Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion

8/3/2019 Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion

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This Opinion should be cited as follows:"Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, aragraph 2 ,of the Cha rter), Advisory Op inion of 20 July 1962 :

I .C.J . Reports 1962, . I~I."

Le prsent avis doit tre cit comme suit:(( Certaines dpenses des Nations Un ies (article 17, paragraphe 2,de la Charte), Avis consultatif du 20 juillet 1962 :C . I.J . Recueil 1962, . I ~ I .

Sd e e npmberNO de vente: 262 1


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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

19622 0 JulyGeneral ListNo. 49

YEAR 196220 July 1962

CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THEUNITED NATIONS

(ARTICLE 17, PARAGRAPH 2 , OF THE CHARTER)

Resolution I73I (XV I ) of General Ass emb ly requesting advi sor yopin ion.- bjec tions to giving opini on based on proceedings in Gen-eral Assemb1y.-Interpretation of mea nin g of "ex pe ns es of theOrganization".-Article 17, aragraphs I and 2 , of Charter.-Lack ofjzcstification for limit in g te rms "budget" and "exPenses".-Article 17i n context of Charter.-Respective functions of Secur ity Cou nci l andGeneral Assemb1y.-Article II, iaragraph 2 , in relation to budgetarypowers of General Assemb1y.-Role of General As semb ly in mailztenanceof inte rna tion al peace and security.-Agreements und er Article 43.-Ex pe ns es incurred for purposes of Un ited Nations.-Obligationsincurred by Secretary-General acting und er auth ori ty of S ecu rityCouncil or General Assemb1y.-Nature of operation s of U N E F and0NUC.-Financing of U N E F and O NU C based on Art ic le 17,paragrap h 2.-Implem entation by Secretary-General of Sec uri tyCouncil reso1utions.-Expenditures for U N E F a nd O N U C an dArticle 17, aragraPh 2 , of Charter.

ADVISORY O P I N I O NPresczt : res iden t WINIARSKI Vice-Pres iden t ALFARO JudgesBASDEVANT, BAD AWI, MO REN O QUINTANA, WELLINGTON

K o o , SPIROPOULOS,ir Percy S P E N D E R , Sir Gerald FITZ-MAURICE, KORETSKY, ANAKA,USTAMANTER I V E R O ,JESSUP, MORELLI ; Regis t rar GARNIER-COIGNET.


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COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNE 196220 juillet 1962

1962Le 20 juilletRle gnralna 49

CERTAINES DPENSES DESN A T I O N S U N I E S(ARTICLE 17, PARAGRAPHE 2, DE LA CHARTE)

Rsolution de l'Assemb le gnrale 1731 ( X V I ) dem an da nt u n n visconsultatif. - bjections au prononc d'un avis fondes sziv lestravaux de l'Assemble gnrale. - nterprtation de l'expression(( dpenses de L'Organisation 1). - rticle 17 , paragraphes I et 2, dela Charte.- im ita tio n no n justifie des mots (( budget )) et (( dpenses a.- rticle 17 da ns le contexte de la Charte.- onctions respectives duConseil de Scurit et de l'Assemble gnrale. - 'article I r , para-graphe 2 , et les fiouvoirs budgtaires de l'Assemble gnrale. -R61e de L'Assemble gnrale dans le maintien de la paix et de lascurit interna tionales.- ccords en vertu de l'article 43.- pensesencourues pour les buts des Nations Unies. - bligations encoztruespar le Secrtaire gnral a g i s s a ~ t ous l'autorit d u Conseil de Scuritou de l'Assemble gnrale. - aractre des oprations de la FG.lTUet de I'ONUC. - inancement de la F U N U et de 1'ONUC folzdsur l'article 17, paragraphe 2. - pplication par le Secrtairegnral des rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit.- penses de la F C SCet de Z'ONUC et article 17, paragraphe 2 , de la Charte.

AVIS CONSLLTATIFP r s ~ n t s i. WINIARSKI,rs ident;M. ALFARO, i c e - P ~ s i d e i z t;MM. BASDEVANT,XDAWI, ORENO QCISTANA,EL-

L I N G T O N KOO, SPIROPOCLOS,ir Percy SPENDER,irGerald FITZJIAPRICE,bI. KORETSKY,ASAKA, r-sra-MA N T E Y RIVERO,ESSUP,MORELLI,ziqes; FI.GARSIER-COIGNET,ref iev.

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152 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION O F 20 VI 1 62)Concerning th e question whether certain expenditures authorizedby the General Assembly "constitute 'expenses of the Organization'

within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter ofthe United Nations",

composed as above,gives the fo llowing Ad visory Opi ni on :The request which laid the matter before the Court was formu-lated in a letter dated 21 December 1961 from the Acting Secre-tary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Court,

received in th e Registry on 27 December. In tha t let ter the ActingSecretary-General informed the President of the Court that theGeneral Assembly, by a resolution adopted on 20 December 1961,had decided to request the International Court of Justice t o givean advisory opiniotl on the following question :"Do the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions1583 (XV) and 1590 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (XV) of3 April 1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and 1633 (XVI) of 30 Oc-tober 1961 relating to the United Nations operations in the Congoundertaken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of

14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960, and 21 February and 24 No-vember 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of20 September 1960 and 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of15 April1961, and the expenditures authorized in General Assemblyresolutions 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956, 1089 (XI) of 21 Decem-ber 1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957, 1151 (XII) of 22 Novem-ber 1957, 1204 (XII) of 13 December 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 De-cember 1958, 14.41 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 and 1575 (XV) of20 December 1960 relating to the operations of the United NationsEmergency Force undertaken in pursuance of General Assemblyresolutions 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-1) and 999(ES-1) of 4 November 1956, 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956,1001 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956, 1121 (XI) of 24 November 1956and 1263 (XIII) of 14 November 1958, constitue 'expenses of theOrganization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, ofthe Charter of the United Nations?"

I n the Acting Secretary-General's letter was enclosed a certifiedcopy of the aforementioned resolution of t he General Assembly.At the same time the Acting Secretary-General announced th at hewould transmit to the Court, in accordance with Article 65 of theStatute, al1 documents likely to throw light upon the question.Resolution 1731 (XVI) by which the General Assembly decidedto request an advisory opinion from the Court reads as follows:

"T h e General Assembly,Recognizing its need for authoritative legal guidance as to obli-gations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations

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CERTAINES DPENSES DES N. U. (AVIS DU 20 VII 62) 152Sur la question de savoir si certaines dpenses autorises parl'Assemble gnrale constituent desdpenses de l'organisation ))au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des NationsUnies ,LA COUR,ainsi compose,donne l 'avis consultatif suivant :La requte qui a saisi la Cour a t formule dans une lettreadresse le 21 dcembre 1961 pa r le Secrtaire gnral pa r intrimdes Nations Unies au Prsident de la Cour et reue au Greffe le27 dcembre. Par cette lettre le Secrtaire gnral par intrimporte la connaissance du Prsident de la Cour que, par une rso-lution adopte le 20 dcembre 1961, l'Assemble gnrale a dcidde demander la Cour internat ionale de Justice un avis consultatifsur la question suivante :

Les dpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemblegnrale 1583 (XV) et 1590 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, 1595 (XV)du 3 avril 1961, 1619 (XV) du 21 avril 1961 et 1633 (XVI) du30 octobre 1961, relatives aux oprations des Nations Unies auCongo entreprises en excution des rsolutions du Conseil de Scu-rit en date des 14 juillet, 22 juillet et g aot 1960 et des 21 fvrieret 24 novembre 1961 ainsi que des rsolutions de l'Assemble g-nrale 1474 (ES-IV) du 20 septembre 1960, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV)et 1601 (XV) du 15 avril 1961, et les dpenses autorises par lesrsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 1122 (XI) du 26 novembre 1956,1089 (XI) du 21 dcembre 1956, 1090 (XI) du 27 fvrier 1957,1151 (XII) du 22 novembre 1957, 1204 (XII) du 13 dcembre 1957,1337 (XIII) du 13 dcembre 1958, 1441 (XIV) du 5 dcembre1959 et 1575 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, relatives aux opration:;de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies entreprises en excutiondes rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 997 (ES-1) du 2 novembre1956, 998 (ES-1) et 999 (ES-1) du 4 novembre 1956, 1000 (ES-1)du 5 novembre 1956, 1001 (ES-1) du 7 novembre 1956, 1121 (XI)du 24 novembre 1956 et 1263 (XIII) du 14 novembre 1958, consti-tuent-elles des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies? ))

A cette let tre d u Secrtaire gnral par intrim est joint unexemplaire certifi conforme de la rsolution ci-dessus mentionnede l'Assemble gnrale. Le Secrtaire gnral pa r intrim annonceen mme temps qu'il transmettra la Cour, conformment l'article 65 du Statut, tous documents pouvant servir luciderla question.La rsolution 1731 (XVI) par laquelle l'Assemble gnrale adcid de demander la Cour un avis consultatif est ainsi conue:

(( L'Assemble gnrde,Reconnaissant qu'elle a besoin d'un avis juridique autorisquant aux obligations des Etats Membres en vertu de la Charte5


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Ij3 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.X. (OPIXIOSOF 20 VII 62)in the matter of financing the United Nations operations in theCongo and in the Middle East,

I. Decides to submit the following question to the InternationalCourt of Justice for an advisory opinion:"Do the expenditure' authorized in General Assembly reso-lutions 1583 (XV) and 1590 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595(XV) of 3 April 1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April I ~ G Iand 1633 (XVI)of 30 October 1961 relating to the United Nations operations inthe Congo undertaken in pursuance of the Security Councilresolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960, and 2 1 Feb-ruary and 24 November 1961, and General Assembly resolutions1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960 and 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV)and 1601 (XV) of 15 April 1961, and the expenditures authorized

in General Assembly resolutions 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956,1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957,II51 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1204 (XII) of 13 December1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958, 1441 (XIV) of 5 Decem-ber 1959 and 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 relating to theoperations of the United Nations Emergency Force undertaltenin pursuance of General Assemhly resolutions 997 (ES-1) of2 Kovember 1956, 998 (ES-1) and 999 (ES-1) of 4 Noveniber1956, 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956, 1001 (ES-1) of 7 Novem-ber 1956, 1121 (XI) of 24 November 1956 and 1263 (XIII) of14 November 1958, constitute 'expenses of the Organization'within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charterof the United Nations?"2. Reqz~ests he Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 65of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to transmitthe present resolution to the Court, accompanied by ail documentslikely to throw light upon the question."

On 27 December 1961, the day the letter from the Acting Secre-tarj7-General of the Cnited Nations reached the Registry, the Presi-dent, in pursuance of Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute , con-sidered that the States Members of the Vnited Nations urerelikelj- to be able to furnish information on the question a nd madean Order fixing 20 February 1962 as the time-limit within nihichthe Court tvould be prepared to receive written statements fromthem and the Registrar sent to them the special and direct communi-cation provided for in that Article, recalling that resolution 1731(XVI) and those referred to in the question submitted for opiniontvere already in their possession.

The notice t o al1 States entitled to appear before the Court of thelet ter from the Acting Secretary-General an d of the resolutiontherein enclosed, prescribed by Article 66, paragraph 1, of theStatute, was given by lette; of 4 January 1962.The foilowing Members of the Cni ted Yations submitted state-ments, notes or letters set ting forth their views: Australia, Bulgaria,6


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C E R T A I N E S DPENSESDES N. U. (AVIS D U 20 VII 62) 153des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le financement des oprationsdes Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) et au Moyen-Orient (UNEF),I. Dcide de soumettre la question ci-aprs la Cour internationalede Justice pour qu'elle donne un avis consultatif:Les dpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemblegnrale 1583 (XV) et 1590 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, 1595(XV) du 3 avril 1961, 1619 (XV) du 21 avril 1961 et 1633 (XVI)du 30 octobre 1961, relatives aux oprations des Nations Uniesau Congo entreprises en excution des rsolutions du Conseilde Scurit en date des 14 juillet, 22 juillet et 9 aot 1960 et des21 fvrier et 24 novembre 1961 ainsi que des rsolutions del'Assemble gnrale 1474 (ES-IV) du 20 septembre 1960, 1599(XV), 1600 (XV) et 1601 (XV) du 15 avril 1961, et les dtpensesautorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 1122 (XI)du 26 novembre 1956, 1089 (XI) du 21 dcembre 1956, 1090(XI) du 27 fvrier 1957, 1151 (XII) du 22 novembre 1957, '204(XII) du 13 dcembre 1957, 1337 (XIII) du 13 dcembre 1958,1441 (XIV) du 5 dcembre 1959 et 1575 (XV) du 20 dcembre1960, relatives aux oprations de la Force d'urgence des NationsUnies entreprises en excution des rsolutions de l'Assemblegnrale: 997 (ES-1) d u 2 novembre 1956, 998 (ES-1) et 999(ES-1) du 4 novembre 1956, 1000 (ES-1) du 5 novembre 1956,1001 (ES-1) du 7 novembre 1956, 1121 (XI) du 24 novembre

1956 et 1263 (XIII) du 14 novembre 1958, constituent-ellesdes dpenses de l'Organisation )) au sens du paragraphe 2 del'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies? ))2 . Prie le Secrtaire gnral, conformment l'article 65 duStatut de la Cour internationale de Justice, de transmettre laprsente rsolution la Cour et d'y joindre tout document pouvantservir lucider la question.

Le 27 dcembre 1961, jour o la lettre du Secrtaire gnral parintrim des Nations Unies est parvenue au Greffe, le PrCtsident,par application de l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Sta tut , a jug queles Membres des Nations Unies taient susceptibles de fournirdes renseignements sur la question et a rendu une ordonnancefixant au 20 fvrier 1962 la da te d'expirat ion du dlai dans lequella Cour serait dispose recevoir d'eux des exposs crits; et leGreffier leur a adress la communication spciale et directe prvue cet article, en rappelant que la rsolution 1731 X V I ) ,comme cel-les qui sont mentionnes dans la question soumise pour avis, taitdj en leur possession.

La notification tous les t at s admis ester en justice devant laCour de la lettre du Secrtaire gnral par intrim et de la rsolu-tion qui y tait jointe, notification prescrite par l'article 66, para-graphe 1, du Statut, a t effectue par lettre du 4 janvier 1962.Les Membres des Nations Vnies dont les noms suivent ont pr-sent des exposs, notes ou lettres nonant leurs vues: Afrique du6


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154 CERTAIN EXPENSES O F U.N. ( O P I N I O N O F 20 V I1 62)Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia,Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal,Romania, South Africa, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repu-blic, Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America andUpper Volta. Copies of these communications were transmitted toal1 Members of the United Nations and to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.Mexico, the Philippines and Poland referred in letters to theviews expressed on their behalf during the session of the GeneralAssembly.The Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, in pur-suance of Article 65, paragraph 2 , of the Statute, transmitted to theCourt a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the ques-tion, together with an Introductory Note and a note by the Con-troller on the budgetary and financial practices of the UnitedNations; these documents reached the Registry on 21 Februaryand I March 1962.The Members of the United Nations were informed on 23 March1962 that the oral proceedings in this case would open towardsthe beginning of May. On 16 April 1962 they were notified that14 May had been fixed as the opening date. Hearings were heldfrom 14 o 19 May and on 21 May, the Court being addressed bythe following:for Canada : M. Marcel Cadieux, Deputy Under-Secretary and Legal Adviser for theDepartment of Extemal Affairs;for the Netherlands: Professor W. Riphagen, Legal Adviserto the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;for Italy: M. Riccardo Monaco, Professor a t theUnivosity of Rome, Head of Depart-ment for Contentious Diplomatic Ques-

tions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;for the United Kingdom The Rt. Hon. Sir Reginald Manning-of Great Britain and ham-Buller, Q.C., Attorney-General;Northern Ireland :for Nonvay : Mr. Jens Evensen, Director-General,Ministry of Foreign Affairs;for Australia: Sir Kenneth Bailey, Solicitor-General;for Ireland: Mr. Aindrias O' Caoimh, S.C., Attorney-General ;for the Union of Soviet Professor G. 1. Tunkin, Director of theSocialist Republics : Juridical-Treaty Department of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs;for the United States The Honorable Abram Chayes, Legalof America : Adviser, Department of State.7


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Sud, Australie, Bulgarie, Canada, Danemark, Espagne, tats-Unis d'Amrique, France, Haute-Volta, Irlande, Italie, Japon,Pays-Bas, Portugal, Rpublique socialiste sovitique de Bilorus-sie, Rpublique socialiste sovitique d'Ukraine, Roumanie, Royau-me-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Tchcoslova-quie, Union des Rpubliques socialistes sovitiques. Copie de cescommunications a t transmise tous les Membres des NationsUnies ainsi qu'au Secrtaire gnral par intrim des Nations Unies.Par lettre, le Mexique, les Philippines et la Pologne se sontrfrs aux vues qui avaient t exprimes en leurs noms respectifslors de la session de l'Assemble gnrale.

Le Secrtaire gnral par intrim des Nations Unies a transmis la Cour, par application de l'article 65,paragraphe 2, du Statut,un dossier de documents pouvant servir lucider la question;il y a joint une Introduction ainsi qu'une note du contrleur surles pratiques budgtaires et financires de l'organisation des Na-tions Unies. Ces documents sont parvenus au Greffe les 21 fvrier etI~~mars 1962.Le 23 mars 1962, les Membres des Nations Unies ont t informsque la procdure orale en cette affaire s'ouvrirait vers le dbut dumois de mai. Le 16 vril 1962, il leur a t notifi que la date d'ou-verture tait fixe au 14mai. Des audiences se sont tenues du 14 u19mai et le 21 mai, au cours desquelles ont pris la parole:pour le Canada:pour les Pays-Bas :pour l'Italie :

pour le Royaume-Unide Grande-Bretagne etd'Irlande du Nord:pour la Norvge :pour l'Australie :pour l'Irlande :pour l'Union des Rpubli-ques socialistessovitiques :pour les tats-unisd'Amrique :

M. Marcel Cadieux, sous-secrtaire ad-joint et conseiller juridique du ministredes Affaires extrieures;M. W. Riphagen, jurisconsulte duministre des Affaires trangres;hl. Riccardo Monaco, professeur l'universit de Rome, chef du conten-tieux diplomatique au ministre desAffaires trangres ;le trs honorable sir Reginald Man-ningham-Buller, Q. C., Attorney-Gene-ral;M. Jens Evensen, directeur gnral,ministre des Affaires trangres;sir Kenneth Bailey, Solicitor-General;M. Aindrias O' Caoimh, S. C., Attor-ney-General;M. G. 1. Tunkin, professeur, directeurdu service juridique et des traits duministre des Affaires trangres;l'honorable Abram Chayes, conseillerjuridique du dpartement d'tat.

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155 CERTAIN EXP ENS ES OF U . N . ( O P I N I O N O F 20 SrII 62)

Before prcceeding to give its opinion on the question put to it,the Court considers it necessary to make the following preliminaryremarks :The power of the Court to give an advisory opinion is derivedfrom Article 65 of the Statute. The power granted is of a discre-tionary character. In exercising its discretion, the InternationalCourt of Justice, like the Permanent Court of International Justice,has always been guided by the pnnciple which the Permanent Courtstated in the case concerning the St atu s of E as ter n Carelia on 23 July1923: "The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in givingadvisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding theiractivity as a Court" (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, p. 29). Therefore, andin accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the Court can give anadvisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is no1 alegal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must declineto'give the opinion requested. But even if the question is a legalone, which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it maynonetheless decline to do so. As this Court said in its Opinion of30 March 1950, the permissive character of Article 65 "gives theCourt the power to examine whether the circumstances of the caseare of such a character as should lead it to decline to answer theRequest" (Interpretation of Peace Treaties wi th Bu lga ria, H un ga ryand R om ania (F irs t Phase) , I .C.J . Reports 1950,p. 72). But, as theCourt also said in the same Opinion, "the reply of the Court, itselfan 'organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in theactivities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not berefused" (ibid., p. 71). Still more emphatically, in its Opinion of23 October 1956, the Court said that only "compelling reasons"should lead it to refuse to give a requested advisory opinion ( Judg-me nts of the Ad min istra tive T rib un al of the I .L.O. u p o n comp laintsmad e against the Unesco, I .C. J . Reports 1956, p. 86) .

The Court finds no "compelling reason" why.it should not givethe advisory opinion which the General Assembly requested by itsresolution 1731 (XVI). It has been argued that the question putto the Court is intertwined with political questions, and that forthis reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion. I t is tme thatmost interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations will havepolitical significance, great or small. In the nature of things it couldnot be othenvise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a politicalcharacter to a request which invites it to undertake an essentiallyjudicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision.

In the preamble to the resolution requesting this opinion, theGeneral Assembly expressed its recognition of "its need for authori-8


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Avant de donner son avis sur la question qui lui est pose, laCour juge ncessaire de faire les observations prliminaires sui-vantes :Le pouvoir qu'a la Cour de donner un avis consultatif procde del'article 65 du Statut. Le pouvoir ainsi attribu a un caractrediscrtionnaire. Dans l'exercice de son pouvoir discrtionnaire,la Cour internationale de Justice, de mme que la Cour permanentede Justice internationale, a toujours suivi le principe nonc le23 juillet 1923 par la Cour permanente en l'affaire du Statut de laCarlie orientale : ( La Cour, tant une Cour de Justice, ne peut passe dpartir des rgles essentielles qui dirigent son activit de tri-bunal, mme lorsqu'elle donne des avis consultatifs )) (C. P. J. I.,srie B, no5, p. 29). En consquence, et conformment l'article 65du Statut, la Cour ne peut donner un avis consultatif que sur unequestion juridique. Si une question n'est pas juridique, la Courn'a pas de pouvoir discrtionnaire en la matire: elle doit refuserde donner l'avis qui lui est demand. Mais, mme s'il s'agit d'unequestion juridique, laquelle la Cour a indubitablement comptencede rpondre, elle peut nanmoins refuser de le faire. Ainsi que laCour l'a dclar dans son avis du 30 mars 1950, le caractre per-missif de l'article 65 (( donne la Cour le pouvoir d'apprcier si lescirconstances de l'espce sont telles qu'elles doivent la dterminer ne pas rpondre une demande d'avis )) (Inter prtatio n des traitsde paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie (pre-mire phase) , C . I . J . Recuei l 1950,p. 72). Mais, comme la Cour l'agalement dit dans le mme avis, (( la rponse constitue une parti-cipation de la Cour, elle-mme organe des Nations Unies s, l'action de l'Organisation et, en principe, elle ne devrait pas trerefuse )) (ibid. , p. 71). La Cour a indiqu encore plus nettementdans son avis du 23 octobre 1956 qu'il faudrait ((des raisons d-cisives )) pour l'amener opposer un refus une demande d'avisconsultatif (Jugements du tr ibunal adminis trati f de l 'O. 1. . surrequtes contre L'Unesco, C . I . J . Recueil 1956, p. 86).La Cour ne voit aucune (( raison dcisive )) de ne pas donner l'avisconsultatif que l'Assemble gnrale lui a demand par sa rsolu-tion 1731 (XVI). On a fait valoir que la question pose la Courtouche des questions d'ordre politique et que, pour ce motif, laCour doit se refuser donner un avis. Certes, la plupart des inter-prtations de la Charte des Nations Unies prsentent une impor-tance politique plus ou moins grande. Par la nature des choses, ilne saurait en tre autrement. Mais la Cour ne saurait attribuerun caractre politique une requte qui l'invite s'acquitter d'unetche essentiellement judiciaire, savoir l'interprtation d'unedisposition conventionnelle.Dans le prambule de la rsolution par laquelle elle a demandle prsent avis, l'Assemble gnrale a reconnu qu'elle avait (( be-

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tative legal guidance". In its search for such guidance it has put tothe Court a legal question-a question of the interpretation ofArticle 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. Inits Opinion of 28 May 1948, the Court made it clear that as "theprincipal judicial organ of the United Nations", i t was entitled toexercise in regard to an article of the Charter, "a multilateral treaty,an interpretative function which falls within the normal exerciseof its judicial powers" (Co ndi tion s of A dl ni ssi on of a Sta te to Mem ber-sh ip in the Uni ted Nat ion s (Ar t ic le 4 of the Charte r), I.C . J. Reports1947-1948, p. 61).The Court, therefore, having been asked to give an advisoryopinion upon a concrete legal question, will proceed to give itsopinion.

The question on which the Court is asked to give its opinion iswhether certain expenditures which were authorized by the GeneralAssembly to cover the costs of the United Nations operations in theCongo (hereinafter referred t o as ONUC) and of the operations of theUnited Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (hereinafterreferred to as UNEF), "constitute 'expenses of the Organization'within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of theUnited Nations".Before entering upon the detailed aspects of this question, theCourt will examine the view that it should take into considerationthe circumstance that at the 1086th Plenary Meeting of the GeneralAssembly on 20 December 1961, an amendment was proposed, bythe representative of France, to the draft resolution requestingthe advisory opinion, and that this amendment was rejected. Theamendment would have asked the Court to give an opinion on thequestion whether the expenditures relating to the indicated opera-tions were "decided on in conformity with the provisions of theCharter"; if that question were answered in the affirmative, theCourt would have been asked to proceed to answer the questionwhich the resolution as adopted actually poses.If the amendment had been adopted, the Court would have beenasked to consider whether the resolutions authorizing the expendi-tures were decided on in conformity with the Charter; the Frenchamendment did not propose to ask the Court whether the resolutionsin pursu ance of w hi ch the ope ratio ns in the Middle Eas t and in theCongo were undertaken, were adopted in conformity with theCharter.The Court does not find it necessary to expound the extent towhich the proceedings of the General Assembly, antecedent to theadoption of a resolution, should be taken into account in interpret-ing that resolution, but it makes the following comments on theargument based upon the rejection of the French amendment.9


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soin d'un avis juridique autoris 1). Recherchant un tel avis, ellea pos la Cour une question juridique- ne question ayant trait l'interprtation de l'article 17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte desNations Unies. Dans son avis du 28 mai 1948, la Cour a soulignqu'a en tant qu'organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies elle est fonde exercer l'gard d'un article de la Charte, (( traitmultilatral, une fonction d'interprtation qui relve de l'exercicenormal de ses attributions judiciaires s (Condit ions de l 'admissiond 'un tat comme Membre des Nat ions Uni es (art ic le 4 de la Charte),C . I . J . Recueil 1947-1948, p. 61).La Cour, ayant donc t saisie d'une demande d'avis consultatifsur une question juridique concrte, donnera maintenant son avis.

Il est demand la Cour de dterminer si certaines dpenses quiont t autorises par l'Assemble gnrale pour couvrir les fraisdes oprations des Nations Unies au Congo (ci-aprs dsignes parl'abrviation ONUC) et des oprations de la Force d'urgence desNations Unies au Moyen-Orient (ci-aprs dsignes par l'abrvia-tion FUNU) (( constituent . (( des dpenses de l'organisation a ausens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies D.

Avant d'examiner la question dans tous ses dtails, la Courprendra en considration l'opinion selon laquelle il faut tenir comptedu fait qu' la 1086me sance plnire de l'Assemble gnrale,tenue le 20 dcembre 1961, un amendement au projet de rsolu-tion soumettant une demande d'avis consultatif a t propos parle dlgu de la France, et que cet amendement a t rejet; cetamendement tendait ce que la Cour donnt un avis sur le pointde savoir si les dpenses relatives aux oprations en questlon ontt (( dcides conformment aux dispositions de la Charte ; encas de rponse affirmative, la Cour aurait t prie de rpondreensuite la question qui est pose dans la rsolution telle qu'elle at adopte.Si I'amendement avait t adopt la Cour aurait t invite rechercher si les rsolutions autorisant les dpenses ont t prisesconformment la Charte; I'amendement franais ne proposait pasde demander la Cour si les rsolutions e n excu tion desquelles desop.rations ont t entreprises a u Moyen-Orient et a u Congo ont tadoptes conformment la Charte.

La Cour ne juge pas ncessaire d'exposer dans quelle mesureles travaux de l'Assemble gnrale antrieurs l'adoption d'unersolution doivent entrer en ligne de compte pour l'interprtationde cette rsolution, mais elle fait les observations suivantes quant l'argument fond sur le rejet de l'amendement franais.


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157 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. OPISION OF 20 VI1 62)The rejection of the French amendment does not constitute adirective to the Court to exclude from its consideration the question

whether certain expenditures were "decided on in conformity withthe Charter", if the Court finds such consideration appropriate. I tis not to be assumed that the General Assembly would thus seek tofetter or hamper the Court in.the discharge of i ts judicial functions;the Court must have full liberty to consider al1 relevant dataavailable to it in forming an opinion on a question posed to it foran advisory opinion. Nor can the Court agree that the rejectionof the French amendment has any bearing upon the questionwhether the General Assembly sought to preclude the Court frominterpreting Article 17 n the light of other articles of the Charter,that is, in the whole context of the treaty. If any deduction is to bemade from the debates on this point, the opposite conclusion wouldbe drawn from the clear statements of sponsoring delegations thatthey took i t for granted the Court would consider the Charter as awhole.

Turning to the question which has been posed, the Court observesthat it involves an interpretation of Article 17, aragraph 2,of theCharter. On the previous occasions when the Court has had tointerpret the Charter of the United Nations, it has followed theprinciples and rules applicable in general to the interpretation oftreaties, since it has recognized that the Charter is a multilateraltreaty, albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics. Ininterpreting Article 4 of the Charter, the Court was led to consider"the structure of the Charter" and "the relations established by itbetween the General Assembly and the Security Council" ; a com-parable problem confronts the Court in the instant matter. TheCourt sustained its interpretation of Article 4 by considering themanner in which the organs concerned "have consistently inter-preted the text" in their practice (Com petence of the General d s se m -bly for the Ad m is si on of a State to the Uni ted N at io ns , I .C.J. Reports1950, PP- 8-91.The text of Article 17 is in part as follows:

"1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budgetof the Organization.2. The expenses of the Organization shali be borne by theMembers as apportioned by the General Assembly."

Although the Court will examine Article 17 in itself and in itsrelation to the rest of the Charter, it should be noted that a t leastthree separate questions might arise in the interpretation of para-graph 2 of this Article. One question is that of identifying whatare "the expenses of the Organization"; a second question mightI O


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Le rejet de I'amendement franais ne constitue pas une injonc-tion pour la Cour d'avoir carter l'examen de la question de sa-voir si certaines dpenses ont t dcides conformment aux dis-positions de la Charte , si la Cour croit opportun de l'aborder.On ne doit pas supposer que l'Assemble gnrale ait ainsi entendulier ou gner la Cour dans l'exercice de ses fonctions judiciaires; laCour doit avoir la pleine libert d'examiner tous les lments per-tinents dont elle dispose pour se faire une opinion sur une questionqui lui est pose en vue d'un avis consultatif. La Cour ne sauraitnon plus admettre que le rejet de I'amendement franais ait au-cune influence sur le point de savoir si l'Assemble gnrale a vouluempcher la Cour d'interprter l'article 17 la lumire des autresarticles de la Charte, c'est--dire dans le contexte de l'ensemble dutrait. Si l'on voulait tirer des conclusions des dbats tenus sur cepoint, une conclusion en sens contraire ressortirait des dclarationstrs claires d'aprs lesquelles les dlgations qui ont prsent leprojet de rsolution considraient comme acquis que la Courexaminerait la Charte dans son ensemble.

Pour en venir la question qui a t pose, la Cour observe qu'ellecomporte une interprtation du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de laCharte. Dans les affaires prcdentes o la Cour a d interprterla Charte des Nations Unies, elle a suivi les principes et les rglesapplicables en gnral l'interprtation des traits, tant donnqu'elle a reconnu que la Charte est un trait multilatral, bien qu'elleprsente certaines caractristiques spciales. Dans son interprta-tion de l'article 4 de 12 Charte, la Cour a t amene prendre enconsidration cc l'conomie de la Charte et les rapports que celle-ci a tablis entre l'Assemble gnrale et le Conseil de Scurit ;c'est un problme du mme ordre qui se pose aujourd'hui devantla Cour. Pour appuyer son interprtation de l'article 4, la Cour apris en considration la manire suivant laquelle les organes int-resss (( ont constamment interprt ce texte dans leur prati ue(Comptence de l 'Assemble g nrde pour lJad miss ion d ' un j t a ta u x N a t i on s U n i e s , C . I . J . Recueil 1950,pp. 8-9) .Le texte de l'article 17 se lit en partie comme suit :

I. L'Assemble gnrale examine et approuve le budget del'Organisation.2 . Les dpenses de l'Organisation sont supportes par les Membres

selon la rpartition fixe par l'Assemble gnrale. ))La Cour se propose d'examiner l'article 17 en lui-mme et dansses relations avec le reste de la Charte, mais il convient de noterqu'au moins trois questions distinctes pourraient se poser en cequi concerne l'interprtation du paragraphe 2 de cet article. Lapremire question est celle de l'identification des ((dpenses de


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concern apportionment by the General Assembly; while a thirdquestion might involve the interpretation of the phrase "shall beborne by the Members". I t is the second and third questions whichdirectly involve "the financial obligations of the Members", but itis only the first question which is posed by the request for theadvisory opinion. The question put to the Court has to do with amoment logically anterior to apportionment, just as a question ofapportionment would be anterior to a question of Members' obli-gation to pay.

I t is true that, as already noted, the preamble of the resolutioncontaining the request refers to the General Assembly's "need forauthoritative legal guidance as to obligations of Member States",but it is to be assumed that in the understanding of the GeneralAssembly, it would find such guidance in the advisory opinionwhich the Court would give on the question whether certain identi-fied expenditures "constitute 'expenses of the Organization' withinthe meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 , of the Charter". If the Courtfinds that the indicated expenditures are such "expenses", it is notcalled upon to consider the manner in which, or the scale by which,they may be apportioned. The amount of what are unquestionably"expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17,paragraph 2" is not in its entirety apportioned by the GeneralAssembly and paid for by the contributions of Member States, sincethe Organization has other sources of income. A Member State,accordingly, is under no obligation to pay more than the amountapportioned to i t ; the expenses of the Organization and the totalamount in money of the obligations of the Member States may not,in practice, necessarily be identical.The text of Article 17, paragraph 2, refers to "the expenses ofthe Organization" without any further explicit definition of suchexpenses. I t would be possible to begin with a general propositionto the effect that the "expenses" of any organization are the amountspaid out to defray the costs of carrying out its purposes, in this case,the political, economic, social, humanitarian and other purposesof the United Nations. The next step would be to examine, as theCourt will, whether the resolutions authorizing the operations herein question were intended to carry out the purposes of the UnitedNations and whether the expenditures were incurred in furtheringthese operations. Or, it might simply be said that the "expenses"of an organization are those which are provided for in its budget.But the Court has not been asked to give an abstract definition ofthe words "expenses of the Organization". It has been asked toanswer a specific question related to certain identified expenditureswhich have actually been made, but the Court would not adequatelydischarge the obligation incumbent on it unless it examined insome detail vanous problems raised by the question which theGeneral Assembly has asked.II


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l'organisation n ; une seconde question aurait trait la rpartitiondes dpenses par l'Assemble gnrale; et une troisime porteraitsur l'interprtation des mots (( sont supportes par les Membres 1).Les deuxime et troisime questions visent directement les (( obli-gations financires des Membres JI , mais c'est uniquement la premirequi est souleve par la demande d'avis consultatif. La questionsoumise la Cour se rfre au moment qui prcde logiquement larpartition des dpenses, de mme qu'une question relative cette rpartjtion serait antrieure une question touchant l'obli-gation des Etats Membres de payer.Certes, ainsi qu'il a dj t not, le prambule de la rsolutioncontenant la requte se rfre au (( besoin [qu'a l'Assemble gn-rale] d'un avis juridique autoris quant aux obligations des tat sMembres ,mais on doit supposer que l'Assemble gnrale entendtrouver une indication de cet ordre dans l'avis consultatif que laCour donnera sur la question de savoir si certaines dpenses don-nes (( constituent . (( des dpenses de l'organisation )) au sens duparagraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte . Si la Cour juge que lesdpenses indiques sont des (( dpenses de l'Organisation , ellen'aura pas examiner la mthode ni le barme suivant lesquelselles peuvent tre rparties. Le montant des dpenses qui consti-tuent indubitablement des dpenses de l'organisation au sensdu paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 )) n'est pas totalement $parti parl'Assemble gnrale et pay par les contributions des Etats Mem-bres, car l'organisation a d'autres recettes. Un Etat Membre n'estdonc pas tenu de payer plus que la quote-part qui lui est attribue;les dpenses de l'organisation et le montant des obligations desMembres peuvent dans la pratique ne pas tre ncessairementidentiques.Le texte du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 mentionne (( les dpensesde l'organisation )) sans donner de dfinition plus prcise de cesdpenses. II serait possible de poser tout d'abord la propositiongnrale portant que les (( dpenses )) d'une organisation quelcon-que sont les sommes payes pour couvrir les frais relatifs laralisation de ses buts, en l'occurrence les buts politiques, conomi-ques, sociaux, humanitaires et autres des Nations Unies. I l faudraitensuite considrer, comme le fera la Cour, si les rsolutionsautorisant les oprations en cause visaient la ralisation des butsdes Nations Unies et si lesdites dpenses ont t engages dansl'accomplissement de ces oprations. Ou bien, on pourrait simple-ment dire que les (( dpenses )) d'une organisation sont celles quisont prvues dans son budget. Mais on n'a pas demand la Courde donner une dfinition abstraite des mots (( dpenses de lJOrgani-sation . On lui a demand de rpondre une question prcise qui atrait certaines dpenses dtermines qui ont t effectivementfaites, mais la Cour n'exercerait pas de faon adquate l'obligationqui lui incombe si elle n'examinait en dtail les diffrents problmessoulevs par la question que l'Assemble gnrale lui a pose.

II


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159 CERTAIN EXPENSES O F U.N. (OP INION O F 20 VI1 62)I t is perhaps the simple identification of "expenses" with theitems included in a budget, which has led certain arguments tolink the interpretation of the word "expenses" in paragraph 2 ofArticle 17, with the word "budget" in paragraph I of that drticle;in both cases, it is contended, the qualifying adjective "regular"or "administrative" should be understood to be implied. Since nosuch qualification is expressed in the text of the Charter, i t could beread in, only if such qualification must necessarily be implied fromthe provisions of the Charter considered as a whole, or from someparticular provision thereof which makes it unavoidable to do soin order to give effect to the Charter.In the first place, concemifi;. the word "budget" in paragraph I of

Article 17, it is clear that the existence of the distinction between"administrative budgets" and "operational budgets" was notabsent from the minds of the drafters of the Charter, nor from theconsciousness of the Organization even in the early days of itshistory. In drafting Article 17, the drafters found it suitable toprovide in paragraph I that "The General Assembly shall considerand approve the budget of the Organization". But in dealing withthe function of the General Assembly in relation to the specializedagencies, they provided in paragraph 3 that the General Assembly"shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agen-cies". If it had been intended that paragraph I should be limitedto the administrative budget of the United Nations organi-zation itself, the word "administrative" would have beeninserted in paragraph I as it was in paragraph 3. Moreover, had itbeen contemplated that the Organization would also have hadanother budget, different from the one which was to be approvedby the General Assembly, the Charter would have includcd somereference to such other budget and to the organ which was toapprove it.Similarly, at its first session, the General Assembly in drawingup and approving the Constitution of the International RefugeeOrganization, provided that the budget of that Organization wasto be divided under the headings "administrative", "operational"and "large-scale resettlement"; but no such distinctions were intro-duced into the Financial Regulations of the United Nations whichwere adopted by unanimous vote in 1950, and which, in this respect,remain unchanged. These regulations speak only of "the budget"and do not provide any distinction be tween ."administrativeJ' and"operational".In subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, including thesixteenth, there have been numerous references to the idea ofdistinguishing an "operational" budget ; some speakers have advo-cated such a distinction as a useful book-keeping device; someconsidered it in connection with the possibility of differing scalesof assessment or apportionment ; others believed it should mark adifferentiation of activities to be financed by voluntary contribu-12


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C'est peut-tre simplement l'identification du mot (( dpenses 1)avec les postes inclus dans un budget qui a conduit certains argu-ments rattacher l'interprtation du mot (( dpenses 1) au paragraphe2 de l'article 17, au mot ((budget ) au paragraphe I de cet article;on a soutenu que dans les deux cas l'adjectif qualificatif (( ordi-naire )) ou administratif )) devrait tre sous-entendu. tant donnque ce qualificatif ne figure aucunement dans le texte de la Charte,on ne pourrait l'y sous-entendre que si cette qualification devaitdcouler ncessairement des dispositions de la Charte considredans son ensemble, ou d'une disposition particulire de celle-ciqui obligerait l'y introduire pour donner effet la Charte.En premier lieu, en ce qui concerne le mot ((budget au para-graphe I de l'article 17, il est clair que l'existence d'une distinctionentre les (( budgets administratifs )) et les (( budgets oprationnels ))n'a pas chapp aux rdacteurs de la Charte et qu'elle n'tait pastrangre aux conceptions de l'Organisation, mme au dbut deson histoire. En rdigeant l'article 17, les rdacteurs ont jug bonde prvoir au paragraphe I que (( L'Assemble gnrale examine etapprouve l e bz~dgetde l'Organisation 1). Mais en traitant des fonc-tions de l'Assemble gnrale au regard des institutions spciali-ses, les rdacteurs ont prvu au paragraphe 3 que l'Assemblegnrale (( examine les Oztdgets administratifs desdites institutions n.Si leur intention avait t de limiter l'application du paragraphe Iau budget administratif des Nations Unies elles-mmes, le motadministratif )) aurait t inclus au paragraphe I aussi bien qu'auparagraphe 3. De plus, s'il avait t envisag que l'organisationait aussi un autre budget, diffrent de celui qui devait tre approuvpar l'Assemble gnrale, il aurait t fait mention de cet autrebudget dans la Charte, ainsi que de l'organe par lequel ildevait tre approuv.

De mme, sa premire session, l'Assemble gnrale, en rdi-geant et en approuvant la constitution de l'Organisation interna-tionale pour les rfugis, a prvu que le budget de cette organisa-tion serait divis en trois rubriques: (( administration )), excu-tion et (c projets de rtablissement en grand 1); mais aucunedistinction analogue n'a t introduite dans le rglement financierdes Nations Unies qui a t adopt l'unanimit en 1950 et quireste sans changement sur ce point. Ce rglement vise seulementle (( budget )) et ne fait aucune distinction entre (( administration et (( excution .Dans les sessions ultrieures de l'Assemble gnrale, y comprisla seizime, on a parl plusieurs reprises d'tablir une distinctionen ce qui concerne le budget oprationnel: certains orateurs re-commandaient d'adopter cette distinction titre de mthodecomptable pratique; certains y voyaient un moyen de diffrencierles barmes de quotes-parts ou de rpartition; d'autres pensaientqu'on diffrencierait ainsi les activits financer par des contribu-


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tions. But these discussions have not resulted in the adoption oftwo separate budgets based upon such a distinction.Actually, the practice of the Organization is entirely consistentwith the plain meaning of the text. The budget of the Organizationhas from the outset included items which would not fa11 within anyof the definitions of "administrative budget'' which have beenadvanced in this connection. Thus, for example, prior to the estab-lishment of, and now in addition to, the "Expanded Programmeof Technical Assistance" and the "Special Fund", both of whichare nourished by voluntary contributions, the annual budget ofthe Organization contains provision for funds for technical assist-ance ; in the budget for the financial year 1962, the sum of $6,4oo,ooo

is included for the technical programmes of economic development,social activities, human rights activities, public administration andnarcotic drugs control. Although dunng the Fifth Committee dis-cussions there was a suggestion that al1 technical assistance costsshould be excluded from the regular budget, the items under theseheads were al1 adopted on second reading in the Fifth Committeewithout a dissenting vote. The "operational" nature of such activi-ties so budgeted is indicated by the explanations in the budgetestimates, e.g. the requests "for the continuation of the operationalprogramme in the field of economic development contemplatedin General Assembly resolutions zoo (III) of 4 December 1948 and304 (IV) of 16 November 1949"; and "for the continuation of theoperational programme in the field of advisory social welfare ser-vices as contemplated in General Assembly resolution 418 (V ) ofI December 1950".

I t is a consistent practice of the General Assembly to include inthe annual budget resolutions, provision for expenses relating tothe maintenance of international peace and security. Annually,since 1947, the General Assembly has made anticipatory provisionfor "unforeseen and extraordinary expenses" arising in relation tothe "maintenance of peace and secunty". In a Note submitted tothe Court by the Controller on the budgetary and financial prac-tices of the United Nations, "extraordinary expenses" are definedas "obligations and expenditures arising as a result of the approvalby a council, commission or other competent United Nations bodyof new programmes and activities not contemplated when thebudget appropriations were approved".

The annual resolution designed to provide for extraordinaryexpenses authonzes the Secretary-General to enter into commit-ments to meet such expenses with the pnor concurrence of theAdvisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,except that such concurrence is not necessary if the Secretary-


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CERTAINES DPENSES DES N . U . (AVIS DU 2 0 VII 62) 160tions volontaires. Mais ces discussions n'ont pas entran l'adoptionde deux budgets spars suivant la distinction envisage.En fait, la pratique de l'Organisation est entirement conformeau sens ordinaire de ces termes. Ds l'origine, le budget de l'Orga-nisation a compris des rubriques qui ne relevaient d'aucune desdfinitions du (( budget administratif )) proposes en la circonstance.C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'avant la cration du ((Programme largid'assistance technique )) et du cc Fonds spcial , l'un et l'autrealiments par des contributions volontaires, le budget annuel del'organisation prvoyait des crdits pour l'assistance technique,lesquels s'ajoutent prsent aux fonds susmentionns; au budgetde l'exercice 1962 figure une somme de 6.400.000 dollars pour lesprogrammes techniques de dveloppement conomique, d'activi-ts sociales, d'activits dans le domaine des droits de l'homme,d'administration publique et de contrle des stupfiants. S'il estvrai qu'au cours des dbats de la Cinquime Commission on a pro-pos de supprimer du budget ordinaire toutes les dpenses entra-nes par l'assistance technique, tous les postes relevant de cesrubriques ont t adopts en seconde lecture par la CinquimeCommission, sans vote contraire. La nature ((oprationnelle ) desactivits ainsi inscrites au budget ressort des explications touchantles prvisions budgtaires, comme par exemple les demandes visant ce que soit poursuivie ((l'excution du programme d'action enmatire de dveloppement conomique que l'Assemble gnrale aenvisag dans ses rsolutions 200 (III) du 4 dcembre 1948 et 304(IV) du 16 novembre 1949 )) ; ainsi que ((l'excution du programmed'action relatif aux fonctions consultatives en matire de servicesocial, tel que l'Assemble gnrale l'a envisag dans sa rsolution418 (V) du I~~ cembre 1950 1).La pratique constante de l'Assemble gnrale est d'inclure dansles rsolutions concernant le budget annuel des dispositions tou-chant les dpenses qui dcoulent du maintien de la paix et de lascurit internationales. Tous les ans, depuis 1947, l'Assemble apris par anticipation des dispositions touchant des dpenses im-prvues et extraordinaires )) entranes par les actions visant au((maintien de la paix et de la scurit J I. Dans une note sur lespratiques budgtaires et financires de l'Organisation des NationsUnies soumise la Cour par le contrleur financier, les (( dpensesextraordinaires )) sont dfinies comme (( les engagements de dpenseset les dpenses dcoulant de l'approbation par un conseil, une com-mission ou un autre organe comptent des Nations Unies de nou-veaux programmes ou activits qui n'avaient pas t envisagsau moment o les crdits budgtaires ont t ouverts .La rsolution annuelle sur l'ouverture de crdits destins couvrir des dpenses extraordinaires autorise le Secrtaire gnral engager des dpenses ce titre avec l'assentiment pralable duComit consultatif pour les questions administratives et budg-taires, mais cet assentiment n'est pas ncessaire si le Secrtaire

13


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General certifies that such commitments relate to the subjectsmentioned .and the amount does not exceed $2 million, At itsfifteenth and sixteenth sessions, the General Assembly resolved"that if, as a result of a decision of the Security Council, commit-ments relating to the maintenance of peace and security shouldarise in a n estimated total exceeding $IO million" before the GeneralAssembly was due to meet again, a special session should be con-vened by the Secretary-General to consider the matter. The Secre-tary-General is regularly authorized to draw on the Working CapitalFund for such expenses but is required to submit supplementarybudget estimates to cover amounts so advanced. These annualresolutions on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses were adoptedwithout a dissenting vote in every year from 1947 through 1959,except for 1952, 1953 and 1954, when the adverse votes are attn-butable to the fact that the resolution included the specification of acontroversial item-United Nations Korean war decorations.

It is notable that the 1961 Report of the Working Group ofFifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and BudgetaryProcedures of the United Nations, while revealing wide differencesof opinion on a variety of propositions, records that the followingstatement was adopted without opposition:

"22 . Investigations and observation operations undertaken by theOrganization to prevent possible aggression should be financed a s+a. of the regular budget of the Unit ed Nat ions ."In the light of what has been stated, the Court concludes thatthere is no justification for reading into the text of Article 17,paragraph I, any limiting or qualifying word before the word"budget"

Turning to paragraph 2 of Article 17, the Court observes that,on its face, the term "expenses of the Organization" means al1 theexpenses and not just certain types of expenses which might bereferred to as "regular expenses". An examination of other parts ofthe Charter shows the variety of expenses which must inevitablybe included within the "expenses of the Organization" just as muchas the salaries of staff or the maintenance of buildings.For example, the text of Chapters I X and X of the Charter withreference to international economic and social cooperation, espe-cially the wording of those articles which specify the functions andpowers of the Economic and Social Council, anticipated the nume-rous and varied circumstances under which expenses of the Organi-


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gnral certifie que ces engagements ont trait aux sujets mention-ns et que le montant n'en dpasse pas 2 millions de dollars. A sesquinzime et seizime sessions, l'Assemble gnrale a dcid(( qu'au cas o il faudrait, la suite d'une dcision du Conseil deScurit, engager, pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit,des dpenses dont le total estimatif dpasserait IO millions dedollars )) avant que l'Assemble gnrale ne se runisse nouveau,une session extraordinaire serait convoque par le Secrtaire gn-ral pour examiner la question. Le Secrtaire gnral est rgulire-ment autoris prlever sur le Fonds de roulement les sommesncessaires ces d~enses.mais il doit rs enter des rvisionsbudgtaires supplmentaires pour couvrir les sommes qui aurontt ainsi avances. Ces rsolutions annuelles concernant les d-penses imprvues et extraordinaires ont t adoptes tous les ans,de 1947 1959, sans vote contraire, sauf pour 1952, 1953 et 1954,les votes contraires venant de ce que la rsolution comprenaitun point sujet controverse - es dcorations pour les combattantsdes Nations Unies en Core.Il est noter que le rapport en 1961 par le Groupe detravail des Quinze pour l'examen des procdures administrativeset budgtaires de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, tout en rv-lant des divergences d'opinion trs tendues touchant un grandnombre de propositions varies, constate que la dclaration sui-vante a t adopte sans opposition:

22. Les enqutes et les oprations d'observation que l'Organisationentreprend pour empcher une agression ventuelle devraient trefinances azr moyen d u budget ordinaire de l 'ONU. A la lumire de ce qui a t dit, la Cour conclut que rien ne per-met de sous-entendre dans le paragraphe I de l'article 17 un motlimitant ou qualifiant le mot (( budget .

Passant au paragraphe 2 de l'article 17, la Cour remarque qu'premire vue le terme (( dpenses de l'organisation )) signifie toutesles dpenses et non pas seulement un certain type de dpenses quipourraient s'appeler dpenses ordinaires N. L'tude d'autres sec-tions de la Charte montre la varit des dpenses qui doiventinvitablement rentrer dans la catgorie des (( dpenses de I'Orga-nisation )) tout aussi bien que les traitements des fonctionnaireset l'entretien des btiments.Par exemple, le texte des chapitres IX et X de la Charte qui onttrait la coopration conomique et sociale internationale, etparticulirement celui des articles qui prcisent les fonctions etles pouvoirs du Conseil conomique et social, a prvu les circons-tances nombreuses et varies dans lesquelles l'organisation pou-14


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zation could be incurred and which have indeed eventuated inpractice.Furthermore, by Article 98 of the Charter, the Secretary-Generalis obligated to perform such functions as are entrusted to him bythe General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic andSocial Council, and the Trusteeship Council. Whether or not ex-penses incurred in his discharge of this obligation become "expensesof the Organization" cannot depend on whether they be adminis-trative or some other kind of expenses.The Court does not perceive any basis for challenging the legalityof the settled practice of including such expenses as these in thebudgetary amounts which the General Assembly apportions amongthe Members in accordance with the authority which is given to itby Article 17, paragraph 2 .

Passing from the text of Article 17 to its place in the generalstmcture and scheme of the Charter, the Court will consider whetherin that broad context one finds any basis for implying a limitationupon the budgetary authority of the General Assembly which inturn might limit the meaning of "expenses" in paragraph 2 of thatArticle.

The general purposes of Article 17 are the vesting of control overthe finances of the Organization, and the levying of apportionedamounts of the expenses of the Organization in order to enable it tocarry out the functions of the Organization as a whole actiygthrough i ts principal organs and such subsidiary organs as may beestablished under the authority of Article 22 or Article 29.Article 17 is the only article in the Charter which refers to budget-ary authority or to the power to apportion expenses, or othenviseto raise revenue, except for Articles 33 and 35, paragraph 3 , of theStatute of the Court which have no bearing on the point here underdiscussion. Nevertheless, it has been argued before the Court thatone type of expenses, namely those resulting from operations forthe maintenance of international peace and security, are not"expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17,paragraph 2, of the Charter, inasmuch as they fa11 to be dealt withexclusively by the Security Council, and more especially throughagreements negotiated in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.The argument rests in part upon the view that when the mainte-nance of international peace and security is involved, it is only theSecurity Council which is authonzed to decide on any action relativethereto. I t is argued further tha t since the General Assembly'spower is limited to discussing, considering, studying and recom-mending, it cannot impose an obligation to pay the expenses whichresult from the implementation of its recommendations. This15


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vait encourir des dpenses, prvisions qui se sont effectivementtrouves ralises dans la pratique.En outre, le Secrtaire gnral, en vertu de l'article 98 de laCharte, est tenu de remplir toutes fonctions dont il est charg parl'Assemble gnrale, le Conseil de Scurit, le Conseil conomiqueet social et le Conseil de Tutelle. Le point de savoir si les dpensesengages pour remplir cette obligation deviennent ou non des dpenses de l'organisation )) ne peut pas dpendre du fait que cesdpenses sont de caractre administratif ou de toute autre sorte.La Cour ne voit aucune base sur laquelle on puisse contester lalgalit de la pratique constante qui consiste inclure de tellesdpenses dans les sommes inscrites au budget que l'Assemblegnrale rpartit parmi les Membres, conformment l'autoritqu'elle dtient de l'article 17, paragraphe 2 .

Aprs avoir tudi le texte de l'article 17 et passant l'examende la place qu'il occupe dans la structure gnrale et l'conomie dela Charte, la Cour recherchera si, dans ce large contexte, il se trouveune base quelconque qui permettrait d'admettre une limite implicite l'autorit budgtaire de l'Assemble gnrale qui, son tour,pourrait limiter la signification du mot (( dpenses dans le para-graphe 2 de cet article.Le but gnral de l'article 17 est l'attribution du pouvoir decontrle sur les finances de l'organisation et la rpartition desquotes-parts des dpenses de celle-ci pour lui permettre d'accom-plir les fonctions de l'organisation dans son ensemble en agissantpar l'intermdiaire de ses organes principaux et des organes subsi-diaires crs en vertu de l'article 22 OU de l'article 29.A part les articles 33 et 35, paragraphe 3 , du Statut de la Courqui n'ont aucun rapport avec la question discute ici, l'article 17est le seul article de la Charte qui fasse mention de l'autorit bud-gtaire ou du pouvoir de rpartir les dpenses ou de percevoir desrecettes par tous autres moyens. On a pourtant soutenu devant laCour qu'un type de dpenses, notamment celles qui rsultent desoprations pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationa-les, ne sont pas des dpenses de l'Organisation au sens de l'ar-ticle 17, paragraphe 2 , de la Charte, puisqu'elles relvent exclusi-vement du Conseil de Scurit et plus particulirement d'accordsngocis en vertu de l'article 43 de la Charte.

Cet argument s'appuie en partie sur l'ide que, dans les circons-tances o il s'agit du maintien de la paix et de la scurit interna-tionales, seul le Conseil de Scurit est autoris prendre unedcision prescrivant une action. On a soutenu aussi que, le pouvoirde l'Assemble gnrale se bornant discuter, examiner, tudieret recommander, celle-ci ne peut pas imposer l'obligation de cou-vrir des dpenses qui rsultent de la mise en uvre de ses propres


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argument leads to an examination of the respective functions ofthe General Assembly and of the Security Council under the Charter,particularly with respect to the maintenance of internationalpeace and security.

Article 24 of the Charter provides"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UnitedNations, its Members confer on the Secunty Council primaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace andsecunty .."

The responsibility conferred is "primary", not exclusive. Thisprimary responsibility is conferred upon the Security Council, asstated in Article 24, "in order to ensure prompt and effectiveaction". To this end, it is the Security Council which is given a powerto impose an explicit obligation of compliance if for example itissues an order or command to an aggressor under Chapter VII. I t isonly the Security Council which can require enforcement by coerciveaction against an aggressor.The Charter makes it abundantly clear, however, that the GeneralAssembly is also to be concerned with international peace andsecurity. Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly to "recom-mend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation,regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the generalwelfare or friendly relations among nations, including situationsresulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Chartersetting for th the purposes and principles of the United Nations".The word "measures" implies some kind of action, and the onlylimitation which Article 14 mposes on the General Assembly is therestriction found in Article 12, amely, that the Assembly should notrecommend measures while the Security Council is dealing with thesame matter unless the Council requests it to do so. Thus while itis the Security Council which, exclusively, may order coerciveaction, the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on theGeneral Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration,the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations; theyare not merely hortatory. Article 18 deals with "decisions" of theGeneral Assembly "on important questions". These "decisions"do indeed include certain recommendations, but others have dispo-sitive force and effect. Among these latter decisions, Article 18includes suspension of rjghts and privileges of membership, expul-sion. of Members, "and budgetary questions". In connection withthe suspension of rights and privileges of membership and expulsionfrom membership under Articles 5 and 6, it is the Security Councilwhich has only the power to recommend and it is the GeneralAssembly which decides and whose decision determines status; butthere is a close collaboration between the two organs. Moreover,these powers of decision of the General Assembly under Arti-16


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recommandations. Cet argument conduit l'tude des fonctionsrespectives de l'Assemble gnrale et du Conseil de Scurit selonla Charte, en particulier en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix etde la scurit internationales.

L'article 24 de la Charte dispose: Afin d'assurer l'action rapide et efficace de l'organisation, sesMembres confrent au Conseil de Scurit la responsabilit prin-cipale du maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales...

La responsabilit ainsi confre est (( principale )) et non exclusive.Selon l'article 24, cette responsabilit principale est confre auConseil de Scurit ((afin d'assurer l'action rapide et efficace del'organisation. C'est donc au Conseil de Scurit qu'est dvolule pouvoir d'imposer l'obligation explicite de se conformer auxordres qu'il peut mettre au titre du chapitre VI I , par exemplecontre un agresseur. Seul le Conseil de Scurit peut prescrire desmesures d'excution par une action coercitive contre un agresseur.La Charte indique cependant trs clairement que l'Assemblegnrale doit aussi s'occuper de la paix et de la scurit internatio-nales. L'article 14 autorise l'Assemble gnrale (( recommanderles mesures propres assurer l'ajustement pacifique de toute situa-tion, quelle qu'en soit l'origine, qui lui semble de nature nuireau bien gnral ou compromettre les relations amicales entrenations, y compris les situations rsultant d'une infraction auxdispositions de la prsente Charte o sont noncs les buts et lesprincipes des Nations Unies . Le mot (t mesures )) suppose uneforme quelconque d'action et la seule restriction que l'article 14impose l'Assemble gnrale est celle qui figure l'article 12,c'est--dire que l'Assemble ne peut recommander de mesures tantque le Conseil de Scurit traite de la mme question, moins quele Conseil de Scurit ne le lui demande. Ainsi, tandis que c'est leConseil de Scurit qui possde le droit exclusif d'ordonner uneaction coercitive, les fonctions et pouvoirs de l'Assemble gnraleselon la Charte ne sont pas limits la discussion, l'examen, l'tude et la recommandation; ses attributions ne sont pas simple-ment de caractre exhortatif. L'article 18 raite des (( dcisions de l'Assemble gnrale sur les questions importantes . Cescc dcisions comprennent en effet certaines recommandations,mais d'autres ont une valeur et un effet de caractre impratif.Parmi ces dernires dcisions l'article 18 comprend la suspensiondes droits et privilges de Membres, l'exclusion de Membres etles questions budgtaires . En ce qui concerne la suspension desdroits et privilges de Membres et l'exclusion de Membres dansle cadre des articles 5 et 6, c'est le Conseil de Scurit dont le pou-voir se borne faire des recommandations et c'est l'Assemblegnrale qui dcide et dont la dcision fixe le statut des tats en

16


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cles 5 and 6 are specifically related to preventive or enforcementmeasures.

By Article 17, paragraph 1, the General Assembly is given thepower not only to "consider" the budget of the Organization, butalso to "approve" it. The decision to "approve" the budget has aclose connection with paragraph 2 of Article 17, since thereunderthe General Assembly is also given the power to apportion theexpenses among the Members and the exercise of the power ofapportionment creates the obligation, specifically stated in Article17, paragraph 2 , of each Member to bear that part of the expenseswhich is apportioned to i t by the General Assembly. When thoseexpenses include expenditures for the maintenance of peace andsecunty, which are not otherwise provided for, it is the GeneralAssembly which has the authonty to apportion the latter amountsamong the Members. The provisions of the Charter which distributefunctions and powers to the Secunty Council and to the GeneralAssembly give no support to the view that such distribution ex-cludes from the powers of the General Assembly the power toprovide for the financing of measures designed to maintain peaceand security.

The argument supporting a limitation on the budgetary authorityof the General Assembly with respect to the maintenance of inter-national peace and security relies especially on the reference to"action" in the last sentence of Article II , paragraph 2 . This para-graph reads as follows:"The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to themaintenance of international peace and security brought before itby any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council,or by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations inaccordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as providedin Article 12, may make recomrnendations with regard to any suchquestion to the State or States concerned or to the Security Council,or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shalibe referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly eitherbefore or after discussion."

The Court considers that the kind of action referred to in Ar-ticle I I , paragraph 2, is coercive or enforcement action. This para-graph, which applies not merely to general questions relating topeace and security, but also to specific cases brought before theGeneral Assembly by a State under Article 35, in its first sentenceempowers the General Assembly, by means of recommendationsto States or to the Secunty Council, or to both, to organize peace-keeping operations, a t the request, or with the consent, of the Statesconcerned. This power of the General Assembly is a special powerwhich in no way derogates from its general powers under Article IO17


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question, mais il y a une troite collaboration entre ces deux or-ganes. De plus, ce pouvoir de dcision que les articles 5 et 6 attri-buent l'Assemble gnrale se rattache expressment aux me-sures prventives ou coercitives.Le paragraphe I de l'article 17 donne l'Assemble gnrale lepouvoir non seulement d'((examiner ) le budget de l'Organisationmais aussi de lcc approuver ) ) . La dcision d'c( approuver )) le budgetest troitement lie au paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 car, en vertude ce paragraphe, l'Assemble gnrale a galement le pouvoir derpartir les dpenses entre les Membres et l'exercice du pouvoir derpartition cre pour tous les Membres l'obligation expressmentnonce l'article 17, paragraphe 2 , de supporter la quote-partdes dpenses qui leur incombe selon la rpartition fixe parl'Assemble gnrale. Lorsque ces dpenses comprennent desfrais pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit qui ne sontpas couverts par d'autres ressources, c'est l'Assemble gnralequi a l'autorit pour rpartir ces frais entre les Membres. On ne trouvedans les dispositions de la Charte qui rpartissent les fonctions etpouvoirs entre le Conseil de Scurit et l'Assemble gnrale aucunejustification de l'ide que cet te rpartition exclut des pouvoirs del'Assemble gnrale celui de prvoir le financement des mesuresdestines au maintien de la paix et de la scurit.L'argument qui soutient que le pouvoir budgtaire de 1'Assem-ble gnrale est limit en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paixet de la scurit internationales se fonde spcialement sur la rf-rence faite une (( action )) dans la dernire phrase du paragraphe 2de l'article I I . Ce paragraphe s'exprime ainsi:

(( L'Assemble gnrale peut discuter toutes questions se rat-tachant au maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales, dontelle aura t saisie par l'une quelcoqque des Nations Unies, ou parle Conseil de Scurit, ou par un Etat qui n'est pas Membre del'organisation, conformment aux dispositions de l'article 35, para-graphe 2, et, sous rserve de l'article 12, faire sur toutes questionsde ce genre des recommandations soit l'Et$ ou aux tats intres-ss, soit au Conseil de Scurit, soit aux Etats et au Conseil deScurit. Toute question de ce genre qui appelle une action estrenvoye au Conseil de Scurit par l'Assemble gnrale, avantou aprs discussion. ))

La Cour estime que la sorte d'action dont il est question l'ar-ticle I I , paragraphe 2, est une action coercitive. Ce paragraphe, quine concerne pas seulement les questions d'ordre gnral touchantla paix et la scurit, mais encore les cas particuliers soumis envertu de l'article 35 l'Assemble par les tats, habilite, par sapremire phrase, l'Assemble gnrale organiser, par des recom-mandations adresses aux Membres, a u Conseil de Scurit, ouaux deux, .et la demande ou avec le consentement des paysintresss, des oprations visant au maintien de la paix. Ce pouvoir,confr l'Assemble gnrale, est un pouvoir spcial qui ne


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or Article 14, except as limited by the last sentence of Article II,paragraph 2.This last sentence says that when "action" is necessarythe General Assembly shall refer the question to the Secunty Coun-cil. The word "action" must mean such action as is solely withinthe province of the Secunty Council. I t cannot refer to recommen-dations which the Secunty Council might make, as for instanceunder Article 38, because the General Assembly under Article IIhas a comparable power. The "action" which is solely within theprovince of the Secunty Council is that which is indicated by thetitle of Chapter VI1 of the Charter, namely "Action with respect tothreats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression".If the word "action" in Article II,paragraph 2, were interpreted tomean that the General Assembly could make recommendationsonly of a general character affecting peace and secunty in theabstract, and not in relation to specific cases, the paragraph wouldnot have provided that the General Assembly may make recom-mendations on questions brought before it by States or by theSecunty Council. Accordingly, the last sentence of Article II,para-graph 2, has no application where the necessary action is not en-forcement action.

The practice of the Organization throughout its history bears outthe foregoing elucidation of the term "action" in the last sentenceof Article II,paragraph 2.Whether the General Assembly proceedsunder Article II or under Article 14, the implementation of itsrecommendations for setting up commissions or other bodies in-volves organizational activity-action-in connection with themaintenance of international peace and security. Such implemen-tation is a normal feature of the functioning of the United Nations.Such committees, commissions or other bodies or individuals,constitute, in some cases, subsidiary organs established under theauthonty of Article 22 of the Charter. The functions of the GeneralAssembly for which it may establish such subsidiary organs include,for example, investigation, observation and supervision, but theway in which such subsidiary organs are utilized depends on theconsent of the State or States concerned.

The Court accordingly finds that the argument which seeks, byreference to Article II,paragraph 2, o limit the budgetary author-ity of the General Assembly in respect of the maintenance of inter-national peace and security, is unfounded.

I t has further been argued before the Court that Article 43 of theCharter constitutes a particular rule, a lex specialis, which derogates18


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diminue aucunement ses pouvoirs gnraux selon l'article IO oul'article 14, part la restriction indique dans la dernire phrasedu paragraphe 2 de l'article II. Cette dernire phrase nonce quequand une cc action est ncessaire l'Assemble gnrale doitrenvoyer la question au Conseil de Scurit. Le mot cc action )) doitsignifier une action qui est uniquement de la comptence du Conseilde Scurit. Il ne peut pas avoir trait des recommandations quele Conseil de Scurit pourrait faire, comme, par exemple, auxtermes de l'article 38, parce que l'Assemble gnrale possde lemme pouvoir en vertu de l'article II. Lcc action 1 qui est unique-ment de la comptence du Conseil de Securit est celle dont il estfait mention dans le titre du chapitre VI1 de la Charte, savoir,((Action en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paixet d'acte d'agression . Si l'on interprtait le mot cc action 1) auparagraphe 2 de l'article II comme voulant dire que l'Assemblegnrale ne peut faire que des recommandations de caractre gn-ral concernant, dans l'abstrait, la paix et la scurit, et non pasrelatives des cas particuliers, ce paragraphe n'aurait pas prvuque l'Assemble gnrale puisse faire des recommandations sur desquestions dont elle aurait t saisie par un Etat ou par le Conseilde Scurit. En consquence la dernire phrase du. paragraphe 2de l'article II n'est pas applicable quand l'action en question n'estpas une action coercitive.La pratique de l'Organisation au cours de son histoire confirmeles claircissements qui viennent d'tre donns sur le terme (( ac-tion )) qui figure la dernire phrase du paragraphe 2 de l'article II.Que l'Assemble gnrale procde en vertu de l'article II ou del'article 14, l'excution de ses recommandations concernant lacration de commissions ou d'autres organismes entrane une acti-vit de l'Organisation - ne action - n relation avec le main-tien de la paix et de la skcurit internationales. L'excution de cesrecommandations reprsente un aspect normal du fonctionne-ment des Nations Unies. Ces comits. commissions ou autresorganismes ou individus constituent, dans certains cas, des organessubsidiaires crs en vertu de l'article 22 de la Charte. Les fonctionsde l'Assemble gnrale pour lesquelles elle peut crer des organessubsidiaires comprennent par exemple les enqutes, l'observationet le contrle, mais la faon dont ces organes subsidiaires sontutiliss dpend du consentement de l'tat ou des Etats intresss.Par consquent, la Cour estime que l'argument qui cherche, ense rfrant au paragragk- 2 de l'article II, limiter l'autoritbudgtaire de l'Assemble gt..'--le l'gard du maintien de lapaix et de la scurit internationales, n'est pas'fond.

On a galement soutenu devant la Cour que l'article 43 de laCharte constitue une rgle particulire, une le x specialis, qui droge


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from the general rule in Article 17, whenever an expenditure for themaintenance of international peace and security is involved.Article 43 provides that Members shall negotiate agreements withthe Security Council on its initiative, stipulating what "armed forces,assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary forthe purpose of maintaining international peace and security", theMember State will make available to the Security Council on its call.According to paragraph 2 of the Article:

"Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers andtypes of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, andthe nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided."The argument is that such agreements were intended to includespecifications concerning the allocation of costs of such enforcementactions as might be taken by direction of the Secunty Council, andthat it is only the Security Council which has the authority toarrange for meeting such costs.With reference to this argument, the Court will state at the out-set that, for reasons fully expounded later in this Opinion, theoperations known as UNEF and ONUC were not enforcement actionswithin the compass of Chapter VI1 of the Charter and that there-fore Article 43 could not have any applicability to the cases withwhich the Court is here concerned. However, even if Article 43 wereapplicable, the Court could not accept this interpretation of i tstext for the following reasons.There is nothing in the text of Article 43 which would limit thediscretion of the Security Council in negotiating such agreements.It cannot be assumed that in every such agreement the SecurityCouncil would insist, or tha t any Member State would be bound toagree, that such State would bear the entire cost of the "assistance"which it would make available including, for example, transportof forces to the point of operation, complete logistical maintenancein the field, supplies, arms and ammunition, etc. If, during nego-tiations under the terms of Article 43, a Member State would beentitled (as it would be) to insist, and the Security Council wouldbe entitled (as it would be) to agree, that some part of the expenseshould be borne by the Organization, then such expense would formpart of the expenses of the Organization and would fall to be appor-tioned by the General Assembly under Article 17. I t is difficult tosee how it could have been contemplated tha t all potential expensescould be envisaged in such agreements concluded perhaps long inadvance. Indeed, the difficulty or impossibility of anticipating theentire financial impact of enforcement measures on Member Statesis brought out by the terms of Article 50 which provides that a State,whether a Member of the United Nations or not, "which finds itselfconfronted with special economic problems arising from the carry-ing out of those [preventive or enforcement] measures, shall have


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la rgle gnrale de l'article 17 chaque fois qu'il s'agit de d-penses pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales.L'article 43 prvoit que les Membres ngocieront des accords avecle Conseil de Scurit sur l'initiative de ce dernier, en stipulantquels seront cc les forces armes, l'assistance et les facilits, y com-pris le droit de passage, ncessajres au maintien de la paix et de lascurit internationales que 1'Etat Membre mettra la dispositiondu Conseilude Scurit sur l'invitation de ce dernier. Selon le para-graphe 2 de cet article:((L'accord ou les accords susviss fixeront les effectifs et lanature de ces forces, leur degr de prparation et leur emplacement

gnral, ainsi que la nature des facilits et de l'assistance fournir. aOn en tire l'argument que ces accords avaient pour objet d'noncerdes prcisions concernant la rpartition des frais des actions coer-citives que le Conseil de Scurit pourrait prescrire et que seul leConseil de Scurit a le pouvoir de prendre des mesures en vue definancer ces dpenses.En ce qui concerne cet argument, la Cour dclare ds maintenantque, pour des raisons qui seront pleinement exposes par la suitedans cet avis, les oprations de la FUNU et de I'ONUC ne sont pasdes actions coercitives rentrant dans le cadre du chapitre VI1 de laCharte et que par consquent l'article 43 ne peut s'appliquer auxcas prsentement soumis la Cour. Toutefois, mme si l'article 43s'appliquait, la Cour ne pourrait pas en accepter une telle inter-prtation pour les raisons suivantes.Rien dans le texte de l'article 43 ne restreint le pouvoir discr-tionnaire du Conseil de Scurit pour ngocier de tels accords. Onne saurait prsumer que, dans tous ces accords, le Conseil de S-curit exigera qu'un tat Membre supporte la totalit des frais de1' assistance qu'il fournira, y compris par exemple le transportdes troupes sur le lieu de l'opration, leur entire subsistance lo-gistique sur place, l'approvisionnement, les armes et les munitions,etc., ou que cet tat sera oblig d'y consentir. Si, au cours de n-gociations effectues en vertu de l'article 43, un Etat Membre avaitle droit (comme il l'aurait) d'exiger qu'une certaine partie desdpenses soit supporte par l'organisation, et si le Conseil de S-curit avait le droit (comme il l'aurait) d'y consentir, alors cettepartie des dpenses entrerait dans les dpenses de l'organisationet devrait tre rpartie par l'Assemble gnrale selon l'article 17.Il est difficile de voir comment on aurait pu envisager que toutesles dpenses ventuelles puissent tre prvues dans des accords dece genre, conclus peut-tre longtemps l'avance. La difficult oul'impossibilit de prvoir toutes les consquences financires pourles tats Membres des mesures coercitives est mme indique parles termes de l'article 50 qui prvoit qu'un Etat, qu'il soit Membredes Nations Unies ou non, s'il se trouve en prsence de difficultsconomiques particulires dues l'excution desdites mesures19


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the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solutionof those problems". Presumably in such a case the Security Councilmight determine that the overburdened State was entitled to somefinancial assistance; such financial assistance, if afforded by theOrganization, as it might be, would clearly constitute part of the"expenses of the Organization". The economic problems could nothave been covered in advance by a negotiated agreement since theywould be unknown until after the event and in the case of non-Member States, which are also included in Article 50, no agreementa t al1would have been negotiated under Article 43.

Moreover, an argument which insists that al1 measures taken forthe maintenance of international peace and secunty must befnanced through agreements concluded under Article 43, wouldseem to exclude the possibility that the Secunty Council mightact under some other Article of the Charter. The Court cannotaccept so

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Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion