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CHAPTER – VI

MANIPUR AND THE REVOLT OF 1857

149

MANIPUR AND THE REVOLT OF 1857

The march of Chittagong mutineers towards North East had not only shaken Cachar in North

East India but also had a deep impact on the princely kingdom of Manipur. It occurred when the

mutineers of the 34th

Native Infantry Chittagong drifted towards this princely kingdom passing

the district of Cachar. Knowing this tough situation faced by the British Government Raja

Chandrakirti Singh was seriously concerned about the matter and he decided to help the British

Government heart and soul. When McCulloch, Political Agent at Manipur, heard about the Battle

of Latoo, 18th

December, 1857, he requested Raja Chandrakirti Singh to send the latter‟s army on

the Cachar border to intercept the mutineers. The Raja instantly responded as it was stated, “That

night the Raja at my request ordered 400 men under a Major to start for the Jeeree–the boundary

between Cachar and Munnipore, there, to intercept the mutineers should they come that way.”1

On the other hand, the masses of Manipur were indirectly on the side of mutineers. They

objected to the recruitment process of the Manipur Regiment which had taken place in the

months of August and September 1857. Besides, they also stated that the mutineers being co-

religionist would have no harm and so they should not sacrifice blood for the Firunghis. In this

way, the common people of Manipur were against the wishes of their Raja in 1857 Revolt.

6.1 Historical background

In 1823, when Gambhir Singh was the virtual Raja of South Cachar, the Burmese not only

occupied Assam and Manipur but also invaded Cachar from three directions viz. Assam, Jaintia

and Manipur. The third party from Manipur had arrived at south Cachar and inflicted a defeat on

the Raja Gambhir Singh‟s local levy. Now the prince fled to Sylhet and started communications

with the British to face the Burmese aggression. At that juncture, the British Government also

felt the great danger with which their frontier was threatened. They also thought of the bravery

and warlike character of Manipuris who had been resisting the Burmese onslaughts for many

years. Here, it was reported, “The Munneepore country, which is inhabited by a brave and hardy

race, who have frequently opposed a noble resistance to their Burmese invaders would thereby

accrue to the security and tranquillity of our North-E Frontier.”2 Again, in a letter to the Court of

Directors, it was stated, “Under such an emergency it was natural that every resource, however

trifling, should be sought after and the re-establishment of the Munnipore dynasty seems to have

been a scheme peculiarly favoured by the late agent Mr. Scott.”3 Ultimately, it was accepted to

join the British force by a group of Manipuris known as the Raja Gambhir Singh‟s Levy which

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consisted of 500 infantry and 40 cavalrymen.4

Lord Amherst, the then Governor General of

British India, declared war against Burma on 5th

march, 1824, and the Raja Gambhir Singh‟s

Levy joined the British outpost at Badarpur (Cachar) in April of the same year. They were

supplied with arms and their expenses were also borne by the British. However, they were

irregulars as no pay was entitled to them.

By this time, the Burmese had built their strongholds at Talain Mountain, Jatrapur and

Dudpatil in Cachar. Their number in those positions was estimated at about 8000. The British

army under Lt. Col. William Inns arrived at Badarpur on June 20 and then proceeded by water

along the river Barak to Jatrapur where he arrived on June 27. On the way, he tried to dislodge

the Burmese from the heights of Talain where they strongly fortified. For three days (July 6, 7, 8)

British guns fired on the stockade; Gambhir Singh with his excellent local knowledge, assisted

the operation.5

In this battle, the Manipuris under Gambhir Singh chased and captured Takheng

Mitlao and Gun Singh who were Burmese agents coming to arrest Chourjit, Marjit and Gambhir

Singh (Manipuri brothers). Later, the two were killed by throwing into the water of Barak River.6

Towards the end of October 1824, the entire Burmese army in Cachar retired to Manipur. On the

role played by Gambhir Singh in Cachar, it was stated, “Gumbheer Sing ...with whom we had

negotiated, raised from among his own followers a body of 500 men, who actively co-operated

with our troops in expelling the Burmese from Cachar.”7

At this juncture, Brigadier-General

Shuldham, Commanding Eastern Frontier decided to march to Manipur so that the gravity of the

war in the Arakan frontier could be diverted to the advantage of the British army. However,

because of the hopelessness of this wet and mountainous kingdom the General‟s mission was

suspended. Yet, Gambhir Singh breaking the ice, proposed to take up the task condemned as

hopeless by General Shuldham. Earlier, the former had also been induced by David Scott to lead

an expedition for the conquest of Manipur. He was also told that “Manipur would be placed

under him if he could liberate it.”8

Ultimately, Gambhir Singh‟s proposal was accepted, and thus

the prince made preparations with his own levy. They were supplied with guns by the British

Government. The Raja Gambhir Singh‟s Levy left for Manipur on 17th

May, 1825, with

Lieutenant R.B. Pemberton.9

In this mission, the latter “volunteered to accompany Gambhir

Singh to Manipur with the additional object of obtaining some accurate information about the

passes into Manipur, its resources and the strength of the Burmese.”10

The party, after facing so

many difficulties, reached Maklang (a village in Manipur valley) on June 10. Hearing their

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arrival, the Burmese army in Manipur were divided into four parts making stockades at Kameng,

Andro, Nambol and Phunal Hills.11

The Burmese stronghold at Nambol was defeated by a party under Nur Singh killing

many of them. Gambhir Singh, sitting on horseback and utilizing his war skill, invaded the

Burmese at Kameng and Phunal hills and the Burmese, being defeated, fled to Burma.12

Ultimately, the Levy successfully captured Kangla (capital of Manipur) on 12th

June, 1825,

expelling the entire Burmese force from Manipur. In this way, the irregular Raja Gambhir

Singh‟s Levy executed the task which General Shuldham had failed to do. On this levy it was

stated, “The men could move lightly equipped without a paraphernalia of a regular army.”13

Once more it was complimented:

“The primary objects in view, viz. The expulsion of the Burmese from Manipur was,

however, achieved by Gambhir Singh, who had accompanied the troops with an irregular

levy of five hundred Manipuris and Kacharis. These men had been provided with arms by

the British commander, but they were wholly undisciplined, and it was only at Gambhir

Singh‟s urgent request that he was permitted to advance with them to Manipur.”14

Therefore, the conquest of Manipur in the First Anglo-Burmese War was the handiwork of the

irregular, unpaid but gallant Manipuris under Raja Gambhir Singh.

The levy faced untold difficulties due to the lack of provisions as there was less

cultivation in Manipur and above all, the Levy, being irregular, did not enjoy regular provisional

supply. Consequently, Gambhir Singh left 300 men at Manipur and returned to Sylhet by the end

of June 1825, to discuss his problems and other policy matters. Lt. Pemberton, returning to

Sylhet with Gambhir Singh, reported on the latter that “the success of the enterprise was due

mainly to his energy, perseverance and skill.”15

At Sylhet, Gambhir Singh was intimated about

the order of the British Government accepting his levy on regular basis, and also allowed to

increase its number with a new denomination. With this happy news Gambhir Singh departed

Sylhet for Manipur on 4th

December, 1825, along with Captain F.J. Grant and Lieutenant R.B.

Pemberton. Reaching Kangla on 23rd

instant, Gambhir Singh declared:

The title Raja Gambhir Singh‟s Levy would be denominated as the Manipur Levy; the

British Government had accepted to increase its strength to 1500 infantry and 150

cavalry; the pay, provisions and all equipments of the Manipur Levy would be borne by

the British Government and the same would be collected from the Magazine at

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Chandrapur (place at the western foothills of the Bhuban Mountain, Cachar); Cap. F.J.

Grant and Lt. R.B. Pemberton would be the Commissioner and the Assistant

Commissioner of Manipur Levy with Lt. George Gordon as Adjutant (who had not

arrived at Imphal that time).16

Here, Cheitharol kumbaba also mentions that the Maharaja coming with two Firunghis entered

the capital on Friday, the 23rd

December, 1825, and arranged a grand feast for the Four Victoria

Battalions.17

On this occasion, Alexander Mackenzie also writes, “In 1825 the force was

increased to 2000 men, and placed under the command of Captain Grant; it was denominated the

Manipur Levy.”18

On the cavalry wing of the levy, T.C. Robertson, Agent to the Governor-

General reported later:

“An annual advance of about fifteen or twenty thousand Rupees appropriated to the

support of a small body of cavalry, to be paid through the British Residence would also I

conceive benefit the country...and secure the presence of the only description of auxiliary

force which we are even likely to find of any real use to us in the event of another contest

with the Burmese.”19

In this way, Manipur was projected seriously for the war against Burma and also to defend the

eastern frontier from the latter‟s aggression thereafter.

Gambhir Singh now decided to expel the Burmese from the Kabaw Valley which had

been for Manipur for ages in the past. Nur Singh was therefore sent along with 1000 men to

Tamu on 1st January, 1826. Being asked for reinforcement, Gambhir Singh along with the two

British Officers left for Tamu on 13th

January, 1826.20

The Burmese fort at Tamu was a very

strong and well protected one. Therefore, the two Sahibs suggested the need for cannon. But

Gambhir Singh, disfavouring the proposal, planned to send Nur Singh to invade Samsok with

300 selected men. Meanwhile, surrounding the Tamu Fort to obstruct provisional supply for five

days, the Burmese were compelled to leave the place in the night of 23rd

January, 1826.21

In the

another front, Nur Singh had a fierce engagement for three days in Samsok and ultimately broke

the latter‟s capital. In this battle, king Soimoila, Kakangka (king of Khampat), king of Kale and

brave Poiyong were arrested among 30 war prisoners. Besides, they also captured muskets,

bullets, rice and paddy receptacles, fish containers and a lot of valuables like silver, gold etc.

Getting the message of the fall of Samsok capital, Gambhir Singh along with the two British

Officers arrived on the bank of the Ningthee on 1st February, 1826.

22 Hereafter, declaring his

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conquest up to the Ningthee River, Gambhir Singh unfurled the flag of Manipur on the bank of

this river.23

In this way, under the leadership of Gambhir Singh, the united Manipuris of the

Manipur Levy, restored their lost kingdom. Had it not been there the status of Manipur would

have been very uncertain. On the role of Gambhir Singh and those gallant Manipuris in the First

Anglo-Burmese War, Captain Grant reported:

“...the activity, judgement, and skill, he (i.e., Gambhir Singh) had displayed on this

occasion, have proved the justice of the opinion previously entertained of his merits. The

steady gallantry which, without the usual aid of cannon, could force a brave enemy to

evacuate a strong fortified position is a very satisfactory illustration of the character of his

followers....”24

Indeed, had the British not received the sacrificing spirit of those brave sons of Manipur it would

have been impossible for the Company to launch an attack on Ava through Manipur and bring

the war to conclusion so early in 1826. However, this highly disciplined and dependable Manipur

Levy seems to change its character very soon as it was stated in January 1834, “The Levy,

consisting of about 3000 men, was shown to be but very imperfectly disciplined and very little

under the control of the officers specially appointed for the purpose of ensuring its efficiency.”25

The following are some of the points why Manipuris had become so disinterested and

disappointed with the British policy.

6.2 Problem over the Kabaw Valley

During the First Anglo-Burmese War, the Manipur Levy, under its gallant leader Gambhir Singh,

conquered the entire Kabaw Valley and unfurled the flag of Manipur on the bank of Chindwin

River. Yet, in the Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826, the British Government failed to enter any clear

provision on the said valley. As the question of this valley remained unsettled, there started a

great unrest on the Burmese border. Soon after the treaty, the Burmese started encroaching into

the territory of Manipur crossing the Chindwin River. It resulted in a serious headache to

Manipuris and consequently they were highly discontented towards the British policy.

6.3 Dispute over South Cachar

Before the First Anglo-Burmese War, Gambhir Singh had established his political hegemony on

South Cachar by ruling over its territories for about six years (1818-1823). His followers, the

chunk of Manipur Levy, had enjoyed the wealth and prosperity of South Cachar. Although they

were defeated by the Burmese in the last part of 1823, yet they contributed much to the expulsion

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of the Burmese from Cachar in the First Anglo-Burmese War. After the Treaty of Yandaboo

(1826), Gambhir Singh and his followers established their outpost at Chandrapur (Cachar)

claiming that the latter was the property of Manipur. After the death of Govindachandra (Raja of

Cachar) in 1830, there was the question of succession in Cachar. Here, Gambhir Singh became a

strong claimant submitting a proposal to the British Government “to farm out Cachar for a period

of twenty years in return for an annual revenue of rupees fifteen thousand...”26

However, the

British policy on Cachar and Manipur had already been formulated as it was expressed earlier,

“By the improvement of Cachar country, therefore, it is to be hoped that our means might be

facilitated of assisting Munnipore against Ava.”27

They also considered Cachar the granary of

this region. Therefore, after the Treaty of Badarpur, (1824), the Commissioner of Sylhet had

been instructed “to keep a keen watch on the conduct of the Raja (Govindchandra) and to

ascertain whether he will be willing to cede the territory to the British.”28

Ultimately, the British

Government annexed South Cachar in 1832 to the great dissatisfaction of Gambhir Singh and his

followers. By the Treaty of 1833, Gambhir Singh was given the mountainous region between the

Jiri and the Barak Rivers which was considered by the British as worse than useless in every

point of view. Hence, Manipur was not suitably compensated for its sacrifices made in Cachar.

6.4 Boundary between Manipur and Assam

It is rightly stated that the Court of Directors represented a mercantile company and was

naturally very sensitive about money. Therefore, the Company‟s Government always tried to

annex those resourceful plain areas leaving mountainous terrain to the indigenous rulers. When

the Naga Tribes raided the neighbouring plains protected by the British Government, the latter

stated, “Gambhir Singh should be held accountable for the behaviour of the Nagas thus

considered to be placed under his permanent authority.”29

Here, L. Iboongohal Singh writes:

“Facts come to light which made it clear that the object which Gumbheer Singh had in

view was the permanent conquest of the Naga Hills. The ambitious Manipuris would

have been a very dangerous neighbour of our vassal Purander Singh, whom we were then

endeavouring to establish on the throne of Upper Assam, and the Government began to

feel uncomfortable in prospect of Gumbheer Singh‟s operation (Political proceedings,

19th

December 1833). It did not absolutely prohibit him from subjugating the Nagas; but

it forbade him to descend into the plains on the Assam side.”30

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Indeed in 1835, “the forest between the Doyeng and the Dhunsiri was declared to be the

boundary between Manipur and Assam (Political proceedings, 11th

February, 1835).”31

Consequently, Manipuris were not allowed to expand their territory beyond the unproductive and

dangerous land in the hills.

6.5 Loss of Kabaw Valley

Kabaw Valley, mainly the plain area between Manipur and the Chindwin River, had been under

Manipur during the most part of its political history. It is stated, “For the greater part of the

century (18th

century) the Kubo Valley unquestionably belonged to Manipur and it was never in

any sense a Burmese province, being, when not under Manipur, a feudatory of the great Shan

Kingdom of Pong.”32

Later, it was given to Burma by Marjit Singh (1813-19) just to possess the

throne of Manipur. After seven years Burmese devastation of Manipur (1819-1825), the latter

was re-conquered by Manipuris under Gambhir Singh. When the prince became the Raja of

Manipur after the Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826, this valley became the thrust area of political

dialogue between Burma and the British Government (ally of Manipur). Here, it was expressed:

“Within a few weeks of the conclusion of the treaty of Yandabo some Burmese troops

crossed the river Ningthi and entered the disputed valley, but they soon retired into

Burmese territory of their own accord. Instead of renewing hostilities Gambhir Singh

submitted the matter to the decision of the British Government.”33

In June 1826, Major General Archibald Campbell was informed that “the Government should

maintain the right of Gambhir Singh over northern and middle portion of Kabow Valley (Samjok

and Khampat) but the southern portion (Kule) had to become a subject of negotiation.”34

However, the Burmese court objected to the line of boundary proposed by the Government of

India. The latter appointed Captain F.J. Grant and Lieutenant R.B. Pemberton as the

Commissioners of Manipur. Lieutenants Montmorency and Rawlinson were deputed to

accompany the Burmese Commissioners to the meeting on the Chindwin which was scheduled to

be held in February 1828. As the season was quite advanced, they postponed their programme.

The British Commissioners met the Burmese in January 1830, and fixed the Chindwin

River as the future boundary between Burma and Manipur and planted flags accordingly; but the

Burmese refused their witness. The latter‟s court was greatly agitated over the step of Grant and

Pemberton, which they thought was unwarranted by any instruction of Government of India and

decided to send a deputation to Calcutta. Accordingly, two Burmese envoys arrived at Calcutta

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in1830, and their first and the foremost demand was “the restoration of the Kabow Valley.”35

Before their arrival the British Indian Government also sent Major Burney as British Resident at

Ava in April 1830. He was instructed that “your attention should be given to the trade of Ava

with a view to reporting to his Lordship-in-Council the practicability of extending and

facilitating British commerce and the consumption of British manufactures.”36

In the previous

letter from Burney it was stated that the importation of British goods in Burma was on the rise,

but in December 1830, he stated, “Some of my former reports expressed an opinion that the

present king of Ava will take the first favourable opportunity of engaging in another contest with

us.”37

The Burmese Government also appointed their Governors of Prome, Bassein, and other

cities in the delta as military chiefs (Bo) who had the power to call out the inhabitants of their

districts to meet armed at any point of time. In this way, the Government of Ava was in a state of

war against the British Indian Government.

157

Sketch Map of N.E. India & Burma

(Courtesy:- Lt-Col. H.J. Huxford, History of the 8th

Gurkha Rifles)

Here, the British Government felt the difficulties and the huge loss of resources in men and

money in the First Anglo-Burmese War as it was expressed by the British Commander-in-Chief

of the said war:

“When I consider the enormous expenditure of treasure …… and …… the great

sacrifice of British blood, when I contemplate the obstacles of difficulties which …… still

present themselves to our views……; when I bear in mind the extraordinary hardships and

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deprivations to which our troops have been already subjected and which they must still be

prepared to encounter; when, above all, I recollect the insalubrity of the climate……, I

cannot disguise my anxiety that, consistently with our honour, this contest may be

brought to the speediest conclusion.”38

Above all, the authorities of Calcutta were also very serious about the trade facilities which they

could enjoy when they developed a good relationship with Ava. The Burmese mainly exported

vegetable oil, petroleum and teak-wood. About the latter it was stated, “It is found also in

Bombay, but in small quantities, and is extremely dear; whereas in Pegu and Ava there are such

immense forests of it, that it can be sold to as many ships as arrive, at a moderate price.”39

By 1830, keeping in view of the above circumstances, the Company felt the need of

ceding the Kabaw Valley to Burma. To Manipur it was a very delicate issue. Therefore, the

Company cleverly took up this matter as it was mentioned in the Cheitharol Kumbaba (royal

chronicle of Manipur) that on Tuesday, the 24th

December, 1833, the British Officers of Calcutta

requested the Raja of Manipur to allow the Burmese to cultivate in the Kabaw Valley as the

latter did not have enough land for cultivation on annual payment of 6000 Tangkhas. The Raja

accepted to it.39

Later on, the British Government declared its final decision:

“......the Supreme Government still adheres to the opinion that the Ningthee formed the

proper boundary between Ava and Manipur; but that in consideration for His Majesty‟s

(i.e. of the king of Burma) feelings and wishes and in the spirit of amity and good will

subsisting between the countries, the Supreme Government consents to the restoration of

the Kubo Valley to Ava, and to the establishment of the boundary at the foot of the

Yoomadoung hills.”40

Accordingly, Major Grant and Captain Pemberton, in a highly diplomatic move, had

given the Kabaw Valley to Burma on the 9th

January, 1834. In a way to compensate this great loss

to Manipur the British Government paid 500 Sicca Rupees per month to Manipur. To Manipur,

the loss of Kabaw Valley was just like snatching of a child from a mother‟s lap. Gambhir Singh

died on the same day of the cession of Kabaw Valley to Burma. Hence, the British Government

knowingly executed this extremely delicate issue as it was expressed by the Court of Directors:

“We are glad to find that the transfer of the Kuboo Valley to the Burmese authorities took

place so satisfactiously, and that the boundary was amicably settled. Major Grant and

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Captain Pemberton, the Commissioners and Lt. Macleod, deputed by the Resident to

accompany the Burmese Officers are entitled to commendations for the manner in which

they executed their rather delicate duty.”41

In this way, the British Government, in a move to fulfil its design on Burma, sacrificed the

interest of a less powerful kingdom of Manipur by ceding the Kabaw Valley to Ava (Burma).

Soon after this cession the Burmese Government reduced its port charges on the British ships.

Here, the Court of Directors again expressed:

“It is satisfactory to find that Lt. Colonel Burney prevailed upon the Woongy of Rangoon

to diminish the port charges on our commerce, and although the concession seems to

have been intended as a mark of personal respect to that officer..., there appears to some

hope that the Government of Ava may be induced to make the concession permanent.”42

On the other hand, the British pre-empted the rise and growth of Manipur into a powerful and

resourceful kingdom which it would have achieved if it had established its control and

sovereignty over the said valley. Indeed, the resourceful Kabaw Valley and the commercial

activities of the river Chindwin would have supported Manipur in its economic development.

6.6 British Interferences after 1834

After the cession of Kabaw Valley the British Government conceived that the Burmese would

not aggress towards Manipur and ultimately, removed most of the assistance given to Manipur

Levy issuing this order, “It has been resolved to discontinue the British superintendence over the

body denominated the Manipur Levy, and to leave it optional with the Government of the

country to maintain that force or not as it please.”43

However, to keep in touch with the political

developments in respect of Manipur as well as Burma, Captain Gordon was appointed as

Political Agent and Lieutenant Pemberton as Joint Commissioner in 1835. The policy of

interference in the internal affairs of Manipur started mainly in 1844, when, after an unsuccessful

attempt on the life of Nur Singh (Regent), the young Raja Chandrakirti Singh fled to Cachar with

his mother Kumudini and the people of Manipur, declaring Nur Singh the new Raja, asked the

British Government to recognise him and deliver the Kabaw compensation money. Here, the

new Raja was given a condition to pay financial assistance to the ex. Raja and Maharani in proof

of the stability of the Government. The Rajah hereafter consented to assign to the young Rajah

and to the Maharani 80 Rs. and 20 Rs. a month respectively, and then he was formally

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recognised by the British Govt. as the Rajah of Muneepore.44

Therefore, from this time onwards,

the Kabaw compensation could not be claimed by any declared Raja of Manipur unless the latter

was recognised by the British Government.

Again, in 1850 when Chandrakirti Singh ascended the throne of Manipur, in the name of

maintaining peace in the kingdom, the British Government made a public avowal to punish any

contender to the throne of Manipur as it was stated:

„Influenced by a desire to put an end to the frequent attempt by exiled members of the

Rajah‟s family to effect a change of Government you have authorized the Political Agent

to make “a public avowal of the determination of the British Government to uphold the

present Rajah and to resist and punish any parties attempting hereafter to dispossess

him”.‟45

With such developments, the British Government became the protector of the Raja of Manipur

scaling the height of its interference in Manipur and to the great irritation of Manipuris.

In financial matters, Raja Chandrakirti Singh was not satisfied when Rs. 150 per month

was deducted from the Kabaw money for the maintenance of ex. king Devendro Singh and his

sons as it was stated, “In regard to the provision of 150 rupees a month for Debindro Sing and his

sons, although he thought it too much he said as it was expected of him he would agree to it.”46

Raja Chandrakirti Singh‟s amicable relationship with the British Government could better be

assessed from his letter translated by the Political Agent:

“The only revenue of our Munneepore which comes in rupees is the Rs. 500 allowance

on account of Kubo. 2nd

Please cause Koonjauba to be forwarded to Dacca from his

arrival there I will give 20 rupees from the Kubo money. 3rd

In consequence of the unruly

nature of Koonjauba and Bogendro Sing were both to remain in Cachar much confusion

would be created in this country. 4th

Of the 5 princes including Debindro Maharaja who

at Dacca receive 150 rupees, from two Phalokngamba and Chaikoingamba no confusion

will arise in the country, therefore, releasing these two might the two Koonjauba &

Bogendro Sing be substituted in their place? 5th

If this be not consented to and I should be

unable to pay their/ Koonjauba & Bogendro Sing‟s monthly allowance I shall represent it

to the Sahib is there anything which might not be agreed to in this?”47

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Hence, Raja Chandrakirti Singh, being helpless economically, had no other way out of the

colonial and selfish design of the British Government, but to side with the latter to secure his

position to the greatest disappointment of the people of Manipur.

6.7 Raja Chandrakirti Singh in 1857

When Raja Chandrakirti Singh heard about the Revolt of 1857 he went to meet

McCulloch two times and expressed his deep feelings as the Agent stated, “The Raja twice called

upon me. He expressed sympathy at the anxiety I must feel and horror at the atrocities he had

heard of.”48

After this, Chandrakirti Singh wrote a letter in Manipuri expressing the following

statements:

Raja Chandrakirti Singh with his courtiers

(Courtesy of the family:- (L) R.K. Jayantakumar s/o (L) R.K. Sanahal, Imphal)

“In a time like the present that I would to my utmost support the Sahib Lok I have

thought. I have heard of what is now doing in Hindustan. Give me an order what to do. I

shall do my utmost to act up to it. And please to believe my country as the Sahib Lok‟s

own.”49

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On 25th

December, 1857, McCulloch heard about the Battle of Latoo and requested Raja

Chandrakirti Singh to send the Manipur Army towards Cachar border. Instantly, the Raja

responded sending 400 men under a major and subsequently another 60 men were also sent as it

was reported, “60 men were subsequently added on Lieutenant Stewart‟s stating that he had not

men for the pursuit of the mutineers should they escape him.”50

After the Battle of Binnacandy (Cachar), 12 January 1858, the Manipur Army arrested

many Chittagong mutineers and sent them to the British Authorities in Cachar. They also

arrested Manipuri prince Narendrajit Singh (Sana Chahi Ahum), who had joined the mutineers

and revolted against the British Government. The prince was brought promptly to Manipur, but

on the repeated appraisal of Lieutenant Stewart (Superintendent of Cachar) to send the prince to

Cachar, the Raja acted on and sent the prince on 25th

April, 1858. Here the Cheitharol Kumbaba

expresses that on 25th

January, 1858, king‟s elder brother Chahi Ahum arrived from Cachar and

on 25th

April,

Longjamba Roma Chingakham Pukhramba Sougaijam Balram

(Courtesy of the family: (L) R.K. Jayantakumar s/o (L) R.K. Sanahal, Imphal)

1858, he was sent back to Cachar.51

In honour of the role played by Raja Chandrakirti Singh in

1857, McCulloch reported, “A sword and belt and suitable dress of honour to be given to the

Rajah of Munnipore, and that they will be despatched. Also that smaller presents will be given to

the officers of the Rajah.”52

Accordingly, Raja Chandrakirti received a sword, a belt and a robe

of honour. Longjamba Roma Singh was rewarded with Mutiny Medal. Another eight officers

namely- Chingakhumba (pukhranba), Chingakhumba (Dewan), Nepra Selungba, Sawaijamba

163

Selungba, Nundababu (Lairikyengba Hanjaba), Nameirakpa Major, Haojoumacha Major and

Gokul Thakur were given Khilluts.53

6.8 Manipuris against the British in 1857

Although the Raja of Manipur supported the British Government the majority of people were

against the British. When the event of 1857 was unfolding, the Government decided to establish

a Manipur Regiment thinking that Manipuris were a very brave race. Here it was reported, “It

might be easy and expedient through the civil and military authorities in the N-E Frontier and

Manipur to raise a very useful body Muneepoorees, and Cacharees for general service.”54

Accordingly, orders were issued to the Political Agent at Manipur and the Commandant of the

Sylhet Light Infantry Regiment to raise a corps each of 1500 Manipuris to be drilled at

Cherraponjee. There, the old jail was repaired for their accommodation. It was stated:

“Natives of Muneepore were recommended for enlistment in preference to Cacharees.

The former being more active and warlike it was suggested that they should receive the

same pay as the Sylhet Light Infantry while under training and that their pay should be

increased when they became general service corps.”55

However, the people of Manipur did not like to extend their full support to this recruitment rally.

Besides, those disaffected Manipuris also objected to support the British Government on that

matter. Therefore, around 300 men only that too mostly from Cachar joined the recruitment. The

Government then had a suspicious eye on them as it was reported, “It was strongly urged, that

until thoroughly disciplined and drilled the corps should be employed in the lower province and

in the S.W. Frontier.”56

When there was less response from Manipur on that recruitment process

the Government expressed its desire to fill in the vacancies by the Kukis as it was expressed,

“Should a sufficiency of Muneepoorees not be procurable the enlistment of Kookies was

sanctioned.”57

In the event of 1857, the Manipuris in Cachar supported the Chittagong Mutineers

under their prince Narendrajit Singh, and thus the British Government reacted brutally towards

the Manipuris in Cachar. It reacted to the psyche of the Manipur Regiment, and ultimately their

station was removed from Cheeraponjee to Jamalpore. Here, it was reported:

“Mr. Allen also noticed the existence of much discontent among the men of the

Munipoor Regiment who were before a cheerful, willing, and well behaved set...the

unsettled state of the Munipooris in Cachar whence the great majority of the recruits of

164

the Regiment had been drawn, rendered it in his opinion very desirable to expedite their

removal to Jamalpur.”58

McCulloch was also doubtful about the fidelity of the Manipur army already sent to Cachar

frontier. When the Raja wanted to send more of his force McCulloch reported, “The Raja wished

to send more troops towards the boundary, but doubtful of the fidelity of those already there I

dissuaded him from doing so.”59

It justifies that even a section of Raja Chandrakirti Singh‟s army

was not willing to support the British Government in this great event.

When the mutineers had arrived at Cachar, it was stated:

“During the last two days the common conversation of the Munniporees has been in a

style shewing they would rather have nothing to do with the mutineers; saying that as

they are co-religionist they can meet no harm from them and that all mutineers want is

the Sahibs life and why sacrifice lives for the Ferunghees.”60

In this way, the masses of Manipur were not on the side of the British. When McCulloch was

asked about the number of Manipuris who seriously assisted their Government the former

expressed:

„I regret the discrepancy pointed out and beg to apologize for having written so loosely in

my letter of 12th

Feb. 1858. When I used the expression “one or two” I meant not to

convey one man only or at the most two men, but that the number was very limited.‟61

Hence during the event of 1857 in Manipur, it was only the Raja and some of his officers who

had seriously supported the British Government. The masses of Manipur were against the British

Government. Therefore, the response of Manipur to the Revolt of 1857 was bi-focal in nature.

165

REFERENCES

1. Foreign Political Consultations (Hereafter, FPC), 28 May 1858, No. 139, McCulloch to Secy.

Govt. of India, Foreign Dept. Mannipore, 12th

Feb.1858, Manipur State Archives (Hereafter,

MSA).

2. FPC, 14 May 1832, No. 84, to Agent, N.E. Frontier from George Swinton, Chief Secy. to

Govt. Fort William, 30th

May 1829, Para 10, National Archives of India (Hereafter, NAI).

3. Foreign Political Letters to Court of Directors of 16 January 1834, No. 2, NAI.

4. B. Kulachandra Sharma, Meitrabakki Ningthou Phambal Kallakkhidaba Ningthou Macha

Mashushing, (Imphal, 2009), p. 117.

5. A. C. Banerjee, Eastern Frontier of British India, (A. Mukherjee & Co. Private Ltd.,

Calcutta, 1964), p. 253.

6. Haodeijamba Chaitanya Singh, “Manipurer Itihas”, in R. K. Sanahal Singh, Haodeijamba

Chaitanya Singhgi Lairikshing Punshinba, (Imphal, 1982), p. 29; also see L. Ibungohal and

N. Khelchandra (eds.), Cheitharol Kumbaba, (Manipuri Sahitya Parishad, Imphal, 1989), p.

223.

7. E. W. Dun (compiled), Gazetteer of Manipur, (Vivek Publishing House, Delhi, 1975), p. 43.

8. J. B. Bhattacharjee, Cachar under British Rule in North East India, (Radiant Publishers, New

Delhi, 1977), p. 40.

9. B. Kulachandra Sharma, op. cit., p. 127.

10. R. K. Jhalajit Singh, A Short History of Manipur, (Moirangkhom Imphal, 1965), p. 196.

11. S. Barmani, Meitei Ningthourol, 2nd

part, (Imphal, 2005), pp. 26-27.

12. Ibid., p. 27.

13. Sir James Johnstone, Manipur and Naga Hills, (Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2002),

p. 89.

14. Sir Edward Gait, A History of Assam, (Lawyer‟s Book Stall, Gauhati, 1997), p. 273.

15. A. C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 261.

16. B. Kulachandra Sharma, op. cit., p. 144.

17. L. Ibungohal and N. Khelchandra (eds.), op. cit., p. 225.

18. Alexander Mackenzie, The North-East Frontier of India, (Mittal Publications, Delhi, 2005),

p. 150.

166

19. FPC, 7 January 1833, No. 82, G. Swinton, Chief Secy. to the Govt. from T. C. Robertson,

Agent to the G.G. at Gowalpara, 14th

Dec. 1832, NAI.

20. L. Ibungohal and N. Khelchandra (eds.), op. cit., p. 225.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. B. Kulachandra Sharma, op. cit., p153.

24. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., 261.

25. Foreign Political Letters to Court of Directors of 16th

January, 1834, No. 2, NAI.

26. J.B. Bhatacharjee, op. cit., p. 54.

27. FPC, 14 May 1832, No. 84, to the Agent N.E. Frontier, from George Swinton, Chief

Secretary to the Government, Fort William, 30 May, 1829, para 11, NAI.

28. J.B. Bhatacharjee, op. cit., p. 44.

29. Foreign Political Letters to Court of Directors of 16 January, 1834, No. 2, NAI.

30. L. Iboongohal Singh, Introduction to Manipur, (Imphal, 1987), p. 133.

31. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

32. Jyotirmoy Roy, History of Manipur, (Imphal, 1973), p. 71.

33. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 367.

34. Gangmumei Kabui, “Controversy over the Kabow Valley”, in Lal Dena (ed.), History of

Modern Manipur, (Orbit Publishers-Distributers, Delhi, 1991), pp. 19-20.

35. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 377.

36. Ibid., p. 376.

37. Ibid., p. 377.

38. Ibid., note 11, pp. 500-501.

39. Ibid., p. 420.

40. R.K. Jhalajit Singh, op. Cit., p. 218.

41. India Dispatch from Court of Directors 1836, Political Department, No. 24 of 1836, para

2,NAI.

42. Ibid., para 4.

43. FPC, 11 February, 1835, No. 105, to Major Grant, Commissioner Manipur from W.H.

Mecnaghten Esqr., Secy. to the Govt. of India, NAI.

44. FPC, 23 May, 1850, No. 120, NAI.

167

45. Political Letters from Secy. of State, 5th

May 1852, No. 14, Our Governor General of India

in Council, London, 5th

May, 1852, NAI.

46. FPC, 14 March 1851, No. 163, McCulloch to F.J. Halliday Esqr., Officiating Secy.,

Government of India, Munneepore Agency, 19th

Feb. 1851, NAI.

47. FPC, 22 August 1850, No. 140, translation of a letter from Chunder Kirtee Sing Raja of

Munneepore to the Political Agent at Munneepore, dated 14th

Shrabon, 1773, NAI.

48. Foreign Secret Consultations, 28 August 1857, Nos.140-41, Cap. McCulloch, Pol. Agent to

G.F. Edmonston Esqr., Secy. to the Govt. of India, Munnipore, 18th

July 1857, para 3, NAI.

49. Ibid., para 2.

50. FPC, 28 May 1858, No. 139, McCulloch to Secretary, Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.,

Munnipore, 12th

February 1858, MSA.

51. L. Ibungohal and N. Khelchandra (eds.), op. cit., pp. 335-36.

52. FPC, 25 Nov.,1859, Nos. 136-37, McCulloch to R. Simson Esqr., Foreign Dept., Fort

William, Mannipore, 14th

Oct., 1859, NAI.

53. B. Kulachandra Sharma, Sana Chahi Ahum, (Imphal, 2011), pp. 192-93.

54. Judicial Letters of the Court of Directors, Special Narrative Vol. 44, 2-8 Aug. 1857, 29

Aug. 1857, No. 20, para 108, Govt. of Bengal, West Bengal State Archives (Hereafter,

WBSA).

55. Judicial Letters of the Court of Directors, Special Narrative Vol. 44, 30 Aug.-5 Sep. 1857,

12 September 1857, No. 24, paras 110-111, Govt. of Bengal, WBSA.

56. Judicial General Letters to Court of Directors, Special Narrative, 6-12 Sept. 1857, 19th

Sept.

1857, No. 25, para 81, Govt. of Bengal, WBSA.

57. Ibid., para 82.

58. Judicial Dept. 15th

April 1858, Special Narrative, 21-27 March 1858, No.22, Govt. of

Bengal, WBSA.

59. FPC, 28 May 1858, No.139, McCulloch to Secy. Govt. of India, Foreign Dept., Fort

William, Mannipore, 12th

Feb. 1858, MSA.

60. Ibid.

61. FPC, 25 Nov. 1859, Nos. 136-37, McCulloch to R. Simson Esqr., Foreign Dept., Fort

William, Mannipore, 14 Oct. 1859, para 2, NAI.