CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 9 — Page 1

CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

While this joint use project has a definedbeginning and end, the investigation andapplication of joint use feasibility is acontinuously evolving process.

9.1 REVISITING THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

The study team came to some conclusionsas the research advanced regarding thestudy effort itself which may assist futureresearch. The problem statement, as thetitle of the project indicates, emphasized"light rail and diesel multiple unit vehicleson freight railroads." As the researchprogressed, the key issues (Chapter 5)broadened the emphasis to include all railtransit on all railroads. "All rail transit"included all non-compliant railbuses, rapidtransit and interurban type operations, androlling stock, as well as light rail and DMUvehicles of various types that couldpotentially operate jointly. The key issuesbetter defined the two regulatory areas ofrail transit and railroads. This definitionwas reinforced by European experienceand the changing U.S. regulatory climatewhere rail transit and railroads areregulated in distinctly different ways.

The expansion of the research was toinclude the Pacific Rim in the overseasexperience. This proved more importantthan first imagined, because the Japaneseexperience indicates a greater integrationof different rail modes to the extent thatthey begin to lose their separate identities.There, joint use is practiced so routinelyand diversely that shared track is notconsidered an exception to the rule.

9.2 REVISITING THE KEY ISSUES

An early objective of this research was toidentify key issues relating to joint use.This was accomplished and documented inChapters 1-4, culminating in Key Issues,Chapter 5. Finally, the key issues were to

be addressed in Chapter 9, Conclusions.Key issues were structured around the fourfoundations of joint use debate:

! Regulation/policy,! Operations,! Physical plant, and! Vehicles.

1. Key Regulation Issues

a. Is joint use a sound policy worthAdvancing?

The research discloses that rail passengertravel is inherently safer than vehicularmodes. Rail transit suffers a fatality rate of0.73 for rapid transit, 0.38 for commuterrail and 0.25 for LRT per hundred millionpassenger miles. In contrast, the vehicularrate is 1.44 fatalities per hundred millionpassenger miles (E. Tennyson, "RailTransit Safety Analysis," TRB, 1998). Thisalone is not sufficient reason to justifyshared track on a national basis. Other riskassessment and alternative investmentanalysis should be performed fully tojustify decisions in support of shared trackbetween railroads and rail transit.

In Europe and Japan, those type ofdecisions are traditionally made at local,metropolitan, or state levels and on aproject-by-project basis. The Federal rolein the U.S. and Europe is to develop aregulatory framework which establishesbaseline standards to be applied locally andto oversee the enforcement of thosestandards. That arrangement and respectiveroles are not dissimilar from the NorthAmerican experience. They differ only inspecific applications and split of regulatoryroles.

The research team found nothing tosuggest that the current procedure of FRAissuing temporary waivers for non-


compliant rolling stock and circumstancesshould not be continued when sufficientjustification is offered and safety measuresare enforced. Similarly, the FRA'sincreasing use of safety risk assessment injoint track use proposals (high speedpassenger with freight, exemplified byFOX and Northeast Corridor electrificationextension projects) follows a similarprocess used by the German Ministry ofRailways five years ago. The difference isthat the German assessment was forrunning Regio-Sprinter DMUs in mixedfreight and passenger traffic at Düren andChemnitz, while the FRA application wasfor slow and high speed passenger railroadon shared facilities. All of this evidencesuggests that shared track and joint use arealready being addressed with similarmethodologies (as a matter of FRA policy),but not in the same applications.

b. What risk mitigations can be appliedto joint use to reduce risk totolerable levels?

The crashworthiness vs. crash avoidanceissue applies in selecting mitigationmeasures to reduce risk. The cooperativePTC and PTS demonstrations andexperiments are currently addressing thisin part, but the results are not available.[Refer to Appendix M, "Special Conditionsfor Operation of LRVs...". Speed, brakingdistance, isolation of switching, operatingdiscipline, and practices, combined inpassive (vehicle design) measures are theprincipal mitigation measures usedeffectively. See also key issue 1d in thischapter.]

c. Does joint use constitute a hazard topublic safety?

This oversimplified statement of a keyissue cannot be answered absolutely with"yes" or "no." Related questions havebeen answered by this research. Is jointuse more hazardous than runninghomogeneous train consists together? Yes,it is more hazardous, but the degree of

hazard may not be significant, may betolerable by the shared track partners andthat hazard which exists may be reduced bymitigation measures to the point where itmeets or exceeds the safety of homogenoustrain consists on the same track. Thefollowing points support these assertions:

! No major accidents have occurred inoverseas joint use applications overthe decade that they have existed.Meanwhile, during the same period,some significant losses of life havebeen experienced abroad and inNorth America by collisions betweentrain consists of the same type (note -Appendix N).

! Data collected from risk analysisperformed for German railroads,using the same risk analysistechnique as those used for FRA (inevaluating high speed vs. freighttrain shared track mixes), indicatetolerable levels of risk. The Germanrisk analysis was performed for lightDMUs, such as used in Chemnitzand Düren, and for LRVs, such asused in Karlsruhe and Saarbrücken(Appendix N).

! Rail transit and railroad passengertravel are inherently safer than othersurface travel modes.

d. What are the quantifiable risks andliabilities arising from variousdegrees of joint use?

Currently the only railroad/rail transitmitigation measure employed in NorthAmerica is temporal separation of trainmovements. This control measure reducesshared track risk to zero by totallyseparating railroad and rail transitmovements. Freight trains have a three-to-five hour window after late night closure oflight rail operations and prior toresumption of LRT operations in themorning. This restricts freight service to


shippers and reduces opportunities toperform track and infrastructuremaintenance because of the lack of routinetotal shutdown during night hours.

The German Railway Ministry, followingtheir risk analysis findings, determined thatseveral mitigation risk controls woulddiminish joint use risk to acceptable levelsfor all participants (see also Appendices Mand N) in German joint use operations:

! Limit speed of train operations onshared track to 90 km/h (55 mph).This speed limit was based on theenhanced braking capabilities ofLRVs, that is, their ability to avoidcollisions through reduced stoppingdistances. As pointed out earlier,80% of (German) rail collisions arecaused by an inability to stop in time.The limit in speed, combined withthe high-performance redundantbraking system inherent in LRVs (toenable them to travel in mixedvehicular and pedestrian traffic),diminish risk. This maximum speedcan be increased to 100 kph (62 mph)if certain ISO 9000 standards arefollowed. Since most LRVs do notexceed 50-55 mph balanced speed,this type of mitigation can be easilyapplied in the U.S.

! Prohibit railroad switchingoperations on track used concurrentlywith LRTs. Again, the risk analysisdisclosed high vulnerability tocollisions with switching operationsbecause of highly intermittent trackoccupancy, as long durations of trackoccupancy occurred by freightsleaving their train on running trackswhile switching cars onto sidings andspurs. Note that this requirementdoes not prohibit through (nonstop)freight trains traveling in the samedirection. This control measure canalso be applied, but at the increased

capital costs of additional tracks topermit switching without interferenceto LRVs.

! Speed and other restrictions areapplied more rigorously with singletrack (with passing sidings). Riskcontrol standards in the Germanexperience change as risk increases.Specific mitigation measures areimposed, then applied on a slidingscale to intensify control measuresconsistent with increases in risk fromhigher speed or greater train density.RA dictates the scale.

! Apply train control technologies.Train protection systems are requiredfor routes with joint operation. Thetype and degree of protectiondepends on maximum permissivespeed, types of train consists, trainperformance (principally stoppingdistance), and the volume of trains.Specific mitigation using traincontrol, signal spacing, and brakingdistances are specifically applied toeach case.

! Wheel tread profile conformity. Thisis somewhat less of a mitigation andmore of an operational requirement.In Germany, a compromise profilewas developed enabling KarlsruheLRVs in Stadtbahn service totransition between in-street train railand railroad track (Figure 7-1).

! Rail transit and railroad vehicles maynot be coupled into the same consistsif the light rail vehicle has a buffingstrength of less than 1500 kN(335,000 lbs.). This creates athreshold for DMUs principally andapplies less to LRVs. It is intended toclearly distinguish among railroadtrains, LRVs, and DMUs, the latterof which would be most likely to becoupled with railroad rolling stock ordual service branch line railways.


The most recent light (Category 2 or3) DMUs produced for the WesternEuropean markets are designed tothese buffing requirements.

e. Can regulation of rail transit beassumed (wholly or in part) by stateand regional entities?

The German joint use experience inregulatory matters is instructive. Itindicates that the concept of shared trackwas accepted more by changes in theapplication of regulations than by changesin the specific standards or requirements.German decisions on permitting permanentjoint use agreements were initiated by theGerman Railway Ministry (a roughequivalent of FRA). Their decisionsfavoring joint use, with conditions, werebased on a process initiated by theKarlsruhe proposal and later by the DürenDMU shared-track proposals. Bothgenerated specific risk analyses of aconventional nature described in Chapter 6and Appendix N. The ministry's decisionswere conditioned on imposingcompensating risk requirements, such asthe substitution of active for passive riskmitigations. Example: To compensate forthe lighter LRV where its passive safety(crashworthiness) is inferior to railroadtrains, higher active safety (avoidance ofcollisions) had to be substituted.

The primary mitigation rationale was toapply the reduced stopping distances ofLRVs combined with a reduced permissivespeed of 100 km/h and improved signalspacing, upgrading, and bettercommunication. Not reported, but alsodeciding factors, were a strong local willand reliance on a firm operating disciplineto implement shared track operations. Thisreport suggests that the German examplerepresents an approach to reconcilingvarious contrasting interests on the subjectof shared track, trading off forms of safetymeasures for others. In summary, thisprocess involved:

! Scoping the specific joint useproposal,

! Collecting data on operations andaccidents,

! Performing a Risk Analysis andmaking a preliminary go/no-godecision,

! Determining probabilities andappropriate risk mitigation measuresto apply,

! Performing a series of controlledtests (as in the pre-service Pforzheimtests in Karlsruhe),

! Applying for permanent waiver orexception,

! Beginning service.

Note that this technique is not applied tojoint use in Japan, where decisions aremore a product of joint venture businessdecisions and applying for operatinglicenses.

This does not suggest that standards shouldbe relaxed or that German regulations aremore lenient or less complex than those inNorth America. In fact, as pointed out inChapter 7, in addition to federal railroad(EBO) regulations comparable to those ofFRA, German streetcar/rail transit isgoverned by stringent standards andregulations (BOStrab) for which there areno direct equivalents now in the U.S. NorthAmerican rail transit standards,regulations, and safety plans are beingcreated by state regulatory authorities forthe purpose of developing statewide SystemSafety Program Plans.

2. Key Operational Issues

a. What elements of overseas joint useexperience and operation practicescan be transferred to the NorthAmerican rail transit and railroadenvironment?

Rather than transferring overseas operatingpractices wholesale to North America,selected lessons can be learned and applied


from the growing wealth of shared trackexperience.

In contrast to European experience, sharedtrack in Japan most commonly appears inthe form of reciprocal running or "throughrunning." There, two or more carriers shareportions of their track networks as zonedbut integrated service. While heavy railrapid transit, interurban, and railroadshared track is relatively uncommon incontinental Europe, it appears as one of themost familiar forms of reciprocal runningin Japan and Korea. Light rail operating onrailroad tracks, however, is relativelyuncommon in Japan, but is becoming aEuropean standard based on Karlsruhe andan increasing number of other models.Because rail freight is so subordinated topassenger service in Japan, shared track,where practiced, most often occursbetween passenger railroads and rail transitoperators. This enhances the popularity ofshared track between operators becauseboth the operations and the services can beintegrated in a common timetable. Servicescan be zoned and other complementarybenefits can accrue to passenger andoperator. No such operating benefit derivesfrom shared track between freight andpassenger carriers, regardless of rail mode.

Some overseas experience may beinstructive but is otherwise nottransferable. In the U.S., the metropolitanareas, even those in the northeast, aredistantly separated and the interurban linksthat may have existed have disappeared.The types of connecting rail linkages foundin Japan are unlikely to be restored in theU.S. even if joint use practices areaccepted. The standards and distances varytoo much to permit the common subway-railroad-subway model found in Japan. TheNorth American situation is one of widelyseparated local rail transit systems, havinglittle in common with those of neighboringmetropolitan areas, and in some cases, little

in common with other lines within theirown system under common ownership.The possibility for some through runningoperations does exist among disparate railsystems; one has recently come to light.

The close proximity of metro areas inJapan, but contrasting physical standards,has resulted in an important feature in theevolution of shared track arrangements; ahybrid car, purpose-built to migratebetween otherwise incompatible rail transitsystems. This is similar to the recentlyapproved JFK Airport Light Rail TransitProject. It is designed to a light raildimensional standard (but automated andusing linear induction motors fed fromconventional DC third rail). Designed as alarge dual-rail people-mover-typeoperation on airport distribution functions,the system ventures off the airport to linehaul connect with the Long Island RailRoad and NYCT rapid transit systems atseparate locations. Because of the varyingdimensional, operating (automated vs. non-automated), and propulsion (LM vs. rotarytraction motors), and institutional problemsof crossing operational domains,interchange of rolling stock and joint use isnow impossible. Passengers will initiallyhave to transfer. Confident that some daythe institutional problems of interchangecan be resolved, the operator of the airportdesigned its rail system so as not topreclude through running, but notreciprocity, using a future hybrid car thatcan operate on the airport system and thenswitch to either the rapid transit or LIRRtracks to access midtown Manhattan.

3. Key Physical Plant and Train Control Issues

a. What fail-safe signaling and traincontrol technologies are applied incollision avoidance?

Train control technologies are beingdeveloped and tested for several importantreasons:


! To improve the already good safetyrecord of rail transit and railroadoperations here and abroad.

! To leverage additional capacity fromrail infrastructure by closer spacingof train movements.

! Accompanied by risk analysis, thesetechnologies are also being applied toproposals for sharing tracks by high-speed passenger and freight railroadtrains.

All of these applications by Federal, state,railroad, technology vendors and railroadsponsors are useful in enhancing theviability of joint use practices, regardlessof train types participating in the tracksharing. The issue revealed in the thirditem above is, if 60 mph freight trains cansafely operate with 150 mph passengertrains using advanced train controltechnology on shared track to reduce risk,why cannot the same be applied to heavy(railroad) and light (rail transit) trainconsists, both going a maximum of 60 mphon shared track? Both would operatewithin the same fail-safe train control andoperating regimen. It is a matter of riskexposure and agreement between therailroad and transit entities regarding costand liability, which are not insignificantissues. This approach of evaluating risk oftwo very different types of trains sharingtracks is currently considered valid in onecase but not in the other similar case.

This research suggests that PTS, PTC, andother train control and separationtechnologies can be applied to validatingselected mixed use by railroad and railtransit vehicles. This is an area wherefurther research and testing is appropriateto determine if PTS train detection andpositioning can be applied to the very highdensity train operations found in railtransit.

4. Key Rail Vehicle Issues

a. Which crashworthiness measurescan be applied to DMU or LRVdesigns as risk mitigations?

A debate among practitioners continues onmixing disparate size and weight vehiclesand on the relative effectiveness of activeand passive approaches to passenger andcrew safety. Only a risk assessment appliedin each operating case will ultimatelydetermine which of these measures orcombination of measures is most effective.Risk assessment is therefore the keystoneto this research and at the center of itsconclusions relating to joint use proposals.

Some attempts are being made to includeboth crashworthiness and crash avoidancetype measures in new light rail car designs.These designs by European-based carbuilders are in response to the new marketfor regional railways and possible otherapplications of joint use/shared track.Contemporary trams and light rail vehiclesin Europe typically fall in the range of 20to 40 tonnes (44,000-88,000 lbs) buffingstrength. The North American buff designpractice is nearer to 150% to 200% of thetare weight of the (single) vehicle. This isoften referred to as the "2g" spec or alongitudinal compression equal to twicethe weight of the LRV. The Portland lowfloor LRV buff load specification is a littleunder 80 tonnes (>160,000 lbs). The NorthAmerican LRV range exceeds that of itsEuropean counterpart by a factor of two ormore. The North American LRV buffingload range is 40-100 tonnes (88,000-200,00 lbs.). Further up on the scale,modern European light rail DMUs are nowdesigned to withstand nearly 350,000 lbs(50kN). Crush zones, impact attenuation,and debris deflection devices areincorporated in the designs of these cars,which are operating on railroads throughwestern Europe (see Figure 9-1). These areof a passive nature, that is, they pertainmore to the design of the vehicle than the


operating performance (active nature).These cars still retain their active safetyperformance characteristics through use ofmultiple disk, tread, or track brakes, andregenerative or retarder systems. The U.S.railroad standard is currently 800,000 lbs.buff load, except for light cars in reducedfixed consists.

5. Comprehensive Issues

a. Crashworthiness vs. crashavoidance can some measure ofboth be applied to mitigate risk?

There are two basic approaches to railaccident risk: active (crash avoidance) andpassive (crashworthiness). The passivemeasures are designed to prevent injury,fatality, or damage in a collision. Theactive measures are designed to avoidcollision in the first instance. These twomethods of dealing with risk are seldomcomplementary. In plain terms, the heavierthe vehicle is to withstand impact, thelonger the braking distance required toavoid a collision. European regulators nowtend to embrace active safety measures or acombination of active and passive, whereasNorth American regulators currentlyrequire passive measures. This is partlydue to German regulators' scope coveringrail transit (BOStrab) and railway (EBO)equipment and operations. In NorthAmerica, the regulation now isconcentrated on railroad equipment andoperations. Rail transit vehicles (LRVsprimarily) are designed to interact withroadway vehicular traffic or each other.Railroad cars are designed to interact withother railroad objects equal in weight andbulk.

Figure 9-1 shows an example of combinedactive and passive measures, though not insufficient quantity to meet current FRAcompliance requirements. What is notshown are the passive measures that areincluded in the interior design of the cars.These include impact attenuators oninterior surfaces and appurtenances which

have a minor affect on car weight andperformance, but diminish risk of injuryand fatality to car occupants. More subtlein appearance is the use of structuralmembers for appearance and strength ofthe car. At least two contemporary DMUcar designs use diagonal members in atruss-like arrangement to increase thelongitudinal strength of the car. Also inthese and other designs of light-weightDMUs are pilots, functional fascias, orsimply "cow catchers" for deflectingobjects on the track. These preventderailments from overrides of foreignobjects and perform the similar traditionalpedestrian safety functions of vintagetrolley fenders. As pointed out in Chapter8, when Japanese subway cars are adaptedto use at-grade tracks with grade crossingson interurban and commuter railroad lines,metal pilots are added below the sills at carends. To the extent that these interior andsubtle exterior physical measures can beintegrated into the car design withoutweight penalty, the crash avoidance andcrashworthiness characteristics of the carscan be reconciled within a single cardesign.

b. How should this joint use researchbe applied as parallel research isadvancing?

By adapting and recommending use of therisk analysis technique, this research issupportive of and in parallel with the otherefforts in quest of safer and moreproductive rail passenger systems. Theseother efforts include:

! APTA's Passenger Rail EquipmentSafety Standards Committee(PRESS)

! FRA jointly sponsored research,demonstration and testing of PositiveTrain Separation (PTS) and PositiveTrain Control (PTC) at the PuebloTest Track and in various locations(IL, WA, PA and elsewhere)


Modern Light DMU Passive Safety Measures - Figure 9-1


! APTA-sponsored Commuter RailSafety Management Program andRail Transit System Safety ProgramPlans (RTSSPP) and Rail SafetyAudit Program (RSAP)

! FRA's Safety Assurance andCompliance Program

! F R A ' s R a i l S a f e t y A c treauthorization in FY 1998

! Developing state oversight of state(rail transit) system safety programstandard.

! Federal reauthorization of theTransportation Legislation (TEA-21)including provisions for new startsand continuance of the MIS process

! Monitoring overseas innovations insafety, operating practices, cardesign, train control technology, andregulatory reform

! State initiation for expanding andenhancing state safety oversighte f f o r t s , w h i ch p r ov i de aquasiregulatory framework for non-FRA-covered systems

c. What cultural, institutional, andsocial conditions will influence jointuse decisions and createenvironments hostile oradvantageous to joint use?

The Pacific Rim and European examples ofjoint use cited in this report demonstratethat shared track can exist in variedcultural, institutional, and social climates.

Shared track practices are being expandedand refined overseas through anevolutionary succession of institutionalreform, research, planning and risk studies,system design, and joint venture. Researchin preparation of this report discloses thatjoint use is not achieved through any singledocument, person, or action. Changes ininstitutions, business, and technologycreate a regulatory environment moreconducive to sharing of facilities. Thesechanges are epitomized by:

! privatization,! breakup of national transportation

monopolies (and formation of newenterprises),

! federal/state/local changing roles,! creation of EU in western Europe,! restructuring of transportation

institutions,! a d v an c e d s t a t e -o f - t he - a r t

communications and train controltechnologies,

! deregulation in some sectors,! inducements for non-traditional

business partnerships, and! adopting of business practices in

public transport.

Absent these types of changes andenvironment in North America, sharedtrack will likely continue to be confined toa few temporally separated examples.

Under existing FRA regulations, theburden would rest with the waiverapplicant to prove that risk has beendiminished to tolerant levels or that itnever existed in sufficient magnitude toimperil public safety. This process wouldnot depart from the current waiverapplication requirements (CFR 238.7).

9.3 CONTEXT OF FINDINGS ANDCONCLUSIONS

During the course of performing thisresearch, a variety of informal views wereexpressed on the issues raised by joint use.They generally fell into two categories, proand con:

For:1. Joint use is feasible, if fail-safe

train control and separationsystems are developed.

2. Regulatory constraints on jointuse in North America must bereexamined and reformed.


3. In spite of the culturaldifferences, shared track likeKarlsruhe, and reciprocalrunning as in Japan, can beapplied here, with propercontrols.

4. "If they can do it over there, wecan do it here."

5. Risk assessment can be used tojustify joint use.

6. Mitigations can reduce any riskto tolerable levels.

Against:• Nothing more than shared

track by temporal separationwill ever be permitted in theU.S.

• None of the overseasexperience can be applied inNorth America because ourrailroads, operations, and urbandevelopment are different.

• North American regulators,transit, and railroad operatorswill never tolerate joint usebecause prevailing attitudesand institutional climate abhorshared track practices.

• Shared tracks by such disparaterolling stock as railroads andrail transit constitute an unsafecondition that can never beresolved in North America.

• Insurance and legal liabilitiesprevent any meaningful jointuse in the U.S.

• Political and regulatorymethodology in the U.S. oftenprecludes any approach notbased on evolutionary changesto existing railroad safetyregulations.

The investigators on the research teamconclude that this study will not resolve theopposing views listed above to the extentthat Federally sanctioned joint use

operations will happen or joint use will beprohibited forever in North America. Someobservers may have expected such adecisive "go, no-go" pronouncement as aresult of this research.

The expectation is that, as a result of thisstudy, joint use and its application willcontinue to be treated as a potential viabletransportation option, though joint use willnot prove feasible in all applications. Thisconclusion is expressed because theresearch disclosed no reason for suggestingabsolute joint use prohibitions norconcluding it should be dismissed withoutfurther research as a matter of nationalpolicy. A process is evolving which, atmaturity, will provide tools to evaluate riskand apply other factors to make case-by-case decisions on applications of joint use.While the analysis tools may be appliedlocally, the ultimate investment andoperational decisions on joint use will bethe result of fitting the analysis resultsupon state and Federal regulatorytemplates, as done overseas.

Shared track can potentially occur wherebusiness advantages overcome theliabilities of shared risk and responsibility.Co-mingled joint use track arrangementscould exhibit advantages such as: shorterimplementation, lower capital costs, and inthe cases of substituting rail transit forrailroad passenger service, reducedoperating costs. Cooperative joint usecannot easily happen where one of thepartners is reluctant to participate. Allpublic transit and participating rail carriers(public and private) would have to benefitfrom a joint use agreement.

While joint use risk was marginally higherthan separated operations, overseas dataand risk analysis demonstrates thatapplying mitigation reduces joint use riskbelow that of separate operations. Risktherefore can be quantified, managed, anddiminished by those assuming the risk atthe local or metropolitan level.


Is joint use on shared track, a potentialtransportation alternative in the context ofMIS-type alternative studies and other newstart ventures? To date, joint use hastended to be dismissed by the fatal flawapproach, citing Federal regulationswithout the benefit of risk or costassessments in individual localapplications. As described earlier, riskassessments are performed with Federaloversight in proposed shared jointfreight/high speed passenger railroadfacilities such as Northeast Corridor andFOX (Florida Overland eXpress). Riskanalysis is also being employed by UtahTransit Authority for Salt Lake Citytemporal joint use and in south NewJersey. Risk assessment used in this way isacknowledged by FRA and rail operatorsto be a tool in demonstrating that publicsafety will not be violated by certain typesof railroad joint operations in the UnitedStates now. It is only applied currently:

1. between different types of railroads,2. temporally between rail transit and

railroads, and3. for temporary waivers.

Risk analysis is not routinely applied topermanent joint use arrangements betweenrail transit and railroad vehicles in NorthAmerica.

To provide the tools to evaluate potentialjoint use risks, this research team hasdrafted a Risk Assessment "Guide"(Chapter 6 in this report) which could beapplied at local option at the metropolitanlevel and in individual corridor studies.The purpose of this approach is not toundermine U.S. safety regulations. On thecontrary, it is intended to quantify wherepotential high risk and unsafe conditionswould accompany joint use – and wherethose unsafe conditions would exist.

This research is only one in a series ofsimultaneously advancing efforts describedearlier and below affecting joint use and

related operating practice outcomes. It hasbeen prepared with recognition of thesecompanion efforts at the state, Federal andprivate sectors, and it is intended to fitwithin the flow of the conclusions andfindings that they produce.

Domestic North American efforts include:

! Activities of trade, research, and adhoc professional groups, such as thePassenger Rail Equipment SafetyStandards (PRESS) program.

! Formulating new or reformingexisting regulations and rulemakingby FRA and various overseas railministries (in the latter caseestablishing precedents and sharingexperience).

! Emerging state oversight of railtransit and implementation of state-developed System Safety ProgramPlan Standards,

! Advancement of new train controltechnologies (PTC, PTS) and theirapplication in a variety of operatingenvironments.

! Clamor for rail new starts by severalNorth American metropolitan areasand local jurisdictions.

! Rail mergers, disposal of branchlines to new and traditional short lineoperators (who tend to be moreresponsive to local needs anddemonstrate greater willingness toblend passenger and freight trainswhere i t produces additionalrevenue).

! Increase in popularity of publicprivate partnerships, DBOM,turnkey, and "third sector" typeenterprises.

! Creation of regional rail transitentities/systems overseas, andRegional Railroads in NorthAmerica.

Overseas efforts include:


! Further overseas applications of jointuse in varied environments andcircumstances.

! Refinement in the state of the art in avariety of joint use applications andgrowing experience about thecharacteristics and performance ofshared track operations.

! Growing experience and time seriesdata on joint use safety and risk.

! Overseas division of formernationalized railways into track/infrastructure, passenger operations,freight operations and rolling stockinto separate private railroadbusinesses.

! Privatization of rail systems andfunctions overseas (to an institutionalrailroad environment closer to that ofthe U.S.).

None of these activities alone will resolvejoint use controversy. None to date haverevealed a single device or practice thatradically alters joint use risk or viability.All of these activities together couldinfluence joint use decision making andoutcomes.

9.4 OTHER LESSONS LEARNED

The nature of joint use is revealed throughdescriptions of current operations, route,and areas served. There is a broad diversityof shared track arrangements betweendifferent rail modes encountered in thisresearch. This diversity indicates threetypes of processes at work:

! Incremental application of joint usepractice spawns variants (inKarlsruhe, there are five types ofjoint use operation).

! Case-by-case local innovation, ratherthan general "wisdom," applieduniformly to joint use.

! A federal regulatory oversight, withsufficient latitude to permit state andlocal innovation.

None of the overseas experience describedearlier offers a single optimal model forapplication in North America. Elements ofeach of the joint use examples profiled inChapters 7 and 8 demonstrate experiencethat can be applied very selectively, and ona case-by-case basis, though fewer railtransit environments exist in NorthAmerica.

9.4.1 Institutional Lessons

One characteristic common to bothoverseas continents is the proliferation ofprivate and third sector-type railways. InNorth America, a comparable condition isthe creation of short line and regional(freight) railroads and their recreationaland dinner train affiliates. In Germany,these type of new rail enterprises fall intothe regional, or Stadtbahn, category. InJapan, they are more commonly considered"interurbans," or third sector short lines.

Since the disappearance of the interurbanrailway in North America, there is nocommon term for these systems, thoughTRB paper sessions have been organizedaround the theme of "Regional Railways."Equivalent operating systems in the U.S.would be exemplified by St. Louis LRT orSan Francisco's BARTD. Note that in theU.S., "regional rail" has been applied tolight rail, rail rapid transit, and commuterrailroad systems that perform similaroperating functions, but to varying degrees.

Because shared track can be accomplishedfar more rapidly than building all-newparallel track, the evolution of rail systemsunder such an arrangement compressestime (and budgets). In Karlsruhe, theregional LRT-based system had a 25-yeargestation, but once the precedents andcommon interests were established andonce the practices were proven feasible onthe interurbans, the full railroad/LRTshared track innovations came in rapidsuccession. In the past five years, six


railroad corridors have been converted toregional Stadtbahn/LRT service totalingover 120 route km (75 route miles).Ridership growth over the previousrailroad service ranges from 100% to 470%(the latter on the Karlsruhe -Bretten/Gölhausen S4 service).

In Karlsruhe, shared track is deployed inseveral ways, not all of which can beapplied in North America. One of theprincipal advantages of German light rail isderived from converting regional DBAGrailroad-based services to LRT-basedStadtbahn services. There are few directequivalents for these types of passengerrailroad service in the U.S., most of thosethat existed were discontinued or replacedby bus. The advantages of one-manoperation, of the lower operating cost perkm (DM5 per LRV km vs. DM12- DM17per train km), lower energy cost (savingsof DM 18,000 per train annually), and timesavings (LRVs @ 90km/h. top speed) savesix minutes on a 32 km line compared torailroad train (@ 120 km/h) and otherpotential savings on crews, equipment, andenergy do not apply in North America,except as LRT might favorably compare toregional bus services.

The Luxembourg case study is somewhatmore applicable. While five rail BTB-2002corridors do provide a regional railnetwork around Luxembourg, the region isheavily dependent on regional buses, andthe insufficient capacity of city streets tohandle regional and local buses combinedwas a prime motivation to convert to LRT.

These are described as "operations" above,but they are also physical and real estate"properties" that are jointly managed.Initially, ownership is important inestablishing shared track rules andpractices, but over time, as tenant and hostbecome more acclimated to joint operation,the ownership distinctions become lessdefined as shared risk, shared benefits,standardization, and common interest

prevail. The most dramatic example of fullmaturation of shared track is when one ofthe partners adopts the rolling stockstandard of the other as a business,marketing, or financial policy.

As pointed out in Chapter 8, the sixsuccessor railroads to JNR have purchasedand operate rail buses in joint service withtheir other railroad-size freight andpassenger rolling stock. In Germany (andSwitzerland), railroads purchase rail busesand LRVs, operating them on theirindigenous railroad tracks in mixed trafficfor reasons of economy and business. Aspecific example is at Karlsruhe, whereDeutsche Bahn AG (DBAG) purchasedidentical (to the LRT operator) light railrolling stock to substitute for more costlyrailroad DMUs and locomotive-hauledpassenger trains operating on its ownrailroad lines.

T h i s p r a c t i c e i s t h e u l t i m a t eacknowledgment by a railroad that sharedtrack and integrated operations can work.Because post-1981 railroad passenger andfreight businesses are separated in the U.S.,these types of applications are limited.Selling the railroad property to a transitoperator in exchange for exclusive trackagerights for railroad freight service is anotheracknowledgment.

In Japan, a broad range of joint usearrangements has unintentionallypromoted standardization of equipment,driven by a shared infrastructure. As railrolling stock is retired, the replacementequipment is specified to a more uniformstandard, in some cases to go beyond jointor reciprocal running to actual pooling ofequipment. Examples are cited in Chapter8.

9.4.2 Lessons on Costs and Cost Savings

Related to the safety issue are cost and costsavings. Can a balance be achievedbetween joint use benefits (better service,


more new starts and lower costs) and thepotential risk and liability associated withshared track? While it is always difficult toweigh injury and fatalities withconvenience and cost savings, the cost oflitigation and claims tend to drive potentialNorth American transportation liabilitydecisions rather than the benefits to users:"If we do this, will we get sued?"Recognizing the difficulty of costlylitigation in North America, andacknowledging that locally performed riskanalysis can begin to estimate cost riskspecifically on a case-by-case basis, thefollowing dramatic examples begin toquantify cost benefits of joint use, at nosacrifice of safety.

The data in Table 8-4 reveal rapid transit intwelve Japanese metropolitan areas. Totalrapid transit route miles are 406 miles (654km.). Rapid transit service with joint usetotals 789 miles (1269 km.) The differencein these two numbers (383 route miles or615 km.) represents the increase in rapidtransit service route miles coverage as aresult of joint use or reciprocal running.The route miles due to reciprocal runningwere increased by 94%. An additionalbenefit is reducing mandatory transfersbetween carriers with end-to-end matchingrail services. Another is the capital costsavings resulting from avoiding orminimizing costly subway construction.With the high density of Japanesemetropolitan areas, such rapid transitexpansion would not take place on thesurface and in any case would be extremelydisruptive to the social, economic, andnatural environment.

If one conservatively estimates cost ofdouble track rapid transit route miles insubway at $100 million a mile, the grosscost savings nationally is $32.8 billion!These savings are diminished by the needfor new rolling stock and critical trackconnections and other costs associated withthe integration of two or more rail systems.These costs, however, are relatively

modest, and can be phased over time. Thecost estimate is, of course, an exercise,because that amount of money would notlikely have been spent and that expansionof route miles would not have happenedusing tunnel construction.

A similar capital cost savings estimate forone European metropolitan area producesmore modest, but significant savings. It isestimated that Karlsruhe gained 127 routemiles as a result of joint running withAVB, DBAG, and SWEG railroads. Aconservative capital cost estimate for LRTroute miles of double track on reservedright-of-way is $20 million/mile. Applyingthat estimate to Karlsruhe VBK/AVBnetwork results in a gross savings, basedon 127 route miles, of $2.5 billion. Therelatively modest capital costs ofintegrating the two systems through trackconnections, compliant rolling stock, andinfrastructure, should be subtracted fromthe estimated benefit savings. As in theJapanese experience above, these rail lineswould never be justified as separatefacilities at these costs. Most of these "newstarts" overlay existing or former obsoleteservices.

The lesson suggested from both precedingparagraphs is that joint use is not only amore cost-effective way of preserving andexpanding existing rail transit systems andinitiating "rail transit new starts," but moreimportantly it enables more new starts tobegin using finite funding resources andlowers the cost feasibility threshold for railnew starts that would otherwise be toocostly.

Other potential capital cost savings arisingfrom shared track are: standardization ofequipment, pooling of rolling stock(because of higher performance LRVs,Karlsruhe saves a train consist [3 LRVs vs.4 railroad consists]), joint purchasing, andselective pooling and sharing ofmaintenance and operating facilities.Cooperation breeds other cooperation and


savings. Uniform or universal farecollection systems are among thecosteffective cooperative venturesaccompanying shared track.

Operating cost savings from resourceconservation includes reducing of energyconsumption. Karlsruhe claims DM18,000($10,000) annually per train and laborcosts by substituting smaller transit crewsfor railroad crews. The latter labor savingstranslates into a minimum of halving trainmile costs or DM 5.5/km for LRVs andDM 12-17/km for railroad consists(Ludwig). The initial joint use lines inKarlsruhe perform at an 85% cost recoveryratio. Prior to the last downturn in steelprices, Japan's Sanriku Ry. third sectorrailbus operation showed a 99% operatingcost recovery.

9.4.3 Lessons Applying Joint Use to North America

During the course of conducting thisresearch, discussions with severaladvocates of rail transit disclosed the viewthat because railroads and light rail sharecommon track "over there," that aloneproves that joint track use can beaccomplished in North America. Thisresearch does not support that premise. Italso does not try to "make a case" basedexclusively on European or Pacific Rimexperience. Operating and socialconditions are different in North America,which casts doubt on the direct applicationof overseas practices. This report does,however, consider what can be learned andtransferred to improve and expand NorthAmerican transit practices.

Recalling Chapters 1-4 and the key issuesidentified in Chapter 5, which issues (andaccompanying measurables/policy) areapplicable to transferring overseas joint useexperience to North America?

! Regulation: Overseas joint use safetyexperience vs. U.S. non-joint useexperience and before/after increased

service benefits/costs compared torisk. Insufficient data on both sidesthwarts direct comparisons. Riskanalysis techniques are compatible.

! Operations: Specific overseasoperating practices can be applied torisk mitigation.

! Physical Overseas Plant: Track,signaling, and train control systemsare being applied now.

! Vehicles/Rail Cars: Crashworthinessmeasures are applicable to NorthAmerica. Most passenger rail transitcar design is non-domestic.

Karlsruhe is held up as the ideal model ofjoint use, yet some prevailing mythssurround Karlsruhe's extensive joint usesystem. Misunderstandings include:

! Karlsruhe overcame obstacles tojoint use in a short time.

! It was the first to implement jointuse.

! The regulatory and institutionalobstacles facing the Karlsruhe regionin implementing joint use practiceswere different, and less difficult, thanthose in North America.

! Once shared track had been achievedat Karlsruhe, expanding the systemmeant merely replicating theexperience with the initial line.

! Because they accomplished joint usein Germany, North America, canaccomplish it here the same way.

! Some feature(s) of the Karlsruhecircumstances or key operatingdiscipline, if applied here in the U.S.,would instantly ensure acceptanceand success for shared trackarrangements in North America.

Karlsruhe may not be the first operator topractice joint use (note earlier references tohistorical examples), but it is currently the


most widely known internationally by railtransit practitioners. It is distinctivebecause it pioneered applying extensiveand varied joint use practices, grew itssystem incrementally, and achievedsuccess within two and a half decades.Karlsruhe provides multiple case studies inapplying shared track use in a variety ofsocial, economic, and geographicenvironments.

Related to the myths listed above, severalcharacteristics of Karlsruhe are instructiveto consider for North American applicationand will provide the structure of thisprofile of Karlsruhe's shared trackexperience:

! Dynamic and persistent leadershipby a strong and skilled personality(Dieter Ludwig, General Manager ofthe system) was important toachieving joint use. Domestic LRTsuccess stories also reveal"champions."

! The system began very modestly byfirst absorbing and then converting afailing meter gauge interurbanAlbtalbahn (AVB), which providedjoint passenger and limited railfreight services.

! Each successive shared trackaddition to the system was anincremental achievement in joint usepractice because it was different andmore venturesome than previousadditions. Each increment increasedsystem complexity, bringing railtransit and railroads and theirinstitutions into greater intimacy. Thecurrent level of integration andcoordination was achievedincrementally, "raising the bar" ateach step.

! Participating joint-use institutionsreached agreement on shared track

specifics when it became in theirjoint interest to do so.

! Shared track credibility came withmore and intensified joint useexperience. Once the advantages ofjoint use were confirmed and thebenefits distributed among allpartners, subsequent joint useproposals were more readilyaccepted.

! Joint use was accompanied by otherchanges in social, economic, andinstitutional structure whichhappened to be supportive.Alternatively, joint use requires or istriggered by a desire to reform andimprove public transportation of allmodes. Most notable among thesewas the shifting of local and regionaltransit financing and decisionmakingdown to the Lande, or provinciallevel.

! Major differences exist betweenGerman and North American railwayequipment and practices, butinstitutional concerns between railtransit and railroad operators andtheir respective regulators aresimilar.

9.4.4 Overseas National Policies

Switzerland and Germany have pioneeredin joint use applications of various typesand circumstances. France and the Beneluxcountries are planning similar joint useapplications.

National polices in Switzerland andGermany can be characterized as:

! Encouraging regionalism of railways,through establishment of localorganizations for planning, financing,and managing such projects (usuallycast-offs of the national railwaysystem).


! Privatizing elements of the nationalrailroad system.

! F r e q u e n t l y a c c o m p a n y i n gprivatization is the division ofnational railway organizations intoseparate businesses: infrastructureownership and maintenance, rollingstock ownership, freight andpassenger operation ownerships, andreal estate managements.

! Establishing a body of law underwhich private companies cancompete for operating contracts for avariety of rail services.

! A set of federal regulationsgoverning tram, rail transit, andr a i l r oa d op e r a t i o ns / ph ys i c a lstandards separately (BOStrab, EBO,and DBAG).

! EC mandates and directives whichoverlay (and in some cases compel)federal regulations and institutionalreform.

! The ability to evaluate newregulatory concepts politically and toapply risk analysis to a high degreein developing new regulations.

! Integrating (or retaining) freight andpassenger operations under commonmanagement.

The Netherlands is somewhat an exceptionbecause, as described in Chapter 7, they aregrouping three adjacent but separatemetropolitan areas that may grow into asingle, common LRT-based system tofunction among and within three cities.Their national planning group (Railned) ischarged with the responsibility forestablishing basic standards and resolvingtechnical compatibility issues between thenational railroad (NS) and among the cityLRT systems.

Railned's policy on risk is pertinent toNorth American circumstances and worthquoting from the March, 1998 InternationalRailway Journal.

"Railned has stipulated that dualmode operation should pose a greaterrisk than for pure heavy railoperation. Any extra risks resultingfrom dual mode operation (additionalservice [train density], differentoperating speeds, crashworthiness,braking potential, train detection,change of derailment) must becompensated by extra safetyelsewhere. Risks are assessed inaccident/train km and the number ofinjuries to passengers and staff.Railned will be making carefulassessment of crashworthiness bothwith other rail vehicles and broadsidewith road vehicles."

A major difference from the Netherlandscircumstances is that U.S. light rail citiesare far enough apart as to preclude anyconcerns about compatibility between LRTsystems. The issue of compatibilitybetween rail transit and railroads remains.

9.4.5 Contrasting Pacific Rim and European JointUse, and Applications to North America

Major differences exist in the Pacific Rimand European arrangements which haveimplications for North Americanapplication:

! Japan has no common examples ofjoint use between light rail and mainline railways. Like the U.S., butunlike Germany, Japan motorized(with buses) substantial portions ofits former street railway network. AsG. Thompson points out, "Don'tgrope for something that does notexist. There are no Pacific RimKarlsruhes." There are, however,many Japanese interurban electric


and diesel propelled (railbus orDMU) operations which integratewith railroads and rapid transit. In asense, the interurban railway is theagent for joint use in Japan, whilelight rail is the agent for joint use inEurope.

! Three major types of joint use haveevolved in Germany and arespreading elsewhere in WesternEurope:

- Regional railways based onlight rail and railroad (Category1 and 2) DMU technologies onrailroad branch line service andventuring onto main linerailroads. (Dürener Kreisebahn- DKB)

- Stadtbahn railways based onlight rail technology integratingservice between streetcar/tramand railroad branch and mainlines. (Karlsruhe AVB)

- Metros and Pre Metros wherelight rail and heavy rail rapidtransit are integrated with theobjectives of extending thereach of metro service cheaplyand/or converting light rail toheavy rail in phases.

! Two types of generic shared trackexist in Japan. These two types donot lend themselves to classifyingrelative to rail modes or institutionsas shown in the German exampleabove. The resulting arrangementbetween two or more rail carriersdoes not form separate railways(though third sector railways areformed to accomplish portions ofshared track arrangement).

- Joint Use between railroadpassenger, interurbans, andrapid transit railways in urban

areas. One railway runs overanother's track beyond itsc u s t o m a r y t e r m i n a l /ownership, with the host/tenant relationship not beingreversible.

- Reciprocal Running (a subset ofjoint use) between dieselinterurbans, railbuses, andDMUs and the national railroadnetwork represented by theJapan Rail group of railroads.Two or more railways ofcompatible standards, joinedend to end, run over each other'stracks in an integrated service.These tend to be suburban orrural in nature. Another subsetof joint use is reciprocal runningbetween rapid transit, light rail,railroad, and interurban. Thesetend to exist and flourish inurban areas.

! Another major difference betweenEuropan and Pacific Rim experienceis that Japan's ambitious railconstruction programs and plansdescribed in Chapter 8 includesignificant new construction built inanticipation of future joint use. InWestern Europe, joint uses arelargely reclamations of existingabandoned, disused, or underutilizedcapacity on the railroad system inresponse to current demand.Purpose-built joint use does exist insome European light rail/pre metroand metros as a temporary means ofphased expanding of heavy rail. Newconstruction consists of keyconnections between metro, LRT,and railroad networks, rather thanall-new lines purpose built witheventual joint use in mind.

! Both of these joint use philosophiesare currently rare among North


American transit governing boards.Rail transit and people moverinfrastructure is built with littleregard for potential interchange or, insome cases, to exclude anyintegration with other modes orcarriers.

9.5 CONCLUSIONS

Risk analysis quantifies and foreignexperience indicates that:

! Risks can be quantified according tocircumstance and situation.

! Joint use risk could be broughtwithin and managed at acceptablelimits, although how that risk wouldbe shared among the railroad andtransit entities would probably bethe subject of considerablenegotiation.

! Risk can be further reduced byapplying mitigation measures.

! Decisions on joint use can beentrusted to those who assume legaland financial risk, with guidance bybasic national standards.

! Selective application of joint usepractice can be made on a case-by-case basis and with the cooperationof the freight and passenger railpartners using the Screening Matrix(See Table 9-1).

! Additional research is required tofully translate and understand theGerman literature, to interpret itsfindings, and to routinely collect newoverseas joint use and risk analysisstudies as they are released. On-siteinspection of Karlsruhe to understandjoint use practice and opportunities isa logical extension of this research.

! There is a dearth of accident data andhistory on which to base riskassessments. While this meager datareveals increasingly safer rail transitand railroads, it also retards theability to quantify risk.

While there is insufficient joint-use accidentexperience at this time to quantify riskconclusively, probabilities of collisions onlow-density freight lines appear to besufficiently small to consider enabling localdecision makers to determine risk and applyshared track practices accordingly.

Application of further physical andoperating measures would further mitigaterisk. In Germany, this is done by applyinga more stringent BOStrab (streetcar)regulation to offset risk exposure caused byexceeding an EBO railway standard. Putanother way, the active performance(deceleration capabilities) of an LRVoffsets the lack of passive (crashresistance) capabilities of that same LRV.In Europe, enhanced stopping performanceis achieved by redundant braking systems,including regenerative braking on LRVsand multiple retarders on Category 2 and 3DMUs.

In North America, this issue has beendebated as crashworthiness vs. crashavoidance. Regrettably, these objectivesare seldom complementary, since one maybe achieved, but at the expense of theother. A Volpe Center study (Tyrell,Severson et al., "Evaluation of Cab, CarCrashworthiness Design Modifications,"March, 1997) claims that increasing thecrush zone at car ends does not exact asignificant weight penalty and therebyreduction in car braking performancerelated to weight.

The motivations for instituting joint use,where it is practiced, are institutional andeconomic. In Europe and the Pacific Rim,shared track is not considered in itself areform. It is considered a device forimplementing reforms that are motivatedoutside the transport sector. It is consideredinseparable from fundamental economicand development policies and initiatives.The reorganization and privatization ofnational railroad systems and relatedactivities which trickle down to


the branch lines exemplifies this massiveoverhaul of the system. In this context, theadvantages and shortcomings of joint useare weighed in light of achieving nationalpolicies and state/local objectives. Theseadvantages include:

! Consistent with national transport (orin the U.S., Class 1 railroad) policyto shed local branch lines whosecontinuance cannot be economicallyjustified by a large railroad.

! Transfer to local authority (in theU.S., a regional or short line carrier)resulting in less expensive trainoperation, as exemplified by thirdsector railway efficiencies in thePacific Rim and bidding of publictransport to contractors elsewhere.

! Current "hold harmless" and otherlegal and liability provisions in jointuse agreements between U.S. freightand commuter railroads haveestablished relationships andprecedents adverse to shared track ofother types.

This research alone cannot resolve thefeasibility issues of joint use introductionin North America. Had there been a richertrove of rail accident and incident databased on actual joint-use operation,perhaps a more convincing case could bemade that joint-use risk is tolerable on anational or generic level.

Research disclosed no extraordinary jointuse accident experience abroad whichmerited coverage in the professional railtrade press, nor did any surface from thedirect overseas contacts. Accidentsbetween LRVs and railroad trains werefound in the risk analysis data (AppendixN). We found no case where joint use wasrevoked for safety, scandal or "disgrace"(in Japan) associated with an accident orother reasons of risk associated with jointuse. The law of averages dictates that suchan incident will occur, but plainly stated,

after a decade of experience, some in veryheavy rail traffic corridors, there is noevidence that shared use of track, asapplied, inherently causes incidents anymore than does other types of shared tracksby multiple train movements.

In dealing with risk, Chapter 6 presentsdata that demonstrates that rail transit andrailroad passenger operations (separately)perform safely relative to other modes oftravel. "Railroad (and) transit accidents,while rare, (are) spectacular, engenderheadlines . . . followed by governmentinvestigation . . . but it confuses theunderstanding on just how (risky) transitmay be" (E. Tennyson, "Rail Transit SafetyAnalysis", TRB, 1998).

Clearly, there are circumstances underwhich mixed operations by certain types ofhigh speed, high volume rail modes orvehicles constitute an unacceptable risk tothe public. There are other low volume,low speed co-mingled conditions in whichthe risk is minimized or negligible. All ofthis range of circumstances is currentlytreated similarly in North America. Themission of this work was to determine ifthere is a way to differentiate between therisk extremes by applying overseasexperience and quantified risk analysis.

Judgments are still made within aregulatory framework. Standards are stillapplied. Operating discipline is stillmaintained. There are, however, severalfundamental differences between theapproach being considered in this reportand what is currently practiced. MPOs,State regulators and independent DBOMconsortia can be the vehicles of change asimplementors as follows:

! Develop a more user-friendlyplanning process in which costs,risks, impacts, and benefits can beconsidered together in potential joint


use applications. The stakeholderswill make decisions on whether jointuse benefits to the immediate localpublic and participants offset thecalculated magnitude of risk. Thisapproach is consistent with Federalpolicy for decades through thelocal/regional 3-C, AlternativesAnalysis, and MIS processes, wherethe planning analysis and design areperformed locally and local choice isexercised under Federal guidelinesand scrutiny, but without precludinglocal prerogatives. Similarly, localdecision-making on joint use,integrated into the planning process,could be conducted under regulatoryscrutiny in order to preclude anypotentially flawed or inappropriateanalysis.

! Apply the Screening Matrix (at theend of this chapter) and risk analysisprocess described in Chapter 6 in amulti-step process. Include thisprocess within the MIS or similarplanning processes in selectingoptimal rail transit alternatives (onlyif joint use alternatives apply and donot create an undue burden on localauthorities).

! Joint ventures between variousb u s i n e s s ( t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,development, etc.) and governmentinterests are continuing and shouldbe encouraged. These ventures offera climate in which joint use canflourish. Joint use of tracks is onlyone aspect of joint venture. ThePacific Rim "Third Sector"experience demonstrates that theright combination of complementarybusiness interests encourages jointuse, joint venture, and jointopportunities. Currently Design,Build, Operate, and Maintain(DBOM) popularity brings diversetransportation and non-transportationinterests together in a common

forum. States like New Jersey havepassed legislation encouraging thesepartnerships to expedite transportprojects formerly the sole domain ofthe public sector. Reintroducing theprivate sector to public transportationand sustaining their existing interestin railroad transportation creates abusiness climate with commoninterests that can cross modalboundaries.

! A stronger relationship needs to bebuilt between other rail safetyresearch, technology ventures, andshared track research. Rather thantreating these as separate researchefforts, they can complement oneanother and be better integrated.

An example of such complementaryefforts is that between risk analysisand Federal and industry cooperativeventures with railroads on AdvancedTrain Control as done now by FRA.

! Case-by-case evaluation, within thecontext of the current federal andstate regulatory environment wouldcontinue, but would allow for moreinput in the decision-making processat the metropolitan level. Theconventional planning process andinstitutions for this cooperativeprocess with Federal oversight isalready in place through MetropolitanPlanning Organizations (MPOs). TheMPO could advance a study agendaand provide a forum for the public,the transit operator(s), the railroad(s),and the federal and state interests toanalyze and debate joint use issues.


! Continuously improve and refineRisk Assessment tools to supportlocal decision-makers. The riskassessment technique will improve asthe safety database grows and jointuse experience broadens. The RiskAnalysis guidance in Chapter 6 andScreening Matrix are two such tools.Collecting and compiling data insupport of these tools is a priority.

! Continue to monitor overseasexperience. While there are no directU.S. equivalents of Karlsruhe norU.S. places where Japanese-typereciprocal running can now bedirectly applied, these and otheroverseas precedents are instructive informing any unique U.S. type ofshared track arrangements. Overseaspioneering in "rail new starts" andenhanced existing services willbenefit domestic practitioners byavoiding "their" mistakes. Directlye q u i v a l e n t c o n d i t i o n s o rcircumstances need not exist to learnfrom the experience of others.

! In a private-sector joint venture, thefundamental decision to advancemay be made cooperatively at themetropolitan level, but the executionwould be left to the private operatorsand risk takers, under the mantle ofbasic regulatory guidelines.

These conclusions are consistent andsupportive of current domestic regulatoryauthority. Nothing in this report suggests apolicy contrary to the current regulation,which is on a case-by-case basis and by-exception regulation of joint use, asdescribed in earlier chapters. It isconcluded, however, that the way in whichdecisions are made, who makes them, andthe tools used to decide joint use practicesmay need to be reconsidered. A principalconclusion is therefore offered.

9.6 PRINCIPAL CONCLUSION

This research does not result in a specificrecommendation on the viability of jointuse in North American railroads and railtransit systems, other than joint use meritsconsideration. That decision is moreproperly made elsewhere, where the risksare assessed and assumed. The research,however, suggests a principal conclusion toapply a technique whereby cooperativejudgments can be made, whether or not toshare track. It is concluded that thedecision process be presided over by anumber of interests coming together forcooperative deliberation. Those interestsinclude at a minimum:

! Rail Transit operator(s).

! Railroad operator(s).

! Railroad owner (when it is differentfrom the above).

! Federal regulatory agencies (ifapplicable).

! State(s) agency(ies) responsible foroversight of rail transit and operatorRail Transit Safety Program Plans,along with Federal policy frameworkand regulatory standards.

! Private Sector Joint Venture,Turnkey, or DBOM Partners andtheir prime consultant (if applicable).

! A g e n c i e s o r o r g a n i z a t i o n ssponsoring any MIS or alternativesanalysis and their prime consultant(if applicable).

Risk analysis is currently not required inthe rail facility planning process. It isselectively used, however, to evaluate veryspecific parts of a proposed system whichare suspected to be risky. San Diego didnot employ it in its initial joint use betweenLRT and railroad.


Salt Lake City is using risk analysis toassess LRV/freight train temporalseparation only. Seattle is using it for aportion of its proposed commuter rail jointuse (with freight). South New Jersey isusing it in its Trenton-Camden DBOMusing non-compliant DMUs. Though riskanalysis may not be used uniformly in newstarts or MIS planning processes, it is usedin railroad major investment planning anddemonstrations. The Northeast Corridor,Florida FOx and non-compliant DMUNorth American new starts provideexamples. FRA will likely require riskanalysis as a condition to granting waiversor exceptions.

No new planning or major (public)investment process is suggested as part ofthis research. Existing MIS or alternativesanalysis framework can apply through theMPOs for certifying and making projectseligible for public funding. Competitiveturnkey or DBOM procurement processes,to the extent that they are required forFederal funding or environmentalconcurrence, also provide a safeguard forevaluating joint use options.

For rail new starts employing MIS orsimilar processes, joint use is vulnerable tobe dismissed early in options screeningbecause of the regulatory barrier to railtransit and railroad equipment on sharedtrack. If joint use alternatives areeliminated as automatic fatal flaws, thefollowing useful planning informationwould be precluded:

! Understanding and quantifying therisk probabilities of the proposedjoint operation.

! Knowing if such a joint operationcould be mitigated down to anacceptable diminished risk whichcould be otherwise feasible for a newrail start.

! Estimating capital cost comparisonsof an all-new alignment vs. adaptingthe existing one.

! Assessing the environmental, social,and economic impacts of a newparallel alignment in contrast toproposed joint use of an existingalignment.

! Knowing if the risk and other joint-use factors offset the added cost anddisruption of acquiring a newa l i g n m e n t a n d i n s t a l l i n gimprovements on it.

A railroad line in a joint-use alternativemight have a range of from less than two tomore than 24 daily freight trainmovements, but the analysis neveradvances to the point of determiningfeasibility under various traffic intensitiesand the risks each entail.

The following steps in determining jointuse feasibility are suggested:

Step #1. This research team devised aPreliminary Screening Matrix for Joint UseFeasibility and application of RiskAssessment (Table 9-1). It is intended as aguide to determine when to apply riskanalysis. It is not intended to prescribe thecircumstances where joint use between railtransit and railroads is viable.

Step #2. If the inquiry passes Step #1, arisk assessment should be considered, ifthere are joint use options under seriousconsideration. The Risk Assessment Guidein Chapter 6 is designed for novices in riskassessment, to make a determination if ajoint use alternative is appropriate forconsideration in an alternatives analysis,MIS, or other screening technique. Otherrisk assessment guidance, such as thesystem described in Military Standard 882-C, is also available.


Step #3. Apply the MIS or otheralternative selection process. The sharedtrack alternative or alternatives may stillbe rejected on technical or otherfeasibility measures when subjected to theconventional screening criteria. Theopportunity thereby exists to assess jointuse with other techniques for expeditedand cost-effective new startimplementation within the conventionalplanning process.

A value engineering exercise may be

applied at this point as an option to confirmthe validity of the selected alternative(whether joint use or not).

Note that these steps are suggested asoptions, not additional regulatoryrequirements.

As risk analysis techniques improve andthe reservoir of safety data accumulates,the processes suggested by this researchwill gain more credence.


Table 9-1Preliminary Screening Matrix for Joint Use Feasibility

and Application of Risk Assessment

Notes:

- DIS = Discretionary Use of Risk Assessment- RA = Risk Assessment should be considered- Risk Assessment subject to local conditions, values and determinants- Consider what mitigation of risk will permit upgrading joint use potential within each cell as ATC, PTC and PTS enable higher concentrations of train density

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CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS