Bonaventura Sententiarum 2

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MMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. II, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

//www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/opera/bon02038.html[2012-09-114:43:21]

S. Bonaventurae BagnoregisS. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae

atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of BagnoregioCardinal Bishop of Alba

& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor

Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the

Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I. COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

PARS II.

De multitudine, fine et distinctione creaturarum.

PART II

On the multitude, end and distinction of creatures

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,

Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 38-40.

Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,

Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 38-40.

Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Et quia non valetetc. And because one cannot prevail etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS. DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Supra egit Magister de conditione rerum a parteprincipii, hic agit a parte finis. Et quoniam res a fine etsecundum illum respectum accipiunt distinctionemformarum, ideo pars ista habet tres particulas. In

prima8ex comparatione rerum ad finem ostendit rerum

distinctionem. In secunda vero secun- / -dum . . .

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the foundation things on the part of (their) principle, here he dea(with the same) on the part of (their) end. And sincthings accept from (their) end, and according to threspect, a distinction of forms, for that reason this pa

has three subparts [particulas]. In the first8 he show

the distinction of things from the comparison of thingto (their) end. However in the second, according / to .

8 In Vat. additurpraemisso, quare rationalis creatura facta sit.

8 In the Vatican edition there is added here having premised, for

what reason the rational creature has been made[praemisso, quar

rationalis creatura facta sit].


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p. 39

secun- / -dum illam distinctionem assignat diversamcomparationem ad finem, ibi: Ideoque, si quaeritur,quare sit creatus homo etc. Tertio vero breviterepilogat determinata, ex ipsis faciens sibi viam adcetera sequentia determinanda, ibi: Ex praemissisapparet. Prima et ultima parte remanentibus

indivisis, media dividitur in tres. In prima determinatfinem intellectualis substantiae; in secunda finemsubstantiae pure corporalis, ibi: Et sicut factus esthomo propter Deum etc.; in tertio vero determinatfinem compositi ex utroque, in quantum est tale, ibi:De homine quoque in Scriptura etc. Et ibi primodeterminat veritatem; secundo dissolvit dubitationem;ibi: Solet etiam quaeri, cum maiorisetc.

according / to that distinction he assigns a diverscomparison regarding (their) end, there (where hsays): And for this reason, if it be asked, For whreason was man and/or Angel created? etc.. But the third he briefly summarizes the determined, makinout of them his own way to determining all the oth

following ones, there (where he says): From thaforementioned it appears etc.. The first and lapart remaining undivided, the middle one is divideinto three. In the first he determines the end of thintellectual substance; in the second the end of thpurely corporal substance, there (where he says): Anjust as man has been made for Gods sakeetc.; but the third he determines the end of the one composeout of each, inasmuch as it is such, there (where hsays): Concerning man it is also sometimes found writingetc.. And in the first he determines the truth;

the second he solves the doubt; there (where he says)It is also customarily asked, Since the soul wouseem etc..

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM. TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua agitur de rebusproductis in comparatione ad finem, secundumordinem et distinctionem, quaeruntur principaliter tria.

For an understanding of this part, in which one deawith things produces in comparison to (their) enaccording to (their) order and distinction, there arprincipally asked three (things).

Primum est de rerum distinctione. The first concerns the distinction of things.

Secundum de ordine. The second concerns (their) order.

Tertium de differentia Angeli et animae. The third concerns the difference of the Angand the soul.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo. About the first two (things) are asked.

Primum est de multiplicatione rerum quantumad principium.

The first concerns the multiplication of thingas much as regards (its) principle.

Secundum quantum ad differentias, secundumquae distinguuntur. The second (concerns the multiplication things) as much as regards the differenceaccording to which they are distinguished.

ARTICULUS I.

De rerum distinctione.

ARTICLE I

On the distinction of things.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse

QUESTION 1

Whether from a first efficient (principle)there ought,


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rerum multitudo. and/or could be a multitude of things?

QUAERITUR ERGO primo, utrum a primo efficientedebuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo. Et quodnon, videtur primo sic:

THEREFORE THERE IS ASKED first, whether from first efficient (principle) through ought, and/or could ba multitude of things. And that (it is) not (so), seemfirst in this manner:

1. Per Philosophum:1 Idem, uniformiter se habens,

natum est efficere idem ; sed efficiens primum unumest omnino uniformiter se habens: ergo videtur, quodnunquam multa facere potuerit, ergo unum solum.

1. Through the Philosopher:1 The same, holdin

itself uniformly, is bound [natum est] to effect the sam; but the efficient, first One is one holding Itseentirely uniformly: therefore it seems, that it counever make many (things), therefore only one.

2. Item, a summe bono nunquam possunt esse mala, a

summe vero non2 possunt esse falsa: ergo a summeuno non possunt esse multa.

2. Likewise, from one most highly good there ca

never be evils, from one most highly true there cannobe falsehoods [falsa]: therefore from one most highone there cannot be many (things).

3. Item, mundus sensibilis dicitur assimilari mundo

archetypo, qui est in mente divina ad illius enimexpressionem factus est sed in illo omnia suntunum: ergo et in hoc mundo: ergo videtur, quod ab

illo non potuerit esse multitudo.3

3. Likewise, the sensible world is said to be assimilate

to the world archetype, which is in the Divine Mind for (the world) was made for an expression of this but in that all (things) are one [unum]: therefore also this world: therefore it seems, that from that the

could not be a multitude.3

4. Item, a Deo exitus est per generationem, perspirationem et per creationem; sed per generationemnon emanat nisi una sola persona, et similiter perspirationem: ergo per creationem non egreditur nisiuna sola creatura.

4. Likewise, from God there is a going forth [exituthrough generation, through spiration and througcreation; but through generation there does not emanabut one sole Person, and similarly through spirationtherefore through creation there does not step fort[egreditur] but one sole creature.

CONTRA: 1. Quanto substantia producens est melior,tanto magis est sui diffusiva, et quanto magis est suidiffusiva, tanto pluribus nata est se communicare; sed

primum efficiens est optimum inter omnia: ergo4etc.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. As much as a producinsubstance is better, so much more is it diffusive oitself, and as much as it is more diffusive of itself, smuch is it bound to communicate itself to more; but th

first efficient (Principle) is the best among all: ergoetc..

2. Item, quanto substantia spiritualior, tanto plurium est

cognitiva;5 sed suprema substantia est spiritualissima:

ergo multorum est cognitiva. Sed non est cognitivamultorum praecedentium se vel comitantium: ergomultorum ab ipsa exeuntium.

2. Likewise, as much as a substance (is) more spiritua

so much is it cognitive of more;5 but the suprem

Substance is most spiritual: therefore It is cognitive many. But It is not cognitive of many preceding and/or accompanying (It): therefore (It is cognitive) the many going forth from It.

3. Item, quanto substantia simplicior, tanto potentior,quia virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita

;6 sed quanto potentior, tanto in plura potest: ergo sisubstantia primi principii est simplicissima, ergo potestet debet ad sui manifestationem producere multa, cumipsa sit unica.

3. Likewise, as much as a substance (is) more simplso much (is it) more potent, because virtue as mucas (it is) more united, so much (is it) more unlimite

[infinita] ;6but as much as (one is) more potent, smuch is it able unto more: therefore if the substance the First Principle is most simple, therefore It can an


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ought, for its own manifestation, produce man(things), since It itself is unique.

4. Item, quanto causa prior, tanto universalior, unde

prima est universalissima;7et quanto universalior, tantoplurium principium: ergo cum principium productivumuniversi sit simpliciter primum, debuit ergo et potuitexire ab ipso multitudo rerum.

4. Likewise, as much as a cause (is) prior, so much (it) more universal, wherefore the First (Cause) is th

most universal;7 and as much as (a cause is) moruniversal, so much (is it) the principle of moretherefore since the productive Principle of the universis simply First, therefore the multitude of things ough

and could go forth from It.

CONCLUSIO.

Multitudo rerum est a principio uno, quia est

principium et primum et unice unum.

CONCLUSION

The multitude of things is from one principle, becaus

it is the Beginning and the First and the uniquely One

RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiamnotandum est, quod si de principio intrinsecoquaeratur,unde veniat multitudo rerum, maxime secundumspeciem, patet, quod a forma. Sed unde veniat . . .

I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaidmust be noted, that if there be asked concerning aintrinsic principle, whence comes the multitude things, most of all according to species, it is clear, th(it comes) from form. But (if there be asked,) whenccomes . . .

1 Libr. II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.).

2 Aliqui codd. ut aa bb nunquam.

3 Plato, in Timaeo ait: Unus (mundus) profecto est: si quidem

factus sit ad exemplum . . . Ut autem hic mundus esset animanti

absoluto simillimus, hoc ipso quod solus atque unus esset, idcirco

non duos vel infinitos mundos, sed singularem et unigenum

mundum Deus procreavit, qui quidem et est et erit (ed. Serrani, tom.

III. pag. 31.).4

Hoc argumentum fundatur in illa Dionysii propositione: Bonum

est diffusivum sui; de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 804, nota 6.

5 Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.) et Liber de

Causis, prop. 10.

6 Liber de Causis, prop. 17.

7 Vide Libr. de Causis, prop. 1, de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 471, nota 3.

1 (Aristotle), On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text 56 (ch. 1

2 Some codices, such as aa and bb, have there can never[nunquam

possunt].

3 Plato, in the Timaeus says: Indeed there is one (world): if,

indeed, it has been made according to the Exemplar . . . Moreover

so that this world would be most similar to the One absolute

animating (it), by this very (thing) that it was the sole and one

(world), on which account God did not procreate two and/or infinitworlds, but a singular and only-born [unigenum] world, which

indeed both is and shall be. (Serrani edition, tome III, p. 31).

4 This argument is founded upon that proposition of (St.) Dionysi

(the Areopagite): The good is diffusive of itself; concerning which

cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, p. 804, footnote 6.

5 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 3 ff (ch. 4) and the Book

of Causes, proposition 10.

6 Book of Causes., proposition 17.

7 See the Book of Causes, proposition 1, concerning which, cf.

Sent., Bk. I, d. 37, p. I, a. sole, q. 2, p. 471, footnote 3.

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multitudo formarum tanquam a principio effectivoextrinseco, patet, quod ab efficiente uno. Sedqualiter potest venire multitudo a principio summe etperfectissime uno, difficile est intelligere. Et aliquicirca hoc erraverunt.

the multitude of forms as from an extrinsic, effectivprinciple, it is clear, that (it comes) from one efficie(principle). But in what manner a multitude cacome from a Principle most highly and most perfectioOne, is difficult to understand. And some have erreabout this.


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Quidam enim dixerunt, quod quamvis unus esset rerumConditor, tamen multa et varia facit proptermultitudinem formarum idealium. Sed illud

improbatum est in primo libro,1 ubi ostenditur, quodomnes illae unum sunt; nec est in Deo secundum remalius numerus quam personarum.

For certain (authors) said, that though the Creator othings was one, yet He makes many and variou(things) on account of a multitude of ideal forms.

But that has been disproved in the First Book,1wheit is shown, all those (ideal forms) are one [unum]; nois there in God, according to thing, a number other thaof the Persons.

Aliqui vero dicere voluerunt, quod hoc erat proptermultitudinem mediorum. Deus enim, cum sit unus etsumme simplex, intellexit se; et se intelligendo et nihilaliud, produxit primam intelligentiam; et illaIntelligentia intellexit se et Deus, et ideo produxit duo,scilicet aliam Intelligentiam et orbem suum; et sicdescendendo et multiplicando. Et ista opinio in

lectione praecedenti2 est improbata, ubi ostenditur,quod Deus immediate producit omnia.

However, some wanted to say, that this was on accouof a multitude of means. For God, since He is One anmost highly Simple, understood Himself; and bunderstanding Himself and nothing else, produced thFirst Intelligence, and that Intelligence understooItself and God, and for that reason produced tw(things), namely another Intelligence and Its own orband thus by descending and multiplying, (the multitudof things was made). And that opinion of their

the preceding lesson2has been disproved, where it shown, that God produces all (things) immediately.

Tertii dixerunt, quod multitudo rerum erat a principiounico propter multitudinem et infinitatem reflexionumquibus divinus intellectus supra se reflectitur etintelligit se, et intelligit, se intelligere; et sic usque ininfinitum. Sed illud nihil est. Primum, quia falsum

est, quod in Deo sit multitudo reflexionum,3cum Deussit suum intelligere. Item, ex hoc nunquam proveniretnisi diversitas secundum numerum.

The third said, that the multitude of tings was from thunique Principle on account of the multitude aninfinite of reflections by which the Divine Intellect reflected upon Itself and understands Itself, anunderstand, that It understands Itself; and thus eveunto infinity. But that is nothing. First, because

is false, that in God there is a multitude of reflectionssince God is His own act of understanding [intelligereLikewise, from this there would never have come butdiversity according to number.

Et ideo est positio recta, quod multitudo in rebus est aprincipio uno, quia est primum principium et uniceunum. Quia enim est principium simpliciterprimum,ideo fecundum et potens est fecunditate infinita etimmensa. Si enim unitas, quae est prima in generenumeri, est principium, a quo possunt infiniti numeriegredi, et punctus, a quo infinitae lineae; quod estsimpliciter primum est ita potens, quod omnino

immensum.4 Propter ergo immensitatem infinitapotest, sed propter immensitatis manifestationem multa

de suis thesauris profert, non omnia, quia effectus nonpotest aequari virtuti ipsius primae causae. Quiavero unice unum, ideo simplicissimum etspiritualissimum et perfectissimum: quiasimplicissimum, maximae potentiae; quiaspiritualissimum, maximae sapientiae; quiapefectissimum est, bonitatis summae; quia maximaepotentiae, multa potest; quia maximae sapientiae,multa novit; quia summae bonitatis, multa vultproducere et se communicare. Et ideo a principio

uno, quia primum et unum, exit5multitudo.

And for that reason the right position is, that thmultitude in things is from one Principle, because It the First Principle and uniquely the One. For becauit is the simply First Principle, for that reason It fecund and potent by an infinite and immenfecundity. For if the unity, which is first in the genuof number, is a principle, form which there can steforth infinite number, and the point, (a principle) formwhich (there step forth) infinite lines; what is simp

the First is so potent, that (It is) entirely immense

Therefore, on account of (Its) immensity it can (causeinfinite (things), but on account of the manifestation o(Its) immensity It carries forth [profert] many from Itreasuries, not all, because the effect (of Its Virtucannot be equal to the Virtue Itself of the First Cause But because (It is) uniquely the One, for that reaso(It is) the Most Simple, and the Most Spiritual and thMost Perfect: because (It is) the Most Simple, (It is) othe greatest power, because (It is) the Most Spiritua(It is) of the greatest wisdom; because It is the MoPerfect, (It is) of a most high goodness; because (It i


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of the greatest power, It can (cause) many (thingsbecause (It is) of the greatest wisdom, It knows man(things); because (It is) of a most high goodness, wills to produce many (things) and to communicaItself. For that reason from the One Principl

because (It is) the First and the One, there goes forth5

multitude.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod idem similiter se habens

etc.; dicendum, quod intelligitur in his agentibus,quorum virtus est arctata et limitata; et hoc non habet

locum in Deo.6

1. What, therefore, is objected, that the same holdin

itself similarly etc.; it must be said, that (this) understood in those agents, the virtue of which

constrained and limited; and this has no place in God.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod a bono non sunt mala;dicendum, quod non est simile, quia mala et falsa

dicunt7 privationes et defectus, et ideo non habentcausam efficientem, sed deficientem, qualem non decetesse Deum; sed multitudo est positio, et ideo causamhabet effectivam.

2. What is objected, that from (something) good theare no evils; it must be said, that it is not simila

because evils and falsehoods mean7privations andefects, and for that reason they do not have aefficientcause, but (rather) a deficientone, which it not fitting that God be; but a multitude is a positing (being), and for that reason it has an effective cause.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod de archetypo et sensibilimundo, dicendum, quod iste imitatur illum in quantumpotest, sed deficit. In illo enim est summa pulcritudoper omnimodam unitatem; hic autem, si esset unitas,non esset pulcritudo, quia non esset ordo nec perfectio. Et ideo, ut mundus hic imitaretur in perfectione etpulcritudine, oportuit, quod haberet multitudinem, ut

multa facerent quod unum facere per se non posset.8

3. What is objected, that concerning the archetype anthe sensible world, it must be said, that the lattimitates the former inasmuch as it is able, but it failFor in the former there is a most high beauty througan omnimodal unity; but the latter, if it would beunity, would not be beauty, because there would not ban order nor perfection (in it). And for that reason, ththis world might imitate (it) in perfection and beauty, was necessary [oportuit], that it have a multitude (othings), so that many would do what the one could no

do through itself.8

4. Quod ultimo obiicitur de generatione et spiratione,iam patet: quia genitus aequalis generanti per omniaimplet et imitatur ipsum, similiter et Spiritus sanctus; et

ideo superflueret aliam ponere personam.8 Sed non sicest in creatura, quae est bonitatis finitae; ideo quod nonpotuit capere creatura in se, accepit quodam modo insibi socia, ut sic ex multis una perficeretur mundialismachina.

4. What is objected last concerning generation anspiration, is already clear: because the One begotteequal to the One generating fulfills through all (thingand imitates Him, similarly too the Holy Spirit; and fthat reason it would be superfluous to posit anothPerson. But not so is it in the creature, which is finite goodness; for that reason what a creature counot grasp in itself, it accepted in a certain manner iitself as an associate, so that thus from the many the

was perfected one, world machine [una mundialmachina].

SCHOLION. SCHOLIUM

I. Haec quaestio cohaeret cum iis quae supra (p. I. a. 2.q. 1. 2.) disputata sunt, et militat contra multosphilosophos Arabes. Ad rem Scotus (de RerumPrincip. q. 2. a. 1. n. 7.): Avicenna veritati catholicaevidetur maxime contrarius esse. Nam IX.Metaphysicae suae c. 4. vult, quod a primo principio

I. This Question compliments those things which havbeen disputed above (in p. I, a. 2, qq. 1 and 2), anmilitates against many Arabic philosophers. On thmatter (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (de Rerum Principio., 2, a. 1, n. 7) says: Avicenna seems most of all to bcontrary to the Catholic truth. For in his Metaphysic


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Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain La

terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.

Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

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Bonaventura Sententiarum 2