BLUE JAY MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY MANUSCRIPT …1990; Uleman 1987; Winter and Uleman 1984; Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff 1985). Therefore, independent of the ability to monitor the

This document is part of a JCR Manuscript Review History. It should be used for educational purposes only.

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BLUE JAY MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY

MANUSCRIPT (ROUND 3)

Abstract

Consumers often find themselves in situations where they are tempted to lie in order to obtain

otherwise unattainable material rewards or financial benefits (e.g. when refunding or exchanging

a product, qualifying for discounts and promotions, negotiating with a salesperson etc.). This

research examines how lying during an interaction with a service provider influences the

consumer’s satisfaction with the outcome obtained. Across six studies we demonstrate that

because lying interferes with the ability to use diagnostic cues to update outcome expectations,

liars are less prepared for the final outcome. This reduced outcome preparedness in turn, leads to

more polarized satisfaction judgments. Our results suggest that lying may not only have financial

ramifications, but that there are also evaluative consequences.


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People lie everyday. By the time an individual reaches 60 years of age, he or she will have

told an average of 88,000 lies (Norman 2008). Although the majority of lies are told to facilitate

social relationships (DePaulo and Kashy 1998), such as a disappointed gift recipient exclaiming

that the gift was perfect, lies are also told to acquire something that would otherwise be

unobtainable such as a child telling his mother that his father said it was OK to have another

cookie. Consumers also tell lies. They lie to other consumers to manage self-impressions and

attain psychic rewards (Argo, White, and Dahl 2006; Sengupta, Dahl, and Gorn 2002), they tell

white lies to be polite (Argo and Shiv forthcoming), they fake their emotional state to gain a

strategic advantage (Andrade and Ho 2009), and they misrepresent information to marketers in

pursuit of material rewards. And why not? The marketplace provides ample opportunities for

consumers to lie in order to gain better outcomes and financial benefits. For example, the

temptation to withhold or distort information may be particularly attractive to consumers when

making warranty and insurance claims (“Someone hit my car in the parking lot”), refunding and

exchanging products (“No, I didn’t drop the toaster”), qualifying for discounts or promotions

(“That was the worst meal ever, so can I get that free dessert your promised now?”), or when

negotiating with a salesperson (“I saw a much better deal online, will you match it?”).

When consumers tell lies to gain an advantage, they may end up better off financially, but

the transgression may also have consequences for their satisfaction with the obtained outcome.

To illustrate, consider the case of a consumer seeking a refund, knowing the reason for returning

the product falls outside of the refund policy, but wanting the refund anyway. Does the consumer

keep the unwanted product or lie about why a refund is requested? If the lie is believed, how will

this influence the consumer’s satisfaction with the outcome obtained? This research examines

how consumers’ satisfaction with the obtained outcome is affected by providing misleading

information during a social interaction with a service provider. We hypothesize that lying for

material gain will have a polarizing effect on consumers’ satisfaction evaluations, such that liars

will be more satisfied than truth tellers following a successful outcome and more dissatisfied than

truth tellers following an unsuccessful outcome. We assert that because executing a lie is

cognitively taxing, liars will be unable to use outcome relevant cues presented during the

exchange to update their outcome expectations, leaving them less prepared for the final outcome.

The lack of outcome preparedness will result in more polarized satisfaction evaluations.

In the next section, we first explore the link between lying and updating interference. We

then discuss the consequences of reduced outcome preparedness on outcome satisfaction

evaluations. Finally, the research paradigms are outlined, before presenting six studies in support

of our hypotheses. We find our effects to be robust and generalizable across a range of contexts,

including fabrications requiring a simple affirmation to a prompted question and more complex

lies involving the construction of a false narrative of an event. We also show our findings to be

consistent across the degree of perceived responsibility, by examining both instructed lies, where

participants are explicitly asked to provide false information and uninstructed lies where

participants choose to communicate false information.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES

Research investigating the motivations to lie has received increasing attention in the

consumer behavior literature. Consumers have been shown to lie to benefit social relationships

(Argo and Shiv forthcoming) and to obtain psychic benefits such as avoiding the embarrassment

or disapproval following an otherwise unfavorable admission (Argo et al. 2006; Sengupta et al.

2002).


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Consumers may also be motivated to lie in pursuit of material rewards if the financial benefits are

offset by the perceived psychological costs involved. For example, previous research has found

that people operate within a band of acceptable dishonesty which allows them to benefit

externally from lying, while maintaining a positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008).

Consistent with this idea, Andrade and Ho (2009) found that consumers deliberately exaggerated

their expressed anger in a strategic attempt to improve their outcome during a negotiation.

Additionally, Andrade and Ho (2009) found that consumers appeared to be quite comfortable

faking their emotions for purely financial reasons. Hence, when there is a desirable outcome at

stake, lying is a strategy open to consumers.

In this research we focus on the latter of these two types of motivations to lie.

Specifically, we examine lying as a strategic and deliberate tactic used to gain a better material

reward during a service encounter. While previous research has focused on the affective

consequences of deception, including detection apprehension (Ekman and Frank 1993), the

increased psychological distress experienced while lying (Ekman 1992), and subsequent feelings

of guilt about one’s immoral actions or shame if the misdeed is revealed to others (Ekman 1992;

Vrij 2000) there are also unique cognitive consequences associated with executing a lie

(Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal 1981). Building on the cognitive framework of deception,

in the next section, we present support for our argument that because executing a lie is more

cognitively demanding than telling the truth, liars are less able to use diagnostic cues provided

during the interaction to update their outcome expectations. We propose that this reduced

outcome preparedness will result in evaluative polarization in response to the outcome obtained.

Lying During an Interpersonal Exchange and Updating Interference

Telling a lie is not easy. Several theoretical perspectives support the assertion that

executing a lie is more cognitively taxing than telling the truth (Buller and Burgoon 1996;

DePaulo et al. 1996; DePaulo, LeMay, and Epstein 1991; DePaulo et al. 2003; Ekman and

Friesen 1969; Lane and Wegner 1995; Mohamed et al. 2006; Vrij et al. 2006, 2008; Vrij et al.

2010; Walczyk et al. 2003; Zuckerman et al. 1981). After all, the liar must craft and communicate

a plausible message while actively concealing the truth. Both of these activities are a drain on

mental resources (DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter 1985; Mohamed et al. 2006; Vrij 2008; Walczyk

et al. 2003). The strain on cognitive resources is even greater under conditions when liars are

highly motivated to succeed (DePaulo and Kirkendol 1989; DePaulo et al. 1991). Previous

research demonstrates that in high-stake situations where an individual stands to gain or lose a

substantial positive reward by telling a lie, the strategy requires considerable cognitive effort to

successfully execute the deception (Ekman and O'Sullivan 1991; Frank and Ekman 1997, 2004).

The difficulty of deceiving in such high-stake situations is further compounded by the fact that

the liar must concurrently manage the consistency of the information communicated while

appearing ‘credible’ to the listener who will ultimately determine the fate of their outcome

(Porter and ten Brinke 2010; Vrij and Mann 2001).

Given that individuals are focused on successfully executing the lie in pursuit of a desired

outcome, it follows that fewer attentional resources will be available for other tasks (Ellis and

Ashbrook 1989). To this effect, previous research outside the domain of lying demonstrates that

without sufficient cognitive resources, people busy with regulatory functions process incoming

information less systematically (Gilbert and Krull 1988; Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull 1988;

Richards and Gross 1999), perform less successfully on concurrent cognitive tasks (Kanfer and


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Stevenson 1985), and are less able to attend to other information in the environment, as

evidenced by poorer memory for the behavior of others (Bond and Omar 1990; Brenner 1973;

Lord and Saenz 1985; Saenz and Lord 1989; Swann, Pelham, and Roberts 1987). Additionally,

Richards and Gross (1999, 2000) found that fewer available cognitive resources, not only

impaired monitoring of the external environment, but reduced the ability to update existing

mental representations on the basis of new information.

In the context of lying, fewer available cognitive resources may reduce the liar’s ability to

notice the target’s reactions to the deceptive message (Butterworth 1978). Noting the listener’s

reaction is critical to the updating process we propose, because the reaction may provide

important information regarding the likelihood of attaining a successful outcome. Providing some

preliminary support for this idea, Butler and colleagues (2003) found that participants instructed

to deliberately conceal their true feelings during a conversation with an exchange partner were

more distracted and less responsive, and therefore, unable to complete the basic processes

required for conversational maintenance. Additionally, DePaulo et. al (2003), found evidence of

reduced immediacy and involvement during deceptive conversation, suggesting that liars are not

particularly adept at recognizing or responding to cues offered by the target.

Even if liars are able to attend to cues sent by the receiver, they may fail to use the

information to update their outcome expectations as they lack the necessary attentional resources

required for correcting and refining their original evaluations. This assertion is based on previous

research demonstrating that cognitive demands during a social interaction damage the ability to

use situational information in an updating process, even if it has successfully been garnered from

the environment (Bassili and Smith 1986; Butler et al. 2003; Gilbert, Jones, and Pelham 1987;

Gilbert and Osborne 1989; Gilbert et al. 1988; Lieberman and Rosenthal 2001; Lupfer, Clark,

and Hutcherson 1990; Osborne and Gilbert 1992; Quattrone 1982; Uleman 1987). According to

Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988), cognitive busyness largely impairs efforts at evaluative

correction because correction demands significant attention and the conscious weighing and

integration of environmental information (Baron 1988; Bassili and Smith 1986; Lupfer et al.

1990; Uleman 1987; Winter and Uleman 1984; Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff 1985). Therefore,

independent of the ability to monitor the environment for outcome relevant cues, cognitive

busyness prohibits the updating process. In summary, previous research supports our proposition

that the reduction in cognitive resources associated with lying reduces the ability to sufficiently

update outcome expectations. We propose that this updating interference will leave the liar

unprepared for the impending outcome.

Reduced Outcome Preparedness and Evaluative Polarization

When a consumer’s outcome expectations have not been sufficiently updated, the

consumer will obviously be less prepared for the impending outcome. The consequence of this

lack of outcome preparedness is that the obtained outcome will appear more surprising (Fisk

2002; Teigen and Keren 2003). Furthermore, the more unprepared an individual is for an

outcome, the stronger the emotional response to the outcome obtained resulting in more favorable

(unfavorable) evaluations of positive (negative) surprising outcomes compared to expected

outcomes (Elster 1998; Kahneman and Miller 1986). This hedonic amplification has been

demonstrated across a variety of economic and psychological domains, including emotional

reactions to the outcomes of monetary gambles (Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; Mellers et

al. 1997), medical tests (Shepperd and McNulty 2002), academic grades (Mellers and McGraw

2001; Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, and Van der Pligt 2003), unexpected Olympic outcomes (McGraw,


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Mellers, and Tetlock 2005) and unanticipated dieting and pregnancy results (Mellers and

McGraw 2001). Consumer researchers have also documented similar polarization effects in

response to unexpected store coupons (Heilman, Nakamoto, and Rao 2002), unexpected

advertising claims (Lee 2000) and unexpected product or service performance (Berman 2005;

Chitturi, Raghunathan, and Mahajan 2008; Oliver, Rust, and Varki 1997).

Building on these findings, we argue that lying will result in polarized satisfaction

judgments to the outcome obtained. Specifically, we propose that because executing a lie

consumes cognitive resources, liars will not have the opportunity to update their outcome

expectations using cues provided by the listener (in this case the service provider) during the

exchange. Consequently, liars will be less prepared for the outcome which, in turn, will result in

more polarized satisfaction responses to the outcome obtained. Liars’ satisfaction judgments

should be more favorable than truth tellers following a successful outcome, and more unfavorable

than truth tellers following an unsuccessful outcome.

THE CURRENT RESEARCH

We test the proposed polarization effect and the underlying process across six studies.

First, we demonstrate the polarization effect after lying to a service provider during an online

negotiation (study 1), during a persuasive attempt to refund a product (studies 2, 3), in a bid to

secure an otherwise unattainable product (studies 4, 5), and during a variety of everyday service

exchanges (study 6). We demonstrate the robustness of the effect by examining both simple lies

and more complex lies, and extend the generalizability of our findings by investigating both

instructed lies (studies 1-3) and uninstructed lies (studies 4-6). Second, the studies test our

proposed underlying mechanism. We manipulate the requirement to update outcome expectations

to provide direct evidence of liar’s reduced ability to correct their initial outcome expectations

based on incongruent feedback provided during the exchange (study 3). We examine the

mediating role of outcome preparedness by measuring participants’ extent of surprise with the

obtained outcome (studies 2, 5, 6). Additionally, we provide insight into liars reduced outcome

focus (and increased strategy focus) while communicating their message (study 4). Finally, we

rule out alternative explanations that elevated physiological arousal, perceived responsibility,

duping delight, and perceived norm violation by the liar could account for the polarization effect

observed. Refer to figure 1.

Insert figure 1 about here

STUDY 1: THE LYING POLARIZATION EFFECT

Study 1 provides an initial demonstration of the proposed lying polarization effect. We

tested our hypothesis using a negotiation paradigm where we manipulated the favorability of

competitor offers to encourage either lying or truth telling. Participants lied by claiming that a

competitor was currently offering a better deal, although the offer was expired. We also

manipulated the outcome such that half of the participants received a deal, while the other half of

participants did not. We predicted a message strategy by outcome interaction, such that liars

would report more polarized satisfaction ratings in response to the outcome obtained.


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Method

Participants and Design. One hundred and forty two university students participated in

the study in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four

conditions of a 2 (message strategy: truth, lie) × 2 (outcome: deal, impasse) between-subjects

design.

Procedure. Upon arrival, participants were informed that they would be negotiating a

package deal for a cellular phone on the basis of price, warranty duration, and free messaging,

and that a successful negotiation outcome would be rewarded with tickets for a cash prize draw.

Participants were told that they would be negotiating with another student (acting as the service

provider) via an interactive messaging system. A payoff chart was provided with information on

the number of prize draw tickets to be awarded for different combinations of accepted offers.

Therefore, participants were motivated to negotiate a package deal associated with the highest

number of tickets to maximize their chances of winning the prize draw. The highest combination

of offers yielded a payoff of 450 tickets. To encourage lying or truth telling, participants were

provided with competitor information to use during the negotiation. Participants were informed

that the salesperson would endeavor to match currently available competitor offers, but did not

have access to the competitor information provided. Participants in the truth (lie) condition

received three currently available favorable (unfavorable) competitor offers and three expired

unfavorable (favorable) competitor offers. The favorable competitor offers had low prices, long

warranty periods and free messaging and yielded a payoff of 400-425 tickets, whereas the

unfavorable competitor offers had high prices, short warranty periods and no free messaging and

yielded a payoff of 25-40 tickets. Therefore, there was little incentive to lie in the truth condition

as participants were in a strong bargaining position, but there was a strong incentive to deceive in

the lying conditions because the currently available competitor offers were unfavorable. We note

also, that it was important to leave a small margin between the best competitor offer and the best

payoff combination possible to ensure that truth tellers were aware that they had told the truth,

not just clamed the highest offer on the payoff chart.

The negotiation commenced with the salesperson asking the consumer to make an offer.

During the negotiation the service provider asked the consumer “What’s the best competitor offer

you’ve seen?” to provide an opportunity to lie or tell the truth and “Is this deal currently

offered?” to confirm the message strategy. After several rounds of negotiation including

questions and feedback from the salesperson, the outcome of the negotiation was manipulated as

a deal or an impasse. In the deal condition, a competitive offer was matched and participants

were notified of the number of tickets they had earned for the prize draw. In the impasse

condition, a competitive offer was not matched and participants were notified that they had failed

to earn any tickets for the prize draw. After the negotiation task, participants indicated their

extent of satisfaction (0 = not at all satisfied, 100 = very satisfied) and happiness with the final

outcome (0 = not at all happy, 100 = very happy). These measures were highly correlated and

combined to form an overall measure of outcome satisfaction (r = .82, p <.001; a = .90).

Participants were subsequently thanked and debriefed.

Results

Compliance. In the lie condition 78% of participants falsely claimed that a favorable yet

expired competitor offer was not expired (the remaining 22% were non-compliers as they


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truthfully used an unfavorable offer), and in the truth condition 76% of participants accurately

confirmed that a favorable competitor offer was currently available (the remaining 24% were

non-compliers as they falsely claimed that a competitor was offering an even more favorable

deal). The compliance rate is higher than previous studies in which deception is an unsanctioned

independent variable or dependent variable (Aquino and Becker 2005; O'Connor and Carnevale

1997; Schweitzer and Croson 1999). Non-compliers were excluded from the analysis,

additionally six participants were omitted from the sample; three experienced computer problems

and three did not follow instructions. Therefore, 105 participants were included in the analysis.

Outcome Satisfaction. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for outcome (F(1,

101) = 265.77, p < .001) indicating that participants in the deal condition (M = 75.77) felt more

satisfied than participants in the impasse condition (M = 20.76). As hypothesized, the results also

revealed a significant message strategy × outcome interaction (F(1, 101) = 8.93, p < .005).

Planned contrasts indicated that liars felt more satisfied than truth tellers following a deal (Mlie =

81.02 vs. Mtruth = 70.52; F(1, 101) = 4.99, p <.05) and less satisfied than truth tellers following an

impasse (Mlie = 15.93 vs. Mtruth = 25.60; F(1, 101) = 3.97, p < .05). Refer to figure 2.


Discussion

Study 1 provides an initial demonstration of the lying polarization effect. Liars reported

more extreme satisfaction judgments in response to the obtained outcome compared to truth

tellers. We assume that, truth tellers used the cues provided during the negotiation to update their

outcome expectations regarding the final outcome. Liars, on the other hand, busy executing the

lie, insufficiently updated their outcome expectations on the basis of the feedback cues provided,

resulting in polarized evaluations. However, we have not provided evidence of the informational

value of the feedback cues provided by the salesperson. Therefore, a follow-up study (n = 49)

was conducted to examine the diagnosticity of the feedback provided to consumers during the

negotiation task and the ability to update outcome expectations of the basis of this information.

Participants were provided with the standardized feedback within one of the transcripts of the

interaction between the consumer and the salesperson in study 1 without knowledge of the final

outcome. Participants rated the likelihood that the consumer would obtain a deal at three points

in the negotiation (beginning, middle and end). A mixed ANOVA with undisclosed outcome

(impending deal, impending impasse) as a between-subjects factor, and outcome expectancy at

each time period (time 1, time 2, time 3) as a repeated measure revealed a significant interaction

(F(2, 94) = 13.49 p < .001). Follow-up simple effects analyses confirmed that in the impending

deal condition, participants expectations that the consumer would obtain a deal incrementally

increased over time (Mtime1 = 43.92 vs. Mtime3 = 64.64, F(2, 46) = 7.72, p < .001). In the

impending impasse condition, participants expectations that the consumer would obtain a deal

progressively decreased over the course of the conversation (Mtime1 = 43.17 vs. Mtime3 = 29.58,

F(2, 46) = 4.60, p < .05). The results confirm that the feedback from the salesperson provided

diagnostic information regarding the impending outcome.

STUDY 2: THE MEDIATING ROLE OF OUTCOME PREPAREDNESS


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Study 1 demonstrated the polarizing effect of lying on consumers’ outcome satisfaction

judgments when the lie was a simple affirmation to a prompted question. In study 2, we

examined whether the polarization effect would occur when an elaborate falsification of a

situation was required. We also sought to provide evidence of the mediating role of outcome

preparedness underlying the polarization effect. In the current study consumers were explicitly

instructed to lie or tell the truth to a service provider in pursuit of a refund. Furthermore, to

enhance convergent validity, the lie was orally communicated to the service provider.

Method

Participants and Design. Eighty university students participated in the study in exchange

for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (message

strategy: truth, lie) × 2 (outcome: refund, no refund) between-subjects design. Two of the

participants experienced technical difficulties with the audio equipment and were removed from

the sample. Therefore, 78 participants were included in the analysis.

Procedure. When participants arrived to the laboratory they learned that they would

receive a free gift for their participation in the study. Participants’ first task was to choose their

desired gift from an assortment of products. The gifts comprised a variety of food products

including fruits and branded chocolate bars and chips. Store branded canned vegetables, relish

and pasta were also included in the product set to provide sufficient variation in the desirability of

the gifts available. In the process of selecting the gift, participants narrowed down the set of

choices in five stages. Participants were asked to choose between: 1] a large and small assortment

size, 2] prices from a grocery store or a convenience store, 3] recent or older ratings of the

products, 4] adding a new product to the choice set or not, and 5] identifying their most preferred

product. During each decision round, participants eliminated their least preferred option(s). In the

final round, participants ranked their remaining options in terms of favorability.

After participants indicated their favorite product, they were notified that the product was

out of stock, and were offered one of the options they had eliminated in the first round instead.

After a short delay, participants were informed that their favorite option had become available.

However, to be eligible to receive their preferred gift they had to convince a service provider –

who was unaware of the decisions they had made during the selection process – that they had

made a decision consistent with the terms of the refund policy (i.e. the selection or non-selection

of an additional product, #4 above). If a participant asked for an additional product during the

selection process, in the truth condition they were informed that this decision was consistent with

the refund policy, therefore, they needed to convince the service provider of their decision. In the

lie condition, participants were told that this decision was inconsistent with the refund policy and

that they needed to convince the service provider that they did ask for an addition to the choice

set. All participants communicated the message as instructed.

Using a pair of headsets, participants recorded a two-minute message for a service

provider. Participants were informed that the service provider would be listening on the other

end. During the conversation, participants were provided with a series of four positive cues (e.g.

“Mmm, uh-huh”) with a rising intonation in the refund condition or four negative cues (e.g.

“Hmm, nuh-uh”) with a falling intonation in the no refund condition. Therefore, cues were

available to update outcome expectations during the recording of the message. A post-test (n =

20) confirmed that the valence and informational value of the cues were in the direction of the


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impending outcome. Post-test participants listened to the feedback provided by the service

provider during the main study and rated the positiveness or negativeness of the cues and the

likelihood the consumer would receive a refund on the basis of the service provider’s reactions.

The results revealed that the positive cues were perceived as significantly more positive (M =

81.20) than the scale midpoint of 50 (t(9) = 8.12, p < .001), and that the negative cues were

perceived as significantly more negative (M = 18.20) than the scale midpoint of 50 (t(9) = -11.39,

p < .001). Importantly, participants in the positive cue condition reported a higher likelihood (M

= 80.20) of successfully obtaining a refund on the basis of the service provider’s reactions

compared to participants in the negative cue condition (M = 18.30; t(18) = 10.50, p < .001).

Following the conversation, the outcome of the interaction was manipulated such that half

the participants received a refund, and could, therefore, attain their preferred product, whereas the

other half did not receive a refund. Based on Fisk (2002) and Teigen and Keren (2003) we

measured the extent of outcome preparedness by asking for a rating of surprise with the obtained

outcome (0 = not at all surprised, 100 = very surprised) on a continuous scale. As in the previous

study, participants then indicated the extent of their satisfaction and happiness with the outcome

obtained (r = .51, p <.001; a = .66). Following completion of the experiment, participants

received their gift and were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Outcome Satisfaction. As expected, an ANOVA revealed a main effect for outcome (F(1,

74) = 55.26, p < .001) indicating that participants in the refund condition were significantly more

satisfied with the outcome (M = 60.03) than participants in the no refund condition (M = 24.65).

More importantly, replicating the polarization effect found in the previous study, a significant

message strategy × outcome interaction emerged (F(1, 74) = 4.78, p < .05). Planned contrasts

revealed that liars were significantly more satisfied than truth tellers following a positive

outcome, in this case a refund (Mlie = 65.69 vs. Mtruth = 54.37; F(1, 74) = 2.90, p <.05, one-tailed),

and that liars were marginally less satisfied than truth tellers when no refund was obtained (Mlie =

19.90 vs. Mtruth = 29.39; F(1, 74) = 1.94, p = .08, one-tailed).

Outcome Preparedness as a Mediator. To test the process underlying the polarization

effect, we conducted a mediated moderation analysis following the procedures outlined by

Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005). First, consistent with earlier results, a regression with outcome

satisfaction as the dependent variable and outcome, message strategy, and their interaction as

independent variables revealed a significant main effect of outcome (β =-.45, t(74) = -3.62, p <

.001) and a significant interaction (β =-.33, t(74) = -2.19, p < .05). Next, a regression with

outcome preparedness as the dependent variable and outcome, message strategy and their

interaction revealed a main effect for outcome (β =-.30, t(74) = -2.02, p < .05) and a main effect

for strategy (β = .30, t(74) = 2.11, p < .05). Consistent with our conceptualization, liars (M =

55.82) were significantly more surprised with the outcome than truth tellers (M = 33.92),

regardless of outcome valence. Finally, a regression with outcome satisfaction as the dependent

variable, and all the main effects and interaction terms as predictors revealed a significant

outcome preparedness × message strategy interaction effect (β = .46, t(74) = 2.06, p < .05).

Importantly, the message strategy × outcome interaction was reduced to non-significance when

controlling for the effects of the mediator (p = .27). This analysis confirms that the mediating role

of outcome preparedness in the polarization effect was moderated by message strategy.

Specifically, follow-up simple slopes analyses run within each message strategy condition,

demonstrated that outcome preparedness significantly mediated the effect of outcome valence on


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outcome satisfaction for liars (β = .39, t(38) = 3.23, p < .005), but not for truth tellers (β = -.02,

t(34) = -.12, p = .91). Refer to figure 3.


Discussion

Study 2 replicated and extended the polarization effect from the previous study within a

different lying paradigm and with more complex lies. Additionally, the current study provided

evidence of the mediating role of reduced outcome preparedness which supports our proposed

theoretical mechanism.

STUDY 3: MANIPULATING REQUIREMENT FOR UPDATING OF OUTCOME

EXPECTATIONS

Study 2 provided evidence in support of the mediating role of reduced outcome

preparedness underlying the lying polarization effect. However, we have yet to provide explicit

evidence that the reduced outcome preparedness is caused by the absence of updating of outcome

expectations for liars. To address this deficit, we manipulated the need to update expectations

during the conversation in study 3. We expected that when updating was required, the

polarization effect would be replicated as liars would be unable to correct their expectations in

preparation for the outcome, but when incoming feedback would not change outcome

expectations, the polarization effect would be eliminated.

Method

Participants and Design. Eighty eight university students participated in the study in

exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a

2 (message strategy: truth, lie) × 2 (updating: required, not required) between-subjects design.

The outcome of the interaction was counterbalanced across conditions. Four participants

encountered recording problems; three participants failed to follow instructions during the

conversation, and one participant accidentally revealed the truth. Data for these eight participants

were excluded from the sample. Therefore, 80 participants were included in the analysis.

Procedure. As in study 2, participants first completed the gift selection task and were

subsequently instructed to lie or tell the truth to a service provider in pursuit of a refund. To

manipulate the requirement for updating of outcome expectations, participants were either told

that on average one out of four of the previous participants had successfully received a refund

(i.e. less likely to receive a refund) or that three out of four of the previous participants

completing the study had successfully received a refund (i.e. more likely to receive a refund). In

the updating not required conditions, participants received feedback and an outcome that was

consistent with these expectations: negative feedback and no refund when told they were less

likely to receive a refund, and positive feedback and a refund when told they were more likely to

receive a refund. Therefore, updating was not required to prepare for the outcome. Alternatively,

in the updating required conditions participants received feedback and an outcome that was

inconsistent with these expectations: negative feedback and no refund when told they were more


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likely to receive a refund, and positive feedback and a refund when told they were less likely to

receive a refund. Therefore, updating was required during the conversation to prepare for the

outcome. In order to ensure that we induced different prior outcome expectations, participants

were asked immediately before commencing the conversation to indicate the likelihood of

receiving a refund (0 = unlikely, 100 = very likely). After the conversation, participants indicated

the extent of their satisfaction and happiness with the obtained outcome. Scores were reverse

coded for participants that did not receive a refund, and the measures summed to provide an

overall index of outcome satisfaction (r = .72, p < .001; a = .83). Following completion of the

experiment, participants received their gift and were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Prior Outcome Expectations Manipulation Check. As expected, a message strategy ×

expectations ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect for expectations (F(1, 76) = 4.15, p

< .05). Participants provided with information that a refund was more likely reported a

significantly greater likelihood of receiving a refund (M = 68.59) compared to those participants

provided with information that a refund was less likely (M = 56.06). No other main or interaction

effects were significant.

Outcome Satisfaction. An ANOVA revealed the hypothesized message strategy ×

updating requirement interaction (F(1, 76) = 4.32, p < .05). Planned contrasts revealed that when

updating of outcome expectations was required, liars reported more polarized satisfaction

judgments (M = 85.65) relative to truth tellers (M = 70.13; (F(1, 76) = 5.00, p < .05), replicating

the effect found in the previous studies. In contrast, and as predicted, when updating was not

required the polarization effect was eliminated (Mlie= 74.35 vs. Mtruth = 78.26; p = .53).

Discussion

The results of study 3 support our proposition that liars’ inability to update their outcome

expectations in preparation for the outcome underlies the polarization effect. When participants

were provided with incoming information that was inconsistent with prior outcome expectations,

liars insufficiently updated their expectations in preparation for the outcome.

AN EXAMINATION OF UNINSTRUCTED LIES

Thus far we have operationalized lying using manipulations designed to encourage (study

1) or directly instruct participants to lie (studies 2, 3). The purpose of studies 4-6 was to test

whether the polarization effect was similar when participants felt responsible for the decision to

lie. In study 4, we offered participants an explicit choice to lie in pursuit of material reward. In

study 5, we created a completely freely chosen lie situation. Finally, in study 6, we adopted a

critical incident methodology to examine real consumer lies told in the marketplace.

STUDY 4: CHOICE TO LIE

In study 4, we offered participants a choice to lie in order to attain a University branded

special edition USB flash drive keyring. As a measure of outcome preparedness, participants

were asked to recall their thoughts while communicating the message to the service provider.


12

Furthermore, in the current design we also examined an alternative explanation for the

polarization effect based on Ekman’s (1985, 1992) “duping delight” hypotheses. According to

this account, it is possible that liars may have experienced feelings of achievement associated

with the challenge of successfully outwitting the target in the refund condition. To test this

explanation we included a measure of pride.

Method

Participants and Design. Fifty eight university students participated in the study in

exchange for course credit. Based on pilot testing, 80% of participants were anticipated to choose

to lie when provided with an explicit choice of message strategy. Therefore, 32 participants were

randomly assigned to a lie condition, and the remaining participants were randomly assigned to a

truth condition. The outcome of the interaction was counterbalanced across message strategy.

Procedure. Participants were welcomed and informed they would be completing a variety

of different tasks requiring them to report their preferences and provide thoughts and opinions on

consumer information. After initially conducting a filler task, participants completed a 12-item

survey on their computer usage and file storage habits for the IT facilities group who they were

told were assessing student computer requirements. Following completion of the survey,

participants were informed that there was a limited number of special edition University branded

USB flash drive keyrings to award to students for completing the survey. An hourglass then

appeared on the screen, asking participants to please wait while their survey responses were

calculated. In the lie condition, participants were then told that given their usage requirements

relative to other students in the room, they were ineligible to receive a USB flash drive. However,

participants were subsequently informed that they would have a chance to obtain the USB if they

chose to convince the prize administrator (who they were told was unaware of their survey

responses) that their usage requirements were the opposite of what they had indicated earlier.

Participants were then told “the choice is completely up to you…” and asked to choose either

Option 1 (to go for the flash drive) or Option 2 (to not go for the flash drive). Therefore,

participants were provided with a choice of message strategy, rather than direct instructions to lie.

Participants choosing Option 1 then proceeded to the conversation with the service provider,

while participants choosing Option 2 did not continue further, and instead moved onto an

unrelated task. In the truth condition, participants were told that based on their calculated survey

responses relative to other students in the room they were eligible to receive a USB flash drive.

Participants also reported their usage requirements during the conversation with the prize

administrator.

As in study 3, participants received cues corresponding with the impending outcome

during the course of the conversation. After the conversation, participants rated the extent of their

satisfaction and happiness with the outcome obtained. As in the previous study, scores were

reverse coded for participants that did not receive a USB and summed to form an overall index of

outcome satisfaction (r =.83, p < .001; a = .91). Participants were also asked to recall what they

were thinking about while recording the message to the prize administrator. To measure duping

delight, participants also reported their feelings of pride regarding the final outcome (0= not at

all, 100= strongly felt) on a continuous scale. Participants then completed an unrelated task. At

the end of the experimental session a suspicion probe was included by asking participants “In the

space below, can you please tell us what you think the study was about today?”. Following

completion of the study, participants were awarded a USB in the relevant conditions, and were


13

thanked and debriefed. An examination of the suspicion probe, confirmed that no participant

reported a link between message strategy and outcome evaluations.

Results

Compliance. When provided with an explicit choice of message strategy, 76% of

participants in the lie condition chose to misrepresent their usage requirements in a bid to obtain

the flash drive. All truth tellers accurately communicated their usage requirements. Therefore, 50

participants were included in the analysis.

Outcome Satisfaction. Consistent with our hypotheses, liars reported significantly more

polarized outcome satisfaction (M = 85.54) compared to truth tellers (M = 76.00; t(48)= -2.09, p <

.05).

Thought Protocol Analysis. To gain additional insight into liars reduced ability to update

their outcome expectations in preparation for the impending outcome, two independent judges’

content analyzed all thought protocols in terms of participants reported focus during the

conversation. Raters used the following criteria to categorize thoughts into either a strategy or

outcome focus. Thoughts were categorized as strategy-focused if participants 1] voiced difficulty

executing the strategy, 2] referred to conjuring plausible explanations or alternative realities, 3]

described attempts to sound convincing, or 4] mentioned efforts to regulate their verbal or non-

verbal responses during the conversation. Thoughts were categorized as outcome-focused if

participants 1] mentioned the feedback provided by the listener and how their strategy was

progressing, or 2] made reference to the likelihood of the outcome based on the feedback

provided. Inter rater agreement was 96 % and disagreements were resolved through discussion.

Additionally, two respondents failed to answer the question in sufficient detail to categorize a

dominant focus, and therefore were omitted from the subsequent analysis. Consistent with our

theoretical framework regarding the lack of updating when lying, participants were less likely to

focus on the impending outcome in the lie condition (χ2

(1) = 14.39, p < .001). While 72% of

participants in the truth condition focused on the feedback provided and the impending outcome,

only 17% of liars focused on cues to the outcome during the conversation.

Duping Delight as an Alternative Explanation. The results did not reveal any significant

differences in the extent of pride reported by liars (M = 59.69) relative to truth tellers (M = 56.71;

t(25)= -.23, p = .82) in the refund condition. Therefore, feelings of pride associated with

successfully duping the service provider do not appear to account for the demonstrated

polarization effect.

Discussion

Study 4 provides evidence of the polarization effect when participants were provided with

an explicit choice to lie. Furthermore, by examining participants’ retrospective thoughts during

the execution of the message strategy, the current study provides convergent evidence of liars

reduced ability to prepare for the impending outcome. Whereas truthtellers made significantly

more references to the feedback provided and how it informed their outcome expectations, liars

made fewer references to the service provider’s reactions and instead appeared to be more

focused on executing their own strategy during the conversation. Additionally, a duping delight

alternative explanation was not supported by the data.


14

STUDY 5: OPPORTUNITY TO LIE

Although participants were offered a choice rather than directly instructed to lie in study

4, the choice of message strategy was still explicitly provided. In the current study, we created a

subtler situation which presented participants the opportunity to lie without providing a specific

message strategy. Specifically, participants were incorrectly informed that they were eligible to

receive a USB flash drive. No mention was made of what they should do in this case.

Additionally, a yet untested alternative account for our findings is that liars may have felt more

tense than truth tellers during the task (Zuckerman et al. 1981), and that this residual

physiological arousal may have polarized subsequent affective and evaluative responses

(Reisenzein 1983). According to work by Schachter and Singer (1962) and Zillmann’s (1971)

excitation transfer hypotheses, it is possible that individuals may transfer residual arousal from a

prior task to a subsequent target evaluation, which would result in the expression of more

polarized judgments in response to the outcome. Therefore, we measured vocal fundamental

frequency (F0) perturbation (i.e. “jitter” parameter) during the conversation to test whether

elevated arousal explained liars’ polarized satisfaction ratings. Fluctuation in vocal pitch is

considered as one of the most reliable non-linguistic indicators of psychophysiological arousal

(Bachorowski and Owren 1995; Scherer 1989, 2003).

Method

Participants and Design. Sixty four university students participated in the study in

exchange for course credit. Based on pilot testing, 60% of participants were expected to lie when

provided with an opportunity to falsely confirm their eligibility. Therefore, forty participants

were randomly assigned to a lie condition and the remaining participants were randomly assigned

to a truth condition. The outcome of the interaction was counterbalanced across message strategy.

Procedure. As in the previous study, following the completion of a filler task, participants

completed the IT survey regarding their computer usage and file storage habits. Participants were

subsequently informed that there was a limited number of special edition University branded

USB flash drive keyrings to award to students for completing the survey. They were then told

that to qualify for a USB flash drive their survey responses must be consistent with three

specified eligibility criteria. In the truth condition, the specified eligibility criteria matched three

of the responses selected in the survey. In the lie condition, one of the eligibility criteria specified

did not match the selected survey response. The target eligibility criterion was counterbalanced

across survey responses. After a short delay, all participants were notified that their responses

successfully matched all of the eligibility requirements. Therefore in the lie condition, the

selected response had been incorrectly validated. The participant was now in a position to decide

whether or not to correct the validation error. Participants were then informed that they would

record a message to the prize administrator who was unaware of their survey responses. The

same cues used in studies 2-4 were provided during the conversation in correspondence with the

impending outcome. After the recording, participants were notified of their outcome. As in study

2, participants reported their extent of surprise with the obtained outcome. As in the previous

study, participants then reported their satisfaction and happiness with the obtained outcomes and

scores were reverse coded for participants that did not receive a USB and summed to form an

overall index of outcome satisfaction (r = .65, p < .001; a = .79). Finally, participants completed


15

an unrelated task, and as in study 4 a suspicion probe was included at the end of the experimental

session. All participants were subsequently thanked, awarded a USB in the relevant conditions

and debriefed.

Results

Compliance. When provided with an opportunity to lie, 56% of participants chose to lie

by falsely confirming the incorrect eligibility validation information in a bid to obtain the flash

drive. All truth tellers accurately confirmed the validation information. Two participants

experienced computer programs, two participants experienced recording problems and one

participant reported a link between message strategy and outcome evaluations in the suspicion

probe. Therefore, 42 participants were included in the analysis. Counterbalancing of the target

criterion was not a significant factor, and therefore we present the results collapsed across this

factor.

Outcome Satisfaction. Consistent with our hypotheses, liars reported significantly more

polarized outcome satisfaction (M = 80.59) compared to truth tellers (M = 65.48; t(40)= -2.45, p <

.05).

Outcome Preparedness. The results revealed that liars were significantly more surprised

with (i.e. less prepared for) the outcome (M = 66.24) compared to truth tellers (M = 43.62; t(40)=

-2.44, p < .05). Furthermore, a mediation analyses revealed that the polarization effect for

message strategy was fully mediated by outcome preparedness. There was a significant

relationship between message strategy and outcome preparedness (β=.36, p < .05), and message

strategy and outcome satisfaction (β =.36, p < .05), and outcome preparedness and outcome

satisfaction (β =.50, p < .01). When controlling for the effect of outcome preparedness, the

relationship between message strategy and outcome satisfaction was significantly reduced (β

=.21, p = .16). Finally, a Sobel test confirmed a significant reduction in the beta value when the

mediator was included versus not included in the model (z = 2.43, p < .05; Preacher and

Leonardelli 2001). These results support our proposition that reduced outcome preparedness by

liars resulted in more extreme outcome satisfaction ratings.

Excitation Transfer as an Alternative Explanation. Vocal analysis (Boersma and

Weenink 2011) revealed that liars exhibited marginally increased vocal jitter (M = 219.18E-6 s)

compared to truth tellers (M = 167.25E-6 s; t(40)= -1.70, p = .096). However, when the jitter

parameter was included in a regression predicting the effects of message strategy on outcome

satisfaction, arousal did not emerge as significant (β= .19, p = .22). Importantly, the polarization

effect for liars also remained significant. Thus, elevated arousal does not appear to account for

the polarization effect observed.

Discussion

When provided with an opportunity to lie without any reference to the message strategy,

more than half the sample chose to misrepresent their eligibility to the prize administrator by

confirming the validation error. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of the excitation transfer

hypotheses, the polarization effect remained significant when controlling for the elevated arousal

experienced by liars.


16

STUDY 6: SELF-REPORTED CONSUMER LIES

Although we have examined lying across a variety of laboratory contexts, one might

wonder about the nature and consequences of consumer lies told in real consumption situations.

The objective of the current study was to examine consumers’ actual experiences of deception in

everyday consumption contexts. We adopted a critical incident methodology (e.g. Dahl, Honea,

and Manchanda 2003; Keltner and Buswell 1996; Miller 1992) in which participants described a

recent situation where they lied during an interaction with a service provider.

Participants. Sixty five university students participated in the study in exchange for

course credit.

Procedure. Participants were first asked to recall and describe a recent situation in as

much detail as possible when they had lied to a service provider during a product or service

encounter and to indicate the outcome of the situation (i.e. whether they had obtained the desired

outcome). Participants were informed that lying constituted any situation where they had

intentionally misled the service provider either by explicitly stating something that was not true

or by failing to disclose something that was true thereby leaving the service provider with a false

impression of what had really happened. Prior to completing the survey, participants were

assured that their responses were anonymous and completely confidential. Participants then

completed a battery of items including; the extent of surprise they had experienced in response to

the outcome, the extent of outcome expectedness, the degree of outcome satisfaction and the

extent of discomfort felt while lying as a measure of experienced arousal. All measures were

taken on 5-point scales. The outcome surprise and outcome expectedness measures were

significantly negatively correlated (r = -.51; p < .01), and outcome expectedness was subtracted

to form a single index of outcome preparedness.

Results

Preliminary Analyses. Seventeen of the responses were deemed irrelevant as they

described a lie which was told for non-financial gain (e.g. lying to a service provider in order to

keep personal details private). Therefore, 48 responses were included in the analysis.

Regression Analysis. Regression results revealed that the extent of outcome preparedness

significantly predicted affective polarization in response to the outcome obtained (β = .32, t(47) =

2.31, p < .05). Participants’ satisfaction (dissatisfaction) with the outcome increased as they were

less prepared for a positive (negative) outcome. Additionally, regression analyses indicated that

negative arousal was marginally related to the extent of outcome preparedness (β = .25, t(47) =

1.80, p = .08), however, the arousal measure did not directly account for the polarization effect (β

= .10, t(47) = .67, p = .51).

Discussion

The present study provides convergent evidence for the predictions of our model using

consumer narratives of real lying experiences. Consistent with our idea that lying interferes with

the updating process, there was a significant relationship between the degree of outcome

preparedness, and between outcome preparedness and the extent of outcome satisfaction


17

polarization. It is also important to note that although reported negative arousal was correlated

with reduced outcome preparedness, arousal did not directly predict the effect.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Prior research has examined the consequences of marketers lying to consumers.

To our knowledge, this is the first research to examine the lies consumers tell marketers in

pursuit of a material reward, and how lying during a service interaction influences the consumers’

satisfaction with the outcome obtained. We focused in particular on lies told for the purpose of

attaining a material gain which would otherwise be unattainable. Accordingly, lying represented

a costly endeavour involving the exertion of deliberate effort during the communication in pursuit

of the desired outcome. Across six studies we provided evidence for our proposed effect and

support for the theoretical mechanism. First, we demonstrated the lying polarization effect across

a wide range of stimuli and situational factors, including simple versus complex lies, oral versus

written lies, instructed versus uninstructed lies and verbal versus non-verbal feedback cues.

Second, we found strong and consistent support for our proposed underlying mechanism by

examining the mediating role of reduced outcome preparedness, and by manipulating the

requirement to update outcome expectations in preparation for the impending outcome. Our

results also provided evidence of liars reduced outcome focus during the conversation, and

offered convergent insight into consumers’ processing of their own real lying experiences.

Ruling Out Alternative Explanations

The reported studies also permitted us to systematically eliminate a number of competing

alternative explanations. First, by measuring participants feelings of pride (study 4) we

eliminated the possibility that the effects are explained by duping delight associated with

successfully outwitting the service provider. Second, by recording the extent of physiological

activation experienced while lying (study 5), and measuring participants’ reported tension while

lying (study 6) we eliminated an arousal explanation based on the excitation transfer hypotheses.

Although our results indicated that liars were more aroused during the conversation relative to

truth tellers, arousal was not found to be a significant predictor of outcome satisfaction, nor a

significant predictor of the polarization effect. Thus, consistent with our theorizing, the attempted

control or active suppression of physiological arousal during deception may form part of the

increased difficulty lying, and thus contribute to liars’ inability to simultaneously engage in other

cognitive processes, but does not appear to directly transfer to subsequent outcome evaluations.

However, a further possibility that warrants investigation concerns the perception of norm

violation when lying. Previous research indicates that actions are perceived to be abnormal and

thus more mutable, whereas inactions are perceived to be the status quo, and therefore, less

mutable (Kahneman and Miller 1986; Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Landman 1987). Therefore,

it is possible that lying represents an action (i.e. doing something that is not normal), whereas

truth telling is perceived as an inaction (i.e. doing something that is normal). In which case our

results could be explained by a ‘lying as an action’ explanation. We explored this possibility in a

follow-up study. We predicted that lying would result in outcome satisfaction polarization,

regardless of whether the message strategy was perceived as a violation of a norm. The post-test

used a 2 (message strategy: truth, lie) × 2 (perceived norm: norm, control) between-subjects

design. Participants first completed the gift selection task used in studies 2 and 3. Prior to the

conversation, following Blanton, Stuart, and Vanden Eijnden (2001) participants in the norm


18

condition were informed that the large majority (99%) of the previous participants completing

the study considered the message strategy to be the normal course of action to take in this

situation. In the control condition participants were not provided this information. A

manipulation check revealed the expected message strategy × norm interaction (F(1, 51) = 4.77,

p < .05). In the control condition, the message strategy was considered more normal by truth

tellers (M = 65.13) compared to liars (M = 38.83; F(1, 51) = 5.94, p <.05), however importantly,

in the norm condition there were no significant differences in perceived normality across message

strategy (Mlie = 62.43 vs. Mtruth = 55.79; p = .53). As hypothesized, a strategy × perceived norm

ANOVA on the outcome satisfaction measure resulted in only the predicted main effect of

message strategy (F(1, 51) = 5.05, p < .05). Regardless of whether lying was perceived to be the

norm or not, liars reported more extreme satisfaction responses to the obtained outcome (M =

88.55) compared to truth tellers (M = 77.65). Therefore, we can be confident that perceptions of

norm violation while lying do not explain the demonstrated pattern of results.

Theoretical Contributions and Future Extensions

Our research offers some important contributions to the current literature. First, our

studies provide novel insights into the effects of lying on outcome satisfaction. Previous research

has examined consumer motivations to lie (Argo et al. 2006; Mazar et al. 2008; Mazar and Ariely

2006; Sengupta et al. 2002), but has not addressed the consequences of lying for material gain.

Using various experimental paradigms that directly simulate contexts in which consumers would

benefit materially from lying to a marketer, we found that lying results in more extreme

evaluations of the outcome obtained. Second, our research contributes to the growing literature

on social interactions in consumption contexts (Andrade and Ho 2009; Buchan et al. 2004) and

builds on the limited social psychological research and communication literature examining the

interactive nature of deceptive communication (Buller and Burgoon 1996; Ekman and Friesen

1969; Levine and McCornack 1996, 2001). We shed new light on how consumers respond to the

strategic communicative displays of the target during a transgression. Our results provide direct

evidence that under certain conditions liars may insufficiently integrate feedback cues into their

cognitions, because they are preoccupied with executing the lie.

Finally, the present research extends our knowledge of the consequences of deception.

While previous deception research has examined the negative feelings experienced during the

process of lying, including guilt, apprehension and the fear of detection (Ekman 1992; Ekman

and Frank 1993) our research focuses on the satisfaction experienced after communicating a lie.

We demonstrated that liars’ reaction to the obtained outcome does not appear to simply reflect a

transfer of the physiological arousal experienced while deceiving, but rather a cognitively

mediated process of reduced outcome preparedness as a consequence of the difficulty associated

with executing the lie. Consequently, when a liar is successful, this may ironically bolster the

liars’ outcome satisfaction, raising interesting implications for marketers and consumers alike.

Additionally it is important to note that we did not find any evidence of amplification amongst

participants choosing not lie (1] Study 5: Mnon-liars = 65.18 vs. Mliars = 80.59; t(36) = -2.49, p <.05,

2] Mnon-liars = 65.18 vs. Mtruth tellers = 65.48; t(36) = .042 , p = .97). Thus, these results suggest that

simply offering the opportunity to lie does not cause amplification.

Whereas previous social psychological research has examined lying as a behavior that

serves everyday functions, such as self-presentation and emotion regulation (Camden, Motley,

and Wilson 1984; DePaulo et al. 1996), the pursuit of internal rewards and for altruistic reasons

(DePaulo and Kashy 1998), this research has focused on instrumental motivations to lie in pursuit


19

of material gain. Future research would contribute to knowledge by examining the cognitive and

evaluative consequences of hedonic motivations to lie. For example, consumers may be

motivated to lie for self-presentational reasons (e.g., lying about an exercise or a dieting regime

when joining a gym), and such identity-relevant concerns may provide an important boundary

condition for our effects, as the deceptive process may be more fluent and less demanding, given

that lies of this nature are often routinely practiced in everyday life (DePaulo et al. 2003; Fiedler

and Walka 1993; McCornack 1997).

It is also important to note that in our research, liars were unacquainted with the person

listening to the lie. Social psychological research suggests that cues to deception may be

moderated by the liar’s relationship with the target (Anderson, DePaulo, and Ansfield 2002;

Buller and Burgoon 1996; Ekman 1985; Levine and McCornack 1992; Stiff and Miller 1986).

Future research might examine conditions under which the consumer is acquainted with or has a

relationship the marketer. In these instances we might expect liars to habitually or strategically

attend to the target’s reactions as their focus is on protecting the recipient’s feelings (DePaulo and

Bell 1996; DePaulo and Kashy 1998; DePaulo et al. 1996). Alternatively, under these conditions,

the consumer may be more likely to harbor concerns over future interactions and the

consequences of detected deception, whereas in our research consumers were focused on

attaining short-term, self-serving benefits during a single interaction with the service provider.

Finally, while this research has focused on the consequences of yielding to, or choosing to

lie in pursuit of material benefits, an important avenue for future research is to examine the

strategies, motivations and consequences of consumers resisting the temptation to lie or choosing

not to deceive when provided an opportunity to do so (i.e. “moralistic truth tellers”). It is possible

that in this instance individuals may expect to be rewarded or appraised for their socially

desirable behavior (de Quervain et al. 2004; Rilling et al. 2002). Furthermore, research has shown

that people are likely to seek retribution as a means of re-establishing moral order (Lerner 1980;

McCullough et al. 2001). Accordingly, one interesting possibility is that moralistic truth tellers

who encounter a negative outcome, may subsequently resort to lying as a means of seeking

revenge to compensate for the perceived lack of justice.

We conclude by noting the implications of this research for marketers dealing with

consumers who lie or are suspected of deception. When faced with liars, marketers must make a

tradeoff between the financial loss of allowing a successful lie and decreased satisfaction if the

deception does not result in material gain. If companies choose to reduce financial losses by

adopting more conservative measures of information verification for their refund policies or sales

promotions, the risk is that not only will liars be more dissatisfied, but honest consumers may

suffer the consequences and be unduly treated with suspicion, or worse still penalized for a lack

of transparency (e.g. inclusion on a corporate blacklist). Therefore, in handling managing

customer relations, marketers need to be informed about the consequences of their actions when

establishing a balance between the scrutiny of information provided and the provision of

outcomes based on unverifiable information (e.g. “benefit of the doubt” and “customer is always

right” policies). If marketers devise informed policies regarding potentially inaccurate consumer

communicated information then the polarized reaction of the liar may be reduced. If

companies do not stand to lose too much financially and are focused on consumer satisfaction,

then it may be worthwhile allowing consumers to stretch the truth. This research is the first step

in examining the consequences of lying for the profit seeking consumer. In addition to the old

adage ‘buyer beware,’ we suggest an addition, ‘marketers be aware’ because they may control the

outcome, but not the strategy a consumer uses: to lie or not to lie?


20

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26

FIGURE 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Cues

Lying for

Material

Reward

Outcome

Satisfaction

Polarization

Studies 3, 4

Reduced

Outcome

Preparedness

Updating

Interference

Studies 1-6

Studies 2, 5, 6


27

FIGURE 2

OUTCOME SATISFACTION BY MESSAGE STRATEGY AND OUTCOME

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Deal Impasse

Ou

tco

me S

ati

sfa

cti

on Lie

Truth


28

FIGURE 3

MEDIATED MODERATION

-.30*

Me: Outcome Preparedness

X: Outcome

Valence

Y: Outcome Satisfaction

× Mo: Message

Strategy (XMo)

× Message Strategy

(MeMo)

-.33* (-.17n.s.)

.46*

Documents

BLUE JAY MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY MANUSCRIPT …1990; Uleman 1987; Winter and Uleman 1984; Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff 1985). Therefore, independent of the ability to monitor the