"BLOODY NICHOLAS": ANALYSIS OF THE POLICIES

AND PERSONALITY OF TSAR NICHOLAS II

by

Kristi Hendrickson King

B.A., Cameron University, 1983

.~.

A thesis submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School of the

University of Colorado at Denver in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of History

1989

This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by

Kristi Hendrickson King

has been approved for the

Department of

History

by

DEDICATION

To my husband, Greg, for all his love and patience

To my parents, Mike and K, for being the wind beneath my wings

To Dr. Mary s. Conroy for her encouragement and guidance

King, Kristi Hendrickson (M.A., History)

"Bloody Nicholas": Analysis of the Policies and

Personality of Tsar Nicholas II

Thesis directed by Associate Professor Mary s.

Conroy

Tsar Nicholas II was the last autocrat

of Russia. His reign has received criticism from

historians for the past seventy years. He is

portrayed as weak and inept and this opinion is

taught to area high school students. The'basis

for this view derives from the opinion of many

scholars and contemporaries of Nicholas. Five

historians make up the control group which represent

the traditional stated opinion of Nicholas are:

George Vernadsky, Nicholas Riasanovsky, John M.

Thompson, and Donald Mackenzie and Michael W.

Curran.

These professionals wrote textbooks which

have been used in area schools which perpetuate

the negative image of Nicholas and his policies.

Through research and analysis of contemporaries'

diaries and memoirs and Nicholas' correspondence

v

with members of his family, .it is apparent that

the representative historians portray Nicholas I

in such a manner based on selected interpretation

of solitary incidences in his life.

By presenting the negative and positive

accounts of Nicholas and his policies during the

early years of his reign, the years immediately

following the 1905 Revolution, and his personality

it is apparent that there is some discrepancy from

the accepted view that Nicholas was weak. True,

in some areas it is hard to disagree with the

negative opinions of his contemporaries and

historians--the ethnic question, particularly the

Jews--but by examination of his correspondence

and his ministers'--Count V. N. Kokovtsov and

M. V.Rodzianko--new insight is provided into the

reign and character of this tragic character.

Each chapter deals with a particular aspect

of Nicholas' reign excluding World War I. As it

is difficult to obtain complete data on Nichola~

due to the inaccessibility of the archives, a full

study of Nicholas is not possible. However, this

paper does not intend to be the final word on

vi

Nicholas but rather to raise the controversy why

Nicholas is depicted so harshly when there is

available proof that there is another side to the

man.

The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION •.•.••••••••••.. • • . • • • • • 1

II. CHIEF POLICIES OF NICHOLAS' EARLY REIGN...................... 11

Witte and Russian Industrialization............ 12

The Hague Conference of 1899... 20

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905............... 25

The Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905~ 28

The Revolution of 1905......... 33

Notes--Chapter II.............. 38

III. INTERIM YEARS, 1907-1914........... 42

Zemstvas and the Dumas......... 45

Stolypin and the Land Reforms.. 52

Nicholas and his Ministers..... 54

Nicholas and Anti-Semitism..... 56

Notes Chapter III.............. 61

IV. NICHOLAS' CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY 63

Nicholas' Personality.......... 64

Nicholas and Alexandra......... 75

viii

Rasputin and Alexandra......... 83

Notes Chapter IV............... 88

V. CONCLUSION......................... 92

Notes Chapter v ......•...•.•... 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY................ . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 04

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The reign of the last Russian Tsar,

Nicholas II, is harshly criticized by historians.

He is portrayed as a weak~willed man, dominated

by his hysterical wife. Further, two historical

theses base their analysis of the collapse of

tsarist Russia on the ineptitude of this ruler.

One thesis is Nicholas was determined to remain

the autocrat of all the Russias and was blind

to the plight of the Russian people. Another

thesis is Nicholas was incapable of managing

his administration and through his blindness

neglected to choose adequate ministers who would

have effectively governed.

2

Nicholas' reign was a turbulent one.

From 1894-1917, Russia progressed rapidly.

Economically, the country experienced a program

of intense industrialization headed by Sergei

Witte, Minister of Finance from 1892-1904.

Socially, this program evoked monumental changes

in both the urban and rural areas of Russia.

Such modernization necessitated political reforms

as well as the above-mentioned economic and social

ones. These years witnessed such events as the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Russian

Revolution of 1905, the subsequent October

Manifesto of 1905, the Fundamental Laws of 1906,

the progressive interim years 1907-1914, and

finally the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

While the October Manifesto of 1905 and

the Fundamental Laws of 1906 reduced, to a certain

degree, Nicholas' autocratic authority, the next

seven years witnessed huge strides in the

political, social and economic arenas, best

exemplified by the Stolypin Land Reforms, the

establ~shment of parliamentary reform, the Duma,

and the industrial progress. Exdept for a few

minor incidents in the Balkans, it was a time

I

3

of relative peace. It was the outbreak of World

War I which ended the continuance of Russian

economic, social, and political advancement.

While the Soviet Union is interested

in more indepth assessment of its past, local

students are subjected to the general consensus

that Nicholas' reign was one of corruption and

backwardness. Or they view a film which while

compassionate in its interpretation, misrepresents

Nicholas and his reign. By analyzing standard

interpretations with primar:y accounts a broader

mor~ enlightened view of Nicholas may be gained.

I have had the opportunity in the past

two years to give four lectures to two Jefferson

County high schools. The first was given before

ari advanced history class which had devoted nine

weeks to the study of Russia, from Peter the

Great to Nicholas II. To subsidize their general

world history textbook, the teacher had utilized

the miniseries on Peter the Great and the movie

on Nicholas, but only for one class. I was asked

to lecture on Nicholas II as a special project.

After providing a brief background on Nicholas

and his family and some of the key aspects of

4

his reign, I answered questions. The questions

were based entirely upon the film, as their

textbook had only one paragraph devoted to

Nicholas. The textbook portrayed Nicholas as

an inept ruler, but a wonderful father and adoring

husband. The most commonly asked question, not

only by this class, but the three succeeding

classes I lectured for at another Jefferson County

high school, was "Did Alexandra and Rasputin

have an affair?" The second question: "Did

Anastasia survive the murder?" Nothing was·asked

about Nicholas' policies or his capabilities.

In fact, when I asked how they viewed Nicholas

the standard reply was: "He was a passive man,

dominated by his wife which eventually caused

his downfall and that of imperial Russia."

In all four classes, particularly the

succeeding three, the students had formed

judgments of Nicholas based primarily on Massie's

book. In the last three classes which I lectured

at only a year ago, the students had only been

exposed to the book or film individually. These

students were easily discernible for they had

the most questions and relied on the information

5

they had gained from the film. They also asked

the two questions above mentioned. Some who

had had no outside exposure to the tsarist era

asked why it was so backward at the beginning

of the twentieth century. This was an impression

they had garnered from their world history

textbook for their teacher had tried to dispel

this image because of her considerable background

in tsarist and soviet history. However, it was

an impression that was difficult to banish.

The thrust of this paper is to study

certain aspects of Nicholas II, his reign and

personality, by examining four historians' views

of the regime. Four texts under scrutiny are:

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia;

George Vernadsky, A History of Russia; David

Mackenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of

Russia and the Soviet Union; and John M. Thompson,

Russia and the Soviet Union. These four

historians and their books have been used in

colleges--Riasanovsky's A History of Russia has

been on the required reading list at the

University of Colorado in Boulder as recently

as two years ago. These historians also have

6

published works of more limited scope which are

used as classroom texts. The colleges have I

employed historical monographs to broaden the

views of these historians, but the most

interesting aspect of Russian historiography

which is currently being employed in the Jefferson

County school district is the film, "Nicholas

and Alexandra" based on Robert K. Massie's book

of the same title, published in:paperback in

1969.

Unfortunately, there is no definitive

biography of Nicholas II. It h~s been twenty

years since Massie wrote his bodk, Nicholas and I

' Alexandra. Massie portrays Nicholas

sympathetically but emphasizes ~he Tsarevich

Alexis' hemophilia. Massie concludes this was '

the catalyst for the collapse o~ the tsarist I

administration. The only work which has discussed

with any depth the reign of Nichplas is Sergei

i Oldenburg's work, The Last Tsar.1 Originally

I

' published in two volumes -in Russ~an in 1939,

i this work has received little attention by

historians. I

I Hugh Seton-Watson used Oldenburg's

work on the Bolsheviks in his books and the

7

popular historian W. Bruce Lincoln utilized the

original untranslated two volume work in his

three books, The Romanovs, Passage Through

Armageddon, and In War's Dark Shadow.

Unfortunately the few quotes employed related

to documented speeches of Nicholas. None of

the positive analysis of Oldenburg's synthesis

on Nicholas·' reign was ever employed.

Recently, a 1975 Soviet film on the last

year of Rasputin's life was released in the Soviet

Union. For ten years "Agonia" had been banned

within the Soviet union. This is understandable

as it shed a new light on Nicholas. While there

are some historical inaccuracies, it portrayed

Nicholas in a more sympathetic light which is

considerably different from a PBS special on

Stalin which analyzed Nicholas' reign as the

catalyst for the Russian Revolutions. By using

actual film footage of Nicholas and his family,

edited in s~ch a way and interspersed with harsh

criticism, Nicholas appeared to be frolicking

while the Russian:people suffered deprivation

and oppression. This portrayal is interesting

when contrasted to the fact that Soviet filmmakers

8

are analyzing Nicholas more sympathetically.

Texts currently used in area high schools

and colleges will comprise a control group.

I will compare these works with historical

monographs and collected documents to provide

corroborating or dissenting views of scholars.

Fortunately more and more contemporary accounts

of the last tsarist administration have been

published in English, particularly in recent

years with the renewed interest in Russia and

the Soviet Union. Gorbachev•s openness policy

has made access to the archives easier.

Unfortunately the papers on Nicholas•

administration have not been made readily

available to scholars who journey to the Soviet

Union to pursue academic reasearch into the

tsarist era.

While the English speaker has many

sources, much has still remained untranslated.

Therefore to study the tsarist era it is necessary·

to read the Russian language. Collected

anthologies of speeches and documents of Nicholas•

reign are in English and provide enough adequate

material to do a cursory analysis of this era.

But until the archives are made available a

definitive biography of Nicholas can not be

attempted.

9

This paper will be divided into three

chapters. the first will discuss the chief

policies of Nicholas' early reign--Witte and

his industrialization program, Nicholas' choice

of ministers, the Hague Conference of 1899 1 the

Russo-Japanese War, the Revolution of 1905, the

October Manifesto, and the Fundamental Laws of

1906. These will be examined by contrasting

the opinions of the historians' views of Nicholas

with those of his contemporaries and even Nicholas

himself.

Chapter II will deal with the interim

years, 1907-1914 which included the following:

Stolypin, the Duma, ethnic reforms ecompassing

the Jews, and the Land Reforms. Here too the

focus will be how Nicholas was perceived by

historians and contemporaries alike.

The last chapter of the body of this

paper will deal with Nicholas' personality.

Historians have most often devoted their attention

to intense dissection of Nicholas' personal life,

1 0

his wife, Alexandra, and his relationship with

Rasputin. World War I will be discussed in sofar

as Nicholas' views and historians' opinions of

Nicholas have been analyzed.

The death of the royal family will be

analyzed only in the aspect of historical

perception. Do historians redeem Nicholas because

of his death? Did his contemporaries lament

such a brutal end or rather did they rejoice?

CHAPTER II

CHIEF POLICIES OF NICHOLAS' EARLY REIGN

The early years of Nicholas's reign,

1894-1904, were marked by a continuation of many

of his father's policies. Three crucial issues

dominated these years. First was the decision

Nicholas made at his accession to continue the

economic advancement begun during his father's

reign. Did Nicholas retain his Minister of

Finance's services because he truly desired economic

progress or was Witte allowed to pursue his program

because Nicholas had "inherited" him from Alexander

III? A second, and even more d~sastrous event,

was the Russo-Japanese War. Did Nicholas approve

of or encourage the adventurism in the Far East

which led to this war? The Russo-Japanese war

led to the Revolution of 1905 which altered the

12

autocracy. Was Witte the author of this manifesto?

What was Witte's role in the decision to convene

the Hague Conference in 1899? Was Witte the

dominant force behind the successful Treaty of

Portsmouth?

Witte and Russian Industrialization

Though Nicholas'early reign was marked

by a peaceful continuation of his father's policies,

Count Sergei Witte was a forceful personality of

this era. Witte became Minister of Finance in

1892.

Witte was typical of the new bureaucrats emerging in the latter half of the nineteenth century, an individual from non-noble origins who worked his way up in government service by talent, hard work, and imagination. Witte believed fervently that if Russia were to remain competitive with European nations, it would have to modernize, particularly by exploiting its ~atural resources and building up its economy.

Historians have interpreted the positive

and negative aspects of Witte's industrialization

program in many ways. Witte used his personality

and the confidence which had been placed in him

1 3

by Alexander III to sway Nicholas into accepting

his policies. According to John Thompson in Russia

and the Soviet Union: "Nicholas could be influenced

by powerful personalities, and he supported for

a time the program for economic modernization

advanced by his minister of finance, Sergei Witte." 2

This statement by historian John M. Thompson

suggested that Witte's methods of modernization

were not always conducive to the best interests

for the majority of the Russian people--the

peasants. It is necessary to compare the negative

opinions of historians with the positive to reach

a conclusion as to the viability of Witte's

industrialization program.

Witte's policies were varied. Like his

predecessor, Vyshnegradsky, Witte advocated

extensive taxation of the peasantry and the

exporting of Russian grain. He promoted Russian

exports to pay for the needed technological imports

to enhance industry. In his book, A History of

Russia, Nicholas Riasanovsky stated: "Serge Witte,

1892-1903, strove especially to develop state

railways in Russia and to promote heavy industry

14

through high tariffs, state contracts and subsidies,

and other means. 113

Witte pursued his system of

industrialization with ruthless efficiency. His

export program relied 80% on agriculturaral

products. He imposed indirect taxes on necessities.

Historians blame Witte's methods for the setback

which Russian agriculture experienced. For example

Thompson stated: 11 Backward and inefficient

agriculture acted as a brake on the economy.

Overpopulation and government taxation created

a land desperate and impoverished pe~santry ripe

for revolution. 114

According to historians, Witte's rapid

industriali~ation caused harsh conditions for not

only the rural workers, but also for the urban

proletariat. Historians Thompson and Riasanovsky

emphasized that the speed with which Witte was

attempting to accomplish his goals was only

detrimental to the peasantry as well as factory

workers. A contemporary observation by V. I. Gurko

who served in the first Duma stated: 11 This was

1 5

due to the general neglect of agriculture and other

branches of rural economy." 5

Although many historians condemned Witte's

program of industrialization some approved. Witte's

theory was expressed best by Theodore Von Laue

in his article, "The State and the Economy":

The expansion of the heavy industries in turn would stimulate the growth of the light industries and eventually agriculture would would improve through the increased demand for food and the cheaper 6supply of better equipment and chemicals.

Like Von Laue, Nicholas Riasanovsky best

exemplified the standard historical opinion of

Witte's industrialization program.

Under Nicholas II, as in the reign of Alexander III, the Ministry of Finance pursued a more intelligent and far-sighted policy than did the rest of the government; and this affected ~any aspects of the Russian economy and life.

Historically, Russia's industrialization

has been viewed as not only a necessity but also

as a positive policy of Nicholas's early reign.

While Thompson credited Witte's success with his

ability to dominate Nicholas, historian Hugh

1 6

Seton-Watson made the following observation of

Nicholas in his book, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917:

11Like his father, he (Nicholas) favored such

economic modernization as would strengthen the

Russian state, and for nine years he supported

Witte, the champion of modernization. 118

While authors of the chief texts used in

our schools credited Witte for the positive aspects

of his policies, they criticized the government,

i.e. Tsar Nicholas for negative effects. However,

historical monographs which have recently been

published credit tsarist Russia for its progressive

economic policies. Neil B. Weissman dispelled

the previous standard theses that Russia was

backward in all areas. In his book, Reform in

Tsarist Russia, Weissman emphasized the positive

role the tsar and his administrators played in

Russia's economic advancement:

It has been a commonplace to associate Tsarist Russia, particularly in its last decades, with conservatism and even stagnation. Yet at that very time, and largely at the instigation of its own autocratic government, the empire was beginniri§ a period of rapid and fundamental change.

1 7

Weissman further emphasized that no matter the

motives, Witte's policy was instigated in order

that Russia might adequately compete with a "rapidly

industrializing Europe." 10

While Witte's early policies emphasized

industry and an ensuing policy of filteration down

to the agricultural area, Nicholas supported him:

Although Nicholas knew that many officials disapproved of Witte's methods and though he himself found it difficult to excuse his aggressiveness, he could not but look with favor on the country's growing financial stability, dependent in great part on Witte's monetary reforms, incfyding the establishment of the gold standard.

Further, Nicholas realized that Witte's system

was "putting Russia safely into the ranks of the

1 · 12 world s most progressive states." Transportation

systems, particularly the railroad lines, were

increasing; the textile .industry which was focused

more in Moscow than St. Petersburg was booming;

natural resources, such as coal, oil and iron were

finally being exploited; foreign and domestic

18

trade were rising; and finally, there was a balanced

budget within sight.

The greatest testimony that Nicholas II

endorsed Witte's fiscal policies was expressed

by Witte himself in his memoirs:

In all financial matters throughout the time when I held the office of Minister of Finances, he (Nicholas} had full confidence in me and 1 ~id not in the least thwart my activity.

·While some historians criticized increased foreign

investment into Russia others have lauded Witte's

determination to back Russia's currency with gold.

Witte credited Nicholas totally for this latter,

positive action. "It may truly be said that Russia

owes the gold standard solely to Nicholas II." 14

Witte's system was somewhat drastic.

However the changes which resulted were not always

for the worse. In June 1897, Nicholas signed the

Factory Law which limited the work day for urban

workers. In many ways it was revolutionary in

the respect that Article 8 stated:

Overtime work is permitted only by special agreement between the manager of the industrial establishment and the worker. The hiring

_)

1 9

contract may include provisions regarding such overtime work only as reqv~red by the technical needs of production.

The positive aspects of Witte's policies

are evident. Although he did not turn his attention

to the agrarian problems until the beginning of

the twentieth century, he did realize the necessity

for agricultural modernization. Further, it is

apparent that historical perception of Nicholas's

role in Witte's program has been neglected by the

standard texts discussed. Witte himself credited

Nicholas for the success of his policies. Although

Witte cannot be regarded as an admirer of Nicholas,

in this one area his words showed that Nicholas

deserved recognition. The texts which represent

the standard interpretation of Nicholas II and

his reign utilized Witte's memoirs, but did not

mention Witte's opinion on this subject.

The next important political controversy

of Nicholas's early reign was his call for a

conference on the issue of universal disarmament.

20

Historians disagree as to the motive for such a

policy and who was behind such a decision, Witte

or Nicholas.

The Hague Conference of 1899

-~

Under Alexander III, Russia had experienced

thirteen years of unbroken peace. The historical

consensus of Nicholas's foreign policy has been

best stated by Nicholas Riasanovsky in A History

of Russia:

Nicholas II approved Alexander III's foreign policy on the whole and wanted to continue it. However, as we shall see, the new emperor proved to be less steady and more erratic than his father in inte1gational relations as in domestic affairs.

In Russia: A Short History, Michael T. Florinsky

criticized Nicholas for his belated proclamation

1 7 of his devotion to peace. Further Robert K.

Massie in Nicholas and Alexandra emphasized the

historical perception of Nicholas's actions in

calling for such a conference as a way to stem

Austria's rapid armament program. "It has been

suggested that the Tsar's proposal stemmed wholly

from the fact that Austria was requipping her

21

artillery with modern fie d guns which Russia was

unable to match."18 j

A contemporary vi w of what such a

conference would convey to the outside world was

expressed by Witte. He stated in his memoirs:

"The step, I declared, could bring us nothing but

harm. It would achieve n~ practical results and

it would merely reveal our financial weakness to

1 9 the whole world." Witte was trying to secure

foreign investment in Russia and he felt such a

decision by Nicholas would only result negatively.

This statement opened the door to the second

question of whether Ni9holas or Witte was behind

the proposal. Also, Witte worried that Nicholas

was more interested in his position as a world

leader than in the maintenance of peace. "Nicholas

II, perhaps attracted by the prominent role he

would play on the world scene, yielded to Witte•s

urging and issued a call for universal peace and

a reduction of the excessive arms burdens through

20 international agreement."

Historians emphasized that Nicholas was

more interested in his world position than either

22

in finances or peace. Also, although Witte stated

that he disapproved of a world wide disarmament

conference, historians persisted in crediting him.

W. Bruce Lincoln best exemplified this perception

in the following statement from his book, In War's

Dark Shadow:

At his (Witte) urging, Nicholas approved the plan, and in August 1898 Muravev appealed to all European powers to assemble at the Hague to discuss a mora torium on the development and production of new weapons. Thus it was Russia and Nicholas II--a weak nation and a far weaker Emperor--who set in motion the forces that brought t~' first Hague Conference together in May 1899.

These negative opinions of Nicholas and

his motives and his role in such a decision are

in direct contradiction to the standard views of

Vernadsky and Riasanovsky. Vernadsky lauded

Nicholas's decision by a subtle comparison to the

policy of Alexander I's Holy Alliance: "For the

first time since the Holy Alliance, an attempt

had been made to bring about international ~eace;

and again, as in 1815, the initiative had come

from the Russian emperor." 22 Nicholas Riasanovsky

23

was even more complimentary of Nicholas's policy

in the following statement:

Nicholas II appeared prominently on the international scene in 1899, when he called together the first Hague Peace Conference attended by repre sentatives of twenty-six states. Although instigated by Russian financial stringency and in particular by the difficulty of keeping up with Austrian armaments, this initiative was in accor23with the emperor's generally peaceful views.

In the 1890's Ivan Bliokh published a six

volume work, The Future of War. In it he described

the method of future warfare if countries continued

their present armaments competition. This was

an influential catalyst to Nicholas's decision

as Kadet leader and historian Paul Miliukov stated:

11 I read Bliokh's work, which led Nicholas II to

organize the First Hague Conference in 1899. 1124

Traditional historical interpretations of Nicholas•

role and the reason behind his decision are

favorable. Witte disclaimed any credit for the

Hague Conference and in fact deplored Nicholas•

precipitate step. However, Paul Miliukov, historian

and leader of the Kadet or Constitutional Democratic

Party, fuelled controversy. He claimed that

Nicholas'motivation in calling the peace conference

24

was altruistic rather than practical. As

presented, popular historians condemned both

Nicholas's role and his reasons, but the standard

consensus has been that Nicholas was responsible

for such a far-sighted policy and for once that

whatever the motives it was a positive program.

Historian Sergei Oldenburg was the most effusive

in his critique of Nicholas and his acitions when

he wrote the following in his two volume work The

Last Tsar which was published in 1939.

But anyone who believes that free will is inherent in individuals and nations must acknowledge that Emperor Nicholas II, who first demanded effective measures to prevent war and reduce the burden of armaments, inaugurated a momentous historic enter prise 25 that has earned him the right to immortality.

So far the standard historical

interpretations as represented by Thompson,

Riasanovsky, Vernadsky, and Mackenzie and Curran

have pictured Nicholas favorably when balanced

with the more limited accounts. Industrialization

was progressing and Nicholas had made it apparent

he desi~ed to maintain peace. However this last

decision was de~troyed in 1904 with the onset of

25

the Russo-Japanese War. Then the control group

of historians again portrayed Nicholas in an

unfavorable light. Further Witte has again been

credited with the successful Treaty of Portsmouth

which honorably concluded the war. What has been

the e.stablished ·historical opinion of Nicholas?

How do primary accounts agree or contradict these

perceptions?

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905

In 1895, Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote Nicholas

that "the great tal:!k of the future for Russia is

to cultivate the Asian continent and defend Europe

from the inroads of the Great Yellow race." 26

While Nicholas obviously advocated peaceful policies

with regard to Europe and the United States,

historians view his Asian policies with cynicism.

Mackenzie and Curran stated Nicholas was influenced

by adventurers who desired rapid penetration into

China in order to circumvent Japan's influence. 27

Riasanovsky emphasized Nicholas's ability to seize

a fortuitous circumstance in promoting Russian

superiority in China:

Moreover, Russia responded to new opportunities more and more aggressively.

26

Thus, when the murder of two German missionaries in November 1897 led to the German acquisition of Kiao-chow through a ninety nine year lease, Nicholas II demanded and obtained a twenty-five year lease of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur--in spite of Witte's opposition to that move and in flagrant d~~regard of the Russian treaty with China.

This policy of expansion continued in spite

of the Japanese attempts during the Ito mission

to St. Petersburg to achieve some compromise. 29

According to Mackenzie and Curran who concurred

that Nicholas was influenced by Bezobrazov, this

step failed. 30 Nicholas underrated Japanese policy

and wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm on the eve of the

Russo-Japanese War: "There will be no war because

I do not wish it." 31 The traditional historical

interpr~tations of the causes of the war and

Nicholas' role do not refute contemporary iccounts.

In fact Witte and Foreign Minister Lamsdorf

vehemently opposed Nicholas' actions and tried

to steer him away from Bezobrazov's influence.

They realized that Japan would not accept Russia's

27

preeminence in Korea, although Japan was willing

to allow Russia's influence in Manchuria.

In February 1904 the Japanese fleet attacked

the Russian fleet in Port Arthur and sunk three

battleships. Russia was at war. Historians have

devoted much attention to the Russo-Japanese War

because it is viewed as the catalyst for the

Revolution of 1905. In spite of Russian perceptions

of a "short victorious war", Japan emerged as the

military victor. The disastrous fall of Port

Arthur, the Battle of Mukden, and the sinking of

the Russian fleet at Tsushima, underscored the

ineptness of Russia's military leaders--best exem­

plified by General Alexei Kuropatkin--and the finan­

cial unpreparedness of the government to wage war.

The standard historical view as shown has

been critical of Nicholas. F~rst, he_ was

manipulated into an aggresive policy by people

other than his ministers. Second, his

short-sightedness as emphasized by his letter ·to

the Kaiser, did not acknowledge the possibility

that the Japanese 'monkeys' would dare attack the

Russian bear. This policy witnessed the general

consensus by historians and contemporaries that

28

Nicholas was incapable of determining a positive

foreign policy.

Historians disagree over Nicholas' role

in the Treaty of Portsmouth and whether it was

favorable or unfavorable to Russia. While it was

apparent by Nicholas's own statements that he had

believed whole-heartedly that he could control

the situation and that Russia would emerge

victorious, the polemic of Russia's defeat has

been questioned by the historical interpretations

of the peace negotiations at Portsmouth.

The Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905

Nicholas had wavered on his decision about

sending the Russian fleet from the Baltic to the

Pacific. However, he finally decided to do so.

He placed all his hopes·on the fleet successfully

demolishing the Japanese and bringing about a swift

end to the war. Unfortunately, the fleet was sunk

at Tsushima and it was this disaster, Mackenzie

and Curran stated, that caused the tsar to agree

t t . t' 32 Th t d d o peace nego 1a 1ons. e s an ar consensus

29

of the Treaty of Portsmouth was that its successful

conclusion was owed solely to Witte and further,

that the terms of the treaty were less than

satisfactory to Russia. Mackenzie and Curran,

Riasanovsky, and Vernadsky, all concur in this

assessment. Riasanovsky stated the following:

The provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth reflected the skillful diplomacy of Witte, who headed the Russian delegation, and represented everything considered, a 3~ther unsatisfactory settlement for Russia.

Mackenzie and Curran stated succinctly that the

terms of .the treaty only confirmed Russia's

defeat. 34 And Vernadsky emphasized that Witte

35 achieved a more favorable peace than was expected.

The terms included ·the loss of the southern half

of Sakhalin Island, Japanese dominance of Korea,

and Russian expulsion from Manchuria. Alan

Moorehead influenced by the mentioned historians,

made the following observation: "Nicholas had

lost here upon almost every count: in Russia's

prestige in the world, in the damage to his armed

forces, in the explosion of his dreams of a new

empire on the East." 36

30

Witte provided his own testament as to

his influence at Portsmouth when he wrote: "I

acquitted myself with complete success, so that

in the end the Emperor Nicholas was morally

compelled to reward me in an altogether exceptional

manner by bestowing upon me the rank of count." 37

Another portrait of Nicholas and the treaty has

emerged in recent years. Obviously historical

interpretation credited Witte for achieving

'honorable' terms of peace, but Raymond A. Esthus

has emphasized Nicholas's involvement in his

article, "Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War."

By April 1905, Japan was by no means averse

38 to peace. Esthus utilized many primary sources

in his article, including Japanese documents.

"Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo declared that while

Russia still had powerful fbrces in its horne I

country, Japan had exhaust~d its forces." 39 This

statrnent portrayed the sit~ation in a much different

light. The historical thesis that Russia was

whipped and agreeable to whatever the Japanese

granted was refuted 'by Nicholas II.

The Tsar's objective was explicitly set out in the instructions prepared for the

31

Russian plenipotentiaries. That document stated that Russia would not hesitate for one minute to continue the war if Japan presented demands which tarnished the 4fionor and worth of Russia as a great power.

Nicholas's instructions to Witte were very

clear. Russia would not pay an indemnity and would

not relinquish one inch of Russian land. Witte

telegraphed the tsar that the Japanese were not

agreeable and Nicholas instructed Lamsdorf to

d W. tt t d d . . 41 comman 1 e o en 1scuss1on. Negotiations

were stalemated once Witte agreed to most of Japan's

demands. However, the Japanese ambassador, Komura,

also had his instructions. While he had attempted

to gain an indemnity payment from Russia,

realistically the Japanese government and people

knew that was impossible. "The need for peace

was so great that Japanese military leaders, as

well as many civilian leaders, believed it was

unrealistic to expect to get an indemnity from

Russia." 42

In the end Witte disobeyed his orders and

ceded the southern half of Sakhalin. However,

there was no indemnity. Further, Russia lost no

land and was still able to control its railroad

through Manchuria. But Witte had been ready to

32

cede all of Sakhalin to Japan if Nicholas had not

remained firm.

Nicholas restrained Witte from ceding all of Sakhalin and possibly paying a disguised indemnity, while Witte, for his part, boldly seized the moment to make peace when Nicholas had ordered him home. The result of the tension and struggle between the two men was the achievement of a peace that all the world 43 recognized as a remarkable Russian triumph.

Obviously the contemporary accounts,

Nicholas and Witte's telegrams, discount the theory

that Witte alone was responsible for the peace.

In fact they emphasize that if anything, Witte

would have been more conciliatory if Nicholas had

not proved so determined. Further the terms of

the treaty were not dishonorable to Russia. In

fact they were considerably more favorable than

would have been expected under the circumstances.

Sir Bernard Pares, a Russian historian

who spent many years there during Nicholas's reign,

contradicted the idea that Witte alone shaped the

treaty conference. In a review of Witte's memoirs,

Pares observed: "There are long passages, easily

detachable from his accounts of eve~ts, and

introduced only to show that Witte did nearly

everything good that got done." 44

33

Esthus has provided a new interpretation

based upon Nicholas's opinions. "It is true that

he was shy, timid, and sometimes indecisive; yet

what comes through during the Russo-Japanese War

is his tenacity and resolution." 45 When the primary

accounts are balanced with the historical ones

it is apparent that the outcome of the

Russo-Japanese War was not as disastrous, with

regard_ to foreign policy, as previously thought.

Witte did not sway Nicholas who held firm to his

position. While some critics might feel this was

stubbornness it may also be interpreted as

determination.

Although Nicholas acquitted himself in

a favorable light with regard to the treaty, the

Russo-Japanese War was the catalyst for a more

serious event; one which altered Nicholas's role

in government and which historians have consistently

criticized him for--the Revolution of 1905.

The Revolution of 1905

The disastrous military losses Russia

experienced in the Russo-Japanese War emphasized

the disaffection of many groups in Russia. I i

Historical ana~ysis of the 1905 Revolution has

'

34

interpreted it!as a dress rehearsal for the 1917 i

February Revoltition. The peasants had experienced i I

a famine in 19Q2; the intellectuels were dismayed I

at the lack of \governmental participation; the I

workers were d~manding better conditions; and the !

ethnic minorit~es were determined to gain the right

of self-determibation. This was the foundation i

for the outbrea~ of revolution in 1905. The

immediate catalyst was the fall of Port Arthur

in January of 1~05.

"Bloody\sunday" has become the traditional

historical inte~pretation of all that was wrong '

with Russia. F~rther it exemplified all of I

Nicholas's weaknesses and the inefficiency of his I

administration. 1 Historians, and contemporaries ! I

alike condemened Nicholas for the shooting of the I

I peaceful demons~rators led by Father Gapon.

I Historically Ni~holas has been acquitted of any

I

direct guilt in rrdering the measures taken by

the police. "In' a tragic display of incompetence,

security officia~s in St. Petersburg, without the I

35

knowledge of the tsar or higher authorities, chose

to disperse the unarmed crowd by force." 46

Bloody Sunday shattered the people's image

o£ the tsar as a benevolent figure. It was

continued violence-the assassination of Grand Duke

Serge Governor of Moscow--which instituted

Nicholas's decision to convoke a "consultative"

assembly. 47 This was a reluctant decision on

Nicholas's part. The standard interpretation of

Nicholas's role in the events of 1905 is negative

and contemporaries who witnessed the events of

Bloody Sunday and the succeeding uprisings--the

Potemkin Mutiny in June 1905, peasant violence

in the country, and the October strike by

workers--concur that Nicholas completely mismanaged

domestic policy.

The only positive outcome of the 1905

Revolution was the October Manifesto which granted

a national parliament--Duma-- and the issuance

of the Fundamental Laws of 1906. However, the

standard historical analysis of these two events

does not always concide with the contemporary

viewpoints. On the negative side, Nicholas was

accused of giving too little and hedging his

36

promises by retaining his right of veto, and the

ability to dismiss the Duma at any time.

Nicholas has historically been portrayed

as a man desperate to maintain his authority so

he grudgingly agreed to suggestions of Witte and

asked him to form a cabinet to discuss the call

for a parliament. In spite of the positive granting

of civil liberties, freedom of speech and press,

the portrait of Nicholas has been one of surly

reluctance. The only positive statement about

the political reforms of 1905-1906 came from

Nicholas in a letter to his mother, written October

19, 1905 (Old Style):

One of two ways was open to us, to appoint an energetic military man and use all available forces to try to crush the rebellion; that would have given us time to breathe, but in a few months we would have to use force all over again. That would mean rivers of blood, and in the end, we should be where we had started. That is, the authority of the government would be reaffirmed, but the situation would remain unchanged. The other way was to give the people their civil rights ••• and also have all laws confirmed by a State Duma 48 That of course would be a constitution.

Nicholas felt he had broken his sacred

oath to maintain the autocracy intact for his son.

37

In spite of the fact that he granted some liberties,

he retained most of his power. The fact that the

army had remained faithful allowed Nicholas to

successfully handle this crisis. This was not

the case in 1917. But the next few years preceeding

the outbreak of World War I would be crucial ones

for the government. As shown there has been some

discrepancies in the standard portrayal of Nicholas

and his early policies. His support of Witte,

the Hague Conference, and the conclusion of the

Treaty of Portsmouth have shed new light on

Nicholas. Unfortunately the negative image

presented by historians of the events of 1905 are

undiminished. What was Nicholas's role in the

interim years between the issuance of the

Fundamental Laws of 1906 and the declaration of

war in 1914? Such issues as Nicholas's relationship

with the Duma, with his ministers, the fiscal

policies, Stolypin's land reform, and his feelings

towards the ethnic minorities, particularly the

Jews will be examined in the next chapter.

NOTES--CHAPTER II

1 John M. Thompson, Russia and the Soviet Union, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1986), 165.

2Ibid.

3Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 396.

4 Thompson, 175.

5Theodore Von Laue, "The State of the Economy," from The Transformation of Russian Society edited by C. E. Black, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 208.

6 V.I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II, (Stanford: University Press, 1939), 5.

7Riasanovsky, 3rd ed. 1977, 441.

8Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1967), 548.

9Neil B. Weissman, Reform in Tsarist Russia: The State Bureaucracy and Local Government,

1900-1914, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1981 ), 3.

10Ibid., 21.

11 sidney Harcave, Years of the Golden Cockerel, (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1968), 301.

12Ibid.

39

13 Sergei Witte, The Memoirs of -count Witte, (Garden City, New York and Toronto: Doubleday,

Page and Company, 1921 ), 308.

14Ibid., 61 •

15George Vernadsky editor, A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917, volume 3: Alexander II to the February Revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 757.

16Riasanovsky, 4th ed. 1984., 400.

17Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A Short History, second edition, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), 356.

18Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1969),

67.

19witte, 96.

20Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution, 1881-1917, (London and New York: Longmanj 1983), 174.

21 w. Bruce Lincoln, In War's Dark Shadow; The Russians Before.the Great War, (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1986), 232.

5th ed. 236.

22 George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961 ),

23Riasanovsky, 4th ed., 1984, 401.

24Paul Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), 190.

25 Serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar; Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia: volume I: The

Autocracy, 1894-1900, (Florida: Academic International Press, 1975}, 103.

40

26Edmond Taylor, The Fall of the Dynasties: The Collapse of the Old Order, 1905-1922, (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), 61.

27David Mackenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union, (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1982), 369.

28R· k 3 d d 1977 445 1asanovs y, r e ., , •

29M k ' d C 369 ac enz1e an urran, •

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 370.

33Riasanovsky, 3rd ed., 1977, 447.

34Mackenzie and Curran, 370.

35 Vernadsky, 5th ed., 1961, 240.

36Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), 28.

37M . ass1e, 97.

38 Raymond A. Esthus, "Nicholas II and the ·RussoJapanese War," Russian Review 4 (1981), 402.

39 Ibid.

40Ibid., 406.

41 Ibid. , 4 0 9 •

42Ibid., 402.

43 rbid., 411.

41

44sir Bernard Pares review of Vospominania: Tsarstvovanie Nikolaya II (Memoirs: Reign of Nicholas II), by Count Sergei Witte, The Slavonic Review 3 (1923), 466.

45Esthus, 411.

46 Thompson, 180.

47R· k 451 1asanovs y, .

48 Serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia: Volume II: Years of Change, 1900-1907, (Florida: Academic International Press, 1977), 161.

CHAPTER III

INTERIM YEARS, 1907-1914

The years after the Revolution of 1905

and preceding the outbreak of World War I in 1914

were crucial ones. Nicholas had reluctantly granted

a national parliament and some civil liberties.

However, he retained the right to govern all foreign

affairs and the ability to dissolve the Duma at

any time. Alexander Kerensky pronounced this era:

"The brief period of Russian history from the

revolution of 1905 to the war of 1914 was a time

of great importance for Russia's internal

1 development."

This era was not only important politically

but economically. John M. Thompson has best stated

the traditional view of this time:

43

Some historians see this period as the beginning of the peaceful emergence in Russia of a·modernized democratic society, quite similar to western societies. Others, however, including Soviet writers, see these few years as a desperate, last-ditch effort by reactionary forces to paper over some of Russia•s most fundamental flaws, a ploy that was doo2ed to fail, whether the war had come or not.

This exemplifies the theory that the 1917 revolution

was inevitable. Thompson•s personal thesis was

the revolution was not unavoidable, but that World

War I was the deciding factor which determined

the events of February 1917; however not those

of October 1917.

The interim years receive praise from all

sides. Not only the group of standard historians,

but contemporary views painted a hopeful picture

of the programs the government instituted. 11 The

last short years before the war--the beginning

of Russia 1 s great catastrophe were marked by a

dynamic development of economic, cultural, and

political forces. 113 Sir Bernard Pares and Maurice

Baring who witnessed first hand the progress agreed,

11 that economically the seven years from 1907-1914,

were, so far, the most prosperous period in Russian

history. 114

44

Industrialization had slowed its intense

pace. "Signs of recovery appeared in all sectors

5 of the economy." Consumer products improved as

did per capita income. Materially, Russia was

rapidly catching up to Western Europe.

Politically there were changes. As Witte

was the dominant personality of the first ten years

of Nicholas's reign, Peter Stolypin, Minister of

Interior and Prime Minister, was the influential

force during the interim years. The controversies

during this era which directly affected Nicholas

were his relationship with the Duma and the

provincial zemstvos; with his ministers,

particularly Stolypin; his views of the ethnic

minorities, and Stolypin's land reforms. What

were the standard interpretations of Nicholas with

each of the above mentioned factors? Were the

historical opinions the accurate ones, or was

Nicholas portrayed as a determined autocrat who

despised his inability to retain his role of

'unlimited autocrat'?

45

Zemstvos and the Dumas

"Introduced in some provinces in 1865,

zemstvos were gradually extended by 1914 to 43

of the 50 provinces of European Russia provinces." 6

In 1894 when Nicholas became Tsar, there was no

hope for the progress which was a reality by 1914.

The zemstvos were the first political participation

the Russian people experienced. On his accession,

Nicholas dashed the hopes of the zemstvos for a

national parliament with his statement that these

ideals were "senseless dreams". These two words

are now famous and are used to standardize the

historical opinion of Nicholas and his views

that constitutional governments were evil.

Alexander Alexandrovich Polovtsev

(1832-1909) made the following observation of the

government and its inadequacies in his diary in

1901 :

Because of the unrestrained abuse of power by officialdom, senseless bureaucratic whims, regulations bordering on the ridiculous, the

46

absense of any sound policy discussed in advance, capricious interference in affairs and especially in appoint ments by the empresses, the grand dukes and duchesses, and the crowd of scoundrels surrounding them, the Russian people are sinking dee~er and deeper into oppression and misery.

During the Revolution of 1905, Nicholas

maintained that the zemstvos must "mind their own

business." 8 He had plans which he would introduce

when he saw fit. This time occurred after the

assassination of Grand Duke Serge in March 1905.

Nicholas issued a statement that he would call

for an investigation into the establishment of

a Duma. Until 1905, the zemstvos had been

restricted in their power. Although Nicholas

realized there was a need for some reform, he

rejected a reform bill presented by Minister of

Interior Goremykin in 1899. This decision was

supported by Stolypin. However in October 1902

another bill for zemstvo reform was presented and

in January 1903 Nicholas "gave his assent to the

formation within the MVD of a commission to prepare

a detailed blueprint for provincial reform." 9

47

This was the most positive statement of

Nicholas' views of the zemstvo reform. Like his

relationship with the zemstvos, Nicholas viewed

the Duma as a continual reminder that he had failed

his father. He distrusted the members of the Duma,

particularly the first two which were dismissed

within months of their convocation. Mackenzie

and Curran provide the best standard interpretation

of Nicholas' opinion on constitutional government.

"Dominated by Pobedonostsev and the reactionary

Prince v. P. Mescherskii, Nicholas believed that

constitutional government and parliaments were

'1 .. 10 ev1 •

Nicholas' relationship with the Duma was

tense from the moment of its first meeting. In

spite of his misgivings he told the Duma: "For I

My own part, I shall pro~ect as immutable the course

that I have set. I do sb in the firm conviction

that you will devote all\your strength in selfless

service to the nation." 11 The Duma issued a reply I

to the Tsar's Address wh~ch demanded full suffrage,

ministerial responsibility to the Duma, and finally

amnesty for all political prisoners. 12

The tsar and his ministers met these

demands with hostility. Further, due to Article

87 under the Fundamental Laws of 1906, Nicholas

was able to pass legislation without the Duma's

approval. This article stated that when the duma

was not in session, the Tsar could institute laws

which would be subjected to the Duma's approval

once it reconvened. However, the Duma seldom

reversed any legislation which occurred during

these periods and Nicholas was able to retain much

of his autocratic power.

These are the standard historical opinions

of Nicholas and his relationship with the Duma.

On the positive side, Nicholas had long realized

that his government needed some reorganization.

During the 1905 Revolution he wrote his mother:

"We are in the midst of a revolution with an

administrative apparatus entirely disorganized,

and in this lies the main danger." 13 Further,

Nicholas displayed his disgust with the bureaucracy

in another letter written a few weeks later to

his mother:

49

Everybody is afraid of taking courageous action; I keep on trying to force them--even Witte himself to behave more energetically. With us nobody is accustomed to shouldering responsibility: all expect t6 be-given order' 4 which, however, they disobey as often as not.

The cynicism apparent in this statement

indicated Nicholas' knowledge that a more efficient

form of government had to be implemented. However,

the first two Dumas only reinforced his opinion

of the inherent weakness of constitutional

governments. He became disgusted with the internal

bickering in the Duma. With the second Duma he

had hoped educational reform would be instigated,

but the members could not agree and it was dismissed

because of its radical membership and inability

to confer upon important legislative issues. As

Nicholas had stated he was determined to make his

reforms work and encouraged the Duma members to

work with the State Council and himself for the

betterment of the government. While many criticized

this speech for its lack of directives, it-must

be remembered that Nicholas had never intended

the Duma to be anything other than advisory. If

the delegates stayed in their place, Nicholas was

more than willing to work with them. 15 Until they

50

realized this Nicholas would not consider receiving

a delegation as he told Stolypin in November,

1907. 16

As shown the traditional historians

have portrayed Nicholas and constitutional

government on all levels in a negative light.

His own opinions illustrated that he realized the

need to streamline the government, but on his terms

and not by granting a parliament. Throughout the

remaining years of his reign, he retained his

distrust for the Duma, but as shown he did try

some measure of cooperation. In fact, the third

Duma served its full five year term as did the

fourth Duma. In spite of the negative picture

of Nicholas which has predominated history, there

was some evidence that Nicholas was more receptive

than previously portrayed. It should be remembered

that Nicholas was not the only person who viewed

the parliament with distrust. 11 Conservative and

reactionary elements at court and throughout the

country, had varying emotions, ranging from

apprehension to abhorrence of the new parliament." 17

Nicholas may have been head of the government but

51

he was not responsible for the opinions of his

ministers. Unfortunately he often chose people

whose views coincided with his and this led to

history's harsh assessment of him.

During Nicholas's reign two men became

influential. Witte was influential for the first

ten years and Peter Stolypin was predominant from

1906 to his assassination in 1911. Historians

argue over who was more important but they were

each valuable. Witte's system had propelled Russia

into the industrial revolution and Stolypin's Land

Reform began a modernization policy of Russia's

agrarian problems. Since Alexander II's reform

policies, the Russian government had been searching

for an adequate way to manage the peasant problem

and a feasible solution to agricultural depression.

What was Nicholas' role in Stolypin's Land Reform?

How has the standard historical interpretation

viewed him?

52

Stolypin and the Land Reforms

Witte's early program of industrialization

had been detrimental to the peasantry. However

by the turn of the century he began to investigate

plans for agricultural reform. The 1905 Revolution

saw the redemption payments for land abolished.

Stolypin carried his land reform further. He

desired to abolish the communes as he felt, as

had Witte, that the traditional commune was

detrimental to agricultural production. He

reorganized the Peasant Land Bank so that a greater

number of the peasants were able to obtain loans.

He advocated a restructuring policy of the way

which the communes divided the land so that a

peasant's land was consolidated rather than

seperated by another's strip as had been the

traditional method.

Historian John M. Thompson regarded

Stolypin's land reforms as a monumental social

change. As the war cut short the policy it is

difficult to ascertain how successful it would

53

have been, but Thompson emphasized that by 1915

only a little over a million peasant families had

acquired and consolidated their land into single

18 plots. However, 25% of the peasants had left

the communes and owned their own land. The October

Revolution of 1917 changed this so historians cannot

accurately assess the success of Stolypin's program.

But it was evident that by 1915, agricultural reform

was in progress.

Until 1902, Nicholas believed in the commune

as the representation of a truly Russian

institution. But Nicholas realized the viability

of agricultural reform once Witte began

' t ' t ' ' t h 1 ' ' 1 9 If th h ~nves ~ga ~on ~n o sue po ~c~es. ere ave

been negative criticisms of Stolypin's land reforms

they have been difficult to ascertain. Historians

generally agree that if war had not come in 1914

agricultural progress would have continued. Further,

what Nicholas' opinion about Stolypin's policy

in this area can only be ascertained by the

observation that the program was instituted and

had to have Nicholas' signature. Also, Nicholas

had maintained his devotion to the peasantry whom

54

he considered truly Russian and his most devoted

subjects. Unfortunately the one area where the

negative outweighed the positive is the assessment

of Nicholas' relationships with his ministers.

The standard opinion was Nicholas was incapable

of choosing ministers with the intelligence or

energy to adequately handle their duties.

Nicholas and his Ministers

"Ministers were appointed by the Tsar,

and held office as long as they possessed his

confidence." 20 "Ministers changed rapidly in what

has been described as a 'ministerial leapfrog,'

and each was more under Rasputin's power than his

predecessor." 21 while this last statement pertained

to the policies during the war, ministerial leapfrog

had been a game that Nicholas had played throughout

his reign. It escalated during the war.

Nicholas is harshly condemned by historians

because of his duplicity in the manner which he

dismissed his ministers. This was true of a few

of Nicholas' ministers who survived to write their

memoirs. Witte was Nicholas's harshest critic.

He accused Nicholas of not being grateful for his

55

services. In fact, Witte was rabid in his hatred

of ~icholas and expressed this in his memoirs.

v. I. Gurko also emphasized Nicholas's inability

to handle his ministers:

Gurko, who served in the· Ministry of Internal Affairs before and during Stolypin's administration, caustically claimed that Nicholas hated to dismiss a minister, not because he was kind, 'for actually he was indifferent to the feelings of the person he dismissed, but because it disturbed his peace of mind and obliged him to make an 22ffort of will which he always found difficult.

Stolypin's death and Nicholas' callousness

to his assassination has also emphasized historians'

and contemporaries' negative opinions of Nicholas'

relationships with his various ministers. Stolypin

had pushed Nicholas to side with him on the reform

plan for zemstvos in the western region of Russia.

By this action Stolypin earned Nicholas' enmity

and it was rumored that Stolypin's assassination

was a plot because the murderer Bogrov was kept

incommunicado till his execution. Further during

the three days prior to Stolypin's death, when

he lay mortally wounded, Nicholas did not pay him

a visit. Historians and contemporaries state that

56

the conflict over the western zemstvo reform would

have instituted Stolypin's dismissal if he had

not died.

The only positive accounts of Nicholas'

relationships with his ministers come from Kokovtsov

and Rodzianko, President of the Fourth Duma. In

spite of Kokovtsov's abrupt dismissal for daring

to criticize Rasputin's influence over the tsar,

he portrayed the tsar in a sympathetic light.

Further, he netralized Witte's depiction of the

tsar. Witte had asked Kokovtsov, whom he disliked

intensely, to obtain a grant from the tsar in the

amount of 200,000 rubles, which the tsar granted

in 1912. Kokovtsov, on the other hand, refused

a similar offer from the tsar when he was dismissed.

This showed the differences between Kokovtsov's

personality and Witte's. Witte did not hesitate

to deprecate the tsar in his memoirs. His

vituperative attack on Nicholas ranged from harsh

judgements of the tsar's personality to the tsar's

political ineptness. Yet Kokovtsov is not as

heavily researched as Witte. Nor do historians

rely as much on his memoirs as they do Witte's.

As earlier stated by Bernard Pares, Witte's memoirs

were records of Witte's personal aggrandizement

rather than accurate reflections of the era in

which he lived.

The historical consensus of Nicholas and

his ministers is the one which is currently

taught. Witte and Stolypin receive all the credit

for their reforms, in spite of the fact that

Nicholas had to approve them before they could

ever be implemented. In this instance the negative

outweighs the positive. However, the positive

as emphasized by Kokovtsov raises an interesting

question. Until the archives are opened and the

papers are available for indepth study this

perception of Nicholas will remain.

Nicholas and Anti-Semitism

Nicholas was anti-semitic. There has been

no positive account of his desire to reform the

government's position about the Jews. The Jews

were still required to live within the Pale of

Settlement which was established by Catherine the

.58

Great after the partition of Poland. Only a small

percentage of Jews were allowed to attend school.

Few were allowed to attend universities and to

live outside the Pale. Government instigated

pogroms which began under Alexander III escalated

under Nicholas II. In fact anti-semitic groups

such as the Black Hundred and the Union of the

Russian People enthusiastically pursued their

violent abuse of the Jews. The worst pogroms Russia

experienced were under Nicholas II; however, Stalin

instituted much more violent discrimination than

any leader but Hitler.

While Nicholas had stated his intention

to grant reforms for all of his subjects in 1906,

the October Manifesto granted the vote to Jews,

but that was all. The Pale of Settlement remained

in force as did the quota for Jewish education.

11 It seems likely that the personal antipathy of

Nicholas II to the Jews, of which there is clear

evidence in his correspondence, was at least partly

responsible. 1123 Stolypin had attempted modest

proposals for Jewish reform but Nicholas vetoed

.59

them. During the Homel pogrom, Witte investigated

as to responsibility and informed the tsar:

His Majesty wrote on the memorandum about this affair that such matters should not be brought t~4his attention (as too trivial a subject).

Witte emphasized that Nicholas was

surrounded by confirmed anti-semites such as

Procurator of the Holy Synod, Pobedonostsev;

Minister of the Interior, Plehve; Trepov; Ignatyev

and Durnovo. Further Nicholas was a member of

the Union of Russian People. He viewed with

equanimity the events of the Kishniev pogrom and

was mildly surprised that greater casualties had

not occurred.

It is difficult to provide any positive

aspect which might negate the anti-Semitic portrait

of Nicholas. In fact he was decidedly anti-Semitic

and often referred to them as zhidy (Yids) rather

than as Jews. However, one positive incident did

occur during Nicholas's reign and that was the

Beilis trial. Beilis was a Jew accussed in 1911

of killing a young man and draining his blood to

use in Jewish ceremonies. In 1913, Beilis was

60

exonerated by a jury constituted mainly of peasants.

It was never proved who the perpetrator was and

the length of time from Beilis's incarceration

to his exoneration was a travesty of justice.

There is no available evidence that suggested

Nicholas attempted to contravene the decision of

the jury.

One other point that must be considered

was Witte's opinion of Nicholas as contrasted with

his views of Alexander III. While Witte condemned

Nicholas he remarked on Alexander's policies as

"firm, but moderate and judicious."25 It was

Alexander III who retracted many of Alexander II's

Jewish reforms. During Alexander III's reign the

Jews started emigrating to the United States and

Palestine in vast numbers. Nicholas continued

his father's policy. Witte believed that Nicholas

pursued it with a vengeance. As Witte played a

strong part in the historical determination of

Nicholas and his policies this statement about

Alexander must be compared to Nicholas and a review

of Witte's opinion be examined.

As shown in this chapter, historians harshly

criticize Nicholas. While the interim years were

economically prosperous, Nicholas was portrayed

negatively as he struggled to retain his powers

and hedge the abilities of the Duma and his

ministers. However, parliamentary reform was

evolving if somewhat tentatively. Agricultural

reforms were instituted as were primary education

reforms, which. had received Nicholas's whole-hearted

approval. Unfortunately historians' consensus

of the period was that while change was occurring

it was not fast enough and the revolution was

inevitable, even though Lenin had stated in 1913

during the tercentenary of the Romanov rule that

he doubted he would live to see the revolution.

The revolutionaries did not consider the

inevitability of the revolution and historians

have too often overlooked this fact.

NOTES--CHAPTER III

1Alexander Kerensky, "Russia on the Eve of World War I," Russian Review 5 (1945), 10.

2John M. Thompson, Russia and the Soviet Union, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986), 184.

3 Kerensky, 10.

4sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), 115.

5 Serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia: Volume III The Duma Monarchy, 1907-1914, (Florida: Academic International Press, 1977), 63.

6David Mackenzie and Michael w. Curran, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1st ed., (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1977), 335.

7George Vernadsky, A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917: Volume 3: Alexander II to the February Revolution, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), 698.

8Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), 5.

9Neil B. Weissman, Reform in Tsarist Russia: The State Bureaucracy and Local Government,

1900-1914, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1981 ), 47.

10Mackenzie and Curran, 2nd ed., 1982, 4.

11 Serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia: Volume II: Years

of Change, 1900-1907, (Florida: International Press, 1977), p.

Academic 206.

63

12M k ' d C 1 t d 1977 · ac enz1e an urran, s e ., , 402.

13Roger Pethybridge editor, Witnesses to the Russian Revolution, (Secaucus, New Jersey: Citadel Press, 1964), 45.

1 4 Ibid. , 4 6 •

15w. Bruce Lincoln, In War's Dark Shadow: The Russians Before the Great War, (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1986), 325.

16Mary s. Conroy, Peter Arkad'evich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Tsarist Russia, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), 164.

17Ibid., 151.

18 Thompson, 185.

19sidney Harcave, Years of the Golden Cockerel, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 307.

20Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914, (London and New York: Praeger, 1952), 246.

21 . Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of

Russia, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 467.

22 Conroy, 28.

23seton-Watson, 243.

24serge Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, translated by Abraham Yarmolinsky, (Garden City,

New York and Toronto: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1921), 274.

25 rbid., 376.

CHAPTER IV

NICHOLAS' CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY

Historians and contemporaries are negative

about Nicholas' personality. Textbooks limit their

discussions of Nicholas to character assassinations

and the Rasputin phenomenon. Little attention

is devoted to examination of Nicholas' political

policies as regarded Nicholas' influence upon such.

Rather historians and contemporaries devoted

themselves to analysis of Nicholas' flaws and his

personal life. Further, as is most often the case,

examination of his diary and letters to his wife

are used to reenforce the negative perspective

of historians.

What is the standard view of Nicholas's

character? What do historians perceive as his

major flaw? Was Alexandra the dominant personality

66

in their marriage? What was Rasputin's role in

the lives of the imperial couple?

Nicholas' Personality

Historians, Thompson, Mackenzie and Curran,

Vernadsky, and Riasanovsky all agree that the word

which most adequately described Nicholas'

personality was "weak"~ "Nicholas was weak-willed

and irresolute," John M. Thompson stated in his

book, Russia and the Soviet Union. 1 Not only do

these historians use the word "weak", but Alan

Moorehead, Donald Treadgold, Michael T. Florinsky,

and even the most compassionate of all Nicholas'

critics, Robert K. Massie implied it with the

following observation: "It would be more accurate

to say that he was a man· of narrow, special

education; of strong and unfortunately-unchanging

conviction; of soft-spoken, kindlymanner, and,

2 underneath, of stubborn courage."

The standard descriptions of Nicholas are

so repetitive that historians accept automatically

the previous assessments of earlier historians.

67

"Easily influenced" are two words which are second

to weak in the analysis of Nicholas' personaLity.

The standard perception of Nicholas' character

is one of an inept, bumbling man, bordering on

idiocy, who ultimately caused his own downfall

and that of his country. This opinion has persisted

for the past seventy years with little or no

contradiction. Not only are historians critical

of his flaws, but so are his contemporaries. Witte

and Trotsky, who never met Nicholas, are two of

the most vehement in their denouncements of the

last tsar.

Witte, who credited Nicholas with the

establishment of the gold standard, used every

possible occasion to attack Nicholas in his memoirs:

"The Emperor's character may be said to be

essentially feminine. Someone has observed that

Nature granted him masculine attributes by

mistake." 3 Witte continued his diatribe with:

"He is incapable of playing fair and he always

seeks underhand means and underground ways. He

has a veritable passion for secret notes and

methods." 4 Witte stated he maintained his position

for eight years only because Nicholas

68

felt obligated to the memory of his dead father. 5

Leon Trotsky's analysis of Nicholas'

character was even more critical than that of Witte.

"Nicholas was not only unstable, but treacherous.

Flatterers called him a charmer, bewitcher, because

of his gentle way with the courtiers." 6 Trotsky

stated Nicholas despised anyone whom he believed

was his intellectual superior and therefore

surrounded. himself with "saintly fakirs, holy men,

to whom he did not have to look up. .. 7

William H. Chamberlin used Trotsky's and

Witte's assessments of Nicholas in his two volume

work on the Russian Revolution and went one step

further: "Nicholas II, whose personal misfortune

it was to rule in a period of wars and profound

social and economic changes, was less fit for the

role of an autocrat than any sovereign since the

mad Tsar Paul." 8 This criticism by one of the

earliest historians of the last tsarist regime

and the revolutions of 1917 has persisted and even

John M. Thompson stated in his bibliography that

Chamberlin's books should be considered a

cornerstone of any historical analysis of the

revolutions. 9

To a certain extent, Trotsky's opinion

must be discounted as his view point was obviously

biased. But Witte and another contemporary Paul

Miliukov have continued to influence historial

assessments of Nicholas' reign. Miliukov was

equally critical of Nicholas: "Nicholas II was

doubtlessly an honest person and a good family

man, but he was by nature extremely weak-willed." 10

Miliukov emphasized his point with the following

observation:

As often happens with weak-willed people--like Alexander I, for example--Nicholas was afraid of being influenced by a strong will. Struggling against such influence, he used the same means as Alexander I had used, the only 1 ~eans available to him--cunning and duplicity.

Miliukov, who didn't particularly like Witte,

remarked that it was the "tsar's weak will and

the tsarina's evil will" that caused the clashes

with Witte and the obstruction of Witte's

1. . 12

po J.CJ.es.

Apparently, there are no positive statements

of Nicholas. Historians seldom use them, except

for Robert K. Massie, whose books are utilized

by historians to project personal incidents of

7Q

Nicholas's life. Yet, there are contemporary

accounts which contradict the negative opinions

of historians and contemporaries. Sir Bernard

Pares was a personal observer of the events of

Nicholas' reign. He completely discredited

Trotsky's opinion with the following statement:

"The idea that he (Nicholas) was stupid, was a

sheer illusion confined to revolutionaries who

knew nothing about him." 13 Pares remarked that

the strongest attribute of Nicholas "was a

conquering personal charm which had for its basis

an innate delicacy of mind." 14

Unlike other historians, Pares viewed

Nicholas' correspondence with a more objective

attitude. This was particularly true of the letters

between Nicholas and his mother.

They (Nicholas and Marie's letters) present a more favourable picture of him than any other first-hand materials, with the exception of the admirable record of Count Kokovtsov, and show a good deal more judgement and resolur~on, than he was ordinarily credited with."

The one criticism Pares presented was that while

Nicholas was more open to "reasonable argument"

than his father, "the trouble was that he was so

71

much so that each new impression might efface the

1 t .. 16 as •

Like his correspondence, Nicholas's diary

received intense examination and through this

Nicholas is found wanting. All the standard

interpretations base their opinions of Nicholas

partially on his diary, which was succinct and

emotionless. It was a recording of his daily

activities, much like a current appointment book.

Little feeling or political opinion was recorded.

Alan Moorehead·supported Nicholas' diary with his

observation that Nicholas would undoubtedly never

have recorded what he did if he had known that

his diary would have been subjected to public

scrutiny. 17 Robert K. Massie compared Nicholas•

diary to that of his cousin, King George V of

England and noticed the similarity. However, where

Nicholas was condemned, George was admired. 18

Other contemporaries of Nicholas who viewed

him more favourably were Kokovtsov, Minister of

Finance from 1904-1914, Ambassador Buchanan,

Ambassador Paleologue, Mikhail Rodzianko, President

of the Fourth Duma, and French President Emile

Loubet. As Pares noted Kokovtsov was the most

72 ..

positive of all the recorders of Nicholas and his

reign. Kokovtsov believed that it was the tsar

who negotiated the successful peace at Portsmouth

rather than Witte. If not for the tsar's firm

stance, Witte would have submitted to the Japanese

demand for all of Sakhalin and an indemnity.

Further, Kokovtsov, like Pares, shed an

interesting light on the person~lity of Witte.

As Witte's successor to the post of Minister of

Finance, Kokovtsov recalled Witte's vindictiveness

and egotism. For instance, on the occassion of

a meeting of the ministers, Kokovtsov remembered

that one minister was absent and that one minister

suggested that another minister be present to give

his opinion. Kokovtsov recalled that Witte

remarked: "I am responsible for the government

and I do not see any need for inviting anyone.•• 19

This incident should incite historical revision

of the importance of Witte's memoirs as accurate

accounts of Nicholas's reign, particularly as Witte

contradicted himself on numerous occasions about

Nicholas' personality and his ability to show

gratitude.

'73

I knew him (Tsar) to be inexperienced in the extreme but rather intelligent and ••• he had always impressed me as a kindly and well bred youth. As a matter of fact, I.had rarely come across a ~0tter mannered young man than Nicholas II.

Another example of Witte's lack of accuracy was

in regard to Nicholas' inability to show gratitude.

Witte recorded in his memoirs Nicholas' rescript

to him on the tenth anniversary of Witte's position

as Minister of Finance:

Now with the lapse of a decade of your activity as Minister of Finances, I take pleasure in expressing my appreciation to you of all that you have done within the past eig~f years to justify my confidence as well.

Mikhail Rodzianko, President of the Fourth

Duma, recalled Nicholas positively in his book,

Reign of Rasputin: "There can be no doubt that

throughout his life he was filled with the most

genuine desire for the good and happiness of his

people." 22 Considering the tsar's attitude of

ignoring Rodzianko's advice, this evaluation of

the tsar was objective.

Ambassador Buchanan from Great Britain

had occasion to consult with the tsar and even

74

though the tsar often dismiSsed Buchanan, Buchanan

remarked in his memoirs:

I have not attempted to screen his fault~; but I have portrayed him as I knew him~-a lovable man, possessed of many good qualities, a true and loyal ally, having, in spite of all appearances to the 2~ntrary his country's true interests at heart.

Buchanan conferred upon Nicholas the greatest of

compliments--at least in his mind--when he observed

that Nicholas was possessed of all the qualities

which would have made him an admirable

constitutional monarch--"a quick intelligence,

a cultivated mind, method and industry in his work,

and an extraordinary natural charm that attracted

all who came near him." 24

Ambassador Paleologue of France was more

effusive than ·Buchanan in his memoirs. He recorded

Nicholas' statement after the dedication of the

ship Ismail in June of 1915: "I like nothing better

than to feel myself in touch with my people." 25

Paleologue emphasized, in May 1916, that the moujiks

still maintained their belief in their tsar, "which

explains the personal success Nicholas II is certain

of achieving whenever he goes among peasants,

soldiers, and workmen." 26

75

Serge Oldenburg, a Russian historian who

witnessed the events of Nicholas' reign and

published a two volume work in Belgrade in 1939,

utilized the opinion of the former French President

Emile Loubet which was published in the Viennese

newspaper "Neue Freie Presse:

The Russian Emperor carries out his own ideas. His proposals are ma~urely considered and thoroughly worked out, and he applies uninterrupted concentration to their realization. Beneath the Tsar's shy, some what delicate features is a powerful soul and a resolutely courageous heart. He know2 7 where he is going and what he wants to do.

Unfortunately historians do not use Oldenburg's

work. W. Bruce Lincoln utilized the untranslated

version in each of his works, The Romanovs, In

War's Dark Shadow, and Passage Through Armageddon,

but only to quote such things as Nicholas'

abdication manifesto, his uncertainty at assuming

the crown, and his oft quote statement to the

zemstvos which included the two words "senseless

dreams". Oldenburg's work was translated into

English in 1975 and subsequently published in four

volumes but still receives little historical

attention. It revolved totally a~ound Nicholas'

policies and his role as tsar rather than his

personal life.

The standard depiction of Nicholas as

weak-willed and irresolute is maintained

.76

in spite of the presented positive declaractions

of some historians and many contemporaries. Witte

retains his predominance as an accurate diarist

of the events of Nicholas' reign. Yet, Witte has

proven to be unstable in his personal evaluation

of the tsar and the accuracy with which he recounted

those events.

The most prominent of the contemporary

accounts was Pares. His estimable opinion provided

historical background of social, political, and

economic reforms which occurred during this era.

Yet, his opinion of Nicholas and his evaluation

of Nicholas' abilities are neglected. Rather he

is used to discuss the various political reforms

which occurred--Stolypin's Land Reforms, the zemstvo

reforms, and the Duma.

The second aspect of Nicholas' life which

dominated standard historical opinion was

Alexandra's role and her subsequent submission

to Rasputin's dictates and through her Rasputin's

77-

dominion over the Tsar. Rasputin merited more

attention from historians and biographers than

Nicholas. His capabilities as a healer are

analyzed time and again to determine his impact

at the court. His ascendancy in St. Petersburg

society was studied with curiosity that a dirty,

illiterate peasant could exude such influence over

the nobility and the imperial family. Finally,

historians attributed Rasputin with destroying

the empire by his promotion of incompetent statesmen

who supported him.

Nicholas and Alexandra

Historians credit Nicholas with being a

loving devoted father and husband. The control

group of historians all aknowledge this admirable

quality of Nicholas' character, but as Grand Duke

Alexander stated in his book, Once a Grand Duke:

He (Nicholas) worshipped the memory of his father he was a devoted husband, he believed in the inviolability of his sacred oath of office and he endeavored to remain honest, polite and unassuming till the very last day of his reign. It was not his fault that ironical history _turned each one of

these sterling virtues into a deadly weapon of destruction. It never dawned o28him that a ruler has no right to be human.

Riasanovsky best respresents the standard opinion

of the historians' views of this attribute of

Nicholas' character: "But these positive personal

traits mattered little in a situation that demanded

strength, determination, adaptability and vision." 29

Nicholas married Princess Alix of

Hesse-Darmstadt in 1894, shortly after his father's

death. It proved to be a passionate and loving

marriage until their death in 1918. From the

beginning, Alexandra as she was rechristened upon

conversion to the Orthodox faith, was unpopular.

The people did not like the dour unsmiling young

woman with the haughty expression. Further, she

came to Russia on the heels of the death of

Alexander III, which the peasants believed was

bad luck.

Alexandra had not had the time as had

Empress Marie to acclimatise to Russia. She knew

no Russian and had no idea how to adjust to the

frivolity of the Russian court. Raised by her

79

grandmother, Queen Victoria, the freedom of St.

Petersburg society shocked her. Alexander III

and his wife had tried to deter Nicholas from his

objective of marrying Alexandra because of her

deficiencies and her German background. As Witte

pronounced:

She might have been a good enough consort for a petty German prince, and she might have been harmless even as the Empress of Russia, were it not for the lamentable fact t~fit His Majesty has no will power at all.

But against all, Nicholas stood firm, and for better

or worse married Alexandra.

The early years of their marriage were

happy ones. They were denied a honeymoon as Nicholas

immediately had to assume his duties as head of

state. But they spent every free moment together

or until they moved to the Alexander Palace at

Tsarskoe Selo, with the Dowager Empress. This

close association with her mother-in-law instilled

some bitterness in Alexandra as it was Marie who

proved most influential during Nicholas' early

reign. Further, it was Marie who was regarded

as the leader of St. Petersburg society--a duty

80

which Alexandra happily relinquished, but nontheless

bitterly resented.

Today Alexandra would be the subject for

many psycho-evaluations. She lost her mother at

the age of . 31 SJ.X. Nicknamed Sunny, her personality

under went a change. She became removed and shy.

To hide these inadequacies she retreated behind

a stern facade which she only lowered with those

she loved. Raised in Victoria's court, she was

given a Puritan morality on the outside which was

belied by her rapturous description of her wedding

night in Nicholas' diary. 32 Nicholas and Alexandra,

from the available accounts, enjoyed a loving,

physical relationship which was immediately apparent

in her subsequent pregnancy just a couple of months

after their marriage. In two year intervals from

1895-1901, four daughter--Olga, Tatiana, Marie,

and Anastasia--were born. Each pregnancy was a

difficult one for Alexandra and added to this was

the disappointment that she had failed to produce

an heir.

Alexandra had turned enthusiastically to

her religion. Once a devoted Luth~ran, she

converted whole-heartedly to the Russian Orthodox

faith. The Orthodox rites satisfied an intense

need for Alexandra and she could not understand

the relaxed attitudes of her husband's family.

Further, as each pregnancy resulted in the birth

of a daughter, she turned more and more to

faith-healers who guaranteed her a son. In fact,

she experienced a fake pregnancy which emotionally

demoralized her.

In 1904, during the tensions of the

Russo-Japanese War, a son, Tsarevich Alexis named

for Nicholas's favorite ancestor, was born. The

joy of the imperial couple was boundless until

the discovery, six weeks after his birth, that

the heir had inherited from his mother the disease

of hemophilia. The knowledge that their son would

likely die before his eighteenth birthday must

have shattered the proud parents. Grand Duchess

Marie Pavlova observed in her book Education of

a Grand Duchess:

Nobody ever knew what emotions were aroused in them by this horrible certainty, but from that moment, troubled and apprehensive, the

82

Empress's character underwent a change, and her heal~~' physical as well as moral, altered.

During Nicholas' first ten years, Alexandra

restricted herself to offering advice only in

private, and it was limited even then. After the

birth of the Tsarevich her attention was focused

on him. Alexandra had committed her opinion of

Nicholas and his ministers in a letter to her

sister:

I feel that all who surround my husband are insincere and no one is doing his duty for Russia. They are all serving him for their career and personal advantage and I worry myself and cry for days on end, as I feel that my husband is very young and i~~xperienced of which they are taking advantage.

Although the standard historical

interpretation of Nicholas' domination by others

received harsh criticism, Count Witte believed

that the Dowager Empress was a positive influence. 35

However, as the Dowager Empress encouraged Nicholas

to adhere to Witte's advice at all times, it was

no wonder he felt this. His opinion of Alexandra

was understandable as he pronounced: "The extent

of Alexandra's influence upon her husband can hardly

be exaggerated. In many cases she actually directs

his actions as the head of the Empire." 36 Alexandra

disliked Witte because of his egotism and tendency

to bully her husband. Her dislike intensified

after the October Manifesto which she believed

Witte contrived in order that he might. achieve

personal grandeur.

Rasputin and Alexandra

Until the birth of Alexis, Alexandra

remained in the background. However in 1905, she

was introduced to a holy man, Rasputin. In 1911,

Rasputin forever established his dominion over

the empress when he supposedly saved the heir's

life. The imperial family were at their hunting

lodge in Spala, Poland when the tsarevich began

to hemmorage. It was such a severe attack that

telegrams were prepared to announce his death.

But Rasputin sent a telegram exhorting the empress

to calm herself, the child would not die, and not

to let the doctors bother him too much. For some

inexplicable reason, the boy began to recover.

Rasputin's place was assurred.

.8.4

Historians credited Alexandra with being

the true ruler during World War I. At the outbreak

of war in 1914, Nicholas hastened to Stavka, general

headquarters, and left Alexandra to be his advisor.

Alexandra had persistently excluded the large

Romanov family from contact with the tsar. In

their book, A History of Russia and the Soviet

Union, Mackenzie and Curran quoted the following:

"The characteristic features of the imperial

family," noted a trusted minister, "is their

inaccessibility to the outside world and their

t h f t . ' " 37 M k . d C a mosp ere o mys ~c~sm. ac enz~e an urran

blamed the empress for this isolation and the

ensuing chaos which erupted in the government after

Nicholas assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief.

Paul Miliukov observed: "I do not know

what the situation would have been, had there not

been near him (Nicholas) that other strong will,

a will to which he completely, though unconsciously,

subordinated himself: the will of his wife." 38

Historians made use of the imperial couples'

correspondence during the war years to illustrate

the Empresses domination of Nicholas. Alexandra

often exhorted Nicholas to be strong and to support

.85

39 Rasputin and his proteges. Further, as Rasputin

gained ascendancy over the Tsarina, ministers were

changed with rapidity. 40

This negative portrait of Alexandra and

her domination of Nicholas is the standard portrayal

written in all the texts. However, contemporary

accounts of Nicholas depict a different picture

of Rasputin's influence over the tsar.

Pares' analysis of Alexandra's personality

was more objective than historians' and

contemporaries.

The essence of her nature and of her intellect was that she was absolutely whole-hearted. She was an entirely good woman and entirely Victorian, which was one of the chief reasons of her unpopularity in the society of St. Petersb~fg--lightminded, unhealthy, and amoral.

This character assessment has received little

attention by historians or contemporaries of the

empress'. Further, while first-hand accounts denied

the extent of Rasputin's influence over the tsar,

they all agreed about his domination by the empress,

as Ambassador Buchanan recorded:

The role actually played by Rasputin at Court is still veiled in a good deal of mystery. His ascendancy over the Emperor

86

was not so absolute as that which he exercised over the Empress, and concerned questions of a religious i~ eccle~iastical kind rather than of policy.

Ambassador Paleologue substantiated Buchanan's

observation when he recorded in his diary that

Nicholas ordered Rasputin to leave St. Petersburg,

in July 1915. 43 But the evidence which most

conclusively negated standard historical opinion

are Nicholas' own letters to his wife. "The letters

reveal that though the empress sincerely regarded

Rasputin as a "man of God", and was prepared to

follow his advice, the emperor completely

disregarded that advice." 44 In letters to her

husband in April, June, and November, 1915, the

empress implored her husband, on the advice of

Rasputin whom she titled 'Our Friend', not to go

to Galicia, not to convene the State Duma, and

to launch an offensive at Riga. 45 Nicholas ignored

all of this advice. He seldom responded to the

Empress but did become irriratated: "'Our Friend's'

opinons of people are sometimes very strange, as

you know yourself:" or, "I beg, do not drag Our

Friend into this." 46 It was Rasputin who caused

the 'ministerial leapfrog' which continued

87

throughout the war. Backed by the Empress he

supported first one protegee and then another.

But Nicholas maintained firmness unless it was

a position upon which he happened to agree.

In fact it was noted by the Grand Duchess

Ma.ria Pavlova that the tsar "seemed more animated

than usual and more gay," after the death of

R t. 47 aspu 1n. In fact Nicholas did nothing more

to Rasputin's murderers than send Grand Duke Dmitry

to the Crimea, and Prince Felix Yussupov to his

estates, even though the empress had begged him

to deal harshly with the perpetrators. "Rasputin's

political influence, therefore, was a myth, but

a harmful one which spread sedition among the people

and sowed confusion among monarchists." 48

Unfortunately, it was Rasputin's

domination of the empress which caused the most

critical historical interpretations, and even the

positive accounts of Nicholas' strength do not

erase this.

Union, 164.

NOTES--CHAPTER IV

1John M. Thompson, Russia and the Soviet (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986),

2Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), 66.

3serge Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, translated by Abraham Yarmolinsky, (Garden City, New York and Toronto: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1921), 182.

4Ibid., 183.

5Ibid., 41.

6 Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution, selected and edited by F. W. Dupee from The History of the Russian Revolution, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), 53.

7Ibid.

8william Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 1917-1918, volume one, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1971 ), 67.

9John M. Thompson, Revolutionary Russia, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), 189.

10Paul Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), 117.

11 Ibid.

12Ibid., 57.

89

13sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), 52.

14Ibid. I 31.

15Ibid., 15.

16Ibid. I 56.

17Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), 1 8.

1 8Massie, 1 7.

1 9 . Witte, 85.

20Massie, 109.

21 witte, 79.

22Mikhail V. Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1922), xiii.

23sir George Buchanan, My two volumes in one, (New York: the New York Times, 1970), x.

24 Ibid. I 77.

Mission to Russia, Arno Press and

25Maurice Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, volume two, (New York: George H. Doran, 1920), 1 9.

26Ibid., 266.

27 . Serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: The Duma Monarchy, 1907-1914, volume III, (Florida: Academic International Press, 1977), 67.

28 Grand Duke Alexander, Once A Grand Duke, (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1932), 176.

90

29 . Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia,

3rd ed, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 438.

30witte, 195.

31M . ass~e, 30.

32Ibid., 47.

33Grand Duchess Marie of Russia, Education of a Princess: A Memoir, (New York: the Viking Press, 1930), 61.

34Harrison E. Salisbury, Black Night, White Snow, (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1977), 63.

35witte, 196.

36Ibid., 1.98.

37David Mackenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union, (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1982), 452.

38M"l" k ~ ~u ov, 11 8.

39M k . d C 453 ac enz~e an urran, p. •

40 Ibid.

41 Pares, 131 •

42 Buchanan, 243.

43 Paleologue, 35.

44 Serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: The World War, 1914-1918, volume four, (Florida: Academic International Press, 1978), 67.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47Grand Duchess Marie, 257.

48 Oldenburg, volume 4, 69.

91

CHA~TER V

CONCLUSION

In February 1917 (Old Style), demonstrations

broke out in St. Petersburg. For the next few

days more and more workers joined and Nicholas

was urged by the Duma to prevent a full-scale

uprising. However, Nicholas disregarded the urgency

and concentrated on the war effort at the front.

The situation grew and troops fired on the

protesters and then proceeded to throw down their

arms and join them. On March 2, 1917 (Old Style)

Nicholas II abdicated for himself and his son in

favor of his brother Michael who in turn renounced

the throne. The three hundred year old Romanov

dynasty ended.

The Provisional government headed at first

by Prince Lvov arrested Nicholas and placed him

and his family under house arrest at Tsarskoe Selo

93

until safe passage could be arranged for them to

England. When this was not forthcoming the

government sent them to Tobolsk, Siberia.

After the overthrow of the Provisional

government in October 1917 (Old Style), Nicholas

and his family and three retainers were sent to

Ekaterinburg in May of 1918. In the early morning

hours of July 16, 1918, the entire family was shot

in the cellar of Ipatiev House in Ekaterinburg.

So ended the life of the last Romanov tsar.

Historians are the most compassionate about

Nicholas when describing his death. Mackenzie

and Curran and Vernadsky use the word "murder".

Edward Crankshaw was the most graphic in his

description of the ex-tsar•s death in his book,

The Shadow of the Winter Palace:

One's memories are dragged again and again to that dreadful cellar at Ekaterinburg (Sverd­lovsk) in the Urals, where Nicholas himself, the Tsaritsa, the four nice girls, and their brave and cheerful little hemophiliac brother were murdered by the Bolsheviks with a brutality which seemed to be a barbaric aberration, but which turned out to be prophetic. The courage to die well, however, 1 was not enough to make Nicholas a good ruler.

94

Crankshaw detested the murder of the imperial family

but emphasized no matter how Nicholas died he was

not a competent ruler. Historian Serge Oldenburg

was more passionate in his defense of the last

tsar: "Exit Czar. Deliver him and all he loved

to wounds and death. Belittle his efforts, asperse

his conduct, insult his memory; but pause then

to tell us who else was found capable." 2

This statement by Oldenburg indicted other

members of the government. If Nicholas was guilty

then so were others. Oldenburg reiterated this

with the following:

History inexorably summons to the bar the leader of the nation. Though the issue may be decided by the exertions of legions 'to the supreme responsible authority belongs the blame or credit for the result.' Why should this sterm test be denied to Nicholas II? ••• Should he reap no honour for decisions ma~e 'at the summit wher3 all problems are reduced to Yea or Nay?'"

Winston S. Churchill recorded: "It can

never be proved that a three-quarters Czar or half-

Czar and the rest a Parliament, could in such a

period have commanded anything at all." 4 This

is an ambiguous statement about Nicholas, but it

does illuminate the point Nicholas was not totally

95

to blame for his country's predicament or his own.

Contemporaries of Nicholas, Grand Duke

Alexander in particular, place the blame for the

fall of imperial Russia on other factrirs than

Nicholas. "The French, the British, the Germans,

the Austrians--they were all alike in their

perennial efforts to turn Russia into a weapon

for their egotistical combats." 5 Alexander continued

to expand on this by stating it was the

intelligentsia and members of the court who were

responsible for destroying imperial Russia. 6

Historian W. Bruce Lincoln in The Romanovs

acknowledged the power which Russia attained but

stated: "The utopia envisioned by the men who

had succeeded the Romanovs remained elusive and

unrealized." 7

As shown in the preceeding chapters,. the

brutality of Nicholas' death did not change the

historians opinions of his capabilities. If

anything they have all emphasized if Nicholas had

been firm or more liberal then it was unlikely

he would have abdicated. John M. Thompson did

not believe revolution was inevitable before 1914,

96

but the war aggravated unresolved social, economic

and political problems. Riasanovsky emphasized

revolution was coming in spite of the reforms

initiated by the tsarist administration.

Each of the historians in our control group

have varied in degrees from harsh to compassionate

in their opinions of Nicholas. They acknowledge

the attempts of the tsarist government to rectify

the country's problems, but with restraint--always

mentioning that it was never enough and progress

was too slow to satisfy the majority of the people.

This is the picture that high school students and

some college students are presented--Russia was

ripe for a revolution because its system was too

corrupt and cumbersome to accomodate the needs

of the people.

Each chapter attempted to present a modified

portrait of Nicholas with regard to certain aspects

of his reign. The inaccessibility of government

documents during this period makes it difficult

to present a thorough view of Nicholas and the

success or failure of his policies. Without these

no definitive biography of Nicholas is possible.The

97

traditional interpretation of Nicholas and his

reign as presented by our control group of four

historians has been perpetuated for over seventy

years. Recent monographs, such as Neil B.

Weissman•s book, question such dogmatic opinions.

Certain policies are presented accurately as there

is no available source to contradict these views.

This is true of Nicholas and his feelings for the

ethnic minorities--particularly the Jews.

As shown, Nicholas does deserve some credit

for the successful policies as well as the

unsuccessful ones. Witte and Stolypin are acclaimed

for their brilliance and foresight in determining

the trouble spots and carrying out innovative

policies to rectify them. However, Nicholas is

not credited with agreeing to such measures, rather

the term used is 11 tsarist government or

administration... As autocrat, Nicholas receives

total blame for the failures, but the historians

neglect to credit him with the successes. He did

have a voice in the implementation of Witte•s

industrialization program, the Factory Act of 1897,

the Treaty of Portsmouth, and Stolypin 1 s Land

98

Reforms. Without his approval, and in the case

of the Treaty his determination, none of the

measures could have been implemented.

In addition to the standard historical

interpretations represented by our control group,

Robert K. Massie and historians w. Bruce Lincoln

have influenced students' perceptions of Nicholas.

As stated, Massie's book was the basis for the

film, "Nicholas and Alexandra", and this film is

used in area schools as a supplemental source for

the study of the tsarist era. Massie portrayed

Nicholas sympathetically, but a man dominated by

an hysterical wife who was in turn subservient

to a depraved self-annointed holy man. Further,

one scene in the movie leaves the impression that

Alexandra and Rasputin were lovers. And as earlier

stated this is a common question among students.

W. Bruce Lincoln is a prestigious historian

and his three books, The Romanovs, In War's Dark

Shadow, and Passage Through Armageddon, have all

received critical acclaim. But as shown he aligns

himself with Nicholas' harshest detractors even

though he credits the measure of progress the

tsarist administration achieved.

99

There are many areas of the last tsarist

administration which need to be investigated.

Robert K. Massie and Serge Oldenburg are the only

two who have ever done a work devoted to Nicholas.

However, Massie's is based on the premise that

if one small boy had not been a hemophiliac perhaps

none of the seceeding events would have occurred.

Massie's own son is a hemophiliac.

Serge Oldenburg published his book in 1939,

yet it receives little attention from historians.

The work is available in a four volume English

translation, but is either ignored or totally

unknown to historians. In the introduction to

the first volume of Oldenburg's work, editor Patrick

J. Rollins observed: "The real emperor, according

to Oldenburg, was a strong-willed, independent

minded monarch who personally dirested Russia's

foreign and domestic policies and who took counsel

only with himself." 8 But for some obscure reason,

Oldenburg's work is used primarily--best exemplified

by W. Bruce Lincoln--to recount Nicholas' fears

100

at his succession to the throne, his 'senseless

dreams' speech to the zemstvos which historians

have emphasized as best portraying Nicholas'

personality, and his Abdication Manifesto which

is available in almost all collections of documents

of the era.

The other source most often used to judge

Nicholas is his diary. It is brief, unemotionless,

and used to record his daily activities.

Alexandra's entries are the most passionate.

Nicholas did not discuss political matters. Critics

describe the diary as shallow and an example of

the inept, uncaring man who was Autocrat of all

the Russias

Nicholas' correspondence with his wife

and mother proves to contradict the negative

opinions of traditional historical opinion.

Nicholas' insight is most apparent in examination

of his letters to his mother, particularly at the

time of the 1905 Revolution. As shown, during

the war, his letters were brief but adamant in

insisting Alexandra not involve Rasputin in

governmental affairs.

1 01

Nicholas is a tragic figure. He was a

kind man who attempted to do the best he could

for his country. His death attracts more historical

attention than his capabilities. In fact on April

13, 1989, "The Denver Post" published an article

that shed new light on Soviet interpretations of

the imperial family's murder. "Contradicting

official Soviet history, a Soviet writer says the

execution of the last Russian czar, Nicholas II,

and his family was ordered by the Bolshevik

government with Vladimir Lenin present." 9

Historians have stated Nicholas would have

made an exemplary constitutional monarch, but that

would have been an insult to Nicholas as he did

not approve of parliaments or constitutions. He

was a firm believer in the patriarchal society

and prided himself on his devotion to the peasantry

whom he regarded as the true Russians.

This paper attempted to present a balanced

portrait of Nicholas by utilizing standard

interpretations against contemporary accounts.

By doing so, it has emphasized that t~ere are

definite areas of Nicholas' reign which need

102

reexamination and must not be perpetuated in the

standard negative attitude.

NOTES--CHAPTER V

1 Edward Crankshaw, The Shadow of the Winter Palace, {New York: Viking Press, 1976), 305.

2 Serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia: Volume IV: The World War, 1914-1918, (Florida: Academic International Press, 1978), 161.

3Ibid., 159.

4Ibid., 99.

5Grand Duke Alexander, Once a Grand Duke, {New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1932), 69.

6Ibid., 197.

7w. Bruce Lincoln, The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the Russias, {New York: The Dial Press, 1981), 749.

8serge Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: ~I~I~,--~H~i~s--~R~e~l~·~g~n~~a~n~d~~H~i~s~~R~u~s~s~i~a: Volume Autocracy, · 1894-1900. {Florida: International Press, 1975), xxvii.

Nicholas I: The

Academic

9"Lenin approved czar's execution, new account says," "The Denver Post", April 13, 1989, 6A.

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