Cayat to Gumabon

8/10/2019 Cayat to Gumabon

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Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary orwhimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts,

but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but,in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade ofcivilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs.Provincial Board ofMindoro,supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiarconditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of cer tain members thereof who at presenthave reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of theclassification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in hispossession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-callednative wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the

passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes.It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use ofhighly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, therebyhampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to applyfor all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, uponthe assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, theLegislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must gomeasures of protection and security.

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may beunfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not anargument against the equality of its application.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent ofthe government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of anymember of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this

provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are notalways necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrativeofficials in applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval inRubivs.Provincial Board of Mindoro,supra.) Due process of law means si mply: (1) that there shall be a law

prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall bereasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs.Ling Su Fan, 10Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a

person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property usedin violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs.Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus

delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs.Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power isthe most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the la w of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promotethe health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, developits resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs.Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of

the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of anindividual, the same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to reall obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unificatwith the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino peopa view to a greater Philippines.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the coall measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of

inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeby appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their prowith the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of tr ue equality. It iindeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves incompetitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors aother professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in themultifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a sour

pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the NationaAssembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than toinquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exiswisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forware matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educateChristians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus

suprema est lex.When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practiccertain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer . The private interests of such membmust yield to the paramount interests of the nation ( Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs.Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Ctribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed onof A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have

possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the sonative wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage oflaw. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 o n the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies tequal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the lawviolated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) mugermane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginwhimsical distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant as


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but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief butin a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade ofcivilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board ofMindora, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiarconditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. Itapplies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operationagainst a certain number of non-Christians by re ason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against theequality of its application.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionervs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 78742July 14, 1989

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this preciousresource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place inthe sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being andeconomic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed thisgoal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of

private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specificinjunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the

bondage of the soil."

Facts:

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn landsnot exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their r espective landsdo not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from hisfarmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have beendetermined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because theDepartment of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoteddecree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retentionfrom persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used forresidential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family.And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have

already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by SmLandowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DARAdministrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Reteand/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 2failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now bafrom invoking this right.

The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures ar e not applicable to them because they do not own moseven hectares of agricultural land.

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whoseparate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere

provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoptioState of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and farmworkers, who are landless, to own dire ctly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of otherfarmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and underta

just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Comay prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the pof just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Issue:

Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 22retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657.

Held:

P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the lanowned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation ato be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acqvirtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the governmreceipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cLBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change oownership is contemplated either.

This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by ththereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original


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homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivatesaid homestead."

R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its mostcontroversial provisions.

Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the PresidentialAgrarian Reform Council (PARC) creat ed hereunder, but in no case shall rete ntion by the landowner exceed five(5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following

qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directlymanaging the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead granteesor direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retainthe same areas as long as t hey continue to cultivate said homestead.

All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landownerswho were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted byR.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions areDISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of Agrarian ReformThe subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner NicolasManaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano,

Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation ofpowers, due pr ocess, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private pr operty shall be taken forpublic use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The saidmeasure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide forretention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the otherrequisites of a valid appropriation.

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended forpublic use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where theowner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may

be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the pr ice or other

conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramountauthority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistibledemands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfareof the people is the supreme law.

POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN; TRADITIONAL DISTINCTIONS.There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that

logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. The caseus present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. Textent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there iexercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the ConstitBut where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatevethey may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the poweminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplateda mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the ph

possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmbeneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent do

18. BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; CLASSIFICATION; DEFINEDClassification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certa

particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.

19. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES.; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; CLASSIFICATION;DEFINED.To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based osubstantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limitexisting conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

20. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING.Equal protection simply means that all persons or things simsituated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.

21. POLITICAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; NATURE.Eminent domain is an inherenof the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment

compensation to the owner.

22. ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILED OF.Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where theis willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accep

price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come intassert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rightsthen yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as incase of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

23. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS.Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

24. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION; DEFINED.The term "political question" connotes whmeans in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, und

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which fudiscretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the governmeis concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. (TaaCuenco, 100 Phil. 1101)

25. ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN JUST COMPENSATION; DEFINED.Just compensation defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.


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26. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORD "JUST", EXPLAINED.It has been repeatedly stressed by this Courtthat the measure is not the ta ker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify themeaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the

property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.

27. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPENSABLE TAKING; CONDITIONS.There is compensable takingwhen the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrymust be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legalauthority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated orinjuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as tooust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

28. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSIT NOT NECESSARY WHERE THE EXPROPRIATOR IS THEESTATE.Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessar y for it to make a deposit uponits taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faithof the public is pledged for its payment, and a ll the resources of taxation may be employed in raising theamount."

29. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION THEREOF, ADDRESSED TO THE COURTS OF JUSTICE.The determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may notbe usurped by any other branch or official of the government.

30. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORMLAW; DETERMINATION MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ONLYPRELIMINARY.The determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final

and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16 (f) clearly provides:Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction forfinal determination of just compensation. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminaryunless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right toreview with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is a dmittedly a judicial function.

G.R. No. 192935

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert

any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act ofthe legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the

Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to

establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and

guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powersof government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the severaldepartments.[2]The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and towhich all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.[3]Constitutional doctrines must remain

steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate thsituations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it .[

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5]both of which essentially assail theand constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the PhilippinCommission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioneBiraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 fviolative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitutio n[6]as it us

constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by peEdcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petlegislators)as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 electionthen Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption wslogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity anability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Ordeestablishing thePhilippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).Pertinent provisions of said e

order read:EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnlyenshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officersand employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter,serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and

justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principleand notorious violation of this mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political,economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and

misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector of society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, andundermined the peoples trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certainreports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them bythe filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
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committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their

public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last

elections kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected,he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating andfinding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previousadministration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justicefor all;

WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwiseknown as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President thecontinuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III , President of the Republicof the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby createdthe PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to asthe COMMISSION,which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offendthe moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees,their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the

previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to betaken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will actas an independent collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all thepowers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the AdministrativeCode of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reportedcases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers andhigher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, duringthe previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to thePresident, Congress and the Ombudsman.

In particular, it shall:

a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it willinvestigate;

b) Collect, receive, re view and evaluate evidence related to or r egarding the cases of largescale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, officialor employee of the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations,to produce documents, books, records and other papers;

c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from theSenate and the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committeesthereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated by the Commission;

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, includingthe Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents inrespect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may

be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administeroaths or affirmations as the case may be;

f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness toensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness

under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorialauthorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence oncorruption of public officers and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplicesor accessories, if any, when i n the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there isreasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinentapplicable laws;

h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Departmentof Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for suchassistance and cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions a nd duties;

i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personneldetermined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;

j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary toeffectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure theorderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation ofevidence;

k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection withthe objectives and purposes of this Order.

SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements.x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees.x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts.x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings.x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons.x x x.

SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Anygovernment official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoenaissued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath oraffirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be


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subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may bedealt with in accordance with law.

SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall providethe necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute itsfunctions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, andexpeditiously as possible.

SECTION 12. Office.x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment.x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish itsmission on or before December 31, 2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report.x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment ofthe President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the

prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplementalExecutive Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any pr ovision of this Order is declaredunconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisionshereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity.This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30 thday of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.Executive Secretary

Natur e of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is amere ad hocbody formed under the Office of the President with theprimary task to investigate reports of graft andcorruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices andaccessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to thePresident, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an independent collegial body, it is

essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it conpublic office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under SecChapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as itadjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it cgather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have su

powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a facbody, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an informatiocourts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations orights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys past.

[9]They are usually established by states efrom periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justi

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as oppo

particular event; (3) they are te mporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report coconclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empoweredState.[10]Commissions membersare usually empowered to conduct researc h, support victims, and

policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare tfor prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.[11]

Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo wtribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible fo

against humanity. A form of a re conciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconcil iation Commission of Souththe principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by pa cathartic experience for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliaon judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpAs one writer[12]puts it:

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out byAquino in his inaugural speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean thatthey would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have committed in the past, wehave this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to gounpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again.

The Thr usts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to dunconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments

petitioners in both cases shows t hat they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarizedthe following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of theCongress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
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(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President tostructurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity andefficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which washitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when itvested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and theDepartment of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets forinvestigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as ifcorruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, pastand present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the

consistent and general international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truthcommissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations, which customary practiceforms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the Philippines ismandated to adhere to pursuant to the Decla ration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in

partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populistpropaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish ifcorruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged isof no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on theconstitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute.[13]

In their Consolidated Comment,[14]the respondents, through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral (OSG),essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive orderwith the following arguments:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public officebecause the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherentpower to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in anyevent, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), [15]PresidentialDecree (P.D.) No. 1416[16](as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17]and settled

jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds becausethere is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Officeof the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ),because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erodethe latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it wasvalidly created for laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and preissuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint andCommission (PCAC)by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative PerfEfficiency (PCAPE)by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and GovOperations (PARGO)by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issu

resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file theirrespective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle ofseparation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate fundsfor public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsmanand the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential r equisites for j udicial r eview

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitawit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) thechallenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwisehe must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direas a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportun(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis motaof the case.[19]

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for fademonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shothey have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTclaiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creas a result of its proceedings.[20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legisassail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the C
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as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congressas an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of thelegislature before the Court. As held inPhilippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each memberthereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of thatinstitution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivativebut nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In sucha case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested bythe Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any officialaction which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators .[22]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creationof the PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation andoperation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, theallocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be anexercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger ofsustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere inhis petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power andto wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case ofDavid v.

Arroyo[24]explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standiis defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a givenquestion. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule ascontained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It providesthat every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party ininterest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited orinjured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly

put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiffwho asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a

representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently fromany other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, ortaxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial

protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the

public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing inpublic actions. The distinction was first laid down inBeauchamp v. Silk, where it was heldthat the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizenssuit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in thelatter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York SupremeCourt inPeople ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people

are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see

that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance beremedied. With respect to taxpayers suits,Terr v. Jordanheld that the right of a citizenand a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds tohis injury cannot be denied.

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in anyofficial policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities ofgovernmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid downthe more stringent direct injurytestinEx Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v.Ullman.The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to

determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he hassustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has ageneral interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. InPeople v. Vera, itheld that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury asa result. The Veradoctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President ofthe Senate,Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of

Public WorksandAnti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.[Emphases included.Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of phence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when thinterest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching signifi

society, or of paramount public interest.[25]

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26]the Court held that in cases of paimportance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxesuit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of review. In the firstEmergency Powers Cases,[27]ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to quesconstitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest scommon with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importanc e[28]laid down in CREBA v. EMeralco[29]are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that thecovers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Courare constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their serionovelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance notthe public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all .[30]UndoubtFilipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presid ents first effort to bring about a p

change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political unthat clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perfconstitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Comm ission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a puband not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President .[31]Thus, in order that the President may
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WHEREAS, the transitiontowards theparliamentary form of governmentwillnecessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D.No. 1416, as amended by P .D. No. 1772, becamefunctus oficioupon the convening of the First Congress, asexpressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agreeswith this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereasclause of P.D. 1416 says it was enactedto prepare the transition from presidentialto parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentaryform of government, the legislative andexecutive powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would youagree with me that P.D. 1416 should not

be considered effective anymore upon thepromulgation, adoption, ratification of the1987 Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entireNational Government is deemed repealed,at least, upon the adoption of the 1987Constitution, correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amendedby P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article V II of the Constitution,imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasissupplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches ofgovernment is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him inensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency

is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conductinvestigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or instatutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51]As explained in the landmark case ofMarcos v.

Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system ofgovernment and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by theiractual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and

balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power toenforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever

powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholdsit. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one ofthe powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the

execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposeslimitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what istraditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers ofthe President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in theConstitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers soenumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neitherlegislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. Aabove, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution .[53]On

recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the pcreate ad hoccommittees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws hafaithfully executed. Thus, in Department of H ealth v. Camposano,[54]the authority of the President Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative chargagainst the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheldcase, it was ruled:

The Chief Executives power to cre ate theAd hocInvestigating Committee cannotbe doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department,to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executiveofficials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legalityof the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigatingteam and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices andfacilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to a

inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guideperformance of his duties relati ve to the execution and enforcement of th e laws of the land. And if historyrevisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There bchanges in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-exis

because the direction of the political winds have changed.
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On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds forthe operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment orallocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of theExecutive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to beearmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Soli citor General, whatever funds theCongress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for thecommission.[55] Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existingauditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Power of the Tr uth Commission to In vestigate

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is wellrecognized. It flows from thefaithful-execution clauseof the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all lawsare enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume thefunctions of the executive department.[57]

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft andcorruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have beenvested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-

judicial powers involve the power to hear and dete rmine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is toapply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering thesame law.

[58]In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, suchthat it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case ofadministrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the

Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59]

Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve orprobe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or studyclosely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official

probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is todiscover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notionof settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into byapplication of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step bystep by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquireinto with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking ofevidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turndescribed as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require ahearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 2 57; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and

collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,judge, decide, determine, resolve, r ule on, sett le. The dictionary defines the term as "to settlefinally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to

pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or ruleupon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in acase of controversy x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means:"To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a

judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. CitationsOmitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of jueven a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the fcontroversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arrfactual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to theconclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and defi

subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law .[60]

Even respondents themselves admicommission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or er

respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequencoverall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual prosecution of soffenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them,[63]is certainly not a functionthe commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights thisgives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining pcause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ Ombudsman.[64]

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shaother similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65]it was writ

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution andThe Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorizedgovernment agenciessuch as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipalcircuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against publicemployees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice.Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retainsconcurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunianstoinvestigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminunder Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act oromission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omissionappears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdictionover cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may takeover, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation ofsuch cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the condupreliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically oPTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and g
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President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In thisregard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IVin the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise taskedto investigate the commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accordedconclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the ZenarosaCommission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and theDOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices,

therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possibleindictments for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, theCourt finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparenttransgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without dueprocess of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutionalsafeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of

singling out the previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisanhostility.

[66]Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft andcorruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo .[67]

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption mustencompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prioradministrations where the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies

[68]were reported to have beencommitted against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does notfall under the recognized exceptions becausefirst, there is no substantial distinction between the group ofofficials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their publicoffice for personal gain; andsecond, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order

No. 1 to end corruption.[69] In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that thecommission should deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strongarm of the law with equal force.[70]

Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as the

initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of largescale graft and corruption solely during the said administration .[71] Assuming arguendo that the commissionwould confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense iscommitted against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the

previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial

distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct.[72]To distinguish theadministration from past administrations, it recited the following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft andcorruptionin the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in publicinstitutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regardingcertain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure tothem by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deterothers from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government

and in their public servants.

Second.The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-findingis warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the currentadministration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previousadministration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class forinvestigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence thatcould lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy le

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