” to those who wor-ked for equality between the races.From the end of 1972 Sweden had contact with

both ZANU and ZAPU. This gave Sweden a uniquerelationship compared to both the Western powersand the Eastern bloc. An expression of this was thatHerbert Chitepo – ZANU’s leader in exile and seenby some as Zimbabwe’s Mandela – in October 1972told Pierre Schori of the Foreign Ministry and An-ders Möllander of Sida that – in agreement withFrelimo – it was decided to move the armedstruggle eastwards before the end of the year withresultant new waves of refugees to take care of.

The tension between ZANU and ZAPU continu-ed, which may partly explain why the Africa Groups

expressed a relatively absent-minded in-terest to the Smith-regime. The bookAfrika: Imperialism och Befrielsekamp(1972, Africa: Imperialism andthe Liberation Struggle) did noteven discuss Zimbabwe. Thenthere was the notion of the abso-lute primacy of the armedstruggle, while political mobilisa-

tion of the population was not accor-ded the same importance. Only in1976 did the Africa Groups start aZimbabwe campaign, to benefit the“guerrilla war”.

The change of government in Sweden in 1976did not affect the size and principal direction of as-sistance. Because of the Liberal Party’s anti-com-munist attitude on other questions, one might haveexpected that support to ZAPU would be called in-to question because of its good relations with theEastern bloc. Instead the Liberal Party was ZAPU’sstrongest advocate in Sweden. Among the front linestates Tanzania was closer to ZANU and Zambiacloser to ZAPU, which may also have played a role.Zimbabwe was the only country where two libera-tion movements received state support from Swe-den.

25. Détente with hindsightDuring a visit to Sweden in November 1974, Her-bert Chitepo was received like a head-of-state. Hemet the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Develop-ment Cooperation Ministers as well as Sida’s Gene-ral Director. TV2 recorded a programme with himand in general he attracted media attention. The re-

The button from the AfricaGroups did not mention

the names of the organisations.


ason was that the previous week the Front Line Sta-tes’ presidents – Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, JuliusNyerere of Tanzania, Seretse Khama of Botswanaand Samora Machel of Mozambique – had met lea-ders of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. Among them were the imprisoned Robert Muga-

be, Joshua Nkomo and Nbadaningi Sithole. Theyhad been temporarily released, surprisingly, a resultof negotiations between Kaunda and South Africa’sPremier John Vorster. He had assured Kaunda thatSmith was now prepared to accept majority rule.The aim of the meeting would be to discuss how apeaceful transition could be achieved. Chitepo wassceptical and believed that the will to negotiate wasdue rather to the liberation movements’ militarysuccesses and that Smith wanted to gain time andundermine ZANU’s position. The impending riskwas a puppet government. On 7th December 1974 a common manifesto,

the Lusaka Unity Accord, was signed. It implied thatall would assemble under the ANC’s umbrella un-der the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Thestructures would be rapidly coordinated with ajoint congress in sight four months later. At the sa-me time “the inevitability” of continued armedstruggle was recognised as were all other forms ofstruggle until Zimbabwe was liberated. It looked good on paper. Reality was different.

There never was a united Zimbabwean liberationmovement, on the contrary. Leadership struggleswithin ZANU between Sithole and Mugabe, amongothers, already existed when Chitepo was killed by acar bomb in Lusaka in March 1975. Irrespective ofwho did the deed – Smith or a ZANU rival – it ledto the banning of ZANU and 1 660 ZANU suppor-ters were arrested in Zambia, some of whom weretortured.

For the Smith regime this was the best thing thatcould have happened. On the surface, détente, butunderneath the strongest opponent was disarmed.The Rhodesian position did not deteriorate when afew months later Sithole gave his support to the ar-rests. For the majority in ZANU’s revolutionarycouncil this meant that he had betrayed the revolu-tion, and that Mugabe must take over the leader-ship. A minority left ZANU with Sithole.Anders Bjurner, then at the Swedish embassy in

Lusaka, made a strong plea for Sweden to supportthe relatives of the prisoners economically and togive the accused legal help, a politically sensitivematter in the light of Sweden’s good relationship toZambia. Through Swedish Amnesty Sweden gavethe required support to the accused, which in theend – after 19 months – led to the release of themain accused, ZANU’s head of defence, in October1976. Internal conflicts within liberation movements

and their strained relationships to the Front LineStates led to official Swedish support ending during1975–77. Sida nevertheless continued to supportEmmaus Björkå’s and Bread and Fishes’ freighttransports to ZANU.

26. After détenteDétente in southern Africa died with the South Af-rican invasion in Angola in October 1975. ZAPU re-sumed its guerrilla actions from Zambia andBotswana, and ZANU stepped up its military activi-ty from Mozambique. To crush this threat the infa-mous Selous Scouts undertook a raid over the bor-der and brutally shot down over 1 000 refugees inthe Nyadzonia massacre.Before the Geneva Conference in December 1976

the ANC was reorganised and became the United


ANC, while the more radical Canaan Banana (laterZimbabwe’s first president) joined ZANU. It hardlycame as a surprise that the negotiations led nowhe-re. Smith soon returned home and he hadn’t givenany promises. The end result was a certain coopera-

tion between ZANU and ZAPU, a pragmatic marri-age in the form of the Patriotic Front. After the collapse of the Geneva Conference, the

Front Line States agreed in January 1977 to give po-litical support to the Patriotic Front. This made it

The Africa Bulletin revels

Mozurewa behind

the mask.


easier for Thorbjörn Fälldin’s government to giveincreased support to ZANU and ZAPU despite theModerates’ critical attitude. To what extent the Mo-derate party’s ideological organ Svensk Tidskrift re-flected the views of the party leaders is unclear, butit did not mince matters regarding DevelopmentCooperation Minister, Ola Ullsten (fp): Of thecountry’s “quarrelling groups” he had:

opted for [the one] qualified to kill most whi-tes in Rhodesia… The most communist sup-ported [group], the so-called Patriotic Front, isto receive Swedish financial assistance… It isunbelievable how much the concept of neutra-lity can cover… Palme’s government introdu-ced support to revolutionary movements fromthe aid budget. The idea might have been rai-sed in Moscow. Those who took up arms forsocialism… were supported… Mr Ullsten in-nocently continues along Mr Palme’s road.

Because of their scepticism towards both ZANUand ZAPU the Africa Groups had never activelypursued the issue of state support to them. Howe-ver, Emmaus Björkå, Emmaus Stockholm andBread and Fishes had long had a close relationshipwith ZANU. EB even had two “comrades” from ZA-NU placed with them in 1974–75 both for practicalwork and to work with information. In a letterbetween ZANU and EB not only practical questionswere discussed, but also policies, in a tone of mutu-ality. They regarded each other as comrades in thestruggle. Nevertheless the split was a problem. Mai Palmberg recounts the following from a

conference in Lisbon in April 1977, organised by theSoviet supported Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Or-ganization. The issue of ZAPU’s and ZANU’s unitywas at the top of the agenda, and the Nordic delega-

tes were able to meet ZAPU’s president Joshua Nko-mo and ZANU’s president Robert Mugabe:

First Nkomo came. He was the picture of a fat-her of his country. He sat there… in our midst,but said nothing worth quoting. Empty phra-ses. Then Mugabe came. Don’t bother aboutthe Patriotic Front, he said, give all support tous. He made a few sarcastic comments aboutZAPU and Nkomo. After these interviews wehad a meeting to discuss how we should relateto this. The best we can do for Zimbabwe’s pe-ople is not to write anything at all, I suggested,and this was accepted as our line of action. Wesupported virtually all strivings for unitywithin the Patriotic Front. Censorship? Per-haps, but we did not want to join a game thatmight contribute to further divisions.

Robert Mugabe from ZANU has a limited interest in the meeting aboutunity with Joshua Nkomo at Easter time 1979 in Lusaka.


When Mugabe came to Sweden in September 1977he first went to BoF in Västerås to discuss the collec-tion of clothes and delivery of goods, and continuedto Sida, the Foreign Ministry and Ola Ullsten. He al-so visited Kyrkans Hus, home of the Church of Swe-den, in Uppsala. Under the influence of the Emmaus groups, the

Africa Groups – like the government – began tosupport the Patriotic Front from their congress in1977. In the light of this, AGIS board in November1978 found it “unfortunate” that BoF had decidedonly to support ZANU. Bertil Högberg was chargedwith resolving the issue. It the end, those AfricaGroups (among them Gothenburg) that wanted to,

could sort and pack clothes for ZAPU in BoF’s pre-mises.

27. The Church of Sweden Mission andthe liberation movementsInterestingly, the state established its support beforethe Africa Groups. To a great extent this was a resultof the Church of Sweden Mission (SKM) on the ba-sis of its work in Rhodesia developing direct con-tacts with the liberation movements (ZANU in1976 and ZAPU in 1977). SKM’s relations to Sidaand the Foreign Ministry were also close, throughthe Board for Humanitarian Assistance. During a

Picture from the visit by Mugabe to the Bread and Fishes in 1979. Then published in an editorial by Anders Mellbourn.Now in a rerun when he came as the prime minister.

visit to Southern Rhodesia in November 1975, ToreBergman, at the time Africa Secretary in SKM, not -ed that some of the “exiled youths in Mozambiqueare members of the Lutheran Church or come fromthat area”. Because of external criticism of Church of Swed -

en support to The World Council of Churches’ Pro-gramme to Combat Racism (see below) Bergman ac-ted “in his personal capacity”, for instance when hewrote to Mugabe in April 1976 and asked for moreinformation to be able to mobilise support fromSweden if possible. At the same time he wrote to Jo-nas Shiri, Lutheran bishop in Bulawayo, that inSweden people were bound to question whether:

the assistance [proposed] is not, de facto, in-directly, assistance for arms and soldiers. Can achurch and a mission organisation involve it-

self in this? The reply… is not so easy. Are wenot already as whites involved against theblacks? Who started the fighting – the strongman show – in Rhodesia? If we remain passive,are we not already taking sides, even militarily?

Bergman was rapidly answered by both Mugabeand Edgar Tekere, who described the great needamong the 20 000 refugees in the camps: educationfor the younger ones (1 400 aged 7–15 years) andagricultural projects for self-support. Contacts withZANU were controversial, especially within theSwedish church, but Bergman was soon supportedby the board of SKM.Through the newly formed Mozambican

Christian Council and the Lutheran World Federa-tion’s office in Maputo, SKM could soon channel


Liberation movement soldiers at the Church of Sweden Missions station Masase in southern Zimbabwe.


support to refugee children in the camps. In Sep-tember 1976 ZANU sent a delegation to Swedenthat included Didymus Mutasa, one of the foundersof Cold Comfort Farm in Rhodesia (banned in1971), and Ruvimbika Tekere, Edgar Tekere’s wifeand responsible for work with women at ZANU’sLondon office. They visited SKM, Sida and Em-maus Björkå.During a visit to SKM the previous year Robert

Mugabe said of the armed struggle:We do not say that you necessarily have to sup-port [it], but the churches are duty bound tosupport the cause of justice. They must, at thevery least, loudly denounce the regime.

He commended the Catholic Bishops Conference,the Christian Council and Christian Care, but sta-ted:

The Swedish mission has not distinguished it-self by denouncing the regime… it is true thatwe receive support from the government andSida, but we appreciate the assistance even mo-re, when it comes from people like yourselves.A government is a government. We would liketo have our cause as deeply rooted in thehearts of the [Swedish] people as possible.

At this stage both ministers and members of theLutheran church in Zimbabwe had been sent to pri-sons and to camps because of their political activiti-es. The missionary Hugo Söderström reported thatsome of them might be released if they were per-mitted to go to Sweden. SKM took the economic re-sponsibility, among others for pastor Arote Vellah,who became active in the Africa Group in Uppsala.The Manama Exodus in January 1977 triggered

SKM’s close contact with ZAPU. The year before,

the liberation struggle reached SKM’s mission areain southern Matabeleland, and many youths weretravelling either to ZANU in Mozambique or toZAPU in Zambia. Now over 300 youths, seventeachers, three nurses and a Lutheran minister leftManama Secondary School, 40 km from theBotswana border. Teacher Paulos Matjaka narrates:

We left in the evening of the first Sunday of thefirst term of the academic year. Some children… were less than 13 years old. After travellingthrough the bush in pitch darkness throughoutthe night, sunrise found us crossing the ShashiRiver into Botswana en route to Zambia. Wecalled it “going to Geneva”… We had two ar-med guerrillas in our company.

The school was founded early in the 1960s by ToreBergman. Tord Harlin later became school princi-pal. After Bergman returned home to Sweden heworked for SKM and Church of Sweden Aid. Seve-ral of the liberation movements’ future leaders wereeducated in SKM schools, among them Edward Nd-lovu, who in the late 1970s led most ZAPU delega-tions in their negotiations with Sida. In March 1977 Tord Harlin went to Zimbabwe,

Botswana and Zambia to find out what had happe-ned to the Manama youth. In Lusaka, among ot-hers, he met ZAPU’s leaders, who presented aneducational project “New Manama”. Later the pro-ject was estimated to cost about 10 million kronorfor buildings, equipment etc. After having weighedthe pros and cons of support to an armed liberationmovement like ZAPU, Harlin observed that becauseof the actual situation there was no alternative wayof helping and that SKM probably was “the first or-ganisation that received a request of this kind”.The cost was assessed as being unreasonably

high. After much discussion back and forthSKM allocated 80 000 kronor in May to al-leviate the most acute needs of 6 000 child-ren. At the same time it tried to mobilisefurther support from Sida and through theLutheran World Federation. A month laterofficial state support to ZANU and ZAPUwas reinstated.

28. South Africa returns –through the churchesWhile attention was on the wars in Viet-nam and the Portuguese colonies, the issueof apartheid and white racism in South Af-rica had almost disappeared from the agen-da. Its return largely depended on whathappened within the churches, first inter-nationally and then in Sweden.At The World Council of Churches Ge-

neral Assembly in Uppsala in 1968 thechurches of developing countries played amore prominent role than previously. In astrongly worded declaration the churches were ex-horted to run a forceful campaign against racismand for full citizenship rights for its victims. Institu-tionalised racism as it appeared “in refined form” inmany churches was declared scandalous. Insteadthe churches should withdraw their economic sup-port from institutions that kept racism alive. The issue of racism was closely linked to ques-

tions of economic justice and human rights. AThird World perspective dominated. It was also ex-pressed in resolutions at a meeting of non-statechurches in Örebro (March 1969). There, amongother things, they declared their solidarity with Fre-limo. By their “actions” Christians ought to try to

prevent the Cabora Bassa project and its support ofwhite racism. They also expressed solidarity withthe 30 or so priests and theologians accused of ha-ving organised a prayer service in Lund’s cathedralin protest against the churches’ indulgence towardsa representative of the apartheid regime.In 1969 the central committee of the World

Council of Churches decided to launch the Pro-gramme to Combat Racism (PCR), linked to a fundfrom which it was later possible to give contribu-tions to liberation movements for education, healthcare, legal aid. Conservative groups within and out-side the churches saw this as evidence of commu-nism in the World Council of Churches. They saw


Nkomo is discussing building projects with a Jugoslav engineer. LeftRonald Henrysson that were with the CSM Africa secretary Tore Berg-man and Tord Harling at this visit at the ZAPU “Victory Camp” 1977.


their view being further confirmed by the WorldCouncil’s 1972 decision to sell their own stocks andshares in companies working in countries ruled byPortugal and white racist regimes. At the same time,WCC encouraged member churches and individualChristians to use their influence, for example, at ge-neral meetings of shareholders.In 1972 the Swedish Ecumenical Council (SEN)

published a small but in principle important

brochure entitled Kampen mot rasismen (Thestruggle against racism). The Church of Sweden de-cided to donate a national collection to PCR, andboth the Swedish Covenant Mission Church and Si-da made donations to the same end. In Sida’s case itwas increased to a half million kronor in 1977 (to-day about 2 million) and from then it continued togrow. During the years 1986–91 more than 8 milli-on kronor was donated to PCR through SEN, mostof which came from Sida. The motivation was theneed to combat racism both ideologically and prac-tically and PCR was a good weapon in the struggle.A large Christian National Meeting in Gothen-

burg in 1972 raised the issue of international justi-ce. The decision was taken to hold an annual ecu-menical development week to alert public opinionand create a Programme of Action. In 1973 the De-velopment Week started with the topic Rättvisan kaninte vänta (Justice cannot wait), followed in 1974 byFrihet åt förtryckta (Freedom for the oppressed) withambitious conceptual study books. In the latter, oneof SEN’s statements is reproduced, based on a ma-jor investigation undertaken on Swedish economicinvolvement in southern Africa. Churches and indi-viduals were encouraged to review their shares incompanies involved in South Africa, and it was sug-gested that the World Council of Churches coope-rate with the International Confederation of FreeTrade Unions (ICFTU) on actions against racialoppression in southern Africa. The Swedish compa-nies working in South Africa were given two yearsto improve, but this did not help.

29. Kick out the priest!SEN found that Swedish companies in South Africawere no better than other foreign firms on the ques-tion of pay differentials between whites and blacks.

The Africa group member Bertil Malmström was a resour-ce person when the churches involved themselves in theliberation of southern Africa in a campaign week 1973.


At the suggestion of peace researcher Peter Wal-lensteen, SEN decided that on the strength of ha-ving at least one share, it would be possible to takepart in the shareholders’ meetings of large compa-nies.The appearance of Lutheran Archbishop Olof

Sundby and the leader of the Swedish CovenantMission Church, Gösta Hedberg, at ASEA’s share-holders’ meeting on 14th March and Volvo’s on14th May 1975 attracted considerable attention inthe press, radio and TV. They based their questionson observations made by Lester Wikström, secreta-ry of SEN’s international committee that visitedSouth Africa at the beginning of the year. As re-quested, ASEA received the questions ahead of ti-me. Wikström relates:

When we arrived at the shareholders meetingin Västerås we were informed the Archbishopwould appear after the meeting and that ASEAhad already answered the questions and wouldhand out both the questions and the answersafter the shareholders’ meeting. I explainedthat the Archbishop had prepared a number offurther questions depending on the answers.In this way there would be a little dialogue. Inaddition we were there as shareholders withthe right to put questions. Coverage by themass media was very large.A courteous atmosphere prevailed at ASEA’s

shareholders’ meeting. One cannot say the sa-me of Volvo’s shareholders meeting. There theleader of the Swedish Covenant Mission Chur-ch, Gösta Hedberg addressed the board andput questions to them. After a relatively calmintroduction one began to hear booing. Some-one cried: “Throw out the priest!”I also attended the Electrolux shareholders

meeting in Stockholm on 31st May 1976. Intheir answers to our written questions thecompany hid the cleaning services they ran inSouth Africa. They paid wages under the po-verty line. At the shareholders meeting thecompany acknowledged the existence of thecleaning services and promised to review pay. I

“Throw out the priest – invest in South Africa” The shareholdersof Volvo did not like it when the Swedish Ecumenical Council putforward questions by the church leader Gösta Hedberg.

still remember the company’s advertisementsin South Africa: “We keep South Africa clean”.The debate on sanctions against South Afri-

ca had moments when it was very heated. Formy personal stand a statement in 1976 by theChristian Institute and its director BeyersNaudé was crucial: “Investments in South Afri-ca are investments in apartheid and thus im-moral, unjust and exploitative.”

In its 1977 Programme of Action the SEN board ga-ve its support to:• an arms embargo against South Africa;• efforts to ban new investments in South Africathrough the UN;

• an increase in Swedish assistance to anti-apart-heid organisations in southern Africa;

• a committee of enquiry tasked with investiga-ting:

• the possibilities of changing Swedish currencylaws so that new investments in South Africacould be stopped; and

• the preconditions for a gradual disinvestment ofSweden’s economic relationships to South Africa.

SEN kept itself in the forefront of the debate andcreation of public opinion in Sweden in regard tosouthern Africa during 1973–78. Focus lay onSouth Africa, but its international committee alsofollowed and commented on developments in theother countries.Lester Wikström later became deputy secretary

in the South Africa commission of enquiry that thegovernment appointed in 1977. The main secretarywas Åke Magnusson. The following year its report,entitled Förbud mot investeringar i Sydafrika (SOU1978:53, Prohibition on investments in South Afri-

ca) was published. The commission chose to definecertain Volvo- and ASEA-controlled companies asoutside the ambit of the proposal. This was later cri-ticised by Claes Brundenius, Kenneth Hermele andMai Palmberg in the book Gränslösa affärer (1980,Borderless business).

30. Massacre in SowetoThe relative calm in the early 1970s in South Africawas deceptive. The ANC had been forced into exileduring the 1960s. With roots in the black churches,a new black awareness evolved through the BlackConsciousness Movement (BCM) with its base pri-marily among students in the South African Stu-dents Organization (SASO). Liberation was not se-en as a purely political question; it also concernedliberating blacks from experiencing themselves asinferior to whites and required reconquering theircultural identity. To interpret this – as sometimeshappens – as an expression of reverse racism and incontradiction to the ANC’S line is a false interpreta-tion. Nothing indicated that the BCM leaders heldsuch a view. In 1972 an opinion poll among youths in Soweto

showed that 98% did not want to be taught in the“oppressors’ language” Afrikaans but preferred Eng-lish. A decree in 1974 that Afrikaans must be usedfor the more theoretical subjects thus led to strongprotests among pupils in Soweto. On 16th June1976 several thousand students gathered for a pea-ceful protest march. The result was devastating withseveral hundred killed.With the massacre in Soweto, international pub-

lic opinion against apartheid was aroused again. Itwas further fuelled when in detention the youngBCM leader Steve Biko was tortured to death by thepolice in 1977. He died. This brutal crime against


human rights made Biko a martyr in the eyes of theworld; shortly afterwards the UN declared a man-datory arms embargo against South Africa.

31. Political majority for sanctionsOne of the first in Sweden to become involved inthe question of apartheid was the Liberal Party’sDavid Wirmark, who, in the late 1940s as a youngpolitician in the World Assembly of Youth (WAY)came across the apartheid issue. In April 1960 hemet Oliver Tambo in Tunis, and they became life-long friends. Around 1960 the liberals were in thevanguard of the first political debates on humanita-rian assistance and apartheid.Thorbjörn Fälldin’s Centre Party had for years

advocated sanctions against apartheid, as had theLeft Party Communists. The Moderates, however,were consistently against all kinds of sanctions. Fora long time the Social Democrats were indifferent tosanctions as a method, and it was primarily the tra-de union movement that acted as a brake. A certainUN fundamentalism – that only the Security Coun-cil ought to decide on sanctions – may also haveplayed a role. The government’s critics did not keep silent.

Their arguments had strong international backingfrom the World Council of Churches central com-mittee in Utrecht in August 1972 and the Interna-tional Labour Organization’s (ILO) conference inGeneva in June 1973. The latter was a meetingagainst apartheid of 200 trade union organisationsfrom the three trade union internationals; the Cat-holic World Confederation of Labour (WCL), theWest-oriented ICFTU to which LO and TCO be-long, and the East-oriented World Federation ofTrade Unions (WFTU) to which the ANC’s ally, theSouth African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU)

was affiliated. Both assemblies supported the idea of isolating

the apartheid regime. While waiting for mandatorysanctions to be declared by the UN, they paved theway for a dialogue with foreign companies in SouthAfrica on accepting black and non-racially basedtrade unions. The choice was isolation or involve-ment. Despite objections from the ANC and SAC-TU, both the churches and the unions in Swedenchose the latter alternative – initially – in LO/TCO’scase after a controversial trip to South Africa in ear-


The southern Africa Week of 1978 organised by the Afri-ca Groups was advertised with Sam Nzimas picture ofhector Pietersen, the first victim of the SWETO uprising.


Palme at the meeting of the movement of Christian Social Democrats 1976.

ly 1975. Nevertheless the government could not hi-de behind these alternatives. Without a doubt PerWästberg had the broad anti-apartheid movementbehind him when, in mid-1974, he asked in DagensNyheter:

How long can Sweden support armed libera-tion movements and severely condemn apart-heid without cutting off economic relation-ships to South Africa?

The massacres that began in Soweto increased thepressure on the Swedish government. As in 1965,when Olof Palme in Gävle announced a new andmore critical attitude to the USA on the question ofVietnam, he chose the 1976 congress of the Christi-an Social Democrats to launch a more positive lineon economic sanctions against South Africa. In a six point programme for European Social De-mocracy Palme summarised a strategy againstapartheid:• A mandatory UN arms embargo;• Support to liberation movements;• No recognition of Bantustans; • More extensive UN sanctions; • An independent Namibia;• Study the issue of foreign companies and newinvestments in South Africa.

Although the Social Democrats lost the elections in1976, from 1977 there was a majority in Parliamentin favour of economic sanctions against South Afri-ca. On 1st July 1979 new investments and the exportof capital to South Africa and Namibia were prohi-bited, in accordance with the proposals put by thecommission of enquiry on South Africa.

32. The Africa Groups gird their loinsWriter Adam Hochschild, best known for the bookKing Leopold’s Ghost claimed, in another book, Burythe Chains!, that since the British campaign againstthe slave trade, solidarity movements have beenunited by two things: • The motive force of solidarity is human com-passion, not self-interest;

• The belief that information on injustices can le-ad to popular mobilisation to end them.

The Africa Groups in Sweden (AGIS) can thus beseen as one in a series of these solidarity move-ments, where the requisite conditions are strongconvictions and great tenacity. The road to the for-mal formation of the organisation in 1975 was long. In the background were SUL’s boycott campaign

and the South Africa Committees of the 1960s. Un-der the pressure of the broad Vietnam involvementthe groups took a back seat and the few that survi-ved – mostly in the major University towns – cameto direct their support primarily towards the libera-tion movements in the Portuguese colonies. In 1970the activists from Lund, Uppsala and Stockholmagreed on this; they did not see any guerrilla war inSouth Africa and Zimbabwe and were thereforesceptical towards the movements there. In addition,they started calling themselves the Africa Groupswith reference to both Guinea Bissau and otherpossible countries like Congo and Kenya. Only inNovember 1974 did they recognise the ANC as theleading liberation movement in South Africa.In the 1970s the criteria for membership was to

attend a minimum number of activities, which ma-de it difficult to recruit new members and increasedthe risk of sectarianism. Categorical criticism of theSocial Democratic government made it more dif-


ficult to work with the trade unions and SSU. Theattempt in 1973 to form a common national orga-nisation based on a broad platform against SouthAfrica’s racism, Portugal’s colonialism and USA’simperialism broke down. Not until June 1976 didthe Africa Groups finally succeed in uniting on acommon programme. Although they were marginalised for a long time,

the Africa Groups played an important role in for-ming public opinion, not least on the local level –with Afrikabulletinen as an important instrument.Through it one could spread information from Na-mibia and South Africa that was otherwise difficultto get. It was often written under a pseudonym or


The Africa Bulletin is sold and money collected to MPLA by Hasse Erikssonat Forumtorget in Uppsala 1975. The daily activist work.

”in the 1970s the criteria for membershipwas to attend a minimum number ofactivities, which made it difficult to recruitnew members and increased the risk ofsectarianism.”

anonymously, partly to protect sources and writers,and partly to emphasise collective responsibility. Bythe late 1970s the print-order was 5 000 copies. Inthe 1980s the Africa Bulletin became increasinglyprofessional and in 1994 it changed its name to Söd-ra Afrika (southern Africa). At its height AGIS had30 local groups and over time a total of 50 groups aswell as 20 contact people.In certain groups conspiracy theories flourished.

The fear of infiltration by the Swedish secret police,SÄPO, was perhaps particularly strong in Gothen-burg Africa Group (GAG). There was considerabledisagreement on Angola’s liberation movements,just as among the parliamentary parties. Superpo-wer politics and Swedish sympathisers loyal to vari-ous acronyms led to long discussions, also on Rho-desia. Despite this, GAG cooperated with many ot-her organisations. Activists Gert Klaiber and HansTollin recall:

GAG also cooperated with CUF, the LiberalYouth, SSU, trade unions, church organisationsand other organisations. There were only twogroups that we never cooperated with: the ex-

treme right, which is self-explanatory, and theModerates and their organisations, for reasonsthat are more difficult to explain. Perhaps theyhoped that market forces would liberate Afri-ca’s oppressed people? The Moderate Youth Le-ague (MUF, Moderata Ungdomsförbundet)was always invited to our manifestations butrefused each time with the argument that theydid not work cross-politically.

The question of South Africa was also hotly discus-sed because of political differences.

Some members maintained that the ANC didnot represent the broad masses of the peopleand that we ought to support other groups andmovements. In the end, we decided to supportthe ANC to the hilt. One important reason wasthat we were not sure about what kind of free-dom the other movements wanted. We foughtagainst colonialism and did not wish for anyform of neo-colonialism in liberated countries,nor in a majority ruled South Africa. Special toSouth Africa was that there were active trade


unions that we could contact. We helped ar-range meetings between SACTU and the tradeunions at SKF, Volvo and the ship-buildingyard Götaverken.

Formally GAG was a democratic organisation withfree debate, but in concrete work a handful of peo-ple took the decisions. The reason was partly thesectarian left-wing descussing climate:

We weren’t armchair leftists; we wanted toachieve results. Thus it was important to beco-me united within the group of leaders andthen get going. We were forced to rely on oneanother. When we went round at night to pasteup posters we were going beyond the boundsof the law. If someone was caught, we otherscould rely on her or him keeping quiet aboutany accomplices. We shared fines in solidarity.When we crept around in supermarkets andpasted small stickers with the text “Don’t buySouth African goods”, we were not really legaleither. Our work bore the influence of the mood

after German terrorist attacks in Stockholm(hostage drama at the West German embassyin 1975, and in 1977 a foiled kidnap attempt ofa cabinet minister, Anna-Greta Leijon). Thegovernment relinquished all democratic rulesand threw people out, non-Swedish citizens,without giving a reason. Supervision of work-places was also dramatically heightened. Reve-lations of a “hospital spy” employed to registerleft-wingers at Sahlgrenska Hospital in Got-henburg in 1975 produced shock waves. Cer-tain liberation movements in Africa were stillregarded as terrorists, and the ANC’s statuswas ambiguous. Some of us were afraid that, asan activist in the Africa Groups, one might beaccused of consorting with terrorists.

It was important for Africa Groups’ campaigns tobe based on both feelings and knowledge, and at ti-mes the demands made on members were draining.They were expected not only to be committed butalso to share a common view of the conflicts. Thepublication and study of qualified study books wasone way of reaching that goal. Afrika: Imperialismoch befrielsekamp (Africa: Imperialism and libera-tion struggle) from 1972 was based on a Marxistanalysis. Befrielsekampen i Afrika (The liberationstruggle in Africa) edited by Mai Palmberg waspublished in 1977 (revised in 1980 and 1982) andwas published in English in 1983 as The Struggle forAfrica (Zed Press). 1990 saw the publication of Söd-ra Afrika: kamp för befrielse och utveckling (SouthernAfrica: the struggle for liberation and development)written by Kenneth Hermele and Mai Palmberg. For AGIS, 1978 marked the beginning of much

greater influence than in the past. In May the orga-nisation undertook a dramatic revision of its views


”Although they were marginalised for along time, the Africa Groups played an

important role in forming public opinion,not least on the local level – withAfrikabulletinen as an important

instrument. through it one could spreadinformation from namibia

and south Africa.”

on LO, TCO and the Social Democrats by both wel-coming LO’s campaign for the people in southernAfrica and by revoking their own “earlier over-simplified statements about these organisations”.With this they also cleared the way for the creationof ISAK (Isolate South Africa Committee).Sales of the new study book The liberation struggle

in Africa netted a surplus, and the Africa Groupsopened an office. The Stockholm Africa Group ren-ted out a part of its premises at Humlegårdsgatanon Östermalm. Bertil Högberg, Georg Dreifaldt andLena Johansson were the first employees. Towardsthe end of 1982 AGIS moved to Solidaritetshuset, a

building of cultural and historic interest at Bar-nängen on the island of Södermalm, where a num-ber of solidarity groups have their headquarters. As a leftist organisation with roots in the anti-

authoritarian revolt of 1968, AGIS avoided hierar-chic structures. No one should stand above another.In practice Dick Urban Vestbro functioned as chair-man. When Vestbro left the board in 1978 it becamedifficult to manage the work of the board, and in1981 Bertil Högberg was secretly elected as chair-person. When, after a year away from the board, hewas again elected to that post in 1983, he becamethe first official chairperson of the Africa Groups.


“The Liberation Struggle in Africa” the study book thatcreated a financialbase to start a national office. The book was later translated also publishedin English by ZED press.

6.1978–1983

STAND UP FORSOUTHERNAFRICA

33. Rhodesia becomes ZimbabweBy the late 1970s Sweden had become the most im-portant donor in regard to non-military support toboth ZANU and ZAPU, especially when it came tofood and vehicles. Emmaus Björkå and Bread andFishes continued donating clothes, and from oldemergency stores 20 000 pairs of pants were sent tothe movements. There was a great demand for me-dical support, and a complete field hospital was putat ZAPU’s disposal in Zambia. The extent of thesupport did not eliminate certain internal tensions.There was even rivalry between the two movementsabout assistance.Over the years support to ZANU came to be of

an increasingly political kind, with support for thecreation of civil institutions (they claimed to opera-te in 75% of Zimbabwe), while ZAPU support re-mained more humanitarian. The difference could,among other things, have had to do with the move-ments’ own long-term strategies. The support was,however, not uncritical. Both ZAPU and ZANU we-re criticised in Sweden, the latter for death threatsagainst “black traitors” like Muzorewa and Sitholein November 1978. Mugabe admitted that the state-ment “was perhaps formulated rather drastically”.By the end of the 1970s, 30 000 had been killed in

war, and the regime – now formally ruled by a coa-lition under Muzorewa – was well on the way to col-lapse. The British government under Margaret

Thatcher was forced, at the Commonwealth Confe-rence in Lusaka in August 1979, to begin negotia-ting with the Patriotic Front on independence. TheLancaster House Agreement of 21st December 1979entailed that Great Britain for a time resumed therole of colonial power with a single task: to organisefree elections to a parliament with a black majorityof 80 seats. For a decade the remaining 20 seats we-re divided among whites, coloureds and Asians,who thus had heavy overrepresentation.During the pre-election period Sweden continu-

ed to give humanitarian support not only to theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) but also to ZANU and ZAPU for repat-riation of refugees from Botswana, Mozambiqueand Zambia. The British government said this wasgiving an unfair advantage to the Patriotic Front’sparties. They also received 200 000 kronor eachfrom the Social Democrats.In January 1980 the Africa Groups initiated a

broad ad hoc committee, Friends of the PatrioticFront (Patriotiska Frontens Vänner), followed by anappeal in Dagens Nyheter signed by 50 Swedes, inclu-ding parliamentarians from both blocks, amongthem CH Hermansson (vpk), Birgitta Dahl (s), PärGranstedt (c) and Olle Wästberg (fp). The appealwas followed by a demonstration at the British em-bassy with the demand that the Thatcher govern-ment should see to it that the Lancaster House



Independence celebration in Zimbabwe 1980.

Agreement was implemented.In the appeal it was noted that South African

troops remained in Rhodesia, that thousands of pe-ople were still in prison, that Muzorewa’s private ar-my terrorised people in the rural areas and thatRhodesian military and police were harassing thePatriotic Front. It concluded that the British gover-nor, Lord Soames, was obviously permitting in-fringements of the Lancaster House Agreement.The British ambassador Jeffrey Petersen made an

indignant protest to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The strong tensions in Rhodesia created a lot of

apprehension in Sweden that the elections on 27–29February would not be held, an apprehension ex-pressed by both Olof Palme and Ola Ullsten. TheBritish were still hoping for a large coalition in Sa-lisbury and on Swedish support for this. In a letterto the Swedish Foreign Ministry they explained:

There is no obligation on the [British] Gover-nor to invite the leader of the largest party toform the government, unless that party has anabsolute majority… We hope that the Swedishgovernment will take every opportunity to ex-plain to African governments that even if MrMugabe’s party wins the most seats, it will notnecessarily enter the government, perhaps re-ferring to the fact that the largest single partyin Sweden is in opposition.

To the overwhelming surprise of the British govern-ment – but not Swedish politicians –ZANU-PF wonan absolute majority – 57 seats – while PF-ZAPUwon 20 seats, Muzorewa’s UANC 3 and Ian Smith’sRhodesian Front 20. ZANU-PF was dominated bythe Shona – ±80% of the population – which mayhave contributed to the result.On the 18th April 1980 the independent state of

Zimbabwe was proclaimed. Popular mobilisation inSweden could now focus on South Africa and Na-mibia.

34. The many faces of the trade unions At ILO’s major conference on apartheid in 1973,SACTU was recognised as a legitimate trade unionrepresentative for South Africa, while TUCSA (Tra-de Union Council of South Africa) was not permit-ted to participate in the conference as it was seen as


The ZANU print shop in Maputo. The Africa Groups,Bread and Fishes and Emmaus Björkå send a charteredaircraft with supplementary equipment to Salisbury thatwere seized.

being too close to the regime. This was an interna-tional breakthrough for SACTU, which advocatedand gained a hearing for the isolation of the SouthAfrican regime. At the same time the importance of“economic, moral and material support to SouthAfrican workers and people through their genuinetrade unions and political organisations” was emp-hasised.As has been previously mentioned, LO and TCO

chose – together with their Nordic sister organisa-tions and under the ICFTU umbrella –, the line ofsupport rather than sanctions. SACTU’s affiliationto the East-oriented WFTU was for them not only apolitical but also a psychological obstacle to coope-ration. This led to a paradoxical result: While all the Swedish opponents to apartheid,

including the labour movement, rallied to the sup-port of the ANC, LO and TCO refused to cooperatewith the ANC’s trade union ally. Nevertheless, oneTCO-member, the Swedish Union of Clerical andTechnical Employees in Industry (SIF), did giveeconomic support to SACTU. At the same timeSACTU – as the only non-liberation movement –received official Swedish support from 1977/78, andfrom 1983/84 was included in the support given tothe ANC. Still, the strategic lines did cross one anot-her. While LO and TCO pleaded for a reformist line

and for support to the emerging black trade unionsin South Africa, they emphasised at the same timethat Swedish investments in southern Africa entai-led a support to the white and colonial regimes. Theduty to stop them was, however, the government’s.Jan Olsson, international secretary of the MetalWorkers’ Union (Metall) and one of the six mem-bers of LO/TCO’s delegation to South Africa in1975:

We saw that revolution would come rollingover the country in a number of years and as-ked ourselves: What should our policies as atrade union movement be up to this point? Wesaw that this revolution would not come fromthose who were outside the country, nor fromthose who sat on Robben Island, but from peo-ple in the townships. So we said: How shall we


SACTU was for a long time the only trade union that re-jected racial division.

deal with this? We decided that we wanted tosupport free union rights in South Africa. Thatwas what we knew [we could do]. Let politici-ans fix what they are good at, we will look afterthe people – and the trade union movements.

SACTU’s main line was isolation, at the same timeas recognising a need to develop contacts with andsupport to the internal unions. As an exile organisa-tion SACTU had some problems organising unionsin South Africa; thus the political struggle tended tobecome more important than the trade unionstruggle.LO’s largest union, Metall, did not agree with

unilateral Swedish sanctions but supported sanc-tions declared by the UN. It said its South Africanpartners agreed with this line. One of those who ad-vocated “hibernation” and union organisation wasGöran Johansson, then the chairman of Metall atSKF in Gothenburg and now a senior s-councillorin Gothenburg:

We demanded that the black workers ought tobe treated as all the others. Fairly soon we feltthat the greatest resistance to change did notcome from management in the Swedish com-panies, but from the white foremen on the fac-tory floor. It was very difficult to get at themand break down the barriers. Company mana-


Two trade union leaders at SKF in the beginning of the the 80-s, Göran Johansson from Gothenburg and Daniel Dubefrom Uitenhage.

gement did not know what was happening onthe floor; there might be a white foreman whohad a “black book”, in which he kept track ofthose he favoured and set his own pay levels.What we learnt from the work in South Af-

rica was how unbelievably important it was toget to know and understand the culture in dif-ferent contexts. When I see South Africa today,what worries me most is that the “blacks havebecome so black”, people are sacked from – ordo not get jobs – because they are not blackenough. They are losing the strength theymight have gained, because of these splits.

Within the Swedish Mine Workers Union (Gruv)and the Municipal Workers’ Union (Kommunal)the picture of South Africa differed, and they had amore positive view on sanctions. Anders Stendalenwas chairman of Gruv:

The guidance I received from our comrades inSouth Africa was very important to me. We re-alised that an efficient weapon in the struggleagainst apartheid was to refuse companies tomake new investments. Some thought this wasa militant attitude, but we stood by our line.Mandela also said that one does not put outthe fire just before the water boils.

Through direct adult education in South Africa,among other inputs, Gruv played a major role inbuilding up the National Union of Mineworkers(NUM). Johan Peanberg, then Kommunal’s inter-national secretary, said that even if the question ofsanctions did not split the trade union movement itdamaged its reputation as an anti-apartheid force.Kommunal supported sanctions and boycotts:

Metall’s divergent voice set the tone within the

trade union movement, because export in-dustries were leading. From previously havinga common view, those of us who were positiveto sanctions lost influence and the trade unionmovement followed a softer line. Still, after awhile public opinion changed, and the view onsanctions and boycotts became tougher again.

Out in the country the conflicts at union headquar-ters were less noticeable. Most of the time everyoneagainst apartheid cooperated without difficulties.In Oskarshamn, for example, Tormod Nesset wasactive in both Metall and the Social Democrats andwas a member of the board of the local ISAK (seebelow). This contact came through a tip from LO.He and some friends one day decided that theywanted to do something against apartheid. Theyphoned LO and were told about ISAK:

ISAK had a simple constitution and all couldjoin. We did not want to make it a party orga-nisation. Anyway, everyone in Oskarshamnknew who we were. Each of us worked in our


Tormod Nesset left. With the American musician Little Steven, as a boos-ter for the ISAK child campaign.

respective organisations and initiated interestand support. There were several political parti-es and organisations, from Metall’s Chapter 32to Döderhults nature conservation society andEmmaus Björkå. ISAK accepted all who wan-ted to join and when we were involved in largecampaigns like “Ungdom mot apartheid”(Youth against apartheid) everyone joined, themunicipality, commerce and industry, social

democratic organisations and the trade uni-ons.

In early 1977 Kristina Persson – later county gover-nor and Deputy Director of the Bank of Sweden –visited South Africa at the behest of LO/TCO to re-view trade union activity and organisations. Inter-national contacts were still unusual:

I travelled round alone – to Johannesburg, Ca-pe Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban. When I ca-


Cyril Ramaphosa and the NUM leadership meets Olof Palme and Anders Stendalen.

me to Durban, Alec Erwin from the MetalWorkers Union was waiting for me at the air-port.“Kristina, you are not alone,” said Alec. After

this I had about 10 guys shadowing me, threecars, a massive following, all the time. Thus Ionly met people who were openly union orga-nisers formally and clearly. On one occasionwhen we wanted to talk about slightly moresensitive matters like how our support oughtto be organised, Alec Erwin and I took a walkalong the beach in Durban and talked abouthow we could transfer money, whether weshould do it openly and bilaterally, through thetrade union internationals, or the churches.

During the six weeks she spent in South Africa, Kri-stina Persson laid the basis for cooperation that ac-quired great importance for both the Swedish andthe new South African trade union movement. Itwas cooperation based on trust, but it also involvedthe psychology of opposition to apartheid that cre-ated strong ties and a sense of community betweenpeople:

The struggle brought people together in a fa-scinating way. After only a few weeks I wasclearly a part of the South African liberationstruggle. I identified myself with those I metand they showed me they had very great confi-dence in me. It was the 1970s even in South Af-rica, and there were youths who identified withthe left. To work with the unions was a way ofstrengthening the political opposition. I metyoung academics, Alec Erwin was one of them,Bernie Fanaroff another, who worked in exact-ly the same way as I did, because of ideals.

In a meeting with union organisers from Port Eliza-beth and Durban she discovered that the unionswere split and suspicious of each other:

I took up a discussion about whether theycould not find a way of cooperating – it wouldalso simplify contacts in the future; instead ofthe Swedish trade union movement they coulddistribute the funds themselves. They agreedwith this. When I had been home for a coupleof weeks, they contacted me and said: Now wehave discussed this and we shall call a meetingof all the organisations and suggest that weform a confederation of South African tradeunions.

It took time, but in 1979 FOSATU, the Federation ofSouth African Trade Unions was formed, to be suc-ceeded in 1985 by the Congress of South AfricanTrade Unions (COSATU). It chose not to join eitherof the trade union internationals. From the left Kri-stina Persson was accused of being a CIA-agent, andfrom the right she was seen as working for the KGB:

The presence of American interests and theAmerican trade union movement was veryclear in southern Africa, while there were Rus-sian interests too. A Cold War and a strugglefor souls were underway. There I stood withmy social democratic message and was viewedwith great suspicion in both camps. I interpre-ted it as though we’d found the middleground.

35. LO’s campaign for southern Africa As part of their 80 year old celebration in May 1978LO decided to start a big information and collectioncampaign for the liberation movements in Zim-babwe, Namibia and South Africa, starting in Sep-


tember. The largest international campaign in LO’shistory coincided with UN’s International Anti-Apartheid year and was also supported by TCO andthe Africa Groups.The LO-campaign was a major adult education

project for international solidarity. Exhibitions ofSouth African art were arranged together

with Riksutställningar (Swedish Travel-ling Exhibitions), Sida, TCO, TBVand the Labour movement commu-nity centres. The recording compa-ny A-disc produced a recordagainst apartheid and the filmApartheid was distributed to organi-sations by Föreningsfilmo. Swedish

primary and secondary schools wereinvited to describe both the oppression

and the liberation struggle in southern Africa intheir own words and illustrations. Ulf-Göran Widquist at Brevskolan (a correspon-

dence college and publisher) was given the task ofproducing the material for LO’s study circles. Hetravelled to Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibiaand South Africa to meet representatives of diffe-rent liberation movements and gather material:

I was careful, but we had good contacts, oftenthrough churches. Sweden had a good reputa-tion in southern Africa, we did many goodthings, we gave support and money. The la-bour movement has never been as strong in-ternationally as it was then, in all ways; consci-ous, knowledgeable when it concerned feelingsfor a major, important and good cause. Thisfeeling permeated the whole movement. It wasa question alongside pension issues and no onewondered why it took so much space on theagenda.

The campaign culminated with 1st May celebra-tions in 1979 and collected 3,3 million kronor (to-day ±10,5 million). When the trade union movement began to coo-

perate and support the unions in South Africa andNamibia, they needed more money and better orga-nisation to be able to handle the work. In 1977 LOand TCO formed a joint aid organ. LO chairmanArne Geiger always maintained that the unionsshould not use state funds for solidarity, because the


LO and TCOin a joint campaign year. “Support yourcomrade in South Africa”.

state should never get involved in union work. Uni-on solidarity was a question for the organisationsthemselves. LO and TCO agreed, however, to hand on state

assistance, if Sida in turn would not ask how LOand TCO would pay their own contributions, sincethey already contributed so much through their in-ternational union organisations. For LO/TCO itwas an important principle to work multilaterally,and Sweden was strong in the international tradeunion movement. In 1978 workers in the food industry (Livs), fac-

tory workers (Fabriks), and the Swedish Union ofForemen and Supervisors (SALF) got involved in aninternational sympathy strike for the right ofemployees at South African Unilever to organisethemselves. The South African Food and AlliedWorkers Union led the strike. In Sweden it was thefirst sympathy strike of this kind and was supportedby LO. In Nyköping, 700 workers at Sunlight wenton strike. Local clerical and service workers (SIF)branches decided not to join in, for which SIFcentrally expressed regrets in public. After the Uni-lever strike several individual trade unions becameinvolved in conflicts at companies in South Africain different ways, but not by striking.

36. Art, dance and musicThe study books and the Africa Bulletin (under vari-ous names) were important to enrich members’knowledge, but to strengthen feelings, art and mu-sic were needed. This was true in the refugee campsas well, where common experiences and hopes nee-ded to be interpreted and expressed through art,dance and music. To transfer this to Swedish solida-rity work was natural.In 1976 the ANC, together with the Support

Group for South Africa’s People (SSF, Stödgruppenför Sydafrikas folk), organised a tour with the ANC’scultural group Mayibuye whose members camefrom London and East Berlin. Three years later theAfrica Groups organised a second tour with theANC’s Mayibuye group. At their first concert inStockholm a woman suddenly hopped up onto thestage and joined in the songs, but the group was notfazed, on the contrary. Later the audience realisedthat this was Lindiwe Mabuza, ANC’S new repre-sentative in Stockholm, a recognised poet and wri-ter. She was intensely involved in the role of cultureas a factor for mobilisation and it became a great as-set to solidarity work in Sweden. On her suggestion the cultural group Amandla

was invited to do a big tour. They lived in ANChousing in Luanda, Angola and were trained by aprofessional, South African composer and trombo-nist, Jonas Gwangwa. No fewer than 30 musicians,singers and dancers plus a few tour leaders and con-tacts for the mass media and organisations came toGothenburg in late October 1979.Unfortunately Gwangwa hadbroken his leg a few days befo-re departure and was unableto join the group on its firstvisit. Five weeks of work with the

tour began, day and night. Thevery first performance was a suc-cess. The music, story, songs and dances were extre-mely skilful, and the group played to full houses allover Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany and Hol-land. A record was cut and large numbers were sold.In late 1983 a similarly successful tour was organi-sed in the same countries as well as Belgium. Swe-dish TV2 taped the show in Gothenburg, and a new



record was made. The interchange was mutuallyconstructive. Young people were able to show offtheir skills, their self-confidence rose, they were vi-sible and could see the world, they were able to me-et other young people and talk about music orsinging, they got a taste of what normal societiescan be, they acquired status in their own organisa-tion. Jan Henningsson from the Swedish Christian

Youth Council (SKU) said: In Sweden choir singing was a handle on theinner life of oppressed groups, their culture.There was no sense of being the victim, no em-

phasis on feeling sorry for others. Here theyhad something to give us, namely attractive,beautiful, easily learned choir music. We alsohad the musical group Fjedur, who in an act ofbrilliance popularised the Amandla songs, thewe-shall-win-songs. People were singing themeverywhere, not least in churches and chapels.They were even included in the new ecumeni-cal psalm book. In a unique way songs in Zuluentered the treasury of sacral songs. If onestarted singing one of these hymns in a churchin the countryside in the 1980s at least half thecongregation joined in! They were incredibly

ANC cultural group Amandla performs the gum boot dance in Gothenburg.


important in building a broad pub-lic opinion so that people couldidentify themselves with those whoare oppressed and with whom theyfelt solidarity.

Choirs with South African repertoires inand outside the Africa Groups contribu-ted to strengthening commitmentamong many of ISAK’s member organi-sations. The group Fjedur with itsChristian roots and with Anders Nybergas leader acquired something of an iconstatus in its manner of uniting Swedishfolk ballads and South African liberationsongs. Their music was even played inother countries. Falu Fredskör in Falun,Motvals in Linköping and Vred Fred inUppsala were some of the choirs thatutilised this repertoire.Culture came into the anti-apartheid

work in many ways. In 1983, Artistsagainst apartheid (Konstnärer mot apartheid) started.Lindiwe Mabuza was again the motor, and thechairperson was a working artist, Ursula Schütz.There were art exhibitions in Stockholm and Got-henburg, to which many known artists donatedtheir work to benefit the ANC. Artists against apart-heid continues today as Artists for Africa. In 1985 the 29 November Committee organised

two ANC galas called Rock against Apartheid (Rockmot Apartheid). Here widely differing artists likeBjörn Afzelius and Mikael Wiehe on the one handand Tomas Ledin on the other cooperated. It was ahuge success. With the on-going sales of records thetotal made may have reached over 10 million kro-nor. As well as providing economic support to the

ANC, the concerts made an important contributionto rooting the anti-apartheid movement among ayounger generation. Tommy Hansson, writing in the moderate Svensk

Tidskrift, claimed that the galas made “it possible forANC to murder and mutilate still more innocentSouth Africans, black, white and coloured”. For themajority, however, the reverse held. When NadineGordimer was awarded the Nobel Prize in literaturein 1991, ISAK organised a gala at Stadsteatern, whe-re artists like Monika Zetterlund, Allan Edvall andArja Saijonmaa paid tribute to the anti-apartheidauthor. The climax was a speech by writer Sara Lid-man for the prize winner, a personal friend for ma-ny years.Various kinds of cultural expression also played

The song group Fjedur with its leader Anders Nyberg left, preforms at a rally by Gothen-burg Africa Group at “Kopparmärra”.


an important role among activists in South Africa,who needed economic support from outside. Swe-dish assistance was channelled through SEN and la-ter Riksutställningar to projects like the CommunityArts Project in Cape Town, where drama, dance,painting, sculpture and other work became modesof expression for people’s protest against apartheid.The art school in Eshiyane, best known as Rorke’sDrift and for many years supported by SKM, isanother example of art and culture as a basis forself-respect and development.

37. South Africa’s fifth province?In 1884 Namibia became a German colony, knownas German South West Africa. The administrationwas brutal and this led to many attempts at revolt.After the First World War, at the Peace of Versaillesin 1919, Germany lost all its colonies. In 1920 thearea was given to South Africa to administerthrough a mandate from the League of Nations. Ac-cording to the mandate, South Africa ought to sup-port the development of the area towards indepen-dence, but in practice it treated South West Africa asa fifth province. In 1966 the UN General Assembly decided to get

to grips with the situation and formally place thearea under direct UN administration. In 1968 theUN gave this very sparsely populated area the nameNamibia, in 1969 the Security Council declared theSouth African presence in Namibia illegal, and in1971 the International Court of Justice in the Ha-gue confirmed this. Since Western powers refused to implement any

economic measures, based on a triple strategy,South Africa could strengthen its grip on Namibiawithout fear of punishment:

• Combat SWAPO by military means with theaim of reducing its domestic and internationalcredibility and legitimacy;

• Attempt to create support in Namibia for a do-mestic solution;

• Continue a diplomatic dialogue with externalparties with the aim of buying time and preven-ting negotiations.

Through a series of “terror trials” from 1968 andonwards – foreign observers called them “travestiesof justice” – South Africa tried to destroy its oppo-


nents. Long sentences – sometimes life terms – han-ded out to Namibian leaders like Andimba Toivo yaToivo did not help. South Africa managed to buy ti-me but not legitimacy. Instead, the UN recognisedSWAPO as a genuine liberation movement in 1973,and as “the sole and authentic representative of theNamibian people” in 1976. Western powers negotiated a solution to the Na-

mibian question (Resolution 435), which was ac-cepted by SWAPO and South Africa in September1978. In December 1978, in defiance of the agree-ment, South Africa decided to go it alone and holdelections in Namibia to guarantee continued SouthAfrican rule. SWAPO and several other parties boy-cotted the elections.From early on there was a strong commitment to

Namibia in Sweden, not least because of a positiveinterest on the part of the media. For instance, thenews programme Rapport on TV2 in 1974 showedextracts from a film, Frihetskampen in Namibia (Theliberation struggle in Namibia) by Per Sandén andRudi Spee, distributed by Filmcentrum. It documen-ted a massacre in the Caprivi Strip committed bythe South African army in September 1973. TheSouth African Defence Minister dismissed the char-ges as nonsense, and its Foreign Minister invitedSwedish Television to participate in an “investiga-tion” of the situation. On the advice of SWAPO,TV2 agreed, on condition that Sandén, Spee and theUN Namibia Commissioner were included – a con-dition that not surprisingly was not accepted. An important motive for Sweden to support

SWAPO soldiers in a ca-noe from the film “ TheLiberation Struggle in Na-mibia” by Per Sandén.

SWAPO against South Africa was the issue of theUN’s authority. As long as South Africa continuedto defy the UN, any decision on UN administrationof Namibia was dead in the water. Because of weaksupport from the Africa Groups, it was natural forSWAPO to seek to develop a relationship with theUnited Nations Association of Sweden (Svenska FN-förbundet). There was, however, a troublesome fac-tor to deal with: the collaboration between SWA-PO’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army ofNamibia (PLAN) and UNITA. It may be possible todescribe it as geo-ethnically motivated. Utilising the

close relationship between the Ovambos in nort-hern Namibia and UNITA’s primary base amongthe Ovimbundus in central Angola was arguably ageographic necessity for PLAN’s attacks in Nami-bia. When the MPLA took power in Luanda in 1975

the situation changed. South Africa began to colla-borate with UNITA, which in turn made it necessa-ry for SWAPO to re-evaluate its policies and drawcloser to Angola’s new government. In 1976 this re-sulted in promises of bases in Angola and in directcooperation between PLAN and the Angolan army.


Within the project “Medical Aid to SWAPO” material, medicine and equipment for more than 10 million SEK was sendand up to four doctors and nurses worked through the whole 1980-s in the refugee settlement in Kwanza Sul, Angola.Here the District nurse Magdalena Bjerneld.

On 4th May 1978 airborne South African forcesattacked Casinga. According to the United NationsChildren’s Fund (UNICEF), which had visited thisSWAPO centre 250 km from the Namibian borderthree weeks previously, it was a rapidly growing butimpressive and well-organised refugee camp. Themassacre left about 600 dead, nearly half of whomwere children and more than a quarter of whomwere women. A further 600 were maimed and morewere traumatised and injured by gas. Militarily itwas a success but politically it turned out to be a ca-tastrophe for South Africa. Per Sandén soon made anew film, Här är Namibia (Here is Namibia), whichwas widely disseminated through the Africa Groupsand local audio-visual centres. Within Sida there was some doubt as to SWA-

PO’s administrative capacity – both initially and la-ter. Emmaus Björkå and Bread and Fishes, however,did not share such doubts. The latter in particulardeveloped very close relations with SWAPO. BoF’ssupport to SWAPO came to exceed the sum of theirsupport to all the other liberation movements. Sho-es and clothes alone had, up to the time of Namibi-a’s independence in 1990, reached almost 1 000tons. To this should be added the Africa Groups’ ex-tensive collection of medicines and medical equip-ment. In cooperation with the local Africa Groupand five schools in Västerås, BoF took part in Opera-tion Dagsverke, which financed two Land Rover am-bulances to SWAPO and at the same time increasedpublic knowledge about Namibia.One of the leaders of BoF – and also active in

AGIS – was Bertil Högberg, who later (1977–79)worked as an employee at SWAPO’s office in Stock-holm. For a long time there was a great deal ofdoubt about SWAPO in the Africa Groups, sinceone could not point to any liberated areas. Through

its International Fund, the Social Democrats consi-stently supported the movement without hesita-tion. In time support from Sweden grew; the non-socialist government continued to increase officialassistance to SWAPO and was backed in this by theSocial Democrats and by that time also by the Afri-ca Groups. (During 1969–91 SWAPO received a to-tal of about 670 million kronor in current prices.)When the Africa Groups finally decided to supportSWAPO in 1976, they came to exaggerate SWAPO’smilitary successes during subsequent years.In December 1979 BoF, AGIS and SWAPO

agreed to apply to Sida for support for a major he-alth care project, which, as a first step, allocated 1,4million kronor in 1980 (today over 4 million). Thisconfirmed the rapprochement that occurred betwe-en public authorities and voluntary organisationsin their views of support to southern Africa. Thiswas reinforced on a personal plane when Sidaemployees became active in the Africa Groups andits members were recruited by Sida as processing of-ficers.

38. Isolate South Africa!Towards the end of 1978 AGIS invited a large num-ber of organisations to cooperate together againstthe white regime in South Africa. An earlier at-tempt, with human rights lawyer Hans-GöranFranck (s) as a draw card, had failed. AGIS had beenallocated funds to reach the youth, and Lennart Re-nöfält, with his background in the Swedish Cove-nant Church Youth League (SMU, Svenska Mis-sionsförbundets Ungdom), had responsibility forSouth African issues on the Africa Groups’ board.Bertil Högberg from AGIS, later a ISAK chairper-son, says:

He was cut out for the task. He became a part-



The union man who sold biblesThe LO-TCO Secretariat for International Trade UnionDevelopment Cooperation had initially a modestamount of work – about 15 projects, nearly all in SouthAfrica, but also had partners in Botswana, Zimbabwe andNamibia. In 1978 LO/TCO started a project to supportthe National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). Pal-le Carlsson from LO visited them:

All we knew was the name of the chairman, MaxGerson, who was a priest in a church in Windhoek. Iarrived there and found him. Then he revealed thatno trade union existed. Max and I travelled roundthe country to mines and other workplaces. We wereallowed in since he was a priest. I accompanied himand sold bibles, and afterwards I talked about theunion and Max translated to Ovambo. The reasonthat he in particular started a union organisationwas that like so many Namibians he’d been withmissionaries to Finland. There were radical leaderswithin the church who were against apartheid.On one occasion we visited a place where there

was a Methodist church and one of the ministers ca-me to look for us. “We have heard that you are aprofessor from the Methodist church in Sweden andthat you are travelling round to meet ministers.” Ikept a straight face and was invited to the church,and thought that now things will be difficult. Whatwould we talk about? The minister was friendly andsuddenly suggested, “Should we not say The Lord’sPrayer together?” The Lord’s Prayer, I thought andall I could remember was that I’d read the name in acrossword puzzle. But I went along to the altar andthere we stood. He began reciting it and I recognisedit as Fader Vår (Our Father) so then I could praywith him – in Swedish, of course.

Palle Carlsson was in Namibia on atourist visa and was forced to leavethe country from time to time. TheSwedish authorities had given him se-veral passports, which meant that heonly needed to leave for a short peri-od. It appeared that SWAPO was notaware that NUNW did not have anorganisation. However, soon 600members signed up for training. Thematerial was hand-produced by Palleand the co-workers he employed atthe little office in Windhoek, next do-or to the security police:

To transfer our methods of studydidn’t work; people became angry if I asked them aquestion. “You are the expert, you must tell us”, theysaid. Their most important union issue was to get afuneral policy, so their families could afford to re-turn their bodies to their homes, if they died in themines or at other workplaces.

The security police grew more and more interested, andat the end of 1979 deported Palle Carlsson from Namibia.NUNW developed rapidly and like most newly startedtrade unions received support and help with negotiationsfrom lawyers on the spot. The well-known anti-apartheidadvocate Anton Lubowski in Windhoek worked for theunions with support from LO/TCO. He was one of thefirst whites to become a member of SWAPO and wasmurdered in 1989 by South African security police.

The Lutheran mi-nister Max gersonthat workedamong thecontract workersfrom northern Na-mibia was stronglyinvolved I startinga trade union.

time employee in our youth campaign, but histask shifted to building up ISAK with him asits first chairperson. Not exactly what we’d be-en given the money for, but it was importantthat ISAK had a proper start, and I believehistory has forgiven us. The political partyyouth leagues of course did not want anotherparty’s youth league to have the chair, so onlythe Christians were left. With only two excep-tions ISAK’s chair came from the churches therest of the time. The first was I myself, whohad to hop in twice because there was no othercandidate, although I represented AGIS.

21 organisations plus Hans-Göran Franck came tothe constituent meeting in January 1979. In addi-tion to AGIS, umbrella organisations like SKU andSUL wanted to join. Together they covered nearlyall youth organisations. A number of political,Christian and other voluntary organisations alsojoined. During 1979 they agreed on a constitutionand on a campaign:

• Do not buy South African goods!• Withdraw Swedish investments from South Afri-ca!

• No trade with South Africa!• No cultural, academic, sporting or scientific ex-change with representatives of apartheid!

• Free all political prisoners!• Support the liberation struggle! Support theANC!

• South Africa out of Namibia! Support SWAPO!

There was a great deal of enthusiasm among all whowere there, confirmed Maria Leissner, then in theleadership of the Liberal Party Youth. Stephen Lind-

holm in the Communist Youth League strikes a si-milar tone:

It was great to get the young liberals, the Cent-re Party Youth and others who one normallydidn’t see in this type of work. It was not onlytrue of the political side; I thought that we gotquite a few of the Christian youth leagues, likethe young Catholics.They were fairly midd-le-class, but joined in agood way on this issue.The SMU membersshouldered a huge bur-den. The only ones ab-sent were the youngmoderates.


Early ISAK campaign in Västerås 1980. Don’t buy South African fruit.

Don’t buy South African Products.The red sticker campaigners appli-ed on products in the shops.

The board of the Moderate Party hadtaken a decision on the principle ofnever taking part in organisationsworking across party lines. Even theyouth and student leagues respectedthis. ISAK nevertheless continuedgaining large and growing support.

Several political women’s leagues weremembers. Cooperation with individual tra-

de unions and branches was good, even if it was alittle stiff with LO and TCO centrally. The consu-mer boycott and ban on new investments might af-fect employment levels. With such large sections ofSweden’s popular movements linked together, ISAKmight have collapsed either because of ideologicalcontradictions or because of the danger that whenall are with you, no one is with you, at least no onewho in practice is really involved. This did not hap-pen. Jan Henningsson from SKU:

The humanitarian issue was so conspicuous,and with the unbelievably clear symbolicevents like Sharpeville and Soweto like tragicbaggage, it was not the correct place to discussthe party colours of the liberation movements.It became increasingly obvious that we weredealing with a humanitarian catastrophe alsoentailing a moral collapse for the white world.

Karl-Gunnar Norén – who was acampaign secretary in ISAK –points to several factors to ac-count for the spirit of good fel-lowship:• Nelson Mandela, a cha-rismatic leader, had somethingin common with many ideologi-

es: he was a Christian and unjustly

imprisoned freedom fighter;• Many South Africans are Christi-an; thus there are common cultu-ral expressions and values thatmade it easy to communicate withSwedes, such as through South Afri-can choral music;

• Among the ANC there was a desire for adulteducation that many Swedes could identify with;

• The absurdity of the apartheid system had forseveral decades sunk in among broad circles;thus there was both fertile soil and endurancefor anti-apartheid work;

• The armed struggles of the ANC and SWAPOwere clearly in defence of basic human rightsand were conducted in forms that were experi-enced as not too brutal.

39. Campaigns beginto take shapeISAK was formed in January1979 for a trial period, butthe results led to a continua-tion. A decision was takenon a consumer boycott be-ginning in April 1980. It wasone way of influencing pub-lic opinion to put pressure

on the government for stronger laws. Through ha-ving built up a great deal of knowledge on southernAfrica over many years, the Africa Groups had agreat deal of influence over the work, and their de-mands on the whole became ISAK’s joint demands. In the early 1980s ISAK had to rely on the sale of

material, in the form of stickers, posters, booklets,badges and other campaign material, that localgroups and individuals could order, now with


ISAK’s own logo. These sales were important forISAK’s finances, which were very weak in the begin-ning. In addition, with limited capacity it was oftenfairly difficult to implement all the projects, butISAK also had friends outside the organisationaland political contexts. Advertising campaigns initi-ated in the morning and evening press roused manyindividuals, and some companies continually sup-ported their work. At the beginning contributionsfrom Sida came solely from allocations for informa-tion, and only towards the late 1980s did Sida’s hu-manitarian working committee open its purse, alt-hough it had for years supported quite a few inter-national anti-apartheid projects. ISAK combined different ways of working. One

was purely influencing public opinion and politicallobbying; here ISAK argued for generally recogni-sed ethical norms. Another was for ISAK’s memberorganisations to examine reality. If AGIS had not in1980 already dug up the National Key Points Act,ISAK would probably not have known that the Swe-dish companies in South Africa actually participa-ted in South Africa’s military strategy. Now it waspossible to inform the general public in Swedenabout this – a weighty point in the campaign. Through combining facts and ethics, ISAK’s

campaigns acquired considerable credibility andthey could put pressure on the law-makers. A stan-ding question was how to work to tighten the law.As the circle of lobbyists and friends within the ad-ministration and political organs grew and ISAK’sown expertise increased, it became easier. Thus on 13th April 1980 a new consumer boycott

period began. ISAK also took part in the prepara-tions for the third international conference of ICSA,the International Committee against Apartheid, Ra-cism and Colonialism, which was held in Södertälje

in April 1980. This put ISAK on the internationalarena. There were now 28 member organisations,which with the participating umbrella organisa-tions’ own member organisations meant that prac-tically all organised youths in Sweden supported thedemands of the platform, as well as many adults.

40. ISAK presses the politicians The tripartite non-socialist government fell apart


Don’t buy South African products. Don’t let your moneysupport the oppressors buying of weapons.

over the issue of nuclear power nearly two years af-ter it won the elections in 1976. After that a LiberalParty minority government ruled Sweden from1978-79, which was accepted by the Social Democ-rats. After having in vain tried to get commerce andindustry to stop investments voluntarily, the go-vernment put forward a proposal for a stop to newinvestments, which became law in 1979. It wouldstill be possible to upgrade and modernise machi-nery, if the company did not increase production.In practice it was impossible to check whether thelaw was being followed, and applications for ex-emptions were normally approved – and often clas-sified secret – by the National Board of Trade (Kom-merskollegium). When ISAK tried to review thesedocuments, most of the text was censored withblack ink. No public insight was possible at a timewhen the right of the public to have access to offici-al documents was entrenched in Sweden. The pro-hibition on new investments was a paper tiger. Mo-re force, or rather more political will, was requiredto stop Swedish companies from supporting theapartheid regime.Africa Group veteran Sören Lindh explains:Even those who disliked us admitted that weknew what we were saying. Our breadth, ex-pertise and commitment were the three im-portant factors in this context. More and morepeople who had facts at their fingertips beca-me involved, and it was not possible to deceiveISAK, in any case one would have to try veryhard. We generally knew as much as the civilservants in the government departments. Andwe were always so fast off the mark that ourforce could compensate for the little we didnot know.

One example of this is that ISAK managed to com-bine the debate on GATT (General Agreement onTariffs and Trade) with a Swedish trade embargoagainst South Africa. It appeared that the generalfree trade agreement had certain exceptions. SörenLindh:

We skipped over the main body of text … andlooked among the exceptions. There we disco-vered that the import of goods produced byprisoners could be stopped. This had nothingto do with humanity, no. The basis of the argu-ment was instead that prisoners could producegoods more cheaply, and thus have an imper-missible competitive advantage. The AfricaGroups and ISAK directed the debate to thisexception and asked: Who knows if this orangewas picked by a free man or by a prisoner?”

ISAK’s strategy was intended to link the Swedishcompanies in South Africa to the regime, for instan-ce, SKF, Sandvik and Atlas-Copco that worked withthe mining industry. Through the National KeyPoints Act of 1980 strategically important compani-es like these were forced to set up and arm their ownindustrial civil defence units against uprisings.

An earlier law – the National Procurement Act– meant that the regime could compel a com-pany to … pay employees who were serving inthe security forces and the army, and there wasno information on companies refusing to dothis. Thus the Swedish companies in South Afri-

ca actually took part and paid their employeeswho, on their compulsory military service, forexample, harried people in the townships orwent to war in Angola. At the beginning thisobligation was swept under the carpet, but af-


ter a while the issue became more sensitive,and in reality it remained in force till the endof sanctions. In the second half of 1980 we wrote a letter

to the Foreign Ministry and asked how Swedenwould act in this new situation. There the let-ter caused some consternation and confusion,since the report from South Africa did not ar-rive as quickly as our question. For a long timeafter this we enjoyed a solidly established repu-tation at the ministry for being well informed.

It was not possible to place ISAK in a particular box,because ISAK had people from different camps andwith real knowledge of different areas of expertise.The result? ISAK pushed the law-makers ahead ofit, mildly but determinedly. An expert group couldin 1981 note that there had not been any significantfall in investments since the prohibition on new in-vestments became law, and that the value of pro-duction of both SKF and Sandvik had increased byabout 50% between 1979 and 1981. The work of theexpert group identified loopholes in the South Afri-ca law that led to the appointment of a specialSouth Africa Committee with Ambassador SverkerÅström as chairperson. Its official report in 1984 in-cluded several proposals to tighten loopholes likeleasing equipment, transfer of patents etc. Therewere further limitations on the possibility of seek-ing exemptions. The new South Africa law came in-to force in 1985.

41. Pockets of resistance in industryThe influx of support from popular movements inSweden in mobilising against apartheid policies didnot strike a chord among management of Swedishcompanies with interests in South Africa. On the

contrary, in 1983 the International Council of Swe-dish Industry (NIR) published a 75-page bookletSydafrika och Svenskt Näringsliv (South Africa andSwedish Commerce), written largely by Åke Mag-nusson. He had undertaken a long personal journeyfrom in the 1960s being an anti-imperialist studentwho collected money for Frelimo, to the executivedirector’s post in NIR, and en route working as aconsultant and researcher for churches, the trade


Are South African soldiers paid by Swedish companies.Yes though salaries during military service …..Swedish companies have to leave South Africa.

union movement and the state.From this new position, Magnusson and NIR’s

board, led by Peter Wallenberg, a leading industria-list, launched “the new strategy” on “constructiveengagement” – an echo of Reagan and Thatcher anda line that the churches and unions (with the excep-tion of Metall) abandoned as unrealistic in the1970s. Representatives for Alfa-Laval, Atlas Copco,Fagersta, Sandvik, SKF and Transatlantic were onthe NIR board. The brochure maintained that“South Africa is not unique” and Swedish compani-

es “must follow the laws of the host country and inall essentials adapt to the applicable local businessand work rules”. The Swedish government’s supportto the ANC not only backs up “a confrontational li-ne”, but also “further … isolates us from the Wes-tern world” and contributes to undermining theUN’s “authority and credibility”. The booklet further argued that through its deci-

sion on sanctions Sweden “excluded the manyblacks who prefer non-violent methods, economicdevelopment and political mobilisation to sabotage,


The drawing by Karin Södergren in the Africa Bulletin that depicts how Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten and Prime MinisterTorbjörn Fälldin, allow the investment law to leak as a sieve.

guerrilla war and perhaps civil war”. Aside fromeconomic sanctions actually being a non-violentmethod, the credibility of the argument was not st-rengthened by NIR promoting Inkatha as a non-vio-lent alternative. The real reason for this choice seemsto have been that its president Gatsha Buthelezi ple-aded for foreign investments in the “homelands”.Peter Wallenberg continued to criticise Sweden’s

support to ANC. In March 1992 he said: I wonder exactly what we would think if some-one sat and shovelled in a great deal of cash tothe Lapps (the indigenous Sámi people innorthern Europe) so that they could make a lotof trouble for the Swedish government … Isuspect that then there would be an incredibleamount of shouting.

In September 1994 – in other words after the ANCwon the elections – Wallenberg informed the worldthat the “apartheid system… had certain aspectsthat were necessary under current conditions” andthat South African blacks would absolutely not ma-nage without the whites. “Blacks simply do not havethe competence required… they are more or less atthe same level of development as we were 100 or150 years ago”. This remark was made by one ofSweden’s most prominent businessmen.


Alfa Laval milks South Africa. Divest from South Africa!


What was driving the activists? Sver-ker Sörlin, now a professor of scien-ce and ideas, tries to give an answer.He was one of many in the UmeåAfrica Group from 1977 and thedecade following, and also did somework on a national level. The acti-vists learnt to keep the minutes ofmeetings and developed a relatively“puritanical … Nordic popular movement ethic”, buthow did this solidarity come about? Sörlin points to seve-ral roots: the trade union movement, the co-op move-ment, the phenomenon of national insurance, theChristian sphere. Suddenly it all coalesced in time into amighty wave of solidarity:

In the first place it was concerned with solidaritywith developing countries… But on a more generaland extended sense solidarity could refer to a greatdeal. Africa was naturally included. Even those whogenerally knew nothing about this continent wouldin some way feel convinced that one ought to showsolidarity with it and its people.This sense of solidarity coincided in time and

ought to have guaranteed unity, and the commonecumenical view of solidarity as a core must havemeant a good deal for the broad recruitment base ofthe Africa Groups in Sweden. Here people from dif-ferent social groups agreed, though there was a cer-tain over-representation of highly educated people.Health care personnel made up a significant catego-ry, as did teachers and other professional groups likeveterinarians and agronomists, who could all take

part in concrete tasksin Africa’s developingcountries. The longertime passed, the moreclearly one could feelthe roots threadingback to missionariesand philanthropy, par-ticularly when we be-

gan to send our own personnel to Africa. Behind the ecumenical facade there was also so-

mething else. So, long afterwards I remember onething that was striking: that this movement of a rela-tively modest size contained such strong tensions.Solidarity was a uniting factor, but several differentsolidarities existed. Two poles seem to me to be clea-rer than others. The one type of solidarity originated in the

Christian sphere. Here was the patient striving andhappy struggling, the inner flame of which I didn’tunderstand in the beginning but which sooner or la-ter showed itself. Then it came like a revelation.Between them, I sometimes thought, lay a silent andmutual understanding. One was working for a hig-her goal, but what could not really be said. Thosewho knew, knew.The other was communist. This ideological basis

was nothing that was demanded according to theconstitution. Thus it was seldom expressed, as littleas the religiously oriented desired the non-believers’sympathy for their views. But it was unmistakable,and sometimes declared, in fact somewhat moreloudly than the believers’. At one congress one of the

A mighty wave of solidarity and its sources


prominent figures wore a red T-shirt with the text“Sure, I’m a Marxist”. A similar confession about theprophets I never saw on anyone’s chest, only discretecrosses here and there.Those who represented this position in the debate

acted with a conviction that I found at least as enig-matic as that of the faithful. They seemed so sure ofwhat was the right thing to do, more assured thanwhat I thought there was a reasonable foundationfor. Here there were also those who knew. Fundamentally this kind of thinking often rests

on metaphysics. History has a meaning and a direc-

tion, even in southern Africa. To start with, colonia-lism and apartheid must be abolished, and then therealisation of socialism will begin. Thus solidaritywith the ANC will continue. A few of us were doubt-ful of how judicious it was for a movement like theAfrica Groups to, without further ado, devote itselfto a state and its government’s policies, rather thanto principles of freedom, democracy and human dig-nity, and in a while these ambitions were moderated. They had a positive effect in that the Africa

Groups became directly involved in providing assi-stance in the former Portuguese colonies and later inZimbabwe. This meant that the organisation beganto accept contributions from Sida and that the workgot a practical solidarity side. Balancing the ac-counts, annual reports and staff policies stabilisedand set a framework for the most metaphysical ho-pes.This does not mean that hope ended, but that the

influence of the ideologies on the organisation’s reli-ability was neutralised. The Africa Groups became apartner in global solidarity work. There were missio-naries and Christian groups since earlier, charity or-ganisations, whose new, or for Sweden new, voiceswere heard, like Oxfam, Doctors without Bordersand Greenpeace, that grew dramatically during the1980s. The organisation increasingly began to take aplace in a rainbow human rights and charity panora-ma. There was still the question of solidarity … inthe light of a later world it always appears to defendthe struggle against apartheid and for freedom, de-mocracy and human dignity like the backbone of theorganisation… The solidarities were united.

ISAK was the organisational expression of the unified so-lidarities.

Lennart Renöfält with pram outside the South African Le-gation. At the request of the Africa Groups he started upISAK and was the chair for several mandates.


Boycott demonstration in the 80-s. At the front Kaire Mbuende, SWAPO Eddie Funde, ANC Hans Göran Frank and AnnaLindh the Social Democratic Party.

7. 1983–1988THE CRUCIAL

YEARS


42. The third wave of resistanceThe years 1983–88 were crucial to the struggleagainst apartheid. After the ANC and PAC werebanned in 1960 the opposition against apartheidinside South Africa was virtually destroyed and ittook a decade before a new generation reorganisedprotests again. In 1973 extensive spontaneous strikes broke out

in Durban and Johannesburg, and in Namibia,where workers protested against the disgusting con-ditions. The strikes did not lead to any improve-ments for the workers, but at the universities thestrikes did have consequences. The youth gatheredround the black consciousness movement, Steve Bi-ko and SASO, the South African Students Organisa-tion. In 1977 Biko was murdered while in detentionand SASO was banned. The UN responded with amandatory arms embargo.At the same time students and intellectuals star-

ted forming what would become a new trade unionmovement. If trade unions were to be built up andsurvive in South Africa, they could not be associa-ted with the ANC nor become involved in open po-litical activities. They must be organised at theworkplace, not in residential areas. If the presidentwere arrested, there should always be others whocould take over. In addition, citizens’ groups were built up, so-

called civics. They included tenants’ associations,women’s organisations, funeral societies and coope-ratives – South Africa’s blacks had never been so

well organised before. Less spectacularly, but with avery long-term view, people began to build up a ci-vil society as a base both for their own developmentand for opposition to the regime’s policies.An important condition had thus been created

for the third wave of opposition. In the same way asReagan became the foremost recruitment officer forthe American peace movement in the 1980s, Presi-dent Botha, “the old crocodile”, was the one to givethe new wave of opposition a lift. He believed thathe would be able to split the movement through of-fering coloureds and Indians – but not blacks – achamber each in a revamped parliament. This, hebelieved, would silence their criticism without himhaving to give up the apartheid system. Bothaproclaimed a referendum on the proposal, thus ma-king a strategic mistake. Up until 1983 citizens’ groups worked separately.

They were not formally coordinated even if theycooperated with one another. Now suddenly therewas need for a united front against apartheid. Closeto 600 citizens’ groups joined together to form anumbrella organisation, the United DemocraticFront (UDF), to run a joint campaign for the boy-cott of the referendum on the tricameral parlia-ment. The UDF was launched on 20th August at ameeting in Cape Town with 10 000 participants.The main speaker was Pastor Frank Chikane, theGeneral Secretary of the Institute for ContextualTheology.The regime immediately accused the UDF of be-

ing a disguised internal wing of the ANC. This wasnot true. Even if the ANC in the late 1970s discussedan internal national civil rights movement as a stra-tegy for the liberation struggle, the UDF was inde-pendent. In fact, at the beginning there was consi-derable scepticism within ANC towards the UDF,which on the other hand had great faith in theANC. They shared the same principles. The pro-blems of relationships and the division of roles wassorted out at a secret meeting between the ANC’s

exile leadership and representatives of the UDFheld at Bommersvik in Sweden in January 1986.Only a few weeks after the formation of the UDF,

Auret van Heerden, president of the white studentmovement NUSAS (National Union of South Afri-can Students), landed in Sweden to meet represen-tatives of ISAK, the Africa Groups and the LabourMovement’s International Centre (AIC) to discusshow the UDF could get Swedish support. Bengt Sä-ve-Söderbergh was at the time head of the AIC:


The start of UDF.

There was a feeling of “now or never”. Duringthe year we had received information from va-rious sources, among them the trade unionmovement, that the formation of the UDF wasimminent. This was positive for we had expec-ted that a broad political movement would beformed inside the country. The liberation of a

country must come from within. The ANC al-so had major problems at this time; South Af-rica was engaged in war against the neigh-bouring countries that were independent sta-tes, under the pretext that they posed a com-munist threat.


Frank Chikane, Olof Palme and Cassim Saloojee.

Only a few months later the newspaper Arbetet pre-sented the Let Live Award to the UDF, and two of itsforemost leaders, Murphy Morobe and Cassim Sa-loojee, came to Sweden to receive the prize. In Janu-ary 1987 Frank Chikane, currently head of Presi-dent Thabo Mbeki’s secretariat, came to receive apeace prize from the ecumenical developmentNGO, Diakonia. Unlike the ANC, which was happyto appear in different political contexts all over theworld, the UDF’s leaders were doubtful about ma-king international appearances. Each time they re-turned to Johannesburg they ran the risk of beingarrested at the airport, even if they had only fetcheda symbolic prize. The AIC rapidly took the decision to support the

UDF with money from its I-fund, but much morewas needed than the labour movement itself couldprovide. Sida was initially doubtful. To support theANC and SWAPO in exile was no problem, but togive assistance to an organisation inside the countrywas completely new. Formally it could be questio-ned if this did not conflict with international law.South Africa was an independent state. To send mo-ney to the UDF meant that the Swedish state sup-ported the opposition inside the country, which,though it was not declared illegal, did have the aimof deposing the regime. The UDF’s campaign against the referendum was

a success. 85% of those entitled to vote boycotted it,but the tricameral parliament was nevertheless in-troduced in 1984. Not much time passed before theUDF was banned from accepting foreign money.

43. Boycotts and sanctions The aim of the consumer boycott was primarily toincrease ordinary people’s knowledge of racialoppression in South Africa and Namibia and thus

also the pressure on politicians to take new measu-res. South African fruit, wine, preserves and Nami-bian Swakara furs were targets. Soon stickers withthe text “Don’t buy South African goods!” (Köp inteSydafrikanska varor) were spread all over Sweden.When ISAK focused on the procurement by muni-cipalities and county councils, they were often suc-cessful. In early 1985 local ISAK committees did a detai-

led survey of nearly two hundred shops about sup-plying South African goods and attitudes to boy-cott. Not surprisingly it ap-peared that most private su-permarkets and even manymembers of the cooperativesold them. The exceptionwas Konsum (coop) in grea-ter Stockholm, which stillmaintained the boycott fromthe 1960s. More surprisingwas that three-quarters ofthe store managers were pre-pared not to buy South Afri-can goods, if there was acommon action. Only a fewper cent were negative to aboycott. That political work and

influencing public opinion is boring is a myth. Fruitwas an important and relevant question to draw inyouth in the work. Maria Leissner remembers itclearly:

It was fun, exciting and we had butterflies inour stomachs and were a little nervous, whenwe went into all these shops to check whetherthey had KOO marmalade or South Africangrapes. Then we tried to start a discussion with


Continueson page 132

»tre fjärdedelar avbutiksföreståndarna varberedda att avstå frånsydafrikanska varor, omdet skedde i en gemensamaktion. Bara några fåprocent var avvisande till bojkott.«


Sida’s support to the liberation movements was, in princi-ple, simple. To a great extent it involved the transport ofgoods. As long as the host country and the liberation mo-vement had a good relationship, there were seldom seri-ous difficulties. Similarly, support went to services likeeducation, health care etc. If there were liberated areas, it

was up to the move-ments to see to itthat goods and ser-vices were providedwhere they wereneeded. To managethis they were oftenalso given trucks.South Africa was

more difficult. TheANC never tried toliberate any areas.Yet the needs insideSouth Africa grewever larger. Supportin the form of goodswas unthinkable.Assistance must begiven in the form of

money – but how? The white regime tried in all possibleways to choke off international support to the oppositionagainst apartheid. How could one succeed in outwittingthe controlling apparatus, based as it was on an increa-singly stringent Fund Raising Act?Sweden was probably the country that transferred the

most money to the liberation struggle inside South Afri-ca: 100 million kronor (today closer to 175 million) to

UDF and 200 million (over 325 million) to COSATU tomention only two recipients. (The ANC received themost, a total of almost 900 million during the period1969–94 in current prices, including support inside andoutside South Africa). It could not be done through theSwedish legation in Pretoria. On the contrary, the factthat the Swedish government tried to contribute econo-mically to overturn the white regime had to be hidden.Thus the decisions on allocations were kept secret, andthe funds were passed through Swedish popular move-ments without informing the movements’ members.

There were many ways to move money:To qualify for a scholarship for tertiary studies one had tohave been politically active and have been given a writtenrecommendation by a credible authority. The EcumenicalAdvice Bureau in Johannesburg was responsible for selec-tion and student guidance. At most 270 people participa-ted in the programme. To everyone’s great surprise it waspossible to send the money individually to the recipients.Probably the amounts were too small for the control ap-paratus to react, but the administrative burden for SENwas great; and this was before wholesale computerisation.Another channel for scholarships was WUS, World Uni-versity Service.One method to transfer money was to sign a formal

and expensive contract on the purchase of e.g. news andother information on a monthly basis. FOSATU produ-ced a film, which was sold at extremely high prices over-seas. Many UDF leaders were lawyers and a South Africanlaw firm could send an invoice to a foreign law firm. Christian Åhlund at Advokatbyrån Sju advokater (Seven

Secret funds – and open transfers

Thank you letter from scholarship holder.


Advocates) was an important secret link between AIC andUDF. Money was sent through him. He was also on theboard of the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF)in London, which is estimated to have been involved in25 000 trials. IDAF and AIC used “the radio” to cover acu-te transactions to UDF. On the telephone a radio intervi-ew was discussed, and the time mentioned was the sum tobe transferred. The route the funds took had been workedout previously.In South Africa, both jokingly and seriously, it was said

that many advocates survived the apartheid years on Swe-dish assistance. When the unions were newly formed, theyoften turned to lawyers for help in conflicts and negotia-tions. Certain lawyers, opponents of apartheid, charged asignificantly lower fee for union work, R120 per hour,while ordinary lawyers took R500. The Legal ResourcesCentre, with six regional offices, filled two tasks: free legalassistance to poor blacks and practice for newly qua-lified black lawyers.Another way was to exchange money. Swe-

dish money was deposited in an account some-where in Europe. It was then withdrawn by aperson or organisation in South Africa withmoney in a bank account in South Africa thatcould not be transferred out of the country, whilethe UDF could withdraw the corresponding amountin rand. It could, however, also be considerably more complica-

ted than this. During the major miners strike in 1986,when 360 000 workers downed tools, Swedish miners andother organisations within the labour movement collec-ted over 3 million kronor (today over 5 million) to saveNUM, the National Union of Mineworkers. The unionswere prohibited from accepting foreign support, so themoney had to be smuggled in. Peter Jansson was in Tanza-nia working for the Swedish Municipal Workers Union to

train union leaders, but he alsohad another task:

The Swedish money cameto the union in Tanzania,where it was withdrawnin dollars. I received themoney, fetched it inbrown paper bags andthen I took the train toLake Malawi. It was try-ing; a 23-hour long tripon a train that only hadsimple bunks. In firstclass there are four bunksin a compartment. Icouldn’t leave the com-partment, the moneywas in a cloth bag so that it should not draw at-tention. I slept with the bag as a pillow. When Iarrived a person met me, took the money andtook the boat over to Malawi, where it wassimple to exchange it to rand. It was like an old black-and-white espionage

film. We used code words. I was told that the con-tact “would wear horizontally striped clothes” anduse passwords: “Where is this place?” I’d ask, I thinkit was a hotel, and he’d reply: “It isn’t in this town”.The second and third times were not so hard; it wasthe same person. I did three trips. From Malawi a new courier took over and entered

South Africa through the Kruger National Park andSwaziland. It was dangerous, as soldiers chased them.The Kruger Park is full of wild animals and somecouriers. The whole chain was dangerous since wehandled a great deal of money. A half million kronor

South African LiteraryService mediated litera-ture and informationbetween South Africaand the surroundingworld.

the

manager of the shop or the poor girl or boywho stood by the cash register. We took ISAK’scampaigns to FPU, the Liberal Party Youth,and ran them like our own campaigns. Asyouth league secretary I attended diffe-rent meetings and we nearly alwayshad a public action linked to them,for instance, a raid in shops in thetown.

Lobbying at a political level bore fruit,and in June 1985 a ban on the import ofagricultural goods came into effect. Italso gave municipalities and county

councils the right to counteractapartheid politics when doing theirown procurement. After this ISAKdevoted itself to discovering thefruit and not least the juice thattrickled in under false certificatesof origin. It turned out to be quitea lot. Swaziland, for instance, pro-duced less than half of what wasexported in that country’s name.During a follow-up in 1987

ISAK found to its great and posi-tive surprise that 21 of the 26municipalities asked had utilisedthe new opportunities to actagainst apartheid. There wasthus widespread public opinionagainst South Africa’s policies,and it was necessary to pass lawsto simplify conditions for ta-king effective measures. Underheavy pressure from public opi-nion, large sections of their own

party, all the other parliamentary parties except theModerates, as well as the other Nordic govern-ments, the social democratic government was fi-nally forced to give in and in February 1987 it pre-

sented a proposition on the banning of tradewith South Africa. The party board hadwith considerable doubt placed “commit-ment before principles”. Prior to this,Great Britain and USA had once againvetoed sanctions in the Security Council.The Swedish embargo on imports and ex-

ports was a step in the right direction, butthere were loopholes in the law. It was also important to block


ISAK tried indifferent ways to stop trade with South Africa.

continuedfrom page

129

No business with Apartheid.

South Africans wherever they appeared in an inter-national context. The aim was to prevent them frommoving in and posing as honourable citizens from anation with no major faults.. They came to Sweden

on tourist visas and in other ways. Scouts, physiot-herapists, scientists – everyone should be targeted.The argument, “I am not interested in politics, I doresearch”, or “We scouts all have the same scout


Young and joyful activists in Gothenburg.

Continueson page 137


The Foreign Ministry’s secret agentsDuring the period 1982-88, while the protest movementtook shape, Birgitta Karlström Dorph was working at theSwedish Legation in Pretoria. She had contact with indi-viduals and groups who were building up the oppositioninside the country. She looked at and evaluated whoshould get help and then suggested which Swedish orga-nisations should become partners in such cooperation.

I came from Angola and had received the advice tocontact Beyers Naudé who was a white minister, aBoer who had rejected apartheid. He was, after Man-dela, the leader of the liberation struggle; people hadconfidence in him and he knew most of what washappening. The first time I met him he came dressedas an electrician, since he was banned. We met inprinciple every fortnight during my stay in SouthAfrica and it was through Beyers that I was led intothe whole opposition movement.

In townships, churches, cafés and shops Birgitta Kar-lström Dorph met people who she heard were important,or were busy building up an organisation or were doingsome work. Security was rigorous.

It was essential not to make the contacts on the te-lephone or write letters but to meet. Our greatestfear was that the apartheid government would realisewhat we were doing and close the legation. It wasimportant for me not to do anything illegal. It was abalancing act all the time.Everything was unique. Beyers had ideas of what

we could do. He also understood our role as a lega-tion. From the start I felt an immediate and comple-te trust in him. Without him we would never have

been able to do what we did. After a while – as he gotto know me better – my contacts widened and I be-gan to get my own ideas. If I was doubtful I always went back to Beyers.

Then he would check through his contacts. He had aunique contact network. He never talked about whohis contacts were. I never talked with him aboutwhom I had spoken to, but we compared notes andhe came back and made comments. In South Africa,after Mandela, he was the leader of the opposition.He ought to have been awarded a Nobel Peace Prize.

It was necessary to find the right organisations and theright people, to try to assure oneself that the organisationin question was not infiltrated and that it was not anagent of the South African government acting as thecounterpart. Birgitta Karlström Dorph was quite alone inusing this method of working.

Birgitta Karlström-Dorph and Beyers Naude.


After a while it became clear to me that wehad to have a range of organisations: somethat were uncontroversial so that we could al-so have some that were more controversial.We needed the full range. The South Africangovernment naturally knew that we met theopposition, but I still believe today – and pos-sibly I’m naïve – that they did not see the sca-le of what we were doing. In that case wewould have been expelled.

Through Birgitta Karlström Dorph and her suc-cessor Anders Möllander – today Swedish Ambas-sador to South Africa – the Legation became a stra-tegic link between South African organisations andSwedish ones like AGIS, AIC and SEN. Möllanderworked in the same way as his predecessor andlooked for critical references:

Two people who I had great confidence in we-re Jesse Duarte and the current Vice-PresidentPhumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

He also provided important support to the AICwith contacts that were already established andcould follow up less satisfactory economic reports,as on one occasion with UDF:

I was called to a meeting with UDF, whichwas being pursued and persecuted by the re-gime in every way. I went to a restaurant inJohannesburg and was shown to a privateroom. There the entire leadership of the UDFwere sitting. They took an enormous risk bygathering in this way, as several were wantedby the police. But they were keen to sort outthe problem and so we did it.

On many occasions during the five years Iwas in South Africa, I knew that what I didmade a difference. My wife and I were ofteninvited to disguised political meetings like fu-nerals, church assemblies and so on. They we-re nervous; the atmosphere at this time wasoften loaded, there was so much hate that itwas tangible. Often we diplomats had a certain protecti-

ve function, for example for guests at a fune-ral. I remember one occasion in Tomahole –AIC supported the civics there – we attendeda funeral. Outside the family’s house a Casspirwas standing, an armoured military vehicleused by the police. It did not matter, but whenthe time came for us to leave the house thefather of the family asked us to stay, because,“as soon as you have left they will attack us, atleast with teargas, and then we can’t eat thefood”. Sometimes it could be difficult to keep the

roles apart and one had to set boundaries. To-day I am often called “Comrade Ambassador”,which reflects how UDI members thought ofme then. But I have never smuggled anything.I didn’t want to be deported, and Sweden wasreally viewed as an enemy of the apartheid re-gime and thus they always kept an eye on us.


The Apartheid government not only imprisoned criminals but also political opponents.


teams even if we come from a Bantustan” wasdismissed. Those who did not take a stand againstthe apartheid system contributed to its survival.There was little acceptance of a position in a greyarea. Quite literally, lives were at stake, the lives ofthe children of Soweto and of many more.The effect of the organised anti-apartheid work

was clear. Furthermore there were many eyes, evenoutside activist circles, that registered attempts atvarious kinds of exchange. These protests or war-ning signals compensated for the laws that were notpassed. One group that was on the mark was physi-otherapists, who early blocked South Africans inter-nationally.Blacklisting reminded the white population how

the rest of the world loathed apartheid, and the re-gime reacted in various ways to circumvent the boy-cott. Artists and sportsmen were lured to South Af-rica with huge fees, and, under cover of the so-cal-led independent homelands concerts and tours we-re arranged in the amusement metropolis of SunCity in one of South Africa’s bantustans. The boy-cott drew spectacular attention when artists andsportsmen were pilloried in the press for havingbroken the UN boycott by appearing on stage orplaying sport in South Africa. If the sinner thenapologised, the media could tell the story once mo-re.

44. Treason trials and reactionsUDF’s successes led to yet stronger protests – therewas a growing feeling that the system was beginningto crack. The unrest in the townships increased,starting round Johannesburg. School and rent boy-cotts caused chaos. The anti-apartheid movement’sstrategy was to make the country ungovernable.Instead of creating calm, the regime’s attempt at re-

Organisations took turns to de-monstrate outside the South African Legation. Advertisement telling which trade unions were responsib-le during one week.

continu-ed from

page133

form had strengthened the resistance and paved theway for the system being overthrown from below. In 1985 a state of emergency was introduced, and

in all 38 people – most of them active in UDF – we-re charged with “high treasonagainst the state”. In a series oftrials they were accused ofinstigating violence and un-rest in the townships, and forterrorism and murder. Through several trials of

this type the apartheid regimeattempted to crush the UDF,which was now seen as a realthreat. The regime tried toprove that the UDF was abranch of the banned ANC.Altogether there were arounda dozen trials over a four-yearperiod against UDF but theregime did not succeed in proving that the UDF wasthe ANC. Instead the UDF drew considerable inter-national attention. Early in 1985 the AIC started a petition to protest

against apartheid and in particular the treason tri-als. 100 000 names were collected on lists to be han-ded over to South Africa’s legation. Each day forover a month the AIC’s 33 member organisationspicketed the South African Legation in Stockholm.One day an entire union congress protested – 400people from the National Union of GovernmentWorkers (SF). The legation refused to accept the petitions. “You

can burn them”, they replied. The petitions, tied to-gether with black mourning tape, were dropped inthe legation’s letterbox. The demonstrations endedwith the Social Democrats inviting all the other

parliamentary parties to a common manifestationon 11th September; one way of showing that theentire Swedish people stood behind the protestsagainst apartheid. All participated – except the Mo-

derates.ISAK and SEN produced

material for a letter cam-paign. This was partly fortraditional letters addressedto the apartheid regime,and partly the unconven-tional approach, whereSwedes were encouraged towrite to “ordinary” whiteSouth Africans to drawtheir attention to what theregime was doing. They we-re also encouraged to writeto the accused to show theirsupport. Further, school

classes were asked to write to school classes in SouthAfrica to stimulate mental processes that in the longterm might disturb the regime. A small brochurewith facts about the campaign was published in De-cember 1985.The Swedish Legation in Pretoria followed the

treason trials and reported home. Magnus Walanfrom ISAK also paid visits to South Africa and pas-sed information to and from the accused. In Febru-ary 1986 the trial in Pietersburg was meant to resu-me, after charges against twelve of the sixteen accu-sed were withdrawn. SEN’s secretary Rune Forsbeckwrites:

We tried to get Swedish lawyers down to followthe trials and in this had strong support fromthe International Commission of Jurists in Ge-neva. A number of senior jurists were in-


”early in 1985 the Aic started apetition to protest against apartheidand in particular the treason trials.100 000 names were collected onlists to be handed over to south

Africa’s legation.”

terested in going down, among them Sweden’sformer Minister of Justice, Lennart Geijer. Inthe end we decided on Hans-Göran Franckand Staffan Vängby. They applied for visas,and although our opinion was that the regimewould be ashamed to deny a qualified delega-tion visas, that is nevertheless what happened.There was no delegation, and yet somethinghappened.

The regime preferred the shame to more witnesses.In Alexandra township in Johannesburg, resi-

dents succeeded for six days in 1986 in setting upbarricades against the police and military, who wereprevented from entering the area. Their willingnessto protest had had been strengthened through orga-nisations like the Alexandra Arts Centre, the Alex-andra Civic Association and the Alexandra ActionCommittee. This demonstration of strength was animportant injection in the liberation struggle. Leaders were imprisoned, among them the gene-

ral secretary of the Metal Workers Union, MosesMayekiso, who was taken by police at the airport,after returning from a visit to the Swedish metalworkers. He was accused of high treason; he had or-ganised people in street and residential committeesand initiated boycotts. The trial was important forthe whole of UDF’s future; was it treason when or-dinary people protested against apartheid usingpeaceful means – where was the border?The trials evoked powerful reactions. South Afri-

ca hit the headlines and was often the first newsitem in the media. The International Metalworkers’Federation started a collection campaign for the de-fence. Swedish Metal workers contributed 2,6 milli-on kronor (today about 4,5 million). After threeyears in prison Moses Mayekiso and the other anti-

apartheid leaders were completely exonerated andreleased.

45. A major breakthroughTo start ISAK, three separate streams united to forma broad river that played an active international ro-le in the coordination of the work against apart-heid:

The first stream consisted of the Christianyouth organisations in both the Church ofSweden and the free churches. The second wasmade up of the political youth leagues and ot-her actors who early identified internationalsolidarity as important. The third stream wasthe Africa Groups, which not only took the ini-tiative but also had both current and far-re-aching knowledge about conditions insideSouth Africa and Namibia.

From around 1984 a media wave came and the issueof South Africa soon widened to become a turbu-lent river. Media penetration and political explosi-veness had already been revealed during the Viet-nam war. The cruelty of that war penetrated to TVcouches. Now history repeated itself. The brutalityof the apartheid system became visible through in-ternational TV news and features. At the same timethere was an increase in pressure on the press to gi-ve place for facts and debate, but most of the mediadid not have local reporters. The national newsagency, TT or Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, had tosupplement its sources. Now the joint strength ofthe ISAK umbrella was revealed, and it hadpreviously undreamt of opportunities of making itsvoice heard. Both central and local activities werereported, and the discussion pages of the major ne-wspapers were happy to publish contributions fromISAK.


That the charismatic archbishop Desmond Tutuwas awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December1984 for his struggle against apartheid increased thestrength of the media winds. When pupils in Sowe-to demonstrated in 1976 Tutu had already challeng-ed the international community to boycott South

Africa economically. Since Tu-tu was general secretary of theSouth African Council ofChurches from 1978 he waswell-known internationally,so he had a certain room tomanoeuvre and could bothpublish his writings and travelabroad.Pastor Lennart Renöfält

was ISAK’s first chairpersonand was re-elected to this po-sition in the mid-1980s, when

the organisation enjoyed a major breakthrough inthe media:

From the beginning up to the first part of 1984one always had to present oneself and explain,but somewhere there it shifted, and one onlyneeded to say ISAK. Afterwards journalists we-re continuously on the phone, as soon as so-mething happened in South Africa or someSwedish relationship with South Africa defiedthe boycott. We sometimes didn’t even manageto put something out ourselves before we werecontacted. But this did not happen out of theblue; it was preceded by a long and unyieldingdrive to cultivate contacts, and to learn what itwas possible to do in relation to public opini-on. We were fairly good at this. Another positi-ve approach was our research, where we dugup unique data that we then launched in the

media. It gave us a serious role when we couldformulate questions that then waltzed roundin the mass media. ISAK acquired a reliablevoice in the mass media.

The accelerating developments in South Africa,with increased protest and thereby increased re-pression by the regime, could now be matched withgrowing solidarity. More and more organisationsapplied to join. Despite a strained economy theboard decided to invest in an office. With a fewemployees the board could prepare, visit and lobbyministers, members of parliament and governmentservices. ISAK’s unique breadth was a significant example

abroad and also gave it an important role in thecoordination of international public opinion. Per-sonal meetings with significant people from the li-beration movements contributed to its perseveran-ce in the work. The media and other actors increa-singly realised that even if the tempo was high,ISAK had a clear and well-founded strategy. ISAK’srelationship to the ANC and SWAPO was notbecause it slavishly followed some doctrine, butbecause of an ongoing analysis of the situation. The UN’s Special Committee against Apartheid

from time to time invited selected organisations,among them ISAK, which the UN regarded as oneof the leading anti-apartheid movements (AA) inthe world. Its international secretary Lotta Johns-son-Fornarve represented the Nordic anti-apart-heid movements on one occasion. The internatio-nal work started early with a joint Nordic campaignagainst the Nordic carrier SAS’s flights to South Af-rica:

In Stockholm we organised street theatre witha model of an SAS plane on a wheelbarrow


”that the charismaticarchbishop Desmond tutu

was awarded the nobelpeace prize in December

1984 for his struggleagainst apartheid

increased the strength ofthe media winds.”


In connection with receiving the Nobel Peace Price 1984 Desmond Tutu also visted Stockholm. The Secretary general of the Ecume-nical Council, Lars B. Stenström interpreted the long talked about sermon he held at the Stockholm Cathedral.


and representatives of Swedish companies inSouth Africa in the plane. Parallel with that weplayed a scene showing how badly black mineworkers were treated. When it was performedoutside SAS offices on Sveavägen in Stockholmthe work stopped and the staff came out to sta-re in amazement at our “aeroplane”.

The Nordic AA organisations met regularly andkept an eye on, among other things, the Nordic me-etings of foreign ministers to ensure that the SouthAfrican issue always remained on the agenda. WhenCzechoslovakia, after the collapse of the Easternbloc, wanted to end sanctions linked to the old regi-me, ISAK succeeded in helping to prevent this byreference to Swedish AA work. For a long time ISAK’s activities were run by a

small activist office in AGIS premises. Only in 1985did ISAK get its own 11m2 room in Solidaritetshu-set. The following year staff was expanded to fouremployees, including one doing his national serviceas a conscientious objector. The local and centralactivities were now so newsworthy that ISAK had tostop subscribing to a press clippings service so thatits finances would not break down.

46. Forming public opinion in South AfricaA growing plethora of organisations and traditionaloral communication were naturally central ele-ments in the formation of domestic public opinionagainst apartheid policies. Other media were alsoneeded, and required resources – both in terms ofpersonnel and financial. The former had to be avai-lable on site, but the latter could possibly comefrom outside, which is what happened in variousways.

The joint campaign against the Scandinavian Airline, SASflights to South Africa was one example of the Nordiccooperation.


The ANC’s Radio Freedom was broadcast from fi-ve African countries, but to listen to it could lead tofive years in prison. Nevertheless people listened tothe messages and challenges, to liberation songs andnews that were censored in the radio, TV and pressinside South Africa. Radio Freedom required manykinds of support: money and help to procure ex-pensive transmission and reception equipment butalso simple things like ordinary cassette tapes. DonNgubeni of the editorial staff in Lusaka put it this

way when he visited Sweden in1988:For us a cassette is an impor-tant part of our work. Soundis what radio deals with. Webroadcast the recorded voice,not a written speech a piece ofpaper. The living voices of AN-

C’S leaders are personal, and peo-ple listen. You can form your own opi-

nion: What kind of person is this? We send ourcassettes to people in South Africa. They arelistened to. They are copied onto other casset-tes and spread. They play a big role in thestruggle against apartheid.

Some cassettes were sent in empty, or with the do-nor’s old music remaining to appear innocent. On-ce in the country they were kept for upcomingtransmissions. On some, one kept the old contentsfor 5–10 minutes before recording banned informa-tion. About 20-50 blacks would gather round eachcassette to hear the latest about the struggle. Thismeant that old cassettes that were simply lyingaround could help provide thousands with the verymessage they needed to understand the situationand participate in the struggle. Tormod Nesset ex-

plains how ISAK in Oskarshamn collected cassettes: It was great fun! At some of the municipality’syouth centres boxes were made in the shape ofhuge piggy banks with a slit where visitorscould drop the tapes. We talked with the youthabout the aim, and asked them not to turn thepiggy banks into rubbish bins for diverse junk,to be serious. Very little junk was thrown in.We trained some young people from eachcentre, and they talked about the struggle and

5 years in prison for listening to Radio…Campaign for economic support to ANC Radio Freedom.

guarded the boxes till the centre closed. Theydid a great job. Masses of tapes were collectedand in the process we mobilised a youth groupfor ISAK.

The original initiative was taken in Holland, and theidea was taken over by the local branch of SIF, theSwedish Union of Clerical and Service Workers atSwedish Radio. Kristian Romare on the radio con-

tacted ISAK in early 1985 and wanted to broadenthe campaign by cooperating with the collection ofcassette tapes. The public response was so over-whelming that ISAK had to stop the collection!Bush Radio in Cape Town never got a broadcas-

ting licence but nevertheless sent programmes.They were stopped and the equipment was confi-scated. The alternative ether media was too popularto be permitted. Thus most of the support Sidachannelled through the Africa Groups was directedto the written media, which had the only opportu-nity of publishing information critical of apartheid.In time a number of text media which were criticalof the regime, and were often community-based,appeared in South Africa. They had both financialand political problems. Several editors spent moretime in court than at the paper. Their investigativejournalism was very embarrassing to the govern-ment and it was probably among the most skilledand courageous in the world at this time.When the Weekly Mail (now Mail & Guardian)

was suspended for a month in late 1988, AGIS, withthe help of Sida, was able to finance staff training tokeep it together, until the paper could start publi-shing again. This was the beginning of AGIS sup-port to journalist training that continued for over adecade. On a previous occasion the Stockholmchapter of the Swedish Union of Journalists sentmoney they had collected for journalist trainingthat helped the Weekly Mail survive during a three-month suspension. This training suited the times;there were only a few black journalists, and even thelarge dailies needed to have reporters in the blacktownships. Another alternative paper in Johannes-burg was the fortnightly Indicator. Each edition ofabout 30 000 copies (1990) was largely free-of-char-ge and mainly advertisement financed.


Weekly Mail was very effective in exposing the Apartheid regime.


Support to Afrikaans language alternative media,like Saamstaan in Oudtshoorn and Namaquanuus inSpringbok, was of extra value. The most successfulwas Vrye Weekblad. Even here the support was rela-ted to training. The paper became famous for its re-velations of the police’s clandestine methods and itwas the first Afrikaans paper against apartheid. Itwas edited by Max du Preez, later a TV commenta-tor (but suspended in 1999), a genuine Boer if moreradical than most. He loved his Volk and represen-ted a positive Afrikanerdom without racist ideas. Inand around Cape Town there was media training atgrassroots level producing simply laid out newsshe-ets, filled with explosive material. They wrote aboutand for farm workers, who were strictly controlledbut could be reached on the occasions they werepermitted to leave their workplaces.To shape internal opinion, access to books was

also required. Through SEN resources were chan-nelled to several publishers:Ravan Press was founded in 1972 by Beyers

Naudé and others linked to the Christian Institute,in the first hand to publish studies on the effects ofrace policies. Their books were also used in shapingSwedish public opinion. Staffrider was launched af-ter Soweto in 1976 as a forum for mainly black wri-ters. Many of their publications were banned.Skotaville Publishers aimed to give blacks a chan-

ce of making their voices heard and through verylow prices reach as many as possible. Non-fictiondominated their publications, including a series onAfrican Theology. In May 1986

The Unquestionable Right to Be Free was banned. Es-says in Black Theology, and the State of Emergency ofthe same year led bookshops to remove Skotaville’sbooks from their shelves so that they would not bepenalised. When André Brink’s novel Kennis van die sand

was banned in 1974, Taurus Publishers distributedthe book as a pure protest action by a few universitylecturers. This publisher became one of the few thatwriters threatened by censorship could turn to.They included Breyten Breytenbach, Nadine Gordi-mer, John Miles, Wilma Stockenström and LettieViljoen. Most of the practical work was voluntarilydone without pay by the owners themselves in theirspare time. They were opposed to state interferencein publishing and never negotiated with the Cen-sorship Board. For the same reason they never ap-pealed against the banning of a book. There were several attempts to start some kind of

news agency, inter alia Africa Press News and Infor-mation Agency with Zwelakhe Sisulu in the vangu-ard. The idea was to compile information and pro-duce articles on detained, killed and missing people,for both internal and international consumers.Through SEN, Sida granted support but Sisulu wasimprisoned in June 1986, and the project did notget off the ground. A similar fate affected the sup-port that was intended for The Press Trust of SouthAfrica, an independent news agency with its mainoffice in Durban.

47. No business with apartheidFrom the beginning ISAK’s work was strategicallyfocused on the annual and increasingly professionalcampaign week held to commemorate Sharpevillein March. In 1984 the topic was “Nordic actionagainst apartheid”, and the local work highlighted

parliament’s review of the ban on new investments,the consumer boycott, the release of political priso-ners and support to ANC and SWAPO. Shortly be-fore the campaign week Toivo ya Toivo, one ofSWAPO’s founders, was released from RobbenIsland.The topic in 1985 was “Youth against apartheid”

and the campaign was held in 60 towns and villages.In cooperation with the Africa Groups and theSchool Student Organisation of Sweden, SECO, theoffice helped to organise ten seminars and offeredto send speakers to the local groups. Fruit picketsand demonstrations were part of the arsenal.“For a free Namibia – isolate South Africa!” was

the topic in 1986. Now for the first time Namibiawas in focus, and actions against Swakara furs wereheld in many places. As South Africa’s military pre-sence increased, protests grew. Over 100 places tookpart in the week.In 1987 the topic “No business with apartheid”

largely summarised the core of ISAK’s work. Short-ly before the campaign week, information was re-leased on a Swedish trade embargo from 1st July.Even if media interest had begun to cool, ISAK nowhad to trace the companies that sought loopholes inthe law. 160 sites were now involved in the cam-paign week.1988 featured the twin topics: “Children against

apartheid – No business with South Africa”. As theprevious year the campaign paper came out as a ta-bloid, which made it both cheaper to print and easi-er to read. It was also less pretentious. Through achild’s perspective one could reach new groups,above all schools. On the business side, with thebook Morality for sale: Apartheid business on new rou-tes by “Henrik Adolfsson” alias the journalist LasseHerneklint, one could follow up a previous publica-

tion, Apartheid. After a visit to a goldmine he wrote:testing room was shown, a large gymnastic hallof concrete with some kind of solid benchesset in the floor. Here the so-called migrantworkers from The Front Line States roundSouth Africa were brought, and the temperatu-re and humidity were raised to the conditionsprevailing under ground. Then the workershad to climb up and down concrete blocks forhours. Those who passed the test wereemployed, the rest were returned. The betterone did on the test, the further down the mineone was assigned. In Sweden one cannot evendo this to cattle without being reported to theauthorities.

The Swedish companies that did not withdraw fromSouth Africa also sat on the International Councilof Swedish Industry. Internationalism apparentlyhad a somewhat limited focus. Aside from PR gainsto South Africa, their presence was technologicallyvaluable, in certain respects crucial. Atlas Copcoand the other mine suppliers were at the pinnacle ofinternational mining operations. Without them itwould be difficult to fetch the gold from the kilo-metre deep shafts. ABB’s optical fibre cables and ad-vanced power transfer were important technologi-cal advances. SKF’s ball bearings were not techni-cally pioneering, but without them it would not bepossible to keep armoured vehicles rolling in thehunt for school children in the townships. The Afri-ca Groups’ slogan SKF keeps South Africa rollingwas areality, and company taxes went straight to the na-tional budget, which at that time allocated 40% tothe military.ISAK was successful in its work towards legal

sanctions, and from an international perspective


The campaign YouthAgainst Apartheid wasvery successful aroundthe country.


Sweden was far ahead, but the loopholes meantSwedish legislation leaked like a sieve.

48. Swedish People’s Parliament againstApartheidInspired by the Swedish People’s Parliament for Di-sarmament in 1983, ISAK, together with the Swe-dish UN Association, among many others, organi-sed the Swedish People’s Parliament against Apartheidon 21–23 February, 1986. It was a mighty manifes-tation of the commitment of Sweden’s popular mo-vements on the issue: 1 000 delegates from 700 or-ganisations dealt with motions in six committees:South Africa as a threat to world peace, support

to the liberation struggle in South Africa and to Na-

mibia’s route to independence, but also the plunderof Namibia’s natural resources, development coo-peration to the Front Line States, as well as ISAK’score issues like economic sanctions and the UN’sblacklisting of sport and cultural exchange. The resolutions of the People’s Parliament were

taken in plenary sessions after discussion on the sta-tements of the committees.Prime Minister Olof Palme held what would be-

come his last speech in public at the People’s Parlia-ment, and a historic photo of ANC President OliverTambo and Olof Palme next to each other was takenhere. A week later Olof Palme was shot dead on astreet in Stockholm. Lotta Johnsson-Fornarve, thena member of the ISAK board, recalls the drudgerybefore the age of the personal computer:


SKF Keeps South Africa Rolling. Poster in

a series produced by the Gothenburg

Africa Group.Picket outside the SKF headquarter in Gothenburg.

Everything had to be typewritten and allchanges had to be cut and pasted in. Severalhundred functionaries of all kinds had to beorganised to do everything from guarding thedoors to typewriting. The People’s Parliamentwas a huge lift for the issues of apartheid andsanctions, and contributed to making SouthAfrica the greatest international issue of the ti-me. Absolutely everyone joined, even the Mo-derate Youth League, which on principle oppo-sed everything. This was excellent, since it cre-ated a polarisation that was easy to relate to,and the effect was unifying for the other dele-gates. It was the largest and broadest assembly on

the issue, and could with its organisation take

important political decisions that were verysignificant in future opinion work, since onecould refer to them. It also gave an enormouslift to the work throughout the country. Manysport clubs and recreation organisations, tradeunions and other local organisations that nor-mally did not bother about social issues werepresent. Tremendous!

49. Shell campaign – success or failure?For over 15 years, in violation of the UN oil boycott,Shell supplied Rhodesia with oil, roughly 50% of itsneeds, and in the same way it supplied South Africa.In 1986 ISAK began to boycott Shell. A combina-tion of poor union conditions at Shell installationsin South Africa and Shell’s strategic importance to


The peoples Parliament against Apartheid gathered many organisations also outside ISAK.

the apartheid regime triggered an internationalboycott. When the company fired 80 miners at acoalmine in Rietspruit in 1985, the ICFTU objec-ted. In less than two years the boycott had sup-port from unions throughout the world. The ti-me had come for the most powerful action thusfar against one of the many companies that sup-ported the apartheid state. Already in 1984 at a UN conference in Paris

the ANC had recommended a boycott of Shell,and in May 1985 the World Council of Churchesdiscussed an international boycott of Shell. Thatboth trade unions and the church were involvedat an early stage meant a lot for its subsequentbreadth. Jonas Ideström, doing VTP weapons-free service at ISAK, began to work on the cam-paign in 1986:

I had long had a burning interest in Africa,and came right into the Shell campaign. Inthe circles in which I moved, the Church ofSweden Youth, the boycott of Shell was ob-vious, in the same way obvious to boycottNestlé. I’m aware that I still never fill up atShell, and I know others who say the samething. It drew a lot of attention.

In Sweden, Shell’s fuel and heating oil were notsold only by its own outlets but mainly by privatebusinesses with leasing agreements. Shortly beforethe middle of the year ISAK urged companies, insti-tutions, buildings and other major consumers notto procure oil from Shell, and the public to boycottShell’s filling stations. The Swedish Shell traders’ association, whose

members ran Shell filling stations, made contactwith ISAK and offered to try to get Shell to with -draw from South Africa. In return ISAK postponed

the boycott of these garages to mid-August. Theboycott of Shell’s own outlets and other productscontinued. August came and went, but it was nosurprise that Shell did not leave South Africa. ISAKjudged that as long as the traders cooperated withISAK it might hurt Shell, and thus found it difficultto argue for a boycott of the traders. Thus ISAK puttwo demands that the traders’ association agreed to:• To send a joint delegation to Shell’s internatio-nal headquarters;

• To distribute a joint statement on Shell’s com-


mitments in South Africa that would be availab-le in Shell filling stations.

Shell pretended it was unaffected by the boycott,but hired the consultants Pagan International, whi-ch specialised in counteracting boycott campaigns.It had practised on Union Carbide’s blackout of thegas leak catastrophe in Bhopal in India as well as onNestlé’s substitute for mothers’ milk that was killingbabies in developing countries. Among other mea-sures Pagan recommended a “meaningful dialogue”with churches and unions throughintermediaries. These were exactlythe same tactics used by the Shelltraders. When they did not live up tothe conditions in an honourableway, the boycott was also extendedto them. In the meantime a dilem-ma arose in the campaign, exactlywhat the Pagan strategy intended.Although Swedish Shell tried to

pretend it was unaffected by thecampaign the oil company’s activiti-es indicated the reverse. When theinternational company held a share-holders meeting in the Hague in1990 there was a 36 % drop in pro-fits. This plunge openly disturbed the shareholders.The board did not give the reason for the deteriora-tion, but kept a straight face. Holger Sandelin also did VTP service at ISAK’s

office: Before the Shell campaign it was simple, butnow suddenly ambivalence arose among ourmembers. When Swedish Shell showed indivi-dual garage owners, problems arose. When itcame to acquaintances in one’s neighbourhood

who might go bankrupt, the great public sup-port for a boycott of South Africa was inade-quate. It was a educational conundrum to boy-cott Shell and - at the same time – except thoseShell garages owned by local businessmen.

Problems mounted and vandalisation of Shell gara-ges by militant groups outside ISAK were a clearly ablow to the campaign. The members with a com-mitment in international questions had great confi-dence in ISAK; there the campaign was not so con-

troversial. Theoretically the cam-paign was not a problem, but inpractice it became difficult becauseof the sabotage of garages, rather likebreathing out with flour in onesmouth. Suddenly ISAK found itself in a si-

milar position as the Shell traders’association that claimed: “We havedone what we could and asked Shellto leave South Africa, but they ignorethis.” Now ISAK said: “We have chal-lenged these activists not to vandali-se, but they ignore this.”When the assaults continued de-

spite this, the campaign was in dif-ficulties from two sides. The militants thought thatISAK was taking too much consideration, was toocowardly. It was not too difficult to ride this. Whatwas worse was that doubt arose within ISAK, main-ly among the liberal organisations. FPU left ISAK,and the Liberal Party Women were also critical butremained. The Church of Sweden was a rock andthere the campaign was sanctioned at the highestlevel in the AGM in 1987. The hitherto youngest de-legate wrote the motion on the Shell boycott that


”shell pretended it wasunaffected by the

boycott, but hired theconsultants pagan

international, whichspecialised in

counteracting boycottcampaigns.”

was adopted without debate or reservation. His na-me was Holger Sandelin. Together with the campaigns on business and

Children against Apartheid, the Shell campaignbecame a kind of flagship for ISAK. When connec-

ting social commitment with concrete action it wasa simple way of doing something. Since ordinarypeople do not usually buy very many drilling rigs ormining equipment, it was difficult for consumers toboycott Atlas-Copco. The Shell campaign was more


To cut credit cards became part of the campaign.

tangible, since it was not a particularlygreat sacrifice find another filling station. ISAK’s former organisation secretary

Peter Göransson sees advantages to thecampaign:

It was good to gather people aroundthis issue since the trade embargohad removed South African goodsfrom the shelves. The campaignmeant that Shell’s trademark wasblemished. Had Shell been untou-ched, they would not have botheredto contact us. Unfortunately it wasmainly the attacks on Shell fillingstations that were seen by those whoread the evening news. Locally as inDalarna and Oskarshamn it wasdifferent with the peaceful actionsthat were the aim of the campaign.Incidentally I almost got a new job.The information secretary at Shellasked me: “Peter, what are your qu-alifications? We need people likeyou at Swedish Shell.”


Church of Sweden marched in front of the Shell campaign.

The message from Man-dela on his visit to Swe-den in Mach 1990: Tothe people of Sweden:The path towards peo-ples� victory is illumina-ted by your unselfish solidarity.

8.1988–1994

TIME TO BRINGTHE HARVEST IN


50. Namibia is liberatedIn 1982 under the leadership of Martti Ahtisaari,the fifth UN Commissioner on Namibia, the Wes-tern powers, SWAPO and the Front Line States uni-ted on the constitutional principles for Namibia, ata time when the prospects appeared dim. In 1981France, Great Britain and USA had vetoed sanctionsagainst South Africa, and the USA refused to con-demn South Africa’s latest military invasion in An-gola. Instead it demanded that Cuban troops shouldleave Angola so that South African troops wouldwithdraw from Namibia. That the former were there on the invitation of Angola’s government andthat the latter were there illegally did not matter. Itwas more important for USA to reduce the influen-ce of the Soviet Union and Cuba than to give Nami-bia freedom. SWAPO’s response was to intensify thearmed struggle and prepare for a lengthier exile.When its president, Sam Nujoma, came to Swe-

den in May 1983, he was received like a head of state. In addition to meetings with Palme and the

Foreign Minister Lennart Bodström, he met theStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs and all theparty leaders. Official assistance was increasingly al-located to development projects, and from 1982–83Sida and the Foreign Ministry treated SWAPO as ifit were a government. This put completely new de-mands on planning and transparency. Adult educa-tion at Sandöskolan in administration and econo-my thus became a strategically important part ofthe support. Recognition of the need existed onboth sides, which was also a precondition for thegrowing support. Erik Karlsson, among otherthings a former deputy director of Sweden’s natio-nal bank and a director of the central bank in Lesot-ho, in an extension of this cooperation later becameeconomic advisor to Sam Nujoma and ended up asdirector of Namibia’s central bank.In 1987 the Swede Bernt Carlsson was appointed

the seventh UN Commissioner for Namibia to leadthe transition to democracy. He had worked togeth -er with Olof Palme on negotiations on peace in theIran/Iraq conflict, and had been the Social Democ-ratic Party’s international secretary and general sec-retary in the Socialist International as well as theNGO Ambassador at the Foreign Ministry. SouthAfrica had just suffered a humiliating military de-feat in Angola. At last the situation looked brighter.In 1988 Bernt Carlsson organised a meeting betwe-en SWAPO and white Namibians, and South Africawas on the way to giving up control over Namibia.In September 1988 Presidents Reagan and Gor-bachev had agreed that the Cuban troops would gohome after the South African troops withdrew toSouth Africa. Resolution 435 on the independencePresident Sam Nujoma presenting the Namibian flag.


The South Africa flag is lowe-red once and for all in the Na-mibian capital Windhoek. Thephotographer Kaleni Hiyalwawas part of a Africa Groupproject with SWAPO.

of Namibia could now be implemented. On 20th December Bernt Carlsson was to fly to

New York to sign the accord with the other signato-ries. His plans changed at the request of a South African mining company, de Beers, who wanted tomeet him in London for discussions on Namibia’sdiamonds. It led to his death. He was one of 270 kil-led when PAN AM 103 was blown up over Locker-bie in Scotland. Work for Namibia’s independence continued –

despite certain armed skirmishes – under the lea-dership of Martti Ahtisaari from neighbouring Fin-land. Elections were held in November 1989. Al -though South Africa had supported the electioncampaigns of seven other parties to the tune ofroughly 300 million kronor 1989 (=almost 600 mil-lion 2019), the election was convincingly won bySWAPO (57%), while the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which was close to South Africa, got 29%. On 21st March 1990 – to the day 30 years after

the Sharpeville massacre – Namibia finally was free,and Sam Nujoma installed as the country’s first pre-sident. In accordance with Resolution 432 from1978, the enclave of Walvis Bay was also returned toNamibia in 1994.

51. Retreat of the apartheid regime Developments in Namibia had shown that not eventhe leading Western powers could, in the long run,prevent the white regime from collapsing. The stra-tegic oil boycott had in the late 1980s begun to af-fect industry badly. In addition South Africa lostmore important trading markets. Prospects of turn -ing the economic crisis around were bleak.In the meantime, through the UDF and COSA-

TU, civil society’s black/non-white majority hadgained a strong position, while white youths increa-

singly distanced themselves from the prevailing po-litics. Within the NP a revolt emerged. The regimehad to prepare a soft landing. Secret discussions started with Nelson Mandela.

In late 1989 several imprisoned black leaders werereleased, but Mandela put political conditions onhis own release. On 2nd February 1990 the banningof the ANC and 30 other organisations was lifted,and nine days later Mandela became a free man. Hismessage was clear: Isolate South Africa! Continuewith sanctions! There is a long road to a non-racistsociety. With support of the World Council ofChurches, Frank Chikane, then General Secretaryof South Africa’s Christian Council, emphasisedthat it would be “a grave mistake if the internationalpressures against the regime were reduced at thisstage”, and COSATU’s vice-president Chris Dlaminimade a similar appeal.What ought ISAK – and its 63 member organisa-

tions and 100 supporting organisations – do? Con-tinue, yes, but how? There was a great need for ana-lytical material. In October 1991 a delegation wentto South Africa. The result was a series of publica-tions På väg mot ett fritt Sydafrika med apartheid i ba-gaget (On the road to a free South Africa with apart-heid in one’s luggage). Questions that were raisedincluded violence, the development of trade uni-ons, the education situation, land questions, theeconomy, culture etc. Already in April 1990, in thepublication Sanktioner och Sydafrikas mineraler (San-ctions and South Africa’s minerals), Hans Gustafs-son, Bertil Odén and Andreas Tegen had shown thatthe world would manage quite well without SouthAfrican minerals. The world was new after the fallof the Berlin wall.The coming elections – it was unclear when –

would put great demands on the ANC, and ISAK


needed to make a decent contribution. Pelle Knuts-son took hold of the campaign Tänd ett ljus – släckapartheid (Light a candle – extinguish apartheid):

It was a greater sales success than the campaignpaper. I do not know how many candles wesold but I remember Patrik standing and load -ed cartons of candles onto postal vans. We or-

dered new supplies but before they were alldistributed the campaign ebbed out. It hadreach ed the threshold of our distributionnetwork and it took us a long time to get rid ofall the candles, since we ordered a whole lot inthe second round.


The newly released ANC leaders are welcomed to Stockholm in January 1990.

Not everything that ISAK didbear fruit, for instance a cam-paign Så ett frö för Sydafrika(Sow a seed for South Africa),as South African seeds did notgrow well in Swedish soil. Inthe past collections weremostly run locally and bymember organisations. Nowone had to gear up for acentral collection and newmeans. In late 1991 PatrikLönn was charged with de-veloping and coordinatingthese efforts:

My role was to try to col-lect as much money aspossible… even important symbolically. ForANC it was also important that the funds werenot taken from the ordinary Sida support. Wenow began to interleave leaflets about the col-lection in papers like the Social DemocraticWomen’s League paper among others, andproduced a professional wall calendar that ma-ny even outside solidarity circles bought, sinceit was so well done. The year before the elec-tions we collected a million kronor, and boththe ANC and ourselves were pleased with that.

In a referendum in March 1992, 68% of the whiteelectorate voted to end apartheid through negotia-tions. At last they had seen the writing on the wall.For many the chance of renewed international sportwas a strong argument. After several years of nego-tiations in CODESA, the Convention for a Democ-ratic South Africa, the parties could present a newdraft constitution: equal suffrage for all, two cham-

bers and a united state with federal and regi-onal bodies.In April 1994 for the first time general

elections would be held in South Africa.Who could guarantee that they would befree and fair and thus democratic? Up tothe last minute the IFP, Inkatha FreedomParty, tried to sabotage the process and onlydecided to participate a few days before theelections.

50. Mandela at the Globe“Don’t put out the fire just when the pot isbeginning to boil” were Nelson Mandela’swords to 12 000 enthusiastic spectators at thesolidarity gala held in Globen, the Globe, on

16th March 1990, just over a month after his release.Sweden was the first the country outside Africa onhis trip abroad, and this was not a coincidence. TheCommittee for Nelson Mandela’s Release organised theevent. Most of ISAK’s member organisations werethere, Sida and several trade union organisations,etc. It was a financial gamble, although the artistsperformed gratis. Sound, rent and pay to around250 people for other services cost money, but it allworked. The evening became a world event with artists

like Miriam Makeba, Cyndee Peters, Astrid Assefa,Tomas Ledin and others, plus a speech by PrimeMinister Ingvar Carlsson as well as a large numberof choirs, which for the evening formed a giant cho-ir of 700, to sing African songs, ending their appear -ance with Nkosi, sikelel’ iAfrika!Suddenly US presidential candidate Jesse Jackson

arrived with a party, without prior warning. Not achair was to be found on the VIP platform, but theANC’s Alfred Nzo and his wife had excused them-


Buy the ISAK candles.

selves, so two places were free. The rest of the com-pany waited in the corridor.

53. Black townships and violenceApartheid was still alive, weak but not dead. Thus itwas important to portray the situation in thecountry. In 1991 ISAK chose to try and interpret thefeeling of the black township through a project cal-

led Den Svarta Förstaden, (The Black Township). Theidea was to portray both the oppression and the st-rength in the poverty, the protests. A mobile exhibi-tion of 60m2 was created. It had sound and imagesand a culvert led right into the township and its sce-nes with a real tin shanty with a bed, wallpaperedwith posters. The smells and sounds recreated werenot appreciated by all the libraries that showed it,


The Swedish artista Asrid Assefa, CyndeePeters, Elsie Einarsdotter with Nelson Mandela.

but visitors’ empathy was strong. When humanrights activist Howard Varney from Legal ResourcesCentre in Durban saw the exhibition he was ama-zed: “How on earth did you manage to do this?” it

was all so authentic that he felt as though he waswalking into Alexandra! Particularly the images ofthe police and military who were often in the town-ships depicted in the form of welded scrap metalsculptures instead of scarecrows.Even with Mandela free, the democratic process

was far from assured. Political violence was real inthe black townships. Black-on-black violence wasideal from the regime’s perspective, which did all itcould to exacerbate existing tension. The IFP, led byGatsha Buthelezi, lent itself to this, and its warriorsreceived weapons training on secret farms of theSouth African army. In September 1991 the National Peace Accord

was signed between 26 of the most significant ac-tors. COSATU in Durban had for several years wor-ked out conflict resolution methods and achievedlocal peace pacts. They were used as guidelines innegotiating the peace accord. The military as well asright and leftwing extremists, however, remainedoutside the fold. In 1992 the violence accelerated. In June 46 peo-

ple in Boipatong were killed in a massacre that ledto the ANC walking out of the negotiations. Theperpetrators were vigilantes – the regime’s minions– not new, already known from the 1980s. The in-ternational media was often ill-informed and uncri-tically disseminated the official police version. IFP-supporters were bussed to hostels in the vicinity ofmines and other industries, from whence they wenton night time raids in the townships. If there was adirect fire fight between the ANC and IFP, the

police and army chose either to look the other wayor to support the IFP. Many feared that a civil war would break out in

the black townships. White fascists like the Afrika-ner Resistance Movement (AWB) armed themsel-ves. In this situation the need for independent in-formation was great. ISAK thus tried to form a pic-ture of the situation not only from ANC but alsofrom the Legal Resource Centre, the ecumenical or-ganisation Diakonia based in Durban and theNetwork of Independent Monitors (NIM), whichtried to monitor and document the violence in thetownships.


Poster for “The Black Township”.


An activist reflectsMagnus Walan was one of the activists involved in solida-rity work for many years both as a volunteer and profes-sionally:

My journey with the Africa Groups began in secon-dary school in 1974–75. I was angry because the me-dia placed the liberation movement MPLA in Angolaon an equal footing with the armed groups, coopera-ting with the South African forces. I remember a me-eting at the library in Linköping where Sören Lindhwas one of the speakers.I was on the board of the Africa Groups, went on

a study trip to Guinea Bissau in 1976–77, did morethan ten years work on ISAK’s board and was at theindependence celebrations in Zimbabwe in 1980.Through my work in the Africa Groups and ISAK Iwas entrusted by the ANC to visit apartheid SouthAfrica as a representative for the solidarity move-ment in the West. My South African trips to the ANCunderground started in 1984 and continued up tothe elections in 1994. In South Africa I had very strong experiences. I re-

member the mourning women at a mass funeral inAlexandra who showed me no hate as a white, alt-hough their children had recently been killed bywhite soldiers, how I instead was warmly embraced.How at the post and telephone workers trade unioncongress I was spontaneously called on to talk aboutsolidarity work in Sweden. Or when we were stoppedat a roadblock by soldiers from the Riot Squad andhad to pretend that UDF chairperson, Albertina Si-sulu, was a domestic worker in our home in Johan-nesburg and I was only driving her home. What itwas like to travel to the forced removal camps inKwaZulu-Natal disguised as a Catholic priest.South Africa was a political school on various pla-

nes. When friends in human rights work in SouthAfrica asked me for a comment on the news that theANC in its Angolan camps had used torture, and ex-ecuted political dissidents and suspected spies, I eva-ded the issue and said that they were in a difficult si-tuation. Then I was told off in no uncertain terms,correctly, I later realised. Torture is never acceptable. Loyalty to parties

should never be more important than loyalty to ba-sic rights and principles like never accepting tortureand to always start from the poor person’s perspecti-ve and interests. On this point I think the AfricaGroups have sometimes been weak because of loyal-ty to parties and states. This had an influence, for in-stance, when Swedish pressure persuaded South Africa to buy the JAS Gripen fighter plane. Yet this does not blemish the whole. Without the

Africa Groups, Sweden would have been poorer. Andmy life would have been very different, very muchpoorer.

Magnus Walan represented represented the Africa Groups atThe extra ordinary General assembly of UNESCO in Parisabout Namibia in 1980. To he right Ruth Mompati from ANC.

As expected the violence died down soon afterthe elections in 1994, except in Kwa-Zulu Natal,Buthelezi’s home territory, where a power strugglewith the ANC continued.

54. New roads to peaceIn 1992 the UN decided to send Peace Monitors toSouth Africa try to reduce the violence and make itpossible to hold general elections. In South Africa,fear of the escalating violence was growing. The Na-tional Peace Accord was a positive but insufficientcontribution. In August 1992 the World Council ofChurches launched the Ecumenical MonitoringProgramme in South Africa (EMPSA) so that thechurches through an international presence couldcomplement inputs by governments. The interna-tional coordinator was Barney Pityana, formerBCM member, amongst other things. Beyers Naudéwas EMPSA president in South Africa. Swedish EMPSA was largely integrated into

PEMSA, Peace Monitoring in South Africa. Earliercommon experiences and new impulses facilitatedthe project. In all 17 organisations with trade union,Christian, peace and solidarity movement back-ground were involved. 66 peace monitors under-took to do at least six weeks monitoring for fivemonths before, during and after the elections inApril 1994. These points are essential to explain that the

broad cooperation around PEMSA was possible.There were three important pre-requisits for the

project: 1. The broad and many years of cooperation inISAK was not only an important practical expe-rience but also an expression of a commonsystem of values.

2. Early contacts with EMPSA on behalf of the

churches and with NIM in South Africa on beh-alf of the Olof Palme International Centre (suc-cessor to AIC) contributed to insights on boththe needs and the possibilities. Their representa-tives also took part in a meeting in June 1993 todraw up guidelines for the cooperation.

3. Led by the firebrand Margareta Ingelstam, SEN(later the Christian Council of Sweden) had forseveral years worked on developing nen-violentstrategies. A result rff this was a course in con-flict resolution, communication, negotiationmethodology and nonviolence, prepared by her-self and Joe Seremano, head of the Justice andReconciliation Department at South AfricanChristian Council. The first course was held inSigtuna with 15 participants from South Africaand Sweden.

PEMSA required practical assistance in organising,recruiting, educating and debriefing peace moni-tors, who were at the disposal of voluntary organi-sations in South Africa. The methods were based onexperiences of similar tasks within churches andpeace movements but were nevertheless new in ter-mms of form and comprehensiveness. An absolutecondition for the project was that Sida financed it.PEMSA was also seen in Sweden as a pilot project todevelop a model for peace services, and the meth -ods were later employed by Swedish organisationsin connection with tasks for peace and election mo-nitoring elsewhere. A fact-finding mission to South Africa was part

of the preparations, in which Pelle Knutsson andMagnus Walan participated on behalf of ISAK. Theformer says:

Among my most shattering meetings waswhen Magnus and I sat in Inkatha’s office and


talked with these men who went out and mur-dered people at night, and we conversed withthem about a democratic South Africa. Everyo-ne knew exactly who everyone was, everyoneknew what everyone else did, and everyoneknew where everyone was sleeping that night.There we sat and had a dialogue that was ice-cold on the surface. I felt that anything couldhappen in this environment. A few nights later we drove out of a town-

ship near Port Shepstone. There was only oneentrance and one exit to be able to control theresidents. A SADF military vehicle stopped us,and a pale pimply soldier with shaky handsand armed to the teeth lit up the car with atorch and wanted to know everything beforewe could leave. The boot was full of ANC jer-seys and if he had opened it anything mighthave happened. I was really scared then.

A few weeks before the elections 21 representativesfrom ISAK arrived to function as election observersin, among other places, one of the country’s largesttownships, Mdantsane on the outskirts of East Lon-don in the Eastern Cape. They monitored things like the parties’ election meetings, public debates,marches and demonstrations. During the electionsthey observed and reported on how the electionswere run in different polling stations, particularly inthe countryside, where there were few other inter-national observers.It was with pride and commitment that the elec-

torate went to the elections. More than 90% votedand, to the surprise of many, the elections procee-ded peacefully.

55. The route to the electionsThe vast majority of those eligible to vote had nevervoted. How could one get all of them to go to thepolling stations? This – and not competition fromother parties – was the ANC’s main concern. On theadvice of the Social Democrats and after a certainhesitation from the ANC a special organisation forvoter education was formed – the Voter Educationand Election Training Unit (VEETU) – in Septem-ber 1992. Its strength lay in the breadth of its reli -gious, union, civil and women’s organisations, andan approach to adult education that had never beentried in South Africa. Its impartiality made it pos-sible for Sida to support this work.The VEETU project had a clear goal. All who we-

re eligible should go and vote on election day. To reach over 20 million voters there had to be a snow-ball effect through training on an industrial scale.From January 1993 to the elections in April 1994


Four Swedes that were part of PEMSA. From the left Martin Misgeld, Ro-bert Eriksson, Bengt Gabrielsson and Åke Forsberg.

(16 months) VEETU held 467 training courses onweekends and during the week, often with accom-modation and food, sometimes with more than1 000 participants. About 77 000 course leaders were trained in this time and one reached 2,2 milli-on voters directly. In one trial election 60 000 peo-ple took part.VEETU’s work was documented and evaluated,

both in Sweden and in South Africa. It was a uniquepublic education project, not only from a South Af-rican perspective. It wrote Bringing out the Vote: Masstraining as an organising tool – as a handbook for others who wanted to do the same thing.After the CODESA agreement, the political par-

ties could no longer exert any influence over the

election procedures themselves. The IndependentElectoral Commission was responsible. The elec-tion would be run in close cooperation with the in-ternational community. The UN charged manycountries, including Sweden, to appoint a sum totalof 250 election observers. One problem was that white society, with state

support, controlled radio and TV, large sections ofthe press, as well as the election apparatus. In addi-tion, many in the new electorate were illiterate. Itwas also a problem that white farmers did not wantto permit the ANC’s election officers onto theirfarms, while the black workers refused to listen tothose of the NP. ISAK’s and Africa Groups’ Fritt Sydafrika (Free


The group of ISAK election observers in Eastern Cape.


South Africa) and Slå på trumman (Beat the drum)collections got into high gear, where one of the go-als was to equip a video vehicle and train the crewand driver. They began by visiting villages in Nort-hern Transvaal with its three homelands of Venda,Lebowa and Gazankulu, where the population wasamong the most disadvantaged. Many single wo-men support large families on small overused plots,while the men work in Johannesburg. The moneyalso went to support the training of election wor-kers from the ANC and its allies, and to printing theANC’s handbook for training election workers. Solidarity imperialism was a problem. Many in-

ternational actors wanted to tell South Africanswhat they ought to do. The National DemocraticInstitute had both money and staff but wanted totrain people for an American electoral system. Bea-tie Hofmeyr cooperated with Bo Toresson and Bir-gitta Silén, among others, and wrote South Africa’sfirst election handbook:

I remember a discussion with an Afro-Ameri-can woman where I questioned their methods.In her broadest American she said, “Honey,you must just trust us, we have done this formore than a hundred years”. I could not helpreplying, “How come fewer than 25 per cent ofthe Afro-American population actually vote?We hope for at least 80 per cent.” That was theend of our cooperation with Americans. Yetthey were not the only ones who behaved inthis way. Britons, Germans, Italians and theIrish all had similar attitudes. The Swedes were quite different. I’ll never

forget the first meeting with Bo Krogvig. Wetook up all sorts of things and he said: “Every -thing you do will be assessed on whether youhave put the voters in the centre of the activiti-

es”. This became a guiding light for us. TheSwedes had a way of always quickly coming tothe point in a very simple manner. We onlyhad a direct partnership with the Swedes. Itwas the largest assistance and we had most useof it. We appreciated that they gave us inputwhere they were experts, with preparations,planning, and writing handbooks – but alsothat they let us take the main role.

56. Mission accomplishedANC won a landslide victory in the elections, gar-nering nearly 63% and formed – as agreed in theCODESA Accord – a Government of National Uni-

Beatie Hofmeyer and Roshene Singh are planning votereducation.

ty (GNU) together with the NP and the IFP. On10th May 1994 Nelson Mandela was sworn in asPresident, and the Vice-Presidents were ThaboMbeki and F W de Klerk. ISAK had reason to say,Mission accomplished, something that is granted tofew popular movements. ISAK was thus closeddown a year later.ISAK was the culmination of the many years of

work in the Swedish solidarity movement for sout-hern Africa’s liberation and came to embrace auniq uely large section of the Swedish people. It wasnot as visible on the streets as the more attention-

getting Vietnam movement, but its size, popular ba-se and influence over political decisions was muchgreater.ISAK had an heir: Network for Southern Africa.

Its members today comprise solidarity groups, fri-endship associations, churches, folk high schools,study associations and political organisations. Itsaim is to support sustainable development insouth ern Africa – based on social and economicjustice, peace and democracy – through widespreadcooperation.

57. An impatient patienceGlobally the major story dealt with the liberation ofthe Third World, the two thirds� world, as it is so-metimes called, based on population numbers, alt-hough the figure was an underestimation already inthe year 1900. Now over four fifths live in Asia, Afri-ca and Latin America. In the early 1960s the windsof change swept over Africa, a steady trade windthat swept away the colonial powers in 19 Africancountries in 1960 (a total of 35 over a decade). Insouthern Africa, the white regimes grasped powertightly, and the dictatorship in Portugal refused toliberate its colonies. The result was the Thirty Years War that encom-

passed many wars in many countries with many dif-ferent motive forces. It meant that at least 150 000people were actively deprived of their lives. In the li-beration wars hundreds of thousands of people we-re injured, hundreds of thousands of children weredeprived of their childhood (some to become childsoldiers), the extent of the life-long trauma causedto southern Africa’s population cannot be estima-ted, direct and indirect violence is still a living reali-ty in many of the affected countries, human rightsare being squeezed in many places, justice and


Beat the drum.Big joint mo-

ney collectioncampaign by

ISAK and theAfrica Groups.

peace have not arrived, the poorest are even poorer.Was all the solidarity work in vain? No.It might have been better if some countries had

not had natural resources that were so rich that theywere tempting boothies to the superpowers andmultinationals. Oil and diamonds (Angola), plati-num, gold and coal (South Africa), aluminium andhydroelectric power (Mozambique), uranium anddiamonds (Namibia), and very fertile soil (Zim-babwe), are examples of their raw materials. Thestruggle was prolonged and today they are a sourceof political unrest.It might have been better if the superpowers had

not interfered so much, if they had not so energeti-cally devoted themselves to proxy wars, superpowerconfrontation through agents, backed up and sup-ported with arms and other military equipment.The worst affected by this phenomenon were Ango-la and Mozambique, which in 1980–88 were expo-sed to devastating attacks by South Africa – cheeredon by USA and Great Britain in the Cold War. Ac-cording to UNICEF the excess death toll reached 1,5million in southern Africa, of whom 100 000 diedin the Front Line States, 500 000 in Angola and900 000 in Mozambique. Nearly two thirds werechildren under five years. According to a 1989 UNreport, South Africa’s aggression led to 1,5 millionrefugees from the above-mentioned countries flee-ing to neighbouring states, over 6 million internalrefugees, and the economic losses reaching an in-conceivable over 100 billion dollars.It might have been better if the international

community had become involved earlier and morefirmly, or if the Security Council had earlier main-tained:

• that the Portuguese colonies must be rapidlywound up in accordance with previous UN re-solutions;

• that systematic violation of fundamental humanrights on the Rhodesian and South African scalewas completely unacceptable and therefore hadto stop immediately;

• that continued refusal to follow these principleswould elicit the response of a far-reaching eco-nomic, cultural, political and social blockade ofthese countries.

If all this had been the case, hundreds of thousandsof people’s lives as well as great economic, culturaland social values would have been saved. This didnot happen.It might have been worse. If there had not been a

broad international solidarity movement thatsqueezed into nooks and crannies and reached intopeople’s hearts through new and old popular move-ments, then the established economic and politicalinterests would have dominated alone and in prac-tice ruled the agenda of the international world.Who knows if both Portugal’s colonial rule and thewhite minority regimes may have remained in oneor other form?It might have been worse, if the politicians and

governments of many countries – particularly inSweden and in the other Nordic countries – werenot forced to listen to and give in to wide-spreadpublic opinion thatdemanded morallydefensible policiestowards the liberationmovements and theregimes they comba-ted.


It might have been better. It might have beenworse. However, a different world became possible.How did this happen? Several interacting factorsand perspectives came to direct Sweden’s dispro-portionally large influence on all the areas of the li-beration struggle – except the military:1. the eArly sWeDish creators of public opinion we-re not on the fringe of the political field. On thecontrary they had central positions in the liberalpress, intellectual and religious leaders madethemselves heard, and African voices werepublished early by Christian publishers.

2. the First WAve’s organisational base was among

pupil and student organisations, then among theChristian youth organisations, after that withinthe political youth leagues in the middle and onthe left as well as among other, internationallyoriented, actors. In the second wave the coordi-nating Africa Groups came with both commit-ment and current and deep knowledge from in-side Portugal’s colonies and on South Africa andNamibia. In a third wave in the mid-1980s themedia, which had finally woken up and madeserious inputs. The patient work of solidarityhad on this point finally borne fruit.

3. eArly on, oloF pAlMe had developed close perso-


South Africa with the support from USA , created death and destruction in major parts of southern Africa. Here a bom-bed furniture factory in Angola 1979.

nal contacts with the Front Line States’ most im-portant presidents, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere andZambia’s Kenneth Kaunda. Therefore, Palme didnot see the struggle against Portugal and thewhite minority regimes in an East-West perspec-tive but from a South perspective. In connectionwith a small country’s own interest in maintain -ing respect for international law, this entails analmost anti-imperialist understanding of theconflict. Interestingly enough, the same inter-pretation seemed to characterise the views of le-aders of the Centre and Liberal parties.

4. FurtherMore, the conflict was viewed from a de-mocratic perspective: the right to majority ruleand thus self-determination was a condition –but not a guarantee – of human rights and adignified life.

5. Finally, there was a Swedish interest in strengthe-ning the non-aligned bloc through trying toprevent the liberation movements becomingover-dependent on one or the other side in theCold War. Through economic and political sup-port, conditions for a political dialogue werecreated, although the support was given withoutideological ties.

With strong support in popular public opinion itwas thus natural for Swedish governments – inde-pendently of party colour – to develop close rela-tionships to the liberation movements and their le-aders. However, on one point there was, nearly allthe time, a conflict between the political establish-ment and the broad solidarity movement: the issueof economic sanctions.Why did the governments not want to introduce

unilateral economic sanctions against Portugal andSouth Africa? (In the case of Rhodesia there was a

mandatory decision by the Security Council.) Why– when they did come – was it in such small steps?Two main motives are conceivable:

• economic, i.e. concern for Swedish companies inboth countries and for Swedish exports and thusthe issue of employment in Sweden;

• the fear that a deviation from international law


Poster by the artist Chister Temptander that was sold bythe Africa groups to benefit ANC.

would undermine it to the detriment of a smallcountry like Sweden.

Which of these motives was the stronger is difficultto estimate. While international law on the ques-tion of economic support to the liberation move-ments was seen as an argument for support (if notinitially), international law on the question of eco-nomic sanctions was seen as a strong argumentagainst action. In the one case political reality tookover the judicial principles. On the question of po-sitive support these were seen as more elastic.In the second case the judicial principles (only

the Security Council has the mandate to take reso-lutions on mandatory sanctions) were for long farmore important than the political reality: The Secu-rity Council could never be expected to pass any re-solutions on economic sanctions; a veto from theWestern powers was unavoidable. This also occur-red when Sweden sat in the Security Council, and,with strong Nordic backing, put forward a motionon sanctions. Only after this failure did Sweden (af-ter Denmark and Norway) decide to introduce a ge-neral embargo on trade with South Africa.In the end it became politically impossible to

withstand public opinion’s persistent impatience.This is an important lesson for the future. Anotherpolicy became possible.

58. What happened then?Another world was possible, but how did it turnout? The picture has shades of dark and dawn:In Mozambique it is estimated that 110 000 were

killed in a 15-year war (1977-92) between the go-vernment and Renamo (Mozambican National Re-sistance), the latter supported by Rhodesia, SouthAfrica and USA. In Angola’s internal armed con-

flicts from 1975-2002, with and without foreign in-volvement, an estimated 150 000 people were killed.Guinea Bissau has suffered several military coups,Namibia has had a minor revolt, South Africa hasprotected both Burma’s military junta in the Securi-ty Council and its neighbour Mugabe, and Zim-babwe has been badly affected by misrule and vio-lence with catastrophic consequences for the popu-lation. All these countries now lie far down on thewelfare scale Human Development Index. A contri-butory cause, in addition to the above problems, isHIV/Aids.Tragically enough, development is not only or

even mainly characterised by justice, peace, democ-racy, human rights, economic and social blosso-ming. There are too many scars from too manyyears of war. Their natural resources have been tootempting for international interests. Power has beentoo attractive for those who did not win for them tolay down their arms. To “resolve” conflicts with vio-lence easily becomes habitual, also for the victors.Should the mass international solidarity move-

ment have been more critical of the “genuine” libe-ration movements? Yes, for their own sakes, and forthe sake of the people affected (see above: An activistreflects). There is an art to saying, “You have theright to conduct the liberation struggle on yourown terms” on the one hand, and on the other handto caution, “Violence carries the risk of generatingmore violence; thus minimise the violence and doall you can to break its evil circle”. That art is hard.To exchange solidarity with the oppressed for criti-cal reviews of the new power holders after the libe-ration is an even more difficult art, a different ex-pression of solidarity. The solidarity movement didnot manage to live up to this. On the other hand, Angola and Mozambique


have moved out of the shadow of war and now havestrong (if skewed) economic development. Democ-racy has been introduced in Mozambique.Namibia has, for African conditions, a robust de-

mocracy; its constitution is a democratic model. Ithas always had a positive economic developmenteven if it is not strong enough to lift the people outof poverty. South Africa has fairly successfully handled the

conflict inherited from apartheid through impressi-ve work of reconciliation. As a regional superpowerit has strengthened Africa’s place internationally.Furthermore there is now the economic develop-ment that makes it possible to reinforce the econo-mic safety net for the weakest and even begin to re-duce unemployment.

Zimbabwe under Mugabe remains a sad storyuntil democratically inclined forces take over.

What happened to Swedish solidarity? After liberation the Africa Groups started sen-

ding volunteers to each country and later got invol-ved in projects, but have now left Cape Verde andGuinea Bissau. As to South Africa, the commitmentof the broad popular movement led to many smalldevelopment cooperation and exchange projects bymany different organisations. South Africa has be-come the country with the most NGO projects. Theacademic boycott has also changed into an intensiveexchange. It is the most popular country in theSouth for Swedish students’ field studies and theses.All the countries discussed have become major


A land reform in South Africa is compensating for forced removals. Dancing an jubilant women in Kaiskamahoek, EasternCape after the signing of an agreement for compensation is signed by the minister Thoko Didiza. One example whereSwedish NGO support has been assisting.

recipients of state assistance, the most going to Mo-zambique. Now assistance to Namibia and SouthAfrica is being terminated. In Angola termination isalready a fact, while support to Zimbabwe is sus-pended while waiting for a change of government.

59. What is happening now?In the time of neo-liberal globalisation there is arisk that old divisions between North and Southwill be cemented and new ones arise. The limitedaccess to natural resources like oil, diamonds andstrategic metals leads to a race between both stateand private actors with economic interests, in which potential conflicts may be exacerbated andflare up in the form of armed violence. In additionthere is a risk for a short-sighted over-exploitationof renewable natural resources, that may have de-vastating consequences in the long-term.

Against this background there is need of a deeplyrooted and broad international solidarity move-ment larger than anything previously. The worldwi-de support of the World Social Forum is a sign thatthis is happening, though in a new form. The mainstory today deals with a need for global solidaritythat must embrace not only rich and poor, industri-alised countries and developing countries, but alsopresent and coming generations.

A solidarity existing not only in space butover time – with political consequences alreadyin the present – particularly in the North. Tocreate such a movement many uncomfortable andpersistent truth tellers are needed, with no guaran-tees of success but with peace and environment infocus, and a patient impatience to achieve resultsand with the conviction that another world is pos-sible.


HIV/AIDS is the biggest threat against development in southern Africa and despite other positive developments this con-tributes to the fall in the index for Human development, HDI.

country population proportion living porportion hiv infected orphans life expect-under 2$ a day between 15–49 years due to AiDs ancy men

0–17år AnGolA 15,9 milj i u 3,7 % (280 000) 160 000 38BotsWAnA 1,7 milj 50,1 24,1 % (260 000) 120 000 40MoÇAMBiQue 19,7 78,4 16,1 % (1,6 milj) 510 000 44nAMiBiA 2 milj 55,8 19,6 % (210 000) 85 000 52syDAFriKA 47 milj 34,1 18,8 % (5,3milj) 1 200 000 47tAnZAniA 38 milj 59,7 6,5 % (1,3 milj) 1 100 000 47ZAMBiA 11,7 milj 87,4 17,0 % (1 milj) 710 000 40ZiMBABWe 13 milj 83 20,1 % (1,5 milj) 1 100 000 37

11 450 000 4 985 000 source: unAiDs 2006

1994 south AFricA BecAMe A DeMocrAcy after morethan 50 years of Apartheid. The other countries insouthern Africa were “liberated” way earlier, but so-me of them suffered civil war and other difficulties.In Sweden the popular solidarity with the strugglefor liberation in the region – from the 60s until1994 – got a unique width and scope. The existingengagement for the region is largely remaining asan effect of that. In southern Africa there is an in-terest to have the work of the solidarity movementsdocumented as well as the work of the representati-ves of the liberation movements stationed hereduring the struggle. On the requests from archivesin southern Africa The Nordic Africa Institute tookupon themselves to map relevant archives in theNordic area that may document these activities. Ar-chival work in southern Africa has also been sup-ported from Sweden. On the homepage www.liber-tionafrica.se these archives are presented togetherwith interviews with different actors, other storiesand some pictures. Here you may also find othermaterial collected by Tor Sellström for his books.The material collected for this project has still tofind a place there. The five first books in the projectare available as PDF documents there. They are un-fortunately only available in Swedish.This project is an initiative by the organisations

that were the main actors in coordinating the popu-lar solidarity work. The project has been coordina-ted by the Africa Groups of Sweden (Afrikagrup-perna) who also took responsibility for the docu-mentation of the Isolate South Africa Committee(ISAK) that no longer exist. A group of individuals

from the ISAK leadership and staff took charge ofit.The practical solidarity work in the form of ship-

ments of clothes and other material has been docu-mented by the organisation “Practical Solidarity”.The story of the wider church based work withinthe then Swedish Ecumenical Council (SEN) and itsdifferent member churches has been the responsibi-lity of the Swedish Christian Council. Olof PalmeInternational Center (OPIC) did the book that co-vered the work of the labour movement. These fivebooks were published between November 2006 andMay 2007.These books supplemented the three books in

English about the Swedish relation to the liberationstruggle in southern Africa by Tor Sellström “Swe-den and National Liberation in Southern Africa”,published by the Nordic Africa Institute. They havemore focus on the Swedish state and Governmentactions in relation to the liberation struggle.The five books produced within this project and

the books by Tor Sellström have subsequently beenthe basis for this book. The aim of this book is to gi-ve a more easily accessible summary of the Swedishsupport and popular solidarity work. The intentionwas also to have this book published in English.That never materialized. Only now in 2019 have webeen able to have it available in PDF format in Eng-lish. This thanks to support from Afrikagrupperna,the Olof Palme International Centre and TommyAndersson Emmaus Stockholm/PS.Another end product of this project was a con-

cluding seminar held in 2008 with the title “Modern


The documentation project ”Popular Movements and Swedish Solidarity with Southern Africa”

Solidarity”. Activists fromthe different organisa-tions as well as guestsfrom southern Africa di-scussed the experiencesand learnings from thepast and the meaning ofthis in the new era. The project is meant to

cover the period from1960 up to the liberationor democratization andthat means to 1994. Thevarious books cover vari-ed time periods depen-ding on when the invol-vement started. Whichcountry that is coveredalso varies between thedifferent projects. SouthAfrica and Namibia are however covered in all fivebooks. Even if it deals mostly with the period up to“liberation” some aspects of what happened withthe solidarity afterwards are also present. The focusis on the work done in Sweden but even the workdone or supported in southern Africa played a rolefor the actions at home. In many cases the worksupported inside Namibia and South Africa was

unknown to the public because Sida demandedsecrecy. The project has not been able to cover all ofthe very extensive work done but will at least pre-sent the main treads and give glimpses of the veryvaried activities taking place.

Project Coordinator


On the road towards liberation 177

Some of the photos and illustrations come from thepicture archive of the Africa Groups of Sweden. He-re under the name Afrikabild. Most of it has beenused in “Afrikabulletinen / Södra Afrika or I variousother publications. Since contributions to the pub-lications for a long time were anonymous, there isoften no indication as to who is the photographer.

Some pictures that have been sourced privately ha-ve also been difficult to trace who is the photograp-her. We regret if some photographers not made it tothis list. We thank everyone that has supplied pho-tographs. Posters, stickers and buttons are scannedform the Africa Group archive.

Photographers and Illustrators

Sida Fotograf/ bildkälla10 Hernried12 Bertil Högberg13 Ur Södra Afrika kamp för befrielse och utveck-

ling. Afrikagrupperna 198014 Ur Befrielsekampen i Afrika. Afrikagrupperna

197715 Ur När Sverige upptäckte Afrika. Lasse Berg16 Afrikabild19 Robben Island Mayibuye Archives21 Afrikabild24 Karin Södergren/ Afrikabild27 Robben Island Mayibuye Archives34 Frelimo/ Afrikabild36 Mats Andersson/Afrikabild40 Hillevi Nilsson ?????????43 Afrikabild45 Thomas Danielsson/ Afrikabild47 Christer Hallgren/ Afrikabild48 Christer Hallgren/ Afrikabild49 Bertil Högberg50 Birgitta Dahls arkiv51 Dag Hammarsköld Fonden52 Hernried54 Mats Andersson/ Afrikabild56 Anders Nilsson AIM/ Afrikabild57 Sture Lidén/ Afrikabild

59 Bertil Malmströms arkiv63 Afrikabild64 Afrikabild67 MPLA/ Afrikabild69 Göran Bordy/ Emmaus Björkå70 Emmaus Stockholm72 Emmaus Björkå73a Brödet och Fiskarna73b Gittan Arwén74 Karin Södergren76 Tore Bergmans arkiv80 Karin Södergrén/ Afrikabild81 Mai Palmberg83 Tord Harlin85 Tore Bergmans arkiv90 Tidningen Broderskap92 Afrikabild99 Mats Öhman/ Afrikabild100 Bertil Högberg102 Birgitta Silén103 Oskarshamns södra Afrika kommitté104 Anders Stendalens arkiv108 Afrikabild109 Arne Lindström111 Per Sandén/ Afrikabild112 Gittan Arwén114 Bertil Högberg

115 Bertil Högberg/ Afrikabild120 Karin Södergren122 Mai Palmberg123 Ann-Marie Gustavsson/ Afrikabild124 Afrikabild127 Afrikabild128 AICs Arkiv132 Bertil Högberg133 Arne Lindström/Afrikabild134 Birgitta Karlström-Dorphs arkiv136 Axel-Ivar Berglund141 Jim Elfström148 Arne Lindström149 Jim Elfström

152 Alf Ralmé/ Afrikabild153 Krister Hansson/ Afrikabild156 Erik Roxfelt NAMPA/ Afrikabild157 Kaleni Haialwa NAMPA/ Afrikabild159 Irene Peréz/ Afrikabild161 Afrikabild163 Bertil Högberg165 Birgitta Silén166 Mia Sundsten167 Birgitta Silén170 IDAF171 Christer Temptander/ Afrikagrupperna173 Bertil Högberg176 Karin Södergren

178 On the road towards liberation

Documents

BERNT JONSSON THE AMBITION TO BOTH HONOR …