reconstitution of title cases

G.R. No. 107903.May 22, 1995.*MARILOU RIVERA, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF CLAUDIO GABALONES AND BENITA ROLDAN, respondents.Evidence;Land Titles;Ownership;Tax Declarations;A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.Petitioner anchors her claim on the alleged titles of her predecessors-in-interest, i.e., that the land was initially sold by deceased Gabalones spouses to Generoso Reyes, who sold it to spouses Taio and Leron, who later sold the same to her. Petitioner also introduced in evidence two (2) deeds of sale covering the subject lot: the first deed was executed between Reyes and the Taio spouses, the second deed was executed by the Taio spouses in her favor. Significantly, the deed of sale supposedly made by the Gabalones spouses to Reyes was not presented in the trial court. All that was introduced during the hearing to prove this vital fact was atax declaration in the name of Generoso Reyesfor the year 1948. The respondent court correctly found this proof inadequate. In a number of cases, we have ruled that atax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership._______________*SECOND DIVISION.219VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995219

Rivera vs. Court of Appeals

Same;Same;Same;Prescription;Reconstitution of Titles;Titled land cannot be acquired by prescription; The fact that the title to the lot was lost does not mean that the lot ceased to be a registered land before the reconstitution of its title.We also hold that the respondent court did not err in ruling that petitioner cannot invoke acquisitive prescription considering that the subject land is titled land. Petitioner contends that the subject land was not covered by any title when Reyes acquired it in 1947 up to the time the petition for reconstitution was filed by private respondents in 1989. She submits that prior to the reconstitution of private respondents title, she could acquire it by prescription. We reject this submission. The fact that the title to the lot was lost does not mean that the lot ceased to be a registered land before the reconstitution of its title.Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Words and Phrases;Reconstitution, Explained.Reconstitution is simply the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Indeed,the order granting reconstitution of title confirms the fact that the subject land has been previously registered and covered by a torrens title. As the subject land did not cease to be titled, it cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. To hold otherwise is to wreak havoc on the stability of our torrens system.Same;Same;Same;Words and Phrases;Laches, Defined.Finally, the respondent court rightly rejected petitioners invocation of the equitable principle of laches. Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Laches thus amounts to animplied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them.There is nothing in the records proving that private respondents,despite discovery or knowledge of the successive transfer of their parents land, omitted to assert their claim over it for an unreasonable length of time. In the absence of this proof, laches cannot be applied against private respondents.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Leopoldo M. Consunto, Jr.for petitioner.Vicente R. Redorfor private respondents.220220SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


PUNO,J.:In this petition, we are asked to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 7, 1992,1declaring private respondents as the owners of Lot No. 3876 of the Cadastral Survey of Pagsanjan, Laguna.The petition at bench stems from the complaint to quiet title and for delivery of owners duplicate of reconstituted title filed by petitioner Marilou Rivera against private respondents, heirs of Claudio Gabalones and Benita Roldan, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.The reconstituted title involves a parcel of land with an area of sixty (60) square meters at Pagsanjan, Laguna. This land was originally registered in the name of deceased spouses Claudio Gabalones and Benita Roldan. Allegedly, the Gabalones spouses sold the land to Generoso Reyes in 1947.The deed of sale was not presented to prove the sale. Tax Declaration No. 4304 in the name of the Gabalones spouses appears to have been cancelled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Generoso Reyes for the year 1948.On April 22, 1969, the land was sold by Reyes to spouses Rogelio Taio and Corazon Leron. The transaction was covered by a deed of sale, duly registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna.On February 21, 1977, spouses Taio sold the land to petitioner. The deed of sale executed by the parties was also registered on September 11, 1981.On August 20, 1989, petitioner discovered that Paz Gabalones, one of the heirs of spouses Gabalones (the original owners of the land), filed a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed original title covering the subject land. Notwithstanding, petitioner failed to file an opposition to the petition for reconstitution. The petition was granted and a reconstituted title was issued.Petitioner then filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds which was annotated on the title of_______________1Penned by Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua and concurred by then Associate Justice Jose A.R. Melo and Associate Justice Ricardo P. Galvez; Rollo, pp. 52-60.221VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995221


the land. She also filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, for quieting of title and delivery of the reconstituted title. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SC-2698. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision2declaring petitioner as the absolute owner of the subject land.Aggrieved by the ruling of the trial court, private respondent heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals.On August 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that petitioner had no equitable or legal title over the subject lot. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint ordered DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Laguna is directed to cancel the adverse claim filed by the plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that:IRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE NON-PRESENTATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL OWNERS AND GENEROSO REYES IS FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE PETITIONER.IIRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER CANNOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OVER THE DISPUTED LOT BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE PROPERTY IS TITLED.IIIRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES.________________2Penned by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.222222SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


IVTHE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RTCIN TOTO.We affirm.The respondent court did not err when it ruled that petitioners failure to present the deed of sale evidencing the initial transfer of the subject land from the original owners to Generoso Reyes was fatal. Petitioner anchors her claim on the alleged titles of her predecessors-in-interest, i.e., that the land was initially sold by deceased Gabalones spouses to Generoso Reyes, who sold it to spouses Taio and Leron, who later sold the same to her. Petitioner also introduced in evidence two (2) deeds of sale covering the subject lot: the first deed was executed between Reyes and the Taio spouses, the second deed was executed by the Taio spouses in her favor. Significantly, the deed of sale supposedly made by the Gabalones spouses to Reyes was not presented in the trial court. All that was introduced during the hearing to prove this vital fact was atax declaration in the name of Generoso Reyesfor the year 1948. The respondent court correctly found this proof inadequate. In a number of cases,3we have ruled that atax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.Petitioner cites the case ofBautista v. Court of Appeals,4where it was held that tax declarations are strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession. Petitioners reliance on said case is misplaced. In theBautistacase, the subject lot was anunregistered land. Private respondent del Rio who was applying for registration of a parcel of land asserted ownership over said land_______________3Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court,G.R. No. 74830, July 5, 1993,224 SCRA 285;Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court,G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993,219 SCRA 339;De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 57092, January 21, 1993,217 SCRA 307;Director of Lands v. Buyco,G.R. No. 91189, November 27, 1992,216 SCRA 78.4G.R. No. L-43190, August 31, 1984,131 SCRA 532.223VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995223


and traced the roots of his title to apublic instrument of salein favor of his father from whom he inherited the land. In the case at bench, however,the subject land is covered by a title and has been registered in the name of the original owners, the Gabalones spouses. It is also undisputed that, unlike in theBautistacase,petitioner traces her roots of title to a mere tax declaration in the name of Generoso Reyes. The sale between the Gabalones spouses and Reyes was not satisfactorily established.We also hold that the respondent court did not err in ruling that petitioner cannot invoke acquisitive prescription considering that the subject land is titled land. Petitioner contends that the subject land was not covered by any title when Reyes acquired it in 1947 up to the time the petition for reconstitution was filed by private respondents in 1989. She submits that prior to the reconstitution of private respondents title, she could acquire it by prescription.We reject this submission. The fact that the title to the lot was lost does not mean that the lot ceased to be a registered land before the reconstitution of its title. Reconstitution is simply the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.5Indeed,the order granting reconstitution of title confirms the fact that the subject land has been previously registered and covered by a torrens title. As the subject land did not cease to be titled, it cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription.6To hold otherwise is to wreak havoc on the stability of our torrens system.Finally, the respondent court rightly rejected petitioners invocation of the equitable principle of laches. Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.7Laches thus amounts to animplied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them.8There is_______________5Anciano v. Caballes,No. L-5040, September 29, 1953,93 Phil. 876.6Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529.7Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,23 SCRA 35.8Gutierrez v. Bachrach Motor Co.,105 Phil. 29.224224SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Quibal vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division)

nothing in the records proving that private respondents,despite discovery or knowledge of the successive transfer of their parents land, omitted to assert their claim over it for an unreasonable length of time. In the absence of this proof, laches cannot be applied against private respondents.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa(C.J., Chairman),RegaladoandMendoza, JJ., concur.Judgment affirmed in toto.Notes.It is an elementary principle that the owner of land registered under the Torrens System cannot lose it by prescription. (Bishop vs. Court of Appeals,208 SCRA 636[1992]) Title to registered land is not lost through ignorance. (Jacob vs. Court of Appeals,224 SCRA 189[1993])o0o

No. L-15183.October 30, 1962.IN RE:ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. O-1385, SP. No. 695, BOOK NO.1-5, PATENTEEPAULINO P. GOCHECO,CESARIO GOCHECO, petitioner-appellant,vs.FRANCISCO T. ESTACIO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.Land Titles and Deeds;Petition for issuance of owners duplicate copy of certificate of title; When publication of notice not necessary.Notice of the hearing of a petition for the issuance of an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title need not be published if the complete record of the original of the certificate of title is intact in the Register of Deeds. Likewise, there is no need to first secure the appointment of a legal representative of the estate and the declaration of the lawful heirs of the decedent if the petition, which does not seek the distribution of the estate, comes under the provisions of Section 109 of Act No. 496.APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur. Canonoy,J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Climaco & Azcarragafor petitioner-appellant.Antonio M. Cenizafor oppositors-appellees.PAREDES,J.:Cesario Gocheco is a legitimate son of Paulino P. Gocheco, registered owner of a parcel of land, with improvements, in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. O-1385 of the Register of Deeds for the said province. The owners duplicate279VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962279

Gocheco vs. Estacio

copy of the said original certificate of title was lost, and notwithstanding diligent search to ascertain its whereabouts, the said owners duplicate copy has not been found. However, in the records of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, the original of the above number certificate No. O-1385 of title is found intact and complete in Sp. No. 695, Book No. 1-5patentee Paulino P. Gocheco.On January 18, 1957, Cesario Gocheco, in his capacity as heir of the registered owner, filed a petition before the trial court to require the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur to issue another owners duplicate copy of the O.C.T. No. O-1385, in lieu of the owners copy which was lost, copy of which petition was served to the Register of Deeds, thru the Provincial Fiscal, on April 30, 1957. Francisco T. Estacio and others opposed the petition, claiming that they have been in continuous, peaceful, lawful, public and adverse possession of the property covered by O.C.T. No. O-1385. On June 1, 1957, petitioner replied, stating that the oppositors can not intervene in the petition for want of personality and that to allow them to claim ownership and/or possession of the subject property would defeat and destroy the indefeasibility of title guaranteed and protected by Act No. 496.On June 29, 1957 petitioner appeared in Court and submitted his oral and documentary evidence. Notwithstanding notice of hearing served upon them, the oppositors or their counsel failed to appear. On the same day, however, the trial court entered an order suspending hearing of the petition and required the petitioner to publish within 30 days his petition or to file a testate or intestate proceeding, and to secure the appointment of a legal representative to the estate of registered owner and the ultimate declaration of heirs. For failure of petitioners to comply with the order, on August 23, 1957, the oppositors filed anex-partemotion to dismiss the petition. The Court, instead, on August 24, 1957 gave the petitioner 10 days within which to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed. On September 3, 1957, petitioner filed his constancia manifesting that he was submitting his case, on the evidences adduced in the hearing. On September280280SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gocheco vs. Estacio

9, 1957, the trial court dismissed the petition against which petitioner interposed the present appeal.Petitioner-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in requiring him to publish the petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of O.C.T. No. O-1385; in requiring him to secure the appointment of a legal representative to the estate of the original registered owner, Paulino P. Gocheco and to obtain a judicial declaration of his lawful heirs before giving due course to his petition and (3) in dismissing the petition.The petition is only for the issuance of an owners duplicate copy of O.C.T. No. O-1385, in lieu of the one that was lost. Section 109 of Act No. 496, as amended, provides:SEC. 109. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed or cannot be produced by a grantee, heir, devisee, assignee, or other person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a suggestion of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered. The court may thereupon, upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, after notice and hearing direct the issue of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate for all the purposes of this act.In view of the existence of the complete record in the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, of the original of the certificate of title in question, which appears in Book No. 1-5 of the said Register of Deeds Office (Exh. A) and of the fact that the present petition is not one for reconstitution as provided by Republic Act No. 26, there is no necessity for publishing notice of the hearing thereof. And the petition, coming as it does, under the provisions of Section 109, aforequoted, there is likewise no need to first secure the appointment of a legal representative of the estate and the declaration of the lawful heirs of the deceased Paulino P. Gocheco. The petition does not at all seek the distribution of the decedents estate. The owners duplicate copy to be issued will be only an281VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962281

Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons

owners duplicate copy of the O.C.T. No. O-1385 and the petitioner is a person in interest as he is a legal heir, according to his uncontroverted verified petition.The oppositors-appellees, who had not chosen to file their brief, have no personality to intervene and their grounds of intervention, namely, that they have been in public, continuous, peaceful, adverse and lawful possession of the property is immaterial, impertinent and of no consequence, in the present proceeding. Their claim of ownership or possession of the property can be properly instituted in a separate, independent and ordinary civil action.IN VIEW HEREOF, the order of June 29, 1957 of the Trial Court, appealed from, is set aside, and another entered, directing the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, to issue to the petitioner a new owners duplicate copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. O-1385, in lieu of the owners copy which was lost. With costs on the oppositors-appellees.Bengzon, C.J.,Padilla,Bautista Angelo,Labrador,Concepcion,Reyes, J.B.L.,Barrera,Dizon,RegalaandMakalintal, JJ.,concur.Order set aside.Note.SeeCayanan v. De los Santos,21 SCRA 1348and theannotationon Jurisdiction over Land Registration and Cadastral Cases as Distinguished from the General Jurisdiction of Courts in Ordinary Civil Actions.21 SCRA 1353-1358.________________

G.R. No. 101690.August 23, 1995.*REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES FERNANDO DAYAO and REMEDIOS NICODEMUS, respondents.Actions;Land Titles;R.A. No. 26;Reconstitution of Title; Reconstitution of title under R.A. No. 26 is an action in rem which means that it is one directed not only against particular persons but against the thing itself.Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 (An Act Providing A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates Of Title Lost Or Destroyed) is an action in rem, which means it is one directed not only against particular persons, but against the thing itself. Its object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make any objection against the right sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is binding theoretically upon the whole world.Same;Same;Same;Same;The jurisdictional requirements of publication, posting and service of notice provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings.The jurisdictional requirements of publication, posting and service of notice are provided in Section 13 of R.A. No. 26. They seek to provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings. Their purpose is to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action and to give them ample time to intervene in the proceeding. They bring in the whole world as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.Same;Same;Same;Same;Elements of the publication requirement under R.A. No. 26.Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove to the trial court two things, namely that: (1) its Order giving due course to the petition for reconstitution and setting it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of the Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. In the case at bench, private respondents were able to show both elements through the certification of the Director of the National Printing Office, a government official who enjoys the undisputed presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. We note that, on the other______________*SECOND DIVISION.552552SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

hand, mere submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would have evidenced only the first element.Same;Same;Same;Same;Official Gazette;Evidence;Best Evidence Rule;What must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the0 content of the Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time publication in successive issues thereof at least thirty days before the hearing date.Petitioners reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous. What must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the content of the Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time publication in successive issues thereof at least thirty days before the hearing date.Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;The Supreme Court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution casesand there is no reason for it to deviate from its earlier rulings and to require now the submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.This court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases. We have, on two separate occasions, adjudicated cases with factual backgrounds similar to the one at bench. In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the parties seeking reconstitution did not submit copies of the Official Gazette in evidence, but merely relied on certifications comparable to the one at bench. In both cases, the granting of reconstitution by the trial court was reversed. But the reversals were not made on the basis of the failure to present the Official Gazette issues. They were, instead, both grounded on the factas clearly evidenced by the National Printing Office Directors certificationthat the publications were made less than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no reason for us to deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement in reconstitution cases.Same;Same;Same;Same;While L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983 mandates the Land Registration Commission Administrator and the Register of Deeds concerned to submit to the court their reports and recommendations regarding the petition for reconstitution, it attaches no concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by said officials.It is true that L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983 mandates the Land Registration Commission Administrator and the Register of Deeds concerned to submit their reports and recommendations regarding the petition for reconstitution to the court. But, it attaches no553VOL. 247, AUGUST 23, 1995553


concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by said officials. It would, thus, be illogical in the case at bench to require such showing by private respondents before their petition may be acted upon.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Roberto S. Dionisiofor private respondents.PUNO,J.:Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,1dated February 28, 1991, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 16, dated October 9, 1989, granting the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-304198.2The facts are undisputed.On March 7, 1987, fire gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On March 16, 1989, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. T-304198, on the ground that its original was among the documents destroyed in the conflagration. The trial court set it for initial hearing through an Order which reads, as follows:WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of the petition be set on September 13, 1989 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.Let a copy of this order be published twice in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette, at the expense of the (private respondents), and that copies thereof be posted by the Deputy Sheriff of this_____________1Through its Sixteenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. (ponente and chairman), Nicolas P. Lapea, Jr., and Fermin A. Martin, Jr.2Also impugned is the August 29, 1991 Order of the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration from the impugned Decision.554554SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Branch at the main entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building at Malolos and on the Municipal Hall of Malolos, Bulacan where the parcel of land covered by the subject title is situated for a period of thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing.Finally, let copies of this order be also sent by registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General, the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, the Bureau of Lands, the Provincial Fiscal, the Register of Deeds, and the boundary owners, in order that they may appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.During the hearing, private respondents submitted in evidence, among others, the following Certification of Publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office:Order relative to LRC No. F-504-84 In Re: Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Burned/Destroyed Original Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-304198, SPS. FERNANDO DAYAO and REMEDIOS NICODEMUS, x x x was published in the Official Gazette, to wit:VOLUMENUMBERPAGESDATE OF ISSUE

8524June 12, 1989

25June 19, 1989

June 19, 1989 issue was released for publication on June 28, 1989.They did not submit nor offer in evidence actual copies of the June 12, 1989 and June 19, 1989 issues of theOfficial Gazette.On October 9, 1989, the trial court issued an Order granting private respondents petition for reconstitution. The Order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 28, 1991. It held:x x xAccording to the Republic, the certification of publication issued by the National Printing Office is not sufficient proof of publication, the best evidence being the presentation of the copies of the Official Gazette where the notice was included.We are not convinced. The certification clearly states that the notice was published in the June 12, 1989 and June 19, 1989 issues of the Official Gazette, the second notice being released for publication on June 28, 1989. Be it stressed that the official acts of public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity and this has not been overcome in this case.555VOL. 247, AUGUST 23, 1995555


Besides, the Official Gazette is an official publication of the government and consequently, We can take judicial notice of its contents in accordance with Section 2, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, as recently amended. Indeed, Our examination readily reveals that the first notice of hearing in this case appeared on page 3908 of Volume 85, No. 24 issue while the second notice appeared on page 4028 of Volume 85, No. 24 issue of the Official Gazette. As the last issue was released for publication on June 28, 1989, as stated in the certification of the National Printing Office, or three months prior to the hearing of September 13, 1989, the requirement of Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 35, which provide that the notice be published at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, was complied with.WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.The motion for reconsideration from the above Decision was denied in a Resolution, dated August 29, 1991.Petitioner now puts forth a single reason for warranting review, viz., that in affirming the Order of the Trial Court granting the petition for reconstitution in LRC No. P-504-89, public respondent Court of Appeals grievously disregarded: (a) the inadequate evidence submitted by private respondents; and the (b) explicit provisions of L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983.3We affirm the Decision.Petitioner argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution of TCT No. T-3041984because private respondents failed to prove actual publication of the trial courts Order setting the petition for initial hearing. Petitioner posits the view that a mere certification of publication is utterly inadequate to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of publication x x x; (t)he best evidence to prove (the fact of publication) is the presentation of the actual copies of the Official Gazette x x x, duly marked and offered as evidence in Court.5We are not persuaded.____________3Petition for Review, p. 9; Rollo, p. 14.4Ibid.5Id., at pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 16-17.556556SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 (An Act Providing A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution OfTorrensCertificates Of Title Lost Or Destroyed) is an actionin rem, which means it is one directed not only against particular persons, but against the thing itself.6Its object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make any objection against the right sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is binding theoretically upon the whole world.7The jurisdictional requirements of publication, posting and service of notice are provided in Section 13 of R.A. No. 26, as follows:Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. x x x The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.They seek to provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings. Their purpose is to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action and to give them ample time to intervene in the proceeding.8They bring in the whole world as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.9Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove to the trial court two things, namely that: (1) its Order giving due course to the petition for reconstitution and setting it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of the Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made_____________6Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 900.7F.D. REGALADO, 1 Remedial Law Compendium, p. 16 (1988).8SeeRepublic v. Court of Appeals,218 SCRA 773(1993).9See Register ofDeeds of Malabon v. RTC of Malabon, MM, Br. 170,181 SCRA 788(1990).557VOL. 247, AUGUST 23, 1995557


at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. In the case at bench, private respondents were able to show both elements through the certification of the Director of the National Printing Office, a government official who enjoys the undisputed presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. We note that, on the other hand, mere submission of the subjectOfficial Gazetteissues would have evidenced only the first element.Petitioners reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous. What must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the content of the Order published in theOfficial Gazette, but the fact of two-time publication in successive issues thereof at least thirty days before the hearing date.This court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases. We have, on two separate occasions, adjudicated cases with factual backgrounds similar to the one at bench. InRegister of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 17010andRepublic v. Court of Appeals,11the parties seeking reconstitution did not submit copies of theOfficial Gazettein evidence, but merely relied on certifications comparable to the one at bench. In both cases, the granting of reconstitution by the trial court was reversed.But the reversals were not made on the basis of the failure to present the Official Gazette issues. They were, instead, both grounded on the factas clearly evidenced by the National Printing Office Directors certificationthat the publications were made less than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no reason for us to deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement in reconstitution cases.Petitioner next argues that private respondents failed to comply with Land Registration Commission (L.R.C.) Circular No. 35, Series of 1983,12particularly Section 13 thereof which reads as follows:____________10Op. cit.11Op. cit.12Petition for Review, p. 19; Rollo, p. 24.558558SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


13. The Court, after considering the report of the Land Registration Commission and comments and findings of the Register of Deeds concerned, as well as the documentary and parole evidence presented by the petitioner, may take such action on the petition as it may deem proper.Petitioner believes that the report of the Administrator of the NALTDRA (now LRCA) and the comments and findings of the Register of Deeds are conditions sine qua non before a petition for reconstitution could be granted so as to forestall, if not eliminate, anomalous or irregular reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title.13Thus, it argues, private respondents failure to show compliance with these requirements is fatal to their petition for reconstitution.We disagree.It is true that L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983 mandates the Land Registration Commission Administrator and the Register of Deeds concerned to submit their reports and recommendations regarding the petition for reconstitution to the court.14But, it attaches no concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by said officials. It would, thus, be illogical in the case at bench to require such showing by private respondents before their petition may be acted upon. More so, in light of the provisions of Section 15 of R.A. No. 26, thus:Sec. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk of court shall forward to the register of deeds a certified copy of said order and all the documents which, pursuant to said order, are to be used as the basis of the reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence or basis to justify the reconstitu-____________13Ibid., at p. 20; Rollo, p. 25.14See Sections 7 and 13, L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983, dated June 13, 1983.559VOL. 247, AUGUST 23, 1995559


tion, the petition shall be dismissed, but such dismissal shall not preclude the right of the party or parties entitled thereto to file an application for confirmation of his or their title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. (Emphasis supplied)IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision, dated February 28, 1991, as well as its Resolution, dated August 29, 1991, are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No costs.SO ORDERED.Regalado,MendozaandFrancisco, JJ.,concur.Narvasa(C.J., Chairman),On leave.Petition denied. Judgment affirmed in toto.Notes.The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he has purchased the property. (Co vs. Court of Appeals,196 SCRA 705[1991])The torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible, should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of the real property. (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals,199 SCRA 113[1991])o0o

No. L-29073.April 18, 1980.*ESPIRITU BUNAGAN, PERPETUA INSO, and GUADALUPE LUMONGSOD, petitioners, vs.BRANCH VI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, FILEMON OMPAD, ARSENIO OMPAD, NAPOLEON OMPAD, and DIONISIA ICONG, respondents.Land Registration;Torrens Certificate of Title;Reconstitution of title under Republic Act No. 26;Purpose of Reconstitution.The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occured.Same;Same;Same;Land Registration Act;Change in the name of the owners of land than the name decreed in the lost or destroyed title sought to be reconstituted constitutes a material change in the certificate of title; Material change in the Certificate of Title should be ventilated in a separate ordinary civil action, not in the proceedings for reconstitution of title.If the certificate of title covering the lot was decreed in the form of Antonio Ompad and Dionisia lcong, as in this case, the reconstituted certificate of title should likewise be in the name of owners as they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. Any change that should be made in the ownership of the property should be the subject of a separate suit. In the instant case, it appears that the petition filed on December 19, 1966 is not merely for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title. Dionisia lcong and her children also wanted the correction of the name of the owners of the lost from Antonio Ompad and Dionisia lcong to spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia lcong which involves a material change in the certificate of title, a change which, not being consented to by the herein petitioners whose interests are affected thereby, cannot be authorized under the summary proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in Republic Act No. 26. A change of this nature raises an issue which should be ventilated and decided in an ordinary civil action.____________*SECOND DIVISION73VOL. 97, APRIL 18, 198073

Bunagan vs. CFI of Cebu, Branch VI

Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Material change in certificate of title not authorized under the summary proceedings for reconstitution under Republic Act No. 26 nor under Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act; When Sec. 112 of the Act availed of.The claim of Dionisia Icong that the change is authorized under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act is without merit. The proceedings authorized in Section 112 could not be availed of in view of the opposition of the herein petitioners, for such proceedings apply only if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.PETITION for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.The facts are stated in the opinion of Court.Pedro T. Garciafor petitioners.Pedro L. Albino & Nicolas Jumapaofor respondents.CONCEPCION JR.,J.:Petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, dated June 17, 1967, in Cadastral Case No. 17, LRC Record No. 946, Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre, directing the reconstitution of the original certificate of title in the name ofspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.as well as the order dated January 4, 1968, denying the motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967, and the original certificate of title issued pursuant thereto.The record shows that on December 19, 1966, the herein private respondents Dionisia Icong and her children named Filemon, Manuel, Arsenio, and Napoleon, all surnamed Ompad, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name ofAntonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, spouses,and once reconstituted, to cancel the same and another one issued in the name ofFilemon Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident of7474SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lapulapu City;Manuel Ompad, widower, of legal age, and resident of Lapulapu City; Arsenio Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident of Lapulapu City;Napoleon Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident of Lapulapu City; andDionisia Icong, surviving spouse of Antonio Ompad, of legal age and resident of Lapulapu City.1The petition was opposed by the herein petitioner, Espiritu Bunagan, upon the ground that he is the owner of the lot in question, having bought the same from Guadalupe Lumongsod and Perpetua Inso, legitimate heirs of the late Antonio Ompad; and that Dionisia Icong is merely a trustee of the lot in behalf of Antonio Ompad.2On April 22, 1967, the petitioners therein moved to dismiss the opposition, contending that the said opposition constitute an adverse claim against the rights of Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong which cannot be entertained by the cadastral court.3Acting upon the petition and the opposition, the cadastral court ruled that it could not entertain the claim of the oppositor which should be ventilated in an ordinary civil action, and gave due course to the petition. After hearing, the court issued an order, dated June 17, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:WHEREFORE, upon payment of the prescribed fees, the Register of Deeds of Lapulapu City is ordered to reconstitute the original certificate of title of Lot No. 1660, Opon Cadastre, located at Basak, Lapulapu City, in the names of the original ownersspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, based on its corresponding plan and technical description, Exhs. P and Q.4Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 was issued in the name ofspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong._____________1Rollo, p. 8.2Id., p. 11.3Id., p. 15.4Id., p. 17.75VOL. 97, APRIL 18, 198075


On November 22, 1967, Espiritu Bunagan filed an urgent motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967 and the original certificate of title No. RO-9675, by substituting, as the registered owners of Lot 1660.Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Iconginstead ofspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icongupon the ground that upon the evidence presented (plan and technical description and the certificate of the Clerk of Court) the lot was adjudicated toAntonio Ompad and Dionisia Icongduring the cadastral proceedings, and not tospouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.5Dionisia Icong filed her opposition thereto on December 8, 1967, claiming that the issuance of the certificate of title in the name ofspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icongis warranted under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act which authorizes alteration or amendment of the title upon proper petition.6On January 4, 1968, the respondent Court issued an order, denying the motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967, saying:Considering that the court, sitting as a cadastral court, did not entertain the claim of the oppositor which, according to then Judge Jose N. Mendoza, may be ventilated in a separate civil action this Court, likewise, cannot entertain the Urgent Motion to Correct Order of Honorable Court dated June 17, 1967 and Entry of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 by the Register of Deeds of Lapulapu City, for the same reason.7Now claiming that the orders dated June 17, 1967 and January 4, 1968 have been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioners have filed the instant recourse to annul and set aside the said orders.There is merit in the petition. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in_____________5Id., p. 24.6Id., p. 32.7Id., p. 35.7676SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


its original form and condition.8The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occured. If the certificate of title covering the lot was decreed in the form of Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, as in this case, the reconstituted certificate of title should likewise be in the name of the owners as they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. Any change that should be made in the ownership of the property should be the subject of a separate suit.9In the instant case, it appears that the petition filed on December 19, 1966 is not merely for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title. Dionisia Icong and her children also wanted the correction of the name of the owners of the lot fromAntonio Ompad and Dionisia Icongtospouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icongwhich involves a material change in the certificate of title, a change which, not being consented to by the herein petitioners whose interests are affected thereby, cannot be authorized under the summary proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in Republic Act No. 26. A change of this nature raises an issue which should be ventilated and decided in an ordinary civil action.10The claim of Dionisia Icong that the change is authorized under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act is without merit. The proceedings authorized in Section 112 could not be availed of in view of the opposition of the herein petitioners, for such proceedings apply only if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.11It would result that the respondent Court committed an error in re-registering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name ofspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong._____________8Vda. de Anciano vs. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875.9Govt. of P. I. vs. Abada, 48 O. G. No. 4, April 1952, p. 1372.10Bachoco vs. Esperancialla,105 Phil. 404.11Enriquez vs. Atienza,100 Phil. 1072and other cases cited therein.77VOL. 97, APRIL 18, 198077


WHEREFORE, the orders of June 17, 1967 and January 4, 1968 are modified in the sense that the petition for reeonstitation is granted only insofar as it orders the reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name ofAntonio Ompad and Dionisia Icongand the Register of Deeds of Lapulapu City is hereby ordered to correct the name of the registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 accordingly.Barredo(Chairman),Antonio,Aquino,SantosandAbad Santos, JJ., concur.Petition grantedNotes.When an area is erroneously included in a relocation survey and in the title subsequently issued, the said inclusion is null and void. The Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act cannot be made a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another. (Vda. de Recinto vs. Inciong,77 SCRA 196).Mangrove lands are not included in the term timber or mineral lands as used in the Revised Administrative Code. (Tongson vs. Director of Forestry,79 SCRA 130).Foreshore lease application pending award is not covered by a presidential ban on grant pf foreshore leases all along Manila Bay towards Cavite and Bataan. (Santulan vs. Executive Secretary,80 SCRA 548).Section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is not different from Section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law, C. A. 141. (Santulan vs. Executive Secretary,80 SCRA 548).Though there is no formal deed of transfer over a piece of land, the fact that a deed of confirmation of applicants title was executed by the heirs of the former owner of the land without opposition whatsoever is enough to prove the transfer of the land to the applicant. (Reyes-Talag vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna,22 SCRA 1388).Registration of titles by owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of Forestry results in an exemption from the pay-7878SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gokongwei, Jr. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission

ment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes. (Director of Forestry vs. Muoz,23 SCRA 1184).Where the title invoked by a party is a reconstituted title and it is not disputed that the Certificate of Title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate has been issued the adverse party may avail of section 19 of Republic Act 26 to prove their rights. (Supio vs. Garde,45 SCRA 429).So long as a decree of registration has not been issued, registration proceedings are still pending for the purposes of the pre-Commonwealth Act 3110, and, when lost or destroyed, must be reconstituted in conformity with said Act. (Villegas vs. Fernando,27 SCRA 1119;Sampedro vs. Director of Lands,27 SCRA 1119).A judicially reconstituted certificate of title has the same validity and legal effect as the original thereof (Section 7, Republic Act No. 26). Unlike in the extrajudicial reconstitution of titles, where there is the statutory reservation that the new title shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the same time it was lost or destroyed (Section 7, Republic Act No. 26)., a judicially reconstituted title, by express provisions of the statute (Section 10, Ibid). shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in Section 2 of Republic Act 26. (Municipality of Legaspi vs. A. L Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.,26 SCRA 218).o0o Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

No. L-22377.November 29, 1968.MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF LEGASPI, petitioner,vs.A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION Co., INC., respondent.Torrens system;Judicial and extrajudicial reconstitution of certificate of title;Validity and legal effect;When reconstitution of liens and other encumbrances may not be allowed.A judicially reconstituted certificate of title has the same validity and legal effect as the original thereof (Sec. 7, Rep. Act No. 26). Unlike in the extrajudicial reconstitution of titles, wherein there is the statutory reservation that the new title "shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the same time it was lost or destroyed" (Sec. 7, Rep. Act No. 26), a judicially reconstituted title, by express provisions of the statute (Sec. 10,Ibid),"shall not be subject to the encumbrance" referred to in section 2 of Republic Act 26. Evidently, the statute would not ordinarily allow the reconstitution of liens and other encumbrancesnotnoted in the judicially reconstituted owner's certificate of title (Philippine National Bankv.De la Via, L-14601, Aug. 31, 1960).Same;Judicial reconstitution of title;Nature of proceedings;How jurisdiction to hear and decide petition for reconstitution of title is acquired.Proceedings for judicial reconstitution of certificate of title arein remand as such no individual notice need be sent to any particular person who has an interest in the property covered by the title; and failure to send such notice would not amount to a jurisdictional defect. The219VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968219

Municipality (now City) of Legazpi vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.

land registration or cadastral court acquires jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition for reconstitution of an owner's title upon compliance with the required posting of notices and the publication in the Official Gazette (Philippine National Bankv.De la Via,supra; Cf.Wright, Jr.v.Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-18904, July 11, 1964; Archesv.Billanes, L-20452, April 30, 1965).Same;Torrens title;Right of registered owner to recover possession at any time;When restoration of possession to registered owner may not be granted;Relief available where property covered by Torrens title have long been converted into, and used as, public road;Conflict between right of registered owner and public interest; Appropriate solution;Case at bar.Where the property (registered under the Torrens system) sought to be recovered, have long been converted into, and used as, a public road, the problem of recovery thereof thus gives rise to a matter of public interest. Fortunately, it is not a new one in this jurisdiction. The appropriate solution was indicated in the leading case of Alfonsov.Pasay City where this Court held: "In the present case, Alfonso remains up to now the owner of the land in question, Lot No. 4368 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, because being registered land, the City of Pasay or its predecessor, Municipality of Pasay, did not and could not acquire it thru prescription. As registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land. However, said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for the City of Pasay to make due compensation, which it could and should have done years ago since 1925" (106 Phil. 1017, 1022 [1960]).In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has given the petitioner a period of one year within which to expropriate the portion occupied by the road if it does not want to return the portion in question to the respondent, ALATCO.PETITION f or review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.City Fiscal Aquilino P. BontoandAssistant City Fiscal E. V. Serrafor petitioner.Ramon C. Fernandezfor respondent.FERNANDO,J.:There is a need for an inquiry into the jural consequences attaching to the reconstitution of a title in this petition for the review of a decision of the Court of Ap-220220SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


peals. The case had its origin in an action before the Court of First Instance of Albay a complaint being filed by now respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. for the recovery of the possession of a piece of land against the Province of Albay, the Municipality of Legaspi, and twenty-four private individuals occupying portions thereof. Earlier, it was shown that said respondent, as plaintiff, filed a petition for the reconstitution of its Transfer Certificate of Title covering said lot on the ground that it lost its previous title. It was successful, the Court of First Instance of Albay issuing an order authorizing such reconstitution. The reconstitution notwithstanding, one of the defendants, and now sole appellant, petitioner City of Legaspi, did not surrender possession. Hence the filing of such complaint. Respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. as plaintiff, was unsuccessful, its complaint for the recovery having been dismissed.It elevated the matter on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the lower court, declaring that the reconstituted certificate of title "is valid and that [respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.] is the registered owner of Lot No. 1114 of the Legaspi Cadastre."1The City of Legaspi in turn instituted a petition for certiorari to review such decision of the Court of Appeals. On the facts as found by it, which we are not at liberty to alter, we sustain the Court of Appeals.What were the facts as found by the Court of Appeals? According to its decision now under review: "We note that the issues raised and the evidence adduced on behalf of appellee city and even the findings of the trial court relate to the acquisition or ownership of the lot, its alleged registration as a result of a cadastral survey and hearing, and the reconstitution of the title to the land. Since,________________1Decision of the Court of Appeals, Annex A, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 22. In a resolution dated January 22, 1964, acting on a motion for reconsideration of respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., the Court of Appeals modified this decision by ordering now petitioner City of Legaspi to pay plaintiff P200.00 a year as rental beginning January, 1948.221VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968221


however, the fact of reconstitution is not in dispute, there is no need in this action to go into the question of acquisition or ownership of the property or to determine whether the reconstituted title thereof was obtained in bad faith or in a fraudulent manner. In fact, as far as the reconstitution is concerned, it is unsafe for this Court at this instance to make any finding as to whether it was procured in bad faith or fraudulently since the record of the reconstitution proceeding is not before us; besides there is the presumption of regularity in the granting of the reconstituted title."2To show why the appeal of respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. from the decision of the lower court was meritorious, the Court of Appeals referred to the applicable statutory provision which leaves no doubt that the reconstituted certificate of title has the same validity and legal effect as the original thereof.3The force to which such statutory language is entitled was clearly set forth in the leading case of Philippine National Bank v. De la Via,4where this Court, speaking through Justice J. B. L. Reyes, stated: "It appears that prior to the institution of these proceedings with the court below, there had already been a judicial reconstitution of the original certificates of title upon petition of the registered owner. Unlike in the extrajudicial reconstitution of titles, wherein there is the statutory reservation that the new title 'shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the same time it was lost or destroyed' (Sec. 7, Republic________________2Ibid,p. 20.3Section 7, Republic Act 26, provides: "Reconstituted certificates of title shall have the same validity and legal effect as the originals thereof:Provided, however,That certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner stated in sections five and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the properly was duly noted in the original, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which has not been made on the reconstituted certificate of title. This reservation shall be noted as an 'encumbrance on the reconstituted certificate of title."4L-14601, August 31, 1060.222222SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Act No. 26), a judicially reconstituted title, by express provisions of the statute (Sec. 10,ibid),'shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in sectionTof the Act. Evidently, the statute would not ordinarily allow the reconstitution of liens and other encumbrances not noted in the judicially reconstituted owner's certificate of title."Even the objection based on procedure on due process grounds could not prosper for as clearly set forth in the above decision: "While it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to the petitioner bank when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. The proceedings therein beingin rem,the cadastral court acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for the reconstitution of the owner's title upon compliance with the required posting of notices and publication in the Official Gazette."5With the above conclusive pronouncement of this Court to which, as was to be expected, the Court of Appeals paid deference, the first three assigned errors of the City of Legaspi, the sole appellant, could thus be disposed of. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the fact of reconstitution of title to the land in question is not in dispute, in concluding that the proceedings before the lower court was not in the nature of a direct attack on the legality of the issuance of the reconstituted title, and in declaring respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. as the owner of Lot No. 1114 on the basis of the reconstituted title. As the fourth error deals with the alleged "overwhelming evidence" to rebut the presumption of legality in the issuance of the reconstituted title is factual, it cannot be inquired into in this petition for review.Necessarily, likewise, the fifth alleged error to the effect that petitioner should vacate the premises within a_________________5Ibid. Cf.Wright, Jr. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.,L-18904, July 11, 1964;Arches v, Billanes,L-20452, April 30, 1965.223VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968223


period of one year and to pay damages would be unavailing. It may require further reservation though. The ably written brief of petitioner, represented by City Fiscal Aquilino P. Bonto, "emphasized that the land in dispute is now a public road (Quezon Avenue) making up one of the vital arteries of commerce and trade in Legaspi City. It is the principal outlet to and from the Pier Area where vessels both coastwise and unload their cargoes; from the Pier Area it leads to the market and the commercial sector of the City; and from various points it is the most convenient road to the Post Office, the frontage of which abuts the land in litigation. Ordering the petitioner to vacate the property would in effect cut off access to the areas of trade and commerce, thereby adversely affecting the economic potential of petitioner and its inhabitants. Generally the closing of the road would otherwise create serious inconvenience to vehicular pedestrian traffic to which Quezon Avenue has been devoted since 1947, or a period of seventeen years."6Such a problem thus gives rise to a matter of public interest. Fortunately, it is not a new one in this jurisdiction. The appropriate solution was indicated in the leading case of Alfonso v. Pasay City where this Court, through Justice Montemayor, held: "In the present case, Alfonso remains up to now the owner of the land in question, Lot No. 4368 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, because being registered land, the City of Pasay or its predecessor, Municipality of Pasay, did not and could not acquire it thru prescription. As registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land. However, said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for the City of Pasay to make due compensation, which it could and should have done years ago since 1925."7That respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.________________6Brief for the Petitioner, p. 13.7106 Phil. 1017, 1022 (1960).224224SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rileco, Inc. vs. Mindanao Congress of Labor-Ramie United Farm Workers? Association

with an equally well-written brief prepared by its counsel, Atty. Ramon C. Fernandez, is not insensible to such a solution is indicated therein, where the following is set forth: "In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has given the petitioner a period of one year within which to expropriate the portion occupied by the road if it does not want to return the portion in question to the respondent, ALATCO."8It is thus obvious why the last assignment of error is equally not persuasive.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals of November 18, 1963, as modified by its resolution of January 22, 1964, is affirmed. Without costs.Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon,Makalintal,Zaldivar,SanchezandCastro, JJ.,concur.Capistrano, J.,did not take part.Decision affirmed.

No. L-31885.December 27, 1982.*THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO-BENGUET, BRANCH III, HONORABLE FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, and MARIA LORETO DIAZ, respondents.Civil Law;Land Registration;Section 112 of Act 496;Proceedings in Sec. 112 summary in nature and allowable only when issues in pleadings are insubstantial and the case is not controversial.In the case of Sangalang vs. Caingat, 25 SCRA 180, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that the proceedings under Section 112 of Act No. 496 are summary in nature and are allowed only when a scrutiny of the allegations discloses that the issues presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The relief provided in said section can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest, for otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs and because controversies arising after the entry of the original decree of registration are beyond the limited authority of a land registration court to pass upon.Same;Same;Same;Petition for insertion of the civil status of a person and other personal circumstances in the certificate of title should be threshed out in a proper proceeding; Section 112 of Act 496 and Art 411 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court partake of summary proceedings and contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes only clerical in nature and not those affecting civil status or citizenship which can be granted only in an adversary suit.In the case at bar, there is no question about the controversial nature of the petition before the respondent court. The civil status and more importantly, the citizenship of Chaoli should be threshed out in a proper proceeding where all the persons who may be affected therein are notified and represented. Section 112 of Act No. 496 is similar to the proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which calls for correction of mere clerical, innocuous or harmless error in a per-_______________*FIRST DIVISION406406SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet

sons certificate of birth. The proceedings therein are summary in nature and contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical in nature, but certainly not controversial issues, such as citizenship. Corrections of substantial errors such as those that affect civil status or citizenship cannot be granted except only in an adversary suit.Same;Same;Same;Petition to insert civil status and citizenship in an administrative case not an adversary suit; Case at bar.Administrative Case No. 1426, re-petition to insert civil status and other personal circumstances in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 of the Benguet Registry of Deeds is not an adversary suit. It is not a proper action in which an alleged omission regarding civil status and citizenship may be inserted. There was no issue, dispute or controversy between contending parties which the lower court was called upon to decide. The mere naming of the Benguet Registry of Deeds and the Solicitor General, as respondents, did not ipso facto convert the same into an adversary suit.PETITION for review on certiorari the orders of the Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet, Br. III. Chanco,J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Solicitor Generalfor petitioner.Virgilio F. Bautistafor private respondent.RELOVA,J.:On December 9, 1969, respondent Maria Loreto Diaz, as the surviving legitimate child of the late Chaoli, filed with respondent court a petition for the insertion in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324, after the registered owners name CHAOLI, the following phrase and words Filipino citizen, of legal age, widow and a resident of Gumatdang, Itogon, Benguet Province, which phrase and words do not appear and/or are not contained in the aforementioned Original Certificate of Title No. 1324.Petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province, entered its oral opposition to the petition. After the hearing on March 2, 1970, respondent court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:407VOL. 119, DECEMBER 27, 1982407


WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Benguet is hereby ordered to amend the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324, in such a manner that after the word and name CHAOLI the following phrase Filipino Citizen, of legal age, widow and a resident of Gumatdang, Itogon, Benguet Province, be inserted in the said certificate of title upon payment by the Petitioner (herein private respondent) of the necessary fees in accordance with law. This Court, before the finalization of this Order, welcomes as stated previously any authorities which the Fiscal may submit and which may aid this Court to reverse this Order. Let the Original Certificate of Title be returned to the Petitioner and/or her counsel for the above-stated purpose.Petitioner Republic filed with respondent court a motion for reconsideration of the latters order, dated March 2, 1970, on the ground that there is no action or proceeding provided for by law for the judicial declaration of the citizenship or status of a person, and that the petition states no cause of action.Respondent court, for lack of merit, denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with prayer that the orders, dated March 2, 1970 and March 24, 1970, in Administrative Case No. 1426, B. L. No. F-49844, Patent No. 16499, of respondent Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet, be set aside and that the petition for respondent Maria Loreto Diaz in said case, be dismissed.Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) in exercising jurisdiction over the petition filed before it and in finding that petitioner herein had a cause of action; and, (2) in ordering the amendment of Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 which, in effect declared private respondents mother a Filipino, when there is no proceedings available for the purpose of obtaining such a declaration of citizenship.It is the position of the petitioner Republic that the petition in the lower court partakes of the nature of a summary proceeding where the parties affected were not notified and afforded protection on whatever interest they have; and that the insertions sought in the Certificate of Title are controversial, and such being the case, respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition in said summary proceeding.408408SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


On the other hand, the respondents contend that pursuant to Section 112 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, respondent court is legally vested with power to act as a land registration court; that pursuant also to said Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, private respondent Maria Loreto Diaz, as the only surviving legitimate child of Chaoli, filed with respondent court a petition to insert the civil status and other personal circumstances of Chaoli in OCT No. 1324 (Free Patent); and that the citizenship, civil status and other personal circumstances of the late Chaoli are not in issue in the case, inasmuch as the same had already been considered in the administrative proceedings which resulted in the issuance of said certificate of title in the name of the late Chaoli.We find merit in the petition. In the case ofSangalang vs. Caingat,25 SCRA 180, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that the proceedings under Section 112 of Act No. 496 are summary in nature and are allowed only when a scrutiny of the allegations discloses that the issues presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The relief provided in said section can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest, for otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs and because controversies arising after the entry of the original decree of registration are beyond the limited authority of a land registration court to pass upon.In the case at bar, there is no question about the controversial nature of the petition before the respondent court. The civil status and more importantly, the citizenship of Chaoli should be threshed out in a proper proceeding where all the persons who may be affected therein are notified and represented. Section 112 of Act No. 496 is similar to the proceeding under Article 412 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which calls for correction of mere clerical, innocuous or harmless error in a persons certificate of birth. The proceedings therein are summary in409VOL. 119, DECEMBER 27, 1982409


nature and contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical in nature, but certainly not controversial issues, such as citizenship. Corrections of substantial errors such as those that affect civil status or citizenship cannot be granted except only in an adversary suit.Administrative Case No. 1426, re-petition to insert civil status and other personal circumstances in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 of the Benguet Registry of Deeds is not an adversary suit. It is not a proper action in which an alleged omission regarding civil status and citizenship may be inserted. There was no issue, dispute or controversy between contending parties which the lower court was called upon to decide. The mere naming of the Benguet Registry of Deeds and the Solicitor General, as respondents, did notipso factoconvert the same into an adversary suit.WHEREFORE, the Orders, dated March 2, 1970 and March 24, 1970, in Administrative Case No. 1426 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet are SET ASIDE and the petition of private respondent Maria Loreto Diaz to insert the civil status and other personal circumstances of her mother Chaoli in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 of the Benguet Registry of Deeds is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.Plana,VasquezandGutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.Teehankee, J., reserves his votes.Melencio-Herrera, J., in the result.Orders set aside.Notes.The failure to perform all conditions essential to a government grant of a portion of a public domain does not entitle the applicant to confirmation of an imperfect title. (Director of Lands vs. Datu,115 SCRA 25.)A decree of registration can no longer be impugned even on the ground of fraud after the lapse of one year from its issuance. (Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals,115 SCRA 63.)410410SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Although the general rule is that a land registration court has no power to decide cases involving issues properly litigated in ordinary actions, yet inasmuch as in this jurisdiction it is the courts of first instance that also function as courts of land registration, our jurisprudence recognizes exceptions to said rule, where the parties have acquiesced in submitting the issues for determination in the registration proceedings and they were given full opportunity to present their respective sides and submit their evidence. (Franco vs. Monte de Piedad,L-17610, April 22, 1963.)It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters (La Urbana vs. Bernardo,62 Phil. 790.)There is a distinction between voluntary and involuntary registration. In involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like, an entry thereof in the day book is sufficient notice to all persons even if the owners duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds. On the other hand, in voluntary registration, an innocent purchaser for value becomes the registered owner the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owners duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform, (Levin vs. Bass,91 Phil. 420;Potenciano vs. Dineros,97 Phil. 196.)o0o

No. L-45168.January 27, 1981.*THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and DEMETRIA STA. MARIA VDA. DE BERNAL, respondents, GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT_______________*FIRST DIVISION371VOL. 102, JANUARY 27, 1981371

Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals

CORP., intervenor, ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORP. and RAMON D. BAGATSING, intervenors.Land Registration;In successive registration, the person with the prior certificate is entitled to the estate.In successive registration, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in the land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived, directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly coyer the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continue to hold the title.Same;Jurisdiction;Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution and by law.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.Same;Same;Where the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied with. In petition for reconstitution of title under R.A. 26 the procedural requirements, especially the statements in the petition of and the giving of notices to, persons in possession of the property in litis, and with claims thereto, should be strictly complied with, otherwise the entire proceeding is utterly void.To ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into (Auyong vs. Hon. Court of Tax Appeals, L-25181, Jan. 11, 1967, 19 SCRA 10). In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and must strictly be complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void (Caltex, et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-28472, April 30 1968 23 SCRA 492). So that where there is defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, L-27443, July 19, 1971, 40 SCRA 37). And when the courta quolacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects (Development Bank372372SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


of the Phils. Employees Union vs. Juan Perez, L-22584 and L-23083, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 179, 187). Further, absent jurisdiction the court cannot pass upon the merits of the petition (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220, 224).Same;Same;Same.In the case at bar, the jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance is conferred upon it by Republic Act 26 entitled An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed, approved on September 25, 1946. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can act on the petition and grant to the petitioner the remedy sought for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The petition for reconstitution must allege the jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must also be published and posted in particular places and the same sent to specified persons.Same;Same;Same.In the Notice of Hearing of the amended petition, copies of the Notice were required to be posted only in the bulletin board of the Provincial Capitol of Rizal and on Lots 1 and 3. The Notice now omits the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Rizal which the Court order of December 7, 1970 had specifically directed. Likewise, in said Notice of Hearing of the Amended Petition, no person was named to whom copies of the Notice should be sent by registered mail so that the names of Manuela Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, the Director of Lands, the Land Registration Commissioner, the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, and the Office of the Solicitor General were now omitted, whereas the order of the Court required notices to the alleged boundary owners, namely: Manuela Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, Atty. Casiano P. Laguihon, and Atty. Josefina Nepomuceno.Same;Same;Same.And since the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the same data does not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconsideration and Section 13 which similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of373VOL. 102, JANUARY 27, 1981373


obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition should not be granted is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication and posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We have pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the requirements for publication and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court.Same;Same;Same.The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose. M. Moya, et al.,suprais rightly so because one who seeks the reconstitution of his title to property is duty-bound to know who are the occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an interest in the property involved, specially where the property is so vast and situated in a suitable residential and commercial location, where buildings and improvements have been or are being constructed openly and publicly. As stated earlier, indispensable parties have appeared, claiming ownership, possession, and valuable interests in the property, which are not only numerous but also patently conspicuous that private respondent cannot fiegn ignorance, much less unawareness, nor blindness as to their existence on her or within her claimed property.Same;Supreme Court;Evidence;Appeal;The Final Report of the Bureau of Lands on the relocation survey is admitted, on appeal/petition for certiorari, as evidence of the Supreme Court.We accept and approve this Final Report on the relocation verification survey ordered by Us on the properties in question, further admitting the same as evidence of this Court. Private respondent was given all the opportunity to attend and participate in said survey and inspite of due notice to her of the time and place of the survey, she manifested no interest in the same. On the contrary, she preferred to stand pat on the certification of the Land Registration Commissioner that there was no conflict of the boundaries as platted and besides she has no financial means to defray her share of the survey cost. We reject these objections of private respondent as without merit.374374SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Same;Same;Same;Waiver;Private respondent, who wanted her alleged title reconstituted, cannot now complain of the propriety of the survey as evidence having refused, and thus waived her right to participate in the survey/relocation.It is too late in the day for private respondent to complain that the survey report is not proper evidence for not having been presented at the trial of the case nor passed upon by the said Court and the Court of Appeals. Private respondent has waived her right to object to said report by refusing to attend and participate in the relocation and verification survey. She is now estopped to claim that they were net furnished copies of the report after the Court directed the parties to secure copies of the same at their expense. She is likewise estopped to claim that she is not bound by the results of said report. The Final Report is evidence obtained by the Supreme Court upon its own authorit

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reconstitution of title cases