Caesar 40 - The New Soviet Constitution and the Party-State Issue In CPSU Politics, 1956-1966

8/2/2019 Caesar 40 - The New Soviet Constitution and the Party-State Issue In CPSU Politics, 1956-1966

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: JUN 2 0 9 ;I 1

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21 July 1966mINTELLIGENCE STUDY '

T HE N E W SOVIET CONSTITUTIONA N D THE PARTY-STATE ISSUE

IN CPSU POLITICS, 1956-1966-cC/g5&4 wfu

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THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION AND TEEPARTY-STATE ISSUE I N CPSU POLITICS,1956-1966

This working paper of -the DDI/Resea.rch S t a f f examinest he t en year d isp ut e , which cont inues , wi t h in t he CommunistPa r ty of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over t h e q u e s t i o n of t h ecor rec t r o l e f o r t h e Communis t p a r t y i n t h e modern Russ ians t a t e I t examines the in tense par ty-s ta te d ispute- -whichis r e f l e c t e d i n t h e e f f o r t s t o ' adopt a new Soviet Consti-tu t ion- -p r im ar i ly th rough pos i t ion s t aken i n th e pa r tyand ju r id ic a l media .

Although not c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h o t h e r o f f i c e s , t h epaper has ben ef i t ed much f rom t he auth or ' s d isc uss ionswi th co l l eagues in OC I , ONE, ORR, FDD and BR . In pa r t lou -l a r , t h e author, Leonard Parkinson, would like t o th'ankMarion Shaw of OC I and C a r l Linden, formerly of RPD , f o rt h e i r sugges t ions The au thor a lone, however, is respon-s i b l e f o r t h e c on cl us io ns of t h e pa pe r. The DDI/RS wouldwelcome f u r t h e r comment on t h e p a p e r , addressed t o M r .- .Parkinson, o r t o the Chief or Deputy Chief of t h e s t a f f( a l l a t 7 1

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, THE H EW SOVIET CONSTITUTION AND THEPARTY-STATE ISSUE I N CPSU POLITICS,

1956-1966Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............................

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Su~a~y...................................., .......... iiONE: ELEMENTS I N THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION......l

The I n s t i t u t i o n a l Problem In CPSU Pol it cs ,, ,. .,2The Form Of The I n s t i t u t i o n a l Debate. . . . . . . . . . . .GTWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL-INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE.................,.........ll

Opening Moves On Ins t i tu t ional Reform. . . ....... 221st Congress And The C o u n c i l of Minis te rs 'Diminished Role...............................17Khrushchev And The J u r i s t s On The Withering22nd Congress And The P a r t y ' s T r ad i ti o n alThe ltProduction Pr in ci pl et 1 And The

Thesis...............................,........23

Role. . . . . . . . . . . ...............................5C o n s t i t u t i o n . ................................. 2

Inte rven t ion of t he Pres id ium Opposi tion .. .. . . , 5 2New Leaders And Old Problems...................6523rd Congress And The Supreme Sov i e t ' sExpanded Role..O..OOO.....e.D.............. .... 81The "Brezhnev Constitution". .................. 90

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THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION AND THEPARTY-STATE ISSUE IN CPSU POLITICS,1956-1966i

ConclusionsThe long-standing e f fo r t wi th in t h e USSR t o promul-gate a new cons t i tu t ion re f l ec t s t h e d i s p u t e w i t h i n t h eCPSU over t h e ques t ion of t h e correct r o l e for t h e Com-munis t pa r ty in a modern, ind us t r i a l i z ed Sov ie t Union.Unlike t h e d i s p l a y of S t a l i n i s t s o l i d a r i t y whichsurrounded t h e promulgation i n 1936 of t h e e x i s t i n g S o v i e tC o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e e f f o r t t o w r i t e a new bas i c l a w emergesa g a in s t a background of major t he o r e t i c a l a n d j u r i d i c a l .d i s p u t e s over bas ic i n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s .The main i s s u e a t s t a k e was-and remai ns i n t h epost-Khrushchev period-- the ques t ion of t h e f u t u r e andfunc t ion of t h e p r in c ip a l p a r t y a n d s t a t e organ iza t ions .

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Under Khrushchev's direction,.the pro jec t f o r d r a f t -i n g a new const i tu t ion was p a r t of a l a rge r plan t o t r a n s -form t h e p a r t y i n t o an i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t would absorb func-t i o n s t r a d i t i o n a l l y p erf or med by t h e m i n i s t e r i a l a p pa ra t usof t h e s ta te .by Khrushchev appears t o have been Qimed a t e n a b l i n g himt o surmount bureaucrat ic h inderances t o t h e e x e r c is e ofpersonal power which have accompanied t h e pos t -S ta l ins lacken ing of p o l i t i c a l d i s c ip l i n e i n t h e CPSU.

The i n s t i t u t i o n a l t r an s f or m at i o n s ou gh t

.. ..... . /. . . F or d iv e r s e re a s on s , t h e l e a d in g members i n t h e p a r t ypres id ium ( the p ar ty 's h ig hes t policy-making body, r e c e n t l yrenamed "pol i tburo") and t h e sec r e t a r i a t ( t h e p a r ty ' s h ig h -e s t executive body) who were involved i n t h e d i s p u t e ont h e c o n s t i t u t i o n rejected Khrushchev's e f f o r t s t o c o n s t r u c ta produc t ion-or ien ted pa r ty , t o enhance h i s personal powerpos i t ion , and t o push h i s p a r t i c u l a r domestic programs.Suslov, t h e p a r t y ' s l e a d i n g t h e o r e t i c i a n a nd t h e one whol e d t h e oppos i t ion t o KhrushchevO s Cons t i tu t ion , a rgued

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fo r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of t h e CPSUas t h e ideologica l a n d p o l i t i c a l m o n i to r of 'a separa tes t a t e appara tus concerned y i th t h e r o u t i n e f u n c t i o n s o frunning t h e country . Suslov t h u s u p h e l d t h e v i a b i l i t yof t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t e m i n i s t e r i a l s y s t e m as a p a r t of h i sa r q p e n t f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e p a r t y a s a p o l i t i c a lorgan iza t ion . In e f f e ct , he argued t h a t Khrushchev wasp r e s s in g f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e t r u e i d e n t i t y of t h eparty. Ponomarev, a l e a d i n g o f f i c e r of KhrushchevOs con-Kosygin, t h e pa rt y ' s le ad in g economic manager, s uppo rtedt h e e x i s t i n g m i n i s t e r i a l s ys te m as a p a r t of h i s argumentf o r t e c h n i ca l e x p e r t i s e in runn ing t h e complicated economic'l i f e of t h e country. The l a t e Kozlov, t h e e a r l y h e i r ap-paren t dur ing t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e b a t e , appeared t o b a l ka t Khrushchdu's i n s t i t u t i o n a l e f f o r t s t o s t r e n g th e n h i spower posi t ion. Brezhnev, t h e subsequent h e i r apparent ,may a l so have objec ted t o Khrushchev ' s ins t i tu t iona lschemes. Nevertheless, Brezhnev, l i k e s e n i o r p a r t y o f f i -c i a l Mikoyan, had strongly seconded Khrushchev's projec tf o r a new const i tu t ion and re fe r red t o t h e pro jec t in . thecon tex t of pr ai si ng Khrushchev's concept of a product ion-or ien ted p a r ty .

While KhrushchevOs successors i n i t i a l l y s o f t - p e d a l l e dt h e idea of c o n s t i t u t i o n a a r e f o r m , t h e c u r r e n t p a r t y l e a d e r ,Brezhnev, re ce n t ly rev ived t h e p r o j e c t o f a new c o n s t i t u -t i on . And ce r t a i n l e s s c o n t r o v e r s i a l f ace t s of t h e o l dques t ion of a p r a c t i c a l r o l e f o r t h e par ty have once againbeen ra i s ed by t he new consti tutional commission chairman,Brezhnev, i n t h e c o n t e x t of a new basic l a w . Thus, i tis p o s s ib l e t h a t t h e Brezhnev Const i tu t ion conceals ane f f o r t t o s a n ct i on j u r i d i c a l l y less con ten t ious p a r t y -s t a t e po l i c i e s s u c h as a "working par ty" , pr i mar i ly a tt h e rank and f i l e l e v e l , a n d a s t reng thened Supreme Sovie t( t h e formal law-making parl iam ent ) i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t ht h e Council of Min i s t e r s ( t h e formal execut ive body) .The l a t t e r p o l i c y sugges t ion h a s been endorsed by Podgorny,the cur ren t cha i rman of t h e p r e s i d i u m of t h e Supreme S o v ie t ,and h i s protege S h e l e s t , t h e p a r t y leader of t h e Ukraine.Kosygin, th e cur re nt chairman of t h e p r e s i d i u m of t h e Councilof Ministers, and one of h i s f i r s t d e p u t y chairmen, Mazurov,

- 8\ . - s t i t u t i o n a l commiss ion, seconded Suslov 's o pposi t ion....

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have so f a r r e m a in e d s i l e n t on t h e Brezhnev-Podgorny pro-p o s a l s t o s t r e n gt h e n t h e Supreme Soviet .Mazurov have emphasized t h e need f o r an improved s t a t eapparatus in< unning th e complex a f f a i r s of contemporaryR u s s i aKosygin and

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So f a r t h e issues i n t h e c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a ldebate have been of a f a r more l im i t ed scope t h a n thosera i sed by Khrushchev's h ighl y co nt ro ve rs ia l approach t ot h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e . Accordingly t h e cur ren t cons t i -t u t i o n a l d i a l o g u e is s i l e n t on t h e themes t h a t were promi-nent under Khrushchev; namely, e x p l i c i t sub ord ina tio n ofideological t a s k s to economic t a s k s i n o v e r a l l p a r t y work,t h e f o r m u l a on t h e "withering away" of t h e s t a t e apparatus ,t h e assumption of s t a t e t a s k s by t h e p a r t y organ iza t ion ,and other %odiall* orgElnil;ations.

Khrushchev's conspicuous f a i l u r e t o a l t e r funda-mental ly t h e major governing bureaucracies i n t h e USSRcombined w i t h t h e s t reng thened in f luence of t h e Suslov-l e d p a rt y t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s i n t h e c ur re nt p o l i t i c a l en-vironment within t h e CPSU makes i t l i k e l y t h a t a t t h i ss t a g e t h e project of t h e new c o n s t i t u t i o n t e n t a t i v e l ys c h e d u l e d fo r completion next year w i l l n ot r e s u l t i nany basic i n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e sys t em,As y e t no l eader , inc lud ing Brezhnev whose s tr en gt h hass t e a d i l y i n c r e a s e d , e i t h e r seems powerful enough o r readyt o force th rough major changes. The best any leader mighthope for, it wo u l d seem, wou l d be t o in t roduce f o rm u l a -t i o n s i n t h e new cons t i tu t ion which .he could u s e t o j u s t i f yp o l i t i c a l programs now o nl y i n embryo.

summaryPar t one of t h e paper br ie f ly examines t h e con ten tand form of t h e p o s t - S t a l i n d e b at e over t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a lroxes of t h e p a r t y a n d s t a t e .Part two of t h e paper reconstructs the: .development. ' .oft h e controversy , , -and' h e . development '..ofh e ' . pos i t ions -o f . th e

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c u r r e n t S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p I%concludes with an examina-t i o n of t h e c o n t r a s t Ing c o n s t t u t s n a l p o s i t o n s withint h e cur ren t Kqernlkn command.development, e i g h t t im e p e r io d s i n .&Be e on st i t u t i o n a ldeba te are s i n g l e d out :The f i r s t per iod , 1936-1959, i nv ol ve s the develop-ment of KiirushchevOs co ns t i tu t i on al po si t ion . In t h i s

' period, Khrushchev (1) rev ived t h e "withering away of t h es ta te" t hes i s t h a t had been b u r l e d by S t a l f s , (2) made 'clear h$s c o n t ro v e r s ia l p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e wither ing t h e s i smeat t h a t r e s p o n s l b i l i t ies of t h e s t a t e apparadus wouldi n f ac t be diminished, (3) he ld t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t eapparatus would not remain under %ornunism, '( (4 ) s t re s sedt h a t s t a t e f u n c t i o n s wo u l d b e t r a n s f e r r e d t~ "social organi-~ a t f o n s ~ ~ ~uch as t h e pai -ty, th e sov ie t s , t rade unions, '( 5 ) placed par ty work on a produet ion-or iented, ratherthan on I t s t r a d i t i o n a l l d e o l o g i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d ba s i s, and( 6 ) i m p l i c i t l y argued that t h e party organ%zation, t h e' ?h ighest form of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , " would l a t e r s u b s t i -t u t e for o r merge wi th t h e m in i s t e r i a l a n d s o v i e t o r g a n i -za t o n s

To smnarize t h e chrono log ica l

In 1959-1961, vsa~ious o l i t i c a l and ju d i c i a l spokes -men exposed t h e i r oppos i t ion t o KhrushchevQs co ns t i tu t i on a lscheme. The op po si ti on w a s led by p r e s i d i u m member Suslovwho supported a s t r o n g &ate appa~sttus ('Oeven a f t e r ther e a l i z a t f o n of communisnP) to s t r e n g th e n his case f o r t h e .p r e s e r o a t i o n o f the pasty as an ideo log ica l ly -o r ien tedorgan izat io n. Leading Sovie t j u r i s t s e n t e r e d t h e debatein t h i s p e r io d and presented t h e i r c o n t r a s t i n g br ie f s ont h e projec t f o r a new b a s i c l a w ,By t h e 1961 Par ty Congress , th e deb ate appears tohave undercut Khrushcheves i n s t i t u t i o n a l v iews. He w a sunable t o g a in party s a n c t i o n fop t h e p r i o r i t y of p r a c t i c a lwork i n th e new pa rt y prog~amwhich gave t h e u s u a l - p r i o r i t y

to t h e p o l i t i c a l - i d e o lo g i c a l o v e r economic t a s k s i n p a r t ya c t i v i t i e sahead w i t h t h e project t o d r a f t a new c o n s t i t u t i o n a n dtoward t h e end of t h e year gained formal adoption of h i sr e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e p a r t y "produc t ion p r inc ip le "

D e s p i t e t h i s sethack, Khrushchev in 1962 moved

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The reac t ion t h a t followed t h e October 1962 Cub amissile d e b a c l e c o n s t i t u t e s t h e f i f t h round i n t h e debateon t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . D u r in g t h i s period, Khrushchev'sd e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p o l i c y , a n im po r ta n t p a r t i n h i s "wi ther -i n g t hes i s , " s u f f e r e d s e t b a c ks and t h e p r o j e c t of t h e con-s t i t u t i o n showed no s i g n of progress .of Kosygin, Brezhnev and t h e l a t e Kozlov manifes ted d i f -fer enc es of v iew on t h e p r o j e c t .Desp i te s i g n s of high- leve l disagreemen ts, Khrushchevi n mid-1964 renewed h i s e f f o r t s t o move f orwa rd on t h ec o n s t i t u t i o n . I n d i c a t i o n s of r es i stance t o h i s p l a n s 'were s u g ge s t ed i n t h e p u b l i c h a n d l i ng of h i s mid-July con-s t i t u t i o n sp ee ch which appeared t o q u a l i f y h i s commentsby n o t in g t h a t he made only "pre l iminary observat ions"--w h i l e two yea r s e a r l i e r he had "defined" t h e main t a s k sof t h e new cons t i tu t ion . In a d d i t i o n , t h e r o l e of t h es t a t e appara tus was h i g h l i g h t e d i n t h e Sov iet media i nt h e per iod fo l lowing t h e mid-July c on st i t ut io n commissionmee t ing , s e c re t a r i a t member Ponomarev presented a Suslov-s t y l e t h e o r e t i c a l de fe ns e of t h e s t a t e sys tem

The s ta tements

Within a year' a f t e r Khrushchev's overthrow, h i sm aj or i n s t i t u t i o n a l ch an ges were abol ished: f i r s t h i s1962 r e s t r u c t u r i n g t h e p a r t y on a product ion basis andl a t e r 1 95 7 d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of t h e s t a t e m i n i s t r i e s werefu l ly revoked .p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l l e a d e r s h i p , t h e s t a t e appa ra t u s re-gained i ts p r e r o g a t i v e s as t h e economic manager withint h e system. Suslov took h i s u s u a l p a r t as t h e p r o t e ct o rof t h e ideo l og ica l ly -o r ien t ed pa r ty , l eav i ng mundane t a s k st o s ta te i n s t i t u t i o n s . Brezhnev i n i t i a l l y e nd or se d t h i sl i n e , b u t as t i m e went on--and as p r e s s u r e s fo r h a r d deci-s i o n s mounted--he gave in cr ea si ng emphasis t o t h e neces-s i t y of t h e pa r t y ' s involvement in t h e economic sphe re .He w a s , however, caut ious no t t o a s s o c i a t e h im s el f d i r e c t l yw i t h t h e dis c re d i t ed Khrushchevian fo rmula t io ns on t h eproduct ion-or iented p a r t y .of t h e s t a t e , Kosygin sought t o mark out t h e realm ofeconomic-industrial management as h i s quasi-autonomousj u r i s d i c t i o n .of t h e Supreme Sov iet anot her dimension t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l

The p a r ty w i th d r e w . to i t s sphere of

In defense of t h e p r e r o g at i v e sWith P od go rn y' s s h i f t t o t h e c h a ir m an s hip

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r i v a l r y e n t e re d t h e pic ture :ing t)is powers of t h e Supreme Sovie t I n its r e l a t i o n s w i t hKosggin's Council of Min i s t e r s was pressed.endorsement of par l iamentary reforms t o p ut t ee th i n t ot h e Supreme Soviet seemed di rec t ed not so much towardboosting Podgorny (over whom he had gained t h e advantage)b u t r a t h e r as another way of diminishing Kosggings s t a t eappara tus . S U S l O V , w hi l e a p p ar e n tl y n o t o b j e c t i n g t o "the expans ion of t h e Supreme S o v i e t * s ro l ep cont inued t oc o n c e n t r a t e on t h e concept of t h e i d e o lo g i c a l p a r t y .

t h e movement aimed a t expand-BjrezhnevPs

As- these cleavages developed, t h e p r o j e c t for writ-i n g a new co ns t i tu t i on once more grew i n p o l i t i c a l s i g n i -fi ca nc e. And Brez hnev qs 10 June 1966 announcement t h a ta new Sovie t Con st i tu t ion wou l d 'krown the maJestic h a l f -c e n tu r y course of o u r ~ountrg*~--1967--mayw e l l engendert h e e i g h t h round in t h e debate.ened by t h e f a c t t h a t (1)Brezhnev surrounded h i s refer-ence t o t h e new basic l a w w i t h r e f e r e n c e s r e m in i s ce n t ofsome of h i s p r e d e c e s s or * s p a r t y - s t a t e c o n ce p t s and (2)t h e memb e r s of t h e new IWemlin o l i g a r c h y presen ted d i s -s i mi l a r views on the r e s p e c t i v e r o l e s of t h e pak ty , t h es o v i e t s , and th e s t a t e a p p w a t u s a n d t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n -ship. In s ~ @ ~rezhnev's move on t h e p r o j e c t is l i k e l yt o sharpen t h e i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t o ve r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a lissue as var ious e lements seek t o incorpora te t h e i r posi-t i o n s i n t o t h e regimevs bas ic l a w .

This p o s s i b i l i t y is s t r e n g t h -

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ONE: ELElldENTS I N THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION

During t h e momentary political vacuum in t h e lead-e r s h i p produced by S ta l in ' s dea th (5 March 1953) a h i gh l yu nu su al j o i n t s e s s i o n of t h e CPSU Central Committee, t h eUSSR Council of Minis t e rs and t h e Pres id ium of the'USSRSupreme S ov iet -w as convened i n 'o rd e r t o undertake t h ef i r s t a c t i o n s of t h e p o s t - S t a l i n regime. For a b r i e fmoment t h e three bodieh represen t ing t h e p a r t y , t h e s t a t em i n i s t e r i a l bu reauc racy , and t h e par l i ament were d e p i c t e das co-equals. While t h e Supreme Soviet p r e s i d i u m wassoon r e l ega ted to i t s usua l ce remonia l func t io ns i n Sovie tp o l i t i c s , t h e cleavage between t h e p a r t y and s t a t e ap-p a r a t u s has f igur ed prominent ly i n contemporary Sovie tp o l i t i c s . I t r eve rbe ra t ed i n t h e Khrushchev-Malenkovs t r u g g l e i n t h e 1953-55 per iod and t h e charge r a i s e d a g a i n s tMalenkov following h i s defeat t h a t he attempted t o p u t t h es t a t e over t h e par ty--whether h i s u l t i m a t e i n t e n t i o n ornot--gave expression t o an underlying i s s u e .a s Khrushchev's po li cy from 1956 on c u t i n c r e a s i n g l y deeperi n t o t h e p r e r o g a t i v e s df t h e s t a t e a ppa r a tus he becames u b je c t t o t h e r e v e r s e charge and a f t e r h i s f a l l he wasdenounced for a t t em p t i ng t o i nvo lve t h e p a r t $ i n f u n c t i o nst r a d i t i o n a l l y exercised by t h e s t a t e .I n t h e post-Khrushchev l e a d e r s h i p , i n s t i t u t i o n a l

i s s u e s are once more enmeshed i n l e a d e r s h i p p o l i t i c s .A t pre sen t t h e Supreme Sovie t ap para tus en te rs i n t o thep o l i t i c a l e qu at io n s i n c e t h e t o p p o s t s of t h e p a r t y , t h es t a t e apparatus and t h e Supreme Soviet are divided betweent h r e e pow er fu l f i gu re s i n t h e i r own right--Brezhnev, Kosy-gin and Podgorny. While Brezhnev is c l e a r l y i n t h e s t rong -e s t , and Podgorny i n th e weakest s t r a t e g i c - p o s i t i o n in termsof f a ct io ' na l p o l i t i c s , t h i s ci rcumstance is more l ike lyt o exacerba te ka ther t han s i m p l i fy any a t t em p t a t a r a t i o n a lr e o r d e r i n g of t h e S ov ie t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e .

I r o n i c a l l y ,

I n b r i e f , s i n c e t h e pas s i ng of S t a l i n ' s sys t em ofpe r sona l absolut ism, i n s t i t u t i o n a l issues have been anever- presen t and inc re as ing ly important dimension of S o v i e tl e d d e r s h i p p o l i t i c s . These i s s u e s under Khrushchev and

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more r e ce n t l y i n t h e Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny l eader -sh ip have been mirro red i n a con t inu ing d i scuss ion and.d e b a t e within t h e regime o v e r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and ap-p l i c a t i o n t o contemporary R u s s i a of d o c t r i n e s f e c e i v e dfrom Lenin and S t a l i n on t h e p a r t y a n d s t a t e ,c o n t e x t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e and secondly s e t s f o r t h .i n summary th e b as ic doc $r inal e lements of t h e debate overt h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e a u s s i a n p o l i t y .

P a r t one f i r s t b k i e f ly discusses t h e broad p o l i t i c a l

THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM I N CPSU POLITICS

. . . . .' .. . . . . ..

Since i ts founding t h e S o v ie t regime has s u f f e r e dfrom bas i c defects i n i ts i n t e r n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n .* Botht h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t hi n t h e r u l i n g group and between th em a j o r p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s of t h e regime have been ill-def ined and es ta b l i she d channe ls or r e g u l a r i z e d methodsfo r con ta in ing and reso lv in g p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s havebeen almost wholly absent.These defects of t h e Soviet "const i t u t on'' havebeen var ious ly manifested s i n c e 1927 perhaps most con-s p i c u o u s ly i n t h e absence of any arrangement for t h e t r a n s -f e r of power from one l eade r sh i p to another .f e r of power has been and remains an i r r e gu l a r and un-p r e d i c t a b l e p r oc e ed ing f r a u g h t w i t h dangers fo r t h e r u l i n g

The trans-

*Throgghout most of t h i s paper t h e t e r m c o n s t i t u t i o nis used i n i ts gener ic sense - - tha t is , t h e o v e r a l l i s f i -t u t o n a l s t r u c t u r e and p o l i t i c a l pract ice of t h e Sovie tpo l i ty . The paper a l so discusses t h e e f f o r t in t h e post-S t a l i n regime t o d r a f t a new w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n t osupersede t h e 1936 S t a l i n C o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t t h e con tex tw i l l m a k e i t clear when reference i s be ing made t o t h econs t i tu t iona l document

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p a r t y i n s t i t u t i o n i t se l f e The 'vsuccessionvv r i se s howeverare r o o t e d in t h e p e r e n n i a l c o n d i t i o n s of S o v i et p o l i t i c s .The au th o ri ty and powers of a prime leader have never beens t h b l i z e d i n clear-cut i n s t i t u t i o n a l terms and have beenvu lne rab le bo th t o t h e e c c e n t r i c i t i e s of f a c t i o n al p o l i t i c sand t h e s h i f t i n g b a la nc es of i n s t i t u t i o n a l forces w i t h i nt h e regime. A t t h e same time th e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c -t u r e s of t h e par ty and s t a t e r a ther t han p rov id ing a s t a b l eenv ironment f o r t he r e so lu t ion of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t shave served as coun te r s i n power s t ru gg les among f a c t i o n sof t h e l e a d e r s h i p .Under Lenin and Stalin t h e problem of r a t i o n a l i z -ing and s t a b i l i z i n g b ot h p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and t h e in-

n e r - p o l i t i c s of t h e regime remained submerged. La rge lythrough h i s pres t ige as t h e author of Bolshevik v i c t or yi n 1917 and t h e force of h i s perso nal i ty , Lenin dominatedand g av e u n i t y t o t h e new Soviet regime. Though of ar a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l c h a ra c t er th an Le nin , S t a l i na l so created a p e r s o n a l i s t regime.he imposed is of e n c a l l e d a sys tem of " ins t i t u t i ona l i z ed"t e r ro r and, indeed, from t h e s t andpo in t 6f t h e s o c i e t ys u b j e c t e d t o t h e t e r r o r t h i s w a s p r e c i s e l y t r u e . Eowever,i n terms of inner- regime pol i t ics t h e t e r r o r p re ve nt edi n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s from gain ing autonomous pol i t ica lforce and t h u s a f f e c t i n g t h e personal power of t h e supremeleader.

The d i c t a t o r i a l sway

. ...... . . .. .. , .. .

With t h e e r o si o n of Sta l inOs sys tem of t e r ro r a f t e rh i s d e a t h, i n s t i t 6 t i o n a l f a c t o r s began t o g a i n i n impo rt-ance in Sovie t po l i t i c s . Khrushcheves l ead e r sh ip i t s e l fref lected the change. While h e s t r o v e i n h i s own way t olead i n t h e p e r so n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n of Lenin and S t a l i n ,he devoted more and more energy a f t e r 1956 t o t h e e f f o r tboth t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e h i s p o s i t i o n and reshape t h ei n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e regime. (In way of con-trast, S t a l i n , e s p e c i a l l y i n the l a s t h a l f of h i s r u l e ,d i sp layed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t , i f not contempt, for t h e ques-. t i o n of h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s . Molotov occupied t h eprem ie r sh ip in t h e heyday of S t a l i n e s d i c t a t o r i a l powersand even S ta l in ' s t i t l e of Genera l Secre tary of t h e p a r tyf e l l i n t o d i s u s e . ) Khrushchev, f o r example, engaged ina s u s t a i n e d b u t not notably successful e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h

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himself formal ly as the 'thead**of t h e p a r t y pres id ium,a body which is fo rmal ly based on t h e concep t o f v9c01-l e c t i v i t y " and t h e p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y of i ts members.*He sought t o overcome t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n f l i c t i n t h er eg im e r e s u l t i n g from th e d iv i s i o n of e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t ybetween t h e pa r t y and s t a t e by ta k in g over th e p remiersh ipi n a d d it i o n t o t h e po,st of F i r s t Secre ta ry . H e e v i d e n t l yr e g a r d e d > o rcame t o r e ga r d h i s s t r a d d l i n g ac t as only ani n t e r i m s o l u t i o n . In t h e l a s t t w o ye ar s of h i s incumbency,' Zok example, Khrushchev sought t o u n de r sc o re h i s e x e c u t i v esupremacy over party and s t a t e b y c h a i r i n g a se r i e s ofjoint pres idium-Counci l of Minis ters meet ings . ghrushchev sconcern with h i s f o r m a l p o s i t i o n also was echoed i n char-a c t e r i z a t i o n s of Khrushchev by some m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s ast h e "Supreme High Commander" of the armed forces--a t i t l esimilar t o t h e t i t l e he ld by t h e U.S. Pres ident under theC o n s t i t u t i o n . R e p o r t s a t t h e t i m e of Khrushchev's f a l lt h a t he w a s a t tempt ing t o set up a new execu t ive a r range-ment designed t o separa te himself from h i s pres id ium c o l -leagues seem a t l e a s t credible i n v iew of h i s prev iousmoves.l e m w a s not narrowly l i m i t e d t o s e c u r in g h i s persona lp o s i t i o n .i n a broad eff0r.C t o r e co n s t i t u t e t h e o v e r a l l i n s t i t u -t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the regime. H i s 19b2 reform of t h ep a r t y was p a r t o f a long-term e f f o r t a t once aimed a ta s s u r i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s u p r e m a c y of t h e p a r t y in t h eSoviet sys tem and a t reshap ing t h e r o l e of t h e p a r t y i ncontemporary Sovie t socie ty . From t h e s t a n d p o in t of t h e

KhrushchevOs awareness of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prob-As h a s been noted he w a s conc urre nt ly engaged

. .

, .

*Rhrushchev"s own concept of t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a ni z a ti o nof a p a r t y bureau was reflected in h i s c r e a t i o n a t t h e2 0 t h Congress of t h e Central Committee Bu r e a u f o r t h eRSFSR. In c o n t r a st t o t h e concept of a c o l l e c t i v e ofe q u a l s , t h e new bureau con ta ined a h ie r a r c h y of ranks(chairman, f i r s t d e p u t y chairman. and so f o r t h ) modelleda f t e r t h e Council of Min i s t e r s .B u r e a u was a b o l i s h e d a f t e r h i s f a l l .

EbrushchevQsRSFSR

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t r a d i t i o n a l s e p a r a t i o n of par ty and s t a t e f u n c t i o n s Khru-shchev was moving i n a r a d i c a l di r ec t ion . Under h i sprospectus of t h e " t r a n s i t i o n t o communism" t h e s t a t e ap-p a r a tu s wou l d be reduced and i t s f u n c t i o n s g r a d u a l l y ab-sorbed by the pa r ty which would increas ingly involved i t -s e l f i n t h e management of t h e economy. Khrushchev'sp r o j e c t fo r i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform aroused powerful opposi-t i o n b o th i n - t h e p a r t y a nd s t a t e apparatus and i t f e l lwith him.As a r e s u l t t h e ins t i tu t ional problems Khrushchevsought t o resolve have been posed anew i n t h e post-Khru-shchev leadersh ip . In f a c t , i n t h i s second decade of t h ep o s t - S t a l i n period, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n o m a l i e s of p a r t y

and s t a t e remain e s s e n ti a l l y unchanged. The regime f o r m a l l ys t i l l has no less t h a n t h r e e execu t ive pos ts - - the pa r tys e c r e t a r y , t h e Premier and t h e Supreme Soviet chairmanheading t h e r e s p e c t i v e hierarchies of t h e par ty and s t a t em in i s t e r i a l a p p a r a tu s a n d t h e Supreme Sovie t pa r l i ament .S t r i c t l y s p ea ki ng t h e p a r t y has no genuine execut iveo f f i c i a l , r a t h e r i t is l e d by a "co l lec t ive" o rgan ofp o l i t i c a l e q u a l s ( p o l i t b u r o , f o r m e r l y pr e s id ium ) . By'c o n t r a s t t h e arrangement of a u t h o r i t y and o f f i c i a l respon-s i b i l i t y is f a r more c l e a r l y d e f i n e d and r a t i o n a l l y o rg an iz ed. in t h e s t a t e m i n i s t e r i a l a p p a r a t u s and t h e Supreme Sovie ts t r u c t u r e . Unlike t h e par ty o rgans , each ha s i t s def inedorder of ranks and subord ina t ion .I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p r i n c i p l e s of coexistence between1 t h e p a r t y and t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e s t a t e con t inue t obe surrounded by ambiguit ies . In form, t h e appara tusof t h e s t a t e remains as a s e p a r a t e o r d e r of p o l i t i c a lpower. Indeed, pa r t y dominance wi th in t h e regime has t odate been complete, b u t t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p h as alwayshad t o compete w i t h t h e l a t e n t b u t r e a l danger t h a t t h e s ei n s t i t u t i o n s p r o vid e p o t e n t i a l frameworks f o r a l t e r n a t i v e st o p a r t y r u l e . T h i s c o n s id e r a t i o n h a s i n c r e a s ed i n import-ance i n t h e p o s t - S t a l i n p e r i o d . No longer is t h e "mono-l i t h i c " u n i ty of t h e in ternal regime enforced by an a l l -power fu l o r d i c t a t o r i a l p e r s o n a l i t y . N o r i s t h e i n t e r n a ld i s c i p l i n e w i t h i n t h e l e a d in g group a s t i g h t as it oncew a s . F u r t h e r w i t h t h e p a s s in g of Khrushchev t h e i n s t i -

t u t i o n s of par ty and s t a t e once & re become entangled i n

.. .

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. r...t h e s t rugg le f o r l e a d e r s h i p among h i s successors. Unders u c h c i rc u ms tan c es t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d u a l is m s o f t h eregime can have a d i s i n t e g r a t i v e c e f f e c t .has succeeded i n keeping t h e System more or l e s s u n i t a r yi n p r a c t ic e t h e d i v e r s i t y of i n s t i t u t onal forms h asa f f e c te d t h e p a t t e r n of p s s t - S t a l i n S o vi e t p o l i t i c s .

While t h e p a r t y

THE FORM OF 'THE'-NSTITZPPIONAL DEBATE. ..

I .;While p o s t - S ta l i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s has been subjected

t o ex te ns iv e examination and an al ys is , one body of evid-ence b e a r i n g OB t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d h i en si o ns of leader-s h i p pol it cs - -espec ia l ly the p a r t y - s t a t e issue-has beengiven, a t most , on ly pass ing a t t e n t ipn . Th is ev idencec o n s i s t s of t h e e x t e n s iv e debate i n r e c e nt y e ar s i n p a r t ya n d j u r i d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e (and l eader s* s ta tements as w e l l )on t h e f u t u r e of th e p a r t y and s t a t e appara tuses i n t h e" t r a n si t i o n t o communism. f v While the d i s c u s s io n h a s beenconducted i n e labo ra t e and abstruse d o c t r i n a l terms, ithas echoed t re nds and co nf l i c t s wi th i n t h e l e a d in g groupo ve r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e .L e n in i s t n o t i o n of t h e wither ing away of t h e s t a t e undercommunism. The "wit her ing t h e s i s " w a s , and remains,c l o s e l y t i e d i n w i t h S o v ie t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t he or y.* Thec o n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e stadre apparatus u n d e r S t a l i n ' sr e i g n was predica ted on L e n in ' s d o c t r i n e i n h i s 1917Sta t e And Revolution t h a t t h e USSR would p a s s through a" t r a n s i t i o n a l stage" ca l l ed "soclalism"--a s tage i n whichthe r o l e of t h e s t a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( f o r example, t h es:ecret pol i ce ) would expand r a t h e r t h a n w i t he r away.

Much of t h e debate has revolved around t h e Marxist-

. .*The f u t u r i s m of S o Q i e t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law c o n t r a s t sw i t h Weste rn cons t i tu t iona l law, which is founded onp a s t o r e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s .

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t. .. I I

Under Sta l in , t h e p a r t y became, i n p r a c t i c e , one of s e v e r a li n s t i t u t on s of governance. The co ns t t u t o n a l r o l e o ft h e s t a t e ap pa ra tu s under Khrushchev's pl an , however,w a s p r e d i c a t e d on L en in 's f u r t h e r a s s e r t i o n i n t h e samework on a s ub se qu en t t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e "higher s t a g e c t of*lcommunismlvd u r in g which time t he s t a t e w a s supposed t o"wither away.I* Khrushchev he ld t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n s o ft h e s t a t e bureaucratic orga n iza t ion would be t ran s f e r re dt o 11socia119 rganizat ions--such as t h e p a r ty , "the h i g h e s tform of s oc ia l o rgan iza t ionVv--as t h e Sovie t Union progressedtoward t h e l 'higher s t a g e e f t Those r e s i s t i n g Khrushchev'spurposes ( including, , i n p a r t i c u l a r , Suslov) drew on otherelements of d o c t r i ne o r r e i n t e r p r e t e d d o c t r in e s on t h es t a t e i n favor o f more conserva t ive pos i t i ons i n e l a b o r a t earguments dealing w i t h two key questions.*

One argument d e a l t w i t h a s t r i c t l y f u n c t i o n a l q u e s -what would t h e r o l e of t h e p a r t y and t h e m i n i s t r i e si o n :be dur ing t h e per iod of t h e w i t h e r i n g away of t h e s t a t e ?The Khrushchev school stressed t h a t dur ing t h i s per iodt h e p a r t y ' s "main task" was c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e "mater ia l -technical foundations for communism. * * The Suslov groups t ressed t h a t such a c t i v i t y was l i m i t e d t o t h e "maineconomic tasK'of t h e p a r ty , t h a t is , a job subord ina tet o t h e p a r t y ' s t r a d i t i o n a l i d e o l o g i c a l a n d p o l i t i c a l"guidance. lv The former echool, in a s tep-by-s tep construc-t i o n of i t s p o s i t i o n , a rg ue d t h a t t h e s t a t e f u n c t i o n sshould be t r ans fe r red t o soc ia l o r g a n i z a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e

. . .... . .. *P a r t two examines th e pre sen ta t ion s of t h e l e g a ladvo cate s .of t h e Khrushchev schoo l ( p r hc i p a l l y j u r i s t sP S. Romashkin, F. Burla tsky, M. Mnatsakanyan, M. Akhmedovand A. Nedavny), and t h e p a s t and present opponents( p r i n c i p a l l y j u r i s t s G . Shakhnazarov, 1. P i s k o t i n , B.Mankovsky, V. Chkhikvadze, V o Kotok, and D. Chesnokov).The p e n u l t i m a t e s e c t i o n of p a r t two examines t h e presen ta -t i o n s of t h e advocates of t h e Brezhnev-Podgorny proposalsf o r g r e a t e r s o v i e t c o n t r o l o v e r t h e m i n i s t e r i a l a p p a r a t u s( j u r i s t s A. Makhnenko, V. Vasi lyev, M. Binder, M. S h a f i rand 0. Kutafyin) .

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withering-away peri od. Included in t h i s d e f i n i t i o n ofs bc i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s were t h e p a r t y , t h e s o v i e t s , t r a d eunions, young communist league, comrades0 c o u r t s - - v i r t u a l l ya l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s other t h a n t h e s t a t e bureaucracy.der KhrushchevOs developed consti tutional v i ews , a l ls o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e w i t h e r i n g p e r io d wouldconverge in to an a l l -embracing so c i a l o rgan iza t ion- -h i sconcept of t h e p a r t y of t h e f u t u r e , The other schoolsought t o j u s t i f y c on ti nu in g r e l i a n c e on t h e s t a t es t r u c t u r e i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n to ' communism. Th ei r arg ume nts,in e f f e c t , opposed t h e notion of a convergence of p a r t yand s t a t e and a concur ren t d iminu t ion o f the , r o l e o f t h es t a t e appa ra t u s . In t h i s connect ion, t h e y defended t h et r a d i t ionalcconcept of t h e p a r t y as p r i m a r i l y a p o l i t i c a l -i d e o l o g i c a l r a t h e r than managesial-administrative agencyof governance

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I n t h i s con tex t , t w o CPSU paEty congresses--the8 t h and t h e 18 t h - -w e~ e u sed as j u r i d i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a lp r e c e d e n t s f o r c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n a l a r gu me nt s of t h e twoopposing sch ool s. The 8 t h Pa rt y Congress (18-23 March1919) had r e s o lv e d (1) t h a t t h e s o v i e t s were s t a t e organsand t h a t t h e par ty ough t t o ' fguidel t s o v i e t a c t i v i t y b u tnot *'replace*' h e s o v i e t o r g a n i z a t i o n , and (2 ) t h a t t h es t a t e system would di ss ol ve * * l f t e r e ing f r eed of itsc l a s s c h a r a c t e i ' ( i . e . a f t e r t h e at ta inme nt of %ocia l ism**)The Khrushchev group s t ressed t h e second p ropos i t ion o ft h e 8 t h Congress and, i n e f fec t , d i s t o r t e d t h e f i r s t i nto r t u o u s ly a r g u in g t h a t t h e s o v i e t s ( l i k e t h e p a r t y ) weres o c i a l o rga n iza t ions . The Suslov g roup concen t ra ted ont h e f i r s t r e s o l u t i o n and deemphasized th e second, The1 8 t h Par ty Congress (10-21 March 1939) fo rmal ly sanc t ionedan e a r l i e r pronouncement by Stalin t h a t *'under communismt h e s t a t e w i l l r e m a in u n t i l such t i m e as t h e danger offo re ign aggress ion has van ishedo l temphasizing t h e need for a s t r o n g s t a t e apparatus (an-c lu d in g i ts coerc ive o rgans ) i n t h e face of t h e e x t e r n a lt h r e a t from **imper ia l ism,**a u d e d t h e 1 8 t h Congress9 j u s t i -f i c a t i o n f o r s tr e ng th e ni n g t h e s t a t e on t h e eve of t h ewar w i t h t h e " imper ia l i s t s " ( i n t h i s c a s e N a z i Germany).The Khrushchev school allowing t h a t t h e 1 8 t h Congressgave a n e c e ss a r y j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r m ai nte na nc e of ac o e r c iv e a p p a r a t u s a g a i n s t th e e x t e r n a l t h r e a t a l s o

The Suslov school,

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s t r e s s e d the theme t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l n eed f o r t h e coer-c i v e s t a te was waning i n t h e "transit ion taccommunismOtiA l s o i n t h e f u n c t i o n a l c on t e xt , t w o d o c t r i n e s ont h e state--the t r a d i t i o n a l c on ce pt of t h e " d i c t a t o r s h i pof t h e i ~ p a o l e t a r i a t q tnd an innova t ion in t roduced a t t h e22nd Congress, t h e Itstate of t h e whole people"--f i guredprominent ly in t h e arguments of t h e opposing schools .Khrushchev in terpre ted th e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e d i c t a t o r -s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t t o t h e s t a t e of t h e whole peopaeas a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e process of w i th e r in g away oft h e s t a t e an d t h e assumption of s t a t e tasks by t h e p a r t yand s oc i a l organ iza t ions .t h i s B'otion holding ra the r t h a t t h e s t a t e of t h e wholepeople doctr ine meant an increased r o l e f o r t h e s t a t e ,and t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e p a r t y u s r a d i t i o n a l r o l e i nt h e t t t r a n s i t i o n t o communism." Since KhrushchevOs f a l l ,t h e concept of t h e s t a t e of t h e whole people has oncemore a pp ar en tl y become t h e subjec t of controversy i n s i d et h e regime. The 23rd congress ' s complete s i l e nc e on t h ed o c t r i n e suggested t h e presence of s t r o n g p r e s s u r e s w i thint h e l e a d e r s h i p t o s he lv e t h e conce pt. BrezhnevOs in tr o-duc t ion of t h e not ion of a Itgenuine people's s t a t e " a f t e rt h e congress bore earmarks of an at tempt to come up w i t han a l te rn at iv e formula . Behind t h e Brezhnev move may bet h e c u r r e n t issue produced b$ moves by some regime &le-ments t o s t r e n g th e n t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e Supreme Sovietvis-a-vis t h e Council of Minis ters and t h e m i n i s t e r i a l

apparatus as a whole.would t h e s t a t e w i t h e r away?i n t e r e s t in r e a l i z i n g *tcommunismlt--and t h u s h i s p a r t i c u l a rview of t he product ion-or iented par ty--as soon as p o s s ib l e .Suslov and other oppcqents had:.a ves ted in te r es t i n push-ing back t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of tlcommunismleas an importantp a r t of t h e i r case f o r t h e maintenance of t h e t r a d i t i o n a lroles f o r t h e par ty and s t a t e . While both s c h o o l s s t a t e dt h a t t h e process would be t fgradual ,f i h e former tookp a in s t o ex pl ai n why it wou l d take as much as two decadest o b u i l d communism. (The 20-y ear d ead l ine was ra i sed a tt h e 1961 p a r t y congress , )t h i s school adopted a l i n e which emphasized the urgent

The Suslov school res i s t ed

A second argument w a s p u t i n terms of t i m e : whenKhrushchev had a ves ted

On t h e bas is of t h e "deadl ine ,"

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n e c e s s i t y t o commence, now, t h e withering away of t h es t a t e . T h e lat&er.schodl went t o some e f f o r t t o p o s i tt h a t communism wou l d not be real ized by 1981, a n d t h a tt h e s t a t e sys tem a t t h a t time wou l d be s t reng thened , no twi thered . In t h e post-Khrushchev l eade r sh ip , t he ele-ments opposing any hurr ying of t h e advent of "communismiii n t h e USSR appear t o have won the day a t l e a s t f o r t h ep r e s e n t a The ambitious goals of Khrush chev*s economicprogram which w a s t o take t h e USSR t o t h e v e r y doors tepof t h e communist so ci e ty have been shar pl y scaled downand the successor l e a d e r s h ip h a s general ly avoided anye x p l i c i t commitment t o a target date when the "transi-t i o n t o communism" is o s t e n s i b l y t o be completed i n t h eU S S R .

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TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL- INSTITUTIONALDEBATE

INTRODUCTION

With h i s sweeping i n d u s t r i a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i ne a r l y 1957 Khrushchev f orce d t he i s s u e of t h e r e l a t i o nof p a r ty a n d s t a t e t o t h e c e n t e r of p o s t - S t a l i n p o l i t i q s .H i s a s s a u l t on t h e s u p e r - c e n t r a l i z e d s t a t e a p p a r a tu s An-. h e r i t e d from S t a l i n was t h e op en in g a c t i o n i n a running'b a t t l e over b a s ic i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s 'ues i n t h e Khrushchevand post-Khrushchev regimes. T h e i n d u s t r i a l reform whicharoused immediate resistance from the Molotov-Malenkovo p p o s i t i o n and o t h e r s was among t h e major i s sues invo lvedi n t h e c h al l en g e t o KhrushchevOs leadership in June 1957.The re fo rm in i t i a t e d Khrushchev' s e f f o r t t o diminish t h ero le of t h e s t a t e app arat us andFinsure t h e supremacy oft h e p a r t y a p p ar a t us i n p o s t - S t al i n R u s s i a . T h e e f f o r tre g i s t e r ed Khrushchevvs awareness t h a t th e pe rpe t ua t ionof p ar ty hegemony with in t he Sovi e t sys tem had inc rea s in glybecome. an i n s t tu t ona l p rob lem. H i s drive, howevers t i r r e d powerful forces o pposed t o m ajo r i n s t i t u t i o n a lchanges and not s u r p r i s i n g l y h i s 1962 r e s t r u c t u r i n g oft h e p a r ty a p p a r a tu s was a key event i n t h e lead-up t o h i soverthrow i n October 1964. On the , -eve o f h i s f a l l he wasp r e s s in g a h e a d w i th a n e f f o r t t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e i n s t i -t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s h e had a l r e a d y e f f e c t e d and a p p a r e n t l yo t h e r s h e w a s p la n n in g i n to a new c o n s t i t u t i o n r e p l a c i n gth e 1 9 3 6 S t a l i n C o n s t i t u t i o n .t o t r a n sf o r m t h e regime's i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e h e in-c r e a s in g ly s o u g h t t o j u s t i f y i$ in broad d o c t r i n a l t e r m s .He tu rned t o v a r i o u s l e g a l t h e o r i s t s t o e l a b o r a t e h i sp o s i t i o n . Some e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y t oo k up t h e t a s k , othe rswere lukewarm and still others engaged in a d i s g u i s e de f f o r t t o d i l u t e and undermine t h e Khrushchevian f o r m u l a -t i o n s . J u r i d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e f o cu s in g on i n s t i t u t i o n a la n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l matters became a m ir r o r of t h e c o n f l i c t s

As Khrushchev developed h i s far- reac hing program

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and cross-pressures t h a t developed in s i de t h e regime undert h e impact of Khrushchev's prodect eThe fo l lowing sec t i on d 6 t A i l p t h e development oft h e c onf l i c t , t h e r e a c t i o n to what may be broadly char -a c t e r i z e d as t h e "Khrushchev Con sti tut ion " for t h e con-temporary USSR both b e f o r e a n d a f t e r h i s f a l l , and fdfrallyth e reemergence of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l con-f l i c t i n somewhat al tered terms among WlieushchevOs succes-s o r s

OPENING MOVES ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORMKhrplshchev's f i r s t major fo ray in fo t h e s p h e r e ofi n d u s t r i a l reform--the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of t h e managerials t r u c t u r e of t h e s t a t e appara tus i n e a r l y 1957--was under-t a k e n i n t h e m i d s t of c o n f l i c t i n t h e Sovie t l e ade r sh i p .He launched h i s bold ven tu re desp i te t h e s t r e n g th -e n e d p o s i t i o n of his pres idium opponents a f t e r t h e Hungarianr e v o l t ,a cloud as a resu l t of t h e revolt; and he had been tempor-a r i l y forced t o t h e defens ive - -pa r t i cu la r ly on t h e S t a l i nissue-- in t h e presidium, His d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n pr o j e c tIn f a c t came on t h e heels of a major manager ia l reorgani-z a t i on i n December 1956 t h a t was not of h i s own makingand which wasopposed i n concept and des ign t o h i s e a r l y1957 i n d u s t r i a l reform, The December 1956 reorg an iza t ionhad enhanced t h e powers of t h e s t a t e apparatus throught h e c r e a t i o n of a new cen tr al iz ed economic directorateand supe r-pl anni ng agency, t h e Gosekonomkommissiya, headedby Pervukin (a f u t u r e mem b e r of th e "ant i -par tyV9 group).The ghrushchev reform, by con t ras t , d i smant led t h e c e n t r a lm i n i s t e r i a l appara tus seek ing t o s h i f t major economicr e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f r o m t h e s t a t e to t h e p a r t y , e s p e c i a l l yi t s t e r r i t o r i a l apparatus . Thus , t h e new l o ca l Counci lsof t h e National Economy created by t h e Khrushchev reformcame under the purview of p r o v in c i a l p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

His 1956 C o n g r e s s d e s t a l i n i z a t i o n p o l i c y vas under

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A t t h e 1966 Congress,, Khrushchev had s t r e s s e d t h a tt h e p a r t y mu s t i nc reas ing ly invo lve i t s e l f in **problemsof prac t ica l economics" b u t he gave l i t t l e h i n t - t h a t hewas contemplat ing a d i r e c t a t t a c k on t h e t r a d i t i o n a ls t a t e s t r u c t u r e . H i s i n du s t r i a l re'form emerged w i t h noforewarning and bofe t h e earmarks of a s u r p r i s e move i nt h e cent ra l commit tee aimed a t s e t t i n g h i s o p p o s i t i o n i nth e pres id ium off ba lance . He d i d succeed i n r ecoup ingt h e i n i t i a t i v e w i t h t h e reform proposal b u t i t s in t roduc-t i o n produced sharp c o n f l i c t i n t h e p r e s i d iu m and thetenuousness of Khrushchev's posi t ion iin t h e ensur ing s t rug -g l e was r evea led in JunerL1957 when he came p r e c a r i o u s l yclose t o being overthrown by h i s **an t i-pa r ty** iv a l s .Khrushchev's Decentral izat ion T h e s e s

.

Khrushchev introduce'd h i s r e fo rm p lan a t a c e n t r a lThe p l a n c a l l e dommittee plenum on 13-14 February 1957.f o r a sweepidg;decentralization of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v es t r u c t u r e of Sovie t i ndus t ry by s e t t i n g up a network ofregional economic counci l s in t h e p lace of c e n t r a l i z e dmi ni s t r i es . And on 29 March 1957 t h e cen t r a l committeereleased t h e famous Khrushchevian '%heses*' which c l e a r l yi d e n t i f i e d t h e m i n i s t e r i a l s y s t e m as h i s t a r g e t . The**theses**roposed (1) t h a t w i t h t h e c r e a t i o n of r e g i o n a lc o u n c i l s of national economy there would be no need t ohave union and republ i can min is t r ie s .to r u n i n d u s t r y andcons t ruc t ion , and (2) i n a pp ar en t r e f e r e n c e t o P e r uv k in ' sGoskonomkommAssya, t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of new c e nt ra l organsunder t h e USSR Council of Ministers would mean " t h e preser-v a t i o n o f t h e o l d form of management only under a newname b u t of an i n f e r i o r t ype .*@ A passage i n Khrushchev9s"theses" charged t h a t "some comrades*' were i n f a v o r o ft h e l a t t e r scheme."comradesv* Yalenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov were i d e n t i-f i e d as among t h e opponents of Khrushchev's plan. Soona f t e r t h e ous te r o f Marshal Zhukov i n Octo ber 1957 fromh i s p o s i t i o n s on t h e p a r t y p r e s i d i u m and t h e Ministry.\ofDefense even t h e m ini s t r i e s connec ted w i t h t h e d e f e n s ei n d u s t r i e s were downgraded to s t a t e committees.

After t h e June 1957 lea der shi p cr i s i s ,

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With the d iminut ion of t h e r o l e of t h e m i n i s t r i e s ,Khrushchev concurrently held o u t t h e p r os p ec t of t h e ex -pans ion of t h e ro l e of t h e so v ie t s . Thus, a long w i t h h i si n d u s t r i a l r ef or m d e cr e es , t h e m i n i s t e r i a l s ys te m was .a l so t h e t a rge t of an ear l le r Khrushchev-supported decreeof th e pa r tyDs : . cen t r a l comm it tee en t i t l ed Iton improvingt h e a c t i v i t y of t h e s o v i e t s of workers deputies ands t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r connect ions w i t h t h e masses." Thedecree, dated 22 January 1957, enabled t h e s o v ie t s t oassume legal ly f unc t i ons r e s id i ng in t h e s t a t e appara tus( t h e m i n i s t r i e s , or execu t ive committees a t l o c a l l e v e l s ) .The decree also provided added sanc t& n t o a Khrushchev-emphasized campaign which cal led for v o l u n t e e r s t o assist,if not assume, t h e work of t h e s t a t e employees in execut-i n g c o r r e c t i o n a l p r o t e c t i v e , medical , cu l tu ra l , educa -t i o n a l, a n d r e c r e a t i o n a l f unet ion s *Khrushchev gs Withering Thesis

With o r g a n iz a t i on and p o l i t i c a l g a i n s in hand, Kh ru -shchev in h i s 6 November 1957 re vo lu ti on ann ive rsar yspeech formal ly resurrected t he f9wi the r ing way of t h es ta te" t h e s i s which had been buried by S t a l i n and h i schief postwar s t a t e t h e o r e t i c i a n , Do Chesnokov.***According t o t h e o f f i c i a l S ov ie t s t a t i s t i c s presentedi n Na ti on al EcQnomy of t h e USSR, a 25 percen t r educ t ioni n t h e number of s t a t e adminis tka t ive workers took placebetween 1953 and 1957. Th is re du ct io n coin cid ed w i t h t h epo st- St al i n emphasis given to th e volu nte erse campaign.According t o t h e same s t a t i s t i c a l source,, a s h a r p i n c r e a s ei n the number of workers in t h e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s dur ingKhrushchevOs l a s t year (some 46,000 workers were added t ot h e 1963 force ) was sus ta ined--a lmost doubled--during t h ef i r s t year of t h e new l e a d e r s h i p (some 86,000 a d d i t i o n a ladminis t ra t ive workers w e r e added in 1965) .

**After l o s i n g h i s s e a t on t h e smal ler March 1953 p a r t yp2esidium (he had been elected a member of t h e expandedpres id ium a t t h e October 1952 pa rt y co ngress and selected( footnote cont inued on page 15)

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That t h e wi the r ing t h e s i s had been buried by S t a l i nand Chesnokov had been made clear i n t h e l a t t e r ' s 18 March1953 Pravda c i t a t i o n t h a ton t h e b a s i s of t h e ba lance of exper ienceof t h e S o c i a l i s t S t a t e , J .V . S t a l i n f o r .t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h e h i s t o r y of Marxdsm,came t o t h e s t r i k i n g c o nc lu si on on t h enec ess i ty of m a in ta in ing t h e S t a t e e ve nunder Communism ' i f by t h a t time, c a p i t a l -is t enci rc lement h as not been l iqu ida ted , ?and he placed befo re u s t h e t a s k of ' s t r e n g t h -enin g i n every way t h e power of t h e Soc ia l -is t s ta te .?E a r l i e r , a t a 1 9 June 1951 l ec ture at t h e Department ofEconomics and Law of t h e Academy of Sciences, Chesnokovhad made t h e t r a d i t i o n a i i s t s O c a s e f o r t h e p r e e m i n e n tr o l e of t h e s t a t e i n b u i l d in g communism. **Onlya sound .S ov ie t s o c i a l i s t s t a t e is capable df ensur ing t h e b u i l d -i n g of t h e m a t e r i a l - t e c h n i c a l bas i s of communism.'* Andl i k e .the 1936 S t a l i n Consti tut ion, Chesnokov in 1951l ec tu red t h a t the r o l e of t h e p a r t y is t h a t of t h e "guid-i n g nucleus of t h e s t a t e and o th e r o rgan iza t ions o fSov iet , soc iety . '* (The B S U le . .is t h e l ead ing co re ofa l l organ iza t ions o f t h e working people, both so c ia l ands t a t e , " Article 126.)Khrushchev in h i s November 1957 speech s e t o u t tor e v e r s e t h e gases of th e Stalin-Chesnokov %on-withering"t h e s i s . Linking h i s 1957 d e c e n t r a l i z a t i on d r i v e t o t h ew i t h e r i n g t h e s i s , Khrushchev devised a three-par t i n t e r -pr e t a t io n of Lenin ' s vagary i n S t a t e Abd Revolution (1917)

I

(footnote continued from page 14)by S t a l i n as a mem b e r of an e l i t e 11-man commission tor e v i s e t h e 1919 p a r t y program)t i o n as e d i t o r of Kommunist i n A p r i l 1953. In January1955 in t h e w a k e of KhrushchevPs p u b l i c a t t ack on Malenkov,a P a r t y L i f e a r t i c l e i m p l i c i t l y l i n k e d Chesnokov w i t h t h ep r m s G Z F views of t h e disgraced Malenkov.

Chesnokov lo s t h i s posi-

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t h a t t h e statei,would Pwi ther away'* under "communism. f vFirs t , Khrushchev held t h a t flcommunism is no l o n g e r i nt h e d i s t a n t f u t u r e . " Second, he s t a t e d t h a t s t a t e func-t i on s would be diminished dur in g t h e movement toward com-munism. * "The Marxist-Leninist teaching on t h e s t a t e ands i t s w i th e r in g in propor t ion t o t h e movement 8P s o c i e t y-toward complete communism is of enormous s ign i f icance , *he sa id . Third, he concluded t h a t t h e s t a t e f v w i l l w i t he raway completely when t h e h ighe r pha s e of communism se t si no** (Two o t h e r p a r t s of Wr u s h c h e v v s w i th e r i n g t h e s i s

I \ awaited--and in 1959 duly rece ived- -exp l ic i t fo rmula t ion ;(1) t h a t - s t a t e funct ions would be t r a n s f e r r e d t o social:.organ iza t ions and (2) t h a t t h e p a r t y , a "soc ia l o rgan iza -t i o n , f f wou ld assume product ive tasks--and t h u s become

.I.... . . .

*The process of t h "withering away" of s t a t e c o u r tf u n c t i o n s w a s graphical ly demonskrated dur ing t h i s per iod.I n 1957-1958 a se r i e s of h a r s h IQant i -paPasi te t f a w s w e r epromulgated by t h e s e v e r a l r e p u b l i c s of t h e USSR. Thel a w s , o s t e n s i b l y aimed a t ref orm ing "hooligans" and 'fwork-s h i r k e r s " among other s u c h " p a r a s i t e s , " were t o be carr iedo u t t h rough a newly es t ab l i shed network 'of t r i b u n a l s ca l led"comrades' cou rts ." The Khrushchev-endorsed tr ib un al s,somewhat s i m i l a r to S t a l i n P s fo t ro i kas l t e p o r t e d l y abol5shedin 1953, were placed o u t si d e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e r e g u l a rs ta te - run c r imin a l cou r t s . And w h i l e t h e new party-runcomradeso courts w e r e engaged i n t h e s phe r e of c r im in a lJ a w , t h e y r e p r e s en t e d a j u d i c i a l maneuver d i rect ly r e l a t edt o t h e bas i s of IChrushchevOs inaerpretation of Soviet con-s t i t u t i o n a l -law--the "withering away" of t h e f unct i s n sof governmental bodies and the t r a n s f e r of s t a t e t a s k st o non-governmental ' sso ciaI org ani zat ion s" s uc h as t h ei r r e g u l a r t r i b u n a l s .h i s 21s t Par ty Congress speecb in January 1959.a l l y , t h e r e g r e s s i o n t o Sta l inOs sys tem of par ty-runkangaroo courts and f h e subsequen t '%io la t ions of s o c i a l -is t l e g a l i t y " t h a t were re po rt ed ly handed down i n thecomradesv courts tended to s t r e n g t h e n t h e appeal of Sus-loves conservat ive view of t h e s t a t e among several lead-ing , l f b e r a l S o v ie t j u r i s t s . The views of t h e l e a d in glawyers on t h i s q u e s t i o n are examined present ly .

m u s h c h e v drew t h i s conc lus ion inParadoxic-

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more t h a n t h e " lead ing core" of t h e na t on--and sub ord ina tea l l o t he r t a s k s , such as ideological work, i n t h e b u i ld in gof comunism. P a r ty p r o du c t i on t a s k s were equated w i t hp a r t y ideological work in Khrushchev's 14 February 1956Par ty Congress repor t , b u t t h e l a t t e r work was n o t t h e ne x p l i c i t l y s ub or di na te d t o t h e f or me r. The f i n a l s t e pi n Khrushchev's wi th er ing t h e s i s - - t h a t t h e p a r t y w o u l dthen become the "all-embracing" or " m u l t i-purposeq' organi-z a t i o n i n modern R u s s i a - - c r y s t a lb e d i n m i d - 1 9 6 1 . )Following t h e basic g u id e l i n e s se t by Chesnokovi n t h e e a r l y T i f t i e s , t h e o p p o s i t i o n to Khrushchev's party-s t a t e scheme main ta ined con t ra ry conc lus ions on Khrushchev's

w i t h e r i n g t h e s i s i n an ensu ing debate on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n .The debate vigorously commenced a t t h e nex t pa r ty congress .THE 21st CONGRESS AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS* DIMINISHEDROLE

Having occupied t h e h ig h e s t party,, government, andm i l i t b y * posts , Khrushchev a t t h e 21s t Pa rt y Congresst o l d t h e delegates on 28 January 1959 t h a t "somett r e v i s i o n

*W ithin's year a f t e r t h e f a l l of Zhukov, Khrushchevhad es t ab l i shed t h e "Bigher M i l i t a r y Councilq* (sometimesr e fer red t o as t h e Supreme M il i t ar y Council or Main M i l i -t a r y Council by Sovi e t mi l i ta ry spokesmen) w i t h himselfas chairman. The Higher Mil i ta ry Counc i l , which seemedto bear some resemblance to t h e U.S. Nat iona l S e c u r i t yCounci l , cons i s ted o f key mi l i t a ry and par ty pe rsonne lwho served as KhrushchevQspersona l adv isory g roup onmatters r e l a t i n g t o defense . Two o r t h ree years a f t e rt h e c r e a t i o n of t h e Council, Khrushchev donned t h e t i t l eof "Supreme High Commander"--a t i t l e which a p p a r e n t l yhad been intended t o i n d i c a t e t h a t K h r u s h c b v Os m i l i t a r ya u t h o r i t y w a s comparable t o t h e m i l i t a r y powers e x p r e s s lyg r a n t e d i n t h e U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n t o t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e( foo tno te con t inued on page 18)

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Of t h e 3439 C o n s t i t u t i o n was i n o r d e r. He d i d not cas t'h is remarks on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n i n a n a n t i - S t a l i n c o nt e x tas h e d id a t th e 20 th Par ty Congress. (In his 25 Febru-a ry 1956 secret speech a t t h a t congress, Khrushchevempha t ica l ly concluded, wi t h no f u r t h e r e l ab o ra t io n , t h a ti n o r de r t o "abo l i sh the c u l t of t h e i n di v i du a l d e c i s i v e l yonce and for a l l " i t was necessary **to estore completelyt h e L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s of Sovie t soc ia l i s t democracyexpressed i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ' of t h e S o v i e t Union.")Rathe r, he announced a t t h e 1959 Congress that c o n s t i t u -t i o n a l r e v i s i o n was n e c e s s i t a t e d by t h e f a c t , announcede a r l i e r by h i m i n h i s c o n g r e s s r e p o r t , t h a t t h e USSR wasen te r ing upon the "h igher stage" of h i s t o r y c a l l e d " la rg e-s c a l e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a communist society.11

(footnote cont inued fromUnited Sta tes : 'The P r e s id e n t s h a l l be Commander-in-Chiefof t h e Army and t h e Navy...'' Article 11, Sec t ion 2. (Fora s tu d y on Khrushchevvs r o l e in mil i t a ry po l icy makingsee CAESAR XXIV of 20 Ju ly 1964, "The Higher Mi li ta ry Coun-c i l of t h e USSR.**) f a l l of Khrushchev, Brezhnev. . th rou gh

ms-elf as chairman of a "Defense Council"

Ilous o n ly o the r r e f e r e n c e t oa We fen se Counci l" d at es back to 1961,\

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The P r a c t i c a l P a r t y Corol la ry of t h e Withered S t a t eTwo pr in c i pa l co ns t i tu t i on a l changes , Khrushchev 'srepor t f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e d , wou l d be r e c o g n i t i o n of (1 ) t h et r a n s f e r of s t a t e f u n c t i o n s to "social organ iza t ions" ,

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Khrushchev argued t h a t t h e bas ic l a w of t h e l a n dought t o recogn ize t h e endeavor of building communism,as w e l l as a l l t h e theore t ica l and fu nc t ion a l changes ,such as t h e expanded r o l e of t h e par ty and "wither ingaway" of t h e s t a t e a p p a r a tu s (whose h i g h e s t body i s t h eCouncil of Min i s t e r s ) 1 t h a t he s a i d e n t e r i n g th e ' 'higherstage" embraced.Congress tha t He t o l d t h e d e l eg a t es t o t h e 2 l s tThe Communist Party, as t h e h i g h es t formof s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , as t h e l e a d in gdetachment, t h e wel l - t r i ed vanguard of t h en a t i o n , leads a l l t h e soc ia l o r g a n i z a t i o n sof t h e working people.Comrades, a t present, when o u r coun t ryis e n t e r i n g a new and m o s t importantpe r i od of development, t h e need fo r in-t r o d u c in g some changes and add i t io ns t ot h e USSR C o n s t i t u t i o n h a s r ipened .t h e adopt ion of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , o v e r20 years r e p l e t e w i t h e v e n t s of worldh i s t o r i c s ignif icance have gone by.Socialism h a s l e f t t h e c o n f in e s of onecoun t ry and has become a mighty worldsystem. Important changes have take nplace i n t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f eof t h e Soviet Union. The b u i ld in g ofa communist society h a s become a d i r e c tpra c t i c a l t a s k of t h e p a r t y and t h e people .A l l these grea t changes i n t h e domesticl i f e and in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o nshou ld be r ef lec ted and se t down legallyin t h e Sovie t Union' s Cons t i tu t ion , t h ebas ic l a w of o u r s t a t e .

Since

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Khrushchev*e report t h u s p r e s e n t e d a clear Insighti n t o h i s long-range goal of e s t a b l i s h i n g , in t h i s par-t i o u l a r hstrnce by w n e t i t u t - i o n a l amendment, a -party.hatwould take t h e place of tbe efate. h c o r d l n g l y , t h e t r ad i -t i o n a l s ta te adarin~stra~ive~gunctlonshich were cen te redin t h e Counci l of Minis ters- the ce nt ra l government ap-paratus wh1ch.had been t h e base of power fo r KhrushchevOsr e c e n t l y defeated r i v a l s , Malenkov and Bulganln--were give nl i t t l e r e c o g n i t i o n in Khrushchev's congress report . Hes a i d t h a t s t a t e funct ions would be t r a n s f e r r e d t o nvolun-taFye socia l organ lsa t ionsv0dur ing t h e prooess of t h ew i th e r in g away of t h e s ta te i n t o what Khrush$,hev calledand cont inued t o c a l l a "communist socia l self-aklministra-t ion.awayn th e transfer of c e r t a in u n d e f in e d aspects of c u l -t ural serxices away from ' qgoverment o rgan iza t ion s , t(t h u s undercu t t ing t h e Minis t ry of C u l t u r e , t h e transferof h e a l t h s e r v i c e s and resort f a c i l i t i e s t o t h e t radeunions and local s o v i e t s , t h u s u n d e r c u t t i n g s ta te minis-t r ies, and t h e s t r en g the n - of t h e newly formed comrades*courts, and Npeopleosm i l i t i a , which had s e t u p a p&al-le1 and r i v a l party-run sys tem for t h e s ta te m i l i t i a andcourt hei rarchy.

1 )

Khrushghev gave as examples of t h i s "withering

' That t h e withering t he s i s had a direct bearing ont h e f u t u r e of s t a te c o e r c iv e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( t h e s t a t em i l i t i a an d t h e s t a te secur i ty bodies) w a s made even moree x p l i c i t by Khrushchev e i g h t months af ter t h e congress .B u t t h e r a t i o n a l e for such a connect ion w a s made in hiscongress r e m a r k s on t h e changed role of t h e secret police.While asserting a t t h e congress t h a t it would be " s tu p idand crlmlnal" to do away w i t h t h e s ta te m i l i t i a and s t a t e-20-

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s e c u r i t y b o d ie s due t o " i m p e r i a l i s t i n t r i g u e s , h e em -phasized t h a t th e **spearhead" of such bodies I t i s p r i m a r i l yp o s t e d a g a in s t agents s e n t i n by i m p e r i a l i s t s ta te s" an dhe. e m p h a ti c a ll y r e i t e r a t e d t h a t **atp r e s e n t w e have nop eo pl e i n p ri s o n s f o r p o l it i c a l motives .*The Old Party-Old;.State Opposi t ion

The Khrushchev ian co ro l l a r y th a t t he wi th e r in gaway of t h e s t a t e and t h e t r a n s f e r o f m i n i s t e r i a l f un c-t i o n s t o s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s w o u l d be m e t by a p a r a l l e lr i s e of t h e f u n c t i o n s of t h e p a r t y w a s promptly challengeda t , t he 21s t Congress. The oppo si t i on w a s l e d by presidiummembe r and s e n i o r p a r t y t h e o r i s t S us lo v who, i n h i s 30January co ngress speech, ignored KhrushchevQs appeal f o radditions and amendments to t h e S t a l i n c o n s t i t u ti o n ashe a t tempted t o u nd er cu t t h e p r i n c ip a l f o u n d a ti o n of Khru-s h ch e v' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e s is . *

Suslov argued that as the Sov ie t Union en te r s t h e"higher s tage1* (1) t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of t h e s t a t e ap-para tus under t h e Council of M ini ste rs would no t be re-duced and (2) t h e role of t h e par ty would remain i n t h e

*The onl y high- le vel s ta temen t by a p a rt y o f f i c i a l t oend orse Khrushchev's remarks on the need fo r changes anda d d i t i o n s t o th e S ta l i n ((3bns ti tut ion was made in a speecha t t r i b u t e d t o t h e n pr es id iu m member and cha irm an of t h eSupreme So vie t presidium (th e ceremonial "presidency")Vorosh ilov. The speech was i n s e r t e d in t h e o f f i c i a l s t e n o -g r a p h i c record of t h e 2 1 s t C o n g r e s s w i th t h e be la t ede x p l a n a t i o n t h a t i t w a s n o t d e l i v e r e d a t t h e c o n g r e s s duet o l * i l l n e s s ' l of t h e speaker. While t h e s p e a k e r r e p o r t -e d ly e x p r es s e d t h a t KhrushchevOs const i tu t ional p lanswere "complete ly c or re ct ," Voroshilov d i d n o t e l a b o r a t eon t h e f o r m er ' s w i th e r i n g t h e s i s . V or os hi lo v a t t h e n e xtcongress (1961) was l i s t e d , by Khrushchev, among t h emembers of t h e "ant i -p ar t y group. ((

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ideoiLogica1 field. The s t a t e r e l a t e d f u n c t i o n s of t h epa r ty , Sus lov poin ted out , were t o Itraise Ideological work"and '*guidet t th e p lanned a c t i v i t y of the people .Sepa ra t ipg dov i e t s f rom s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , Sus-l ov p resen ted h i s funct ional and tempora l a r g um e n t t h a t" the i n c re a s i ng r o l e of s o c i a l o r g a ni z a t io n s by no meansl eads t o a r e d u c t i o n of t h e ro le of t h e s t a t e o r economicorgans o r of t h great r o l e of t h s o v i e t s d u r h g t h egradual t r a n s i t ion from s o c ia li sm t o communism."* sus lovfollowed his argument w i t h a sca th i ng remark abaut th ea t t empt s of **Yugoslavfqe v i s i o n i s t s t o deprec ia t e t h eImportance of t h e s t a t e and s t a t e organs "and, t h u s ,

i d e o l o g i c a l l y t o di sarm t h e working c lass in t h e s t r u g g l efor t h e Vic to ry of s o c i a l i s m e t qKhrushchev linked t h e p a r t y and l o c a l s o v i e t s w i t hso c i a l o rgan iza t ions . And in f u r t h e r con t ra s t t o S u sl ov 'sargument, Khrushchev remarked t h a t " t h e implement a t o nby pub l i c o rgans of s eve r8 l func t ion s which a t t h e momentbe long t o t h e s t a t e w i l l broaden and strengthen t h e p o l t i -c a l foundat ions of t h e s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y and w i l l l e a dt o t he f u r t h e r development o f s o c i a l i s t democracy. 'I AndKhrushchevvs remarks on t h e Yugoslav view of t h e w i t h e r i n gaway of t h e s t a t e were no t cas t i n a p r e j o r a t i v e t o n e .In . - fac t he went o u t of h i s way t o po in t out t h a t ??we dono t q u a r r e l w i t h Yugoslav l eaders about t h e formation of

t h e workers counci l s or o t h e r ques t ions o f t h e i r i n t e r n a ll i f e . " (The Yugoslav workersD co un cil s seemed to bearmuch In common w i t h Khrushchev's no tio n of loca l l e v e lv o l u nt a r y s o c i a l o r g a ni z a t io n s IFi na l l y , Suslov rounded o u t h i s case w i t h a S t a l i n -

i s preserved nbt on ly under soc i a l i s m b u t a l s o i n c e r t a i nh i s t o r i c a l con di ti on s under communism, when t h e c a p i t a l i s ts t a t e s and t h e c a p i t a l i s t c a m p are s t i l l preserved and,1 .< Chesnokov defense of t h e s t a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n : '*The s t a t e

*Emphasis s u p p l i e d here and elsewhere i n t h i s paperunless o therwise noted .

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consequently,when t h e danger of t h e i m p e r i a l i s t a t t ack onour coun t ry and other s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s is s t i l l noteliminated." (The log ica l conclus ion t o S u s lo v D scon-s e t f r a t i v e s t a t e d o c t r i n e was 'made b y c o n s t i t u t i o n a lj u r i s t B. Mankovsky, who i n 1961 w a s i d e n t i f i e d as t h echairman of t h e committee of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law of t h eI n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Democratic Lawyersaccording t o t h e B u lg a r ia n l e ga l journa l P ravna M i s u lof N6vember-becember 1966, claimed a t a l-nferencet h a t " it is only w i t h t h e v i c t o r y of t h e world communists y st e m th a t t h e process of withering away of t h e s t a t eand l a w begins .") Xhrushchev rounded o u t h i s case w i t ha d i s c u s s io n of s t a t e f u n c t i o n s , n o t o r g a ni z a t i o n s:"under communism c e r t a i n p u b l i k f u n c t i o n s w i l l remain,analogous t o presen t s t a t e func tions ." (The lo gi ca l con-c l u s i o n t o gfhrushehevOs s t a t e d o c t r i n e was made by t h ehead of t h e USSR Law In s t i t u t e , P. Romashkin, whose viewsare examined presently.)

S i g n i f i c a n t l y , S u s l o v o s emphasis on t h e con t inu ingro l e of t h e s ta te apparatus found its way i n t o &he congressr e s o l u t i o n on KhrushchevOs r e po r t . The resolut ion obscuredKhrushchev s apposing formulat ion For example it in-c l u d e d a passage dealing, w i t h t h e need to expand t h ea c t i v i t y of t h e s o v i e t s , b u t d i d not broach t h e i s s u e ast o whether t h e s o v i e t s w e r e s t a t e o r s o c i a l organ iza t ions ,or both . The re so lu t i on 's endorsement of t h e Khrushchev-sponsored proposal for changes and addi t ions to t h e con-s t i t u t i o n followed,

.,

Mankovsky,

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE JURISTS OM THE WITHERING THESIS. .'....,.:... . Though he w a s unable to push through unimpairedi n t h e c o n gr e s s r e s o lu t i o n h i s concept of t h e r o l e of t h epa r t y i n contempora ry R u s s i a , Khtushehev and certainj u r i s t s proceeded t o expand upon t h e impl ica t ions of h i scongress formulat ion on t h e wit her ing away of t h e s t a t e .As a way of t r y i n g to get around SuslovQsopposi t ion,Khrushchev presented t h e ma J o r e x p o s i t i o n of h i s t h e s i son 24 February 1959 t h a t a l l s o v i e t s were "soc ia l o rgan i -zat ionseveHowever, t h e a t t o r n e y s f o r t h e defense of t h eo l d p a r t y and s t a t e were prompt to dev ise new argumentsi n d ef e ns e of t h e o l d sys tem. .

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The Working Party, The Strengthened Soviets, and "OthertvS o c i a l O r a a n i z at i o n sPoetic utopianism combined w i t h a forecast t h a tt h e advent of communism wab c l o s e a t hand was expressedi n KhrushehevOs 24 February 1959 speech i n t h e Kal in in .e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t of Moscow: "Communism is no longera remote dream b u t our near tomorrow,'*Khrushchev expanded upon h i s c o n g r e s s p o s i t i o n by asser t -ing t h a t *@ aumber of functions of t h e bodies of t h es t a t e appara tus wou l d be t r a n s f e r r e d t o socia l organlza-t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e s o v i e t s of workers d e p u t i e s , which

are among; h e most mass-scale and au th or i t a t iv e ones ."Khrushchev had inc luded- , and then i n pass ing, only lo ca ls o v i e ts i n h i s January 1959 C on gr es s d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a lo rgan iza t ions . In February 1959 he included t h e wholes o v i e t o r g a n i z a t i o n i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a -t ons .

In t h e same speech

P o s s i b l y f o r t a c t i c a l re as on s, Khrushchev went ont o v o ice o n ly p a r t of a l i n e f irst made a t t h e 8 t h P a r t yCongress he ld 18-23 March 1919. Ee told the e l e c t o r st h a t " t h e t a s k of t h e p a r ty o r g a n i z a t i o n s is t o a s s i s tt h e s o v i e t s i n t h e i r workL,guide t h e i r a c t i v i t y , bu t notto take t h e i r p l a c e or t o take over t h e i r funct ions ."S ign i f ican t ly , Khrushchev steered clear of s t a t i n g t h a tt h e p a r ty : o r g a n i z a t i o n s wou l d not take t h e place of s t a t eorgans--the main theme of t h e 8 t h P ar ty Congress c a v e a t(which had e x p r e s sl y de f i ne d t h e s o v i e t s as s t a t e organs)and a c r i t i c a l p a r t o f S u s lo v D s a n u a r y 1959 Congress de-f e n s e f o r t h e "pur i ty" of Marxism-Leninism for t h e CPSU.

Khrushchev's post-congress formula on t h e n a tu r eof t h e s o v i e t s w a s r e i t e r a t e d i n a conference of t h e In-s t i t u t e of Law of t h e Sovie t Academy of Science h e l d on18 May 1959 which w a s devoted to t h e i s s u e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a lrev i s ion . The conference renewed Khrushchev's congressview t h a t t h e p a r t y was t h e h i g h es t form of so c i a l o rgan i -za t io n , and rev ived t h e ques t ion o f t h e g ra d ua l t r a n s f e rof f u n c t i o n s of t h e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s t o s o c i a l o r ga n i za t io n sIn a d d i t i o n , t h e c o n f e r e es i m p l i c i t l y ra i sed t h e s e n s i t i v eques t ion of d e f i n i n g a new r o l e of t h e p a r t y i n t h e r e v i s e d

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c o n s t i t u t i o n . The c on fe re nc e r e p o r t p r i n t e d i n S o v i etS ta t e and Law September 1959 recognized as l l u n s a m t o r y t *t h e f a c t t h a t t h e 1936 S t a l i n C o n s ti t u ti o n d i d n o t speci-f i c a l l y d ef in e t h e ro l e of t h e CPSU but merely s t a t e dt h a t " th e l e a d i n g ro le of t h e Communist Party is t h e mainfeature of a soc ia l i s t s ta te . " T h e j u r i s t s a t t h e con-ference, however, d i d not go on t o propose any majorchanges.

".

.5 . Following t h e May co nf er en ce , t h e ques t ions of t h erole of t h e par ty and t h e im pl i ca t ions of t h e wi the r ingt he s i s were given added a t t e n t i o n in statements by Khru-shchev. With regard t o t h e non-ideological r o l e of t h epa rt y, Khrushchev i n h i s 29 June 1959 ce n tr al committeeplenum speech r e b u t t e d a '*comride" who, Khrushchev s a i d ,had i nqu i red what had happened t o "pa r ty worko" Kh ru -shchev indica ted t h a t t h e t h eo r e t i ca l work of t h e p a r t ywould be relegated t o second p r i o r i t y whale t h e p a r t yw a s engaged in t h e t a s k s of s o l v i n g t h e economic problemsof t h e co un try . Khrushchev snapped

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One of t h e comrades here s e n t me a note :*Comrade Khrushchev, why is it t h a t every-one here' speaks about industry and nobodyspeaks about par ty work?g D e a r comrade,i f a f a c t o r y where you a r e engaged i np a r t y work produces a faulty componentw h i l e you are a t t h a t time d e l i v e r i n g al ec tu r e on t h e co n st r u ct i o n of communismin o u r count ry , f inhal t ion i n t h e ha117wouldn't i t be more u s e f u l i f you wereengaged In organizing people for s c i e n t if cwork of a h i ghe r s t a n d a r d ? Party workm e a n s everyone doing h i s job , knowing h i sprofes s ion w e l l , making good components,and assembling good machines

In h i s 17 October 1961 CPSU Congress repor t , Khrushchevmade e x p l i c i t t h e propos i t ion t h a t i deo log ica l t a s k s weresubord ina te t o product ive tasks in "party work '*

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The Withering Campaign of 1959-1960P o p u la r i z in g t h e w i t h e r i n g t h e s i s , Khrushchev gavep a r t i c u l a r emphasis t o t h e t r a n s f e r of s t a t e f u n c t i o n st o s o c i a l o r g a ni z a ti o n s t h ro ug ho ut t h e l a t t e r h a l f of1959 and ear ly 1960; For one notable example, i n a 2 1September 1959 interview p u b l i s h e d i n P ra vd a on 25 SeptemberKhrushchev, i n d is cus s in g t h e t r a n s f e r o f v e r n m e n t a lf u n c t i o n s to m a s s a s s o c i a t i o n s of workers, pointed toward(1) t h e r e d u c t i o n i n t h e personnel f rom t h e Min i s t r y ofDefense, (2) r e d u c t i o n i n t h e pol ice pe rsonne l f rom t h eM i n i s t r y of Publ i c Order (MWP) and (3) r e d u c t i o n i n

personne l from t h e Minis t ry of S t a t e S e c u r i

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