Santos vs. ManarangFacts: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property which, by his last will and testament, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and now appeals to this court.Issue:Whether or not petitioners claim is within the purview of the committees jurisdiction.Ruling: YESThe petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real property or specific articles of personal property. When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure has established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and whichpro tantorestrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734,id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then the legal portion is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been distributed, what security have the differences against the interruption of their possession? Is the administrator required to pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this may not occur. The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of error he alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is anassetof the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156,id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Quisumbing vs. GuisonFacts: The deceased, Consuelo Syyap, during her life time executed a promissory note dated November 9, 1940 for P3,000 in favor of Leonardo Guison payable sixty (60) days from the date thereof, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The debtor Consuelo Syyap died thereafter. And on the same year, intestate proceedings were instituted and notice given to creditors to file their claim within six (6) months, which period for filing claims expired on August 31, 1941.In the inventory filed on April 30, 1941, by the administrator of the estate of the deceased, the said obligation of P3,000 was acknowledged as one of the liabilities of the decedent. However, the creditor Leonardo Guison died in 1941, and his son Mariano Guison, who was appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of his deceased father, filed the claim of P3,000 against the estate in 1943. Claimant in his reply to the answer of the estate of Syyap, stated that he believed in good faith that he was relieved of the obligation to file a claim with the court, because said administrator had assured him that he should not worry about it, since the debt was in the inventory and he would pay it soon as he was authorized by the court to do so.The administrator later on, in contrary, contends that the court erred or abused its discretion in allowing the appellees claim under Sec.2 Rule 87, eighteen months after the expiration of the time previously limited for the filing of claims and without previous application for extension of time having been filed by the claimant.Issue: (1) whether the claim filed by the claimant may be allowed by the court after hearing both parties, without necessity on the part of the claimant to file a previous application for, and on the part of the court to grant, an extension of time not exceeding one month within which the claim may be filed; and (2) Whether cause was shown by the claimant why he did not file the claim within the time previously limitedHeld:(1) After a careful consideration of this case, we hold that the claim filed by the appellee may be considered as implying an application for time within which to file said claim, and the order of the lower court allowing such claim impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim. It would have been a waste of time on the part of the court and the parties in this case, if the court had dismissed the claim and required the appellee to file, first, an application for a period not exceeding one month within which to file his claim, and then to file his claim within the time granted by the court, when the latter would allow the claim after all. Strict compliance with the said requirement of section 2 of Rule 87 would be necessary if a claim had to be presented to and passed upon by the committee on claims according to the old law; but now as it is to be filed with and passed upon by the court itself, no harm would be caused to the adverse party by such a procedure as was followed in the present case.Moreover, the appellant, in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee, did not object to it on the ground that the former had not previously applied for an extension of time not exceeding one month within which to present his claim. It is to be presumed that both the attorneys for the appellant as well as for the appellee knew that the claim was being filed under the provisions of section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court, because the time previously limited had then already expired, and had appellant objected to the claim on the above-mentioned ground and the court considered it necessary for the appellee to do so, the latter would have complied literally with the law.(2) The last sentence of section 2, Rule 87, provides that the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month. As it does not state what cause shall be considered sufficient for the purpose, it is clear that it is left to the discretion of the court to determine the sufficiency thereof; and when the court allows a claim to be filed for cause or causes which it considers as sufficient, on appeal this court can not reverse or set aside the action of the court below unless the latter has abused its discretion, which has not been shown by the appellant in this case. That nothing is more equitable than what was done by the lower court in this case, is evident. Appellant does not only acknowledge in the inventory the existence of the debt, but does not deny it in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee in the court below, and had been paying interest due thereon up to January, 1943, that is, two months before the filing of the claim. Attorney for appellant, in opposing the claim and appealing to this court from the decision of the court below, relies only on the technicality that no previous application for extension of time has been filed by the claimant-appellee.In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

ELIX BAUTISTA,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AQUILINA TIONGSON, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellants.. ESTATES; PARTITION; CIVIL PROCEDURE. An action to enforce the partition of real estate must be brought and proceeded with in accordance with the provisions of sections 181 to 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. ID.; ID.; ACTION BY ADMINISTRATOR. The administrator of an intestate estate is not authorized by any of the sections 181-196 of the Code of Civil Procedure to maintain an action to enforce the partition of real estate not included in the inventory, or of which he did not take charge when he commenced to discharge his office, but which is in the possession of a third party who alleges that he is not a coheir or coowner but the exclusive owner of the same.

3. ID.; ID.; ACTION BY HEIRS. The heirs of the deceased are alone entitled to maintain an action to enforce the partition of real estate possessed by coheirs or coowners in common with the deceased.

4. ID.; ID. MINORS; ACTION BY GUARDIAN. In case one of the parties in interest is a minor, the law, by section 195 of Act No. 190, expressly authorizes the guardian or curator ad litem, with the approval of the court, to bring, or to intervene in an action to enforce partition.

RODRIGO ALBANO, administrator of the estate of the deceased Silverio Agtarap,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORNELIO AGTARAP ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants.

A. Adiarte, forAppellants.

I. Bitanga, forAppellee.

SYLLABUS1. ESTATES; ACTION BY ADMINISTRATOR; PARTITION. The claim made by the administrator of an intestate estate for recognition of the right the decedent has to a portion of the property, held by persons who are heirs with him, should be enforced by an action for partition, and the trial in such case should terminate with the judgment fixing the portion that belongs to the said decedent.

2. ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF HEIRS. In order to determine who are the heirs to this recovered portion and whether their title thereto is in fee simple or is merely a right of ownership, and in the latter case the extent of the usufruct pertaining to another heir, the proper action is the special proceedings in an intestate estate under section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK,plaintiff-appellant,vs.SILVIO CHENG TAN alias SILVIO CHENG PAN,defendant-appellee.In its order of July 1, 1958 the lower court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Hence, this appeal.1wph1.tWe have heretofore held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Concepcion e Hijos,53 Phil. 806, andGovernment, etc. vs. Concuya et al.,G.R. No. L-45994, promulgated on January 20, 1944, that deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed for the filing of claims. On the other hand, Section, 5 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that, among others, judgments for money against the decedent whose estate is in the process of judicial settlement must be filed with the private court within the time limited in the notice given for that purpose, otherwise they will be deemed barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaim in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the judgment creditor.It is true that a judgment rendered in a civil action remaining unsatisfied after 5 years from its date of entry, is reduced to the condition of a mere right of action (Cia. General de Tabacos, etc. vs. Martinez, et al., 29 Phil. 515), but this, in our opinion, does not argue against the proposition that it should be filed with the probate court for corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted as a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is pending.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late ANTONIO M. CHUA and Mrs. ASUNCION M. CHUA,respondents.In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand.Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescriptionwithout right to file a claim for any deficiency.9The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.12Following thePerezruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim.When account is further taken of the fact thata creditor who elects to foreclose by extrajudicial salewaives all right to recover against the estate of the deceased debtor for any deficiency remaining unpaid after the saleit will be readily seen that the decision in this case (referring to the majority opinion)will impose a burden upon the estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged real property for the security of debts, without any compensatory advantage.Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chuas estate.E. GASKELL & CO., INC.,plaintiff-appellant,vs.TAN SIT, administratrix of the estate of Dy Poco, deceased,But, although it is thus evident that this claim in favor of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is a contingent claim, it by no means follows that said claim can now be allowed against Dy Poco's estate in administration; for a contingent claim is effected by a discharge in bankruptcy the same as an absolute claim, and that this claim has in fact been so barred is easily demonstrable, by reference to section 56 of the insolvency Law, which reads in part as follows:Any person liable as bail, surety, or guarantor, or otherwise, for the debtor, who . . . has not paid the whole of said debt, but is still liable for the same, or any party thereof, may, if the creditor shall fail or omit to prove such debt, prove the same in the name of the creditor. (Act No. 1956, sec. 56.)From this it will be seen that the claim in question could have been proved by Gaskel & Co. in the bankruptcy proceedings in the name of the creditor (the Philippine Guaranty Company), if the latter had failed to present the credit. But, as already stated, the creditor in fact proved in the insolvency proceeding for the very claim for which the present plaintiff is contingently liable; with the result that the present plaintiff will be exonerated to the extent of any amount which the creditor may recover from the insolvent.It necessarily follows that, the claim in question having been discharged in bankruptcy, it cannot serve as the basis of recovery against the estate of Dy Poco in administration. When it happens, as here, that both bankruptcy proceedings and administration proceedings are simultaneously conducted over the estate of a deceased bankrupt, no claim can be proved against the administrator which is provable in bankruptcy; and it was partly with a view for making this point clear that we were at pains to say at the conclusion of our opinion in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canadavs.Ingersoll and Tan Sit, supra, that the proceeds of the policy of insurance there awarded to the administratrix were not liable for any of the debts provable against Dy Poco in the bankruptcy proceedings then pending.Intestate Estate of the late Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan, deceased. BIENVENIDO P. BUAN and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS, Co-administrators-appellees, vs. SYLVINA C. LAYA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants.Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan for appellees.Rufino F. Mejia for appellants.SYLLABUS1.ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON; CONTINGENT CLAIM, CONCEPT OF. The petitioners filed with the CFI of Tarlac a contingent claim more than P500,000 against the intestate estate of the deceased spouses FB and RB based on the fact that a Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by said spouses collided in which JL and others were riding and the collision was caused by the negligence of the driver of the bus and as a consequence JL was killed whose surviving heirs are petitioners. The administrator filed an opposition to said claim on the ground that it was not filed before the death of said deceased and within the period as prescribed by the Rules. The Court finally dismissed the contingent claim. Held: that the dismissal of the said claim by the Court was based on incorrect and erroneous conception of a contingent claim. A contingent claim is one which, by its nature is necessarily dependent upon an uncertain event for its existence or validity. It may or may develop into a valid enforceable claim and its validity and enforceability depending upon uncertain event.2.ID.; TEMPORARY DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION; CONTINGENT CLAIM NOT AFFECTED. A contingent claim does not follow the temporary orders of dismissal of an action upon which it is based; it awaits the final outcome thereof and only the final result can cause its termination. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim and that when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim the Court should then be informed that the claim had already matured. (Secs. 5, 9, Rule 87.)