Cases on Quieting of Title

8/10/2019 Cases on Quieting of Title

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HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SR., represented by their

Administrator ELPIDIO VENCILAO,petitioner,vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, SPOUSES SABAS and RUPERTA GEPALAGO, and

DOMICIANO GEPALAGO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO,J.:

Between two (2) sets of claimants of real property - those claimingownership by acquisitive prescription, and those asserting ownership on thebasis of a deed of sale recorded in the certificate of title of the vendor asmortgagee and highest bidder in a foreclosure sale - who has a better right?

On 12 February 1990 the heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., represented bytheir Administrator Elpidio Vencilao, filed with the Regional Trial Court of

Bohol a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and/orownership, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of writs ofpreliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the spouses Sabasand Ruperta Gepalago.[1]The complaint was subsequently amended toinclude an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title and to impleaddefendant Domiciano Gepalago.[2]

The heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr. alleged that they were the absoluteowners of a parcel of land situated in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with anarea of 3,625 square meters having inherited the same from their father,Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., who during his lifetime was in peaceful, open,

notorious and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property inthe concept of owner, declared the property for taxation purposes under TaxDeclaration No. 37C6-344 and religiously paid the real estate taxes. Helikewise had the property consistently declared as his own in otherdocuments, e.g., those relevant to the 1987 Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program (CARP). After his death, his heirs continued to possess andenjoy the property.

The Gepalago spouses, on the other hand, denied all the materialallegations in the complaint and claimed that they were the registeredowners of a 5,970-square meter property located in Candungao Calapo, San

Isidro, Bohol, and covered by TCT No. 16042, previously a portion of a1,401,570 square-meter land originally owned by a certain PedroLuspo. The entire parcel of land was mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to thePhilippine National Bank (PNB) as security for aloan. Since Luspo failed to pay the obligation upon maturity themortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter PNB, the highest bidder in theforeclosure sale, conveyed the whole property to fifty-six (56) vendees
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among whom were the spouses Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago who acquiredthe 5,970 square-meter portion thereof. Since then, they had been theowner and possessor of the land until they donated the same in 1988 totheir son Domiciano Gepalago.

The trial court appointed a commissioner to survey the litigated propertyand determine the areas claimed by both parties. The commissionerreported that the area claimed by the Vencilaos was included in the titledproperty of the Gepalagos. On the basis of the commissioners report andthe other pieces of evidence presented by the parties, the trial court foundthe following: (a) The property claimed by the Gepalagos consisted of 5,970square meters, while that of the Vencilaos covered an area of 22,401.58square meters as indicated in the survey plan submitted by Engr. Jesus H.Sarmiento, the court appointed commissioner; (b) Insofar as the survey planand report submitted by Engr. Sarmiento were concerned, these indubitablyestablished the fact that the Vencilaos owned the excess area of 16,431.58

square meters which was clearly outside the area claimed by the Gepalagos;(c) The lot in question had been titled to defendant Sabas Gepalago andsubsequently titled to his son, defendant Domiciano Gepalago, underTransfer Certificate of Title No. 18621 by virtue of a deed of donationexecuted on 25 October 1988 by Sabas Gepalago in favor of DomicianoGepalago; and, (d) As stated in the commissioners report, "If the titled lotof Domiciano Gepalago is plotted in accordance with the technical descriptionappearing in the title, it will be relocated to more than 219 kilometerseastward away from its supposed actual location. This amounts to its non-existence."[3]

The trial court then ruled in favor of the Vencilaos holding that they hadbeen in possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the litigated property formore than thirty (30) years and that the improvements therein wereintroduced by them long before any title was ever issued to theGepalagos. The lower court added that there was ample evidence showingthat the Gepalagos knew when they bought the property from PNB that theland had long been possessed and enjoyed in the concept of owners by theVencilaos. Thus, while under ordinary circumstances a certificate of title isindefeasible, it is not so when a person with prior knowledge of theownership and possession of the land by another obtains title to it.

The Gepalagos appealed the decision of the trial court. After dueconsideration, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared theGepalagos owners of the disputed property -

Evidently, defendant-appellants spouses Gepalago were purchasers in goodfaith and for value. They acquired their share in the property from thePhilippine National Bank (PNB) which was the registered owner. Even
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assuming they had knowledge of the plaintiff-appellees' possession of thesaid property at the time of the purchase, it was PNB which was theregistered owner of the property. The title was transferred to the bank afterthe foreclosure sale of the property mortgaged by the previous registeredowner, Pedro Luspo. Thus where the certificate of title is in the name of the

vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely onwhat appears on the certificate of title. The rule that all persons dealingwith property covered by Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to gobeyond what appears on the face of the title is well-settled.

Granting that plaintiff-appellees were possessors of the property for a longtime, they never raised objections to the transactions affecting theland. There was no action made or any protest recorded with the Register ofDeeds.

Defendant-appellants claim of ownership was evidenced by certificates oftitle issued in their names. A Torrens Certificate of Title is the best evidenceof ownership of a registered land. As against the allegations of plaintiff-appellees, defendant-appellants are the ones entitled to theproperty. Defendant-appellants ownership of the property was evidencedby a certificate of title while plaintiff-appellees relied merely on taxdeclaration. Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownershipof the land referred to therein. Defendant-appellants acquired the land in aforeclosure sale and there was no evidence to show that plaintiff-appelleeswere defrauded when the property was mortgaged and then sold x x x x[4]

The motion for reconsideration by the Vencilaos having beendenied[5]they filed the instant petition for review.

In awarding the disputed land to petitioners, the trial court erroneouslyfound that petitioners had been in possession and enjoyment of the propertyfor more than thirty (30) years. It should be noted that the land in disputeis a registered land placed under the operation of the Torrens system wayback in 1959, or more than thirty (30) years before petitioners instituted thepresent action in the court a quo, and for which Original Certificate of TitleNo. 400 was issued.[6]The rule is well-settled that prescription does not runagainst registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise known

as the Property Registration Decree, it is specifically provided that "no titleto registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall beacquired by prescription or adverse possession." A title, once registered,cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Thecertificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence ofownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appearstherein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.[7]All personsmust take notice and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.[8]
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Neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitionersas evidence of ownership prevail over respondents certificate of title which,to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. It should be stressedthat tax declarations and receipts do not by themselves conclusively provetitle to the land.[9]They only constitute positive and strong indication that

the taxpayer concerned has made a claim either to the title or to thepossession of the property for which taxes have been paid.[10]Stateddifferently, tax declarations and tax receipts are onlyprima facieevidence ofownership or possession.

But assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioners had indeed acquiredthe land they were claiming by prescription, there likewise exists a seriousdoubt on the precise identity of the disputed property. What petitionersclaimed in their complaint was a parcel of land located in Cambansag, SanIsidro, Bohol, with an area of 3,625 square meters.[11]This clearly differsfrom the piece of land registered in the name of the Gepalagos, which is Lot

No. A-73 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-60558, LRC Rec. No. H-4251,and located in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 5,970square meters.[12]Even the commissioners report failed to clarify thedifference in the area and location of the property claimed. In order that anaction to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the person whoclaims that he has a better right to it must prove not only hisownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.[13]

As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of thevendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely onwhat appears on the face of the title.[14]He is under no obligation to look

beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing onthe face of the certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required tomake the necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of titlewhich indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of theproperty.[15]Otherwise, his mere refusal to believe that such defect exists,or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defectin his vendors title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value if itafterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears thathe had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had heacted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of

a prudent man in a like situation.

[16]

Petitioners maintain that it is the exception, not the general rule, which

should be applied in this case. They argue that respondents had knowledgeof prior possession and enjoyment by petitioners when they purchased theproperty. Thus, they were not innocent purchasers for value and could notinvoke the indefeasibility of their title.
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We do not agree. The exception contemplates a situation wherein thereexists a flaw in the title of the vendor and the vendee has knowledge or atleast ought to have known of such flaw at the time he acquired the property,in which case, he is not considered as an innocent purchaser for value. Inthe instant case, we discern nothing from the records showing that the title

of PNB, the vendor, was flawed. Petitioners not only failed to substantiatetheir claim of acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they alsofailed to allege, and much less adduce, any evidence that there was a defectin the title of PNB. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption leanstowards the validity of the vendors title.

Therefore, inasmuch as there was no flaw in the title of PNB, privaterespondents rightly believed that they could and did acquire likewise aflawless title. Indeed, as a result of the deed of conveyance between PNBand private respondents, there was transmission of ownership and the latterstepped into the shoes of the former hence entitled to all the defenses

available to PNB, including those arising from the acquisition of the propertyin good faith and for value.

Finally, another consideration that militates heavily against the presentpetition is the unusual silence of petitioners while the ownership of thedisputed land transferred from one person to another. There were at leastthree (3) transactions on record involving the property: first, the contract ofmortgage between Luspo and PNB whereby the property was used assecurity for the loan contracted by Luspo; second, the foreclosure ofmortgage upon the failure of Luspo to pay the loan and the subsequent saleof the property at public auction; and, third, the sale of the property to

fifty-six (56) vendees, among whom were the Gepalago spouses. Each ofthese transactions was registered and a corresponding transfer certificateissued in favor of the new owner. Yet in all these, petitioners neverinstituted any action contesting the same nor registered any objectionthereto; instead, they remained silent. Thus, they are now estopped fromdenying the title of the present owner. Having failed to assert their rights, ifany, over the property warrants the presumption that they have eitherabandoned them or declined to assert them. Or, it could likewise beinferred therefrom that petitioners themselves were not convinced in thevalidity of their claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court ofAppeals of 31 July 1995 as well as its Resolution of 14 December 1995denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban,andQuisumbing, JJ., concur.


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"1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name ofArcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, isconsidered conjugal property;

"2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of

the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but

"3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made,the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property withoutviolating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).

"To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it isnecessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the nameof the surviving spouses and the heirs of the deceased wife by means ofextrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heiror heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this saleexecuted by their father." virtua1aw library

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusanon a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register ofDeeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the correspondingtransfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages andP1,000 attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirols assertionthat it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the actsrequired of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondentreiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that thepetitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law byappealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner ofLand Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that"mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that providedby Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151," dismissed the petition, with costs against the

petitioner.Hence the present appeal by Almirol.

The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus willlie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.

Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire


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on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission ofrights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for hisrefusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not forthe register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a courtof competent jurisdiction. 1

"Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not theduty of Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction."(Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, Et Al., L- 17956, Sept. 30, 1963).

". . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection totheir registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or avalid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does notrequire that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can partiesaffected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they becomeaware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? Ifthe purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regardingthe effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, notbefore, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence thatregistration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards."(Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. v. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).

Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confrontedwith the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the groundthat it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the

proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrumentpresented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submitand certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken onthe doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:

"Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to betaken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, orother instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in

interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to anysuch matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of LandRegistration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, statingthe question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing bythe party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after considerationof the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registeredlands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an orderprescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in


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owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva (formerJustice of the Peace of the Municipal Court, Cavinti, Laguna), pursuant toDecree No. 150562 issued in L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 136, Cad. Case No.1 (Record on Appeal; Answer, p. 28).

Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and firstcousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latterbeing the daughter of Pedro Villanueva.

On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold tothem in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog(Annex "B" of the complaint) that was allegedly signed by the late PedroVillanueva conveying and transfering the property in question in favor of thepetitioners (Record on Appeal, Exhibit "B", pp. 9-10) which deed isreproduced as follows.

Ako, Pedro Villanueva, 66 taong gulang, balo at nananahanan sa municipiong Cavinti, lalawigang Laguna at Kapuluang Pilipinas, alang-alang sahalagang LIMANG DAANG PISO (P500.00) salaping filipino, na sa akinibinayad ng mag-asawa ni Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva, tagarito rinsa nasabing municipio, lalawigang at kapulwan sa hinaharap ng kasulatan aysinasaysay ko na aking inilillwat at pinagbili ng biling patuluyan sa nasabingmag-asawa Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva, sampo na sa kanilaymangagmamana at hahalili, ang aking isang palagay na lupa na nabubuo salimang luang na tubigan, punlang kalahating kabang palay at saka dalatan okatihan na may isang kabang palay na hasik, tumatayo sa nayon ng

Kanlurang Talaongan, sakop nitong municipio ng Cavinti at napapaloob samga hangganang sumusunod:

HILAGAAN, Braulio Villanueva at Modesto RiberaSILANGAN, Braulio Villanueva.TIMUGAN, Braulio Villanueva, Ilog Kaliraya at Jacinto ToqueKANLURAN, Jacinto Toque.

Ang pagaaring ito ay tunay kong pananarili sapagkat aking nabili samagkakapatid na Aniano Gallardo, Zacarias Gallardo at Perfecto Gallardo at

natatala sa Registro ng Amillarmiento dito sa Cavinti sa ilalim ng Blg. 22888,at walang ano mang ipinagkakautang ni pinanagutan kaya at magagamit nanitong aking pinagbilhan ang kanilang matuwid na maipamana at mailiwa saiba. Gayon ding sinasaysay ko na akoy umaakong mananagutan dito saaking pinagbilhan, tungkol sa pagaaring ito na ang katibay ay akingipagsasanggalang laban sa kanino mang maghahabol.


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Dapat tantoin, gayon man, na ang pagaaring ito ay registrado na sa Registrode la Propiedad nitong lalawigang Laguna, subalit at sa isang kamalian ngpagkakasukat tungkol sa lawak at laki, ay hindi pa natutubos ang kanyangtitulo, kaya at kung maisaayos na ang nasabing titulo ay saka na ipatatalasa pangalan nitong aking pinagbilhan upang lalong malagay sa katahimikan

itong aking pinagbilhan.

At sa katunayan ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito dito sa municipio ngCavinti, Laguna, ngayong ika sampung araw ng Agosto taong isanglibosiyam na daan at tatlompu at pito (1937).

(LGD) PEDRO VILLANUEVA

Nagfirma sa hinaharap ni

(LGD) BALTAZAR VILLANUEVAJUAN VILLANUEVA

Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled on the basis ofthe private document of sale (Exhibit "B") and a new certificate of title wasissued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944, particularly describing theland as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 401 of the Cadastral Survey of Cavinti) with theimprovements thereon, situated in the municipality of Cavinti, Bounded on

the N and NE., by Lot No. 403; on the SE by Lot No. 393 and the CalirayaRiver; and on the SW by Lot No. 515. Area Eighty One Thousand andThree Hundred (81,300) Square Meters, more or less. (Record on Appeal,Annex "A," pp. 7 and 9).During the Second World War, the records as well as the Office of theRegister of Deeds of Laguna, where the original of their new transfercertificate of title was kept, were completely burned. Accordingly, by virtueof an Affidavit of Reconstitution dated December 2, 1958 (Record on Appeal,Annex "DD," pp. 41-42) and upon presentation of the Owner's DuplicateCertificate of Title, the title was administratively reconstituted and the

Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293(No. 23350) in the name of the petitioners (Record on Appeal, Annex "B",pp. 7).

On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with PedroVillanueva, Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit ofAdverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Record onAppeal, Annex "C", pp. 10-13). However, on December 6, 1976 a joint


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affidavit was filed by Pedro G. Villanueva, Jr. and Restituto Villanuevawithdrawing their adverse claim on the said parcel of land, with the Office ofthe Register of Deeds of Laguna (Record on Appeal, Annex " D, " pp. 13-14).When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt wasmade to settle said controversy amicably. Several demands made by herein

petitioners upon private respondents Marta Vda. de Agana to withdraw heradverse claim, failed.

On December 9, 1976, said private respondent executed a Deed ofConveyance and Release of Claim (Record on Appeal and Annex "AA", p. 35)wherein the parties agreed, among other things, to the following:

That in consideration of the said transfer and conveyance over a 1,000square meter portion mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, theVENDEE (Marta V. Agana) does hereby withdraw the adverse claimmentioned above; (Rollo, p. 119).

However, when private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana refusedto sign an Affidavit of Quit-claim (Exhibit "9; " Record on appeal, p. 195),petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and herhusband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Titleand Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3,1977, demanding that their title over the questioned land be fortified by adeclaration of ownership in their favor and avoiding the af/recited Deed ofConveyance and Release of Claim (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-7). Accordingly,private respondents in their answer countered that the Deed of Sale in

Tagalog and petitioners' title over the land be declared void ab initio,amongother demands (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-35).

On January 20, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered itsdecision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as thereconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initioRecordon Appeal, pp. 208-216).

The dispositive portion of said decision (Record on Appeal, pp. 215-216)reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants andagainst the plaintiffs, as follows:

a. declaring as null and void the private document dated August 10, 1937written in Tagalog (Exhibit B);


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Private respondents and petitioners filed their respective memoranda on May18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 117) and on June 7, 1985 (Rollo, p. 143) respectively.On July 1, 1985, the Court resolved to consider the case submitted fordeliberation (Rollo, p. 168).

Petitioners, however filed a Supplemental Memorandum, with leave of courton May 18, 1987 (Rollo, p. 169) which was noted by the court in itsresolution dated June 19, 1987 (Rollo, p. 188).

In its petition petitioners raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:

ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXHIBIT B DOES NOTTRANSFER OWNERSHIP, THE SAME BEING NULL AND VOID.

IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTSARE NOT GUILTY OF LACHES.

IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF- APPELLANTSCANNOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT LAND BY PRESCRIPTION UPONTHE PRINCIPLE THAT NO TITLE TO REGISTERED LAND IN DEROGATION OFTHAT OF THE REGISTERED OWNER SHALL BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION.

IVTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONHAS SET INTO THIS CASE; AND,

VTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFlCATE OF TITLENO. RT-6293 AS NULL AND VOID.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there was a validreconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued

in the names of petitioners.It is admitted that the land in question is formerly covered by OriginalCertificate of Title No. 2262, issued in the name of Pedro Villanueva and thatthe cancellation of said OCT No. 2262 and the issuance of the reconstitutedTransfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) are based either on theAffidavit for Reconstitution of Teresa Villanueva and not of Pedro Villanueva,or the unnotarized deed of sale of August 10, 1937 (Annex "B" for plaintiffs),


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held void by the lower court and by the Court of Appeals. As a consequenceTCT No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) was likewise held void ab initio. (Record onAppeal, p. 20).

As to the validity of the Affidavit for Reconstitution, affiant Teresa Villanueva

testified on December 19, 1980, that she did not know anything about thereconstitution of their title as it was their children who took charge of thesame and that she never participated in the said reconstitution. In fact shenever appeared before the Notary Public and this testimony wascorroborated by the testimony of Eleuterio Rebenque, entry clerk in theOffice of the Register of Deeds who never made any categorical affirmationthat said Teresa Villanueva appeared at said office. (Rollo, p. 43).

Consequently, the crux of the matter now centers on whether or not theunnotarized deed of sale purportedly executed on August 10, 1937 by theprimitive owner Pedro Villanueva, in favor of petitioners, can be consideredas a valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of a parcel ofland registerd under the Torrens System. Corollary thereto, it becomesnecessary to examine other matters surrounding the execution of thealleged document of sale (Exhibit B).

Petitioners claim that the sale although not in a public document, isnevertheless valid and binding citing this Court's rulings in the casesofCauto v. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459, 460; Guerrero v. Miguel, 10 Phil. 52, 53;Bucton v. Gabar 55 SCRA 499 wherein this Court ruled that even a verbalcontract of sale of real estate produces legal effects between the parties.

The contention is unmeritorious.

As the respondent court aptly stated in its decision:True, as argued by appellants, a private conveyance of registered property isvalid as between the parties. However, the only right the vendee ofregistered property in a private document is to compel through courtprocesses the vendor to execute a deed of conveyance sufficient in law forpurposes of registration. Plaintiffs-appellants' reliance on Article 1356 of theCivil Code is unfortunate. The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is

that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered,provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The nextsentence provides the exception, requiring a contract to be in some formwhen the law so requires for validity or enforceability. Said law is Section127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance beexecuted "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of recordor a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify suchacknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated."


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Such law was violated in this case. The action of the Register of Deeds ofLaguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale wasunauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective privatedocument of sale.

With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,Act 496 (now Sec. 112 of P.D. No. 1529) provides:

Sec. 127. Deeds of Conveyance, ... affecting lands, whether registered underthis act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially inaccordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey,encumber, ... or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the moreprolix forms heretofore in use: Provided, That every such instrument shall besigned by the person or persons executing the same, in the presence of twowitnesses, who shall sign the instrument as witnesses to the executionthereof, and shall be acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed bythe person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a court of

record or clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or a justice of thepeace, who shall certify to such acknowledgement substantially in the formnext hereinafter stated. (Emphasis supplied).

It is therefore evident that Exhibit " E " in the case at bar is definitely notregisterable under the Land Registration Act.

Likewise noteworthy is the case of Pornellosa andAngels v. Land Tenure

Administration and Guzman, 110 Phil. 986, where the Court ruled:

The deed of sale (Exhibit A), allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favorof Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establishtheir right to the parcel of land. WhiIe it is valid and binding upon the partieswith respect to the sale of the house erected thereon, yet it is not sufficientto convey title or any right to the residential lot in litigation. Acts andcontracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modificationor extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in apublic document.

Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the executionof the assailed document, the trial court found that said private document(Exhibit "B") was null and void and that it was signed by somebody else notPedro Villanueva. Such findings of fact besides being based on the records,were sustained by the Court of Appeals.


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The contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired byprescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title toregistered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall beacquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing notonly against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors

(Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]). The right to recover possessionof registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mereconsequence of ownership (Umbay vs. Alecha,supra, citing Atun v. Nuuz97 Phil. 762; Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298, 308: J.M.Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110, 113-114) where land has beenregistered under the Torrens System (Alarcon v. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390;Umbay v. Alecha, supra) because the efficacy and integrity of the TorrensSystem must be protected (Director of Lands v. CA, 120 SCRA 370). Asprescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is tosuppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances oftime and suprising the parties or their representatives when the facts havebecome obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death orremoval of witnesses ( Senoan v. Sorongon, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).

In the matter of laches, the Court aptly stated in the case of Marcelo Sottov. Pilar Teves, et al.,86 SCRA 155 [1978] that "in determining whether adelay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of aconfidential relationship between the parties is an important circumstancefor consideration. A delay under such circumstance is not as strictly regardedas where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches isnot strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that the parties are

connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwiseunreasonable delay."

In the case of Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Alfonso Lim, 123 SCRA 464,480 [1983]), the Court ruled that laches cannot be asserted by a merepossessor without claim of title, legal or equitable because for laches toexist, there should be a showing of delay in asserting the complainant'sright. The complainant should have knowledge or notice of the defendant'sconduct and an opportunity to institute a suit. Delay is not counted from thedate the lot was sold to the buyer but from the time of entry of the

defendant or from the time the complainant came to know of the occupancyfor that is the only time it could possibly have demanded that he get out ofthe premises or could have instituted a suit. In the case at bar, it will benoted that what transpired was an administrative reconstitution,essentially ex-parte and without notice, thereby lending credence to theclaim that private respondent Marta Agana was unaware of suchreconstitution and possession until she discovered the same in the Office ofthe Register of Deeds in 1976. As such it cannot be claimed that she slept on


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her right as from that time on, it is undeniable that she filed her adverseclaim on the said lot.

After a careful perusal of the case, there appears to be no cogent reason todisturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the

findings of the trial court.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision ofthe Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Heirs of Domingo vs Ramas

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorariassailing the Decision[1]of the Court ofAppeals dated August 16, 2002 and the subsequent Resolution denyingreconsideration dated January 16, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68501.

Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who,

before his death, was the owner of a parcel of land in Gabay, Margosatubig,Zamboanga del Sur then covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-18,208of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur. In 1939, DomingoValientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to the spousesLeon Belen and Brigida Sescon (spouses Belen). In the 1950s, the Valientesfamily purportedly attempted, but failed, to retrieve the subject propertyfrom the spouses Belen. Through an allegedly forged document captionedVENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject propertybetween Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter

obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5,427in theirname. On February 28, 1970, Maria Valientes Bucoy and Vicente Valientes,legitimate children of the late Domingo Valientes, had their Affidavit ofAdverse Claim[2]duly entered in the Memorandum of Encumbrances at theback of TCT No. T-5,427. Upon the death of the spouses Belen, theirsurviving heirs Brigida Sescon Belen and Maria Lina Belen executed an extra-
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judicial settlement with partition and sale in favor of private respondentVilma Valencia-Minor, the present possessor of the subject property.

On June 20, 1979, herein private respondent Minor filed with the then

Court of First Instance of Pagadian City a PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OFMEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN TCT NO. T-5,427 OF THEREGISTRY OF DEEDS OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, which was docketed as SPL

Case No. 1861.[3] On July 31, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) grantedMinors prayer to allow the Register of Deeds to have the title to the subject

property transferred to her name.

In the meantime, on August 20, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint

before the RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur for the CANCELLATIONOF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITHACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OFPRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES. The Complaintwas docketed as Civil Case No. 98-021.[4]

Private respondent Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil CaseNo. 98-021 on the grounds of forum shopping and litispendentia. On August 3, 2000, the RTC issued an order in open court ruling

that forum shopping does not apply. On September 22, 2000, privaterespondent Minor filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5]of the August 3, 2000Order. On May 7, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion forReconsideration by dismissing Civil Case No. 98-021 on the ground of forumshopping.[6]Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[7]on May 30, 2001,but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order[8]dated September 18,2001.

On November 12, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals aPetition for Certiorari[9]assailing the RTC Orders dated May 7, 2001 andSeptember 18, 2001. Petitioners raised the sole issue of whether the trialcourt was correct in finding that Civil Case No. 98-021 constitutes forumshopping, litis pendentiaor res judicatawith SPL Case No. 186. The Petitionwas docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68501.
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SAID CASES ARE NOT ATTENDANT IN THE PRESENT CASE FORCANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427 ON THE GROUND OF FORGERY OR BY REASON OFFORGED DOCUMENT CAPTIONED VENTA DEFINITIVA.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN IT [RENEGED] FROM ITS SOLEMN DUTYTO RENDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DUE THE PARTIES RATHERTHAN THE SANCTIFICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES OR EQUITYON PRESCRIPTION.[11]

Authority of the Court of Appeals to

Dismiss the Complaint on the Grounds ofPrescription and Laches Despite

Respondents Failure to Appeal the

Dismissal Order

Petitioners recount that private respondent Minor interposedprescription as one of her grounds for the dismissal of the case in her Answerwith Affirmative Defenses. When private respondent Minors Motion toDismiss was denied by the RTC in open court, she filed a Motion for

Reconsideration dwelling on forum shopping, litis pendentiaand/or resjudicata.[12] The trial court proceeded to dismiss the case on the ground offorum shopping.[13] Petitioners now claim before us that private respondentMinors failure to appeal the RTCs dismissal of the complaint on the soleground of forum shopping constituted a waiver of the defense ofprescription. Petitioners further argue that the consideration by the Court ofAppeals of grounds not assigned as errors in the Appellees Brief runs

contrary to the precepts of fair play, good taste and estoppel.[14]

We rule in favor of private respondent Minor on this issue.

Firstly, it stretches the bounds of credulity for petitioners to argue thata defendant in a case should appeal the dismissal order she prayed for justbecause other grounds for dismissal were not considered by the court.
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Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules ofCourt provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion todismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when itappears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that thecourt has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there isanother action pending between the same parties for the samecause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or bystatute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions

to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in theanswer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motuproprioon any of the enumerated grounds (1) lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter; (2)litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or theevidence on record.

We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed tohave waived the defense of prescription, and that the Court of Appeals mayconsider the same motu proprio. Furthermore, as regards thepronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 islikewise heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is notin error when it considered the same motu proprio. While not included in theabove enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we haveruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and maybe considered by the court on its own initiative in determining the rights ofthe parties.[15]

Having thus determined the authority of the Court of Appeals todismiss the Complaint on the grounds of prescription and laches despiteprivate respondent Minors failure to appeal the dismissal Order, We shall

now proceed to determine whether or not prescription or laches has alreadyset in to bar the filing of Civil Case No. 98-021.
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Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title

After the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of petitioners on the issue of

whether Civil Case No. 98-021 is already barred by forumshopping, resjudicata orlitis pendentia,the appellate court, nevertheless,affirmed the dismissal order, but on the grounds of prescription and laches:

Be that as it may, this Court is imbued with sufficientdiscretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors onappeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arrivingat a complete and just resolution of the case (Heirs of RamonDurano, Sr. vs. Uy, 344 SCRA 238).

The case cannot prosper because an action forreconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whoseproperty has been wrongfully or erroneously registered inanothers name, which must be filed within ten years from theissuance of the title since such issuance operates as aconstructive notice (Declaro vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA57). Where a party has neglected to assert his rights over aproperty in question for an unreasonably long period, he isestopped from questioning the validity of another persons titleto the property (Ibid.) Long inaction and passivity in asserting

ones rights over a disputed property precludes him fromrecovering said property (Po Lam vs. Court vs. Court of Appeals,347 SCRA 86).

In conclusion, petitioners cause of action has alreadyprescribed and now heavily infirmed with laches.[16]

Petitioners claim that although the complaint was captioned forCANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427,RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP, AND APPLICATION

FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES,the complaint is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title whichallegedly does not prescribe. Petitioners also allege that the cases cited bythe Court of Appeals in ruling that prescription has set in, particularly thatof Declaro v. Court of Appeals,[17]which in turn cites Tenio-Obsequio v. Court
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of Appeals,[18]are inapplicable to the case at bar since neither fraud norforgery was attendant in said cases.

As regards petitioners claim that the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-

021 is really one of quieting of title which does not prescribe, it appears thatpetitioners are referring to the doctrine laid down in the often-cited caseof Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals,[19]wherein we held:

With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court hasruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyanceof a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trustprescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date ofregistration of the deed or the date of the issuance of thecertificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC,159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff isnot in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to bethe owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, theright to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title tothe property, does not prescribe.[20]

The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-021, whereinthey claim that private respondent Minors predecessor-in-interest acquiredthe subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that of

enforcing an implied trust. In particular, Article 1456 of the Civil Codeprovides:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake orfraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered atrustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person fromwhom the property comes.

However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff insuch action is not in possession of the subject property, the action prescribesin ten years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of theissuance of the certificate of title over the property. When the plaintiff is inpossession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quietingof title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar, petitioners(who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of thesubject property. Civil Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered as that
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of enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed within tenyears from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969. CivilCase No. 98-021 was, however, filed on August 20, 1998, which was waybeyond the prescriptive period.

As an alternative argument, petitioners claim that the prescriptiveperiod for filing their complaint is thirty years, pursuant to Article 1141 of theCivil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, whichrespectively provide:

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe afterthirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is establishedfor the acquisition of ownership and other real rights byprescription.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovableproperty are acquired by ordinary prescription throughpossession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights overimmovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adversepossession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or ofgood faith.

The theory of petitioners is that the Motion to Dismiss hypotheticallyadmits the allegations of the complaint, including the allegations thereonthat the spouses Belen were successful in fraudulently acquiring TCT No. T-5,427 in their favor by means of the forged VENTA DEFINITIVA. Thus, forpurposes of ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, it is hypothetically admitted thatprivate respondent Minors predecessors-in-interest are in bad faith. Theapplicable prescriptive period, therefore, is that provided in Article 1141 inrelation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, which is thirty years. Civil Case No.98-021 was filed on August 20, 1998, 28 years and eight months from theissuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.


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Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are generalrules on prescription which should give way to the special statute onregistered lands, Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as theProperty Registration Decree. Under the Torrens System as enshrined in

P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issuedbecome incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date ofentry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action fordamages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.[21]

As previously discussed, however, we have allowed actions forreconveyance based on implied trusts even beyond such one-year period, forsuch actions respect the decree of registration as incontrovertible. We

explained this in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.[22]

:

We have ruled before inAmerol vs. Bagumbaranthatnotwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title alreadyissued in the name of another person, he can still be compelledunder the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightfulowner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust forthe real owner by the person in whose name it is registered.After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield andprotect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation andthus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration isrespected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is thetransfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which hasbeen wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person'sname, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a betterright. This is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied orconstructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An

action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructivetrust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance ofthe Torrens title over the property.[23]

As discussed above, Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed more than 28years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427. This period is unreasonablylong for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus,
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petitioners claim that they had not slept on their rights is patently

unconvincing.

As a final note, it should be pointed out that in choosing to file a

Petition for Certioraribefore this Court, petitioners are required to provenothing less than grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court ofAppeals. We have consistently held that certiorari will not be issued to cureerrors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As longas a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in theexercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors ofjudgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civilaction of certiorari.[24] In the case at bar, petitioners proved neither grave

abuse of discretion, nor even a simple error of judgment on the part of theCourt of Appeals. The present petition should, therefore, fail.

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Certiorariis DISMISSED. TheDecision of the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2002 and the Resolutiondated January 16, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68501 are AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 123509. March 14, 2000]

LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES andEMILIO ROBLES,petitioners,vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SpousesVIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OFCARDONA, Inc., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD JR. in hiscapacity as Director of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in hiscapacity as District Land Officer of the Bureau OfLands, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:

To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show thatthey have title to the real property at issue, and that some deed orproceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered realproperty, especially banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titlesof mortgagors and sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure
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to observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may result in thenullity of the mortgage, as well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/orauction sale. Unless the co-ownership is clearly repudiated, a co-ownercannot, by prescription, acquire title to the shares of the other co-owners. Mesm

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the June 15, 1995Decision and the January 15, 1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[1](CA)in CA-GR CV No. 34213.[2]In its Decision, the CA ruled:[3]

"WHEREFORE, the trial courts June 17, 1991 decision isREVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof a new one ishereby entered ordering the dismissal of the plaintiffs-appellees['] second amended complaint."

Earlier, the trial court had disposed as follows: Spped jo

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is herebyrendered as follows:

1. Declaring free patent Title No. IV-1-010021 issued bythe Bureau of Lands as null and void;

2. Ordering the defendant spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth

Santos to deliver the property subject of this case to theplaintiff; and

3. Declaring the heirs of Silvino Robles as the absoluteowner of the land in controversy."

The January 15, 1996 CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion forReconsideration.

The Facts

The present Petition is rooted in a case for quieting of title before theRegional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, filed on March 14, 1988,[4]byPetitioners Lucio Robles, Emeteria Robles, Aludia Robles and Emilio Robles.The facts were narrated by the trial court in this wise:

"There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitivelyowned the land situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal
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with an area of 9,985 square meters. He occupied the sameopenly and adversely. He also declared the same in his name fortaxation purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 17865 (Exh. "I") and paid the corresponding taxes thereon(Exh. "B"). When Leon Robles died, his son Silvino Robles

inherited the land, who took possession of the land, declared itin his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxesthereon. Rtc-spped

"Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de laCruz and his children inherited the property. They took adversepossession of said property and paid taxes thereon. The task ofcultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles whoplanted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on theland. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes totheir co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.

"In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcelof land in the name of Silvino Robles was canceled andtransferred to one Exequiel Ballena (Exh. "19"), father of AndreaRobles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter,Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank,using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the taxdeclaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo Rural Bank(Exh. "17") and later on, was transferred [to] the name ofdefendant Hilario Robles and his wife (Exh. "16"). Calrky

"In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona RuralBank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. Andrea Roblestestified without contradiction that somebody else, not herhusband Hilario Robles, signed the loan papers because HilarioRobles was working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter.

"For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedingswere had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highestbidder during the auction sale in October 1968.

"The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and sothe tax declaration was transferred in the name of defendantRural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank soldthe same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos. Jospped


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"In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage andattempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. OnMay 10,1988, defendant spouses Santos took possession of theproperty in question and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names."[5]

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case asfollows:

"The instant action for quieting of title concerns the parcel ofland bounded and more particularly described as follows: Sd-aad-sc

"A parcel of land located at Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong,Rizal. Bounded [i]n the north by the property of VenancioAblay y Simeon Ablay; [i]n the east by the property ofVeronica Tulak y Dionisio Ablay; [i]n the south by theproperty of Simeon Ablay y Dionisio Ablay; and [i]n thewest by the property of Dionisio Ablay y Simeon Ablay,with an area of 9,985 square meters, more or less,assessed in the year 1935 at P60.00 under Tax DeclarationNo. 23219.

"As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited the above-described parcel from Leon Robles, the siblings Lucio, Emeteria,Aludia and Emilio, all surnamed Robles, commenced the instant

suit with the filing of their March 14, 1988 complaint againstSpouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the Rural Bank ofCardona, Inc. Contending that they had been in possession ofthe land since 1942, the plaintiff alleged, among other matters,that it was only in September of 1987 that they came to know ofthe foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted thereonby the half-brother, Hilario Robles, in favor of defendant RuralBank; and that they likewise learned upon further inquiry, thatthe latter had already sold the self-same parcel in favor of theSantos spouses (pp. 1-3, orig. rec.). Twice amended to impleadHilario Robles (pp. 76-80, orig. rec) and, upon subsequentdiscovery of the issuance of Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favorof the defendant spouses, the Director of Lands and the DistrictLand Officer of the Bureau of Lands as parties-defendants (pp.117-121, orig. rec). The plaintiffs complaint sought the followingreliefs on the theory that the encumbrance of their half-brother,constituted on the land, as well as all proceedings takensubsequent thereto, were null and void, to wit:
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ousted from their possession in 1988 by the spousesVergel and Ruth Santos.

"Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that"open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable

public lands for the period prescribed by law (30 years),creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completionof the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need ofjudicial or other action, ceases to be public land andbecomes private property. Possession of public land x x xwhich is [of] the character and duration prescribed by thestatute is the equivalent of an express grant from theState, considering the dictum of the statute itself[:]; "Thepossessor x x x shall be conclusively presumed to haveperformed all the conditions essential to a governmentgrant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." Noproof is admissible to overcome a conclusivepresumption[,] and confirmation proceedings would be alittle more than a formality, at the most limited toascertaining whether the possession claimed is of therequired character and length of time. Registrationthereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize atitle already vested. (Cruz v. IAC, G.R. No. 75042,November 29, 1988) The land in question has becomeprivate land.

"Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to theSpouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos is not validbecause at the time the property subject of this case wasalready private land, the Bureau of Lands having nojurisdiction to dispose of the same." (pp. 257-259, orig.rec.)"

"Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Santos spouses andthe defendant Rural Bank jointly filed their July 6, 1991 Notice ofAppeal (p.260, orig. rec.) x x x."[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners nolonger had any title to the subject property at the time they instituted theComplaint for quieting of title. The CA ratiocinated as follows: Mis spped
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"As correctly urged by the appellants, the plaintiff-appellees nolonger had any title to the property at the time of the institutionof the instant complaint. (pp. 25-27, rec.) The latters claim ofcontinuous possession notwithstanding (pp. 3-5, TSN, July 5,1990; p. 12, TSN, July 12, 1990), the aforesaid loss of title is

amply evidenced by the subsequent declaration of the subjectrealty for taxation purposes not only in the name of ExequielBallena (Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 23-24, orig. rec.) but also inthe name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo (Exhibit 17, vol. II, orig.rec.). On the theory that tax declarations can be evincive of thetransfer of a parcel of land or a portion thereof (Gacos v. Courtof Appeals, 212 SCRA 214), the court a quo clearly erred insimply brushing aside the apparent transfers [which] the land inlitigation had undergone. Whether legal or equitable, it cannot,under the circumstances, be gainsaid that the plaintiff-appelleesno longer had any title to speak of when Exequiel Ballenaexecuted the November 7, 1966 Deed of Absolute Saletransferring the land in favor of the spouses Hilario and AndreaRobles (Exhibit "3", p. 25, orig. rec.)

"Even on the theory that the plaintiffs-appellees and their half-brother, Hilario Robles, are co-owners of the land left behind bytheir common father, Silvino Robles, such title would still beeffectively discounted by what could well serve as the latters

acts of repudiation of the co-ownership,i.e., his possession (p.22, TSN, November 15, 1990) and declaration thereof for

taxation purposes in his own name (Exhibit "4", p. 26, orig.rec.). In view of the plaintiffs-appellees inaction for more thantwenty (20) years from the time the subject realty wastransferred in favor of Hilario Robles, the appellants correctlymaintain that prescription had already set in. While it may bereadily conceded that an action to quiet title to property in thepossession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible (Almanza vs.Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718; Coronel vs. Intermediate AppellateCourt, 155 SCRA 270; Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133SCRA 718; Charon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA784; Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441; Burton vs. Gabar,55 SCRA 4999), it equally bears emphasis that a co-owner or,for that matter, the said co-owner[']s successors-in-interest whooccupy the community property other than as co-owner[s] canclaim prescription as against the other co-owners (De Guzmanvs. Austria, 148 SCRA 75; Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Africavs. Africa, 42 Phil. 902; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; DeCastro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). If only in this latter sense, the


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appellants correctly argue that the plaintiffs-appellees have losttheir cause of action by prescription.

"Over and above the foregoing considerations, the court a quogravely erred in invalidating the real estate mortgage constituted

on the land solely on the basis of Andrea Robles testimony thather husbands signature thereon was forged (p. 257, orig. rec.),

xxx xxx xxx

"In according to the foregoing testimony x x x credibility which,while admittedly unrebutted, was altogether uncorroborated, thetrial court lost sight of the fact that the assailed deed of realestate mortgage (Exhibit "5", Vol. II, orig. rec.) is a publicdocument, the acknowledgment of which is aprimafacie evidence of its due execution (Chua vs. Court of Appeals,206 SCRA 339). As such, it retains the presumption of validity inthe absence of a full, clear and convincing evidence to overcomesuch presumption (Agdeppa vs. Ibe, 220 SCRA 584). Maniks

"The foregoing principles take even more greater [sic] when it is,moreover, borne in mind that Hilario Robles made the followingadmissions in his March 8, 1989 answer, viz:

"3. The complaint filed against herein answering defendanthas no legal basis considering that as the lawful owner of

the subject real property, defendant Hilario Robles has theright to mortgage the said real property and could disposethe same in whatever manner he wishe[s] to do." (p. 96,orig. rec.)

"Appropriately underscored by the appellants, the foregoingadmission is binding against Hilario [Robles]. Judicial admissions,verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in thecourse of the trial or other proceedings in the same case areconclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same. Theycannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through[a] palpable mistake or [unless] no such admission was actuallymade (Philippine American General Insurance, Inc. vs. SweetLines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194).

"It does not help the plaintiffs-appellees cause any that, asidefrom complying with the requirements for the foreclosure of thesubject real estate mortgage (Exhibits "6", "7", "8" and "10",


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Volume II[)], the appellant Rural Bank had not only relented tothe mortgagors request to postpone the (Exhibit "g", Vol. II,orig. rec.) but had likewise granted the latters request for an

extension of the redemption period therefor (Exhibits "11" and"12", pp. 35-36, orig. rec.). Without going into minute detail in

discussing the Santos spouses rights as purchasers for valueand in good faith (Exhibit "21", Vol. II, orig. rec.), the mortgagorand the plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard to challengethe validity of the sale of the land after admittedly failing toredeem the same within the extension the appellant Rural Bankgranted (pp. 10-11, TSN, November 15, 1990).

"Being dependent on the supposed invalidity of the constitutionand foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage, theplaintiffs-appellees attack upon x x x Free Patent No. IV-I mustnecessarily fail. The trial court, therefore, misread, and ignoredthe evidence o[n] record, to come up with erroneousconclusion." Manikx

Contending that such ruling was contrary to law and jurisprudence,Petitioners Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio -- all surnamed Robles -- filedthis Petition for Review.[7]

The Assigned Error

Petitioners ascribe the following error to the respondent court:

"Respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling that withthe transfers of the tax declaration over the parcel of land inquestion from Silvino Robles to Exequiel Ballena, then to theRural Bank of Antipolo, then to Respondent Hilario Robles, thento Respondent Rural Bank of Cardona Inc., and then finally toRespondent Spouses Santos, petitioners, who by themselves andtheir predecessors in interest have been in open, actual andadverse possession of said parcel of land since 1916 up to theirforced removal therefrom in 1988, have lost their title to saidproperty by prescription to their half-brother, Respondent HilarioRobles, and then finally, to Respondent Spouses Santos."[8]

For a better understanding of the case, the above issue will be broken downinto three points: first, the nature of the remedy of quieting of title; second,the validity of the real estate mortgage; and third, the efficacy of the freepatent granted to the Santos spouses. Spped
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First Issue: Quieting of Title

Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest

therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effectivebut is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable orunenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an actionmay be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.

"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from beingcast upon title to real property or any interest therein."

Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a common-lawremedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title toreal property.[9]It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legalor an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subjectmatter of the action.[10]Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceedingthat is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in factinvalid or inoperative despite itsprima facieappearance of validity or legalefficacy.[11]

That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is valid andefficacious is clear in the present case. Petitioners allege that their title asowners and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the tax

declaration and, subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to SpousesVergel and Ruth Santos. The more important question to be resolved,however, is whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will entitlethem to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title. Nexold

Petitioners anchor their claim to the disputed property on their continuedand open occupation and possession as owners thereof. They allege thatthey inherited it from their father, Silvino, who in turn had inherited it fromhis father, Leon. They maintain that after their fathers death, they agreedamong themselves that Petitioner Lucio Robles would be tending andcultivating it for everyone, and that their half-brother Hilario would bepaying the land taxes.

Petitioners insist that they were not aware that from 1962 until 1987, thesubject property had been declared in the names of Exequiel Ballena, theRural Bank of Antipolo, Hilario Robles, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., andfinally, Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. Maintaining that as co-owners ofthe subject property, they did not agree to the real estate mortgage
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constituted on it, petitioners insist that their shares therein should not havebeen prejudiced by Hilarios actions.Miso

On the other hand, Private Respondents Vergel and Ruth Santos trace theirclaim to the subject property to Exequiel Ballena, who had purportedly sold

it to Hilario and Andrea Robles. According to private respondents, the Roblesspouses then mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. -- not as co-owners but as absolute owners -- in order to secure an agricultural loanworth P2,000. Upon their failure to pay their indebtedness, the mortgagewas foreclosed and the property sold to the bank as the highest bidder.Thereafter, private respondents purchased the property from thebank. Sppedjo

Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been occupied by Leonand later by Silvino Robles, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, asevidenced by the different tax declarations issued in their names. Alsoundisputed is the fact that the petitioners continued occupying andpossessing the land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they wereallegedly ousted therefrom in 1988. In 1962, the subject property wasdeclared in the name of Exequiel for taxation purposes. On September 30,1965, it was again declared in the same name; on October 28, 1965, in thename of the Rural Bank of Antipolo; on November 7, 1966, in the name ofHilario and Andrea; and thereafter, in the name of the Rural Bank ofCardona and, finally, in the name

Documents

Cases on Quieting of Title