CHAPTER - II

COURSE AND ORl~TATlON OF THE FOREIGN POLICY

41

Prior to the attainment of independence, a

Philippine delegation participated in the .San-Francisco

Q:mference al terr1atively known as U.N. Q:mference held in

April, 1945. This was the commencement of Philippine

interaction in' the community of nations. Brigadier General .

Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippine Resident Cl>mmissioner in

the United States, led the delegation to the conference.

In the conference, Romulo struggled for the inclusion of the

~rd 'independence• instead of 'self-government• in the U.N.

42

such a ruling if used by one of the great powers would

paralyse the U.N. n3 The Philippine delegation went on

record in the conference against the Veto power. Though,

Romulo opined "Without the United states, the United

Nations will be another L·eague of Nations. mother

failure."~ (lbmulo was proud of the fact that he had been a fellow student with Roosevelt at Norte Dame University).

H1 s premises of thinking rehashed the obj active of the

"Philippines as Americanized orimtals", interpreting it

as "American auccess to the Orient." He said: "Here a

Filipino can sa,y the American pattern in my country is a

policy where hatred was tum ed to suspicion, suspicion to

confidence, confidence to loyality.u5 He stressed "The

pattern of America ,..orked in the Philippines. It will work

again." About the Philippine role in the East the General

illustrated, "America as a world power must have prestige

in the Far East. The Philippines were America's bulwark

in the Orient. There her army and n evy headquarters were,

there her clippers were based and there stood her serial

bases;" The Philippines, the GE11 eral felt "was the natural

cente!" from which the .American influence must radiate. n6

Finally Romulo predicted: "America will need in the orient

... Ibid., P• 261. ...;" 4. Ibid., P• 264.

5· Mother America, p.134. 6. Ibid., p.136.

43

her bastian of J..merican democracy which 1 s thEt Philippines."

He said, "I cann•t see the Philippines in the position of

refusing to America any bases she might need to maintain

herposition in the Orient, ~or she owes everything she is,

and may become, to P.merica. n7

Presideqcy of Manuel. A. Roxas :

Presidential elections were held in the Philippines

on April 23, 1946. Liberal wing candidate of Nacionalists

Party Manuel Acuna Roxas was elected the first President of

the independent, republic. Formally, u.s. President Harry s. Truman declared the independence for Philippines on July 4, 1946, In his inaugural address Presidmt Roxas elaborated

the vie\is of his government. ''In a troubled world", accepted

the President, where an alliance with one group of nations

or another might help determine the fate of mankind, we

cannot afford to hesitate or choose capriciously at the

international table. We must select or force, and adhere

. to that selection. But alliance must be firm and unshakable.

Our loyalties must be strond and enduring." The Presidrot

explained: "We are in the atomic age. We cannot stay the

swift advance of time even if we would. The world shrinks

with each passing hour. Wings carry men across deserts,

Oceans and mountains. The wide waters have ceased to bar

access to our land. " While clarifying his views in a

7. Ib id • , p. 1 36 •

44

broader spectrum, he observed: "• ••• Today the affairs of

Trieste must be our concern. Today lie, too have an interest

in the Mediterranean. The problem of Palestine is our

problem. The Poles and the Ozechs are our neighbours,

their fate concerns us as intimately as the destiny of

China, the future of Manchuria or the welfare of Malayas."

"But", asserted Roxas, "We have yet a greater bulwark today,

the friend ship and devotion of America." "That friendship",

Hoxas asset'ted, which is the greatest ornament of our

independence, raises us far above the level of our intrinsic

power and prestige". Delving on the fate of newly

independent nations the President said, "ln both Asia and

Europe snall nations tremble in the shadows of insecurity

if one pawns in the insidious politics of power ••••• famine,

actual starvation stalks the streets of c1 ties and by-roads

of countrysides •••• " Jnd immediately he pointed to the

bastion of salvation and advised: "America is the source

of almost all the assistance fUn1ished the stricken areas

of the world, and the American O:mgress appropriating with

troubled. and divided conscience for the bat'e relief needs

of these lands •••• " Accepting the u.s. prescribed political qualifications for this previlege, Roxas highli-

ghted the u.s. benevolence and extolled, "We, of the Philippine, are spared that trial, American aid to us is

direct and whole-hearted." The Middle East is reeking in

fennent, Africa is a political battle ground' the Iberian

45

peninsula seeths with unrest, only the westetrn hemisphere,

the land and people of the New World, are relatively free,

secure and without fear. 8 Salvaging the nations fortunate

for living in peace Roxas reassured, "And for these nations,

one means or another, the U.s. is the guarantor. Their

security is a measure of unselfish practice and power of

.America." Then asked the President, "Should we in the

Philippine desdain the support of this modern colosus whose

right is the hope and strength of the wrld? 11 "No free

nation today can," Roxas cautioned, "to its advantage,

scoff and roail at the u.s., whose shoulders bear the \

46

In the 1 ight of this perspective, the Roxas govem-

ment pleaded for inm1ediate economic aid for the Philippines.

In response, the u.s. government not only ag·reed to e::xtend

a loan of u.s. $75000,000 but also passed tVJo comprehensive pieces of legislation, the Philirpine Rehabilitation Act

and Philippine Trade Act of April 1946. Again in March

1947, Roxas government signed Hilitary Bases AgreemEnt

providing the extra-terri to rial rights for rome of the

largest u.s. military establishments. Accompanied with this was the Military Assistance Agreement signed just a

LMarch 21, week later, onL1946. Under this agreement a Joint United

States Military Advisory Group (JUS1-1AG) was created to plan

the Philippine DefEnce Policy. 11

New Delh1- Aa;ian Relations O:mferenc.e:

This was the age of liquidation of colonialism.

The newly liberated nations were guided by some sort of

affinity for one another. In 1947, the government of the

republic of Philippines sent its delegation in a gathering

of nations inspired by the feeling of this affinity. This

meet known as Asian Relations Cbnfer.ence \>ia s held in New

Delhi from March 23 to April 2, 1947. The participation

was broad; Asia stretched from Turkey to the Soviet Central

Republics, taking in along the way, Arabs and Jews from

11. u.s. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other Intemational Agreements, Washington, D. C., 1952, vol.1, pp.4lt7-5lf.

Palestine and to the annoyance of Olinese, a delegation

from Tibet. Japan was also invited, although the

invitation was rejected by General Mac.Arthur. Australia

and New Zealand participated as observers. The 01inese

delegation participated without any Cbmmunist representative.

This was a non-official gathering with defence and security

questions excluded from its purview. In his opening

address Nehru announced the arrival of Asia on Vbrld stage;

he called for Asian unity and regional co-operation and

wamed against any Pan-Asian, anti-western feelings.

Mastacio de Castro, the Philippine delegate,

admired the United States 'affection 1 and the Ph1lipp1n·e

'gratitude' towards the 'generous• American 'economic

assistance and cooperation. -•· .Arguing against a prevailing

anti-imperialist tanper, Castro applauded the u.s. role in the economic rehabilitation of the Philippines; ~ecially

its deoocratic ideals. 12

Presidency of Elpideo Quirino:

President Roxas died on April 15, 1948 and Vice-

President and concurrent Fbreign Minister Elpideo Quirino

took over the Presidency. In his inaugural address on

12. Asian Relations Q:mference (Delhi, 1948) pp.2-6 722; See also Sisir Gupta In~ia and R,ional Intmra'tipn in .b1,a (N.Y·-1964) ,p.34,New York imes of April3, 1947 also gave editorial comments on tho conference with special reference to the Philippine delegations' performance).

48

December 30, 1949, President Quirino touched on the mnjor

themes of foreign policy. The President elaborated:

II ••••• And so, in encouraging and assisting tho peoples to

be free on the b~sic principle of mutuality in solution of

our common social, economic, cultural problems, we help to

advance our own national interests". The President further

extended the logic and said: "ln taking this view, we were

guided by new geo-political conditions, anchored though we are

in the bosom of the Orient for all eternity •••• we can help

to advance the interests of the free democratic world by

forestalling the entry of subversive ideas into this rich

and populous reg ion of South-cast :Asia and Western Pacific"·

"In our relations with Peoples Republic of Olina with whom

we have had such close contacts over many countries, we

shall maintain an open mind, giving due heed to the require-

ments of our national security and the security of Asia as

a whole". But Quirino concluded, "the u.s. is still our best friend and we look to her to realize increasingly that,

in this atomic age, her area of safety and that of mankind

as a whole, have no delimiting frontiers. n 13

Agratlan Crl s1 s 9Dd StX'llg8.1e in Asj.,a:

Pbllowing the Asian Relations Cbnferm1ce of 1947,

Asian Youth Cbnference held in Calcutta (India) in 1948

Milton Walter Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, Hawai, 1965, p.126.

49

could be considered an event of great intemat'ional s1gnifi·

cance. Soviet view of prospective political struggle in

Asia was expounded in famous 'Zhdanov thesis'. This thesis,

as the p!ajor agenda of the conference, viewed the Asian

situation ripe for 'armed struggle 1 against the then

governments in Asian countries. Q:msequently it toughened

the· anti-communist stance of these governments. 14

Especially in the Philippine context, the Partai

Kommuni sta Pilipinas (PKP) approved the so-called Zhdanov

thesis. (One can trace here the Huk leader Luis Tarac's

differences with the CPSU, because during the conference the

Socialist Parties of the Asian countries r1ere severely

crit1.cised) This conference and its guidelines served as the

background ror many governments• support to the United

states in its policies in the East. Moreo·ver, the question

of the recognition of Peoples Republic of 2lina (PRC)

became crucial for the small nations like the Philippines.

Perhaps this was the reason that Quirino gave up the idea

of the recognition of PRC which he initially seemed to be

serious about. 15

14. See Philip P. Mosley in "Soviet Policy in the Two-\.\brld

50 §ol1dar1ty with Incones1an Nationa11sm:

There was another dimension of Asiatic politics

which the United States' government undertook with mixed

perception. H:>wever vague, the concern of newly independent

Afro-Asian nations for one another sounded like anti-

.American in Washington. Particularly, when Pand:l.t Nehru,

(F.M. Zhukov viewed the inviting of the Conference as the

expression of sinister ambition of Nehru govemm1mt to

become proponent of Asianism) invited a conference in New

Delhi in January 1949 after second Dutch Action to dislodge

independmt government in Indonesia. On his part, Nehru

set at rest the American fear of Pan-Asianism. He observed:

"there is no idea behind the conference of fo rm:lng an Asian

block as against European countries or .America".. Nehru

defined its functions; "to devise machinery and procedures

by which the Governments repTesented here today can keep in

touch w1 th one another for the achievement of purpose for

which the conference has met". Carlos P. Romul.o made

concrete suggestions however, "The Conference," he said,

"might consider fuTther certain measures for the establishing

of continuing machinery for the implementation of proposals

that may be adopted, including a small permanent secretari-

at ••••• to serve as a clearing house of information essential

to concerted action by our various Governments, and a method

of consultations on matters of common interest. 11 Ibr.mlo

made the proposals for consultation clear, when he said

51

tha~ plans to "poll material or rnili tary resources" are

not under consideration. 16

Quirino Administration's Statement of Foreign Policy objectives:

The prevalent tone of the policy was maintained

towards the end of 1949, when Under-Secretary of Fbreign

Affairs Feline Neri (with the active guidance of President

Quirino and Carlos P. Romulo), outlined the objectives of

the foreign policy as follows:

1. P.romotion and maintenance of friendly relations

with all the nations of the world. •

2. Adherence to the principles of U.N. Charter and

support of the measures taken by that international

organisation to maintain international peace and

security, solve pressing economic, social and

cultural problems of the intemationgl importance,

and promote fundamental human rights for all.

3. Promotion of the mutu~:~lly advantageous, special

relations between Republic of Philippines and U.S.

4. Adherence to the principles of den:ocracy and

preservance of the democratic way of life.

5. Support of the aspirations of dependent and non-self

governing peoples to self-determination.

16. Meyer, pp.143-153·

6. Early and material recognition of our just claims

against Japan and an unequivocal position against

Japan 1 s resurgence in future as a dominant power

capable once more of threatening the peace in this

part of the world. 17

Baguio Q;mference :

President Quirino took a new initiative in August

1949 and explained to General fumulo: "I have summoned you

home to help prepare the necessary groundwork for the

prosecution of an important phase of our foreign policy

which 1 consider a timely contt'ibution ·to the peace of the

world; the problem of forging a closer uni,)n among the

people of southeast Asia dedicated to the maintenance of

peace and freedom in the reg ion through appropriate methods

of political, economic and cultural cooperation with one

another. ''18 Quirino gave an elaborate account of the

Pacific Union of his dreams in a s-peech before the U.s.

Senate on 19th August 1949. 19

The lack of u.s. enthusiastic response didn't

prohibit Qu irino to go ahead v1i th his idea of convening a

conference. In the conference, which opened on May 26,

17. Department of Foreign Affairs Review ( DFRA), v. I, n. 1, 1950, pp.94-96.

18. Elpidio Quirino, The ~eYl Philinpine: ldeolo~y: (Manila, 1949), p.303.

19. Ibid., p.306.

53

1950 at Baguio in the Philippines. The countries that

participated were Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia,

Pakistan and Thailand. The O:mferenc e had no formal

agenda. Nor did it deal with any specific political

question except intended allia.Tlce of Asian countries.

In an effort to win over big Asian nations like India

and Indonesia, President Quirino emphasized in his speech-

at the opening session that the 'Cbnference was not . 20

directed against any country. Referring to a plan for

'permanent regional organization' Quirino explained, ''We

can agree to a concl'ete basis of regional collaboration

definitely providing the working machinery for advancing

our economic, cultural and political welfare. We can

perfect such a machinery where 1 t positively sustains the

deepening of regional ooderstanding and stl'engthoo s our

security. We shall have discharged a vital part of oul'

l'esponsibility if we now take the step, hitherto regarded

impossible, to clear much of the road to~.vard s common

cooperation and action for a "WOrld we want to be fr13e and

stay free''. 21

The Indian delegate attached a little seriousness/

importance to the Baguio Conference. M. Ramaswamy reacted

20.

21.

Elpidio Quirino, The New Philippine lgeology, Manila, 1949, p.305. See, Wamer Levy, Free lndi a in Asia (Minneapolis, 1952

7 p. 58. For a detailed view of President Qui rino

abou~ the regional cooperation see Quirino Papers, unclassified file n·o.68, pp. 869-908.

54

unfavourably and said, •••••• "in every one

com tries in the region and other countries of the \.Prld. 23

Obviously, these recommendations. \llere different

in implications from the basic idea of the conference.

President Quirino' s essential thinlting as he himself

flarified later, was to seek "Strongest defense against

totalitarian subversion." Interestingly, however, be made

these remarks in the context of providing a life of

substance and containment and promoting higher standards

among the Asian people. n24

JU. though Quirino showed a likelihood for recogni-

tion of Peoples Republic of Olina, yet the growing crisis

at home and peasants' rebellion, the crisis in Korean

Peninsula and armed struggle in Burma, specially after

Q)minform' s 1948 "two camps" thesis for Asian lib,3ration

looked real and immediate. 25

Simultaneously, developments within the country a.."'ld

\llitr.10ud had impact on his approach to various issues of

vital importance to the Philippine ngtional interest.

23.

24.

Q)ncluding Proceedings of the Baguio Q)nference -1950, Secretariat of the Baguio Q:mference, Quirino Papers, (n.p.) file No.RC-I, pp.13-17).

Elpidio Quirino, The New Philippine :Sdeolo_gy, Manila, ~949~ p.303· John H. Kautsky1 Moscow and the Cl>mmunist Party of India, (Mass. 1":~56), pp. 87-88.

Philippines §nd Korean cri~i§:

When the delegates were participating in Baguio

Cbnference, a severe crisis was occuring in Korean peninsula.

President Qui rino reacted fairly explicitly and said,

"• •••• there can be no half-way house bet\1een slavery and

freedom; it (Philippines) has ranged itself in the. side of

the free world and is contributing its share of the sacrifice

to keep it free. n26 On July 1, 1950, President created, the

Civilian Fmergency Administration ah.d th(;)-National SGeurity

Council by order No.330. The order transferred 5000 officers

and men from constabulary to the army "to provide for greater

concentration- of military eft'ort in suppressing lawlessness,

disordered violence, in certain troubled areas in the

Philippine." He also declared that the Philippines was

"ready to fulfil, within its limited means, its obligations

to the U.N. and to assist in the defense of democracy in this

part of the world." Three daYs latter, on July 28, he stated

that he would request a large appropriation from Cbngress

for the Armed Forces to enable the government to maintain

internal security ••••• and so that our armed forces, if needed,

may be prepared to fight beyond our borders for world

freedom and peace. Secretary of National Defense Ruperto

Kangleon reported "that considerable quantities of military

26. Republic of the Philippines, Official Gazette, v.47, no.7, July 1951, p.3405.

57

material had been received from the U.s. under the terms

of the Military ~Assistance Agreem~t, and the more are

on the 11ay."27 As a follow up action, the Philippines

successively sent five battalions combat teams. The 10th

battalion combat team, .AFP, including 1200 officers and

men plus 200 replacemEl'lts, were under command of l.

Marino c. Azurin. The 20th battalion combat team, under

command of

56

two native Southeast Asian countries, which so participated,

the other country being Thailand. 29

Mutual Defense Treaty;

The Korean crisis, close on the heels of the Baguic

Qmference, led to quali t.ative changes _in the political-

military strategies in the region. On ;AU1711 st ~1 1951, the .. 0""" _,.,

Philippines and the United States signed a Mutual Defense

Treaty. It provided "Each party recognises that any attack

in the Pacific area on either of the Parties will be

dangerous to its own peace and safety; and declares that

it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with

its constitutional processes. n30

This treaty didn 1 t create any machinery 1 ike Pacific

Cbuncil of the ANZUS (Australia, Newsealand and United

states defence treaty for the Pacific region signed in

1951). It also didn't carry any provision of the treaty

and the treaty could terminate "on a year's notice", in

the case of ANZUS. 31 The Quirino Administration continued

to urge for a Pacific Pact. Although desired for

participation, Quirino hailed Pacific

59

fully satisfied with the Mutual Defense Treaty, Quirino

continued to urge for a Pacific Pact. He renewed his

proposal for this pact before the Indonesi an Parliament

in July 1952. fbwever, the three m~jor non-aligned

countries of the reg ion, In don esi a, Burm.H ,;nd In cia

rejected the idea. Later, in Nay 1953, Quirino even

prepared for the conv€1'ling of second meeting at gaguio but

lack of interest in neighbourhood made him withdraw it.32

The U.s. insisted for an agreement between Japan

and the Philippines. At the San Fran si sco Peace Chnferenc e

in 1951 Japan and the Philippines signed the peace treaty.

But the reaction in the Philippines was so bitter that

. Dulles was burnt in effigy in Manila. F.ven President

Quirino himself interpreted it as the "restoration of

Japanese domination in Asia. " fumulo d eclr:tred that the

t .reaty ''filled the Filipino people with profound di sillu-

sionment and dismay." After being asked why he signed the

treaty, Romulo responded, "we signed the t:reaty with great

possible reluctance -- (it was) a virtual compulsion for

us to sign it. n33 The ratification of the treaty was

withheld until 1956.

32. .See Meyer, Ibid., pp.155-156.

33· Karunakaran, 1950-1953, p.93·

so Presidency of R;@Pn Nag sav say:

R?..amon Mag say say was elected the president at the

end of 1953. During his inaugural address on December 30,

1953, the President aptly linked the domestic problems

and the foreign policy needs. Switching to the internal

issues he assured: "The land tenure system of ou:r country

shall be reexamined to purge it of injustice and oppression."

Land for the landless lNOulr. be more than just a catch phrase.

"We will translate it into actuality. u34 He stated inter

ali a, "·. ~. We cannot escape the fact that, today, the destin 1-

es of nations are closely linked. It is in this spirit that

we regard the goodwill and assistance extended to us through

the various programmes of international economic cooperation

w1 th the more developed nat ions, chiefly the U.s. We shall

continue to cooperate with the U.N. in seeking collective

security and a just world. peace. No effort will be spared, no

element of coopel"ation will be withheld in · strE!'lgthen ing

and safeguarding our physical security. "We are prepared",

President put the facts very subtly, "to live up to all our

obligations tmder our Mutual Defense Treaty with the u.s. Cl:lrtainly we cannot temporize with anned di ssidmce." H9

further clarified, "l therefore call upon the remnants of

the Huk uprising still hiding in the hills." "'lhe Huks" '

President rebuked, "have been misled by the 11 es of the

. Kremlin, they can win the economic security and social justice

34. Ibid., p.n.1, p.88.

61 they desire only within the framework of our democracy.

We shall welcome back the truly repentant w1 th tm.derstanding

and sympathy. But to the leaders of the conspiracy who

would deliver this country to a foreign power." President

threatened to use the force to respectfully pro·tect l"Jhat

he told the l 'sovereign authority' of the government. 35

Urge for Collective secur1 ty:

Korean cri s1 s ambi tted some new experience for the

United States, Olina and Soviet Union. Moreover, it

clarified the positions of other nations in the context of

their own interests. Philippine government openly came out

1n favour of alliance with the United States, keeping in

view the situation, . particularly in the Far East and

Southeast Asia. All the Southeast Asian countr:l.es were at

this stage witnessing a widespread and escalating domestic

crisis. This situation with the Korean crisis in the back-

ground, alarmed various governments in Southeast Asian

region. It came to have a combined effect and alarmed all

tho govemments. A particular corelation of factors impelled

the Philippine governmEilt to seek the u.s. help and comm1 t-ment tor its security in the regional context. Though, this

commitment already existed under the provisions of Mutual

Dafen se Treaty, the logic of regional security had rendered

it little inadequate.

35· Ibid., p.92.

·Viet Minh success at. Dien Bien Phu in July, 1954

further alarmed the White fuuse. Secretary of state John

Foster Dulles immediately asserted the necessity of •tbited

action' in South-East Asia in order to 'forestall', what

he described, the 'commtm ists' expansion. He elaborated

the U.s. perspective and called the loss of mainland Olin a

a 'great disaster'. It warned about the con sequences if

South-East Asia and the Pacific regions are lost that way. 36

President Magsaysay issued his firs·t statement on

the Dulles's proposal for nunited ac~ion" on April 10, 1954.37

Subject to mutual agreement on details, he said, his

administration, being committed to the principle of 'collect-

ive security 1 , was prepared to participate with the govern-

ments of other free nations in a common declaration opposing

further communist aggression in South-East Asia. Although

this made clear the President's willingness to take part in·

"united action", it was subject to certain consideration put

forth by the Philippine government not yet spelled out. 38

This led to the convening of a conference for

deliberations on "united action" which was held at Baguio on

36. Department of State Bulletin, v.30, n.774, April 26, 1954, p.623.

37. For details see

April 11, 1954. It was attended by the President, the

Vice-President, Cbngressional leaders of the ruling

Nacionalists Pa.rty and the members of the General staff

63

of the Armed forces. Interestingly, Senator Claro M. Recto,

the prominent spokesnan of the party was not invited.

The Cbnference decided to pre~s for Philippine-D .. s. talks

on the implementation of the Mntual Defense Treaty. Tne

Conference also adopted a joint declaration warning against

'communist aggression' in South-East Asia.39 Press reports

tended to convey an impression that the conference had

leaned towards the views of Senator Recto, who had vehemently

criticized Magsaysay's April 10, 1954 statement. On April

12, 1954, however, the President declared that there was

no modification in the pos_ition he had taken on April 10,

thus implying that the Baguio Qmference had made no

decisions contrary to his v1ews.4o Neanwhile, the concept

of "united action" was beginning to assume the shape of a

mul tilaterJll security arrangement in the Southwest Pacific,

South-East Asia 8nd SOuth Asia. Clarifying his attitude

towards such a system, President Hag say say stated that his

government 'WOUld "support any move towards establishing a

NATO-type alliance provided the following conditions are

met: first, that the right of Asian peoples to self-

39·

40.

For Magsaysay's position, D~artm~t of State Bulletin, vo1.30, no.774, 26 April 195 , pp.623-24.

Ibid. , p. 626.

determination 1 s respected; and, second that the U.s.

should provide guarantee through Nutual Defence Pact

41 against any external aggression."

64

The Acting Secretary of Fbreign Affairs, Leon Na

Guerrero, on April 23, in a note to American ambassador

to the Philippines, Raymond Spruance, reiterated the desire

of the Philippine government for Mutual Defence Treaty

consul tat ions. The Philippine ambassador Romulo, special

and personal representative of President Mag say say, met

President Eisenhower in Washington on April 30, 1954 and

discussed with him various questions regarding implement-

ation of the Treaty. Cbn sequen tly, the r. s. Secretary of Defence, iliarles E. Wilson, arrived in Manila on Hay 24,

1954. The following day, agreement was reache:J to create

a United States-Philippine Cbuncil to serve as a continuing

body incharge of the overall implementation of the Nutual 42 Defet1 se Treaty.

On June 15, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles and

Ambassador Romulo agreed on the m~ .. mbership of the Cbuncil

comprising of the U.s. Secretary of State and Philippine

Secretgry of Foreign Affairs, or their deput:.!es assisted

by representatives of the mili tal'y. Either side could

41.

42.

Ibid. , p. 6 2 7.

Republic of the Phili-opines, QUid.al Gazette, vol. 50, Septembe!' 1954, p. 4158.

request to call a meeting whenever the need fO!' consultations

arose. The O:>uncll was formAlly esta'blishecJ in an exchanee

of official notes on June 23, 1954.

The Cbuncil of Leaders met at the Malacai!at""le on

August 20, 1954 and made c:iear that the Philippines 1-ranted

a N . .rrO-type alliance. 43

After this meeting, the Philippine Under-Secretary

of Foreign Affairs, Raul S. Manglapus, who had been appointed

Cbnference Secretary-General, announced that technical

erperts would meet on September 1, 1954, to prepare a draft

treaty; 44 the O:>nference would continue for three days and

would be called the "Manila O:>nference on 1954. "45 Carlos

P. Garcia was the

objectives, namely discouragement of aggression before it

occurs; early and sound organisation of counter me::1 sure s

against aggression when it threatens, and immediate use

of such measures." Speaking for the Philippine delegation,

Senator Francisco A. Delgado called for a collective

regional defence system, that has the will and capacity to

give immediate and effective aid to the vict1.m of

aggression. 47

The U.s. Secretary of State, John ~lles, declared

that the "eight nations attending the Cbnfe,..ence were

united against a cor.unon danger stemming from international

Cbrmmm 1 sm. n4 8

'The treaty provided that "each party recognizes that

aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area

against any state, or territory which the parties by

tmanimous agreement may hereafter designate "WOuld endanger

its o\o111 peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that

event act to meet the common danger in acco:rdance with its

constitutional processes. 11 (:Art. IV, paragraph I). 49

In an understanding attached to the Manila Pact,

the u.s. declared that Article IV, paragraph I, "would apply

47. For the Tex.t of the Treaty,__ see Philip:Qine Tr~ Series, vo1.3, no.67, p.35~.

48. "Report by Secretary Dulles", 'The Department of State Bulletin, November 29, 1954, p. 821.

49. Ibid.

67

only to '

Pacific., He said the Philippine government welcomed the

participation of France, Great Britain, and the U.S .. for

two reason: "the nations of the region individually were

unable to resist a determined aggressor and their only

hope of protecting themselves was a definite and a formal

association for mutual defense; since the area as a whole

was extremely vulnerable to attack by an aggressor posse-

ssing the new weapons of warfare, a collective defense

arrangement neces~arily must include those great powers

which had such weapons and were willing to use them for

the defense of free people. n53 On September 8, following

the treaty signing ceremony, Ambassador Pomulo described

the Pacific Charter as an 'effective reply' to a.ll charges

that the Filipinos were mere 'pUppets• and that the Nanila

Cbnference \vas intended to 'perpetuate colonial"! sm 1 • 54

President Magsaysay, the following day, declared tha-t the

combination of the Mutual Deren se Treaty with the u.s. and the Hanila Pact had greatly enhanced the security of the .

Republic. In a statement to the Press he observed that the

Military provisions of the M1nila Pact 11 \oJOtllcl constitute

the armor" for protecting the treaty area from aggression. n55

Empnasjzing the in'Portance of the Pacific O:tarter, the

53. Felino Neri, "The Southeast Asia Security Alliance Pact", Department of Fore.1gp Aff..ai.rs Rev·iew, vol.2, no.1, March 1955, pp.38-39.

54. Ibio., p.41. 55. Ibid., p.42~

69

Presic~ent said that the treaty prov1 Eion s for econon.ic

development and self-determ:in :1t ion, reflectine tl~1e

principles of the charter, were the heart and soul that

give the :treaty life and meaning for the people of Asia, C::6

and for all other people • .J

For the first time, the U .. s. which had the military

and econornic strength, had commit ted 1 t self to the defense

of part of the South-cast Asian f'.ir~inland. 57 Fro1:1 then on, Philippine affiliation with the SEATO became a factor in its

relations with other countries of Asia.58

Revised Statem~Qf ]breign Policy Objectiyes:

Early in 1955, Felino Neri, who then hac1 the tittle .

of Ambassador and was special adviser to President Magsaysay

on foreign affairs, presented a little revised version of

the foreign policy objectives. He explained that the

foreign policies of President Poxas, Quirino and Magsaysay

showed "domestic instability". This time he listed the

objectives of the Philippine foreign policy as follows:59

1. Promotion and strengthening of our relation·s with

with the U.s. particularly, as regards the problems

56.

57.

58.

59·

Ib 1 d • , p • 4 3. Republic of the Philippines, O!ficJ._gl Gazette, vol. 51 no.10, October 1955, p.CCCIV. Romeo s. Busuego, "The Manila Pact and the Pacific

2.

4.

70

of national security and economic welJ.-being.

Development of understanding and cooperation

with the other countries of Asia, particularly

in matters involving self-determination, self-

govemment and independence as well as including

coinJ'ron problems pertaining to economic, social,

cultural development.

Maximum participation in the activities of the

U.N. and support of its purposes and powers.

Promotion and maintenance of friendly /peaceful

relations ,.,ith other peace-loving countries,

particularly those belonging to the Latin American

group.

Philipi>in e stand Regarding Indo-

the U.s. and the Chinese- Communists reearding offshore

islands along the mainland of Cllina in the hands of the

Republic of iliina. On January 24, 1955 the American

Congress authorised the President to use Rrmed forces as

he deemed necessary to protect Tai\-..ran 8nd the Pescpdores. 61

President Hagasaysay, on February 7, 1955 i~sued a statement

endorsing the U.s. stand in defense of Tai\·Jan~ The

Philippine President elaborated on the United States

commitment to defend Taiwan which to him, "figured import-

antly with the Philippines in the Defense pattern against

aggression. n62

Ban dung Cbnf._e ren£j!:

In this backdrop the idea of Afro- Asian fraternity

and solidarity was yet prevalent in the government circles

of various countries. .A propose to this, at the initiative

of Sukarno, Nehru, Sad at and Ti to a conference of Afro- Asian

Nat ions was in vi ted at BandurJg in April 1955.

In the Philippines, senator Recto was the first

person to come out in favour of attending the Afro-Asian

Conference. He contended that O:>nmnmist China's presenc~

sr..oUld not deter the Philippines from sending a delegation

61. Republic of the Philippines, Official Gazett§, vo1.51, no.2, February 1955, pp.681-82.

62. Department of :Fbreign Affairs Review, vol. 2, no. 2,

and that to decline the in vi tat ion would be interpreted

in Asian capitals as another token of the Republic• s

"isolation from Asian neighbours". "l t is about time",

he said, "that we show our real interest in them by

-'2

accepting the invitation and taking part in the conference". 63

On January 19, 1955, Liberal Representative Macapagal urged

for the Philippine participation. 64 President Magsaysay

explained the decision in these words: "The Philippines is

going to participate at Bandung aware of the inte:rplay of

varying if not conflicting views that may take place in that

conference. Our views may not exactly devetail "'ith those of

many Asian countries, specially our bigger neighbours. Our

participation is, therefore, necessary to enable us to

enable us to understand these views and express our own.

At the same time, conference would be an opportunity to

express before our fellow Asians our adherence tcr the

democratic cause and to renew our solidarity and identity

with .Asia. n65

The Philippine position for Ban dung meet was

decided in a meeting of the Chuncil of Leader on April 13,

with General Romulo present. It included the following

guidelines: (a) Opposition to any move designed to endorse

the admission of Chrnmunist China into the United Nations;

63. Bomulo, n.167, p.9. 64. Ibid., p. 11. 6 5. Ib i d • , p. 1 3.

73

(b) Opposition to any proposal to dmounce military

agreements with western powers, such as the Manila Pact

and the Mutual Defense Agreements with the United States;

(c) Opposition to any proposal for outlawing nuclear

tests without establishing effective international control;

(d) Opposition to any zoove to adopt Nehru• s five principles~

and (e) agreem~t with the expected resolution denouncing

colonialism. 66

While addressing the opening session of the

Cbnference, Carlos P. Ibmulo, the leader of the Philippine

delegation stated "· •••• political freedom has been won by

(Afro-Asian countries) through many different means. The

British surrendered power in Southern Asia because they knew

they could no longer maintain it, the French and Dutch had

to be forced to the same conclusion. The United States has

at times appeared to us lacking in consistency and vigour in

upholding the right of non-self-governing peoples to indepe-

ndence. It has on times leaned heavily in favour of

colonial powers and has some times disheartned us in the

Philippines because of failure to dovetail with :t ts ideals

of equality and freedom. We think this was more than

regretable and tmv1ise. Let it be stated fairly that the

United States •••• in our case made a 'pledge of independence'

66. Ibid., p.13.

74 ••••• and fully and honourably redeemed that pledge ••••

we of the Philippines have nirectly experienced the

basic good faith 'of the United States •••• and it will

ultimately prevail'. 67

Romulo further viewed, "It could be that Russia• s

bombs or .4meriC8 1 s bombs will determine the future shape

of the wrld and the fate of humanity.: •• Eut I do not think

the decision will be that way •••.• I thin¥: the shape of the

world is going to be the way in which the people of Asia

and Africa go about, the business of tran !~forming our lives

and our societies ••••• "

Properly assessed, the position of the Philippine

delegate could be viewed as definitely not that of a

singularly pro-U.s. nation. 68 General Romulo supported

a resolution introduced by Turkey against colonialism and

cor:mmnism; which denounced communism as· unevJ super

barbarism, a new imper1alisrn". 69 ;\nother controversial

issue was the alliance of Asian nat ions \vi th NATO and

SEATO and the five principles of peaceful co-existence

championed by India, Burma and Indonesia.

67.

68.

69.

Asia-Africe1, speeches from Bandung; I:ocument.s issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, July 1955, opening session address, p.114.

lb i d • ' p. 11 5 . See, J .L. Vellut, The Asian Policy_ of the Philippines, 1954-61, ( Canberra, 1965), p. 24.

15 Premier Nehru m~de a frontal attack on NATO and

SEATO and said, "It wuld be most degrading and humiliating

for any self-respecting people or nation to join one of the

t,~'O power b1ocs; such power blocs and coalitions of states

contributed to the internation,,l t..8~1sion; and the five

principles", Nehru asserted, "meet the needs of the day, in

the sense that they lessen te:1sion, they do not harm anybody,

. criticize anybody, condemn ~mybody. u70 On the other hand,

General Romulo defended sEATO, as an organization which

could guarantee security in the region. Ee characterized

the five principles as an "tmrealistic" basis for coexistence

with the Cbmmtmists. 71

Despite the controversies and conflicts of interests,

the Bandung Conference was able to reach a

76

that the Philippines would be forced into a passive role

in the debates, and that its delegates' utter1nces mieht

be tal~en as "the voice of the United States". ln the

event, however the Philippine delegation '>'Ja s able to c 1 arify

the aims and purposes of an ~mtt-Cbmmun"ist Phili}Jpi:ie State

at this crit'ical juncture. President l

77 With these countries the Philippines has bonds of

langu:Jge, custom, ethnicity ::md geogr·1phic.:~l proximity.

Presidency of Carlos P. Gsrci.a:

On the sudden death of President Magsaysay in a

plane crash on lvlarch 18, 195'1, Vice-President Carlos P.

Garci3 took over the presidency. Basically, there was

no change in the foreign policy perspective flowing from

the presidency of Mag say say. Wi tllout n inching a word,

President Garcia in his inaugural address on 30 ~camber

1957 once more reaffirmed the 'determination' of his

administration to "preserve and enhance historic relations

of friend ship with the U.S. based on equality, mutuality

of interest and community of ideals". Referring about a

number of agreement with the u.s. including a mutual defense treaty he called it an association with "freedom

loving states in the SEATO in an effort to meet the threats

.on a regional level". Reqognising the u.s. as "leader of the free world", he maintained that the u.s. is ;resolved with all her might and resources to maintain "peace,

freedom and democracy"..... About the Philippine share in the

individual responsibility to preserving world peace and

freedom, he hoped "our western allies in the SEATO will see

eye with us on the need for strengthening further the

fabric of this regional defense organisation and the capa

bili ty of their Asi.~n allies to meet subversion or open

aggression. n

!2lo~avour to Forma.llze the Regional Qloperat1on:

78

In consonance with slight rethinking in the

Philippine elite about the foreign policy orientation,

Garcia took initiative to articulate and strengthen the

regional ties. He invited Malayan Prime Mint ster Tunku

Abdul Rahman to visit the Philippines. Responding

positively to Garcia's invitation, the Tunku pTOposed the

formation of Association of South-East Asia (ASA} in

Manila in January 1959. President Garcia agreed with

Tunku' s proposal and further suggested to interest other

members as well in the organisation.76 Three plans- one .

each from Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines - were

exchanged and discussed. Mora explicitly, Premier Rahman

suggested the format ion of an organisation tmder a "South-

East Asian Friend ship and Economic Treaty 11 , his advisers,

in their private opinions were already referring to the

proposed group as Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic

Treaty. 77 Indonesia, apparently in the wake of Philippine

involvement in the an ti-govemment rebellion in its outer

islands rej acted the idea. 78

President Garcia's specific and public association

of fuhman' s proposals, doubted the New York Times 1 s a

76. Ibid., no.11, pp.29-30.

77, See Asian Research Bulletin, }.1arch 1973, pp.1733-35.

78. For details see this chapter in last section Philippine-Indonesia Relations.

79

resUlt of botp 'countries' dread of communism. 79 Despite

all ASA disclaimers and its actions to the contrary,

leaders in other &>uth-East Asian Cbuntries - particularly

in Indonesia, Cambodia and Burma - have maintained that ASA

is a "political" organisation, some others like Indonesian

Fbreign Minister Suband:rio had not concealed their

conviction that "ASA is merely a front for SEATO. "eo It was supposed to be confirmed when in October 1959, Rahman sent

letters to the leaders of every &:>uth-East Asian states

except North Vietnam. 81 still, Tunku' s message to Sukarno,

dated October 28, 1959, highlighted the attempt 'to

encourage close relations' among the neighbourers, to help

one another economic, social, cultural and scientific

fields. But the :responses from, Djakarta, Rangoon and

Phnom Phenh were unfavourable. 82

With these concerns in mind, President Garcia and

Premier TWlkU met in Bangkok on July 31, 1961 and all three

nations issued the Bangkok Declaration creating the

Association of Southeast Asia. 83 AS..A was stated to be a

79· eo.

81.

82.

83 ..

See New York Times. (January 4, 1959)

Bernard K. Gordon, Th~ Dimensions of Q:mtlict in Soutneast A~1a, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196 , p.167. Hamil ton Fish Armstrong "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia", Foreign Affairs, July 1963, pp.861-82. See Michael Hars, "Asian W::lY to Peace, Pecific O:>rnmunity, (Tokyc), July 1973, n.4, vol. , p.509.

Ib 1 d. , p. 344 •

80

free association of Southeast Asian countries. Its

objective included: the promotion, th~ugh joint endeavour,

of the well being, and the economic, 90cial and cultural

progress of the region with no connection to any outside

power bloc:,. nor direction ·against any other country. 84

The aims of ASA were laid down as:

i} To establish an effective machinery for friendly

consultation, collaborations and mutual assistance

in the economic, social, c.ultural, scientific and

administrative fields;

ii) to provide educational, professional, teclmical and

administrative training and research facilities in

their respective countries for nat'ionals and

officials of the associated countries;

iii) to exchange information an matters of common

interest or concem in the economic, cultural,

educational scientific fields;

iv) to cooperate in the promotion of South-East Asian

Studies;

v) to provide machinery for fruitful collaboration in

utilization of their respective na·cural resources,

the development of agriculture and industry, the

expansion of trade, the improvement of their

transport and communicgtion facilities, and generall.Y

e4. Ministry of Extemal Affairs, Federation of Ma~~ya, "The story of ASA", January 1963, v.3, pp.981-0'1'•

in the raising of the living standards of their

peoples;

vi) to co-operate in the study of th13 problems of

international commodity trade; and

vii) generally to consult and cooperate with one another

so as to achieve the aims and purposes of the

Association, as well as to contribute IJX)re effecti-

vely to the v.urk of exporting or.ganizations and

agencies. 85

But within a few years after its formation ASA was '

taken into the inertia. Philippine claim to North Borneo

(Sabah} and rebellion in outer inlands of Indonesia and its

policy of confrontasi overshadowed the ASA perspective.

Relations with the N eighbourers:

This issue attracted a controversy during the mid

nineteen fifties within the rulling elite. From the very

very beginning there was a vacuum in Philippines interaction

vis-a-vis many Asian countries. Fbrmal ties existed with

Nationalist Olin a, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan and India

in South Asia.

The Philippines established diplomatic relations

with India in January 4, 1952. Accordingly, the Philippine

85. See the Fbreign Aff

O::m sulate General in Calcutta became a Legation under

Minister Narciso Ramos. Both the countries concluded

a treaty of friendship on July 11. The actual relation-

ship, hO\oJever was stated to be not friendly. 86 An

incident in November, 1954 raised the existing degree

of apprehensiveness. The Philippine Leg at ion in N ev1

Delhi reported to the Department of Foreign Affairs that

the rem~rk that the Philippines "is an American colony and

the Filipinos do not know it", was attributed to the

Indian Hinister to the Philippines, M.R.A. Baig. 87

President Nag say say ordered an investigation with

instructions to "proceed accordingly" if the report proved

to be correct. 88 The Indian Ninister ho\vever, issued a

categorical denial. 89

The Indian policy of non-alignment (in a 'vorld

largely devided between pro-communist and anti-communist

camps) was generally considered in the Philippines to be

•unrealistic', and 'opportunistic' and working to the

'advantage of international communism' .9° Divergent foreign policy orientations of Philippines and India were an

tmderly ing cause of coolness.

86. See J .L. Vellut, The ,§sian Policy of .the Philippines, 1954-2.1, (Canberra, 1965), pp.23-24.

87. Ibid., p.25. 88. Ib icl., p.27. 89. Ibid., p.28. 90. See in Carles P. Romulo, 1'he Meaning of Ban dung,

(California, 1956), p.79.

63

Philippines and the Pakistan signed a ~reaty of

friend ship in Washington on January 3, 1951. The

Philippine consulate in Karachi became a Legation on July 1,

1952. Relations remained nornJal, but a major change took

place in 1954. The two countries became allies in the

collective defense and southeast Asia througt the Manila

Pact, and from then on the relat1on ship warmed up. On

June 27, 1956, the legations in Karachi and ::1anila became

embassies. The Philippines' formal ties with Burma opened

in September 1956, when both countries accredited their

respective ambassadors. As for (Sri Lanka), the negoti-

ations for diplomatic relations already under\'Tay did not

bear fruit b efore the end of the Magsaysay Administration.

With the exception of Sri Lanka and the Conanunist countries,

therefore, the Philippines under President Magsaysay

established formal ties with most of the countries of Asia.

The Republic became a full member of the C.olombo Plan at

the Ottawa meeting of its O:msultative Cbmmitted in

October 1954.91

Diplomatic relations with China opened on April 18,

1947, when President Manuel Boxas and thf3

84 established in Nan kin, China, with Proceso E. Sebastian

as minister. Subsequently, it moved to Canton,

85 A number of attempts were made by the Philippine

gov emment to curtail the commercial ac:tivities of the

resident Cllinese •. The retail trade was nationalized

through Republic Act No.1180 signed by President Mag say say

on June 19, 1954. Cllinese nationals had a large share of

this business, and Cllinese Ambassador Chen Olin-ping lodged

a strong protest w1 th the Department of Fbreign Affairs;

he also expressed the "deep concern" of his country and

the people at the developments. 95 . The u.s. asked for clarification about the u.s. citizens under the Act. To their satisfaction, Acting Secretary of the Fbreign Affairs

06 Guerrero replied that it did not apply to u.s. citizens."' Even among the Filipinos there were critic isms of the measure,

and disapproval was general among foreign business circles

in the islands. President Mag say say promptly appointed a

four-man cormnittee to study the "imperfections" of the

legi ~lation and to recommend improvements. 97

~other source of friction between the Philippines

and Nationalist China concemed the status of Chinese

schools in the Philippines. As old as the Philippine

educational system, this problem came to the force in

95. 12e.partmrot of lib reign Affairs Reyiew, vol. II, January 1956, p.1.

96. Ibid.' p.2.

97. Ibid., p.2.

86

'August 1955, when the Philippine press reported having

discovered ttcommunist cells" in unreg1s'~ered 011nese

schools in l-1anila, Visa,yas and Mindanao .. 9E iliarges were

made that since the Cllin ese schools did not follov1 the

curricula prescribed by the Philippine Government, the

children of iliinese immigrants were becoming citizens

without appropriate edUCI=ltion. The Philippine government

took measures to purge these schools of communist elements. 99

While eager to cooperate in this respect, the Nationalist

Govemmen t of Cllina did not want to concede that the

Philippine government had exclusive jurisdiction over the

Chinese school::;. iliinese Ambassador Q:.en Chi-mai, on

December 22, 1954, reached a preliminary agreement on basic

principles governing iliinese school sur ervi sion. 100

A joint Philippine- iliinese Tecr~n ical Cbrmni tt ee was

established to draw up a programme of studies in the extra-

carricular

87

of their temporary visas. liJOst of them had entered the

Philippines in 1950 and 1951, after the establishment

of communists in the

Meanwhile the British Government probed the views

of' the Cblombo pO\-Jers. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir

John Kotelawala, on August 2, 1954, proposed a meeting

either in Burma or in Ceylon to discuss their attitude

towards a Southeast Asian .Treaty Organization. On the same

day Indonesia disclosed its reluctance to take part in such

an alliance. India's opposition to such an anti-communist

alliance was well known. Burma and 03ylon alro declined to

take part in the Cbnference. 103 In this political background.

the Philippines entered the military arrangement in the

region, 1. e. Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).

fuwever, necessary it might be in view of :Philippine

government, but the one result was that many nations adopted

an attitude of askance towards Philippines ..

The Fb!'mo sa question and the Philippine posit ion

became a subject of heated controversy in the Philippine

104 in 1955. . The 'Chinese Chmmunist• were reported intensi-

fying their attaclcs on the sm:Ul islands of Quemoy, l1atsu and

Tachen group just off the mainland, held by Nationalist

Chinese forces. The ultimate purpose of these attacks was

directed against FornX)sa and the Pescadores Islands. The

mutual defence treaty between the u.s. and China, which was

103. Ibid., p.23.

104. Recto raised the controversy which resulted into his b-r~aking away from Hag say say.

89

a\vaiting the approval of the Senate, limited the pro,Tisions

in the treaty to protect Formosa and nere~:>y Pescadores;

the off shore islands were beyond its purvie,.;. President

Eisenhower, in a January 24, 1955 message to the Qmeress

requested authorisation to employ u.s. ar:ned forces for the defense of Formosa 3nd the Pescadores, taking into

account "closely related locgtions and action. "105 Five

days later, Cbngress approved a joint resolution giving

the President the authority he had ·:requested and specifying

it "to include· the securing and protection of such related

positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands

and the taking of such other measures as he judged to be

required or appropriate in a ssu:ring the defense of Formosa

and the Pescadores". 106

A day before the American SenatB approval, President

Mag say say and Cbngression al leaders at a conference in

Manila had decided to adopt a policy of 11watchful waiting"

in the Formosa Straits Crisis. 107 On Fe'brua:ry 3, Magsaysay,

exercising his Presidential prerogative issued an important

statement clarifying the Philippine position with respect

to Formosa, and supporting the u.s. stand. The President asserted, "We stand squarely behind the United States in

its determination to achieve this pu:rpose 11 • 108•

-------------------105. Department of Foreign Affairs RevieH, vol.2, no.2,

Jan u a :ry 19 56 , p. 26 •

106. Ibid., p.27. 107. Carlo M. Recto, My Cru sa~ (Han il:a, 1965), p.141. 108. Ibid., p.43.

90 As regards relations with Korea, the

Philippines had plgyed an ::~ct1ve role in the Un:lted

Nations. Nevertheless the two countries had been slow

in establishing diplomatic relations. In April 1953,

the Department of Foreign Affairs, instructed Minister

Maximino Bueno, Philippines representative in the United

Nations Chmrnission on Unification and :l.ehabilitation of

Korea, to develop plans for a legation in Seoul. The

following September, Thomas E. de. Castro was appointed

Envoy extraordinary and Hinister Plenipotentiary to

Korea. On January 6, 1954, the first Korean Hinister to

the Philippines arrived in Manila to establish a legation.

This was the result of a mutual desirt3 to develop closer

trade relations. 109 The warmth was added to this desire

by the mutual support by both to the free world idea and

participation in the U.S. containment policies. With

Thailand, thsre had been a close economic relation ship

for a long period. Most of the rice imported into the

islands came from Thailand. 110 These two neighbours

established diplomatic relations in 1949: on May 9, the

Philippine legation was opened in Bangkok, and a treaty

of friend ship was signed in Washington on June 14. 111

109. New York Time:a, May 2, 195'4, p.2. 110. Department of Forei~n Affairs Review, vol.4, no.3

December 1964, p.90. 111 • Ibid. , p. 91 •

91

Thailand established its legation in Nanila on December

1 '1949.

T'ne Geneva settlement in July, 1954, drew the

Philippines and Thailand closer than ever before. Owing

to geographical proximity, the emergence of a pro-communist

regime in North Vietnam made them feel even more clearly a

community of interest in their n::ttional security problems.

Thus, they became allied in the Manila Pact.

The ties of friendship were further strengthened

in 1955. ln April, Prime Ninister Pibul Songgram made a

three-day visit to the Philippines. President Magsaysay

awarded him the order of Sikatuna (Rajah), a decoration

reserved exclusively for a Chief of State. 1be Prime

Hin ister reciprocated by decorating the Pres'5.dent with the

highest award conferred by the govemmmt of Thailand, the

Knight Grand rdon of the Most Exalted Order of the White

Elephant. Their respective legations were raised to the

status of embassies in January 1956. 112

The only Asian embassy maintained by the Philippines

prior to 1954 was in Djkarta. The Philippines attached

special importance to relations with Indonesia. During the

Indonesian struggle for independence, the Philippines had

112. Ibid., p.13.

92 stood behind its northem neighbour in the United Nations.

It had also supported the Indonesian cause at the New Delhi

Q:mference on Indonesia in January 1949. 11 3 The Philippine

Legation in Djakarta was raised to embassy status in April

1951, and a treaty of friend ship "ras signed in the following

June. President Quirino in 1952, reciprocated the State to

the islands by President SUkarno early in ·1951.

The Philippine attitude towards Indonesia can be

easily explained from the angle of geographical and cultural

proximity. -Among the people of the vast island chain to the

south, the Filipinos had a good prospect fo1" finding genuine

f1"iendship. With a population equal to almost half the

population of South East Asia, Indonesia could be barometer of

Philippine adjustment to the 1"egion. There was a possibility,

or at least a theoretical one, that somewhat untaped latent

notion of Malay brothe1"hood Indonesia to be an intermediary

between the Philippines and neutralist countries, while the

Philippines could serve as a bridge between Indonesia and

United States.

There were factors in common which could form the

basis for friendship. Both people had experienced westem

colonial rule, Filipinos under the Spanish and the u.s:, and Indonesia under the Po1"tnguese and n.ttch. Both had been

113. Milton w. Meyert A llgPJ.Qmatig His~n.. Qf the Philippines R§public (Hawail, 19 5), p.? •

93 occupied by the Japanese during the Second World War.

Nationalism in each case had developed in the course of

resistance to an alien rule. There were also similarities

in the linguistic and racial heritage. 114

Potential obstacles to smooth and warm relations also

existed, however. Filipinos were essentially lliristian,

Indonesians Muslims, although the difference of religion

was not a real hindrance to friendship. The volume of

trade between the t\10 countries was negligible; both had

agrarian, underdeveloped economies based upon the exploit-

at ion of raw materials. Their locations along the east

and southeast coasts of the Asian mainland, and their

geographical closeness, suggested common problems in matters

relating to security. Yet their foreign policies reflected

totally different perceptions. The PhUippines, in close

alliance with the United States, become host to the Manila

conference in 1954; Indonesia, pursuing a neutralist foreign

policy course pl~ed a leading role in the first Afro-Asian

Cbnference, with Cbmmunist China annng the participants, at

Ban dung in Apr U, 19 55. 11 5

This difference in foreign policy porceptions was

carried over into problems of direct concern between the two

114. Martin Meadows "Theories of External Internal Political Relationship; A ·Case Study of Indonesia an·d the Philippines,'' A~ian studies, vol.6, no. 3, December 1968, pp.297-9 •

Ibid. , p. 299·

94 countries. When the west New Guinea controversy came

before the United Nations General Assembly, the Philippines

adopted a cautious attitude; it abstained from voting on

the issue in the General Assembly First Cbmmi ttee on

November 30, 1954, although it sided with Indonesia in the

subsequent General .~ssembly vote of December 10. 116 When the Philippin.es was contending with Yugoslavia for a Security

Council seat, Indonesia voted in favour of Manila's rival

in the 21st General Assembly ballot on November 8, 1955. 11 7

Then there was the problem of illegal immigrants. Migrants

from Indonesia had been crossing over into the nearby

Philippines from as far back as the pre-independence days.

On both sides of the Celebes Sea, where the ty.u countries

maritime boundaries comerged the local 1.nhabitants wel'e

Muslims. The absence of adequate border controls also had

encouraged the northward movement of Indonesians seeking

better opportunities for trade and commerce. These

immigrants coming from Balang, Mamuri, Cabaruri s in East em

Indonesia were scattered through four southem provinces of

the Philippines - Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, and the Sulu.

They were estimated at 6,ooo in all, and easily intermingled with Filipinos. 118

116 . Ib i d • , P. eo • 117. See, Mey er, n. 1 54 , p. 87.

118. Department of Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 2, no. 3, August 19 56, p. 91 •

•

95 It was not until July 1956, that the two

countries finally signed an immigration agreement in

Djakarta. Efforts to promote harmonious relations were

not lacking on either side. When President Ukarno and

his party arrived in Manila on May, 1956, on their way

to the U.s., President N~gsaysay received them at the

airport. Gestures of friendship were exchanged. The

fundamental differences in foreign poliey viewpoints,

however, seemed a handicap since the relationship failed

to attain real cord1ality. 119

In 1957, another issue widened the gap in the

perceptions regarding one another. A serious anti-

government rebellion erupted in Outer Islands of Indonesia

against President Sukamo 1 s proposal to replace the

existing p arliantentary sy stern with a central cabinet and

National Cbuncil. The proposal included the representation

of all parties, including the communist p~rty of Indonesia,

in the Cbunc:a. 120 The problem later resulted into a

regional dispute between .. Ja:vanese-dominated government

and less represented outer islands. On February 1~, 1958,

the rebels proclaimed a Revolutionary Government of the

Republic of Indonesia (PRRI). 121 This reballion, though

11 9. Ib 1 d. , p. 160 • 120. See J.D. Legge, SUkarnQ: A Politig.al BiographY

London, 1972, p.279. 121 • Ib i c1 • , p. 2 81 •

96 later suppressed, attracted the United States' attentton

• ~ecially for the rebels anti-communist orient8tion. u.s. was not happy with the nexus of friendship developing

between Sukarno and the Indonesian Cbmrnunist Party. 122

U.S. therefore regarded it as a fight against conummists

in Indonesia.. Secretary of States Dulles stated: ''we would

be very happy to see the non-communist elements who are

really in the majority there exert a greater influence in

the affairs of Indonesia than has been the case in the

past, where Sukarno has moved towards their so~called guided

democracy theory, which is a nice sounding move for what

I fear would end up to be communist despoti:l.sm'•1 23 The

Philippines officially stayed neutral but permitted the

rebels to immigrate to the Philippines. :F.breign Secretary

Serrano even stated: ''Free people should be allowed to work

out their O\-Kl destinies". 124 Philippine foreign office

also rejected an Indonesian request to expel the revels.

Later in April 1958, Indonesian foreign minister SUbandrio

visited Manila and assured Serrano, "Indonesia is not going

communist". 125 Later in 1958, again serious tens1.on grew

between the two countries, whro Indonesia felt itself that

rebels in the outer islands were operating from the

122.

124.

125.

Ib 1 d • , p. 2 87.

G eo rg e M9 Truman Kah in , Nat ion ali srn and Revoly t ion in lndonesi.a, (New York, 1962), p. 109.

Ibid., p.111.

Ib i d • , p • 11 3 •

97 Philippine American bases. (In May 1958, American Air

Force Plane pilot flew from the Clark Air F1e1a and

attacked do\VO one Indonesian Canovy). Ultimately the

relations slightly in:prov.ed when in 1961 Gene:r-al Nasution

visited Manila and signed a naval agree1nent. 126

The Philippines had withheld the recognition of the

three states of Indo-iliina, {Vietnam, Cambodia ana Laos),

although there had been suggestions from the u.s. that this be done. There were strong pressures on this i:Ssue from

the Nacionalista Party, especially Claro Me Recto against

an anti-communist approach. The government 1 t self was in a

dilemma on this issue. 127 This dilemma was partially

solved through the ·1954 Genev-a settlement. Subsequently,

on January 14, 1955, the Philippines recognised Cambodia

and Laos. 128 There was some delay in the case of State of

Vietnam which had emerged in the oouthern half of the

country after the Geneva settlements. Despite the lack of

official ties, an extensive and cordial relationship had

developed. Under the auspices of the Philippine Junior

Olamber of O:>mmerce, a volunteer group of doctors and nurses

went to South Vietnam, where they attended an average of

800 refugees daily1 29 This Filipino contribution to

"Operation Brotherhood" was highly appreciated by South

126.

127.

128.

129.

Ibid • , p • 129. Df!Q art men t o [; Foreign Affairs Review, vol. ; 1 I "[January, 19 5), P• 31. Ibid., P• 33· Ibid., p. 33·

~8 Vietnam's government. When, in April 1955, a severe

earthquake hit Mindanao, President Ngo Dinh Diem cabled an

offer to send a Vietnamese doctors' team to help the

victims. Vietnamese also presented 100 tons of rice. 13°

On July 15, 1955 the Philippines decided to recognize

the government of South Vietnam. As in the case of the

President's statement regaTding Fbrmosa, the move reflected

the Magsaysay Administration's conce-rn for national security.

The Second \obrld War had proved that Vietnam like Formosa,

in hostile hand, would pose a grave threat to the security

of the Philippines. The administrationwas, therefore,

anxious to see th~t South Vietnam remained in what the

Philippine government perceived to be free and friendly

hands. 131

Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia accepted an

invitation to make an official visit to the Philippines. On

his arrival in a speech on January 31, 1956, the Cambodian

leader pledged cooperation in securing peace in the Far-East.

Before a joint session of the Cbngress, the Prince declared

that "if Cambodia is neutral, she does not conceal that she

intends to cooperate with countries which have the same

130.

131·

.

Ibid., p.35 •. Department of Foreign .Affairs Rev~, Oct. 1957, v.2, no.4, p.22.

democratic and so.cial ideals, the same aspiration for

justice, liberty and well-being of the masses". On the

eve of his departure, the Cambodian leader said that he

was "convinced., that the "centuries old ties" between

Cambodia and the Philippines had been strengthened; he

would convey to his people and government that the

solidarity of the Cambodians and the Filipinos "is once

again alive, tangible"· 132

99

On April 25, however, Pr'ince Norodom stated that

he had "absolute proof of a plot against Cambodian neutrality

during (his) trip to Manila". In response, upon instructions

from President Magsaysay, the Department of Fbreign Affairs

issued a statement of rebuttal declaring that "the department

is distressed that the Philippine Government's and people's

friendship and welcome, which were never so warmly extended

to any foreign visitor, should be so unapprec1ated"133

The effort to cultivate good relations with Cambodia thus

ended on an unpleasant note.

It was not different from the earlier policies

of the Philippine governments when President Garcia "assured

132.

133·

Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, My War with the C.I.A. (London, 1973), p. 76.

Ibid., P• 77 •

of Philippine commitment to U.s. policy ~t any cost" in

Laos. 134 In mid 1958 the Philippine press fed by U.s.

100

news agencies, kept the country on thrills for months with

the dramatic details of day-to-day fighting in Laos between

the socalled forces of good (U.s. supported free world)

and forces of evil (Pro-communist). While the visiting U.N.

Investigating Team, revealed that there was no fighting in

September 1958 to January ,1959, 135 Falix Gruna, an eye

witness to the conditions in Laos in 1959, revealed the

truth (of so-called communist aggression). He reported

it as 'humiliating propaganda'. So anxious was the American

Press to report cormnunist aggression th::~t for weeks it had

misled the public. Rumors had been p8 ssed or: as facts. So

firmly '"as this story of invasion of Laos implanted in the

mind of the American public, and so closely had writers

labled China as 'aggressive corranunist• power a threat to'

democracies in Southeast Asia, that more than four years

later, Grunne was repeatedly asked whether the "iliinese

invasion of Laos is not proof of Peking aggress1veness? 111 36

But the u.s. needed propagandists in South-East Asia and it found then Filipino Ramen Bagatsing saying, "to keep Asia

free, Philippines should send troops in Laos for American

134. Ne'd York Herald Tribune, :t-iarch 7, 19513. 135. Felix Grunne, A Olrtain of Ignorance.:.t- New York, 1964,

pp.198-99·

136. Ibid., p.204.

1 01 i t e II 137 1lSS s anc • Another Senator ctprinno Primicias advised

in October 1960, "sEATO should send troops ag =tin st P athest

L~o and communist China" and suggest "China should not be

adrni tted to 'illlO. " 138 In sympathy with the propaganda,

The Olror: icle from Taipeh brought in its headlines, "Sino

Red Troops Enter Laos". 139 In an exclu~ive interview

Generalismo Chiang briefed 1JF1: Chinese communist troops

have entered northern Burma. The infil tl'at ion is related

to the pre~ent situation in L3os and poses a threat to

Thailand. 140 As expected, Felixberto E. Serrano, accused

North Vietnam of "Korean war style of intervention in Lao s~• 141

But not much friendly to commur .. ism the British qnd French

sources were quoted by A.FP saying: "we have no cor:firmqtion

ourselves th8t there has been an invasion from North Vietnam

0 '7" ("\..ina". 142

u- th ti 1 .. d d i t B :: \.A.l .~..vwever, e sen sa on a s ~oro ry en e n o ay

of Pigs fiasco in Nay 1961; subsequently reshifted to lndo-

Olina from 1962, now in Vietnam.

But it should not be surprising, foreign minister

Carlos P. Romulo had al re~dy anticipated the fraine\,.ork of

Philippine foreign policy as eal'ly as in 1940s. Submerging

137. New YQrk Herald Tribune, .~pril, 1959. 138.

139· 140.

141.

142.

Jay Taylor, iliina and Southe01st Asia, NeH York, 1974, p.269. Ibid., cited at p.273· Ibid., p.287.

Ib 1 d • , p • 2 89 • Ibid., p.191.

1 02

the perspecttve in his unquestioned loyalty he ca;~oled:

",\me ric an blood has m:Jd e the Phil i.t-'rin e s a shrine to

democracy ~md a '.•Jorld symbol of strenr;th. It is ~:'lerica' s

masterpiece. We may feel seren2 8bout the futu'!'e of

AL1eric a and the Philippines." 11+ 3

In his oversimplified logic '9or:mlo said, 11 Arne ric an s

in the Philippines p:::'OfitterJ in bnsiness, gold m:i.ning,

expo:rt ~nd import of all kinds Big business Has

practically all in i\meric3n hands. All American products

en terec1 the Philippines duty free, and Ph'il ippin ~=~ pro duets v1ere

sent to America duty free," He felt obliged and said,

"Every American-developed need o_: the modernized Filipino

from automobiles to chewing-gum entered out our country

duty free. Steamship travel, clipper service, _4:-;Jerican

Express banks and oil companies were American". "But

America", said the Ge:1eral, "our industrial and manufacturing

country, broadened here market by developing the standard

of living in the Philippines. T'ne Filipino trajned in

American v.rays found that all his needs \·Jere Ar.le::'iC!'!n. The

Philippine market become completely American". "In turn '

1'+3· Carlos P. Pomulo, l-1other .4merica, (Ne'iv York, 1943), p.11?.

the Philippine products depended upon their Ar.1eric'1n

market." Ant1 then the Gener~l resounderJ, "~his last

argurn~n t should silence the grz;umen t o.f the

imperi3.list in favour of the n·'ltive being kept in an 144

abased posit ion."

144. Ibid., p.135·