Case Study:

Syncrude Tar Sands Incident, Fort McMurray

Canada

Denis Su-Feher & Lin Zhao

CHEN PhD Students

Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center

Outline

• Syncrude Overview

• Sequence of Events

• Investigation Findings

• Analysis

• Recommendations

2

Syncrude Oil Sands Facility in northern Alberta1

Syncrude Oil Sands Overview2,3

3

• Built in 1964

• Location: Fort McMurray,

Canada

• Date: August 15, 1984

• Fluid Coker 8-2

• 82,000 barrels per day

Syncrude Coker Unit2

Sequence of Events

Operational Problems

Maintenance Incident

4

Operational Problems: Up to 19793

5

~2000 external

contractors hired to fix

various issues

Inefficient Operations

High solid level in cyclone separators

Plugging in multiple pipelines

Crash shutdown in cold weather

External maintenance

contractor hired to clean slurry recycle

line

Maintenance Plan: January 19793

6

Remove 18” length of 6” diameter 5%

chrome steel recycle line via cold cut

•Clean pipeline with high pressure hot

water/caustic wash

•Re-assembled slurry line with chrome

steel pup

Weld chrome steel pup to chrome steel

pipeline

Test weld for hardness

Insulate pipe and bring coker online

Carbon Steel

was used

instead!

Incident: August 15-16,19843,4

• August 15

– 9:30 PM: Carbon steel pup

piece ruptured

– 86 barrels per minute of 374oC

hot recycle slurry and bitumen

released

– Subsequent fire burned out of

control for two hours

• August 16

– 1:20 AM: Fire extinguished

– 3:30AM: All clear sounded

7

Mitigation3,5

• Coker feed immediately

isolated

• Emergency response

significantly minimized

losses

8

Aftermath3

• Zero fatalities

• One reported temporary hearing loss

• 2760 barrels of liquid hydrocarbon released

- Majority burned or cleaned up

• $100 million in property damage

• Facility shutdown for 121 days

• Several hundred million dollars in lost revenue

9

Investigation Findings: Immediate Causes3

• 1979

- Chrome steel pup was improperly tagged and secured

- Carbon steel installed instead of chrome steel

• 1984

- Rupture occurred at the mid-point on the gravitational side

where the wall thickness was 0.038” (originally 0.28”)

- Wall thinning was a result of hot sulphidation corrosion

10

Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3

1. Lack of material control

- Lack of material identification, storage,

tracking

- Poor housekeeping during shutdown

- Inadequate lay down area

2. Lack of change/risk management

- Failure to identify key hazards

11

Chrome Steel6

Carbon Steel7

Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3

3. Lack of proper procedures

- Safe work permit system

- Critical work/welding

- Double checking standards

4. Premature transition of maintenance responsibility

- Limited on site experience and expertise

- Reactionary attitude of original construction contractor

12

Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3

5. Limited investigation of maintenance

contractor competence and compatibility

- Site experience (Extreme temperature)

- Familiarity with workforce

- Scale

13

Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3

6. Miscommunication between contractors

and Syncrude

- Scale

- Confusion due to unplanned shutdown

- Lack of leadership and supervision

- Scope of contract and alignment of objectives

14

Analysis

15

• Bitumen and sulphidation corrosion

- Bitumen(Asphalt): Viscous liquid/semi-solid petroleum, residues of vacuum cracking

- Sulfidation corrosion: Prevalent phenomenon in refinery that occurs in oil containing sulfur

species between 230 °C and 425 °C

- Corrosion progresses in the steels via a film on the surface8

Element Concentration(%)

C 80.2 -84.3• Naphthene aromatics

• Polar aromatics/carboxylic acids

• Saturated hydrocarbons

• Asphaltenes

H 9.8 – 10.8

S 0.9 – 6.6

N 0.2 -1.2

… …

Bitumen main composition9

pseudo-passive film

Modified McConomy curves to

predict sulfidation corrosion10

Analysis

16

• Sulphidation corrosion

- Cr, Si, Mo significantly inhibit sulfidation corrosion, carbon steel has Cr up to 1%

- The corrosion resistance of carbon steel is marginal at 316 °C (<374 °C )

Calculated Sulphidation corrosion (5 yr) = 7 mm (carbon steel), 1.9 mm (5% chrome steel)

Measured wall thickness reduction= 0.24 inch = 6.15 mm (carbon steel)

374 °C

Analysis

17

• If PSM had been installed

Process Safety

Information

• Corrosivity data

• Material of construction

Procedure

• Operation limits

• Emergency shutdowns

Mechanical Integrity

• Inspection and testing

• Spare partsPHA

• HAZOP

• FMEA

• Engineering controls

• Initial Training

• Refresher Training

• Employer’s evaluation

Training

Contractors

Employee

Participation

• Information access

• Consultation

• PHA development

• Other PSM elements

Analysis

• Why and how PSM and employee participation (EP) can help

PSM Elements Employee Participation Syncrude Case

Information Identify missing safety informationCorrosivity of pipe materials

Pipe construction materials and specification

ProcedureOperators and maintenance personnel

initiate the safe work practices

Proper procedure and controls under cold weather

Emergency shutdown avoided

PHAHelp identify hazards present

Develop scenarios Potential corrosion identified and risk assessed

Contractor

Training

Give advice on

frequency/content/adequacy of

operational training

Maintenance team proper trained per regulation

Right type of piece installed

… … …

- Workers run process and equipment everyday

- Valuable, specified first-hand knowledge

- Notice trends and problems

Do current regulations give clear instruction on EP implementation? 18

Analysis

19

• Canada health and safety management system (HSMS)

- ILO Guidelines on OSH-MS (International Labour Organization)

- OHSAS 18001:2007 (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series)

- CSA: Z1000-14 (Canadian Standards Association )

• United States process safety management system (PSM)

- 29 CFR 1910.119 - Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals

• Key elements in common

- Employee/worker participation

- Hazard identification

- Training

- Management of change

- Emergency preparedness and response

- Investigation

Analysis

• Employee participation in various management systems (US and CA)

• OSHA 1910.11911:- Written plan of action to implement the employee participation

- Consult with employees on the conduct and development of PHA and other elements

- Access to PHA and to all other information required to be developed by the standard

• ILO-OSH12: Section 3.2- Ensure workers are consulted, informed and trained on all aspects of OSH

- Establishment and efficient functioning of health and safety committee

- Arrange for worker to have the time and resources to participate

• OHSAS 1800113: Section 4.4.3- Establish a procedure for communication, participation and consultation

- Involve in hazard identification, risk assessment, incident investigation, review policies

• CSA Z1000-1414: Section 4.2.3- Ensure active participation of workers at all levels

- Involve in planning, implementation, evaluation, corrective action, and preventive action

- Provide workers with timely access to information for ensuring participation in the OHSMS

- Encourage worker participation by identifying and removing barriers, engaging existing

committees20

• Effective employee participation

21

• Definition of employee(worker):

- "Employee" means an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his

employer which affects commerce(e-CFR 1910.2.).

- Direct impact on the process

- Supervisors, managers, team leaders, contractors, service providers

• Plan

- Clarification of actions

- Procedure for effective communication, participation and consultation

- How each PSM element is accomplished

Analysis

22

• Access to information (PSI):

- Education and awareness of PSM

- Levels of access

- Timeliness notification of updates/changes

• Consultant on PSM elements:

- Awareness of process information

- PHA team(safety expertise and process knowledge)

- Developing procedure

- MI

- Contractors

- Training

Analysis

• Effective employee participation

Accountability

Recommendations

• Syncrude case

23

- Effective PSM

- Employee participation

- Material control

- Quality assurance

- Maintenance procedure

- Contractor selection

- Access to information

- Accountability of involvement

- Updates and continuous improvement

• PSM and employee participation

References

1. J. McIntosh, "Explosion, fire at Syncrude oilsands facility in northern Alberta," CTV News, 5 August 2005. [Online]. Available: https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/explosion-fire-at-syncrude-oilsands-facility-in-northern-alberta-1.3324966. [Accessed 15 February 2018].

2. New Energy and Fuel, "Making Syncrude," New Energy and Fuel, 12 August 2009. [Online]. Available: http://newenergyandfuel.com/http:/newenergyandfuel/com/2009/08/12/making-syncrude/. [Accessed 15 February 2018].

3. L. Wilson, D. McCutcheon and M. Buchanan, Industrial Safety and Risk Management, Alberta: University of Alberta, 2003.4. CBC California, "Fire, explosion at Syncrude plant north of Fort McMurray," CBC California, 14 March 2017. [Online]. Available:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/syncrude-explosion-fire-mildred-fort-mcmurray-1.4025069. [Accessed 2018 March 2018].5. D4H Technologies, "Private Emergency Response. Who’s Qualified?," D4H Technologies Limited, 2018. [Online]. Available:

https://www.d4htechnologies.com/blog/post/20140808-private-emergency-response-whos-qualified. [Accessed 1 March 2018].6. AliExpress, "[CM626ZZ]Free Shipping 10pcs chrome steel Gcr15 160026ZZ 626zz 626-2z 626-zz ball bearing automotive bearing

6*19*6mm," KOKAL, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.aliexpress.com/item/CM626ZZ-Free-Shipping-10pcs-chrome-steel-Gcr15-160026ZZ-626zz-626-2z-626-zz-ball -bearing/32817142453.html?ws_ab_test=searchweb0_0,searchweb201602_1_10152_10151_10065_10344_10130_10068_10324_10342_10547_10325_10343_10546_103. [Accessed 1 May 2018].

7. Ebay, "20x Deep V Groove 3x12x4mm Guide Wire Line Pulley Rail Track Ball Bearing," ilooke, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.ebay.com/p/20x-Deep-V-Groove-3x12x4mm-Guide-Wire-Line-Pulley-Rail-Track-Ball-Bearing/1262977713. [Accessed 1 May 2018].

8. Rebak, R. B. (2011). Sulfidic corrosion in refineries–a review. Corrosion Reviews, 29(3-4), 123-133.9. Goodrich, J. L., Goodrich, J. E., & Kari, W. J. (1986). Asphalt composition tests: their application and relation to field performance.

Transportation Research Record, (1096).10. McConomy, H. F. (1963, May). High-temperature sulfidic corrosion in hydrogen-free environment. In API Proceedings (Vol. 43, No. 3, pp.

78-96). Washington, DC: API.11. 1910.119 - Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals.12. ILO, I. (2001). Guidelines on occupational safety and health management systems. ILO-OSH.13. BS OHSAS 18001 Occupational Health and Safety14. CAN/CSA-Z1000-14 - Occupational health and safety management

24

Thank you!

Questions and Comments?

Backup Slides

26

Similar Incidents

27

• 2009 Silver Eagle Refinery Explosion, Woods Cross, UT

- 10-inch pipeline failure due to sulphidation corrosion

- Grade T12 alloy steel (1%-1.5% Cr)

- Wall thickness never inspected between 1993-2009

• http://www.csb.gov/silver-eagle-refinery-flash-fire-and-explosion-and-catastrophic-pipe-explosion/

• http://www.csb.gov/chevron-refinery-fire/

• https://globalnews.ca/news/3309676/fire-reported-at-syncrude-facility-north-of-fort-mcmurray/

• 2012 Chevron Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Richmond, CA

• 2017 Syncrude Pipeline Rupture, Fort McMurray, Canada

- A catastrophic failure occurs at an 8” side-cut pipe on distillation tower at 640F

- Sulphidation corrosion identified in 2002, Upgrade and 100% inspection denied in

2006 and 2011, Pipeline ruptured in 2012

- 6 injured

- Pipeline failure in upgrader unit

- Release of naphtha, fire and explosion

- One injured

28

• API RP 2200 - Repairing Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

• API RP1106 - Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

• API SPEC 6D - Specification for Pipeline and Piping Valves

• API RP 939-C - Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in

Oil Refineries

API Standards