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ELEVADO, Sabrina Joy B..

CASE DIGEST

78. AC NO 6910

FACTS:

It is an administrative complaint filed by Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio

against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro (Atty. Castro).

On 5 July 2004, complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Castro to handle the

following: (a) Civil Case Nos. 1427 and 1428 before the Municipal Trial Court, Second Judicial

Region, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya (MTC Bambang) for forcible entry, and (b) Civil Case No. 883with the Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region: Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, Station-

Bayombong, Branch 37 (RTC Br. 37) for quieting of title filed by petitioners.

Complainants filed before this Court a Petition dated 27 September 2005 praying for thesuspension or cancellation of the license of Atty. Castro. They allege that they were plaintiffs in

Civil Case Nos. 1427 and 1428 before MTC Bambang, as well as in Civil Case No. 883 before RTCBr. 37. They likewise averred that they paid Atty. Castro the amounts of P40, 000 as acceptance fee

and P20, 000 as filing fee, which he supposedly charged them despite the actual filing fee totaling

only P1, 000. Finally, they contended that he failed to prosecute the cases before MTC Bambang,

resulting in their dismissal. Atty. Castro clarified that he was preceded by two other lawyers, whoacted as petitioners counsel in all three civil cases.. Further, he asserted that petitioners ordered himto abandon the appeal he filed on their behalf before RTC Br. 30 on the ground that they were unable

to file the supersedes bond required of them by MTC Bambang to stay the execution of its 10February 2005 Decision. He maintained that in lieu of pursuing the appeal, they had ordered him to

concentrate on Civil Case No. 883, in which he supposedly performed all his duties as their counsel.

Moreover, he pointed out the correction that petitioners were defendantsand not plaintiffsinCivil Case Nos. 1427 and 1428, and that he did not repeatedly postpone the hearings in the threecases, contrary to what they alleged. Finally, he maintained that he used the money he received from

them to pay for his legal fees and for the filing fees for the appeal.

On 28 June 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

for investigation, report and recommendation. In the proceedings before the Investigating

Commissioner, no actual hearing took place, since Atty. Castro was absent for the first setting due to

a serious ailment, the Investigating Commissioner was unavailable during the second, and petitionerswere unable to attend the third. Instead, the parties were only able to file their Pre-trial Briefs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Castro should be held administratively liable for his failure to file themandatory appellants memorandum before RTC Br. 30.

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HELD:

If it were true in this case that petitioners directed Atty. Castro to abandon their appeal, theprudent action should have been for him to file a motion to withdraw appeal before RTC Br. 30. In

this regard, his failure to file the appellants' brief" could indeed be construed as negligence on his

part.

The Court ruled and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest ofcomplainant, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only

upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been

exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity ofthe legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence

of the public.

Therefore, Atty. Virgil R. Castro is hereby suspended from the practice of a period of two

months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar wrongdoing will be dealt withmore severely.

79. AM NO P-06-2246

Lambayong Teachers and Employees Cooperative, represented in this act by its manager, GUDELIOVALEROSOCOMPLAINANTVs.

CARLOS P. DIAZ, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, RTC Branch 20, Tacurong City - RESPONDENT

FACTS:

On September 14, 2005, Gudelio S. Valeroso (complainant) filed a complaint 1 for and inbehalf of Lambayong District I Teachers and Employees Cooperative (the Caoperative) with the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Carlos P. Diaz (Sheriff Diaz), Sheriff IV of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Tacurong City, for dereliction of duty, inefficiency, grave abuse of

authority, and dishonesty.

The case stemmed from three (3) civil cases for collection of sum of money, attorneys feesand damages filed by the Cooperative against three (3) of its members, namely, Rona M. Tacot

(Tacot), Matabay T. Lucito (Lucito) and Jocelyn S. Constantinopla (Constantinopla), before the

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat (MTCC).

Complainant alleged that Sheriff Diaz committed irregularities in the implementation of thewrits of execution. Sheriff Diaz was said to have delayed the execution of the writs and it was only

after they had inquired from the court that he actually executed them by garnishing the salary checks

of Lucito and Constantinopla. Complainant further alleged that Sheriff Diaz failed to render anaccounting on the garnished amounts and that out of the 16,695.17 worth of cash and checks, only8,347.93 was remitted to the Cooperative.

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Sheriff Diaz denied the allegations to him.

On March 18, 2011, the Investigating Judge found the charges for dereliction of duty,

inefficiency and dishonesty unsubstantiated. He, however, found Diaz liable for grave abuse of

discretion and recommended that the appropriate penalty be meted against him for accepting theamount of 1,500.00 for his expenses in the execution of the writs in violation of Section 10, Rule141 of the Rules of Court. On March 14, 2012, the OCA, in its Memorandum, 6 adopted the

recommendation of the Investigating Judge, dismissing the charges for dereliction of duty,

inefficiency and dishonesty. It, however, found Sheriff Diaz guilty of simple misconduct andrecommended that he be fined an amount equivalent to his three (3) month salary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sheriff Diaz be guilty of simple misconduct.

HELD:

The Court finds that Sheriff Diaz disregarded the procedure for the execution of judgments as

mandated by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which explicitly provides that:

Section 10.

Xxx With regard to the Sheriff's expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or

decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for

each kilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay

said expenses in an amount estimated by the Sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Uponapproval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the Clerk of

Court and ex-officio Sheriff, who shall distribute the same to the Deputy Sheriff assigned to effect

the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. Theliquidation shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party

making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the Deputy Sheriff assigned with his return,

and the Sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.

Ordinarily, Sheriff Diaz's wanton disregard of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as

amended, which amounts to simple misconduct13 is punishable with suspension for one (1) month

and one (1) day to six months, for the first offense. Considering, however, that the sheriff has been

previously suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day for Simple Neglect in A.M. No. P-07-2332,the penalty of fine equivalent to three (3) month salary is in order. Sheriff Diaz, in fact, has been

dismissed from the service on December 12, 2011, for grave misconduct.

Therefore, respondent Sheriff Carlos P. Diaz is found guilty of simple misconduct.

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80. AM NO P-06-2241

JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN, COMPLAINANT

Vs.

NICOMEDES DELA CRUZ, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose Del Monte,Bulacan, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin against Process Server

Nicomedes Dela Cruz, both of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, for

Conduct Unbecoming of Court Personnel and Dishonesty.

In her Complaint

dated March 29, 2006, Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin alleged that Dela Cruz submitted

belated and false returns of service of notice. She also alleged that Dela Cruz submitted false returns relative

to Criminal Case Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489, No. 04-0483 and No. 05-0213. According to Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin, Dela Cruz stated in his return of service in Criminal Case Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489 that the

accused therein was no longer residing at her given address. However, during pre-trial, this was denied by the

accused herself who declared in open court that she has not transferred residence. Dela Cruz likewiseindicated in his return of service that therein accused is no longer residing at his given address and that the

houses thereat have already been demolished. However, during the scheduled pre-trial, the complainant

manifested that the accused who is her neighbor still resides at his given address and that his house is stillstanding thereon.

According to Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin, the aforesaid acts of Dela Cruz were unbecoming,

undesirable, dishonest and even more reprehensible, undermined the integrity of the court processes and

tarnished the trustworthiness of the court employees and of the judiciary.

On May 30, 2006, Dela Cruz denied the allegation that he deliberately delayed the service of theNovember 25, 2005 Order. He claimed that the same was served to the parties concerned three days before

the scheduled hearing. Dela Cruz vehemently denied submitting false returns. As regards Criminal Case No.

04-0483, Dela Cruz claimed that he personally went to the given address of the therein accused and was told

by a certain Hilda Malabao that there were no longer residents thereat as the houses have already beendemolished. As regards Criminal Case No. 05-0213, Dela Cruz narrated that the accused were not at their

given address when he attempted to serve the court process. He averred that it was not his intention to submit

incorrect or misleading returns. He also claimed that Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin only wanted to harass him as

this is not the first administrative complaint she filed against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dela Cruz was guilty of dishonesty.

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HELD:

The duty of a process server is vital to the administration of justice. A process servers primary dutyis to serve court notices which precisely requires utmost care on his part by ensuring that all notices assigned

to him are duly served on the parties.Unjustified delay in performing this task constitutes neglect of dutyand warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Dela Cruz adverted to heavy workload as the cause of the delay in the service of the Order. Duringthe hearing before the Investigating Judge, he contended that he has too many subpoenas and processestoserve. He also alleged that he is the only Process Server assigned in the sala of Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin and

that he is serving 59 barangays of San Jose Del Monte City.

The Court found such an excuse unsatisfactory. All employees in the judiciary should be examplesof responsibility, competence and efficiency.As Process Server, Dela Cruz ought to be aware of theimportance to serve the court processes with dispatch. It is through the process server that defendants learn

of the action brought against them by the complainant. More important, it is also through the service ofsummons by the process server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. It is therefore

important that summonses, other writs and court processes be served expeditiously.Besides, heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in the diligent performance of ones public duties as a publicservant. Otherwise, every government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty will alwaysuse this as a convenient excuse to escape punishment to the great prejudice of public service.In this instance,we find Dela Cruz guilty of simple neglect of duty for the delay in the service of the subject Order.

The Court agree with the observation of the Investigating Judge that Dela Cruz did not deliberately or

intentionally make such erroneous entries. As Dela Cruz explained, he merely relied on the persons whom he

interviewed when he went to the given addresses. We are inclined to give credence to said explanationconsidering that no ill-motive, malice or corruption was imputed upon Dela Cruz. It was never alleged, much

less established, that Dela Cruz was impelled by some evil design or corrupt motives to commit said errors or

to favor any party or litigant. Hence, we find him guilty only of negligence in the the performance of histasks, and not of dishonesty. Much as we empathize with Dela Cruz considering his heavy workload, the

same however is an unacceptable excuse for him not to exercise prudence and care in verifying the

information relayed to him.

In sum, we find Dela Cruz guilty not of dishonesty but only of simple neglect of duty which is defined

as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due tocarelessness or indifference.Considering his 24 years of service in the judiciary and his health condition, as

well as the fact that no prejudice was caused to the party-litigants in the above-mentioned cases as they wereall able to attend the scheduled hearings, we deem it proper to impose upon Dela Cruz the penalty of

suspension of three months.However, in view of Dela Cruz's resignation on June 10, 2008, forfeiture of his

salaries for three months should instead be imposed in lieu of suspension, to be deducted from whateverbenefits he may be entitled to under existing laws.

Therefore, Dela Cruz is guilty of simple nelect of duty.

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81. AC NO 6622

MANUEL G. VILLATUYACOMPLAINANTv.

ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS - RESPONDENT

FACTS:

Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06,2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the

respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.

In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,

complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The

commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.

In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was

employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate

rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would beentitled to 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, inaddition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that

was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millionsfrom the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He

also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial

consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality,

complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other

women while his first marriage was subsisting.

In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant wasnot an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of

the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and

incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding

the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documentsshowing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any

unlawful solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and

an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the

charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and

Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affianthimself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous

marriages with two other women

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of

respondent wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in theCertification issued by the NSO.

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On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by

complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that

criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the CityProsecutor of Manila. He also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently

discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name andallegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions.

The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved

for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome ofpetition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the

administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.

On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendationaddressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the

nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the

Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for havingadvertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded

for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross

immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section

27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commissionrecommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154,adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation

to disbar him was premature.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed

their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondents disbarment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to

complainant;

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.

HELD:

First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.

Supreme Court affirmed the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not

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concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement

that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by

the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensedto practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement

between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is

null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Consideringthat complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed thecharge against respondent on this matter.

Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.

In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had

violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was

breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyersfrom soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Improprietyarises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be

inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when thebusiness is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the

lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a naturethat, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & JaneManagement, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used

by respondent as a means to

procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the

former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related

to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent isoffering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of thispractice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for

violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

Third charge: Bigamy.

The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on

the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural

technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with proceduresuch as the verification of pleadings andprejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance

by the complainantdo not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness formembership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.

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First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter

of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also

qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack ofqualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter

of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainantsubmitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while thelatters first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent deniedentering into the second and thethird marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice

while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of

misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as acondition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership

therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers

professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality soas to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent,

honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private

affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so.

Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty anddishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role

being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part

so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a

member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and

dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and aregrounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and orderedthat his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

82. AM NO P-12-3067

RHEA AIRENE P. KATAGUE, RODOLFO E. KATAGUE, RONA SALVACION K. DELA,

Complainants

vs.JERRY A. LEDESMA, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City, Respondent.

FACTS:

It is an administrative case that involves respondent Jerry A. Ledesma (respondent),employed as Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City. The Office of the

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Court Administrator (OCA) found him guilty of simple neglect of duty for his failure to submit

periodic reports and to make a return of the Writ of Execution in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Complainants alleged that on 17 December 2009, Presiding Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez of

RTC Branch 48 issued a Writ of Execution directed to the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental

ordering the latter to cause plaintiff therein, Eustaquio dela Torre (Dela Torre), to vacate the subjectpremises in connection with the Civil Case. Subsequently, respondent, employed as Sheriff IV of thesaid court, personally served a Notice to Vacate upon Dela Torre on 22 December 2009. The Writ of

Execution was implemented after the five (5)-day grace period, and Dela Torre peacefully vacated

the premises. However, pieces of equipment and other lumber products were left behind, as theirremoval would take approximately two (2) days to accomplish. Complainants claimed that contrary

to the assurance of respondent that he would return the following day to remove the said effects, he

failed to do so.

On 29 January 2010, a Motion was filed by complainants to enforce Writ of Execution in the

Civil Case. Consequently, the trial court issued an Order directing the enforcement of the writ, but

still to no avail. Complainants alleged that respondents explanation, that police assistance wasneeded to facilitate the enforcement, was baseless. They even allegedly facilitated theaccomplishment of three (3) out of the four (4) listed requirements in the writ in order to aid

respondent in its implementation. Subsequently, complainants yet again moved to have the writ

implemented. Despite repeated requests, however, respondent allegedly still did not act upon themotion. Eventually, as stated earlier, the aggrieved complainants filed their respective Verified

Complaints.

Complainants (defendants in the Civil Case) opposed the Intervention of Schlosser. On 14

January 2010, during the hearing thereon, both parties reached a compromise and agreed to transfer

the equipment and lumber products to a particular portion of the same compound until 28 February

2010 with the proper payment of rentals. Complainants alleged that respondent yet again failed tofacilitate the said transfer. As required by the OCA, respondent filed three (3) Comments pertaining

to each of the three (3) Complaints. He alleged that he had done everything to comply with the trial

courts orders and processes; and, if there was any delay in the execution process, it was neverintentional, but caused by factors and circumstances beyond his control. He further explained that he

had indeed issued a Notice to Vacate directed to Dela Torre, who was then no longer actually

occupying the premises. Respondent alleged, though, that by virtue of the Liquidation Case, theremaining subject equipment and lumber stocks could not be removed from the premises, thus,

admitting that he had indeed scheduled the removal on 09 January 2010, but he was unable to do so.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of neglect of duty.

HELD:

The Court affirms the OCAs findings. We find respondent guilty of simple neglect of dutyfor his failure to make periodic reports on the status of the writ he was tasked to implement. We,however, modify the penalty imposed on him.

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The manner in which a writ of execution is to be returned to the court, as well as the requisite

reports to be made by the sheriff or officer, is explicitly outlined in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules

of Court, quoted as follows:

Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution.-The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it

immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot besatisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the courtand state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the

judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30)

days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its affectivity expires.The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed

with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.

In accordance with the above-cited rule, periodic reporting must be done by the sheriffregularly and consistently every thirty (30) days until the judgment is fully satisfied. It is mandatory

for the sheriff to make a return of the writ of execution, so that the court and the litigants may be

apprised of the proceedings undertaken in the enforcement of the writ. The return will enable thecourts to take the necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of decisions. The failure of a sheriff

to make periodic reports on the status of a writ of execution warrants administrative liability.

In fine, respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employeeto give ones attentionto a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting fromcarelessness or indifference.As officers of the court, sheriffs are charged with the knowledge ofwhat proper action to take in case there are questions on the writ needing to be clarified; they arecharged as well with the knowledge of what they are bound to comply with.6 Sheriffs are expected

to know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the court, relative to the

implementation of writs of execution, and should at all times show a high degree of professionalism

in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules ofCourt is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.

Therefore, pursuant to the above-mentioned Rules and due to the absence of any mitigatingcircumstance, we impose on him not the penalty of reprimand as recommended by the OCA, but the

penalty of suspension for fifteen (15) days without pay. This Court finds respondent Sheriff Jerry A.

Ledesma guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.

83. AM NO P-06-21862 & AM NO P-12-3026

A.M. No. P-06-2186FILOMENA B. CONSOLACION, Complainant

Vs.LYDIA S. GAMBITO,

Court Stenographer,

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan, Pangasinan, RESPONDENT

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A.M. No. P-12-3026

JUDGE EMMA S. INES-PARAJAS, Complainant

Vs.

LYDIA S. GAMBITO,

Court Stenographer,Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan, Pangasinan, Respondent

FACTS:

In an Affidavit-Complaint dated July 25, 2005, which was filed with the OCA on August

1, 2005, complainant Filomena B. Consolacion charged respondent Ms. Lydia S. Gambito, a

court stenographer at the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan-Laoac, Pangasinan,with misrepresentation and unlawful acts.Complainant alleged that sometime in November2002, respondent came to her house and convinced her to buy her (respondents) claimed

tricycle, which she described as, Honda (Make), KB503-022-019947E (Motor No.), KB503-022-19947 (Chassis No.), MC-AR-8213 (Plate No.), for65,000.00. Respondent allegedlyneeded the money for her sons deployment for work abroad. As shewanted to helprespondent and the latters son, she agreed to buy the said tricycle after respondent promised herthat she [respondent] would present to her [complainant] the documents evidencing herownership of the tricycle. Respondent allegedly assured her that the said tricycle was not

encumbered. She handed to respondent the amount of 65,000.00 after they executed a Deed ofSale of a Motorized Tricycle, and respondent thereafter delivered and transferred herpossession of the tricycle. Allegedly,respondent also promised her to deliver the OriginalCertificate of Registration of the tricycle on or beforeJanuary 31, 2003. Respondent,however, failed to make good her promise and, despite demands, she failed to deliver the said

document. Complainant further claimed that her repeated efforts to meet with respondent at thelatters place of work was in vain, as respondent was always not around every time she would gothere.

Complainant claimed that on July 14, 2005, a Branch Manager of the PRBank in Urdaneta City, together with a couple of policemen, came to her house andtook possession and control of the tricycle bought from respondent on the claimedground that the said bank already owned it via foreclosure of the Chattel Mortgagesupposedly executed by [respondent] over the tricycle. She insisted that respondent neverinformed her about her [respondents] mortgage transaction with said PR Bank. In fact,she claimed that had respondent told her at the beginning that the tricycle had been

mortgaged, she would not have bought it despite respondents financial plea.

In her Comment dated January 30, 2006, respondent alleged that when her son

applied for work abroad, she borrowed money for her sons placement fee from relatives andfriends, including complainant to whom she gave the tricycle as a security, assuring her thather money [would] be returned after two months following the arrival of her son abroad, ordeliver to her the certificate of registration also within that period. However, the recruitmentagency failed to send her son abroad, and they were unable to get back the money they paid to

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the said agency, as its manager could no longer be found and the person who recruited her son

had already died. She claimed to have suffered trauma caused by the money taken away from[them] by the recruiter. Consequently, she suffered complicated illnes , spending much formedications up to the present and causing her to be financially handicapped most of the time.She also claimed that it was not her intention not to settle [her] obligation, but since she is

the only breadwinner of her family, her meager salary is insufficient to meet all the needs ofher family, as well as the payment of her obligations. She also informed the Court that therewas an ongoingconciliation with complainant, and if the latter would be amenable, shewould pay her installment term until herobligation will be fully paid.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2081-P

In her letter dated November 16, 2004, complainant Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas, then Presiding

Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan-Laoac, Pangasinan (now Presiding Judge of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Tayug, Pangasinan), complained to the Court Administratorthat she discovered the [following]misdeeds of respondent Ms. Lydia Gambito, a courtstenographer of the said first level court, thus:

1. Respondent allegedly agreed to facilitate the issuance of a certificate of title in favor ofNorma Billamanca for a fee of Php10,000.00, assuring Ms. Billamanca that complainant judge could

help facilitate the processing of the papers. Respondent was even asking for an additional amountof 3,000.00 from Ms. Billamanca to be paid to [complainant judge]. The latter claimed thatrespondent admitted to her in the presence of court stenographer Cristeta Magat on October 29, 2004

that she used her [complainant judges] name to exact money from Ms. Billamanca.

2. Complainant judge claimed that in the third week of October 2004, Lolita Erum ofBalangobong, Binalonan, Pangasinan complained to her that respondent offered to help post thebail for her husband, Virgilio Erum, who [was] an accused in a case pending before MTCC,Urdaneta City, and received the amount of 9,000.00 from Ms. Erum, but no bail was posted.Respondent reportedly refused to return the amount despite several demands.

3. The sister of Aboy Abellera of Capas, Binalonan, Pangasinan, who is an accused inCriminal Case No. 7480, also complained that respondent received 10,000.00 from the former forhis bail. However, no bail was posted and the accused is still languishing in jail.

4. Peter Grey filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent before the Municipal

Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan-Laoac, Pangasinan, which arose from the failure of respondent to payher debt to Mr. Grey.

5. Jose Fiesta of Bued, Binalonan, Pangasinan reported to complainant judge thatrespondent and her son failed to pay the rental of the house owned by Mr. Fiesta for the month of

August 2004 as well as the electric bills for the duration of their stay at the said house.

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6. Similarly, Federico Fernandez of Yakal St., Villa Pozorrubio, Pozzorubio, Pangasinan

also complained that respondent rented his house in Villa Pozzorubio after she left the house of Mr.

Fiesta, but failed to pay her obligation of 13,837.00 representing unpaid rentals and unpaid loans.

7. Nancy Esguerra of Ipil St., Villa Pozorrubio also complained that the son of respondent

committed estafa against her and that [respondent] denied that she knew the whereabouts of herson.

8. In 2003, respondent allegedly collected the amount of 2,000.00 from the mother ofEduardo Dapreza of Sitio Orno, Sta. Maria Norte, Binalonan, Pangasinan, who is an accused inCriminal Case No. 7388, as bail because a warrant of arrest has been issued against him. However,complainant judge pointed out that the record of the case does not show that a warrant of arrest was

issued against the accused, the case being covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Gambino is administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to thebest interest of the service and, if so, whether or not her offense warrants the penalty of dismissal

from the service.

HELD:

In the case at bench, Gambitos misrepresentation regarding the ownership and actual statusof the tricycle which she sold to Filomena B. Consolacion for 65,000.00 unquestionablyundermined the peoples faith in the Judiciary. Gambito, a long time court stenographer, tookadvantage of her being a court employee and her friendship with Consolacion when she induced thelatter to buy the tricycle and promised her that she would give her the documents proving ownership

of the tricycle with the assurance that it was not encumbered.

For her misrepresentation and assurance, Consolacion trusted her and immediately gave her

the amount of 65,000.00. Consolacion claimed that she was sincere in helping Gambitos son andwas disappointed when she failed to present the Original Certificate of Registration of the subject

tricycle, despite several demands. What was even more painful for Consolacion was the fact that

there was a chattel mortgage constituted on the tricycle and that it had already been foreclosed.

The Court stresses that the conduct of every court personnel must be beyond reproach andfree from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the Judiciary. They must totally avoid any

impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official

duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office.Court personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of

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the Judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official

and otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the government

sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only becircumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and

decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion.

Indeed, Gambitos unauthorized transactions with Villamanca and Erum constitute conductgrossly prejudicial to the interest of the service. Under the Civil Service Law and its implementing

rules, dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service

are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service.[14]

Under Section 52(A) (11) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the

Civil Service, dismissal is the penalty for improper solicitation for the first offense. Section 58(a) of

the same Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility,forfeiture or retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government

service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

Therefore, Lydia S.Gambito, Court Stenographer, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan-

Laoac, Pangasinan, is hereby found GUILTY of three (3) counts of conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of the service, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement

benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government office,including government-owned and controlled corporations.

84. AM NO P-12-3080

JUDGE ARMANDO S. ADLAWAN, Complainant

Vs.ESTRELLA P. CAPILITAN, Respondent

FACTS:

Complaint filed by Judge Armando S. Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th Municipal Circuit Trial

Court (MCTC), Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental against Estrella P. CapilitanStenographer of the same court for Violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for

Public Officials and Employees.

In his letter, Judge Adlawan stated that respondent Estrella Capilitan was appointed Court

Stenographer on February 4, 2008 on account of his recommendation. Respondent was previouslymarried to a Muslim under Muslim laws and the relationship bore two (2) children. She is now

single handedly raising her kids after being separated from her husband.

Complainant recounted that respondent was simple, innocent, soft spoken, modest, diligent in

work and was well-liked. Hence, he and the rest of his staff were surprised when respondentannounced to them that she was four (4) months pregnant by a married man. Later on, respondent

alleged that the man became elusive when she told him about her pregnancy. Complainant judge

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/july2012/P-06-2186.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/july2012/P-06-2186.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/july2012/P-06-2186.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/july2012/P-06-2186.htm#_ftn16

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noted that respondent was apologetic and acknowledged her mistake. Complainant averred that

while he understands the present condition of respondent, he, however felt duty-bound to report the

matter to the court. Being pregnant outside of marriage, respondent had breached the ethicalstandards in the Judiciary, thus, is administratively liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent is administratively liable

HELD:

In the instant case, respondent has been informed of the charge against her and afforded the

opportunity to respond thereto. In all instances, respondent admitted the allegation that she is

pregnant by a man married to another woman. Indeed, while she initially claimed that the man whoimpregnated her represented to be separated from his wife, the fact remains that the man is still

married. Thus, there is no doubt that respondent engaged in sexual relations with a married man

which not only violate the moral standards expected of employees of the Judiciary but is also adesecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage.

Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also "conduct inconsistent

with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful,flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the

community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare."

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from

any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his

behavior outside the court as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court

employee is also judged by his private morals. The exacting standards of morality and decency havebeen strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of the Judiciary.

Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life.

The Court stressed adherence to the principle that public office is a public trust. The good of

the service and the degree of morality, which every official and employee in the public service must

observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Governmentin the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct affecting morality, integrity, and

efficiency while holding office should be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all

attendant circumstances taken into account.

Therefore, respondent ESTRELLA P. CAPILIT is guilty of Disgraceful and ImmoralConduct and is hereby suspended from service for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day without

pay, and warned that repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more

severe penalty.

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85. AC NO 9259

Jasper Rodica vs Atty. Manuel Lazaro, et. Al.

FACTS:

This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the respondent atty. Lazaro on grounds of

gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and violation of the code ofprofessional responsibility.

On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the bureau of immigration for

allegedly being involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving the creation ofhundreds of dollars in illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol to look for a lawyer.

Apostol recommended the Lazaro law office represented by atty. Manuel Lazaro and his associates who

initially declined but later accepted to handle the deportation case.

Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the complaint filed by his live-in partner jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview marketing corporation for recovery and

possession and damages involving a property they have in Boracay which is represented by atty. Tan. Rodicawas represented by atty. Ibutnande in this case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that atty. Manuel met with atty.

Tan to discuss the settlement package on the deportation case they filed against strong on the condition that

Rodica withdraws her complaint from the RTC of Cebu.

On May 25, 2011 the bureau of immigration rendered a judgment deporting strong to leave the

country. On June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her complaint against Hillview.

Rodica now alleges that after strong was deported and withdrawing the case before the RTC, she wasdeceived by Atty. Manuel et al for over settlement of 7 million which was allegedly extorted from her after

misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case before the RTC is only a part of the settlement package.

It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro law office helped in drafting themanifestation with motion to withdraw motion for reconsideration after Rodica pleaded him to prepare the

motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro law office including the name of atty.

Manuel and atty. Michelle to give more weight on the pleading. Rodica promised atty. Espejo to talk to atty.Manuel about it. The case before the RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to show

cause of action but a motion for reconsideration was filed by Rodica.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the disbarment of the respondents.

HELD:

The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the respondents. As a

general rule, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainantto clearly prove the allegations made against them. The required quantum of proof is preponderance of

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evidence which is an evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is

offered in opposition thereto.

On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package, the court find it without merit because she

withdrew her complaint only after the deportation of strong. It was also evident on record that the said case

was already dismissed even before the deportation case was filed only she filed a motion for reconsideration.Therefore, it cannot be said that her withdrawal of the complaint is a settlement consideration regarding thedeportation case of strong. Moreover, strong is not a party to the case she filed before the RTC therefore there

is no connection between these 2 cases.

There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was presented that the cause of her withdrawal

of the complaint is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According to Atty. Espejo who helped

Rodica draft the motion for withdrawal of the complaint, the said withdrawal is for the purpose of selling her

property to Apostol. Apostol further corroborated that he told Rodica he is willing to purchase the propertyonce it is free from any pending case. Rodica promised him to work on the termination of the pending case

attached to the property to make the sale.

On her claim to have paid 7 million to atty. Manuel et al, she failed to substantiate such claim despite

showing off withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money after failing to prove that the said

amount was paid to the respondents. Moreover, the court held that Rodica is not a client of Lazaro law office.

They merely handled the deportation case of strong.

As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica for misrepresenting before the court

that she was aided by the Lazaro law office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo explained that Rodicaassured him to talk to atty. Manuel and atty. Michelle about including their name on the pleading but she did

not do so. Atty. Espejo should have known better that atty. Ibutnande was the counsel on record on the case

before the RTC and therefore it is not his duty to prepare said pleading. He also should have known that all

pleadings before the court are acted based on merit or the lack of it and not by the name of the law firm.However, the court give due recognition on the fact that atty. Espejo expressed remorse on his conduct and

made a sincere apology to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro law office and that he was

newly admitted to the bar in 2010, the court find it proper to give him a warning to become more prudent onhis actuation in the practice of his profession.

The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.

86. AC NO 9094

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., represented by GABRIEL H.

ABAD,Complainant

v.ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK, Respondent.

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FACTS:

This is a disbarment case against a lawyer who sued a former client in representation of a new one

Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (Hocorma Foundation) filed a

complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk used towork as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from

1983 to 1985. He also served as its counsel in several criminal and civil cases.

Hocorma Foundation further alleged that on November 25, 2006 Atty. Funk filed an action forquieting of title and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc.

(Mabalacat Institute). Atty. Funk did so, according to the foundation, using information that he

acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)

and in breach of attorney-client relationship.

According to Atty. Funk, when Santos got involved in various litigations, he sold or donatedsubstantial portions of his real and personal properties to the Hocorma Foundation. Santos hired

Atty. Funk for this purpose. The latter emphasized that, in all these, the attorney-client relationshipwas always between Santos and him. He was more of Santos' personal lawyer than the lawyer of

Hocorma Foundation.

Atty. Funk claimed that before Santos left for America in August 1983 for medical treatment,

he entered into a retainer agreement with him. They agreed that Atty. Funk would be paid for hislegal services out of the properties that he donated or sold to the Hocorma Foundation. The

foundation approved that compensation agreement on December 13, 1983. But it reneged and would

not pay Atty. Funk's legal fees. According to Atty. Funk, on August 15, 1983 Santos suggested to

Hocorma Foundation's Board of Trustees the inclusion of Atty. Funk in that board, a suggestion thatthe foundation followed. After Santos died on September 14, 1983, Atty. Funk was elected President

of Mabalacat Institute, a position he had since held. rll

Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his attorney's fees,he severed his professional relationship with it. On November 9, 1989, four years later, he filed a

complaint against the foundation for collection of his attorney's fees. The trial court, the Court ofAppeals (CA), and the Supreme Court decided the claim in his favor. rll

After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating

circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting of four court appearances against his former

client, the Hocorma Foundation. The CBD recommended Atty. Funk's suspension from the practice

of law for one year. On April 16, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the CBD'sreport and recommendation. Atty. Funk moved for reconsideration but the IBP Board of Governors

denied it on June 26, 2011.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation ofthe CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.

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HELD:

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflictinginterests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it

is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after

terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of anotherclient, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written consent.

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature oftheir relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting

interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of

professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his presentor former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer's

part does not make it inoperative.15rll

The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client's doings, whether

documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust andconfidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be

impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision orlock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one.

Here, the evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of the legal services ofAtty. Funk in connection with, among others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of the

several suits that the lawyer subsequently filed against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. Funk collected

attorney's fees from the foundation for such services. Thus, he had an obligation not to use anyknowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation

existed at all, when he sued the foundation.

The Court finds it fitting ti adopt the CBD's recommendation as well as the IBP Board of

Governor's resolution respecting the case.

Therefore, Atty. Richard Funk will SUSPENDS from the practice of law for one year

effective immediately.

87. AM NO P-12-3033

MEMORANDA OF JUDGE ELIZA B. YU ISSUED TO LEGAL RESEARCHER

MARIEJOY P. LAGMAN AND TO COURT STENOGRAPHER SOLEDAD J. BASSIG, ALL OFMETROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY

FACTS:

This administrative case originates from a letter1 dated July 28, 2010 of Executive Judge

Bibiano G. Colasito of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Pasay City, transmitting to the Officeof the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action the following memoranda and orders issued

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by Judge Eliza B. Yu (Judge Yu) to two members of her staff at the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City,

and their subsequent letter-explanations: a) Memoranda2 dated June 16 and 22, 2010 to Mariejoy P.

Lagman (respondent Lagman), Legal Researcher; b) Memorandum3 dated July 16, 2010 toSoledad J. Bassig (respondent Bassig), Court Stenographer; c) letters4 dated June 22 and 24, 2010

from respondent Lagman; d) letters5 dated July 20 and August 17, 2010 from respondent Bassig;

and e) Order dated August 13 and 16, 2010.

The charges of grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial functions, and

dishonesty against respondent Mariejoy P. Lagman. Judge Yu, in her Memorandum dated June 10,

2010, directed respondent Lagman to explain why she included and called Civil Case entitledToyota Financial Services Philippines vs. Vivian Villanueva, et al., during the hearingon June 9,2010, when the said case was not even calendared on that day. In a letter dated June 10, 2010,

respondent Lagman explained that the counsel of one of the parties, a certain Atty. Condez,

questioned the failure of the court to calendar his Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsiderationon June 9,2010, as specifically stated in his motion. Respondent Lagman reasoned that she was forced to call

the case due to the insistence of Atty. Condez to set his motion for hearing on the said date. She

stated that it was an unintentional and honest mistake on her part and asked the indulgence andforgiveness of Judge Yu.

Respondent Lagman admitted in a letter12 dated June 22, 2010, that she failed to notice and

correct the different hearing dates in the Constancia and the Minutes dated April 22, 2010, in CivilCase No. 482-01, which she explained were actually prepared by the stenographer on duty. She also

acknowledged the mistake made in the Minutes of the Hearing which should have indicated the

name of then Acting Presiding Judge Josephine Vito Cruz, and not the name of Judge Yu.Respondent Lagman asked for the indulgence and forgiveness of Judge Yu for the inadvertent

mistakes she had committed and promised that the same would not be repeated.

Respondent Lagman, in a letter-explanation14 dated June 24, 2010, clarified that there wasactually no discrepancy in the total number of pending criminal and civil cases since the results of

the physical inventory conducted on February 8, 2010, which were for the year-end December 31,

2009, were the same results that were submitted to the Supreme Court on February 16, 2010. Shefurther explained that the inventory did not include the newly-raffled cases as they were supposed to

be included in the report for the month of January 2010, which at that time, had not yet been

completed. Respondent Lagman stated that all the statistics indicated in the reports were actual andlegitimate numbers, and that if ever there was indeed a discrepancy, the Court Management Office

would have called her attention regarding the errors.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ms. Lagman be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty.

HELD:

Respondent Lagman showed carelessness or indifference in the performance of her duties.

As Officer-in-Charge, she was remiss in her duties to give due care and attention to establishedprocedure in the calendar of cases. Respondent Lagman should have properly informed Judge Yu of

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the inadvertent omission of Civil Case No. M-PSY-09-09232 in the list of calendared cases for

hearing. She should have sought the necessary permission from Judge Yu before calling the case as

she was still under her direct supervision. With regard to the discrepancies in the dates in Civil CaseNo. 482-01, we understand that the said mistakes could not be blamed solely on respondent Lagman

as she was not the one who prepared the documents. However, the errors in the Constancia and in

the Minutes of the Hearing could have been avoided and corrected had respondent Lagman paidmore attention to the details specified in the documents, i.e., the date of hearing and the name of thethen Presiding Judge Vito Cruz.

Similarly in Civil Case No. SCC-10-55, respondent Lagman did not follow establishedprocedure when she allowed one of the parties to sign the Minutes of the Hearing without waiting

for the arrival of Judge Yu. It must be remembered that the Minutes of the Hearing is a very

important document which gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or

hearing of a case. It is, in fact, a capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for itstates the date and time of session; the names of the judge, clerk of court, stenographer and court

interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel of the parties who appeared; the party

presenting evidenced marked; and the date of the next hearing.

From the foregoing, we hold that the mistakes or errors in the contents of the orders,

subpoena, and Minutes of the Hearing committed by respondents Lagman could be attributed to their

lack of attention or focus on the task at hand. These could have easily been avoided had theyexercised greater care and diligence in the performance of their duties. We find respondents Lagman

liable for simple neglect of duty.

Therefore respondent MARIEJOY P. LAGMAN is hereby found guilty of simple neglect of

duty. They are reprimanded and sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar acts in

the future shall be dealt with more severely.

88. AM NO P-12-3029

ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES, represented by ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES,

Complainant

Vs.LEODEL N. ROXAS, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 66, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Astorga and Repol Law Offices,

represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares, against respondent Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV of theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City, for willful neglect of duty, relative to Civil

Case No. 01-1002, entitled FGU Insurance Corporation v. NEC Cargo Services, Inc. and Albert T.

Tamayo, Third Party Defendant.

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On July 11, 2006, respondent served a copy of the Writ of Execution upon NEC at Block 15,

Lot 9, Tulip Street, Camella Homes I, Putatan, Muntinlupa City, which was received by Mr. Narciso

E. Catalon (Catalon). On even date, respondent levied upon the personal properties, consisting ofoffice equipment, found inside the NEC office.

An auction sale was set on July 19, 2006 at 10:30 a.m. at the Main Entrance of the Hall of Justice of

Makati City. Copies of the Notice of Sale were sent to all concerned parties and posted on thebulletin boards at the City Hall, Hall of Justice, and Post Office of Makati City.

Herein respondent had undeniably failed to file periodic reports on the Writ of Execution

dated July 10, 2006. Respondent received a copy of said Writ also on July 10, 2006 and he filed aSheriffs Report on August 7, 2006. According to his Report, respondent had to lift and cancel thelevy on the office equipment found inside the NEC office given Catalons third party claim over saidproperties and the failure of FGU to post an indemnity bond in Catalons favor, thus, the Writ ofExecution dated July 10, 2006 was returned to the RTC unsatisfied. The Sheriffs Report datedAugust 7, 2006 was the first and last filed by respondent in connection with the Writ of

Execution dated July 10, 2006, until the instant administrative complaint dated April 29, 2008 was

filed against him. For almost two years, respondent was completely remiss in filing the mandatedperiodic reports on the Writ of Execution dated July 10, 2006.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sheriff Roxas is GUILTY of simple neglect of duty.

HELD:

Evidently, respondent displayed conduct short of the stringent standards required of courtemployees. Respondents long delay in the execution of the final judgment in favor of FGU andfailure to submit the required periodic reports constitute simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure

of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a dutyresulting from carelessness or indifference. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19

classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension without pay for

one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, for the first offense. This being respondents firstoffense, the penalty recommended by the OCA of one (1) month and one (1) day is appropriate.

Therefore, respondent Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court Branch 66,

Makati City, is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and is SUSPENDED for one (1) month

and one (1) day counted from his receipt of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that arepetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

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89. AM NO P-10-2809

MANOLITO C. VILLORDON, Complainant

v.

MARILYN C. AVILA, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, CebuCity, Respondent.

FACTS:

This is a Complaint for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document against

respondent Marilyn C. Avila (respondent), Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Branch 3, Cebu City. In a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated 27

October 2008, complainant Manolito C. Villordon (complainant) called the OCA s attention tocertain false entries in respondent s Personal Data Sheet (PDS). Complainant alleged that respondent

failed to declare her correct marital status and the fact that she has three illegitimate children.Further, complainant claimed that respondent submitted a falsified income tax return.

In 2001, complainant met respondent. Soon after, they started living together as husband andwife. Respondent was later appointed as Court Interpreter, the position vacated by complainant s

father. Complainant and respondent parted ways in 2008, and both subsequently found other

partners. After their break-up, respondent filed an administrative case against complainant before the

BJMP.

Judge Andrino also examined respondent s PDS. He found that respondent did not indicatethat she has three daughters and failed to disclose that there was a physical injuries complaint filedagainst her.

In her comment, respondent said that complainant has an axe to grind against her because

they had an illicit affair, which she broke off when she entered government service. As to the

information she omitted from her PDS, respondent admitted having left out the names of her threechildren. She argued, however, that she did so because they were never her dependents and were in

the custody of her parents. She also claimed that she has never claimed tax exemptions for her

children. Respondent also denied that she falsified her civil status, as she is in fact single. She

claimed that the omission of her children s names did not mean that she was not acknowledging

them or that she was concealing their existence from family and friends, and neither did it jeopardizethe interest or violate any right of complainant.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not MARILYN C. AVILA, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,Branch 3, Cebu City, be found guilty of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document.

HELD:

It must be remembered that the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheets is a requirementunder the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government.

As such, it is well settled that the accomplishment of untruthful statements therein is intimately

connected with such employment.

Notwithstanding that the making of untruthful statement in official documents is ultimately

connected with ones employment, it bears stressing that dishonesty, to warrant the penalty ofdismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged.

This Office cannot sustain respondent s attempt to escape liability by advancing the flimsyexcuse that she did not list the names of her three children in her Personal Data Sheet because theyalways had been in the custody of her parents. The Personal Data Sheet requires the listing of the full

names of a government employee s child/children and their corresponding dates of birth. Well

entrenched is the rule that when official documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third personneed not be present, because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the

destruction of the truth as therein proclaimed.

Dishonesty has been defined as "intentionally making a false statement on any material fact."

Dishonesty evinces "a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of

integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;

disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.

Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a requirement for employmentin the government. Hence, making false statements in ones PDS is ultimately connected with onesemployment in the government.

14The employee making false statements in his or her PDS becomes

liable for falsification.

Moreover, for respondent to be meted the penalty of dismissal, her dishonesty need not be

committed in the performance of official duty. As the Court has previously ruled:

The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty

of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with hisoffice, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a

dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his

government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty againsthis fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is

employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which

renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to

resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012augustdecisions.php?id=446#fnt14http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012augustdecisions.php?id=446#fnt14http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012augustdecisions.php?id=446#fnt14http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012augustdecisions.php?id=446#fnt14

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The declarations that every government personnel makes in accomplishing and signing the

PDS are not empty statements. Duly accomplished forms of the Civil Service Commission are

considered official documents, which, by their very nature are in the same category as publicdocuments, and become admissible in evidence without need of further proof. As an official

document made in the course of official duty, its contents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated

therein.

Respondent s argument that her failure to indicate the names of her children in her PDS did

not prejudice the government is incorrect. When official documents are falsified, respondent s intentto injure a third person is irrelevant because the principal thing punished is the violation of public

faith and the destruction of the truth as claimed in that document. The act of respondent undermines

the integrity of government records and therein lies the prejudice to public service. Respondent s act

need not result in disruption of service or loss to the government. It is the act of dishonesty itself thattaints the integrity of government service. A government officer s dishonesty affects the morale of

the service, even when it stems from the employee s personal dealings. Such conduct should not be

tolerated from government officials, even when official duties are performed well.

Under Rule IV, Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the CivilService, dishonesty and falsification of official document are both grave offenses punishable bydismissal from government service, even for a first offense, without prejudice to criminal or civil

liability. The penalty also carries with it the cancellation of respondent's eligibility, forfeiture of

retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service,

unless otherwise provided in the decision. Employment in the judiciary demands the highest degreeof responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency from its personnel. All judiciary employees are

expected to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times. An act that falls short of the

exacting standards set for public officers, especially those in the judiciary, shall not becountenanced.

By her acts of dishonesty and falsification of an official document, respondent has failed tomeasure up to the high and exacting standards set for judicial employees and must, therefore, be

dismissed from the service.

THEREFORE, respondent Marilyn C. Avila is guilty of dishonesty and falsification ofofficial document. She is forthwith dismissed from the service, with cancellation of eligibility,

forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification for reemployment in thegovernment service, including in government-owned or controlled corporations.