4 Hurricane Katrina ani) the Myth of Natural DUa.Jter.J

A Racist President or an Act of God?

On 2 September 2005, the NBC television network broadcast a telethon in su pport of American Red Cross disaster relief efforts along the coast of the Culf of Mexico. Hurricanc Katrina , one of the largest hurricanes of its strength ever LO reach the United Staws, had Illude IUlidfali about 80 hours carlier. Large swaths of Louisiana, i\.'lississippi, and Alabama lay flooded and in ruins. After I-larry Connick, Jr., sang "Do You Know What It Means to Miss New Orleans? " Canadian comedian Mike Myers and rapper Kanye West lOok Ihe 1100r. ~'Iyers failMully followed the teleprompter IJnd described the wretched state of New Orleans and its people. But West veered wildl y off script. I-Ie damned the mass media for their porlrayal of blaek people as looters, critici",ed the governmenl for taking so long to arrive with aid, and concluded with the memorable sentence: "Ceorge Bush doesn't eare about blaek people. " Myers then asked viewers to " Please call .. . '" bul didn't get to fini sh his sentence. Someone in (he NBC control room appareutly fi gured oul where West was headed and ordered the camem to turn away and cut (0 comeclil:lll Chris Tueker (DYson, 2006; 26--7).

53

54 • Chapler fOllr

Two months later, hip hop star 50 Cent was imerviewed by Contaclrnusic.eom. '" I don'l know where That came from," he said, refer+ ring to Kanye West's leleviscd out burst. "The New Orlcans disaster was mea nt to happen. [I was an act of Cod" ("'50 Cent ... ," 2005) .

The comments by Kanye West and 50 Cent received a lot of alten· tion and provoked much debate over whether the disaster was the result of one man's alleged racism or nature's wra th . From a socio­logical po in t of view, however, neither rap star came closc t,o under­sta nding how it came about. th at a storm ill the world 's rich est IIlId

most powerful country could kill 2300 people, ca use morc tha n US$ IOO billion in damage, seriously disrupt the suppl y of oil and natural gas t.o the nation , a nd force the eventual evacuation of 80 perce nt of New Orleans' population,1 After all , the danger of such a STOrm was widely and precisely known years earli er. The Federa l Emergency Ma nagement Agency (FEMA) issued a report in ea rl y 2001 saying that II hurricane striking New Orlea ns was one of the three most [ikcl y disasters to hit the Ull ited Statcs (the others were fl

terrorist altack on New York City and a maj or earthquake in Sa n Francisco). Since 2001, long, detailed and, as Hurrica ne Ka trina [atcr proved, shoc kingly accurate art icles had appeared in Scienf.ijic American , Time, NationaL Geographic Magazine, Popular Mechanics, the New York Times, a nd the New Orleans Times-Picayune that made th e results of resea rch on the effect of a powerful hurricane hilting New Orleans ava il able to the broad public and its political rep resen­tatives (see, for example, " Washing Away, .. ," 2002) . Yet a lmost nothing was don~ to prepare (or the inevitab le.

Expla ining thi s sociological mystery is the chief aim of Ihi s chnp+ ter, My exp lanation consists of two main parts. First, for centuries powerfu l and well-lo-do people made economic and political deci­sions tha t placed New Orleans, and especia lly its poor b lack citizens, at h igh risk of hllrricane -related death. Seeond, for a n equall y long period , powerful and we ll - to-do peop le resisted cha rging the American governm ent with responsibi li ty for ensuring the welfare of th e citizenry as a whole. As a result , re lati ve ly inexpensive measures thai preve nt hurricane-re[aLCd deaths in olher coun tri es have not

, In Jnne :!O05. tilt Cutf of M~xico .. -as I"C$]lQ"s ihtt f ..... "tart)' 30 peKent of U.S. oi ll'm<in,·,ion and 20 1"',,"R.m of tJ _S _ "ntnrnl gas pnxlucti'''' (Energy Infonnation Aumiui'lrati'>n, 2(05), lu B,t,li,i,,,, to 11\,~6 ""ufirmed death; due '0 Kalri,,' B, "f mid·~' B! ' 200<i, r~p<n~ r",limH'e '''HI ro",!"-I,], 500 Lo"isiaua /'t'sid"u,s " ·ret- ' .. 'ep' n"'A,' Bud ,,·ill nc,·cr l>e fo"nrl or iflrnlified (Krupa. :!006).

Hurn'Ctllle K(l/rilltl a"'/the My til a/ NlUllrol Dis,u te,., • J."i

bcen irnpl cmcm ed in th c Unit ed Stal cs . Neitll cr God nor OIlC mUll shoul d bc held res ponsiblc for the decisions a nd neglect of entire socia l classes.::!

The Development of New Orleans

In 1840, New Orlcans was the fourth most populous city in the United Slatcs, and untillhe 19205 il was Ihe world celllre of jazz. On the eve of Hurricane Kntrina, it was still an important pOi"! and tourist lowlI wilh a metropolitan population of more than 1.3 million. And, of course, it had a reputation. Tennessee Williams's A Streetcar Named Desire branded New Orleans sensual tllld decaying. John Kenncdy Toole's A Corifederocy oj Dunces rendered it a magnet (or loose screwball s. Anile nice addcd to it s mystery in Ill terlliew wilh the Vamp ire. Everyone kncw it as a party 10WII , home of the Mardi Cras, a place that gave the wol"ld gumbo a nd jlilUbnlaya, and Ihe only city in North America with a major street named after a 90-proof liquor.

New Orleans is situated on tJle CO<IS! of the Culf of Mexico (see Figure 4.1). Most of it lies below sell Icvel- in places, as Illuch as 2.5 metres (8 feet) below. To the SQUUI , the Mississippi River flows past lhe city, through wetlands, and into the Culf. To the nOrlh lies Lake Pontchartrain, the second -biggest sail-water lake in Ihe United Stales and the largest lake in Louisiana (see Figure 4.2). Imagine half a dozen exuberant eight-ycIlJ' . olds splashing in a swimming pool on a hot summer afternoon. New Orlcans is like II plastic soup bowl noating in the pool.

About 1.5 metres (5 feet) of rain falls on New Orleans 8l1IHmlly­

more than twice the anllual rainfall in Toronto lIud ncarly 40 percent more 1I1il 1l Ihat in New York. Every spring, the Mississippi t ries to flood, and it often succeeded even after people sta rt ed bu ilding dykes (or levees as they are called locally) 10 block the overnow. In the twentieth century, city residents achieved a measure of control o\'cr nooding by constructing a seri es of ca llais Ihat allow 900 million cubic metres (24 billioll gallons) of woter to bc collectcd and pumped inl.O La ke POlllchal"truin and other nearby bodies of wa ler every day. Still, every summer and fa ll, trOpies l storms and hurricsucs assault the Gulf coast.

' S'N"ia t dll8~ II perh8p. 'he $in",c ,nO$' ;nlpOMa", l"Q1IttV' in :ooci ... l ... ~· and nlIld , co"''''''rrsl' . urroundS;If d.,(i"i,i'm. For 111 )' P"'P"""~ il ;, . "fficien' '0 rldine ..... ·;ul elMS as a po,i, i" " oc<; upi . d by people i" ft hi . r~ ",h~· 'ha ' is . ha j:lI:d bl' e<Xo" o",k cril~ri~ indudi"!!: ",·eM lih.

56 • Chal'I"'" "..",.

Figure 4.1 The Caribhean BaJin alii) GIJjCOaJt

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f/" rrica,," Kalrina (lm/lhe Myth 0/ NOlllra/ Disa&ler4 • :'J7

Figure 4.2 HurricallL Katrina DiJaJter Area.!

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Sometimes, great waves of seawater surge iIHO New Orleans. Levees were built lO protect the city from storm surge too (see Figure 4.3). Yet there is enough threatening water in the area to make a reasonable person ask why lhe French ever settled New Orleans in the first plnee.

They did so as part of their strategy for continental control. The Mississippi leads deep into the North American interior, links to other rivers that empty into the Creat Lakes, and thus offers access to Canada, which the French had founded in 1608 (calling it "New France"; Sexton and Delehanty, 1993). The swampy and treacherous Mi ssissippi delta was difficult for the French to negotiate, so they settled 200 kilometres (125 miles) upstrea m from the river mouth. Thus was New Orleans born in 1718. It served as onc end of a continemul bridge between French land holdings, a bridge that also served as a barrier lO

the wcstward drift of British settlers, who were a lready moving into the disputed Ohio River va lley. Soon, several thousand French, Canadian, and Gennan colonists, West African slaves, and natives were living in New Orleans. Mainly because women were scarce, intermaniage was common, resulting in thc formation of a distinct ethnic group, the Louisiana Creole, a social jambalaya that was unusuaUy open to a ll races and cultures. With typical colour and exaggcration, yet with a grain of truth, Louisiana Governor Huey Long said two centuries later that you could fecd all the .... pure" white people in Ncw Orlcans with half a cup of beans and half a Clip of rice, and still have food Icf, over.

In the middle of the eightcenth century, war broke out betwcen Britain and France. France lost Canada and its grip 011 Louisiana weakened. Spain took control of Louisiana for 38 years, and when thc French resumed control they sold Louisiana to the UniLCd States fo r US$15 mi IJion (about US$400 billion in today's dollars) , in one stroke raising money for their next war with Britain and helping to reinforce a power that could rival France's chief enemy.

Whitc American settlers now flocked to New Orlcans. Census data show that between 1810 and 1860, the population grew tcnfold as the city became the country's sccond largest port. Tobacco, lumber, rice, sugar, cotton, and grain were shipped OUI. Manufactured goods, slaves, luxury goods, and coUce flowed in . In that half century, the numbcr of Ncw Orleanians of European origin increased from 37 to 85 percem of the population, while those of African origin fell from 63 to 15 percent (Logsdon and Bell, 1992: 206) . A distinct, modern Amclican neigh­bourhood was bu ilt uptown, its inhabitants separated from the Creolc

Illlrrioolie Katrina and t"~ Myth of Nll/liral f)i$a8fers • 59

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n:sidems of Ihe old French city by brond Canal Street and the Americaus' sensc of social, moral, and ('.(,:ollomic ~uperiority.

The Crowth of Black-While Illequality

New Orleans before the Lo uisia na Purchase wos 110 1 a city withollt rac;ial inequillity. Black slaves were brought I here from the begiuuing. Still , Ihe colour' line WtlS less rigid in New Orleans than in ol her cities of the Ullit cd SLat cs. Racial intermarriage was relatively common. MUll), freed slaves lived in New Orleans, nnd they we.re often em ployed nOI as menial workers bUI as skilled tradespeople. French ideas about equality found enger supporters in the city. As 1\ result, no sharp linc 5epllraled hlncks from whites. Social cont act nourished among aU catcgories of New Orlea llions, foste rcd by musicians, livc·in lovcrs, the Cal holic clergy, grocers, and saloonkeepers. Class, cuhure, and complexion elcvaled rmm y black residents 10 a status Ihat IIlOSt Americans or Africun descellt could ellvy ])ulnot reach (Logsdon Hnd Bell, 1992).

Once Americans starled seu.l ing in the city, the situation of the black populutjoll deteriorated . In the 18405 and 18505, an innux of white AmeriClln workers displuCf'd many freed slaves who worked on the docks Rnd in skilled trades. IlAcislll increased as job competilion moullIed; some freed slaves left for Haiti lO escape it. LouisiAnu 's fight 10 protect slavery during the Civil War (186 1-65) hardened the colour line. Then, rrom 1890 to 1952, a series of laws institillionalized rAcial segregulioll . Blacks and whites now had to be kept npart in trains, schools, streetcars, bars, prisons, homes for elderly peoplc, and even in circus nudiences. They could not marry or cohabit, nor could Ihey adopt a child of a differenr race. The)' could lIot dance or engage in ath let ic competiTion together. Blacks could not ft:ceive permitS to build houses in white lIeighbourhoods, aud whites cou ld 1101 receive permits to build houscs in black neighbourhoods ("Jim Crow Laws ... ," 2006). A comparison of the situation before find a rICr the Louisialla Purchase illuSlrtl l<:s the ract Ihal races are defilled not 50 much by Liological dirrerences as by socia l forces. Specificall y, racia l distinctions are typi ­cully mud\.! and reinforced by advantnged people for Ihe pllrpose of creati ng ulld maintaiuillg a syslem or inequality.

In Ih e 19205, ne\\' levee construction permitt ed Ihe shoreline of Lake Pollt charl rain 10 be heighICncd and extended, creatillg (Iesirable real CSHH e north of The ci ly for white residents (Hirsch and Logsdon ,

lI11rriCOIII' Kotri"" amI lite My /h o{Notllroi Diuute" • 61

1992). Aft er World War II, new highways accelerated suburban growth.

As a resull of " whit.e Oight" to the suburbs, African Americans bccurne u majority in the city of New Orleans proper ufter 1980, a position they had not held for HO years. Just before Katrina hit, the city of New Orleans was 68 percent AfricaJi American and just 25 percent nOli -Hispanic white. The poverty rate for African Americans was 35 percelll-7.5 percent above the national average for African Americans. Two-thirds of the city's public schools were deemed "academicall y unacceptable" by Ihe U.s. Department of Education. The ci r.y's homi ci de rate wns th e highesl of ally city in the country (Mahoney and Freemun , 2005). And the black POpuhllion was incrensi ngly concent ra ted ill the ci ly's least desirable, low- lying areas.

Flood COlltrol?

The situatioll of New Orleanians was especially preca rious beca use flood control measures were inadequate (Blumenthal, 2005; Bourne, 2004; Co mfort, 2006; Nordheimel", 2002; Tidwell, 2004). Two big problems existed (and, in fact, persisted a yea r after Katrina hit):

I. The diwppearallce 0/ coastal wetlallds. When waves of seawater from the Gulf of Mexico a.re whipped up by hurricane-fo rce winds, I.hey pound New Orlenns. The first line of defence agai nst this ollSlaught consists of the marshes a nd barrier islands of the wetlands berwccn New Orleans and the Gulf. Every 3.2 km (2 miles) of wetland reduces storm surge by 15 cm (6 inches). Before levees were built along the ~Iiss issippi , silt from the river's flood ­walers used 10 stop or at lea.st slow down the sinking of coastal wetlands inlO Ihe Gulf. BUlthe levees divert silt into the Gulf, ca using the wetlands 10 disappear lit an alarming rate. The first line of defence against storm surge has thus been weakened.

In addi tion 10 removing much of the physical barrier against SlOrm surge, the disappearance of the wetlllllds has another negat.ive consequence for flood cornrol. Hurricanes are mllchines fuclled by heal. They gain strcllgth from the heat that is released as vapour from warm seawater condenses and fall s as min. They weaken as they pass over land, which is cooler zlIld, of course, drier. The disap­pearance of coastal wetlands has effectivel y brought dIe warm

62 • C/'aptl'r f our

Wafers of Ihe Gulf closer to New Orleans, ensuring that hurTicHlles have Jess chance 10 weukeu before they mak e londfaJi.

2. The inadequacy of the ICllees. The second big flood oomrol prob­lem is lillit the levees along Lake POllIchanrain and ill other areas around the city were last reinforced with higher walls after Hurricane BetSy struck ill ·1965, killing more than 70 I>cople. Th~ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers thell built up Ihe storm walls to

wil hSHlnd a cat.egory 3 slOrm.l Forty yea rs afwr Betsy, the Luke Pon tcharlra in and other l ~vees despel"ll1.cly required upgrading, as Hurricane Katrina painfully dClnonslrated; Katrina lIlade landfall in Louisiana as a category 3 Slonn, and Ihe surge off the lake smashed the levccs, engulfing Ihe city. In all , about half the levee system was damaged (Burdellu, 2006). \'t' hu1 is worse, in an y given year, New Orleans stands un estimated 1 percenl chance of fll cing a cotegory 5 hurricane. Lco\.ing the levees al less than cawgory 3 readiness was lil:e playing Il ussian roulene using an alOm bomb inswad of Il bullet.

Aware of lhe problems JUSt outlined, the federal govenJmen! acted, but without resolve. It established a task force to hclp restore losl wetlands around New Orleans ill 1990. In 2003, however, the Bush administralion effectively ended that effort by allowing largely unre­stricted deve!opmem in the wetlands. Remarkably, in November 2005, two months after Katrina, the Bush adlOiniSlralion refused to fund a US$ 14 billion plan to restore the barrier islands and wetlands. (Ir that seems like a lot of money, hCIl!" in mind that it eCluals just six weeks of spending for the wor in Iraq or 7 percent. of the estimated COSt of restoration follOWing Kll trina; Tidwell, 2005. )

c.t.~· 1: ",i"i"""n ... " .-,,,i ,,,,,. sus,.;".,! .. ·i"d. of 71-9~ "'ph (199·15.1 bn/l'r) "".1 , I",,·~_ "Ot"IllR! Storm ~"rge of +-5 ft (1.2-1.5 ",.nu)

• U>,rgo,,· 2: ",;ni",,,,,, ooe·",inmc . " , t.i .. ",1 .. ·;nd. of 96-110 "'ph ( 15+-177 kmlh r) . "d 8bo,·~-no .. mal btu .. ", ~"rge ,,{ 6-8 {, (1.8-2.1 metres ) Ca,el!"'Y 3: ",inimu", une·",inme . " .• I>.i"",d ...... do " f 111 - 130 "'pl. (178-:.!09 k",/I'r) and "bu.·e-"onnal :Ilonn su~ <If 9-12 f, ( 2. 7~1 .7 " Itt"",) Ca.~ i : ,,,inim,,,,, one-",inu .. . ... . . "red .. ·jn,1< of 131 - 155 'np" (210-2 .. 9 b,,/hr) Mud .wove·" "m ... 1 Slorlll ' ''''!'' of 13-18 f. (1.0-5.5 me ........ ) Ca.rl!"'Y 5: mi";",,,,,, one-minu,. " " I .. i,~I .. ·i"d$ gre"lu Ih" " I!>.'i "'pl. (249 "m/hr) ."d alx"'e-norr, ... 15Ionn '!lege fP1'''ler ,"~" 18 f. (5.5 me.",. )

11,,"';1:(1111' K(lI/;nu w.d I/le Myth of NlIlurol fnKl#le~ • 63

In add ition, Congress aU lhorized n proj ecl lO improve the pUnlping of water out of the New Orleans area in 1996. Unfortunately, the proj­ect was only ha lf fi nished when money eUectively dried up in 2003. T he Corps of Army Engineers received money 10 improve the levees on Lake POllfchartrain and vici nity. Bill Ihe Bush adminislralion cut funding for the projecl by more than 80 percent in 2004 and Il lUde additional eUI S at the beginning of 2005, mnking other priorities, such as the war in lraq, higher. Beca use of budget culS, the Corps wns unable to butt ress the 17111 Street levee on Lake POlltcharuai.n, the loca lion of the biggest levee brellch during Katrina.

Brewing Storms

New Orlenns 01 1 the eve of KlItrillil was unusuall y poor, black , segre­gated, unequal, violem, and vu lnerable to noodi ng. As we have seen, there was nothing natural abou t this stllte of affairs. Centu ries of human effort-in the form of geopoli tical rivalry, economic competition, pu blic policy, and social exclusion- were required 10 creat.e il.

People's actions may have oonuibutcd to New Orleans' vulnerabilit y in another wa y too. I refer to lhe increasing use of fossil fuels such as guso­line, oil, fi nd coal. Buming fossil fuel releases Cllrbon dio;\:ide into the annospilcl'c. Carbon dioxide is n heat-trapping gas; it a llows more radia ­tion to elllf'r the atmosphere thun escupc il. The result is global wltnning. In turn, global wunning may increase the intensity uf tropical sronns.

I sa)' "mu y" because cont rovers), surrounds tht last part of my argu­ment. HII/'{Il y uny climate scienti sts doubt the at mosphere is heatillg up or tbat the COllcenlration of cu rbon dioxide and OUler heal- trapping gases hilS increased since the Industrial Revolu tion (Goddard Institute for Space SlUdies, 2006; Karl and Trenbel1h, 1999; Quashning, 2003 ). A large mll jorit)' of climale scienlis ts believes there is a cn use-and-effN'1 relationship III work here, nOl II coincidence." Thus, in 2001 , the In tergovernm ental PO/lei on Climate Change, which is sponsored by Ihe United Nalions and includes c1ima le scientists from around the world,

• ~I~ 1,""""",1). 1I",y belie'"e lhal 110m:: is. c . .. oe·,tnd·e{f«l ..,1. lio"..m., " 'ilh feedback. dUll .~t . ...... te ,Jiloe(l"ila>rium. For uaml'le, sl0b.I .. ·. " ,,;og mtll~ penn.r~ . " 'hen l",m",.r1'O$t " ... h ol, ;1 ..,Ie ....... mtl hMnt. ft ", .. eh 0JOn! t",,-em l"'m·' .... t'I" og ga. th8j, .;ar\.oon dioxide. CIoba.I ..... n"i"~'U'O mph" II", polllr k" CAlK. "l'eo .iIite i"" i. \Urn"d iOlo dark """8tt ,,'''IU, mOre ""Iar .... dialiQrt i, ~l>S<lrhed b~' thll pp.,h and leu i~ I'I'n"",ed barM ;"'0 SpAC<'O. TIt"''',.:h ,h~"" !,,,tili,·f. f~db'lCk 100" •• "uHll''''''pe nlt " ", rh"ge" c8 u,r- l>iJ!t(tr le"'I",ralurl' Ch8"g,-~ (Koll>< n , 20(6).

fH • Chapter Four

concluded tJlat " most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is artribulable to hUlIlan activities" (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001: 5). Leading scieillific bodies in the Uniled States, includ­ing rhe ~ational Academy of Sciences, the American Meteorological Society, the American Geophysical Un ion, a nd [he America n Association for the Advancemelll of Science, agree that the evidence for human impact on climal.e is compelling. A study of 928 papers 0 11 cl imate change published in scientific journals between 1993 and 2003 found 1I0t a single one that disagreed with the consensus view (Or·eskes, 2004). True, some scientists dispute tJle consensus. But their criticism should be taken with a grain of salt because much of their research is funded by Ihe coal and petrochemical induStries.

How might global wanning affect hurricanes? In brief, global wann­ing causes more water to evaporate. More vapour in the atmosphere does not increase the freq uency of hunicanes, but evidence suggests it may mtchet up their illl.ensity and cause fhe hurricane season 1'0 stan earlier (Emanuel, 2005; Knutson and Tuleya, 2004; Webster, Holland, and Chang, 2005). Some scientists legitimately question whelher enough data have yet been collected lO substantiate these early findings on the subject (Schiermeier, 2005a; 2005b). Therefore, the link between global waml­ing and hu .... icane deS(I"lIClivelless mUSI sliII be treal ed as an intriguing possibility rather than a proven fact. One thing can be said with certaimy, however. If research s ll.L ~ tal1tiates the connection, it will be a globa l prob­lem with deep local roots. With 4 percent of the wo .. ld's population, the United States burns a qunrter of the world's fossil fuels, more tJlan any other counrry. And il is olle of the very few commies in the world that has not committed ilself 10 substantially reducing their use.

A Comparative Perspective

The stronge~t argument that deaths due to hurricanes are more a social than a natural disaster comes not from climate science but from sociol­ogy. It is an argulIlelll i.n tJlree pa .. ts:

1. The populations of some countries are more exposed to Ihe threat of hurricanes than the populations of other countries .

2. At fhe same level of e:r:pOSltTC, some countries experience relatively few deaths due to hurrica nes wh ile others experience relatively rTlIllI V such dellths.

3. Countries L1mt experience relatively few deaths take extensive precau lions 10 avoid the cUlOSlrophic effeclS of Illlrricanes. CounlJies Ihat e.'l:pclicllce relatively muny deaths take few such precautions.

Figure 4.4 adds weighl 10 Ihis argument. 111e graph contains dala from 34 coulllries that were exposed to hurricanes from t 980 to 2000. It plals the IlUrnbcl· of people in each country who were exposed to Imrri ­canes (nlong the horizontnl uxis) against the averuge number of dealhs due 10 hlllTiclUu.!s each year (along the vertical a..-us). In the period 1980-2000, I he number of people exposed to hurricanes ranged from just over 18 000 in the small Wesl African country of Cape Verde to more than 579 million ill China. Average an nual deaths due [0 hurricanes ranged frorn less thun 0.,5 in New Zealand to more than 7400 in Bangladesh.

Figure 4.4 Relati"e Vulnerahility to Hurricanu~ 1980-2000

10000 Bangladesh

j " ~

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NOIe: Some WIIIIC!l an: negative becau!!e the variables are logged. Source: Call/piled/rom data in Um·tf!(/ Nlltiafl$ (2004b: 38, 146). A Global Report, Reducing Diltll/er Risk: A Clwllellge for Det·elopment. Uru·/ec! Na lions Developmellt Programme. lJllreoll for Crisis Prollelilion ofld Recol"',,; "'IIIW.IlIldp.orglbcpr.

66 • Chapler Fu«r

In genera l, countries with large exposed popu lations experienced more annual hurricane-related deaths than those with small exposed populations. That tendency is illustrated by the upwa rd-slopi ng trend line in Figure 4.4. The line shows tlle nwnber of deaths one would expect in an exposed population of a given size. Countries lying above the line were rnore vulnerab le to hurrica ne- related deaths than one would expect given the size of their e;>;:posed population. Countries lying below the line were less vulnerable than one would expect given th e size of their exposed population .

This is where the graph starts to gel illleresti ng. The e;>;:posed popu­lations of Uangladesh and Japan were approximately the sa mfl size (126 million in Japa n, 135 million in Bangladesh). Based on the size of their exposed populations, olle would expect both eountrics to have experi ­enced an avcrage of abou t 250 hurricane- related deillhs per year. Yet Japan expClieneed an average of only 39 hurricane- rdated deaths per year, while Bangladesh e;>;:perienced more than 7400. That is partly because Japan took fa r more e;>;: tensive precautions to guard agai nst such deaths than Bangladesh di d.

True, Bangladesh is one of the wo rld's poorest countries while Japan is one of the richest. The Japanese can therefore afford to wk e preca u­tions that lhe Bangladeshis can on ly dream of. Blit wealth is not the only factor that determines a cou nlrY's ability to take precautions. After all, the Uni ted States is about as wealthy as Japa ll, and had a considerably smaller exposed population (89 million people), yet it experienced a n average of 222 hurricane-related deaths per year compared to Japan 's 39. In fact, of the fo ur rich cou nlries represented in figure 4.4, three of them-Japan, Australia, and :"l'ew Zealand­experienced considerab ly fewer hu rricane- related dea ths tha n one would expect given the size of their e;>;: posed popula ti ons. Bllt the fourth rich co untry-the Unit ed STutes-e;>;: peri enced about liS many hurricane- related deaths pCI' year as a relatively poor cou ntry with an exposed population or the same size. In The period 1980-2000, Americans were more vulnerable to death by hurricane than Mexicans (with 65 million exposed people and an average of 85 hurriclllle­related deaths per year) and much more vulnerable than Cuba liS (with 11 million e;>;:posed people and an average of just 3 hurri cane- reitlled deuths per year).

Cuba

The Cuba n case illustrales well the kinds of precautions a country can luke 10 p re\'clIf hurricane-relIned deaths, even if if is rel3f iveiy poor (Cohn, 2005 ; HamilTon, de Valle, a nd Robles, 2005 ; Martin, 2005; Hcut crs Ncws Agency, 2005; Unit ed Na tions, 2004a ). The lasl time Cu bll surrcrcd 11 Inrgc number of cil suahies because of a hurricane was 1963, whell !-IlilTicane Flora killed 11 26 peop le. Afler Flortl, the Cubans ,ook action to prevent a recurrence of the terrible trugcdy.

They fi rsf implemented an educa rional program in schools, uni ver­sities, fi nd workplaces t.o lead l people how 10 prepare for and cope wit h nnturfl l disasters. The progra m truins lhe population from n you ng age 10 ill1 erpl'Ct and heed weal her report.i, \\'hich are broadcusl continllollsly alld updalcd fre'l l/cllIly in lhe e\'clII of all impending slonn . Every May, all anllllni lwo-day trailling session known as Meleoro is hel d. h focuses 0 11 ri sk reduction, in cl uding excn:ises IiHIl simulate evacuation and rescue ill the evelll of a hurriclllle. Metcoro <llso encourages preventati ve measuI·cs, such as trimming tree limbs and checking fo r weaknesses in darns, and it involves a review and updale of all emergency pia liS in Ihe light of Wllill has been Icarncd in the prccedillg year.

Cuba has organized ils civil defence nCl\vork to coordinate evacuation and rescue operations at the neighbourhood level in the e\'ent of u big Slonli . Civil defence workers and members of organiza tions such liS lhe Federation of Cuba n WOllleu go door-to-door to ensure tha t people fill Iheir iJll thtubs with watcr, tape their \\>lndows, put their car.> in the glu'age, unpl ug electricill appliunces, lind have an adequat.e supply of batt eries, lfllnsiSlOr ntdjo~, candles, fW.Ilches, drinking wnter, and food. They crelll.e lists of the ill , elderly people, pcople with disabilities, nnd single mOl.h­

ers--people who would nccd help evacuating-and they ensure Llull help is availuble if these people are required to leave Iheir homes.

If e\'acuation is ncces. .. ary, neighbourhood doctors eVllcuote togcther with l'Csidcllls so people who need medication can be properl y treated . Ilefrigcrators, TV sets, pets, and Olher valuable items are evacuated \\'ilh Ihe p(.'Ople so tbey won't be relu ctant to leave. Evacuation rOlll es, means of lnt li Spon alioll , and teltlporury hOUSing facilities for evncuees (nmiui y in schools) lire set up well in advuncc, as are stores of emer­gcncy WfllCr, food, and medicine. The existence and locations of these

(,.\ • f '/'''I'"./, f'III"

stores ure widely publicized. Buses, trllcks, ambulances, vaos, helicop· tcrs, even horse cans are mobilized to get people to sheher. Hegular wawr suppli ... ..s are turned off to uvoid the spread of disease.

As u result of Ihese precautions, Cuba losl on ly 22 li" .. ..$ in len major hurri ca nes between 1985 and 2004. Bu t the big test for Ihe Cuban system of prevent ing hurrican e- related dea ths came betwl'en 7 a nd 9 Jul y 2005, when Hurricane Dennis, th e most ferociou s stOl"111 s ince f lom, lashed Ihe island. Dennis hit Cu ba tw ice as a ca tegory 4 storm (Katrina hil Louisiana once as a category 3 smrlll ). Olle hundred and twenty thousand houses were badly damaged, 2.5 milliOIl people were left withom electricity, and 12 000 11t."Clarcs (30 000 acres) of banana trees were nallened. Howe\·cr, the timel y e\'ocuation of 1.5 million l)Coplc-a rcmnrkable 13 percent of Cuba's emire population-mini · mized the loss of life. Dennis kill l:d JUSt 16 CU])IIns. One can very cl1ldely estimfl1 e that if prec81 l1ions similar to dIOse employed in Cuba had been taken in the Unit ed Slaws lIearly three mo .. ths later whell Katrina hit , ti m Americall deat h tOll would have bccn l 28 people mt her than 2300.5

Clibu is tl commu nist COlllltry. Some people might argue ti mt its sterling achievem ent in preven ting hurricane- related deaths has been accomplished only by means of stnct poli tical control of ils populll­t iOIl-(:ol1trol that freedom. loving America ns would never tolerate. 8111 the argument is sllspect. Vi etnam is also a comm ullist country with stri ct poli tical control of it s population , yet il is highly vulflera­

ble 10 hu rricane· related dea lhs (sec Figure 4.4). Japan is a capitali st count ry wilhQltt sl.ricl polit ical control of its population , ye l. ; IS recQl·d of prcvent.ing hur rica ne- related dea ths is heller than Cuba's. Com munism verslls cap itali sm is not t.he issue here. Wha l is decis ive in determ ining a country's tolerance of hurricalle-reluted deaths is its popula tion's collecti ve will to ta ke responsibilit y for helpi ng fellow cit izens in need, II will that is typica ll r expressed through government policy. Compared 10 other rich countries, Ihut collective will is wea k ill the Uni ted State ... .

. l My lojI;ic j~ HS folio .... : TI,,, Uni.ed S'lIlel it "I"" •• 8 .iu lCll "..,..,. e.'P""'",1 '" 1t"rri<;II"~' ,loRn ( :"ha (69 milliol, ,.:J. II mittiou n~ 1>Wf'[,-). 11",,.., ~.~..., t6 Cub"" ,J.at h. d,,,, 10 Dr""i., a ""o .. r" of '""I'}. ro"ghly d", Sll n", mag";' "' ''' a. KII.ri" •. II rolJo,."j ,It", if the I lnit~oi 5tHt"" had tnken pff><"8Ll'i ...... "; ,,,il,, .. '" Cuh.· .... Katri"" "' ...... ld h..o,..., kil led appru:ci",",tly 128 Americ .. " , (tin.:<: 16 + 11 (I()() (I()() . t28 + 69 000 0011).

II"nlew/(' Katn"na and the Myth of Natural Disa&lln • 69

Katrina

Here is how it went down.6 On 25 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit Florida as a category ! storm, killing seven people. It then veered into the GuU of Mexico, where it was soon upgraded to category 3. Kathleen Blanco, governor of Louisiana, declared a state of emergency on 26 August and President Rush followed suit on the 27th. New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin deelared a vol untary evacuation order that night. At 10 a. m. 011 the 28th, Nagin finall y announced a mandatory evacuation order. At that poinl, Katrina was a category 4 storm about 20 hours from landfall . Seventeen hours later, at 3 a. m. on the 29th, the 17th StTeet levee on Lake Pontchartrain coll apsed. Other major levee breaches occurred at the London Avenue canal and the Industrial canal (see Figure 4.3 on page 59). Eighty percent of New Orleans was soon flooded, in some places to a depth of nearly 5 metres (16 feet ).

The response of government to the impending disaster was remark­ably restrained, to put. it politely. Top officials gravely underestimated the severity of the catastrophe about to befall residents of the Gulf coast. t"'layor Nagin hesitated to call a mandatory evacuation order because he was worried that the city wou ld be legally liable for closing hotels, hospitals, and businesses. Consequentl y, he tu rned down an offer by Amtrak to evacuate several hundred New Orleanians on the last tmin out of town and he fa iled to mobilize the city's 804 operational buses to gel people out. The director of the National Hurricane Center had to call the mayor at horne during dinner on Ihe evening of the 27th to tell him thllt the storm was the worst he bad ever seen and practically beg the mayor to declare a mandatory evacuation order the next morning.

The White l'louse found Out about the 17th Street levee breach at midnight on 29 August but 0 11 the morning of the 30th, President Bush, vacationing at his Texas ranch, expressed relief that New Orleans had "dodged the bullet. " An e-mail confirming Ihe levee breach had arrived at the Department of Homeland Securily two-and-a-half hours before the information reached the White I-Iollse, but the next morning, i\'lichael Chertoff, Secretary of the Depar1lllent of Homeland Security, flew to Atlanta for a conference on bird flu .

.. The fullu"'ing 8 <0<:1)1)11' i ! ha~cd rnsillly 011 t)yson (2005). U.S. J lo"Sf) nt lI epre~ell'sli,"e" (2005), and repnru in 'he N~", York Tit/wI.

';'11 • f '''''1'/'''' 1/,,,,.

The consefJuences of offi cial inabiliry 10 apprecia te the gravity of the problem were aggravated by woefully inadequllte plan ni ng. For exa m­ple, before the hurrica ne hit, lIoLody was in charge of overseeing the response and nobody had fig ured out how to avoid COnn icl ovcr wh ich agency shou ld be in charge of law enfor'cemenl so that people could be evacuaTed effectively. The Louisiana transportation secretary was legally responsible fo r cvacuating thousands of people from hospilals and nursing homes but had no plan in place to do so. The New Orlea ns Police Depanment unit responsible for the rescue effort was equipped with three small botlls and no food, water, or extra fuel. For years il. was known Ihat 100 000 people lackcd transportation Olll of the cil Y. According to the 2000 census, residents of New Orleans were less lik ely to own cars than residents of any other cit y in the United Sl.ates aside from New York, with its highl y developed mass lr'UnsportUlion system. Almost all of the New Orleans residents who did nOI own cars were black, poor, andlor elderly (Berube and Raphael, 2005). Yet an evacu­ation plan foJ' these people was only 10 percent fini shed when Katrina struck.

Complicllting matters fllrlher was the inexperience-man y say incompetence-of high-ranking officials in the Federal Emergency Managemcnt Agency (FEi\'iA ). Five of the eight lOp people in FEMA, incl uding it s head, Michael Brown, joined the agency without allY expe­rience in disaster management. Many of the agency's top officials, incl uding Brown, were poli tical appoimees whose chief elaim 10 fame was loyal service during President Bush's run for the Wh ite House. Lacking professiollal qualirications and releva nt job e;.;perience, slich people often didll 't know what to do li nd didn't appreciate how urgently they had to act. It hardly helped maners that FEMA had lost its inde­pendent staws after becomi ng part of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security in 2001 and then suffered budget cuts as resources were di verted to fighting terrorism. Little wonder that the New Orleans relief and rescue efforl was slow, inadequate, and often brut al, lead illg to mally deaths (see this chapter's Appendix on pages 75-78).

Tens of thousallds of New Orlefillians were trllpped in the flooded city after the storm passed. Many of them had to be reseued from rooftops by boat or helicopter. Moreover, the bowl was now overflow­ing with toxic soup; t.he waters that engulfed the cit)' con tained a witch's brew of industrial and hou sehold chemica ls, sewage, ga rbage,

fI",,.;,,,,,,,, Kalnll(l (lnd II", 1I{}71/ of Nailiral Oi, os/en • 71

Il nd rotting human and animal corpses . People werc nonctheless forced w wade through the wHters 10 scrounge fo r drinking water, food, and medicine, and lO gel lO higher ground . Conditions in the Superdome and the New Orleans Convention Centcr were especially appalling. Thousands of people sought shelter in those twO buildings, where thcy were stranded for days in slifling heat , with liule or no drinking wal.Cr, food, medicine, or sanitation. Women miscarried, elderly pcople died, all suffered horriblv.

A Smaller, Whiter New Orleans

Some wrule New Orleans neighbourhoods were eXlensively damaged by Katrina. Some black districts escaped seriOllS damagc. Overall, howevcr, a disproportionate amount of modcrate and calastrophic damage took place in poor, black districts. Thus, if aJi residents returned to lightly dmnaged Ileighbourhood~ and none retumed to moderately and cata­strophically damaged districts, thc city would lose 80 pereenl of its black population and 50 pcrccnt of its white pop ulation (Loga n, 2006). Of course, many people have returned and more may do so. Fivc monlhs after the stonn, the population of thc city stood at just under 68 perecnt of its pre-Katrinll level (Katz, Fellowes, and Mabama , 2006: 5). Priva te insurance, individual spcnding, philanthropic contributions, and govern­Illent aid have fundcd and will continue lO fund clean-up, reconstruction, and levee repair and improvemeill . Slill, it seems likely that thc new New Orleans will be smaller and whiter Ihan the pre~ Katrina city.

Indecd, in the uptown diSlriCI life was staning to return to normal just thrce weeks after the storm. Along its broad, tree-lined streClS, work CJ'ews and hired help were restoring the Civil War--era mansions, and well -to-do white families werc already living in them. The uptown and other well-off districts (Algiers, the French Quaner, the Central Business District ) are on higher ground and they escaped the worst of Ihe flood ing. Bllt the poor districts, where most of the ci ty's African Americalls li ved, tcnded to be on low ground . There, flooding was typi­ca lly morc scvere. Three weeks after Katrina, the poor districts were deserted. Much floodwater remained, stagnant and toxic. Emaciated dogs were running wild. Everything was rOiling. A great man y of Ihe houses in the poor di stricts will have to be destroyed (Mahoney alld Freeman, 2005).

72 • Cllapler Four

It is unckur how mun y African Americans will rcturn 10 New Orleans, but 1m indi cation of what might lie fthcad eomcs from a survey condUCled in Houston between 10 and 12 September 2005 among 680 ra ndomly selected Kal:rinn evacuees. Ninety-eighl percent of them came from New Orlenlls, 93 percell! were black, and 86 percelll had house­hold incomes of less than US$30 000 a year. Just 43 percent of the respondcrlls !juid they planned to move back to their hometown ("Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees," 2005 ).

African America ns are less likely 10 rerurn than whiles because they lack the money re(luired to do so and, in any case, have less 10 rClUrn to.

In addition, evidence suggc.<;ts Ihat reconstruction efforl s discri minate against the black community. Such efforts have fi rst concenlrllted on less-damaged, while neighbourhoods, delaying Ihe reconstruction of predom in llllt ly black districts. As ti me passes nnd people get settled el sewhere, the), are less likely t,o return . Mosl governmerll gru nt assistance has gone to white, middle-class Storni victims. In white districts, government loans 10 small business are approved at about seven times the rate of loan approval in poveI1y-slricken black neigh­bourhoods. Blacks arc less likely lhan wh ites w receive insurance settle­ments thaI wi ll ullow them t,o reconstruct their houses (Bullard, 2006). As has been the cuse throughout the history of New Orleans, class and race powerfull y sbape people's lifc-chances.

Markets, Citizenship, Power, and Policy 1 think you nil know thUI I" 'e nlwoys felt the rune most terrifying ~ords in the EngJislr hmguage are, ~ I 'm from the gO\·errunent nnd I'm here to help.'"

- Prelidellf HOlloM He(lgtlll. 1986

Markc ls nre social relations that regulate the exchange of goods llnd services. In a market, the prices or goods and services are established by how plentiful tbey are (supply) nnd how much they arc wallled (demllnd). For example, if demand for labour iucl'eases und the supply of labour Stays tlrc same, tile price of labour (the hourly wage) rises. Workers spend and save m OI'C, a nd unemployment fa lls. In COntrast, if the stlpply of labour increases and demand for labou r stays the same, wages fall . Workers earn ami spend less, and unemployment grows.

Late-eightccnth-cent ury Britain most closely approximllled a completely free market for labour. However, Ihe supply of lllbour

I fll,.rirww KOIni", (lmt /11<' My/h ofiVa/1I1lI1 Di'(ls/I!u • 1:1

exceeded demand 1,0 such fl degree that Slll rvaTjon beca me widespread . The thrent of social inst.a bil ity forced fhe govermnelll to establish u system of stale- mil "poor houses" IImt provided minim ul food and shel­ter for people withoUl menlls (Polanyi, 1957).

Because perfectly free lubour murkets periodicully cuuse much suffering and death if left unchecked, they Ill llst be regliluted by govern ­moms. For e:w:n mple, North J\merican luws outlaw child labour, stipuillte nlll:.;imu!U work hours, make certain holidnys compulsoI)', and specify a minim um wage. Like most people, Americans and Canadians know Ihat without such regulations, the whip of the Illbour market would destroy IlI ll ll}' of us.

The right s of people t,o protect ion ullder the 111\\' un: embodied in d ill cOllcept of citizenship_ To vUI)'ing degrees, ci rizens of differen t COLIII ­Iries have fought for and won civil rights (free sp('ech, freedom of worship , just ice under the Inw ), polj tica l rigill s (freedom to , 'ote aud run fo r office), li nd socinl right s (freedolll to recejve a minimum level of economic securit y ami pll rlicipate full y in socia l li fe) (Marsha ll, 1965). Note the phrase " to vu rying degrees. " In the fight for citizen­ship rights, the citizens of $(lme countries have been more sllccessful than the citizens of other counrries. And note the word "'figh t. " Citizenshi p rights are rllrcl y gnHlt,ed becu use of the gnu;e Hnd generos­ity of people ill positions of power. They nre typically extracted by subordinates using force_ Consequently. success in achieving citizen­ship rights dcpends heavily on how powerful dirferelll ciHegories of people are. Power is the ability to rea lize one's will , even against t,he resistance of others (Weber, -\946: 180). OverSimplifying for the sa ke of hrevity, the ba lance of power between outhorities aud subord inates in a gi\'en society largely determines how e ."u~ns i ve and entrenched citi ­zenship rights become. If subordinates ure relativel), powerful , citi :.r.en ­sllip rightS become extensivc und well entrenched. Luws t.hat ensure broad civil, politjca l, and socinl right s are passed . Among rich COllll ­

tries, societies li ke Sweden emerge in the extreme Clise. If a uthori ties are relatively powerful, citizenship rights do not become ex tensive and well entrenched. Fewer /lnd weaker laws ensuring civil, political, a nd socia l right s arc passed . Among ri ch co untries, societies like the Unit ed States cmerge at. the other ex treme.

On almost every imaginuble measme of citizenship rights, the United States lags bebi nd the otiter 20 0 1' so ot her rieh countries ill the

74 • Chapter- FOIlr-

world. For example, long afwr all ad ult citizens won the right w vote in other rich countries, many African Americans were st ill unable to vote. It was only in the 1960s that African Americans won such rights. Nor did the United Sta tes lead with respect to women's voting right!:!. It became Ihe 26th country to grallt women the right to vote, following the Scandinaviall countries, the B"itish dominions, a number of continelltal European cOllntries, and t.he Soviet Union. The United States compufes unfllvollrably willi other rich countries as far as sociul riSh.s are concerned too. Thus, the gap be' ween rich and poor is @'enter ill the United SUH.es than in any other rich ooumry, and the proportion of the population classified as poor is larger. Americans enjoy no national health-ca re system, no national system of paid parental leave, no nalional system of job retraining, and 110 national child-care system. In recent decades, the govcrnrnelll. has slashed the number of fami lies receiving wclfare benefit s and the Cllsh and noncash assistance ava ilable to each famil y. As a result, the plight of America's poor--disproportion ­at.ely composed of children, single mothers with children, and African America ns-has been worsening steadily (Block, Korteweg, lind Woodwnrd, 2006).

According to fonner Harvard huma n rights professor Michael Igllat ieff (who is now a Ca nadinn Member of Pa rliament fo r the Libcral purty), the circumstances surrounding Hurricane Kiltrina demonstra te that the governmelll of the United Slales has broken its "contract" with its citizens (Ignlltieff, 2005). I disagree. The contraci nevc r slipuilltcd that th e Americllll governmcnt wou ld care much for its citizens in the first place. True, t.here have been peri ods whcn AmeriCll1l government s were charged with grellter responsibility. The Creal Depression of the 1930s, wit.h ils massive nationwide strikes, and the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s, wit.h its marches. demonstrAtions, sit+ins, and race riOIS, were times whclI Democratic administrations took im portant s teps forward in that regard. Bu t the overall tendency, grown stronger since Ronald Reagan firs l came to power in 1980, has been fOf govenunent to minimize it s in volvement in the li ves of it s citizens, giving the freest possible reign 10 the fo rces of the free Illllrket. From this point of view, the rragedy of Katrina WIlS ultimul ely the result of Ihe imbalance of power between upper and lower classes, and between uut horities and subordinat.es, in lhe United States.