Researched and Written by Inayet Hadi. All Rights Reserved. Please email me at inayethadimpa@gmail.com when quoting this article.

Black Gold and Red Blood: The Russian War for Oil in Chechnya

Robert Ebel, the Director of Energy and National Security at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies, and the editor of Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus agrees

that, “Energy accounts for half of Russia’s export earnings, a third of federal budget revenues, and a

quarter of the overall Russian GDP” (164). Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on oil, most of

which comes from the Caspian Sea region. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Chechnya had the

only functioning oil pipelines running through its territory. The Friendship oil pipeline starts from

Baku, Azerbaijan, runs through Chechnya, and ends at Novorossiysk, Black Sea. The Friendship oil

pipeline can transport 1.2 million bbl/d (barrels per day) of oil to southern Russia and to the Black Sea.

The oil is then exported to world markets (i.e. Southern Russia, Eastern European countries, and Black

Sea). Dale R. Herspring, a professor of political science at Kansas State University and a member of

the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations writes in Putin’s Russia that in late November 1990,

before the break up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a National Chechen Conference convened

in Grozny to declare the independence and sovereignty of Chechnya from the Soviet Union (184). After

declaring their independence from the Soviet Union, the “Chechens […] elected General Dudaev as

president by an overwhelming majority” (Herspring 184). Vanora Bennett, a foreign correspondent

based in Moscow, points out in Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya, that on 19 August 1991 a

coup was staged by “a [military] junta of Soviets hard-liners” to try to stop the collapse of the USSR

(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (208). Immediately, the Chechen elected leadership sided with

Boris Yelstin, a prominent political figure in Russia who was opposed to the coup. Yelstin’s motto

during the coup was, “take as much sovereignty as you could swallow.” This was done to gain support

of the people within in the Russian Federation into backing him. At that same time, many autonomous

regions within the Russian Federation wanted to secede from Russia. In 1992, Yelstin became the

president of the Russian Federation. Up until 1994, Chechnya had maintained de facto independence

from the Russia Federation until Yelstin had consolidated his political power after the coup. While

confident on the domestic front, Yelstin’s Defense Minister Pavel Grachev sent troops to control

Chechnya’s natural resources and securing the transportation links on 27 November 1994, under the

guise of restoring “constitutional order.” John Russell, the head of the department of Modern Language

at University of Bradford, has written extensively about post-soviet Russia. Russell writes in

“Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen: Russian Perceptions of Chechens During the Wars in Chechnya, 1994-

96 and 1999-2001” that Dudaev’s [President of Chechnya] soldiers quickly routed the Russians and

sent them home over the weekend. This catastrophe immediately triggered the first post-soviet war in

Chechnya (80). Russia started both wars with Chechnya, first, the 1994-96 war and the present war that

began in 1999, was to control the natural resources of the strategic geopolitical area within in the

Caucasus region, and not to suppress terrorism. Ample evidence exists that top Russian political leaders

were influenced to invade Chechyna again in 1999 to regain the control over the flow of oil from the

oil-rich Caspian Sea to world markets (Bennett 440). By occupying Chechnya, Russia has a monopoly

over the transportation links that already exist in Chechnya.

Near the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, fifteen Soviet Republics declared their republics

independent nation-states from the Soviet Union. Likewise, Chechnya declared their independence

from the Soviet Union. However, Russia, the leading republic within the USSR, did not officially

recognize Chechnya’s independence. Consequently, Chechnya maintained a de facto independence

from Moscow until 1994 when Russian soldiers were sent in to wage a two-year bloody war to keep

Chechnya from gaining independence. It is estimated that ten percent of the Chechen population was

murdered during the 1994-96 Russian invasion. The Russians withdrew from Chechnya with the

signing of the Khasavyurt Accord on 31 August 1996 (Herspring 189). The first Russian post-soviet

war with Chechnya was unpopular with the Russian public. At this time, President Boris Yelstin was

running for re-elections again in 1996. The accord was used by Boris Yelstin to gain Russian public

support in the presidential elections of 1996. President Yelstin was elected to second term in office

because he promised to end the war in Chechnya. With the signing of the Khasavyurt Accord the first

post-soviet war with Chechnya was over The accord would allow the Chechens to decide in 2001 in a

referendum to either secede or remain part of the Russian Federation. The referendum never took place.

Near the Russian Presidential election in 1999, several apartment buildings in Moscow were bombed,

maiming three hundred people. Immediately after the bombing, President Boris Yelstin blamed the

bombings on the Chechen leadership, without providing any proof for their involvement. At the same

time, the Chechen leadership completely denied and condemned the heinous acts against innocent

people. According to Russell, the “terror bombing campaign, the subsequent attributing of blame to

Islamic militants from the Caucasus (and thus the Chechens), followed by the invasion of Chechnya

early in October 1999, […] created for Putin the platform from which to launch his successful

presidential campaign” (81). Shortly after the 1999 bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow, the

Russian media began to air material that showed Chechens in a negative light. A week prior to the

second post-soviet Russian invasion, the Russian channel 2 showed “a stereotypical bearded Chechen

fighter cutting the throat of a young Russian soldier” (Russell 82). The Television images evoked in the

Russian mind that all Chechens would act in such a barbaric way. This was done to desensitize the

public to the mass killings that were about to be perpetrated by the Russian army in Chechnya.

President Boris Yelstin’s favorite successor to the presidency was the newly appointed Prime Minster

Vladimir Putin. Prime Minister Putin ordered over one hundred thousand Russian troops to Chechnya

to eradicate the “bandits” in Chechnya. Prime Minister Putin’s tough stance against the Chechens went

well with the Russian public after the Russian political authorities blamed the bombing on the

Chechens. Prime Minister Putin’s tough policy against the Chechens allowed the Prime Minister Putin

to win the presidential campaign by a landslide victory. Again, Russell writes that, “a year later – after

the bombing in Moscow in the Pushkin Square subway in August 2000 – Putin declined to pin the

blame on the Chechens for what turned out to be a ‘turf war’ between Moscow criminal gangs” (82).

Once Putin got elected to the president office, he did not blame the Chechens for the second bombing

in Moscow in August 2000. The first Moscow bombing in 1999 was used by the Russian political

leaders to get the backing of the Russian public for the second post-soviet invasion of Chechnya. The

bombing of Moscow apartment buildings in 1999 by Russian criminals was a strategic tool used by the

Russian political authorities to re-occupy Chechnya. The bombing of 1999 did two things for Putin.

First, it allowed him to win the elections to the presidency. Second, it gave him the control over the

transportation links from the Caspian Sea to world markets, and not to suppress terrorism.

Russia’s official reasons for invading Chechnya are, to fight against international terrorism, and

to keep Russia’s territorial integrity secure from ‘terrorism’. Labeling the entire Chechen people as

terrorists and bandits does not help promote the “fight against international terrorism”. In fact, the

threat is increased when people are systematically tortured and murdered. As a natural instinct, people

will protect themselves from being wiped out. Furthermore, how can sending in over one hundred

thousand troops and weapons into other people’s land help to defend yourself? This false sense of

security was broken by the recent Moscow hostage situation. The Chechens demanded that Russia

political leaders withdraw all one hundred thousand troops from Chechnya. The operation to “liberate”

the Russian hostages from the Chechens was handled very poorly by the Russian authorities. In the

process of liberating the hostages, the Russians themselves killed over eighty other Russians in addition

to fifty Chechens as a result of using a narcotic gas. This operation shed light on how the Russians

acted in Chechnya; the indiscriminate killing of innocent people.

Russia invaded Chechnya once again in 1999 in order to secure valuable contracts to transport

oil from the Caspian Sea to world markets. Vincent J. Goulding Jr., a Marine Corps Representative at

the US Army War College and the author of online article, “Back to the Future With Asymmetric

Warfare. (Use of Particular Strategy Used by Ancient Germanic Tribe and Chechen Rebels in Russia).”

Goulding endorses that for Russia, oil was the primary reason for invading Chechnya. According to

Goulding, “there was also the issue of oil reserves in the area and the physical security of an

economically significant natural gas pipeline. From Moscow's perspective, it is easy to argue that vital

national interests were at stake.” The Russians began to lose valuable exploration and transportation

contracts to western consortiums because Chechnya was no longer under Russia’s direct control. In the

meantime, western consortiums became more interested in developing the energy sector in the

Caucasian region. The only functioning oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea capable of transporting oil to

the world markets passed through Chechnya. Bennett states that Azerbaijan, a newly independent state

in the Caucasus region, “finally signed a multi-billion-dollar contract with a Western consortium to drill

crude off its Caspian Sea shore” (322). The only way for Russia then “to control Caspian oil would be

to get the contract for transporting it back through [the Friendship pipeline]” (Bennett 322). Russia

could not guarantee the safety of the oil being transported through the Friendship pipeline in Chechnya

because of the 1996 truce signed by Chechnya and Russia. The truce gave Chechnya freedom from

Russian rule. The action by the western consortiums to build a pipeline bypassing Russia was to ensure

the safety of oil reaching its destination. In order to guarantee the safety of oil, the western consortiums

decided to build a pipeline that would run through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and through Turkey,

effectively bypassing Russia. The loss of potential revenue from not being able to transport oil through

the Friendship pipeline prompted Russia in October 1999 to invade Chechnya under the pretext of

fighting international terrorism and securing Russia’s territorial integrity against “terrorists.” This was

accomplished by placing over one hundred thousand soldiers in Chechnya. Chechnya is the size of

Ireland. Russia has ensured that the Friendship pipeline brings oil from the Caspian Sea to the world

markets. Chechnya has considerable amount of proven oil reserve in the capitol, Grozny. The United

States Energy Information Administration confirms Grozny has the capacity of refining oil at 390,000

bbl/d. Anup Shah, associated with the Global Issues website, features in-depth reporting on many

relevant issues that effect the human species on this planet. Shah reports, “Grozny has a major oil

refinery along this pipeline. For Russia it is important that the oil pipelines and routes they take to be

sold to the western markets.” Chechnya was considered as the hub of oil industry during the Soviet

days. After the breakup of the USSR, the lead nation Russia kept Chechnya as part of its Russian

Federation. The significance of holding onto Chechnya was the oil reserves and the transportation links

that exist in Chechnya. By taking control of the oil fields and the transportation links in Chechnya,

Russia ensured a monopoly over the oil reserves in the Caspian region. Ron Holland reports on the

Middle East and on financial matters. Holland is also the Editor of Dixie Daily News and

SwissGnomes.com. Holland was asked in an electronic-mail interview why Russia was occupying

Chechnya? He responded with, “They are occupying Chechnya for oil and because they have the power

to do so. Just the same reason we will occupy Iraq.” Both reasons discussed earlier are all plausible as

to why the Russians have re-invaded and occupied Chechnya. The facts outlined above should leave no

doubt as to what the real reason is for Russian occupation in Chechnya. The first reason is to control

the flow of oil from the Caspian Sea to world markets. The second reason, as mentioned earlier, were

the oil refineries in Chechnya, to be exploited by the Russians. The above information has shed some

light as to what might be the motivating factors for the Russian foreign policy in favor of occupying

Chechnya and it is certainly not to suppress terrorism.

The strategic value of Chechnya lies in the geography, located in the center of the Caucasian

Region. Countries in the Caucasus Region such as North Ossetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria would like to

be independent nation-state from the Russian Federation. The Russians saw Chechnya as the doorway

to the Caucasian Region. Matthew Evangelista, a professor of government at Cornell University and

the author of The Chechen Wars Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?, notes that “Chechnya

stands astride key transportation junctions, including the Rostov-Baku highway and Rostov-Baku

railroad, the only links between northern Russia and Transcaucasia and the countries of eastern and

southern Europe, it has also been an important center for oil refining and transit” (3). If Chechnya can

be controlled, then it is easy to control the flow of commerce and oil in the Caucasus Region, at the

same time preventing other autonomous regions within the Russian Federation from gaining their

independence. After the collapse of the USSR, Islam began to be embraced by the local people once

again in the open, as Islam was suppressed under the Soviet regime. The revival of Islam in the

Caucasus Region had Moscow worried that there could be a successful Islamic state in the Caucasus

region. If an Islamic state had naturally formed in Caucasus Region, and would have been successful,

then Russia would have lost its influence in the Caucasus region completely, which would have meant

great revenue lost from not being able to control the transportation of oil.

Other pseudo-autonomous regions within the Russian Federation would love to break away

from the corrupt, inept rule of the Russians. Herspring writes, “Yelstin viewed Chechen independence

as a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and a magnet for other disgruntled Caucasian

peoples chafing under Russian rule” (184). If Chechnya had been successful at maintaining their

independence, then other autonomous regions within the Russian Federation would have followed

Chechnya footsteps and declared their independence. Russia, did not accept the separation of Chechnya

from the USSR and Russia made Chechnya part of its Federation as was before the soviet system.

Russia feared if Chechnya broke away from Russian Federation, then its influence would have been

diminished in the Caucasus Region and over the newly independent states in the Caucasus Region,

such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Karen Talbot, a member of the International Center for

Peace and Justice and the author of online article, “Chechnya: More Blood for Oil” reveals the real

problem with the Russian Federation. Talbot writes, “On August 27, there was a major confrontation by

separatists demanding that Karachay-Cherkess secede from Russia.” Maintaining over one hundred

thousand Russian soldiers in Chechnya will deter other regions from seceding from the Russia

Federation. By preventing Chechnya’s independence with force, Russia will maintain the strong

influence over the newly independent states in the Caucasus region. The Caspian Sea in the Caucasus

Region has been dubbed as the next Kuwait. Certainly Russia would not want to miss the opportunity

of reaping the profits made from exploring and transporting oil from the Caspian Sea to world markets.

Russia motives were and are to prevent other pseudo autonomous regions from declaring their

independence from the Russian Federation, and to keep its influence over the Caucasian Region. The

benefit of having influence over the Caucasian region is to control the transportation and exploration of

oil in the Caspian Sea region. The above evidence provides an alternative viewpoint as to why the

Russians have not allowed Chechnya to separate as an independent nation-state from the Russian

Federation. Russia’s actions in Chechnya cannot be justified as fighting terrorism. All the evidence

points to Russia wanting to control the flow of oil from the Caspian Sea to world markets.

Russian military action in Chechnya is totally opposite to the rhetoric from the Kremlin, which

is we are in Chechnya to suppress terrorism. Then what is terrorism? It is the inflicting of deliberate

physical or psychological damage against a people. Human Rights Watch is an organization that

investigates human rights violation in over seventy countries, singled out Russia for human rights

violation in a report titled, Welcome to Hell: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Extortion in Chechnya.

The methodology used by the Russians in dealing with detained villagers is not only wrong but also

extremely inhumane. Human Rights Watch points to the treatment received by the Chechen population

in Russian detention centers. Human Rights Watch reports that, “Russian guards would force them to

run a gauntlet of guards who would beat them mercilessly, through their stay in cramped and sordid

conditions” (26). By treating the people of Chechnya in such derogatory and systematic ways, the

Russians have allowed the soldiers to run amuck to terrorize the Chechen people into submission to

Russian rule. All of this evidence points to controlling the flow of oil from the Caspian Sea rather than

suppressing terrorism. On the contrary, it is the Russians who are causing terrorism on the Chechen

people. The homes of Chechens in cities and villages have been destroyed by massive Russian artillery

bombardment, which has destroyed the entire capitol of Chechnya. Herspring points out, “[t]he assault

on Grozny effectively leveled the city, leaving its population without basic services” (192). The

Russians bombed and leveled the biggest city in Chechnya, its capitol Grozny. The bombing of Grozny

and villages has left the people of Chechnya with no proper protection from the severe freezing

winters, no sewage systems, no running water, no functioning electricity grid, etc… The people of

Chechnya are left to be diseased and killed off. All of this is terrorism perpetrated by a state that is

‘superior’ to their enemy. According to Human Rights Watch, Russia is committing mass murder and

other crimes against humanity in Chechnya. There have been many accounts of Russian brutality and

inhumane treatment of Chechens. These crimes do not support the official line of the Kremlin regime

that says ‘we are in Chechnya to bring order and stability’ and to suppress ‘terrorism’. On the contrary,

the Russians are guilty of the same crimes that they accuse the Chechen people of. There are a lot of

inconsistencies with what the Russians are verbalizing and what they are actually doing in reality. The

destruction of the Chechen people’s infrastructure, which provides protection from the freezing winters

and disease, is terrorism in the true sense that inflict psychological, physical, and mental harm on the

entire Chechen population numbering under one million.

Russia’s unwillingness to accept international human rights organizations into Chechnya to

investigate human rights abuses indicates that Russia is not being honest as to what their actions are in

Chechnya. The organizations that were denied access to Chechnya were OSCE (Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe), Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. Russia did not

agree to renew OSCE mandate of carrying out humanitarian aid and ‘monitoring human rights.’ The

decision was viewed by the human rights organizations “as an attempt to shut out international scrutiny

of human rights in the strife-torn republic” (Time). Russian refusal to readmit OSCE into Chechnya

adds to the gravity of charges leveled against the Russians. It is interesting how the Russian controlled

media reported of a Russian de-miner being blown up in Chechnya. The ITAR-TASS is the Russian

government official news agency. ITAR-TASS reported in the following manner, “Having reacted from

a source stating that the landmine had been activated, the equipment exploded the mine together with a

minor”. The quote is from an official Russian government online newspaper. ITAR-TASS news

reporting shows that Russians have no honor to even come out with the truth about their own people

being blown up. Then how can we expect the Russians to come out and tell the truth about what is

happing in Chechnya? The concrete evidence as presented above supports the theory that Russia’s

interest is not fighting terrorism since it is committing terrorism itself against the Chechen people.

Russia started both wars, the first war in 1994-96, and the present war that began again in 1999,

in order to control the natural resources of the strategic geopolitical area within the Caucasus region,

and not to suppress terrorism. The reports from the Human Rights Watch and others have confirmed in

the strongest language of what is happening to the Chechen people. Every day, the Russians humiliate

and kill Chechens in their own country. The Russians are not in Chechnya to suppress terrorism

because Russia is itself committing terrorism against the same people of whom it alleges is protecting it

from. The facts outlined in this research paper prove that Russia is committing gross human rights

violation day in and day out. The real reason and the only reason why Russia went in to Chechnya was

to control the flow of oil from the Caspian Sea to the world markets. By occupying Chechnya, Russia

has the control over the natural geopolitical resources that Chechnya holds for the Caucasian Region.

Work Cited

Bennett, Vanora. Crying Wolf The Return of War to Chechnya. London: Pan Books, 2001.

Ebel, Robert, and Rajan Menon, eds. Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Lanham:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Evangelista, Matthew. The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? Washington

DC: Brookings Institution, 2002.

Goulding, Vincent J. “Back to the Future With Asymmetric Warfare.” Parameters Winter. 2000-01: 21-

30.

Herspring, Dale R., eds. Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain. Lanham: Rowman &

Littlefield, 2003.

Holland, Ron. Personal E-Mail Interview. 02 Apr. 2003.

Human Rights Watch. Welcome to Hell Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Extortion in

Chechnya. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

ITAR-TASS News Agency. “Russian Sec Council Discuss Preparation for Referendum in

Chechnya.” ITAR-TASS 7 Mar. 2003: LexisNexis. Auraria Lib., Denver, CO. Mar. 16 2003

<http://0web.lexisnexis.com.skyline.cudenver.edu/universe/document?_m=7

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Russell, John. “Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen: Russian Perceptions of Chechens During the Wars in

Chechnya, 1994-96 and 1999-2001.” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

18.1 (2002): 73-96.

Shah, Anup. “Crisis in Chechnya.” 16 May 2001. 30 Mar. 2003.

<http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp >.

Talbot, Karen. “Chechnya: More Blood for Oil.” 30 Mar. 2003

<http://www.covertaction.org/full_text_69_03.htm >.

United States. Energy Information Administration. Russia. Washington: GPO. 2002.

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html>.