Byzantine Empire-Political History

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From the r ev iews o f t he F ir st Edi ti on :'Michael Angold nowhere descr ibes his scholar ly his tory of the Byzantine Empire1025-1204 as a chron ic le of c ri si s, yet in i ts own way tha t age was one of dra st icchange. At the beginning the breach between eastern and western Chr is tianity wasconfirmed into hopeless suspicion; at the end the westerners whom Byzantium hadcome to need subjec ted Constan tinople to a dreadful s ack and imposed for twogenerations a Latin empire upon its ruins. The intricate politics of the years betweeni s th e subject of t his book. It is a remarkable achievement. Byzantine his tory isunfortunately so unfamiliarto most educatedwesterners that the very names ofemperorsand writers s tr ike the ear without the resonances appropr iate f rom so awesome acivil ization. Yet here we are guided with a sure touch and f lashes of illuminationthrough a dense maze of factual narrative.'

F.R.H.DuBouiay, TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT'Because this is such an efficienttextbook, itwould be a pity ifit were thereby denieda further readership, for this work has two greater virtues. First, it is clearly based ona fresh re- reading of familiar sources .. .. A second vir tue is that behind Angold'sdeceptive directness of s tyle there is a balance of judgement and reticence which isattractive. No great conclusions,but a stream of conclusions, usually shrewd, some-times idiosyncratic, often epigrammatic.'

Anthony Bryer , HISTOR Y'He has taken as his subjectthe 180 years between the death of the Emperor Basil I I,the las t effective ruler of the Macedonian dynasty, and the cataclysm of the FourthCrusade, which changed the facenot only of Byzantium but of the whole Chr is tianworld. These were the yea rs in which the balance of power in tha t wor ld shi ft eddecisively from East to West.... Teachers and students alike will therefore welcomethis book since it isthe first monograph in English to cover this important period forwhich the standard works have been the [studies] of the French scholar FerdinandChalandon published between 1900 and 1912.. .. This is a f resh and stimulatingstudy .. .'

D.M .Ni co i, T IMES HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT'His focus is that of the political historian, but his scope is comprehensive: politicalevents and characters are set against the social, economic, intellectual and religiousbackground. He marshalsa great amount ofevidence in a lucid prose, uncluttered bynotes and untarnished byrhetoric. Sucha book was needed as no skilled historian hasattempted to present the his tory of these two centuries as a unity, and they containmaterial worthy of a decline-and-falltreatment - the city of Constantinople slippingin 200 years f rom a pinnacleof power to a state of bondage. Angold's approach islaconic, unromantic, attentiveto facts,whileconstantly probing for underlying causesand explanations: theriseof aristocraticfamilies, the fluctuations in money values, theevidence of Latin and Italian sourcesabout trade and industry. The concentration oflearning is admirable.'

Jos eph A . Muni ti z, THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL

The ByzantineEmpire, 1025-1204A political historySecond EditionMichael Ango ld

H.1 fl

LongmanLondon and New York


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Addison Wesley Longman LimitedEdinburgh Gate,Har low, Essex CM20 2JE,United Kingdomand Associated Companies throughout the worldPublished in the United States of Americaby Addison Wesley Longman Inc., New York Michael Angold 1985, 1997The r ight of Michael Angold to be ident if iedas author of this Work has been asserted by himin accordance with the Copyr ight , Des igns andPatents Act 1988.A ll ri gh ts r es er ved; no par t o f t he pub li ca ti on may bereproduced, s tored in a ret rieval sys tem, or t ransmi ttedin any form or by any means , e lect ronic, mechanica l,photocopying, recording, or otherwise , without e ither theprior wri tten permiss ion of the Publishers or a l icencepermi tt ing res tr ic ted copying issued by the Copyr ight LicensingAgency L td ., 90 Tot te nham Cou rt Road , London W1P 9HE.First published 1985Second'Edition 1997

Y t~ ',>l ISBN 0 582 29468 1 PPRBritish Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available ' f rom the Bri ti sh LibraryLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataAngold, Michael.

The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204: a pol it ical h is tory / MichaelAngold. -2nd ed.p. em ,

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-582-29468-1.1 . Byzan ti ne Emp ir e-Hi st or y- l025- 1081 . 2 . Byzan ti ne Emp ir e-

HIs tory-Common Dynasty , 1081-1185. 3 . Civil izat ionMedieval-12th century . 4 . Eleventh century . 1. T it le . 'DF596.A54 1997949.5'02-dc21 96-49085

CIPSet by 35 in 10112pt SabanP r od u ce d t hr o ug h Longman Malaysia ,eLP

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1.; Contents

List of MapsList of Family TreesPre face to the First Edi tionPreface to the Second Edi ti onA Note on the Transliteration of the GreekIntroduction: The Sources

VlllviiiixXlxii1

Part I 1025-11181. Int roduction: Recent Work (1025-1118)2. Basil II and his Legacy3. Byzantium's Place in the World, 1025-1071

The Russian attack of 1043The PetcheneksThe SeljuqsMantzikert 1071Byzantium and the West

131524

353537404448

4. Byzantium 1041-1071: the Search for a NewPolitical Order 56

5. Economy and Society m Eleventh-centuryByzantium 81

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---The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204 Contents6 . Intellectual Currents in Eleventh-century Byzantium 99 1 3 . Manuel Comnenus and the Latins 226

The Venetians at Constantinople 2267 . The Rise of the House of Comnenus 115 Byzantium and the Latins 233The civil wars 116 The Latins and Manuel Comnenus 236The fall of Anatolia 117 14. The Government of Manuel I Comnenusikephoritzes 121Alexius Comnenus's coup 124 (1143-1180): Court, Church, and Politics 241The Norman threat 129 The court aristocracy 243The Petcheneks 132 The aristocratic connection 245Alexius I Comnenus and Asia Minor 134 Andronicus Comnenus and the pol it ics of theComnenian court 2528 . Alexius I Comnenus and the Restoration of The Styppeiotes affair 255the Empire 136 The business of government 257Manuel Comnenus and the church 260John Italos 137 Byzantine monasticism under Manuel Comnenus 266Heresy 141 The patriarchal church 269Alexius and the church 143The defusion of internal opposition 146 15. Capital and Provinces 276Administrative reforms 148 The Greek lands in the twelfth century 280ilitary organization 149Provincial administration 151 The land and the peasantry 286Central administration 153 The Anatolian provinces 289Finances 154 Conclusion 293Conclusion 155 16. Byzantium 1180-1203: the Failure of the9. Alexius I Comnenus and the West 157 Comnenian System 295Isaac II Angelos (1185-1195) 303The foundation of the second Bulgarian Empire 304Part II 1118-1204 171 Local separatism under the Angeloi 307Court , capital , and polit ics - demoral izat ion at the centre 31110. Introduction: Recent Work (1118-1204) 173 17. The Fall of Constantinople and the11. John II Comnenus (1118-1143) Fourth Crusade 31618112. The Foreign Policy of Manuel I Comnenus A pp en dix : F am ily T re es 329Bibliography 331(1143-1180) 191 Maps 351The second crusade 194 Index 361The Normans of Sicily 200Hungary, Serbia, and Russia 204The German Empire and papacy 209Byzantium and the crusader states 215Byzantium and the Seljuqs 221VI Vll


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List of Maps

1. The Byzantine Empi re c.l025 35 22 . Byzantine Asia Minor in the eleventh and twelfth centuries 35 43. The Empire under the Comneni 35 64 . The Balkans in the twelfth century 35 85. Byzantine Greece in the eleventh and twelfth centuries 36 0

List of Family Trees

1. The end of the House o f Macedon 32 92 . The House of Doukas 32 93 . The House of Comnenus 33 04 . The House of Angelos 33 0

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. .

Preface to the First Edition

This isa pol it ical his tory, but not one that aims only at providing a straight-forward account of the main events and personalities. The object has been toset the pol it ical his tory of the Byzantine Empire in the eleventh and twelfthcenturies in its social, economic, and intellectual context. It concentrates onthose who exercised power and influence, both individually and collectively,and it t ries to char t t hose changing forces and assumptions tha t he lped todetermine the possibi li ties of act ion. It sets out to explore Professor PaulLemerle's dictum: 'To represent Byzantium as unchanging over eleven cen-turies would be to fal l into the trap, which i t has i tself laid' . Never perhapsdid Byzantium's external situation and internal structure change so quickly asover the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The fascination of the period lies inthe way the Byzantines strove to adapt to new circumstances. It was a heroiceffort, but one that fai led.

Another of the traps which Byzantium has laid for the unwary comesin the shape of that splendid succession of histories which cover our period.I t is a ll t oo easy to neglect the r ich vari ety o f o ther sources and to fa ll backon the narratives provided by Michael Psellos, Anna Comnena, and NicetasChon ia tes, t o mention on ly the best-known hi stor ians o f the period . Toguard against this danger, I have not treated their his tories as mere reposit -ories of facts, but have sought out their opinions, their prejudices, and theirdiscussions of the issues of the day, in the hope that these will illuminate thepolitical process at Byzantium. I have accordingly, if paradoxically, advancedhistorians to the front of the political stage. There seems to be nothing wrongin this, for they were often considerable political figures in their own right.I have tried to test their prejudices and quest ionable judgements against awhole range of other sources - legal, literary, ecclesiastical, documentary. Ihope that this has made it possible to strike a reasonable balance between thedifferent kinds of source material.

Thi s book has very la rge ly been writt en ou t of the pr imary sou rces,IX


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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204though I have obviously gained much from the secondary material. I havetried to indicatemy debts byciting byname in the text those scholars whosework I have found particularly useful. There is, however, one name that Iwasnotableto work in- that ofPaul Gautier. I was extremely sorry to learnthat hehad died inJuly 1983. I never met him, nor ever corresponded withhim but like all Byzantinistsworking on the eleventh and twelfth centuriesI was great ly in his debt. His scrupulous edi tions of such a variety of newsourcesopened up a body of material, which is almost justification in itselffor takinga fresh look at the his tory of the Byzantine Empire during thosecenturies.I shouldlike to thank Paul and Ruth Magdalino of StAndrews Univer-s ityfor goingthrough a draft ofthis book, which I sent them early in 1983.Theysavedme from a number of mistakes and gave me the encouragementneededto press on to a conclusion. I should also l ike to thank my wife forherforbearance, as papers, books, and typewriters came cascading down thestairsfrom my attic study.I havededicated this book to my mother as a small token of love andaffection.

MICHAEL ANGOLDEdinburghFebruary 1984

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Preface to the Second Edition

For near ly t en years I have tr ied out the f ir st editi on on my specia l sub jectclasses. The various members have been perceptive and sometimes exactingcri tics . I hope that they wil l approve of the numerous changes I have madeto the or igina l t ext. They have been made with them in mind. I must thankthem in all sincerity.They agreed with the reviewer who took me to task for failing toprovide any direct discussion of the sources. I have therefore now tried tomake the sources more accessible bysupplying an introductory note on them.I have also added to the bibliography a list of sources in English translation.Sincethe book originally came out in 1984 there has been a good deal ofnewwork on the period - some of i t of g rea t va lue. I have t ri ed to bring the bookup to date by inserting introductions to the two major sections into which thebook divides. They take the form of a review of the most impor tan t li te ra -ture that has appeared on Byzantium in the eleventh and twelfth centuriessince the early 1980s. I have also brought the bibliography up to date. Theemphasis is very much on publications in English.

MICHAEL ANGOLDEdinburghAugust 1996

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, I , , I O 10 0 I1 ,

A Note on the Transliterationof the Greek

I have tried, where I have thought appropriate, to fol low the tradi tionaltransliteration of proper names, but I have preferred a direct transliterationfrom the Greek for names that are not in common English usage - forexample Eustathios instead of Eustathius or even Eustace, which seems ashadebizarre.In place namesI have, where possible, transliterated the Greekletter X bykh rather than the more usual ch, because the lat ter representssuch a confusing range of sounds.

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0 , 0

Introduction: The Sources

The period 1025-1204 in Byzantine history iscovered by a magnificent seriesof chronicles and histories . Only the reign of John II Comnenus (1118-43)gets short measure. It is inevitable that the chronicles and histories will pro-vide the chronological framework of any political history. The chronologicalf ramework will not be an end in i tse lf . This i s not to di smis s narrative outof hand; there are many k inds o f nar ra tive hi story. The a im of thi s book isto explore the political process at Byzantium. This requires a particular ap-proach to the narrative sources. The emphasis wil l be on the author and hiswork aspart of that process . This does not mean that I am unaware or ignorethe bias of a parti cula r his to rian. I t i s more tha t there is a grea t dea l to begained from working with the bias of a historian. Most of the historians werefigures of some political importance. Their views and the way they shape thehistory of their times reflect the issues of the day and the analyses ofparticulargroups. Their bias was part of the pol it ics of the era. It allows us an insightinto the dynamics of pol it ics. Even their falsi fications on this reading are auseful guide. Since I use the narrative sources in this way it is necessary tosay a l it tle about the his torians and their his tories .

The most detai led account of Byzantine his tory from 1025-57 comesfrom the pen of John Skyli tzes ,' who was an administrator and judge underAlexius I Comnenus. This was the final section of a chronicle that began in813 and was conceived as a continuat ion of Theophanes the Confessor. Hischronicle is largely a narrative of events with little political comment. It is acompilation rather than an original work. For the last section of his chron-iclehe seems to have made use of a his tory or possibly an autobiography ofKekaumenos Katakalon who was prominent inthe events of the mid-eleventh

1 loannis Scylitzae Synopsis historiarum (ed. I. Thurn) [Corpus Fontium Byzantinae 5.Series Berolinensis] (BerlinlNew York, 1973).1


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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204century.' This provides a particular slant. There isa continuation of Skylitzes'schronicle to 1079, which he mayor may not have written.' His chronicle wasthen reworked by John Zonaras ," who came from much the same adminis-trative background as John Skylitzes, Both held the same important judicialoffice of droungarios of the watch. Zonaras added a sec tion on the reign ofAlexius I Comnenus (1081-1118). It is an independent work of the greatestimportance because it conveys the criticismthere wasof Alexius's rule. Zonarasfinished his chronicle under Manuel I Comnenus (1143-80). By that t imehe had reti red to a monast ery and had est abli shed a reputat ion as a canonlawyer. There was clearly a civil service tradition of historiography, whichcould be critical of imperial rule. This was continued later in Manuel's reignby Michael Glykas.' These civil service historians were compiling or continu-ing world chronicles. They were interested in the sweep of christian historywhich gave added meaning to the events of their own time.

Th is i s in cont rast wi th the con temporary h istor ies , where no suchcontext is suppl ied. Their authors put much of their own experience intotheir works. They were often eyewitnesses of the events they described. Inthe hands of Michael Psellos history turned into memoirs. Michael Psellos'sChronographiai was well known, even in i ts own day. In his introduct ionJohn Skylitzes comments unfavourably on it. It broke the rules of historio-graphy. Modern historians have been kinder. Cyril Mango has describedit as a masterpiece 'whose or iginalit y is a ll the more st ri king in as muchas i t is not explicable in terms of a prior development '. He characterizes i tas a 'veritable portrait gallery'." The Chronographia beginswith the reign ofBasil I I (976 -1025) and was left un fini shed. I t ends with a summary of alet ter sent by Michael VII Doukas (1071-78) to the rebel and eventual em-peror Nicephorus Botaneiates (1078-81). From the accessionof the EmperorMichael IV (1034-41) until the abdication ofthe Emperor Isaac I Comnenus(1057-59) Psellos's Chronographia is very ful l. I t coincided with Psellos 'syears of influence. He entered palace service under Michael IV. He belongedto the clique of administrators responsible for the reforms of Constantine IXMonomachos (1042-55). Their failure meant a period of self-imposed exile.He returned to power with Isaac Comnenus and served as his chief minister.Disil lusioned with the emperor he played the central role in a palace coup

2 J. Shepard , 'A suspected source of Scyli tzes ' Synopsis Historian: the great Catacalonfecaumenus', ~yzantine ~nd Modern Greek Studi~s , 16 (1992), pp.171-81.Ioannes Skylttzes Contmuatus (ed. E.Th. Tsolakis) (Thessalonica, 1968).4 loannis Zonarae Epitome historiarum (Bonn, 1841-97) 3 vols; (Leipzig, 1868-75), 6vols,5 Michaelis Glycae annales (Bonn, 1836).6 Michael Psell~s, Chronographia (ed. E. Renauld) (Paris, 1926-28; reissued 1967),2 vols.Enghsh translation by E.R.A. Sewter: Michael Psellus Fourteen Byzantine Rulers (PenguinClassics) (Harmondsworth, 1966). '7 C. Mango, Byzan ti um , The Emp ir e o f th e New Rome (London, 1980), p.245.2

Introduct ion: The Sourcesthat brought Constantine X Doukas (1059-67) to power. The new emperordistrusted Psellos. Apart from a brief period in 1071 Psellos remained in thebackground, and the Cbronographia loses much of its immediacy and value.Its strength lies in itsinsider's view of the political process. Psellos's main con-cern is with the way the leading figures , emperors mostly, faced up to theirresponsibil it ies and the issues of the day. He effects the Olympian detach-ment of the 'philosopher'. Judgement is an important part of the historian'stask. At the same time, the his tory was designed as an apology for Psellos 'sown part in the political life ofthe Empire. The Chronographia also containsPsellos's own analysis of the eleventh-century crisis. He explained it in termsof the abuse of power mani fested in the mismanagemen t of the system ofhonours and the financial resources of the state and in a fai lure to respectconstitutional rights.Psellos's Chronographia has to be supplemented by hi s voluminousother wri tings." Psellos 's career was founded on his rhetorical ski lls. Hehas left behind many speeches intended to celebrate all kinds of occasions.Rhetoric was inseparable from politics at Byzantium. Speeches were a wayof promoting the claims of pol it ical figures from the emperor downwards.Psellos had no qualms about using such occasions for self-aggrandisement, Hewas quite clear about the differences between panegyric and history. Historywas about truth. Byand large Psellos sought that end." Psellos has also lefta vast collection of letters. They tell us a great deal about Byzantine politicalculture. Networking was essential. Psellos made great play with the ideal offriendship which held together the political elite.l" Underly ing this was asystem of mutual favours. Psellos's political influence depended in part on hisabilities as a patron. A fair proportion of his letters concern patronage. Thismight take the form of letters of recommendation for proteges or interventionon behalf of an individual or a monastery which had sought his protect ionor good offices.Itwas well known that Psellos was writing a history. There is a letter ofhis to a contemporary inwhich he lets this be known. There is a sting inthetai l: the recipient should be nice to Psellos , i f he wanted to be remembered

H Michaelis Pselli scripta minora ( eds E . Kur tz and F . Drexl ) (Mi la n, 1936 -41) , 2 vol s:Michael is Pse ll i ora tiones forenses e t acta (ed. G.T. Dennis) (Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1994);Michaelis Pselli orationes panegyricae (ed. G.T. Dennis) (Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1994); MichaelisPselli Philosophica minora, Ied. J.M. Duffy) (Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1992); Michaelis Pselliorationes hagiographicae (Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1994); Michaelis Pselli Theologica, I (ed. P.Gautier) (Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1989); Michaelis Pselli Oratoria minora (ed, A.R. Littlewoo.d)(Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1985); Michaelis Pselli Poemata (ed. L.G. Westennk) (Stuttgart/Leipzig,1992)." C . Chambe rl ai n, ' The t heor y and p ra cti ce o f imper ia l panegy ri c in Michae l P se ll us ',Byzantion, 56 (1986), pp.16-27.III M.E. Mullett, 'Byzantium: a friendly society?' , Past & Present, 118 (Feb. 1988) , pp.3-24.

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204favourably." When the Emperor Michael VII Doukas heard that Psellos wasintendingto tackle his reign,he sent him an autobiographical piece, presum-ably because he fearedmisrepresentation. Michael Attaleiates+ does not refertothe Chronographia inhisHistory, though he doesmention Psellos inpassing.Whether Attaleiates ever had an opportunity to read the Chronographia isdifficultto say. He must, though, have known of its existence and have hada shrewdidea of its contents and approach.

He was a younger contemporary of Michael Psellos . He came from asimilarlymodest social background. Like Psellos, his intellectual attainmentsopened up a gli ttering career at Constantinople in the administrat ion. Hewas a legalexpert and the author ofa legal textbook. His History covers theperiodfrom 1040 to 1080.It ismore pedestrian than Psellos's Chronographia.It limitsitself far more to a traditional concern with military history. LikePsellosAttaleiates reliedheavilyon hisown observations. He was rather moreself-effacingthan Psellos .He never aspired to a pol it ical role in the sameway. He attached himselffirstto the Emperor Romanos Diogenes (1068-71)and then to Nicephorus Botaneiates (1078-81). His History becomes a de-fenceof their policies. It is dedicated to Botaneiates. Attaleiates is less goodthan Psellosin distinguishingbetweenhistory and panegyric. The closing sec-tion of h i s His tory is a paean of praise for Botaneiates. Attaleiates's polit-ical allegianceswere diametrically opposed to those of Psel1os.His Historytherefore provides a useful corrective. It reflects the claims and excuses ofan important element within Byzantinepolitical life.The history ofAlexiusI Comnenus was written bymembers of his ownfamily.His son-in-law Nicephorus Bryennios chronicled his rise to power. LlHe did this at the request of Alexius's Empress Eirene Doukaina. He camefrom one of the great familiesof Adrianople. His father (or grandfather)"had been a con tender for the throne and had been defeated by AlexiusComnenus.Bryennios's Ma te ri al s f or a H is to ry were designed to justify hisfather-in-Iaw'sseizure of the imperial throne in 1081. Bryennios argued thatAlexiuscombined theimperialclaimsof the Comnenus and the Doukas fam-

ilies. His uncle was Isaac I Comnenus and his marriage to Eirene Doukainabrought him the Doukas inheritance. A particular interest of Bryennios'sHistory is that i t presented the struggle for power exclusively in terms ofcompetitionbetween a seriesof aristocratic families.

11 K.N. Sathas, ME.EAInNIKH BIBAlO6JHKH (Bibliotheca graeca medii aeui} V (Venice/Paris, 1876), p.352. '12 Michael!sAt~aliotae Historia (Bonn, 1853). See A. Kazhdan (with S. Franklin), Studies~~.Byzantme LIterature of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Cambridge, 1984), pp.23-IIN' hIcep orus Bryennios, Histoire (ed. P. Gautier) [Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae~. Ser. Bru~ellensisJ (Brussels, 1975). 'D .R . R~l Ils ch , 'De: H is to ri ker N ikepho ro s Bryenn io s, Enke l und n icht Sohn desUsurpators, Byzantmlsche Zeitschrift, 83 (1990), pp.423-4.

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Introduction: The SourcesBryennios also had plans for a his tory of Alexius I Comnenus's reign.He col lected materials , but was unable to complete the project before hisdeath in 1137. It was left to his wife Anna Comnena to finish the his tory.ISShe was s ti ll wr it ing thi rty years afte r the death o f her father in 1118 . I t

has always been recognised that such a long delay must have affected thecharacter of the Alexiad, her his tory of her father's reign. It exaggeratedher determination to present her father as an ideal ruler and his reign as anexample to the new emperor Manuel I Comnenus (1143-80). Her ideal iza-t ion of her father has always cast a shadow over the value of the Alexiad ashis tory. Her dis tance from the events described has also placed a quest ionmark on her accuracy. Rather surpris ingly, i t is the last years of her father'sreign where she is a t her worst. Thi s can perhaps be exp la ined by her needto cover up the succession struggle that disfigured his last decade. Anna wasintimately involved. Together with her mother she was pressing the claims ofher husband Nicephorus Bryennios to succeed to the throne instead of herhated brother John. Why then has the Alexiad been judged one of the greatachievements of medieval historical writing?" It is partly on purely literarygrounds, but i t isalso Anna Comnena's abi li ty to provide a portrai t ofan agewhich catches new departures and predicaments. Leaving aside her prejudicesagainst her brother she also presents us with the conventional wisdom of theComneni; their considered appraisal of how they had come to power and hadtackled the many dangers and problems that faced the Byzantine Empire. Forany polit ical his tory i t is essential to know how the rul ing eli te thinks andwhat i t thinks. This turns out to bea strength rather than a weakness oftheAlexiad.

Though a great ruler John II Comnenus never found his his torian. Tothat extent his sister had her revenge. His reign is treated as an introductionto that of his son Manuel I Comnenus byboth John Cinnamus'? and NicetasChoniates ," the major Byzantine his torians of the twelfth century. Onceaga in his to ry is in the hands of c ivi l s ervant s. John Cinnamus was one ofManuel I Comnenus's imperial secretaries. Nicetas Choniates worked his wayto the top of the civil service, eventually becoming Grand Logothete on theeve of the fourth crusade. Despi te a provincial origin he belonged to thatnetwork of civil service families who dominated Byzantine political life at the

15 M. Mul le tt a nd D . Smy the, Alexios I Komnenos, IBelfast, 1996), pp.260-302.16 ]. Chrysos tomides, 'A Byzantine His torian: Anna Comnena ', in D.O. Morgan (ed .) ,Medieval His torica l Wri ting in the Chris tian and Islamic Worlds (London, 1982), pp.30-46.17 l oann is Ci nnam i Epi tome r erum ab l oanne e t Manue le Comnen is g es tar um (Bonn,1836) . English t rans la tion by C.M. Brand, Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus (NewYork, 1976).IN Nicetae Choniatae Historia (ed . ] .-L. van Die ten) [Corpus Fontium His toriae Byzan-t in ae , 11, 1 -2 . Ser . Ber ol en si en si sJ (Be rl in /New York, 1975) . Eng li sh t ra ns la ti on byH. Magoulias, 0 c ity o f Byzantium: annals o f Niketas Choniates (Detroit, 1984).

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204end of the twelfth century. His brother Michael was archbishop of Athens.Almost nothing isknown about the background of Choniates's older contem-porary John Cinnamus. A Basil Cinnamus was appointed bishop of Paphosin Cyprus in 1166, but whether they were rela ted is another matt er . JohnCinnamus wrote his his tory soon after the death of Manuel I Comnenus in1180. Nicetas Choniates may have started his history before 1204 but it wascompleted and substantially revised after 1204. The loss of Constantinople tothe crusaders was a disaster that coloured his view of Byzantine history. Hemade use of Cinnamus's history, but their interpretation was very different.Modern appraisals, including my own, have tended to favour Choniates overCinnamus. Recently, however, Paul Magdalino has urged that Cinnamus begiven greater consideration, of which more below." Because of his closenessto Manuel Comnenus, Cinnamus has been treated as a panegyricis t. Therecan be l itt le doubt tha t he wrote hi s his tory out of loya lty to his maste r' smemory. On the other hand, he was at the centre ofthings. He allows us aninsight into how Manuel himself faced up to the problems of Empire andshaped policy. Choniates was only just beginning his career at the very endof Manuel' s re ign. He did not share the same loya lty to Manuel. His ap-praisal of Manuel is much cooler and apparently more objective. He is dis-missive of the emperors he served under. He is contemptuous of the peopleof Constantinople. He charts the collapse of the fabric of Byzantine societyand its morale. He contrasts the feebleness of Byzantium with the dynamismofthe West. It isa very impressive analysis of the c ond it io n b y zan ti ne , whichisdifficul t to escape. As with all great his torians the his tory of an epoch ishis creation."

We must respect the honesty with which these historians approachedtheir task. Equally, we know that at the very bestthey are supplying only oneversion of the truth. But we are not ent irely at their mercy. Other contem-porary writings provide different perspectives because they had different aims.The most important isthe compilation conventionally known as Kekavmenos'sStrategikon,21 which dates from the reign of Michael VII Doukas (1071-78).Kekavmenos was a Byzantine Lord Chesterfield. His Strategikon was his col-lected wisdom designed to help his sons make their way in the world. Hisadvicewas based on his own experiences and those of other members of hisfamily. He came from a mil itary background. On his grandfather 's s ide hewas Armenian, but he also had Bulgarian connections. He had finally settledin Thessaly where he was for a time military governor. Familieslike his hadsupplied the officers and junior commanders for the Byzantine armies in the

19 See below, pp.174-6.~~See A. Kazhdan (with. S. Franklin), Studies 012 Byzantine Literature, pp.256-86.Kekavmenos, Sovety I rasskazy Kekavmena ( ed. G .G . L it av rin ) (Moscow, 1972) . Atra~s la tion into English is much needed. See P. Lemer le , Prolegomenes a une editioncntique et commentee de Kekaumenos (Brussels, 1960).6

Introduction: The Sourcesdays of military greatness. They had a tradition of loyalty and service to theEmpire. They felt Byzantine military decline over the eleventh century morekeenly than most. Kekavmenos was doing his best to give his sons soundadvice about careers to be fol lowed in a wor ld tha t had changed ou t of a llrecognition from that into which he was born in the early eleventh century.His advice becomes a commentary on the political process in eleventh-centuryByzantium. But his viewpoint is quite different from that of any historian orchronicler. His purpose too isnot strictly speaking historical. It was practical:to fit his sons for a career. This provides a more immediate appraisal of thepol it ical process than any from the pen of a his torian of the t ime.Rather different is the rapportage of individual events. This was notentirely objective reporting but there survive accounts written within weeksor months with the events f resh in the author 's mind. The best known ofthese is Eustathios of Thessalonica's narrative of the Norman sack of his cityin 1185.22 It was originally delivered early the next year as a Lenten sermon.There are elements of apology, but it is largely an objective account. Similarin tone and style was a speech made by Nicholas Mesarites describing theupris ing of John Comnenus the Fat in 1201,23It is the immediacy of theseaccounts with their strong autobiographical flavour which is striking. Theyprovided some of the raw material for historians, such asAnna Comnena andNicetas Choniates, who may have availed himself of Eustathios's account forhis section on the Norman invasion of 1185.Enough has survived of the raw material of his tory to make a cri ticalappraisal of the way narrative his torians shaped the his tory of their owntimes and to propose different interpretations and lines of enquiry. The rawmaterial comes in a variety of forms. Imperial - not to mention patriarchal- legislation and legal and administrative acts24 survive in relative profusionin comparison with most other periods of Byzantine history; but rather poorlyby comparison with the western middle ages. To a large extent, legislative act-ivity was designed to maintain in working order the Justinianic legal systemas overhauled under Leo VI (886-912). Legislation was consequently often inthe form of rescript." In other words, it was made on the basis o f dif ficul tcasesreferred to the emperor and his legal advisers. This legaland administrat-ive documentation provides an insight into the day to day concerns of gov-ernment . This is the area that his torians ofthe t ime took for granted. It was

22 Eustathios of Thessaloniki, The Capture of Tbessaloniki (transl, j.R. Melville jones)(Canberra, 1988).2.1 A. Heisenberg, Nikolaos Mesar ites , Die Palds treuolut ion des Johannes Komnenos(Wlirzburg, 1907). See Kazhdan, op.cit. , pp.224-55.24 Cal ender ed i n F . Do lg er , Reges ten der Kaiserurkunden des ostromischen Reiches(Munich/Ber lin, 1924-65), 5 vols; V. Grumel, Les reges tes des actes du patriarcat deConstantinople, I: Les actes des patriarches, revised by] . Darrouzes (Paris, 1989) .25 Mullett and Smythe, op.cit. , pp.185-98.

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204largely a matter of trying to make a comparatively complicated system ofgovernment work. It was exact ly this that gave Byzantium its s trengthand stability. Periods of political crisis were times when the administrationwas ceasing to be effective. The details of a quite ordinary law suit affectingthe monaste ry of the Lavra on Mount Athos at the very end of the twelf thcentury provide vivid testimony to the difficulties that the Byzantine govern-ment was having on the eve of the fourth crusade." Such documentationgives another dimension and perspective on the history of the time.Respect for the law was important for the imperial image. ConstantineMonomachos (1042-55) reformed legal education; Manuel Comnenus (1143-80) restructured the law courts of Constantinople." We know a great dealabout the image that individual emperors sought to convey because of thecourt rhetoric that has survived. A good example is the series of speechesdelivered byJohn Mauropous in 1047, which were designed to present Con-stantine Monomachos's reforms." Speeches of this kind can be paralleledthroughout the period. Bythe twelfth century there was a calendar of speechdays, which allowed orators to extol the emperor and to put their spin onevents and policies. Exceptionally imperial rhetoric was openly critical of anemperor. In 1090, for example, John of Oxeia, patriarch of Antioch, deliv-ered two 'diatribes' against Alexius I Cornnenus." They are bitterly dismiss-ive of Alexius's conduct of government. There is a good chance, however,that they were written with the knowledge of the emperor who understoodthat t rue humil ity and an abi li ty to accept just cri ticism were imperial vir-rues." Nothing underlines quite so vividly as these diatribes how critical aposition Alexius faced in 1090. They are the more valuable because in retro-spect it is easy to see that this was the turn ing point of his reign.Byzantine politics, like any politics, was much concerned with image. Itwas the his torian 's task then and now to penetrate beneath the image. In adifferent capacity historians, such as Michael Psellos and Nicetas Choniates,were image makers. This gives a decided edge to their historical judgements.The contrast between rhetoric and history permits usto viewthe developmentof events from different perspectives. Rhetoric may be ephemeral and subject-ive, but this allows an insight into the pol it ical process . It brings us face toface with how the problems of the day were assessed and tackled. In other

26 Actes de Laura, I [Archives de l'Athos, 5] (Paris, 1970), nos.67-8. See P. Lemerle, 'Notessur I'administration byzantine a la veille de la IVe croisade d'apres deux documents ineditsf7 es archives .de L~vra'~ Revue des Etudes byzantines, 19 (1961), pp.258-72.R.J . Macrides, jus tice under Manuel I Kornnenos: four novels on court bus iness andmurder', Fontes Minores, 6 (1985), pp.99-204.28 J. Lefort, 'Rhetorique et politique: trois discours deJean Mauropous en 1047' Travauxet Memoires, 6 (1976), pp.265-303. '29 P. Gautier , 'Diat ribes de Jean l 'Oxi te contre Alexis 1er Cornnene' Revue des Etudesbyzantines, 28 (1970), pp.5-55. 'JG Mullett and Smythe, op.cit. , pp.390-4.8

" l l i l l l ~

Introduction: The Sourceswords, the pol it ical his tory of the Byzantine Empire in the eleventh andtwelfth centuries iswell catered for in the sources of the period. The existenceof so much of the raw material of political history allows us to use thehistorians critically and fruitfully.

Rulers concentrated on five main areas of government: foreign policy,military affairs, justice, patronage, and the church. Technical matters, such asgetting in the taxation or running the currency, were of little interest and leftto experts. It is safe to say that Byzantine emperors were not interested ineither economy or commerce. They were blind to the underlying structures ofthe Empire. These may not have determined policy, but they had a crucialinfluence on the shape that history took. They have attracted modern atten-t ion, on the grounds that they hold the key to his torical developments. Forthis very reason the problems raised are often more important than the con-clusions reached. Debate tends to be inconclusive, simply because the relevantdocumentation is so weak. There is a scattering of estate documents: surveys,transfer of property, law suits, and the occasional tax document. It isenoughto provide a reasonably accurate assessment of agrarian economy and soci-ety. Because there isnothing comparable for the urban economy and society,there is a tendency to seeByzantium in almost exclusivelyagrarian terms. Thearchaeological evidence points conclusively to marked urban growth in ourperiod. It receives confirmation from the Italian - mostly Venetian" - com-mercial documents which survive in ever increasing numbers from the middleof the eleventh century. Their interpretat ion is not easy because nothingsimilar survives from the Byzantine side.The soundest guide to the Byzantine economy is its coinage. Thanks toMichael Hendy" and C. Morrissorr" the history of the Byzantine coinage inthe eleventh and twelfth centuries has been put on a more systematic footing.A monetary system inherited from late antiquity broke down in the course ofthe eleventh century and was replaced under Alexius I Comnenus by a newmonetary system. It has given rise to possibly the most important debate onthe Byzantine economy over the last twenty-odd years. It is distinguished byimmense erudition and technical knowledge. One of the centres of debate has

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1I R. Morozzo de ll a Rocca and A. Lombardo, Documenti del commerc io uenez iano neisecoli XI-XII (Turi n, 1940 ), 2 vols ; A . Lombardo and R . Moroz zo del la Rocca , Nuovidocumenti del commercio veneto de! secoli XI-XIII (Venice, 1955).32 M. Hendy, Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire 1081-1261 (Washington,D.C., 1969); M.F. Hendy, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300-1450 (Cam-bridge, 1985); M. Hendy, The Economy, Fiscal Administration and Coinage of Byzantium(Northampton, 1989)..H C. Morrisson, Catalogue des monnaies byzantines de la Bibliotheque Nationale (Paris,1970), 2 vols; C. Morrisson, 'La devalua tion de la monnaie byzantine au Xle s iecle: essaid'interpretation', Trauaux et Memoires, 6 (1976), pp.3-48; C. Morrisson, 'La Logar ike:reforrne rnonetaire et reforrne fiscale sous Alexis 1er Cornnene' , Trauaux e t Memoires, 7(1979), pp.419-64.

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204been over how consciously the imperial government was manipulating thecurrency as an instrument of economic policy. The answer seems to be thattheir aims were purely budgetary and fiscal. Emperors and their advisers weredealing with trends and forces that were quite beyond their comprehension.Ideal ly, they would have l iked to return to the old monetary system, butthey were forced to do what was practical. Their main interest all along wasrevenue, but Alexius Comnenus created a monetary system that fit ted theneeds ofcommerce and the market far bet ter than the old - rather inflexible- monetary system. There has also been a certain amount of controversyabout the role played by the market in the Byzantine economy. There are nodata tha t a llow a conclusive answer . The growth of the marke t did nottransform the Byzantine economy. It still remained in terms of the economyas a whole of minor importance. That much isclear. But very limited adjust-ments were l ikely to have had a marked effect. Economic change was con-stricted, but in key areas, such as internal trade, market forces could have alarger role to play. Those who had accessto the market would be the bene-ficiaries. The Italian commercial documents should not be dismissed as irrel-evant to the Byzantine economy.As the presence of Italians trading in Byzantine ports emphasises, By-zantine political history cannot be considered in isolation. It is impossible towrite the history of Byzantium in the eleventh and twelfth centuries relyingon Byzantine sources alone. Constantinople was at the crossroads of themedieval world. Its rulers were forced to come to terms with its many neigh-bours. The nature and balance of forces surrounding Byzantium constantlychanged. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Byzantium confronted twonew powers: the Turks in the Eas t and the Latins in the West. The Turksestablished themselves at the end of the eleventh century in Asia Minor,modern Turkey. They soon turned the ci ties of Anatoli a into centres ofIslamicgovernment and culture. There was something of a vogue for Turkishart and architecture in twelfth century Constantinople, but virtually no in-dependent Turkish sources survive from the twelfth century. Consequently,there islittle to be said in detail about how Turks and Byzantines interacted.This isin contrast to relations with the West. The crusades brought theWest into close contact with Byzantium for the firsttime. Byzantium'Sforeignpolicywas dominated by the challenge from the West. It isan encounter thatcan befollowed from both sides. Each was forced to make an assessment ofthe other. There was mutual suspicion. The contemporary western accountsofthefirstcrusade - of which the most important werethe Gesta Francorum."Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem." and]4 Gesta Prancorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum (ed. R. Hill) (London, 1962).]5 Le 'Ltber' de Raymond d'Aguilers (eds J.B. and L.L. Hill) (Paris, 1969). English trans-lat ion by J .H. & L.L. Hill, Historta Francorum qui ceperunt lherusalem (Philadelphia,1968).10

Introduction: The SourcesFulcher of Chartres, Gesta Prancorum Iherusalem Peregrinantium/" - treatedByzantium as a necessary evil. Itwas a convenient scapegoat. Itwas an atti-tude that pointed to the estrangement evident in Odo of Deuil's account ofthe second crusade: his De Profectione Ludouici VII.37 The French KingLouis VII's stay in Constantinople was one of the highlights of his accountof the second crusade. The French were treated generously, but Odo of Deuilleaves quite the opposite impression. The second crusade failed disastr.ously.This had little or nothing to do with Byzantium, but Odo of Deuil andwestern opinion generally found it easiest to blame Byzantium. A more bal-anced attitude is provided byWilliam of Tyre," the historian of the crusaderstates. He knew Byzantium well. He understood the importance of Byzantinesupport to the continuing existence ofthe crusader states. He was an admirerof Manuel I Comnenus. In some ways he iscloser to western literature whichwas fascinated with the glamorous image of Byzantium. The western sourcesprovide a different perspective on Byzantium. The challenge of the Westdefined Byzantine history in the twelfth century. There was ambivalence onboth sides. How that turned into outright hostility isa major theme. It endedwith the temporary destruction of the Byzantine Empire in 1204 as a resul tof the diversion of the fourth crusade to Constantinople. The fourth crusadeforms a convenient finale."

J6 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hieroso/ymitana. English t rans la tion by H.S. Fink, AHis tory of the Expedit ion to Jerusalem (Knoxville, 1969).J7 Odo of Deuil , De profect ione Ludouic i VII in Grien tem (ed . and t rans . V.G. Berry)(New York, 1948). .l' Willelmi Tyrensis chronicon (ed . R.B.C. Huygens) (Turnhout , 1986) , 2 vols, Englishtranslation by E.A. Babcock & A.C. Krey, A His tory of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea (NewYork, 1943), 2 vols. .''" D.E. Queller, The Fourth Crusade. The Conquest cf Constantinople, 1201-1204 (Phila-delphia, 1977); D.M. Nicol, Byzantium, Venice and the Fourth Crusade (Athens, 1990).

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Part I >1025-1118


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Chapter 1 .

Introduction: Recent Work(1025-1118)

This book was originally conceived in the late 1970s against the backgroundof a debate over Byzantium's eleventh-century crisis. The 1976 volume ofTravaux et Memoires was devoted to the problem. In the same year the 15thInternational Congress of Byzantine Studies held in Athens looked at theperiod lOTI to 1261, but the focus remained the eleventh century. In 1977Paul Lemerle published his Cinq Etudes sur le XI" siecle byzantin. At issuewere G. Ostrogorsky's views on the eleventh century which had dominatedthe f ie ld for more than thi rty years . They were he ld up for scrutiny anddeemed inadequate. Ostrogorsky had characterized the eleventh-century crisisas the product of feudal tendencies. It took the form of a struggle betweena military or feudal aristocracy and a civilian or bureaucratic elite. The latterwere the defenders of the state. Their eclipse undermined the strength of theByzantinestate. This had come in for independent criticismfrom A. Kazhdan.'He argued that in a medieva l contex t feuda lism was a progress ive fo rce,which helped to rebuild Byzantium. The eleventh-century crisis was the resultof reactionary forces associated with the Byzantine bureaucracy which wereopposed to the rise of a feudalism. A feudal aristocracy finally triumphed withthe Comneni. The accession of Alexius I Comnenus (1081-1118) ushered ina new period of political strength and economic prosperity.

P. Lernerle/ was reluctant to accept this assessment. He was not surethat the eleventh century was a period of crisis. He thought that the systemof imperial government continued to work effectively. The economy wasbuoyant . Too much was made of the defeat at Mantzikert in 1071. Defeatsof th is kind had of ten occur red in the past. Byzant ium was able to shrug

I A.P. Kazhdan, Derevna igorod u Vizantii IX-X vv. (Moscow, 1960); A.P. Kazhdan,Sotsial'nyj sostav gospodstuuiushchego hlassa Vizantii XI-XII vv. (Moscow, 1974).2 P.Lemerle, 'Byzance au tournant deson des tin' , in Cil1QEtudes sur IeXle siecle byzantin(Paris, 1977), pp.249-312.

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204them off. The real disaster was the accession to power ofAlexius I Comnenus,His neglect of Asia Minor sealed i ts fate. The association of his family inpower undermined the soundness of the state apparatus which had continuedto function efficiently. Nikephoritzes, the eunuch chief minister of MichaelVII Doukas (1071-78), emerges rather improbably as the hero of Lemerle'spresentation. He had tried to reassert state control over the economy and torebuild the Empire's military strength. Alexius proceeded to squander hisefforts. He lost Nikephoritzes's army in the war against the Normans. Statecontrol over the economy was sacrificed to the Venetians. His grant of freetrade to the Venet ians was his final and worst mistake. Lemerle accusesAlexius Comnenus of being 'a dyed in the wool reactionary'. His accessionto power created 'une societe bloquee'. He was opposed to what Lemerlesees as the progressive elements in Byzantine society, which he associateswith the rise of a bourgeoisie which had underpinned the governments ofthe eleventh century. Lemerle was restating Ostrogorsky's case, but moresubtly. He shifted the centre of the debate away from the so-called civilianemperors who followed Basil II to Alexius I Comnenus.The deba te can be boiled down to the ques tion of whether Alex ius IComnenus was working with or against the grain of his tory. This could bestated more concretely in the following terms: would it have been possible forAlexius to have ruled in the style of Basil II (976-1025)? I thought not . Theunderlying structures of the Empire had changed dramatically. Under BasilII the power of the state was underpinned by an effective control over theeconomy and society. Basil II was able to straitjacket Byzantine economyand society and subordinate i t to the needs of the state. After his death thechanges tha t he had held in check took over. There was a rapid growth ofeconomic activity. Though tiny the commercial sector of the economy grewsignificantly. The beneficiaries were the landowners and the rent iers of thecapital and provincial centres. The attempt by Nikephoritzes to restore state~ontrol over the corn trade of Thrace fai led in the face of opposit ion fromJust such people. The essential flaw in Lemerle's argument lay in his failureto recognize that a growing economy was incompatible with rigid state con-trol. It was necessary to adapt the machinery of state to new conditions. Thestrength of Kazhdan's case lay in his recognition that landowners could bethe major beneficiaries of the growth both of the economy and of the rise oftowns. He also saw that there was not any necessary conf lic t between alandowning aristocracy and a bourgeoisie. He coined the term a 'bourgeoisgentry' to cover an urban based rentier group, which mediated between thelandowning aristocracy and the craftsmen of the towns;' The old notion wasthat the eleventh century crisis received political expression in the shape of

.I A. Kazhdan (wi th S. Franklin) , Studies on Byzantine Literature of the Eleventh andTwelfth Centuries (Cambridge, 1984), pp.63-86.16

Introduction: Recent Work (1025-1118)a struggle between the civil and military aristocracy. This has been quietlyshelved.I agreed with Kazhdan 's analysis of the underlying situation of theByzantine Empire in the eleventh century. ButI approached the question fromthe point of view of the funct ioning of government. It was clear that Basil IIleft behind him immense problems, which his immediate successors did theirbest to ignore. Itwas left to that most maligned of emperors Constantine IXMonomachos (1042-55) to face up to the state's predicament. He attemptedto put the Empire on a peacetime footing. He hoped to easethe state 's finan-cial difficulties by cutting military expenditure. Constantine Monomachoswas unable in the face ofdetermined opposition to push his reforms through.The bureaucrats , such as Michael Psellos , who had been behind them, de-parted. Isaac Comnenus (1057-59) too had plans for a thorough reform ofthe state, but these too were dropped. Thereafter, dri ft was the order oftheday. Reform offended the beneficiaries of economic growth, very largelybecause they had in one way and another invested in the state. There was aresult ing l ack of pu rpose . Thi s was di sastrous at a time when the wor ldsituation was turning against Byzantium. Alexius Comnenus may initiallyhave made a bad situation worse, but he restored direction and purpose tothe government of the Empire. He did this not byproceeding to any system-atic reforms, but by associating his family in government. Alexius was ableto confront the many dangers facing the Empire with a fair amount of suc-cess. How sound a structure of government he bequeathed to his successorswas another matter. That in a nutshel l was my analysis.How well does i t stand up in the l ight o f the work produced over thelast twelve years? There have been a number of major publications. Perhapsthe most important has been A. Kazhdan's Change in Byzan tine Culture inthe Eleventh and Twelf th Centuries (with A.W. Epstein) (Berkeley/Los Ange-les/London, 1985). It restated his argument over the 'feudalization' of Byzan-tine society: that is to say, that it created the conditions for economic growthwith attendant difficulties for the state. The main purpose of the book was totake the argument further. Kazhdan's contention was that change in the basiceconomic and social structures was reflected in changes inculture. He saw anaristocratization of Byzantine culture. It meant that culture was no longer thepreserve of a tiny elite at Constantinople connected with the imperial admin-istration. It became more diverse. There was a greater concentration on thepersonal and on the present. There wasmore emphasis on sheer entertainment.Studies of individual authors provided the foundation for Kazhdan's work.They were col lected in his S tudies on Byzant ine Lit erature of the Eleven thand Twelf th Centuries (with S. Franklin) (Cambridge, 1984).Kazhdan's analysis of the underlying situation of the Byzantine Empirereceived independent confirmation from A. Harvey's Economic Expansionin the Byzant ine Empire 900-1200 (Cambridge, 1989). Harvey seems notto know Kazhdari 's fundamental work on Byzantine economy and society:

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204Dereuna i gorod v Yizanti i, IX-X '" : (Moscow, 19?0), wh~ch anticipatedvirtuallyallhis arguments.The great virtue of Harvey s book is to show thattheByzantineeconomycontinued to grow throu~hout the.el~venthand twelfthcenturies.He agreeswith Kazhdan that the mam beneficiaries were the land-owners.He explainsthe apparent anomaly between Byzantium's strong eco-nomic performance in the eleventh century and its weakness politically inthe followingway: in medieval conditions economic growth will inevitablycreatecentrifugal forceswhich act to the detriment of centralized authority.As a verygeneralexplanation this has much to recommend it. His accountoftheunderlyingcauseof economicgrowth isstark. It was due to the greaterdemands that landlords made of their peasantry. Peasants were forced toworkharder and to bring more land into cultivation. How this related to thedemographicgrowth of the period never becomes entirely clear. Harvey hasshownwithout doubt that Byzantiumexperienced economic and demographicgrowth in the eleventhand twelfth centuries. Whether this can all be attrib-uted tothe greater demands beingmade of the peasantry by landlords is moreopento question. One might infer - though this isnever stated - that greaterpressureon the peasantry created a virtuous circle from which all benefited.I t s truckme long ago tha t in the twelf th century i t was a mat te r notmerelyof more peasants, but of more prosperous peasants. Normally speak-ing,greater demand by landlords on their peasantry is a recipe for disaster.Thepeasantrybecomeimpoverishedand abandon their holdings. Some otherfactor must have come into play in the eleventh and twelfth centuries . Iassumedit to be the market. Harvey considers this possibility, but rejects itout ofhand. He prefers to see urban expansion in terms of the developmentoffeudal socialrelations. The market was not a significant factor. In globalterms, he must be right. In comparison with state finance the commercialsectorwas t iny, but i t doesnot haveto belarge to make an impact. Even asmallamount of growth canmake an important difference. There can be littledoubt that the commercialsector did grow from the turn of the tenth centuryandcontributed to the emergenceof provincial towns from roughly the samedate.What Harveyisforgettingis that 'feudal socialrelations' were not incom-patible with the growth of the market. The elite understood all too well thevalueof the market. In the rule that the Empress Eirene Doukaina had drawnupfor a monasticfoundation, the nuns were advised to get their habits onthe market when the supply was plentiful and the prices correspondinglylow."The aristocracy were alive to the commercial opportunities there werefor the produce oftheir estates.Tiny as it may have been the market was anincentivefor extra product ion. This would work to the advantage of thepeasantry in two ways. In the first place, landowners would have a clearer

Introduction: Recent Work (1025-1118)idea of the economic potential of their estates. It became worthwhile to settlepeasantry on waste or underut il ized land on favourable conditions. This isnot to say that the peasantry were direct beneficiaries of the market. Merelythat it created conditions where traditional exploitation of landed resourcesworked to the advantage ofthe peasantry and sti llmore to the benefit of thelandowner.

One of the main arguments for a growth in the commercial sectorrevolves around the debasement of the Byzantine coinage in the eleventhcentury:' A favoured explanation was the increased velocity of circulationwhich pointed towards an increase of exchanges made possible by the growthof the commercial sector. Harvey rejects this following M. Hendy, Studies inthe Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300-1450 (Cambridge, 1985).No doubtthe debasement itself may have been taken on strictly budgetary grounds, butthe budgetary difficult ies could in part resul t from the growth of a marketsector. Harvey goes some way towards contradicting himself when he admitsthat the monetary system that evolved in the wake of debasement was moreflexible and better suited to commercial activity.

Harvey's study of the Byzantine economy provides a useful pendant toKazhdan's book on Byzantine culture. Neither is directly concerned with thepol it ical funct ioning of the Byzantine Empire, but they are reminders thatpolitical history cannot be written without taking into account cultural, eco-nomic and social factors . This is, however, what J. -e . Cheynet attempts todo inh is Pouvoir et Contestations a Byzance (963-1210) (Paris, 1990).Thatisnot to deny its importance and originali ty. His approach to the Byzantinepol it ical process is ingenious. He begins by analysing the 223 revolts andconspiracies that he has ident ified as occurring over the period. There is nodenying that revolt and conspiracy were integral to Byzantine politics. Theywere often the only way in which discontent could be expressed. They actedlike a seismograph of the Byzantine political process. If you break down thefigures on revolts and conspiracies collected by Cheynet into twenty-five yearperiods, you obtain the following results: 1025-50,44; 1051-75, 35; 1076-1100,26; 1101-25,9; 1126-50,5; 1151-75,6; 1176-1200,46. The periodof Comnenian ascendancy from c.ll00 to 1180 stands out as a period ofpolitical stability. Cheynet wonders why this should have been. His answeris that in the eleventh century, i f conducted with a modicum of good sense,a revol t worked to the advantage of the rebels. Under the Comneni there wasmore to be gained from a shrewd marriage pol icy. I t was the d if fe rencebetween a period of political instability and a period of political stability.Cheynet is not always as superficial as this. His stress on the continuityof pa tte rns o f dis sidence among the Anatol ian fami lies l eads to a deeper

--------- -_~---- -_--4 P. Gautier, 'Letypikon de la Theotokos Kechariomene' Revue des Etudes hvzantines 43( 1985 ), p . I 01 , 11.l480-5. ',~ ,1 8

S C. Morrisson, 'La devaluation de la monnaie byzantine au Xle siecle: essai d'interpreration',Travaux et Mblloires, 7 (1979), pp.419-64.19


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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204understanding of the politics of the time. In the tenth century Anatolia wasdivided between the Phokas and the Skleros. The central government couldnormally rely on their mutual hostility to hold the balance. By the eleventhcentury the Comneni and the Doukai had inherited the Skleros network. Sowhen in 1057 Isaac Comnenus rebelled, the Anatolian territories traditionallyloyal to the Phokas cause refused to join the standard of revolt. On the otherhand, they supported Romanos Diogenes against the Doukai after 1071. Thedifference in the eleventh century was that these traditional Anatolian enmit-ies now divided the imperial government. The Comneni-Doukai had been infavour under Constantine Monomachos, but had lost out after his death.They had therefore resorted to rebellion as a way of bringing pressure to bearon the new regime at Constantinople. There was also a divis ion over one ofthe burning issues of the day - military organisation. The Comneni-Doukaisupported the establishment of a professional army of mercenaries. Theiropponents wanted a nat ional army, in other words the revival of the themeorganization. The implications went very deep. It emphasized above all thatlocal power was no longer enough. It was also necessary to have influence inthe capital . After the defeat by the Turks at Mantzikert in 1071 control ofthe imperial government became still more urgent for the Anatolian families.The Comneni - an Anatolian family - were the winners , but once in powerAlexius Comnenus paid little attention to Anatolia. This produced a series ofconspiracies in the earlypart of his reign from members of Anatolian familieswho were discontented with his failure to prosecute the recovery of the lostAnatolian lands more forcibly. However, Alexius was in a very strong posi-tion because he controlled the redistribution of lands. What had undoubtedlybeen one of the major causes of political unrest - the claims of the Anatolianfamilies against the imperial government - slowly disappeared. It helps toexplain the relative stability of the Comnenian regime.Cheynet devotes an interesting chapter to Alexius I Comnenus. He sin-gles out his destruction of the Anatolian opposition as decisive. This allowedhim to establish his dynasty effectivelyin power. Cheynet notes that Alexius'smarriage alliances were mostly with the important families of Thrace, whohad thei r base a t Adr ianople . Alexius did not at tack the posit ion of theadministrative families of Constantinople. They may have lost much of theirinfluence, but there was no purge of the bureaucracy. His conclusion is thatAlexius 's main achievement was to establish a new dynasty in power. Heignores Lemerle's demonization of Alexius.A proper consideration of Alexius's reign has long been a desideratum.Margaret Mullett and Dion Smythe in their Alexios I Komnenos (Belfast,1996) go some way tosupplying i t. I t aims at a novel approach to his reign.It isintended as an introduction to a new edition and translation of AlexiusComnenus's works, including his Muses - an important and neglected text.This was Alexius's political testament for his son John II Comnenus. Thoughthere are problems about its authorship, this text probably brings us closer20

Introduction: Recent Work (1025-1118)to Alexius than any other. The emphasis in the volume is therefore onAlexius the man and his style of government. In her introduction MargaretMullett neatly l ikens the volume to a basilikos logos: a speech in honour ofan emperor. But this does put the accent on his personal achievements andmoral quali ties . Alexius emerges as an emperor who was more at home oncampaign than in his palace or capital . This is an important observation.Alexius, his son and his grandson all commanded their forces in person, evenifthis meant that they were frequently absent from the capital. Control ofthearmy was a key to the ir hold on power. Equally, they were able to en trusttheir capital to members of their family. Alexius relied heavily on his motherand his brother Isaac. He was lesshappy leaving the capital in the hands ofhis Empress Eirene Doukaina. But the charge of Lemerle that he was 'faibledevant les femmes' receivesl i tt le in the way of corroboration. He rel ied onwomen. This was part of the aristocratization of imperial government. Thisnew volume opens up new approaches to the study of Alexius Comnenus'sreign.The kind of questions posed by Lemerle tend to be ignored. Lemerle'sapproach to Alexius 's reign had in any case been cal led into quest ion byanimportant article by Paul Magdalino: 'Aspects of twelfth-century Kaiserkritik',Speculum, 58 (1983), 326-46 . In it he showed how the chronicle r JohnZonaras 's cri ticism of Alexius I Comnenus stemmed from an unrealist icand antiquarian concept of the imperial office. Lemerle's negative appraisalof Alexius Comnenus relied very heavily on Zonaras's account. The resulthas been to reinforce the Kazhdan interpretat ion of Alexius Comnenus'sreign. Alexius was responsible for creating a new style of government whichprovided sixty years or more of stable government. The Mullett -Smythevolume underlines once again that Alexius did not proceed to any radicaloverhaul of government. But he had one major achievement to his credit. Heput an end to the monetary confusion that had exis ted s ince the time ofMantzikert and established a new monetary basis for the assessment of theland tax iNea logarike), which was much more favourable to the sta te . I tensured a sound financial posit ion for more than half a century.In the West Alexius's reputation suffered as a result of biased reportingof the f ir st crusade . In ret ro spect the passage of the f ir st crusade was thecentral event of his reign. The best t reatment remains R.-J. Lil ie 's s tudy ofByzantium and the Crusader states first published in German in 1981. It hassince been translated into English under the title Byzantium and the CrusaderStates 1096-1204 (Oxford, 1993). Itwas revised up to 1988, too late to takeinto account Jonathan Shepard's 'When Greek meets Greek: Alexius I Com-nenus and Bohemond in 1097-98', Byzant ine and Modern Greek S tudies , 12(1988). This article rejects the traditional view based on Anna Comnena thatAlexius distrusted the Norman Bohemond and was indebted to the loyalty ofRaymond of StGilles, count ofToulouse. Shepard makes it clear that Alexiusused Bohemond as hisliaison officerwith thecrusade leadership; that Raymond

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204s initial ly hosti le and likely to have been responsible for forcing the Byzan-

~:e commander to abandon the c rusader camp in February 1?98. WithoutByzant ine back ing Bohemond had to act on hIS own account 111 the face ofRaymond 's con tinu ing enmi ty . I n o ther words, Bohemond did not del iber-a te ly tur n the c rusade aga inst Byzan tium, which has been the cha rge in thepast. The great virtue of Shepard's t reatment of the affair is that he sees itnot in terms of reciproca l re la tionsh ips between Alexius and the d if fe rentcrusade leaders , but as a triangular relationship between Alexius , Bohemondand Raymond ofToulouse . After read ing Shepard i t i s no longe r pos sible tos ay that Bohemond was the v il lain of the p iece .

The pas sage of the c rusade which should have been Alexius 's master-s troke d id not bring Byzan tium the long-term benefi ts tha t had been hoped .Was thi s al so t rue of h is a ll iance with the Venet ians? I t wil l be r emember edthat Lemer le considered this one of Alexius 's major blunders. Venetian sup-port had been bought in 1082 a t the price of exemption from cus toms dut ie sand sales taxes together wi th other concessions. Lemerle argued that thisundermined state con tr ol ove r commerce. I t meant tha t Byzan tium aban-doned i ts pos it ion as intermediary between Eas t and West to the Venet ians .In h is B yz an tiu m a nd V en ic e: a s tu dy i n d ip lo ma tic a nd c ult ur al r ela tio ns(Cambridge, 1988) Donald Nicol takes a qui te d if fe rent l ine, a s the sub ti tl esuggests. He is less interes ted in the economic consequences of Alexius 's grantto the Venetians than in the political and cultural ones. He shows how thechrysobu ll o f 1082 in the long run al ter ed the balance of pol it ic al re la tionsbetween the two powers in f avour of the Venet ians. Th is i s a l so the l ine takenby R. -J. Li li e in h is H an de l t en d P ol it ik z wi sc he n d em b yz an ti ni sc he n R ei chu nd d en i ta lie nis cb en K om m un en V en ed ig , P is a t en d G en ua i n d er E po ch ed er K o mn en en u nd d er A n ge lo i ( 10 81 -1 2 04 ) (Amsterdam, 1984) . This pro-vides an exhaustive examination of Byzantine relations with the I talian mer-canti le republics . He is adamant that Alexius 's concess ions to the Venetianswere made on political and military grounds alone. This remained t rue o fthe Byzantine relations with the I talian republics throughout the twelf th cen-tur y. Commerc ia l and economic conside ra tions simply d id not en ter into theByzantine reckoning, although they undoubtedly did on the I talian side. TheVenetians made substantial gains as a result of their privileged posit ion. Lilieconcedes tha t the Venet ians con tribu ted to the economy of the Byzan tineEmpire in the ar eas where they were most act ively involved, but a rgues tha tthe ir act iv it ie s had l it tl e impac t ove ra ll on the Byzan tine economy, whichremained overwhelmingly agrar ian and autarkic. In economic and commer-cial terms Byzanti um had far less need of the Italians than the Italians hadneed of Byzant ium. This app lied to the Venet ians in part icular. L il ie 's d is-missive views on t he economic importance of the Italian presence i n theB ,yzan tine Empi re match those of Michae l Hendy in h is S tu die s in B yz an -tine Mon et a ry Eco nomy . Neithe r a tt ribu te any sign ifi cance to the market inthe Byzant ine economy. No one would d ispu te tha t the Byzan tine Empire22

I nt ro d uc t io n : Re ce n t Wo rk (1025-1118)rema ined an overwhelming ly agr ar ian economy, nor tha t st ate finance dom-inated economic activity, nor even t hat t he market sector was t iny. How-ever, what seems quit e beyond doubt is that the Italian presence meant thatthe commercial sector grew. It gave t he It ali ans a toehold which they wereunwil ling to re linqui sh . Thei r intere st in the commodi ti es avai lab le in Byzan-tium worked to the advantage of the rentier class that dominated Byzantineurban life.

Associated wit h the quest ion of the It ali an impact on the Byzantineeconomy is that of t he role of westerners generally . The first crusade andthe establishment of the crusader states made relat ions with the West thecen tr al i ssue of twel fth cen tu ry Byzant ine h is to ry . There has been a tendencyrecen tly to quest ion how impor tant wes te rners were to the f unct ioning of theByzant ine Empir e. Apa rt fr om the wea ring of t rouser s the re a re apparent lyfew examples of western influence on Byzantine li fe. The inference is thatwes te rners were not v it al to the Byzan tine Empi re ; tha t Byzant ium was st il lable to glory in its splendid i solation. Even Li lie who subscribes to t his linehas t o admit that Byzantium needed the Italians to crew its ships. One of myconten tions has a lways been tha t splendid i so la tion was no longe r an opt ionfor Byzanti um. It is of course an atti tude of mind as much as a concrete fact.There was a strand that yearned for a return of the good old days whenforeigners were kept at arm's leng th, but the emperors of the Comneniandynasty were realist ic . They understood that they needed to harness the energiesand expert is e of the West . As a re su lt , Byzan tium was inf il tra ted by westerninterests. Control of commerce was one example of this. Di sputing the im-portance of the commerc ia l s ector or the s igni fi cance of western influenceamounts to a re fusal to acknowledge tha t any sign ifi cant change occurr ed inByzant ium over the e leventh and twe lfth cen tu ries . Ther e may not have beenany transformation of basic economic and social s tructures. I t is increasinglyc lea r tha t to expect any such thing i s qui te unreal is ti c before the seven teen thor eighteenth century. But economic change was not just a matt er of demo-graph ic growth. I t was more impor tant ly inc reas ing p er c ap it a wealth. Thepolit ical his tory of the Byzantine Empire in the eleventh and twelf th centuriesin the end revolves around the implications of this fact. It meant two thingsin particular. In the first, the framework of government might not appear tohave changed, but its complexion had. It was more obviousl y infiltrated bypriva te intere st . Thi s could work both ways. It cou ld produce pol it ic al dead-lock or clear direction, as when the Comneni ran government i n the interestof a powerful group. Secondly, Byzantium was more open to external infl u-ences than it had been in the past. This again worked both ways. Byzantiumhad much to gain fr om fore ign penet ra tion , but poss ib ly more to lose. The rewere the makings of a complex equation which was to be resolved by theturn of the twel fth cen tu ry .

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Chapter 2 .

Basil I I and his Legacy

The shadow of Basil II hangs over the eleventh century. In the eveningsmen recounted h is ach ievements and wise sayings. He came to symbol ize theimperial g randeur which was s lipp ing away. His r ule s eemed to have consum-mated a per iod ofByzant ine h is to ry . He a tt ained mos t of the pol it ic al objec t-ive s f or which Byzan tine emperors had been s tr iv ing s ince the midd le of then in th cen tu ry . His Empire may not have r ival led tha t o f Jus tinian in size , butits frontiers ran once more along the Danube and the Euphrates, and theRussian lands were at long last drawn firml y withi n th e Byzantin e sphere o finf luence . On the graph of Byzan tine pol it ic al h istory h is re ign marks one ofthe peaks.

The pattern of Byzantine history is one of peaks and troughs; of tri-umph, swift decline, and dogged recovery. This sequence was rooted in Byzan-tium's very being with it s combinati on of enduring streng ths and ext remevulne rabi li ty . The key is the c ity of Constan tinople. As the seat o f imper ia lgovernment and through i ts shee r wea lth and weigh t of numbers i t p rovidedthe Empire wi th an imp ressiv e concen tratio n of materi al resources. As t hese tt ing for the imper ia l o ffi ce and the pat ri archa l church , i t con tribu ted spi r-i tual and ideo logica l s treng ths. But i t was d iff icul t to con tro l, i f clear d ir ec -t ion from the emperor was lacking . This migh t happen when the succes sionwas i n doubt or the emperor at cross-purpo ses wi th t he chu rch. Con stant i-nople also placed an immense burden upon the provinces, which was thecause of re sentment . For any of these reasons the apparent ly sol id facade ofimperial power migh t suddenly c rack open . The greatest dange rs came whena per iod of internal divis ion and unrest coincided with dif ficult ies abroad, forConstan tinople was not only a sea t o f empire , i t was a lso the c ross roads andthe poi nt of balance of the medieval world. Th is offered its emperors greatoppor tunities , but also presented them with considerable dangers , dependingupon the nature and aims of the peoples and powers that came within itso rb it . Mos t Byzan tine emperors pos sess ed the exper ience and r esources to24

Basi l I I and h is Legacymeet any external challenge, but th ey became extremel y vulnerable, if theyall owed forei gn powers t o be drawn in to t he intern al politi cs of the EmpI~e.

Basil II seemed to have inherited from his predecesso rs, the soldieremperors, Nicephorus Phokas ( 963-69) and John Tz im iskes (969-7~) , a r ingof s ecure f ront ier s. They conque red Bulga ria and r estored the f ront ie r to theDanube, which was protected by a series of great fortresses and a specialf leet . I n the eas t they pushed the f ront ie rs of the Empire beyond the Euphra te sand into northern Syri a, where in 969 the ci ty of Antioch was conquered . Tothe south Nicephorus Phokas's conquest first of Crete (961) and then ofCyprus (965 ) more or less sealed off the Aegean from enemy attack.

There remained t he danger from the north . The Russi an s had threat-ened Con stant inople from across the Black Sea on a number o f occasionssince their first appearance beneath the walls of the city in 860. Efforts toconve rt them to chr is ti an ity had met with no great succes s. Itwas left to Basi lII to f ind a solut ion, which i ronica lly he improvised out of sheer despe ra tion .In 987 the two greatest families of Anatolia, the Phokas and the Skleros,united in rebellion against him. They had at their back the bulk of th e imper-ial armies of the East. Basi l II needed t roops and was willi ng to give almostanythin g fo r them. He t urned to t he Russians of Kiev who had provided theEmpi re with mercenaries in the past . The ir P rince Vlad imi r offe red a . corpsof 6,000 Varangians. He was also willing to be baptized, but the price de-manded was unprecedented, nothing less than the hand of the emperor'ssister, Anna. Th is marriage gave the Russian pri nce immense presti ~e, ~orhis bride was not merely a Byzantine princess, but one born to a reignmgemperor, a Porphyrogeni te princess , the u lt imate s ta tus symbol of the t ime .It has only to be remembered that the great German Emperor Otto I (961-73) was fobb ed off with a princess, who was not even of imperial st ock, forhis son Otto II.

The arrival of the Ru ssian troop s gave n ew heart to the imperial forces.The rebels were defeated on 13 April 989 near Abydos at the mouth of theHellespont. For the time being the power of the Anatolian families wasc rushed . These f ami li es had been a problem for the imper ia l government f romthe tur n of the n in th cen tu ry . The ir power was sol id ly based in the Ana to li anprovinces. They were lords of broad estates and owners of vast f1 o~k s; theycon tr ol led the local mi li ta ry organ izat ion. The succes s of the Byzan tine cam-paigns against the Arabs from the middle of the ninth century was largelytheir work and they benefited in the form of booty and new lands. BothNicephorus Phokas and John Tzimiskes came f rom thi s backgr,o.und.

Normally, a grudging alliance existed between these families a~d th ecen tra l government . This turned into some th ing more concr ete, when. III 963the Emperor Romanos I I d ied, l eaving two young sons, the f uture Basi l I I andConstantine VII I, to succeed him. The commander-in-chief Nicephorus Phokassei zed power and was crowned emperor, b ut on the understanding that therights of the imperial princes would be respected. This arrangement was

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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204con tinued a fter Phokas' s a ss as sina tion in 969 , when he was succeeded by hisnephew John Tzimiskes . For the Anatolian families it was a most satis factorystate of affairs. Li p s erv ice con tinued to be paid to the righ ts of the leg it ima tedyn asty, the house of Macedon, whi le real power rested i n the hands of on eof the ir number. This const itut iona l compromise cou ld not out las t the dea thof John Tzimiskes in 976 and the accession to power of Basil II, who wasnow of age. The Anat olian fami lies tri ed to recover their position under theleade rship of Bardas Skleros, the bro ther -in- law of Tz im iskes , but h is r ebel -lion was put down in 979 thanks to the intervention on the emperor's sideof the ruler of Georgia. This did not break the power of the magnates. Aswe have seen, they cha ll enged Bas il I I once aga in , but with Rus sian help wer ecompletely defeated in 989. The emperor now had no r ivals within the Empire;his position was unassailable.

Tradition records that the defeated leader of the Anatolian armies, BardasSk leros, was led before his conqueror, who enquired of him how he shouldin fu tu re r ule. Back came the r athe r surpri sing adv ice: 'Dest roy the h ighestcommand s. Do not all ow the common soldiers to prosper; rath er exhaustthem wi th un just exacti ons, so that they remain occupied at home. Don'tintroduce women into the imper ial palace. Don't be approachable. Few shouldknow of t he pl an s you are brewing." Whether this pi ece of adv ice was evergiven or was ju st ben trovato, Bas il II 's ru le became inc reas ingly harsh andarbitrary. He set out to curb the power of the great families by attacking itsfoundat ions : the ir con tro l ove r peasan ts and the ir p rope rty. Exist ing leg is la -t ion designed to pro tect peasant p rope rty had r ema ined very lar ge ly a dead-let te r. In 996 Bas il I I r ev ived and extended i t. He underl ined h is se riousnes sof purpose by inc luding the caut iona ry tale of one Philokales. Th is man hadsucceeded in buying up al l the prop erty in h is n at ive vil lage. In the processhe must have offended against the ex ist ing l egisl ation. The matter came tothe emperor' s not ice. 'Pa ss ing through the v il lage , my majesty conside red themat ter o n the request of the v illagers. We had his luxurious villa levell ed tothe ground and re tu rned h is prope rty to the peasant s, l eav ing h im with wha the had to begin with and reducing him to the level of the peasants."

Peasant property now received effective protection f rom the attentionsof th e magnates. Whether, apart from one or two sp ect acul ar ex amples,muc! l peasant p rope rty was r ecove red from the magnates i s ano ther ma tter ,but It was a th reat hanging over t hem and would have made th em reluctantto challenge the emperor, even when he p roceeded to yet anot her measuredirected against them. In the past the arrears owed by a tax district wereshared out among the p easants. Now Basil II forced the magnates to pay thearrears owed by the peasantry. Taxation was the chief burden upon the

IMichael Psellos, Chronographic; Michael Pscllus, Fourteen Byzantine Rulers (trans. E.R.A.~ewter) (Penguin Classics) (Harmondsworth, 1966), pA3.- J. and P. Zepos , Jus graecoromanum (Athens,1931), I, p.265.26

Basil IInd h is Legacypeasant ry and the passage of teams of tax-col lector s was f ea red and r esen ted.Heavy taxati on was one o f the major causes forcin g peasants eith er to aban-don their h oldings or to sell up. It was therefore indirectl y responsible forpeasant property passing int o the hands of the magnat es. It was in the inter-e st s o f the state to have a prosperous and con tented peasant ry , fo r the ir wel l-being , in the words of an imperial novel , ' ha s many and necess ar y advan tages:the payment of taxes and the perfo rmance of mil itary service, which thin gswill always be wanting, as long as the general population abandons itsholdings'."

The condition of the peasantry was to be improved by shifting thearrears of taxation on to the shou lders of t he 'powerful'. In t his way, muchof their surplus wealth would be soaked up by the state. They would haveless money for the purchase of peasant propert y. The defence of the peas-antry was not merely an exercise of imperial philanthropy. It went to theheart o f the question of imperi al authority. In the past , buyi ng up of peasantp roper ty had very often meant that the peasant ry wer e reduced to dependen tstatus; they virtually became serfs bound to great estates. Real power at thelocal level was passing more and more into the hands of the magnates. Theydominated local military organization: the provincial armies, known as themes,were almost turning into private armies. It was a trend which for much ofthe tenth century the imperial government was willing to overlook, but italmost co st Basil II his throne. The rebell ions at th e beginning o f hi s reignshowed all to o cl early th at t he l oyalty of these armi es was to th e magnatesof Anatolia and not to the emperor.

Basi l I I' s solut ion was to gener al ize commutat ion of mi li ta ry serv ice inthe armies of the themes for a money payment and to rely for his militarypower on a standing army, the flower of which was h is Varangian Guard. Itwas this army t hat en ab led him to defeat the Bulgarians who had recov eredthe ir independence, whi le he was embro iled with the Ana to li an magnates. Ittook nea rly twenty year s of campa igning to grind down Bulgarian r es is tanceand to rei ncorporate t he Bul garian l ands in the Emp ire. When in 1016 bootygained in the Bulgarian wars was shared out, the Varangians received asmuch as the rest o f the army put together: a good reflection of their import-ance in Basil II's armies. They provided him with the mili tary backing thatwould make h is i deal of aut ocracy a reality.

Something of its spirit exudes from the frontpiece of the Psalter hecommi ssioned to celebrate h is final victory over the Bulgari an s in 1018. Hestands with the conquered Bul garians cowering at his feet. In his ri ght h andhe holds a spear; in his left a sword. At his side are medallions of warriorsai nts. Around hi s head hover the archangels Mi ch ael and Gabriel, the onetouching his spear in blessing and the other his crown, while from above

l Ibid., p.209.27


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The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204Christ lowers the imperial circlet. Nothing could more clearly express theconcept of military might sanctioned by divinepower. It was the consumma-tion of an extreme version of Byzantine autocracy.

It found its expression on the battlefield, whereas it was more usual forByzantine autocracy to find its dearest expression in the ceremonial of thecourt. Basil II had no time for ceremonial. He was more interested in action.There was a drive and sense ofpurpose behind his rule which bordered onthe fanatical and accorded illwith the more cautious and diffident, if obstin-ate, approach favoured by most of his predecessors. He ruled through fearand was .not :-ecepti.veo the advice of others. He was the complete autocrat.As the hlsto~lan Michael Psellos was to put it: 'He alone decided policy, healone supervised strategy. He conducted his administration not according tothe written laws, but according to the unwritten dictates of his intuition.". Sucha ruler was hard to fol low. He had created a style of government,~hlch he alone c~uld manage. It is not in the least surprising that his imme-diate successors did not measure up to his example. He made their task stillmore difficult by failing to make adequate provision for his succession. Fora ver~ great .ruler i t was a fearful omission, which i t is now impossible toexpl~m. Basil II.never married. This can be explained bya conversion to anascetic way of hfe early in his reign, as he sought to master both himself andhis opponents. His Successorwas to be his elderly brother Constantine (1025-28), a brave man, who had supported him loyal ly. Constantine, however,?nly left daughters to succeed him. For the lasttwenty years ofBasil

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Byzantine Empire-Political History