Amatan vs Aruejo

A.M. No. RTJ-93-956. September 27, 1995

StatCon Issue: Construction in favor of right and justice OR Construction to avoid injustice

FACTS:

A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias Meon of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed by the PNP Station Commander in Bato, Leyte

for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip. After preliminary investigation by the office of the

provincial fiscal, Umpad was charged with the crime of Homicide.

Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the

consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused

would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as originally

charged in the information.

Consequently, in his decision promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent judge found the

accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted

Homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment as stated in the plea bargaining agreement.

In a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-

law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of

the law and gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of Crim. Case No. H-223 entitled People

v. Rodrigo Umpad alias Meon.

Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the

1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individualwith the consent of the offended partyto plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of

lesser jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in applying Sec.2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure in the case at bench?

HELD:

YES. While Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the accused in

a criminal case to plead guilty to a lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, the fact of death of the victim for which the accused was

criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense, be reconciled with the plea of

guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide.

Art 10 of the Civil Code states that In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. When a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge

of conscience. In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to

injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common

sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and

justice at heart. Fiat justicia ruat coelum.

ARTICLE 10, NCC

Salvacion v. Central Bank

G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997

Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS:

Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for the crime of serious illegal detention and 4

counts of rape against Karen Salvacion, daughter of herein petitioners, Federico and Evelina

Salvacion. The police were able to recover from accused several dollar checks and a dollar

account in China Banking Corporation. On the day of the scheduled hearing for petition for bail,

the accused was able to escape from jail. In the meantime, the petitioners filed a civil case for

damages with preliminary attachment against accused. It was granted by the trial court for which

a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued. In view said judgment of the trial court, a Notice

of Garnishment was given to respondent China Banking Corporation, but the latter argues that

the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli cannot be made subject of a garnishment, in accordance with

Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, which provides that Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,

legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Respondent Central Bank further avers that Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 is copied verbatim from a

portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that

grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A.

6426 as amended) itself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as

amended by the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (P.D. 1246), can be made applicable to the dollar

deposits of the accused.

HELD:

No. Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by

the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (P.D. 1246) are held to be inapplicable to this case. The

questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that the rape victim

and her parents fully deserve. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted.

The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such

as the case at bar.

The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. If the questioned Section 113 of

Central Bank Circular No. 960, which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order

or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body

whatsoever, will be applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen

aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New

Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge

of conscience.

Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and

to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the

judgment.

SK Elective Official Qualifications

Garvida vs. Sales, Jr.

G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997

Puno, J.

Facts:

The case at bar is for the annulment and setting aside of the order of COMELEC en banc

on suspending petitioners proclamation as SK chairperson of Brgy. San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The suspension arises from respondent Sales, Jr.s complaint submitted through facsimile to respondent COMELEC regarding the age of petitioner, which he claims to

be beyond 21 yearsthe requirement stated in Sec. 424 of the Local Government Code and Sec. 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. COMELEC en banc ordered as a response, that

proclamation of petitioner Garvida be suspended in the instance that she wins the election.

Come May 6, 1996 election, she won the majority vote and was proclaimed SK

chairperson on June 2, 1996 as without prejudice to any further action by [COMELEC] or any other interested party. Petitioner seeks that the proclamation be upheld, and reasserts that her age of 21 years and 10 months on the day of the election is within the provision of the Local

Government Code, and assails the validity of Sec. 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824,

which she claims to be ultra vires.

Issues1:

1) Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK chairperson under Sec. 424 of the

Local Government Code

2) Whether or not Resolution No. 2824 is ultra vires with regards to the Local

Government Code

Held:

1) No. A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the

maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective

SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a members maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand,

Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old on the day of his election. The addition of the phrase on the day of his election is an additional

1 Additional issue, but does not involve Statutory Construction: Whether or not the procedure undergone by

respondents complaint to COMELEC was legal. Its been held that the proper complaint procedure is not through facsimile (or Fax), but through a mail submission with the procurement of 10 copies to be submitted through the

COMELEC Division, and not en banc.

qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he

registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be

more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that

the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the

Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there

are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.

2) No. The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years

of age on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of

1991. In fact the term qualified voter appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Since a qualified voter is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a qualified voter is a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of

the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it

sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.

However, reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date

at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum

age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in

relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes

the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.

Noscitor a Sociis

Buenaseda vs. Flavier

G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993

QUIASON, J

FACTS:

The petitioners sought to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive

suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et al.

The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the

Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act.

The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend; and (b) Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are

conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; and said conditions have not been

met in the instant case.

In their defense, respondents invoked Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an

investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge

against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave

misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant

removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may

prejudice the case filed against him.

Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given to the Ombudsman under the

said provision provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such

functions or duties as may be provided by law, including the power to order preventive

suspensions.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987

Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other

agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation

conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the

Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or

employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,

censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has

three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against

public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine,

censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees

outside of his own office while investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said

officials and employees are pending.

HELD:

Yes, the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials employees as aid in

investigations. When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the

suspension" of a public official or employees , it referred only to "suspension," as a punitive

measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to

penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule

of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words

with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings,

its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is

found or with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend

public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a

penal statute. The preventive suspension, provided that the requisites are complied with, may be

imposed as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to

perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. The said R.A. should be given

such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any

interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.

Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Summary:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Ombudsman ordered the preventive suspension of the petitioners Petitioners Buenaseda et al sought to nullify the order of suspension provided by the

Ombudsman.

The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that the authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend and thus he acted

outside of his authority.

In their defense, the respondents (The Ombudsman included) invoked Sec. 24 of R.A. 6770 (The Ombudsman Law). The said provision states that the ombudsman may order

preventive suspensions an aid in the investigation of administrative charges.

Unconvinced, the Solicitor General invoked Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which states that the ombudsman may only recommend suspension of officials and employees

facing administrative investigation conducted by his office, and that he may not directly

order the suspensions.

o Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution states that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power, function, and duty to direct the officer concerned to take

appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend

his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure

compliance therewith.

The SC ruled in favor of the respondents and against the Solicitor General. Applying the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the court declared that the constitutional provision that the

solicitor general cited referred only to "suspension," as a punitive measure, and not to

procedural suspensions. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension"

should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a

particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may

be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which

it is associated.

The constitutional provision does not prohibit the Ombudsman from ordering preventive/procedural suspensions as aid in investigations. (Procedural = suspension,

Punitive Measure/Penalty/Sanction = dismissal/removal; it is sometimes necessary for the

ombudsman to order preventive suspensions in order to prevent disruptions in the

investigations. in those cases, the preventive suspensions are merely procedural

measures, not punitive.)

Hence, the petition was dismissed.

CIT vs OPLE

CORTES, J.

FACTS:

6 cases where consolidated by the SC to address a controversy regarding tuition hikes and the

rewards of allowances/bonuses to the teaching and teaching personnel. The cases were file by

the previously mentioned persons as well as parents of students studying on said schools, then

minister of labor and employment, his deputy, NLRC and then minister of Education. The gist

of their complaints lies in the interpretation of Sec 3 of PD 451 which bore the fruit of the case

at bar under the refusal of private schools concerned to pay allowances and benefits on the

ground that the said items stated in PD 451 is deemed included in the salary. Thus petitioners

seeking remedy from SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not allowances and benefits of faculty members and other school employees can be

charged in compliance with PD 451 but not against the 60% meant for salary increase ?

HELD:

YES. Statutory construction rules state that when the language of the law is clear and

unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Where the legislative intent

were consistent with the interpretation of the law of PD 451 it can no longer be argued as to the

meaning of such clear law.

Notes:

SEC. 3. Limitations. The increase in tuition or other school fees or other charges as well as the new fees or charges authorized under the next preceding section shall be subject to the

following conditions;

(a) That no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved unless sixty

(60%) per centum of the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of

the faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the balance for institutional

development, student assistance and extension services, and return to investments: Provided That

in no case shall the return to investments exceed twelve (12%) per centum of the incremental

proceeds.

Principle of Necessary Implication (Or pwede nadin, interpretation of words to uphold purpose?)

Sugbuanon Rural Bank v. Laguesma2

G.R. No. 116194, Feb. 2, 2000

J. Quisimbing

Facts:

Petitioner, through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, seek for the annulment of

the DOLE resolution affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter which denied petitioners motion to dismiss respondent unions (Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office and Technical Employees Union or APSOTEU-TUCP) petition for certification of election. They contended

that since the members of the union are composed of MANAGERIAL and/or CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYEES following the doctrines in the Tabacalera and Panday cases, they are therefore

deemed disqualified from engaging in any labor organization.

On the other hand, Respondents claim that the members of the union are not managerial

employees but are merely SUPERVISORY employees of the bank which under the provision of

the Labor Code (Art. 245) should not be subject to such disqualification.

2 Certification of Election automatically conducted by med-arbiter upon petition of a recognized and legitimate

labor organization, in the case at bar, petitioner assails the legitimacy of the labor organization to hinder the

proceedings of the certification of election kaya nila ayaw yan dahil once certified they can proceed with their CBA, of course as MANAGEMENT, ano pa nga ba? they dont want CBA. Confidential employees - those who assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard to persons who formulate,

determine, and effectuate management policies (specifically in the field of labor relations). The two criteria: 1. The confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer. 2. That officer must handle the

prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

Managerial employees (Art. 212) - one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute

management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.

Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial

actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of

independent judgment.

Illegibility of Managerial employees from union; right of supervisory employees (Art. 245) - Managerial

employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible

for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor

organizations of their own.

Tabacalera Case - classification of a credit and collection supervisor by management held as a

managerial/supervisory personnel

Panday case - branch accountant held as managerial employee

Issue: Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or

highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations

and engaging in union activities.

Held:

No. With regard to the claim of being managerial employees, the reliance of petitioner to the

aforesaid cases are completely erroneous since they were unable to prove that the employees in

question (the Cashiers, Accountant, and Acting Chief of the Loans Department) were vested with

similar powers which are the power to appoint and hire subordinates and the power to

recommend promotions and/or increase. Moreover, their job descriptions do not even allow them

to TRANSFER, SUSPEND, LAY-OFF, RECALL, DISCHARGE, ASSIGN OR DISCIPLINE

EMPLOYEES, contrary to the comprehension of Article 212 which defines the duties of

managerial employees.

As to their status as confidential employees, Article 245 does not expressly include confidential

employees to be illegible from engaging in any union activity, however, by virtue of

NECESSARY IMPLICATION, the Court held that disqualification of managerial employees

equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of

confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of

management policies relating to labor relations. Since confidential employees have a confidential

relationship with his superior officer who handles responsibilities regarding labor relations, such

confidential employees are consequently aware of management policies relating labor relations

and are thus prohibited by law. HOWEVER, if he does not have access to confidential labor

relations information, then there shall be no impediment for him to join a union.

Petitioner claims that the employees are confidential employees by the contention that they have

access to the banks confidential data. The Court held that they have failed to establish the officers access of information relating to labor relations policies and that the only information they can access are CORPORATE policies. As a result, they are not deemed as confidential

employees.

Hence, the employees are not in any obstruction to engage in union activities for they are neither

managerial nor confidential employees.

CHAVEZ vs JBC

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two

representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in

separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate

and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G.

Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as

representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent

and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice

by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of

its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution

speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no

real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the standing of the JBC having 8 members and 2 of which are members of

Congress goes against the language and intent of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

YES. The word Congress is used in its generic sense. Congress being a technical term and well defined at that, it cannot be argued as to its definition and usage on the Constitution. The

seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution

should there be a stalemate in voting.

The Constitution clearly states that the JBC be composed of seven 7 members only.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its

prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions

previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

Statcon: Ejusdim Generesis

LIWAG vs Happy Glen Loop Homeowners

GR No 189755 July 4 2012

Facts:

The issue at hand comes from a water facility that is located in the Happy Glen Loop

Subdivision at Deparo Caloocan City. The original developer,FGR Sales, of the subdivision got a

loan from Ernesto Marcelo and in failing in its obligation to Marcelo FGR Sales assigned to

Marcelo all rights to several parcels of land in the subdivision. Marcelo presented to lot buyers,

National Housing Authority and Human Settlement Regulatory Commision that a water facility

was available in the subdivision. For over 30 years the residents of the subdivision relied on the

water facility for their water needs and this fact was acknowledge by Marcelo and Hermogenes

Liwag (petitioners late husband) former president of Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association. In 1995 Marcelo sold Lot 11 Block 5, the parcel of land that has the water facility,

to Liwag resulting to a transfer certificate of title. After the death of her husband petitioner, on

2003, issued a letter demanding the removal of water tank.

Refusing to comply with petitioners request, the respondents filed before the HLURB (House and Land use Regulatory Board) for the annulment of sale of said parcel of land (TC 350099).

The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favour of the association (respondents). An appeal on the HLURB

board of commissions found that the lot was not an open space. Respondent then interposed an

appeal to the OP, which reaffirmed the decision of the HLURB Arbiter and ruled that the lot was

an open space by virtue of it being the site of the water installation of the subdivision per

Marcelos official representation. It also ruled that the representation was known to the petitioner because they had knowledge to the existence of the water installation. Petition was

moved to the CA which said that HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction on the matter. Aggrieved,

petitioner filed the petition to the SC.

Issue:

Whether HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction on the matter at hand?

Whether the Land is considered as open space? (meaning di pde I benta)

Held:

YES and YES.

Here is the jurisdiction of the HLURB

Execution in the Enforcement of its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957, viz.:

Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall

have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature.

A. Unsound real estate business practices; (eto yung important)

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit

buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers

of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, broker or salesman.

Yung sale daw nung land is in violation of P.D. 957 dahil alam nang both parties na may water

installation dun at un lng yung water installation ng subdivision.

STATCON RELEVANCE: Ejusdim Generesis

Meaning kukunin mo yung meaning nang phrase from the group of words na kasama niya. Sa

Case nato dito sya nag apply:

The term open space is defined in P.D. 1216 as an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers,

barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities.

Hindi sinabi yung water facilities pero from the wording of the enumerated things given na its

for the benefit of the community since water is a basic human necessity.

Child Exploitation and Statutory Rape

People vs. Delantar

G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007

Tinga, J.

Facts:

In this case, appellant assigns these errors committed by the lower courts in his case

regarding his criminal case of supposedly pimping a girl (codename AAA in accordance with the

Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) under his protection as guardian,

through coercion and violence, to one Arab national named Mr. Hammond and then

Congressman Romeo Jalosjos: (1) That the trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime

charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) that

the trial court erred in convicting appellant of 2 violations of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 76103

despite the fact that only a single information was filed by the 2nd

assistant city prosecutor of

Pasay City; and (3) The trial court erred in imposing the penalty for the crime charged in its

maximum period (reclusion perpetua) when there is no showing in its decision of the attendance

of a qualifying circumstance which would warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty.

Supreme Court only addresses the first and third questions because the second has already been

established.

Prior to the hearing of the Supreme Court, appellant has been proven guilty beyond

reasonable doubt even though the defense rested its case. He was sentenced with reclusion

perpetua and to pay civil liability to the victim in the amount of PhP 60,000 in the two counts of

violation of Sec. 5(a), par. 1, 4, and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610. In the Appellate Court, the

sentence has been modified in its fines that appellant is to pay PhP 50,000 for civil indemnity,

PhP 50,000 as moral damages and PhP 25,000 as exemplary damages.

Issues:

1) Whether or not there was an error in convicting the appellant

2) Whether or not the relationship of appellant to AAA as guardian will mitigate the

circumstance of guilt

3) Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and

other penalties imposed therefor

Held:

3 Entitled An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for Its Violation, and for Other Purposes

1) No. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown

beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof

as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or

that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. There is no doubt,

drawing from the evidence, that AAA was a child who was exploited in prostitution as defined in

Section 5, Article III quoted above. The law punishes not only the person who commits the acts

of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with the child but also those who engage in or

promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution. Appellant is one such person. Appellants violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 is as clear as day.

2) No. Under R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 31(c), relationship is not a qualifying circumstance but

only an ordinary generic aggravating circumstance. Thus, although it was not alleged in the

information it can nevertheless be taken into account in fixing the penalty for the crime because

it was proven. A generic aggravating circumstance provides for the imposition of the prescribed

penalty in its maximum period, while a qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime.

While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the record of

birth appearing in the civil register, yet the rule is where the birth certificate presented was not

signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of

the alleged filiation. In Angeles v. Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363 (2005), we held: x x x Such

certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132

of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth

of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of

paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or

by the mother alone if the father refuses. x x x We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is

prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it

is undisputed that appellant is not AAAs biological father.

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or

phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the

company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A.

No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the

victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is

an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. It should be noted that the words with which guardian is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that

the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This

relationship may be established either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the guardian contemplated by law.

3) On the award of indemnity and damages, we delete the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity because appellant was not the one who committed the lascivious acts and

perpetrated the rape of AAA. Instead, we impose a fine which shall be administered as a cash

fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation

of AAA, pursuant to Section 31 (f), Article XII, R.A. No. 7610. Likewise, the award of

exemplary damages is improper considering that appellant is not AAAs biological father.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 31 May 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00977 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant

SIMPLICIO DELANTAR y REDONDO is found guilty of one count of violation of Section

5(a), R.A. No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years,

eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,

four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the sum

of P20,000.00 to be administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and

Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of AAA,88 and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

ejusdem generis

Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. vs. Bautista

G.R. No. 156367. May 16, 2005

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Bautista has been employed by petitioner Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc.

(Autobus), as driver-conductor. He was paid on commission basis. While driving along Sta. Fe,

Nueva Vizcaya, the bus that the respondent was driving accidentally bumped the rear portion of

another bus owned by the petitioner. Respondent averred that the accident happened because he

was compelled by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept for

almost twenty-four hours, as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela. Respondent

further alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid the amount of thirty percent of

the cost of repair of the damaged buses and that despite respondents pleas for reconsideration, the same was ignored by management. After a month, management sent him a letter of

termination. Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for

nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against Autobus. In their defense,

petitioner Autobus Inc. attested that respondents employment was replete with offenses involving reckless imprudence, gross negligence, and dishonesty. Furthermore, they claim that

due process was followed. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for Illegal Dismissal filed

by the respondent. However, respondent Bautista was entitled to his 13th month pay from the

date of his hiring to the date of his dismissal and his service incentive leave pay for all the years

he had been in service with Autobus Inc.

Petitioner Autobus Inc. appealed to the NLRC. The latter deleted the award of 13th

month pay to

respondent Bautista. Displeased with only the partial grant of its appeal to the NLRC, petitioner

sought the review of said decision with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by

the appellate court.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner contends that the respondent is not entitled to

service incentive leave. This issue revolves around the interpretation of Article 95 of the Labor

Code Section 1(D), Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor

Code which provides:

Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE

(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a

yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.

Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE

SECTION 1. Coverage.This rule shall apply to all employees except:

. . .

(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the

employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission

basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the

time consumed in the performance thereof;

Petitioner claims that the respondent is not entitled to service incentive leave. Petitioner contends

that since the respondent is compensated under a commission basis, he should be classified under

Field personnel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave.

HELD:

Yes, respondent Bautista is entitled to service incentive leave. According to the Implementing

Rules, Service Incentive Leave shall not apply to employees classified as field personnel. The phrase other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer must not be understood as a separate classification of employees to which service incentive leave shall not be

granted. Rather, it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the definition of field

personnel under the Labor Code as those whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. The same is true with respect to the phrase those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis. Said phrase should be related with field personnel, applying the rule on ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms that they follow.

Petitioners contention that respondent is not entitled to the grant of service incentive leave just because he was paid on commission basis is misplaced. What must be ascertained in order to

resolve the issue of propriety of the grant of service incentive leave to respondent is whether or

not he is a field personnel.

Field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the

employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose

hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid

specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at

specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel

despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee.

The definition of a field personnel is not merely concerned with the location where the employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the employees performance is unsupervised by the employer. As discussed above, field personnel are those who regularly

perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual

hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to

conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual

hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so

doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employees time and performance are constantly supervised by the employer.

It was observed by the Labor Arbiter and the CA that along the routes that are plied by these bus

companies, there are its inspectors assigned at strategic places who board the bus and inspect the

passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductors reports. There is also the mandatory once-a-week car barn or shop day, where the bus is regularly checked as to its mechanical, electrical,

and hydraulic aspects, whether or not there are problems thereon as reported by the driver and/or

conductor. They too, must be at specific place as specified time, as they generally observe

prompt departure and arrival from their point of origin to their point of destination. In each and

every depot, there is always the Dispatcher whose function is precisely to see to it that the bus

and its crew leave the premises at specific times and arrive at the estimated proper time. These,

are present in the case at bar. The driver, the complainant herein, was therefore under constant

supervision while in the performance of this work. He cannot be considered a field personnel.

Hence, the petition was denied. The assailed decision of the CA was affirmed.

Summary:

Respondent Bautista was terminated from his employment under Petitioner Autobus. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. It was denied by the Labor Arbiter, but

he was awarded 13th

month pay and service incentive leave.

Petitioner Autobus appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC removed the award of 13th month pay, but kept the service incentive leave.

Petitioner Autobus, wanting to remove the award of service incentive leave, appealed with the CA. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Petitioner then filed a motion for review with the SC. Pursuant to Article 95 of the Labor Code Section 1(D), Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the

Labor Code, petitioner claims that respondent Bautista was not entitled to service

incentive leave as the latter was paid on a commission basis.

The SC, using the principle of ejusdem generis, declared that the fact that the respondent was paid on a commission basis does not constitute an exception to the entitlement of

service incentive leave. What should be taken into consideration is whether or not

respondent Bautista was classified under Field Personnel The term field personnel was defined as those who regularly perform their duties away

from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual hours of work in

the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.

The SC, using the observation of the LA and the CA which states that respondent Bautista was under constant supervision while in the performance of his work, declared

that the respondent is not classified under field personnel and he should therefore be entitled to service incentive leave.

The Petition was denied, and the decision of the CA was affirmed.

Ejusdem Generis; of the same kind, class or nature

Parayno vs. Jovellanos

GR. 148408 July 14 2006

Facts:

Petitioner is an owner of a Gasoline Filling Station in Calasiao Pangasinan. In1989 some residents petitioned to the SB the closure or transfer of said station due to factors that cause

problems to the people. After investigation and recommendation from Municipal Engineer, Chief

of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection the SB suggested to the

Mayor the closure or transfer of said gas filling station. The petitioner moved for reconsideration

but the SB denied it. Hence the petitioner moved for a special civil action and mandamus with

the RTC of Dagupan City. Petitioner claims that her gasoline station should not be covered by

section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it was not a Gasoline Service Station but a Gasoline Filling Station governed by section 21 thereof. RTC ruled under the maxim of Ejusdem Generis that they are the same and denied the petition. Petitioner filed for a motion for

reconsideration but was also denied by the trial court. Then petitioner elevated the case to CA via

a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for injunctive relief. The CA

dismissed her appeal and also denied her petition for reconsideration thereafter. Hence minove

nya sa SC yung kaso.

ISSUE:

Statcon: Whether or not Gasoline Service Station = Gasoline Filling Station.

HELD:

CA: yes, SC: NO so NO tayo hahaha. Panalo ung petitioner sa SC

Why? Kasi may distinction yung Gasoline Filling Station sa Gasoline Service Station under sa zoning ordinance ng municipality in question. Eto I copy paste ko ah:

Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with

gasoline and oil only.7

x x x x x x x x x

Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries,

tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the

following services may be rendered and sales and no other.

a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;

b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;

c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses,

floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel, bearing,

mirrors and the like;

d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;

e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing materials;

f. Grease and lubricating;

g. Emergency wiring repairs;

h. Minor servicing of carburators;

i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;

j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or raising the motor.

Dahil sa nakastate yan di nagaaply ung Ejusdem Generesis instead eto magapply legal maxim

expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means express mention of one thing implies the

exclusion of others.

Isa pang issue dito na di na relevant sa statcon (para lang alam nyo) is grave abuse of Police

power. Nagpasa kasi ng Resolution No. 50 nun ordering the closure/transfer of said station and

sinabi nila na hindi na comply yung second requisite in using police power which is DUE

PROCESS CLAUSE.

Eto ung full held ng SC:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the

Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby

directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it

seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION - PTGWO vs SAN MIGUEL

PACKAGING PRODUCTS

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular

monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation.

SMCSU, SMBP, SMPP all under the banner of SMC. Respondent if member of PDMP.

08/17/99 petitioner filed cancellation of registration of respondent due to allegations of

committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration requirements. On 14

July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the

allegations until he found out that the respondent did not comply with membership requirement.

CA dismissed the case filed by petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the CA was erred in believing that the 20% membership

requirement is not require from the respondent.

HELD:

YES. This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of

another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to

exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one exception to a

general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects

are excluded. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by

interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

ejusdem generis

Benguet State University vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 169637. June 8, 2007

NACHURA, J

FACTS:

The Congress enacted the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8292).

Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of Benguet State University

(BSU) passed and approved a Board Resolution granting rice subsidy and health care allowance

to BSUs employees. The sums were taken from the income derived from the operations of BSU and were given to the employees at different periods.

The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance was disallowed in audit under a Notice

of Disallowance, stating that R.A. No. 8292 does not provide for the grant of said allowance to

employees and officials of the university.

BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional

Office, but the same was denied.

BSU subsequently filed a petition for review with the COA, alleging that the grant of Rice

Subsidy and Health Care allowance to its employees in 1998 is authorized by law, specifically

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, which reads thus:

Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards

x x x

d) x x x

Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any

income generated by the university or college, from tuition fee and other charges, as well

as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the

university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/Trustees for

instruction, research, extension or other programs/projects of the university or college x x

x

The COA declared that a closer look at the said provision clearly negate such claim of authority.

It is noted that the term other programs/projects refers to such programs which the university may specifically undertake in pursuance of its primary objective which is to attain quality higher

education. The law could not have intended that the term program/projects embrace all programs of BSU, for these benefits, though part of the overall operations, are not directly

related to BSUs academic program. Under the maxim of ejusdem generis, the mention of a general term after the enumeration of specific matters should be held to mean that the general

term should be of the same genus as the specific matters enumerated and, therefore, the other programs and projects should be held to be of the same nature as instruction, research and extension. The inclusion of an incentive such as Rice Subsidy and Health Care Allowance to its

teachers and non-teaching personnel is a patent or blatant disregard of the statutory limitation on

the powers of the governing Board of SUCs, as these benefits are indubitably not one of

instruction, research or extension. The COA denied the petition for review.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the COA, petitioner BSU filed a petition for review with the SC.

BSU ascribes legal error and grave abuse of discretion to the COA in affirming the disallowance

of the rice subsidy and health care benefits. Relying on R.A. No. 8292, BSU maintains that it can

grant said benefits to its employees. It argues that the said law vests state universities and

colleges with fiscal autonomy and grants them freedom in the appropriation and disbursement of

their funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner is authorized to grant Health Care Allowance and Rice Subsidy to its

employees and still be entitled to reimbursement.

HELD:

No. BSUs contention that it is authorized to grant allowances to its employees is based on Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292. The provision reads:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards.The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of

administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a

corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the

Corporation Code of the Philippines:

x x x x x x x x x

d) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary school charges, such as but not limited to

matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as their respective boards may

deem proper to impose after due consultations with the involved sectors.

Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by

the university or college, shall constitute special trust funds and shall be deposited in any

authorized government depository bank, and all interests shall accrue therefrom shall part

of the same fund for the use of the university or college: Provided, That income derived

from university hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the operating expenses of the

hospitals.

Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any

income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and other charges, as well

as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the

university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/ Trustees for

instruction, research, extension, or other programs/ projects of the university or college:

Provided, That all fiduciary fees shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which

they are collected.

If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college, shall not be able to pursue any

project for which funds have been appropriated and, allocated under its approved

program of expenditures, the Board of Regents/Trustees may authorize the use of said

funds for any reasonable purpose which, in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent

for the attainment of the objectives and goals of the universities or college;

x x x x x x x x x

Similarly, Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum No. 03-01, the Revised

Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for R.A. No. 8292, provides:

RULE V

Powers and Duties of the Governing Boards

SECTION 18. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards (GBs).The GBs of chartered SUCs shall have the following powers and duties, in addition to its general powers of

administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to a Board of Directors of a

corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the

Corporation Code of the Philippines, thus:

x x x x x x x x x

(d) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary charges, such as, but not limited, to

matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as they may deem proper to

impose, after due consultations with the involved sectors.

Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by

the university or college, shall constitute special trust funds and shall be deposited in any

authorized government depository bank, and all interest that shall accrue therefrom shall

be part of the same fund for the use of the university or college: Provided, That income

derived from university or college hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the

operations of the hospitals.

Any income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and other charges, as

well as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the

university or college, and may be disbursed by its GB for instruction, research, extension,

or other programs/projects of the university or college: Provided, That all fiduciary fees

shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which they are collected.

If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college shall not be able to pursue any

project for which funds have been appropriated and allocated under its approved program

of expenditures, its GB may authorize the use of said funds for any reasonable purpose

which, in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent for the attainment of the objectives

and goals of the university or college;

x x x x x x x x x

What is clear from Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292 cited by BSU as legal basis of its claim as

well as from its implementing rules is that income generated by the university may be disbursed

by its Governing Board for instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of the university or colleges.

The theory of BSU that the phrase other programs/projects of the university or college in Section 4 (d) covers all projects and programs of the university, including those designed to

uplift the economic plight of the employees is clearly erroneous.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or

kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to

things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the

context of the statute which would repel such inference. The COA correctly ruled that the other programs/projects under R.A. No. 8292 and its Implementing Rules should be of the same nature as instruction, research, and extension. In BSUs case, the disbursements were for rice subsidy and health care allowances which are, in no way, intended for academic programs

similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4 (d) cannot, therefore, be relied upon by

BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances.

Hence, the petition was denied, and the decision of the COA was affirmed.

Summary:

BSU, pursuant to R.A. No. 8292, approved a resolution granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSUs employees.

The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance was disallowed in audit. BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the Commission on Audit (COA)

Regional Office, but the same was denied.

BSU subsequently filed a petition for review with the COA. They claim that they are authorized by law to use their funds for other programs/projects of the university or college. They used Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 as their legal basis.

The COA, implementing the maxim of ejusdem generis, declared that the clause other programs/projects of the university or college should be construed to refer only to programs and projects related with instruction, research, extension and other

academically related programs and projects.

Petitioner BSU filed a petition for review with the SC. BSU maintains that R.A. No. 8292 grants them autonomy and freedom in the appropriation of their funds.

The SC declared that it is clear from Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292 is that income generated by the university may be disbursed by its Governing Board for instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of the university or colleges. The scope of clause other programs/projects of the university or colleges was restricted because it was preceded by the specific terms for instruction, research, extension. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind

accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to

things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated.

The petition was denied.

Construction of Contracts

Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998

Martinez, J.

Facts:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil

Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS

COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,

INCORPORATED. The two contracting parties made a binding contract ordering a supply from

the latter of 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement, and the former to pay $477,300 by opening an

irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The private respondent

failed to deliver the goods because of a dispute with the owner of ship MV Surutana Nava and it

was held up in Bangkok instead of reaching its destination at Bombay and Calcutta, India. As

compensation, the two parties agreed on a delivery of Class G cementbut it did not pass the petitioners specifications. Pursuant to Clause 16 of the contract, petitioner forwarded the concern to an arbitrator. This went up to the courts of India, and the above-mentioned court ruled

that private respondent should pay up to a total of $ 899,603.77 for all the incurred damages and

losses of petitioner.

Because private respondent failed to comply to the requirements due to several reasons4,

petitioners now seek to uphold the ruling of foreign court by filing a case in the Philippine RTC.

The ruling, however, was different from the first, and the Appellate Court concurs, that the

arbiter, in the first place, was not legible to hold the fix the issue at hand when Clause 16 is read

together with the rest of the contract.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the arbiter under Clause 16 of the contract is eligible to settle the issue

at hand.

2) Whether or not the ruling of the foreign court should be binding even after the non-

response of said court to the private respondents

Held:

1) No. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of statutes, is

equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague contractual

stipulations, such as the aforementioned phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where

4 Two reasons arise from the case heard in the foreign courts: (1) Private respondent sent a letter of clarification to

the court, but did not get a reply for more than a year; and (2) Private respondents question the capacity of the arbiter

assigned for the fulfillment of the contract.

a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,

its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of the words

in which it is found or with which it is associated, or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt

may be reviewed by reference to associated words. In accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a

sociis, this reference to the supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the preceding

words with which it is associated, meaning to say, as being limited only to the design, drawing,

instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The non-

delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising from the failure

to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the

materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the

contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to

arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person possessed with the

required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the regular courts.

Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract should not be

read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted in the light of the

other related provisions. The whole and every part of a contract must be considered in fixing the

meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. Equally applicable is the

canon of construction that in interpreting a statute (or a contract as in this case), care should be

taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated

measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. The rule is that a construction that

would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent

provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious

whole.

The ruling that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by

the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their contract: All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply order, shall be

subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and

the place from which this supply order is situated.

2) Yes. The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by

the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered

differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has

held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the

forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid

judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the

Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts

in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules

provide otherwise.

Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the

reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense or stated otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be

heard. Thus, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the

party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.

Application of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue5

G.R. No. 147749. June 22, 2006.

J. CORONA

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and

exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed to pay the deficiency in

millers tax and manufacturers tax by respondent. The deficiency millers tax was imposed on SPMCs sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. Petitioner

opposed but was denied by respondent; as a result petitioner elevated the case to the Court of

Tax Appeals. CTA then cancelled the liability for deficiency of manufacturers tax but upheld the assessment over the millers tax. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied it for failure to comply on certain procedural rules on

verification and certification against forum shopping. Hence, a petition for review before the

Court assailing the resolution passed upon by CA. Petitioner invokes that the crude coconut oil it

sold to UNICHEM was exported by UNICHEM and should not be subject to Millers Tax as provided in Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Petitioner further resolved its own interpretation

of the provision of such law to mean that exemptions are applicable on exportation of the

enumerated products therein, which are effected by THE MILLER HIMSELF OR THE BUYER

OR MANUFACTURER OF THE MILLED PRODUCTS.

5 Petitioners Own Interpretation - Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates two exemptions from the

millers tax: (a) the milled products in their original state were actually exported by the miller himself or by another person, and (b) the milled products sold by the miller were actually exported as an ingredient or part of any

manufactured article by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products. The exportation may be effected by

the miller himself or by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMCs milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from the millers tax. What Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code really provides - Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of rope

factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories.Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and

desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of the gross value in money of all the

rope, sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava flour or starch, dessicated coconut, manufactured, processed or milled by

them, including the by-product of the raw materials from which said articles are produced, processed or

manufactured, such tax to be based on the actual selling price or market value of these articles at the time they leave

the factory or mill warehouse: Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and

the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and dessicated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil,

palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or

operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines,

whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products...

Issue: WON Petitioner is exempted from the 3% millers tax as provided for in Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code as justified by Petitioners own interpretation?

Held:

No. From the express terms of the law, it is as clear as daylight that the law only intended to

exempt those which are exported by the PROPRIETOR OR THE OPERATOR OF THE

FACTORY HIMSELF. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the PURCHASER

OF THE MATERIAL enumerated in the exempting clause or the MANUFACTURER OF THE

PRODUCTS UTILIZING the said materials was covered by the exception. Petitioners interpretation is unwarranted for it enlarged the scope of the exemption clause. Expressio Unius

Est Exclusion Alterius - Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom

and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute

cannot be placed therein. To allow petitioners claim for tax exemption will violate the established principle and derogate sovereign authority.

Hence, Petitioner is covered by the 3% millers tax under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code due to the fact that petitioner is not the exporter of the crude coconut oil.

Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals6

G.R. No. 128772. February 3, 2000.

J. Gonzaga-Reyes

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a motion for review with the Court of Appeals to annul the resolution of

Civil Service Commission which affirmed his preventive suspension. CA dismissed the appeal

because, among other things, the annexes attached are mere photo copies. In the petition for

review before the Supreme Court, petitioner maintains that Administrative Circular 1-95 requires

that only copies of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from and material

points of record referred in the petition shall be certified; said circular does not require that the

annexes be certified true copies. Under the so-called doctrine of last antecedent, the phrase

certified true copies does not qualify the remote phrase other supporting papers; the qualifier phrase certified true copies only refers to the immediately succeeding phrase such material portions of the record as referred to therein.

Respondent however claims that petitioners application of the doctrine of last antecedent is misleading for the proper application of the doctrine shows that the phrase certified true copies qualifies the words nearest to it which are such material portion of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. Hence, CA held that the attachment of photo copies of the annexes was a fatal flow to ground the dismissal of Petitioners appeal. Petitioner should have attached certified true copies of all supporting documents in order to proceed with

his petition because the right to appeal is merely a statutory right and one must comply with the

requirements of the law in order to properly exercise said right.

Issue: WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF

LAW WHEN IT IMPOSED THE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL ANNEXES TO THE

PETITION FOR REVIEW BE CERTIFIED

6 Section 6 of Rule 43,5 which provides - Contents of the Petition The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b)

contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be

accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final

order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record

referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as

provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that

it was filed within the period fixed herein.

Held: Yes. While a decision of the Civil Service Commission may be appealed to the Court of

Appeals under Section 6 of Rule 43, Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive

disposition of every action and proceeding. In line with this guideline, the Court shall not construe the interpretation of Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Civil Service Commission to impose a

requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies.

A comparison of this provision with the counterpart provision in Rule 42 (governing petitions for

review from the RTC to the CA), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (governing Appeals by Certiorari

to the Supreme Court) and Rule 65 governing certiorari and prohibition, would show that under

the latter, only the judgments or final orders or resolutions need be certified true copies or

duplicate originals. Numerous resolutions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals by

certiorari under Rule 45 and original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules

46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned judgment,

final order or resolution. No plausible reason suggests itself why a different treatment or a

stricter requirement, should be given to petitions under Rule 43, which governs appeals from the

Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals. None could have been

intended by the framers of the Rules. A contrary ruling would be too harsh and would not

promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every

action and proceeding. It must be conceded that obtaining certified true copies necessary entails

additional expenses that will make litigation more onerous to the litigants. Moreover, certified

true copies are not easily procurable and party litigants must wait for a period of time before the

certified true copies are released. At any rate, the entire records of the case will eventually be

elevated to the appellate court.

DOCTRINE OF CASUS OMISSUS

Spouses Nereo and Nieva Delfino v. St. James Hospital Inc.

G.R. No. 166735, September 5, 2006

Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:

Respondent St. James Hospital, which was established in 1990 as a ten-bed capacity hospital,

applied for a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its

hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution, for which a temporary

clearance for the expansion of said hospital was issued. Said issuance was challenged by herein

petitioners spouses on the ground that the proposed expansion is in violation of the provisions of

the 1981 Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance. Aggrieved by the decision of HLURB,

respondent elevated the matter to Office of the President, which was subsequently affirmed by

the appellate court, arguing that: (1) the establishment of a ten-bed capacity hospital, is allowed

within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, the law existing at the time of the

founding of the St. James hospital, but the term hospital was deleted from the list of conforming establishments within a residential zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance; (2) that

under Section 2, Article 6 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, certain activities that are commercial

and institutional in character are allowed within the residential zone, and; (3) that the term

"institutional", as used in 1991 Zoning Ordinance, include hospitals and other medical

establishments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed expansion of St. James Hospital may be permitted under

the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, in view of the deletion therein of the phrase hospitals with not more than ten capacity from those enumerated as allowable uses in a residential zone as contained in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance.

HELD:

No. It was held that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity

medical institution is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance because of

the following reasons:

1. The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance effectively repealed the 1981 Zoning Ordinance. The inclusion of the general repealing provision in the ordinance predicated the

intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and

prior acts. This is what is known as repeal by implication, which proceeds on the premise

that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to

abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.

2. It must be considered that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration

of allowable uses contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had

intended in employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the restrictive

enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,

the express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly

mentioned.

3. The rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not

more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said

allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the

legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential

zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a

residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

Malinias, Sario v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002

Carpio, J. (EN BANC)

FACTS:

Petitioner Malinias, a candidate for governor in Mountain Province, filed a complaint with the

COMELEC for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as Electoral Reforms

Law, and Sections 232 of Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), against Corpuz, Tangilag and

Dominguez, here