Ernst, Mach [Segn Buzzoni]:Similitud fundamental en EMs y ERs:mtodo de variacinEM: variamos las representaciones para ver las consecuencias de esas variacionesER: se varan las circunstancias naturales.[] la similitud entre ERs y EMs depende del hecho de que los ltimos presuponen algunas experiencias; esto es, los EMs presuponen que algunos ERs hayan sido realizados ya, al menos al nivel del sentido comn. [] [p.91]En este sentido:[] los ERs son lgica y cronolgicamente anteriores a los EMs. [] [p. 91]Diferencias:[] [EM es] a necessary precondition for physical experiment. Every experimenter and inventor must have planned arrangement in his head before translating it into factGalileo must see the experimental arrangement for investigating free fall well represented in his phantasy before he can realise it. [] [p. 92] En este sentido:[] el EM precede al ER [] [p.92][Norton trata de eliminar esta contradiccin] Distincin segn Norton: [] The logical structure of TEs guarantees that they are distinct from Res. [] [p. 92] [Sin embargo, estn de alguna forma intrnsecamente conectados uno con otro?] OBJECIN EN CONTRA DE NORTON:[] a TE, stripped of all irrelevant particulars and reduced to a pure argument would lose all empirical meaning. [] it is not irrelevant that TEs are generally performed by constructing particular cases, which need concrete elements that are in principle reproducible in specific spatio-temporal individuated situations.[] [p. 93][] TEs, stripped of any reference to concrete experimental apparatuses and situations, are confined to a domain of purely theoretical statements and demonstrative connections, thereby losing their connection with REs. [] [p. 93][Afirmacin impltica de Buzzoni: los EMs tienen un significado emprico]CRTICA AL PLATONISMO DE BROWN:[] oscillates between an unacceptably radical separation between REs and TEs and their virtual conflation [] [p. 94]Similitud entre REs and TEs:[] in both there is a passage to a proposition. [][ p. 94]Diferencias entre REs and TEs:[] a RE carries from a perception (and some background propositions) to a proposition, while in TE the perception is not sense perception, but rather an intuition, a case of seeing with the minds eye. [] [p. 94]PROBLEMAa) A veces Brown parece querer afirmar que los Res tambin apelan a una intuicin, un caso de ver con el ojo de la mente, o ms precisamente, de propiedades de tipo natural. [p. 94]b) A diferencia de Platn, Brown no descarta la falibilidad de la intuicin intelectual, y por lo tanto tampoco de los EMs (incluidos los platnicos).[] en este sentido, la distincin que Brown intent trazar entre experimentos reales y mentales se desvanece completamente. [] [p.94]Como una consecuencia de esta igualacin virtual entre EMs y ERs, la posicin de Brown se convierte en circular.SALIDA DE ESTE CRCULO: un [] an operative testing criterion for empirical TEs. [] [p. 94]Entre conocimento emprico y a priori:[] an essential difference that hinges on their corrigibility. In the case of empirical knowledge, the possibility of detecting errors depends on the possibility of real interactions between our body and the surrounding world, that is, on something that is accessible to all beings endowed with reason and with a body. [] [p. 94][] If this difference is obscured, any relevant difference between REs and TEs disappears. [ [p. 94] [] no son capaces de articular la relacin entre EMs y ERs, ya sea porque los separan completamente y no tienen nada que ver uno con otro, o porque virtualmente los combinan. [] [p. 95]