China’s Reaction to United States Missile Defense Restructuring China’s discomfort with U.S. missile defense strategies has spiked following the announcement of its expansion in the Pacific. "Actions such as strengthening anti-missile [defenses] will intensify antagonism and will not be beneficial to finding a solution for the problem," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei. The decision to bolster United States missile defense follows the developing North Korean aggression. North Korea has gone as far as to threaten a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States.58 Significantly, North Korea displayed marked advances in its military capabilities in December 2012. Using the guise of putting a satellite into orbit, North Korea was able to successfully launch a long-range rocket for the first time. Just two months later the United Nations Security Council was spurred into responding with stricter sanctions directed towards Pyongyang following North Korea’s nuclear test launch. Reacting to a perceived threat from North Korea, the United States has opted to install additional missile interceptors, placing them in Alaska and in California. Alaska is to gain 14 new interceptors.59 U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that these interceptors will be in place by 2017, for the express purpose of guarding against a possible North Korean attack. The Chinese Foreign Ministry advocates an alternative, diplomatic solution. On top of China’s disapproval regarding the United States response to North Korea, Chinese military analysts are also concerned about their own ability to remain a strong military power. The extent of the United States military reaction has caused some prominent Chinese analysts to wonder whether the North Korean threat is simply a ruse, concealing an ulterior motive to neutralize China’s nuclear arsenal.60 Strategically located along the west coast, United States missile interceptors could easily blunt China’s forces. Reacting to the threat of diminished military capabilities in the face of additional United States missile interceptors could easily lead both the Chinese and the North Koreans to overcompensate by racing to stockpile enough missiles to get past the United States defense system.61 In March 2013 North Korea confirmed these fears. North Korea placed blame on the United States for “having compelled (North Korea) to have access to nukes” because it “escalated the situation of the Korean Peninsula to an extreme phase.”62 China’s standpoint that increased United States missile interceptors will lead to an escalation in tensions as well as increased North Korean nuclear weapons was further supported by reports from state-run KCNA news agency. According to KCNA, a foreign ministry spokesman released a statement saying, "[North Korea's] nuclear weapons serve as an all-powerful treasured sword for protecting the sovereignty and security of the country. Therefore, they cannot be disputed ... as long as the U.S. nuclear threat and

58 http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/bre92h05a-us-korea-north-china/ 59 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2013/0318/China-warns-US-missile-defense-plan-will-antagonize-North-Korea 60 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2013/03/qa-session-on-recent-developments-in-us-and-nato-missile-defense-with-dr-yousaf-butt-and-dr-george-lewis.php 61 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2013/03/qa-session-on-recent-developments-in-us-and-nato-missile-defense-with-dr-yousaf-butt-and-dr-george-lewis.php 62 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/north-korea-us-nuclear/index.html?hpt=hp_t3

hostile policy persist."63 As China has predicted, it appears likely that North Korea will continue attempting to thwart United States missile neutralization attempts.

Despite the increasing tensions with North Korea, China remains vehemently opposed to the United States tactics. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have issued a joint statement on the subject. They indirectly target the United States, stating that they oppose any: “…country or group of countries unilaterally and unlimitedly strengthening missile defenses, harming strategic stability and international security…preferring to confront the proliferation of ballistic missiles within the framework of international law and political diplomacy, where the security of one group of nations cannot be sacrificed at the expense of another group of nations.”64 Interestingly, in spite of its strong opposition to United States missile interceptor expansion, China has also responded by developing an anti-missile system of its own, announcing the latest successful test in January 2013.65 Like North Korea, China has also expressed a desire to strengthen its own military capabilities in response to additional United States missile defense systems. This apprehension could affect the success of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.66 A desire for security in national autonomy could prompt China’s leaders to press to keep the option of future military plutonium production on the table.67

63 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/north-korea-us-nuclear/index.html?hpt=hp_t3 64 http://missilethreat.com/chinese-russian-joint-statement-on-missile-defense/ 65 http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/bre92h05a-us-korea-north-china/ 66 http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/03/qa-session-on-recent-developments-in-us-and-nato-missile-defense-with-dr-yousaf-butt-and-dr-george-lewis/ 67 http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/03/qa-session-on-recent-developments-in-us-and-nato-missile-defense-with-dr-yousaf-butt-and-dr-george-lewis/

China warns US missile defense plan will antagonize North Korea

By Arthur Bright

March 18, 2013

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2013/0318/China-warns-US-missile-defense-plan-will-antagonize-North-Korea

China warned today that US plans to bolster its missile defense program in the Pacific following North Korea's recent nuclear threats will only antagonize Pyongyang, even as North Korea slammed Washington's "hostile policy" and refused to negotiate its nuclear capacity.

Reuters reports that the Chinese Foreign Ministry said today that the problem of North Korea's nuclear program would be best solved through diplomatic means, and that US missile defense plans did not help the situation.

"Actions such as strengthening anti-missile [defenses] will intensify antagonism and will not be beneficial to finding a solution for the problem," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said. "China hopes the relevant country will proceed on the basis of peace and stability, adopt a responsible attitude and act prudently."

RECOMMENDED: Kim 101: How well do you know North Korea's leaders?

China's comments come in response to Friday's announcement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that the US plans to beef up its missile defense system in Alaska and California. Mr. Hagel specifically cited North Korea's third nuclear test and its "irresponsible and reckless provocations" of recent weeks as reason for the upgrade, which will include 14 new interceptors in Alaska and a new early-warning radar system in Japan.

But the announcement brought further fierce criticism from North Korea, which said on Saturday that the US had "compelled [North Korea] to have access to nukes" because it "escalated the situation of the Korean Peninsula to an extreme phase," reports CNN.

"[North Korea's] nuclear weapons serve as an all-powerful treasured sword for protecting the sovereignty and security of the country," a foreign ministry spokesman said, according to the state-run KCNA news agency. "Therefore, they cannot be disputed ... as long as the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy persist."

Pyongyang also denied that its nuclear program was a "bargaining chip" for negotiating economic concessions from the US, which has spearheaded a series of UN sanctions against the North.

North Korea then warned on Sunday that it would target Japan, as an ally of the US, in the event of a war on the Korean peninsula. Japan had recently called for "independent

additional sanctions" against Pyongyang, Voice of America reports.

North Korea's nuclear threat was a major topic on Sunday's Washington news shows. Rep. Mike Rogers (R) of Michigan told CNN that the political situation in North Korea made for a potentially explosive mix. "You have a 28-year-old leader who is trying to prove himself to the military, and the military is eager to have a saber rattling for their own self-interest, and the combination of that is proving to be very, very deadly," he said.

He added that the North Koreans "certainly have a ballistic missile that can reach US shores," though Agence France-Presse notes that Mr. Rogers did not specify whether he was referring to Alaska and Hawaii or to the continental US. The Pentagon and most experts agree that the continental US is outside the range of North Korea's missiles.

(For more background, read the Monitor's Steven Borowiec's article on propaganda and paranoia in the North)

The New York Times' David Sanger, appearing on CBS's Face the Nation, said the North's missile range is probably only half what they need to hit the lower 48 states, but the danger remains high.

"They've now conducted a third nuclear test, and by all the early indications, this time it really worked," Mr. Sanger said. "They have sent a missile as far as the Philippines. If you do the math on that, they're about halfway to being able to hit the Continental United States."

Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, added on Face the Nation that "just because a missile can't reach the United States doesn't mean that it can't reach our allies in Asia who look to us for their security..."

At least one regional ally is backing the expanded US missile defense plan. Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr told the Australian newspaper that he will endorse the plan when he meets with US officials during a 10-day visit to Washington that starts today. Mr. Carr called North Korea's threats "irresponsible and bellicose."

Q&A Session on Recent Developments in U.S. and NATO Missile Defense with Dr. Yousaf Butt and Dr. George Lewis

By Charles Blair

March 20, 2013

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2013/03/qa-session-on-recent-developments-in-us-and-nato-missile-defense-with-dr-yousaf-butt-and-dr-george-lewis.php

Researchers from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) asked two physicists who are experts in missile defense issues, Dr. Yousaf Butt and Dr. George Lewis, to weigh in on last week’s announcements on missile defense by the Obama administration.

Before exploring their reactions and insights, it is useful to identify salient elements of U.S. missile defense and place the issue in context. There are two main strategic missile defense systems fielded by the United States: one is based on large high-speed interceptors called Ground-Based Interceptors or “GBI’s” located in Alaska and California and the other is the mostly ship-based NATO/European system. The latter, European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense is designed to deal with the threat posed by possible future Iranian intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles to U.S. assets, personnel, and allies in Europe – and eventually attempt to protect the U.S. homeland.

The EPAA uses ground-based and mobile ship-borne radars; the interceptors themselves are mounted on Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. Two land-based interceptor sites in Poland and Romania are also envisioned – the so-called “Aegis-ashore” sites. The United States and NATO have stated that the EPAA is not directed at Russia and poses no threat to its nuclear deterrent forces, but as outlined in a 2011 study by Dr. Theodore Postol and Dr. Yousaf Butt, this is not completely accurate because the system is ship-based, and thus mobile it could be reconfigured to have a theoretical capability to engage Russian warheads.

Indeed, General James Cartwright has explicitly mentioned this possible reconfiguration – or global surge capability – as an attribute of the planned system: “Part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.”

In the 2011 study, the authors focused on what would be the main concern of cautious Russian military planners —the capability of the missile defense interceptors to simply reach, or “engage,” Russian strategic warheads—rather than whether any particular engagement results in an actual interception, or “kill.” Interceptors with a kinematic capability to simply reach Russian ICBM warheads would be sufficient to raise concerns in Russian national security circles – regardless of the possibility that Russian decoys and other countermeasures might defeat the system in actual engagements. In short, even a missile defense system that could be rendered ineffective could still elicit serious concern

from cautious Russian planners. The last two phases of the EPAA – when the higher burnout velocity “Block II” SM-3 interceptors come on-line in 2018 – could raise legitimate concerns for Russian military analysts.

A Russian news report sums up the Russian concerns: “[Russian foreign minister] Lavrov said Russia’s agreement to discuss cooperation on missile defense in the NATO Russia Council does not mean that Moscow agrees to the NATO projects which are being developed without Russia’s participation. The minister said the fulfillment of the third and fourth phases of the U.S. ‘adaptive approach’ will enter a strategic level threatening the efficiency of Russia’s nuclear containment forces.” [emphasis added]

With this background in mind, FAS’ Senior Fellow on State and Non-State Threat, Charles P. Blair (CB), asked Dr. Yousaf Butt (YB) and Dr. George Lewis (GL) for their input on recent developments on missile defense with eight questions.

Q: (CB) Last Friday, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced that the U.S. will cancel the last Phase – Phase 4 – of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense which was to happen around 2021. This was the phase with the faster SM-3 “Block IIB” interceptors. Will this cancellation hurt the United State’s ability to protect itself and Europe?

A: (YB) No, because the “ability” you mention was always hypothetical. The Achilles’ Heel of all versions of the SM-3 (Block I A/B and Block II A/B) interceptors — indeed of “midcourse” missile defense, in general, is that it is straightforward to defeat the system using cheap decoy warheads. The system simply does not have a robust ability to discriminate a genuine warhead from decoys and other countermeasures. Because the intercepts take place in the vacuum of space, the heavy warhead and light decoys travel together, confusing the system’s sensors. The Pentagon’s own scientists at the Defense Science Board said as much in 2011, as did the National Academy of Sciences earlier this year.

Additionally, the system has never been successfully tested in realistic conditions stressed by the presence of decoys or other countermeasures. The majority of the system would be ship-based and is not known to work beyond a certain sea-state: as you might imagine, it becomes too risky to launch the interceptors if the ship is pitching wildly.

So any hypothetical (possibly future) nuclear-armed Middle Eastern nation with ICBMs could be a threat to the Unites States or Europe whether we have no missile defenses, have just Block I interceptors, or even the Block II interceptors. Since the interceptors would only have offered a false sense of security, nothing is lost in canceling Phase 4 of the EPAA. In fact, the other phases could also be canceled with no loss to U.S. or NATO security, and offering considerable saving of U.S. taxpayer’s money.

Q: (CB) What about Iran and its alleged desire to build ICBMs? Having just launched a

satellite in January, could such actions act as a cover for an ICBM?

A: (YB) The evidence does not point that way at all. It points the other way. For instance, the latest Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Iran’s missile program observes: (emphasis added)

“Iran also has a genuine and ambitious space launch program, which seeks to enhance Iran’s national pride, and perhaps more importantly, its international reputation as a growing advanced industrial power. Iran also sees itself as a potential leader in the Middle East offering space launch and satellite services. Iran has stated it plans to use future launchers for placing intelligence gathering satellites into orbit, although such a capability is a decade or so in the future. Many believe Iran’s space launch program could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that could threaten targets throughout Europe, and even the United States if Iran achieved an ICBM capability of at least 10,000 km. ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes inherent in a space launch program, but it seems clear that Iran has a dedicated space launch effort and it is not simply a cover for ICBM development. Since 1999, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has assessed that Iran could test an ICBM by 2015 with sufficient foreign assistance, especially from a country such as China or Russia (whose support has reportedly diminished over the past decade). It is increasingly uncertain whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by 2015 for several reasons: Iran does not appear to be receiving the degree of foreign support many believe would be necessary, Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain critical components and materials because of sanctions, and Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight test program many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.”

Furthermore, the payload of Iran’s space launch vehicles is very low compared to what would be needed for a nuclear warhead — or even a substantial conventional warhead. For instance, Omid, Iran’s first satellite weighed just 27 kg [60 pounds] and Rasad-1, Iran’s second satellite weighed just 15.3 kilograms [33.74 pound], whereas a nuclear warhead would require a payload capacity on the order of 1000 kilograms. Furthermore, since launching an ICBM from Iran towards the United States or Europe requires going somewhat against the rotation of Earth the challenge is greater. As pointed out by missile and space security expert Dr. David Wright, an ICBM capable of reaching targets in the United States would need to have a range longer than 11,000 km. Drawing upon the experience of France in making solid-fuel ICBMs, Dr. Wright estimates it may take 40 years for Iran to develop a similar ICBM – assuming it has the intention to kick off such an effort. A liquid fueled rocket could be developed sooner, but there is little evidence in terms of rocket testing that Iran has kicked off such an effort.

In any case, it appears that informed European officials are not really afraid of any hypothetical Iranian missiles. For example, the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, once made light of the whole scenario telling Foreign Policy, “If the mullahs have a target list we believe we are quite low on it.” As if to emphasize that point, the

Europeans don’t appear to be pulling their weight in terms of funding the system. “We love the capability but just don’t have the money,” one European military official stated in reference to procuring the interceptors.

Similarly, the alleged threat from North Korea is also not all that urgent.

It seems U.S. taxpayers are subsidizing a project that will have little national security benefits either for the United States or NATO countries. In contrast, it may well create a dangerous false sense of security. It has already negatively impacted ties with Russia and China.

Q: (CB) Isn’t Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program a big concern in arguing for a missile defense? Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel said Iran may cross some red-line in the summer?

A: (YB) Iran’s nuclear program could be a concern, but the latest report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) says Iran has not even decided to make nuclear weapons yet. Building, testing and miniaturizing a warhead to fit on a missile takes years – after a country decides to do so. In any case, no matter how scary that hypothetical prospect, one would not want a missile defense system that could be easily defeated to address that alleged eventual threat. Even if you believe the threat exists now, you may want a system that is effective, not a midcourse system that has inherent flaws.

Incidentally, the DNI’s report explicitly states: “we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU [weapons grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.” As for the red-line drawn by Prime Minister Netanyahu: his track-record on predicting Iranian nuclear weaponization has been notoriously bad. As I point out in a recent piece for Reuters, in 1992 Mr. Netanyahu said Iran was three to five years from a bomb. I assess he is still wrong, more than 20 years later.

Lastly, even if Iran (or other nations) obtained nuclear weapons in the future, they can be delivered in any number of ways- not just via missiles. In fact, nuclear missiles have the benefit of being self-deterring – nations are actually hesitant to use nuclear weapons if they are mated to missiles. Other nations know that the United States can pinpoint the launch sites of missiles. The same cannot be said of a nuclear device placed in a sailboat, a reality that could precipitate the use of that type of device due to the lack of attribution. So one has to carefully consider if it makes sense to dissuade the placement of nuclear weapons on missiles. If an adversarial nation has nuclear weapons it may be best to have them mated to missiles rather than boats.

Q: (CB) It seems that the Russians are still concerned about the missile defense system, even after Defense Secretary Hagel said that the fourth phase of EPAA plan is canceled. Why are they evidently still concerned?

A: (YB) The Russians probably have four main concerns with NATO missile defense,

even after the cancellation of Phase 4 of EPAA. For more details on some of these please see the report Ted Postol and I wrote.

1. The first is geopolitical: the Russians have never been happy about the Eastward expansion of NATO and they see joint U.S.-Polish and U.S.-Romanian missile defense bases near their borders as provocative. This is not to say they are right or wrong, but that is most likely their perception. These bases are to be built before Phase 4 of the EPAA, so they are still in the plans.

2. The Russians do not concur with the alleged long-range missile threat from Iran. One cannot entirely blame them when the Polish foreign minister himself makes light of the alleged threat saying, “If the mullahs have a target list we believe we are quite low on it.” Russian officials are possibly confused and their military analysts may even be somewhat alarmed, mulling what the real intent behind these missile defense bases could be, if – in their assessment – the Iran threat is unrealistic, as in fact was admitted to by the Polish foreign minister. The Russians also have to take into account unexpected future changes which may occur on these bases, for instance: a change in U.S. or Polish or Romanian administrations; a large expansion of the number or types of interceptors; or, perhaps even nuclear-tipped interceptors (which were proposed by former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about ten years ago).

3. Russian military planners are properly hyper-cautious, just like their counterparts at the Pentagon, and they must assume a worst-case scenario in which the missile defense system is assumed to be effective, even when it isn’t. This concern likely feeds into their fear that the legal balance of arms agreed to in New START may be upset by the missile defense system.

Their main worry could be with the mobile ship-based platforms and less with the European bases, as explained in detail in the study Ted Postol and I did. Basically, the Aegis missile defense cruisers could be placed off of the East Coast of the U.S. and – especially with Block IIA/B interceptors –engage Russian warheads. Some statements from senior U.S. officials probably play into their fears. For instance, General Cartwright has been quoted as saying, “part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.” To certain Russian military planners’ ears that may not sound like a limited system aimed at a primitive threat from Iran.

Because the mobile ship-based interceptors (hypothetically placed off of the U.S. East Coast ) could engage Russian warheads, Russian officials may be able claim this as an infringement on New START parity.

Missile defenses that show little promise of working well can, nevertheless, alter perceptions that the strategic balance between otherwise well-matched states is stable. Even when missile defenses reveal that they possess little, if any technical capabilities, they can still cause cautious adversaries and competitors to react as if they might work. The United States’ response to the Cold War era Soviet missile defense system was

similarly overcautious.

4. Finally, certain Russian military planners may worry about the NATO EPAA missile defense system because in Phase 3, the interceptors are to be based on the SM-3 Block IIA booster. The United States has conducted research using this same type of rocket booster as the basis of a hypersonic-glide offensive strike weapon called ArcLight. Because such offensive hyper-glide weapons could fit into the very same vertical launch tubes – on the ground in Poland and Romania, or on the Aegis ships – used for the defensive interceptors, the potential exists for turning a defensive system into an offensive one, in short order. Although funding for ArcLight has been eliminated in recent years, Russian military planners may continue to worry that perhaps the project “went black” [secret], or that it may be resuscitated in the future. In fact, a recent Federal Business Opportunity (FBO) for the Department of the Navy calls for hypersonic weapons technologies that could fit into the same Mk. 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes that the SM-3 missile defense interceptors are also placed in.

To conclude, advocates of missile defense who say we need cooperation on missile defense to improve ties with Russia have the logic exactly backward: In large part, the renewed tension between Russia and the United States is about missile defense. Were we to abandon this flawed and expensive idea, our ties with Russia — and China — would naturally improve. And, in return, they could perhaps help us more with other foreign policy issues such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria. As it stands, missile defense is harming bilateral relations with Russia and poisoning the well of future arms control.

Q: (CB) Adding to the gravity of Secretary Hagel’s announcement , last week China expressed worry about Ground-Based Interceptors, the Bush administration’s missile defense initiative in Poland discarded by the Obama administration in 2009, in favor of Phase 4 of the EPAA. Why is there concern with not only the Aegis ship-based system, but also the GBIs on the West Coast?

A: (YB) Like the Russians, Chinese military analysts are also likely to assume the worst-case scenario for the system (ie. that it will work perfectly) in coming up with their counter response . Possessing a much smaller nuclear arsenal than Russia or the United States, to China, even a few interceptors can be perceived as making a dent in their deterrent forces. And I think the Chinese are likely worried about both the ship-based Aegis system as well as the West Coast GBIs.

And this concern on the part of the Chinese is nothing new. They have not been as vocal as the Russians, but it is evident they were never content with U.S. and NATO plans. For instance, the 2009 Bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission pointed out that “China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.” Such stockpile increases, if they are taking place, will probably compel India, and, in turn, Pakistan to also ramp up their nuclear weapon numbers.

The Chinese may also be looking to the future and think that U.S. defenses may

encourage North Korea to field more missiles than it may originally have been intending – if and when the North Koreans make long range missiles – to make sure some get through the defense system. This would have an obvious destabilizing effect in East Asia which the Chinese would rather avoid.

Some U.S. media outlets have also said the ship-based Aegis system could be used against China’s DF-21D anti-ship missile, when the official U.S. government position has always been that the system is only intended only against North Korea (in the Pacific theater). Such mission creep could sound provocative to the Chinese, who were told that the Aegis system is not “aimed at” China.

In reality, while the Aegis system’s sensors may be able to help track the DF-21D it is unlikely that the interceptors could be easily modified to work within the atmosphere where the DF-21D’s kill vehicle travels. (It could perhaps be intercepted at apogee during the ballistic phase). A recent CRS report was quite explicit that the DF-21D is a threat which remains unaddressed in the Navy: “No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s trajectory,’ Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy ‘has not budgeted for any study, development, acquisition or production’ of a DF-21D target, he said.”

Chinese concerns about U.S. missile defense systems are also a source of great uncertainty, reducing Chinese support for promoting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). China’s leaders may wish to maintain the option of future military plutonium production in response to U.S. missile defense plans.

The central conundrum of midcourse missile defense remains that while it creates incentives for adversaries and competitors of the United States to increase their missile stockpiles, it offers no credible combat capability to protect the United States or its allies from this increased weaponry.

Q: (CB) Will a new missile defense site on the East Coast protect the United States? What would be the combat effectiveness of an East Coast site against an assumed Iranian ICBM threat?

A: (GL) I don’t see any real prospect for even starting a program for interceptors such as the [East Coast site] NAS is proposing any time soon in the current budget environment, and even if they did it probably would not be available until the 2020s. The recent announcement of the deployment of additional GBI interceptors is, in my view, just cover for getting rid of the Block II Bs, and was chosen because it was relatively ($1+ billion) inexpensive and could be done quickly.

The current combat effectiveness of the GBIs against an Iranian ICBM must be expected to be low. Of course there is no current Iranian ICBM threat. However, the current GMD system shows no prospect of improved performance against any attacker that takes any serious steps to defeat it as far out in time, as plans for this system are publicly available. Whether the interceptors are based in Alaska or on the East Coast makes very little

difference to their performance.

Q: (CB) There were shortcomings reported by the Defense Science Board and the National Academies regarding the radars that are part of the system. Has anything changed to improve this situation?

A: (GL) With respect to radars, the main point is that basically nothing has happened. The existing early warning radars can’t discriminate [between real warheads and decoys]. The only radar that could potentially contribute to discrimination, the SBX, has been largely mothballed.

Q: (CB) Let’s say the United States had lots of money to spend on such a system, would an East Coast site have the theoretical ability to engage Russian warheads? Regardless of whether Russia could defeat the system with decoys or countermeasures, does the system have an ability to reach or engage the warheads? In short, could such a site be a concern for Russia?

A: (YB) If you have a look at Fig 8(a) and 8(b) in the report Ted Postol and I wrote you’ll see pretty clearly why an East Coast site might be a concern for Russia, especially with faster interceptors that are proposed for that site. Now I’m not saying it necessarily should be a concern – because they can defeat the system rather easily – but it may be. Whether they object to it or not vocally depends on other factors also. For instance, such a site will obviously not be geopolitically problematic for the Russians.

China criticizes U.S. anti-missile North Korea plan By Ben Blanchard March 18, 2013 http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/bre92h05a-us-korea-north-china/ BEIJING, Mar. 18, 2013 (Reuters) — China said on Monday U.S. plans to bolster missile defenses in response to provocations by North Korea would only intensify antagonism, and urged Washington to act prudently.

"The anti-missile issue has a direct bearing on global and regional balance and stability. It also concerns mutual strategic interests between countries," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a daily news briefing.

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced plans on Friday to bolster U.S. missile defenses in response to "irresponsible and reckless provocations" by North Korea, which has threatened a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States.

Hong said China believed efforts to increase security and resolve the problem of nuclear proliferation were best achieved through diplomatic means.

"Actions such as strengthening anti-missile (defenses) will intensify antagonism and will not be beneficial to finding a solution for the problem," Hong said.

"China hopes the relevant country will proceed on the basis of peace and stability, adopt a responsible attitude and act prudently."

The Pentagon said the United States had informed China, North Korea's neighbor and closest ally, of its decision to add more interceptors but declined to characterize Beijing's reaction.

The remarks from China's Foreign Ministry come days before U.S. Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen visits China to discuss implementation of economic sanctions against North Korea.

China has expressed unease at previous U.S. plans for missile defense systems, as well as sales of such systems to Taiwan and Japan, viewing it as part of an attempt to "encircle" and contain China despite U.S. efforts to ease Chinese fears.

China has responded by developing an anti-missile system of its own, announcing the latest successful test in January.

Chinese-Russian Joint Statement on Missile Defense Updated March 27, 2013 By “editor” http://missilethreat.com/chinese-russian-joint-statement-on-missile-defense/ Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin included the following short paragraph on missile defense in a lengthy joint statement that covered a wide variety of other topics. It appeared in the section of the statement devoted to international affairs.

“With a view towards the historical experience and practice of building a new type of great power relations, and with a sense of historic responsibility for world peace and humanity’s future, the two sides call on all nations of the world to … deepen mutual understanding, coordination and cooperation on the question of missile defenses, urge members of international society to be prudent on the issues of deploying and beginning cooperation on missile defenses, and oppose one country or group of countries unilaterally and unlimitedly strengthening missile defenses, harming strategic stability and international security. We stand for the collective confrontation of the challenges and threats from ballistic missiles, preferring to confront the proliferation of ballistic missiles within the framework of international law and political diplomacy, where the security of one group of nations cannot be sacrificed at the expense of another group of nations.”

The language echoes past statements issued by Russia and China, which are concerned about the intentions driving what, from their perspective, appears to be massive U.S. fiscal and technical investments in a highly questionable technology. Neither country is particularly concerned about the technical capabilities of the currently deployed or tested missile defense technologies. Experts in both countries understand the vulnerabilities of these systems. What worries defense planners here in China, and presumably in Russia, is the almost fanatical U.S. devotion to missile defense technology. Political and military leaders see the monies spent, not the technology they have actually purchased, as sufficient cause to wonder if some surprising new breakthrough might be on the horizon. Otherwise, my Chinese interlocutors routinely ask, why would the United States be wasting so much money on it, especially in a time of supposed fiscal austerity?

The persistence of Chinese concerns about U.S. missile defense plans cannot be assuaged by pointing out the technical limitations of the current systems. They know them already. The Obama administration should stop lecturing and start listening to what the Chinese are actually saying, which is that they don’t want to wake up one day and suddenly find themselves vulnerable to a U.S. first strike. It isn’t the reality of missile defense, but the U.S. dream of missile defense, that keeps Chinese military planners up at night.

Chinese analysts are not assured their U.S. counterparts accept the idea of mutual

vulnerability between the United States and China, which is the basis of deterrence. That leads to concerns that the level of U.S. commitment to missile defense, which China believes is higher than is justified by the North Korean and Iranian threats, is credible evidence this massive, decades-old defense effort is actually focused on them.

Posted in: Missiles and Missile Defense Tags: China, missile defense, Xi Jinping

About the author: Gregory has lived and worked in China for the better part of the last twenty-five years facilitating exchanges between academic, governmental, and professional organizations in both countries. Since joining the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2002, he has focused on promoting and conducting dialog between Chinese and American experts on nuclear arms control and space security. Areas of expertise: Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese space program, international arms control, cross-cultural communication

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North Korea: Nuclear Program Not a Bargaining Chip By Greg Botelho March 16, 2013 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/north-korea-us-nuclear/index.html?hpt=hp_t3 (CNN) -- A day after the United States promised new missile defense interceptors to guard against a North Korean attack, Pyongyang responded Saturday by blasting the Americans' "hostile policy" and saying it won't negotiate with them over its nuclear program. "(North Korea's) nuclear weapons serve as an all-powerful treasured sword for protecting the sovereignty and security of the country," a foreign ministry spokesman said, according to the state-run KCNA news agency. "Therefore, they cannot be disputed ... as long as the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy persist." The stern statement marked the latest in the war of words, and more, pitting North Korea against the United States and, in fact, many other countries worldwide. Tensions have escalated since December, when North Korea successfully launched a long-range rocket for the first time under what the United States and other Western nations say was the guise of putting a satellite into orbit. They rose to yet another level when North Korea launched a nuclear test last month, prompting the U.N. Security Council to agree on stepped-up sanctions intent on pressuring Pyongyang. In Saturday's statement, the North Korean foreign ministry spokesman claimed the United States "hostile policy ... has become more pronounced." Washington's latest salvo on this front came Friday, when U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said 14 more missile interceptors -- bringing the total to 44 -- will be in place on the West Coast by 2017 to guard against a possible North Korean attack. U.S. to beef up missile defense against North Korea, Iran North Korea blamed the United States on Saturday for "having compelled (North Korea) to have access to nukes" because it "escalated the situation of the Korean Peninsula to an extreme phase." The statement challenged claims that North Korea was pursuing its nuclear program as a "bargaining chip" to gain economic benefits through negotiations, such as food and other humanitarian aid. "The U.S. poor temptation that it would help (North Korea) if the latter makes other choice(s) may work on other countries, but it sounds nonsensical to (North Korea)," the foreign ministry spokesman said. "(North Korea) has no idea of negotiating with the U.S. unless it rolls back its hostile policy."

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http://english.sina.com/world/p/2012/1218/539334.html

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http://english.sina.com/world/p/2012/1218/539334.html Russia, China boost strategic defense in different ways: Expert 2012-12-19 01:33:29 GMT2012-12-19 09:33:29(Beijing Time) SINA.com Russia and China are working to modernize their strategic defense capabilities. However, they have chosen different approaches to replacing their key heavy missiles, notes Vasily Kashin, an expert at the Centre for Strategy and Technology Analysis, who compares the latest steps taken by the two countries to increase their missile defence potential. Sergey Karakaev, commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, announced that Russia is currently designing a minimum of two new types of intercontinental ballistic missile. According to mass media sources, one of the two projects is a giant liquid fuelled rocket called Sarmat, which is to replace the Soviet RS-36M “Voyevoda” system, better known by its Western name “Satan”. The Voyevoda complex has served as an important component in Russia's strategic nuclear forces for many years. These are the heaviest intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed anywhere in the world. Their take-off weight is over 200 tons, while their powerful liquid fuelled engines allow them to carry a payload of up to 10 nuclear warheads and host of anti-missile defence capabilities including false targets. Depending on the combat equipment it carries, the rocket’s range can be as much as 11 to 16 thousand kilometres. “In weight the RS-36M compares only to the Chinese intercontinental rocket, DF-5, which weighs 183 tons. The Chinese rocket is less advanced; for example, it requires lengthy preparation before launch as fuelling takes from 30 minutes to two hours, according to different sources. It makes the missile vulnerable to a first strike. However, China maintains about 20 DF-5 missiles as they constitute the only strategic system that would allow China to strike anywhere in the USA”, points out Vasily Kashin. Russia and China have chosen different approaches to replacing their key heavy missiles. In essence, Russia has chosen to revive the RS-36 system with new and advanced technology. The choice of liquid fuel is rooted in the fact that compared to a solid fuel rocket, it can carry a heavier payload. Russia expects that in the future the US will start deploying its missile defence in space and will also escalate its missile defence capabilities in Europe. A heavier and more powerful rocket will be guaranteed to circumvent that system. In addition, according to Sergey Karakaev, commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, a liquid fuelled rocket, with its greater payload potential, will allow Russia “to realize such opportunities as the creation of high precision strategic weapons with non-nuclear warheads and a practically global range”. Russia can create non-nuclear, high precision weapons based on intercontinental rockets in the event that the USA also works on designing such a weapon”, Karakaev points out. “Along with the heavy liquid fuel rocket, Russia is also working on a new mobile solid fuel rocket to replace the Topol-M and Yars complexes”, says Karakaev. Thus, Russia wants to preserve, for the foreseeable future, its strategic nuclear forces consisting of two main components: mobile rocket systems and heavy, liquid fuelled silo-based missiles. As far as China goes, it is a known fact that, in addition to the current mobile solid fuel DF-31A missiles, it is working on a heavier solid fuel rocket with multiple warheads. This missile is also a direct response to the

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increased capabilities of US missile defence systems, but it would be difficult for it to equal the range and payload characteristics of the existing DF-5 rocket. Such an approach corresponds to the Chinese strategy for developing its nuclear forces. China, from the very beginning, has not aimed for nuclear parity with the USA, but has paid more attention to maintaining a smaller missile group, capable of surviving a first strike and hitting back in retaliation. That approach is now undergoing some changes; it is already clear that China will have to increase the number of its submarine based ballistic missiles and its intercontinental ballistic missiles. “But”, thinks Russian expert Vasily Kashin, “conditions for the strategy change are not ripe yet”.

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WPW-China Nuclear Forces-and Proliferation-BMD-Weitz-26nov2012-with notes.doc Russia China, and Missile Defense “Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD,” the 2010 U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review explains. “Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and interests.” Interestingly, China’s concerns and response regarding U.S. missile defenses are similar to Russian concerns but also differ in certain respects. They both fear that U.S. BMD systems threaten to weaken their nuclear deterrents and undermine one of their main tools for constraining U.S. foreign policy by shielding the United States from their retaliation. The strong U.S. offensive capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, exacerbate these concerns since they increase the U.S. potential for successfully pre-empting Russian and Chinese nuclear missiles before they have been launched.68 Although U.S. BMD systems would find coping with a full-scale Russian and Chinese nuclear strike difficult, they would have an easier task if their nuclear retaliatory capacity had been severely weakened by a U.S. first strike that had destroyed many missiles in their silos and disrupted the strategic command-and-control systems.

Under such a scenario, China or Russia might not even respond at all since Beijing or Moscow would be faced with the option of launching a weak retaliatory strike that would be even more vulnerable to U.S. defenses and could trigger a full-scale U.S. counterstrike nuclear strike in response.

Even if the United States attained the theoretical capacity to preemptively destroy their strategic nuclear forces in a first strike, Russian and Chinese policy makers still might not anticipate a nuclear war with the United States, but they could reasonably worry that U.S. policy makers might presume that, with an effective missile shield, they could then intervene in other countries without having to heed to Moscow’s and Beijing’s objections.

When launching the most recent Russian campaign against U.S. missile defenses at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin explicitly warned that, unless deterred by the Soviet nuclear force, the U.S. military “hyperpower” would be free to impose its unilateral will on other countries without fear of effective military retaliation. Major General Chen Zhou, Director of the Center for National Defense Policy at the PLA Academy of Military Science, claims that “the US has been using missile defense systems as one of its effective measures to break the global strategic balance” by undermining a key source of China’s power.69

Both Beijing and Moscow fear that the United States is using missile defenses to widen and deepen security alliances designed to contain China’s and Russia’s influence. Russians oppose U.S. BMD deployments in eastern Europe and perhaps the South Caucasus, while Chinese oppose U.S. BMD cooperation with Japan and potentiallly South Korea and Taiwan.

In order to decrease the vulnerability of its ballistic missiles to a U.S. first strike, Russia and China have expended considerable resources to develop and deploy mobile missiles as well as submarine-launched missiles.70 These passive defenses can decrease the ability of the United States to destroy Russia’s and China’s missiles before they have been launched, but these systems would become vulnerable to effective adversary BMD systems. .

68 He Yun, “US Missile Defense and China: An Exchange,” CSIS Pacific Forum Number 50, September 6, 2011 69 Chen Zhou, “Anti-Ballistic Missile Program: Does No Good to World Peace and Security,” China-US Focus, August 24, 2012, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/anti-ballistic-missile-program-does-no-good-to-world-peace-and-security/. 70 Keith Bradsher, ”China Is Said to Be Bolstering Missile Capabilities,” New York Times, August 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/asia/chinas-missile-advances-aimed-at-thwarting-us-defenses-analysts-say.html?_r=1

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The Chinese media has explicitly argued that China should learn from what Moscow has been doing to oppose U.S. BMD deployments in Europe.71 A 2010 Guanghzou Daily article quotes Ni Lexiong, an expert on military issues at the Shanghai Institute of Political Science and Law, told the yesterday, "The US anti-missile system in China's neighborhood is a replica of its strategy in Eastern Europe against Russia.”72 But the Chinese also see U.S. missile defenses as at least partly designed to negate the PLA’s anti-access/area denial strategy. China’s fleet of medium- and intermediate-range missiles are designed to enhance its anti-access area denial strategy to keep the U.S. military from intervening in China’s regional affairs.

Unlike Moscow, Beijing has adamantly refused to constrain its missile arsenal by, for example, rejecting suggestions that China accede to the Russia-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which exclusively prohibits these two countries from having ballistic or cruise missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers. The PLA’s missiles include short-range systems to discourage Taiwan’s independence and deter U.S. and other adversary militaries near China; medium-range missiles to consolidate Beijing’s influence in East Asia; and long-range missiles to deter the United States from interfering in Chinese efforts to achieve these first two objectives. In addition, China continues to rely on its missile technology exports to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and other states to gain money and diplomatic influence. Conversely, Beijing has adopted a much less threatening tone in its response to U.S. BMD initiatives than Moscow. The Chinese may have benefitted by seeing how shrill Russian threats to launch preemptive strikes against Poland, Ukraine, and other countries hosting U.S. BMD sites have only alarmed Russia’s neighbors into tightening their mutual defense ties.

In contrast, Chinese officials have not threatened to attack Japan, India, or South Korea to discourage them from supporting Washington’s BMD policies, which could drive these countries closer to the United States and increase the risks of containment. Unlike in Europe, where the U.S. BMD program has been adopted by NATO as a collective alliance initiative, the U.S. BMD initiatives in Asia (and the Middle East) are proceeding thus far almost exclusively on a bilateral basis. Furthermore, the Chinese seem more optimistic that they can develop their own sophisticated penetration aids or missile defenses. Unlike Russian officials who characterize all national missile defense programs as potentially destabilizing , the Chinese simply urge caution in the development and deployment of BMD systems, suggesting that China wants to defend its own incipient missile defense program.

Although China’s nuclear arsenal could more easily be neutralized by emerging U.S. missile defense systems than Russia’s larger fleet of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, PRC officials have declined to pursue Russian probes about greater cooperation in this area. Chinese and Russian representatives have thus far largely limited their BMD efforts to issuing joint declarations, though Russia has in principle decided to sell advanced S-400 air defense systems to China that have some missile defense capacities.

Chinese analysts have informally explained that they are weighing the value of working with Russia, but are concerned that Moscow might, as in 2001, abandon China to reach a separate agreement with the United States on the issue. They also worry that, unlike Russia, China lacks any missile defense assets they could offer the United States in return for BMD cooperation.

More extensive Sino-Russian BMD collaboration could range from simply exchanging intelligence assessments to undertaking joint research and development programs for shared anti-BMD technologies. For example, they could pool their resources or expertise to overcome U.S. BMD systems stationed on their peripheries. They could also coordinate pressure against other countries in Europe or Asia to abstain from deploying U.S. BMD assets.

71 “China Nervous About U.S.-Led Missile Defense System,” The ChosunLibo, March 30, 2012 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/03/30/2012033001312.html. 72 Cited in Qin Jize and Li Xiaokun, “China circled by chain of US anti-missile systems,” China Daily, February 22, 2010 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-02/22/content_9481548.htm. See also

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Whether in collaboration with Russia or alone, China is likely to continue to seek its own BMD capabilities. Beijing followed Washington and Moscow in developing its own nuclear weapons in the1960s, an anti-satellite weapon in the past decade, and most recently claims to have tested its own incipient BMD system in 2010.73 Chinese experts have confirmed that they are debating whether to develop BMD systems as well.74 Analysis of PRC technical writings show extensive interest in developing passive and active countermeasures to BMD as well as more recently China’s own anti-satellite and BMD capabilities.75 But more cooperative BMD collaboration between China and the United States (and Russia) is also possible. PRC analysts should recognize that China’s expanding offensive nuclear capabilities are making it more difficult for Russia and the United States to agree to further reduce their own strategic forces, which can inflict much more damage on China than any U.S. missile shield.76 Similarly, the Chinese military buildup is encouraging influential Japanese, South Koreans, and Taiwanese to develop their own matching long-range strike weapons as well as more advanced defensive systems.

Like their Russian counterparts, China’s authoritarian leaders can more easily overcome domestic or legislative objections to making major concessions on the missile defense issue. If Beijing and Washington both accept the legitimacy of missile defenses, than a bilateral agreement is possible between them.

73 Lora Saalman, “China's Evolution on Ballistic Missile Defense,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Analysis, August 23, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/23/china-s-evolution-on-ballistic-missile-defense/dkpl. 74 Keith Bradsher,”China Is Said to Be Bolstering Missile Capabilities,” New York Times, August 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/asia/chinas-missile-advances-aimed-at-thwarting-us-defenses-analysts-say.html?_r=1.. 75 Lora Saalman, “China's Evolution on Ballistic Missile Defense,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Analysis, August 23, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/23/china-s-evolution-on-ballistic-missile-defense/dkpl. 76 A specific concern is that China would exploit further Russian-US strategic reductions to “sprint to parity”; Lora Saalman and Alexei Arbatov, “Russia-U.S.-China: Trilateral Strategic Stability,” Carnegie Endowment, April 24, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/24/russia-u.s.-china-trilateral-strategic-stability/bzha.

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Russia China, and US Missile Defense “Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD,” the 2010 U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review explains. “Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and interests.” Interestingly, China’s concerns and response regarding U.S. missile defenses are similar to Russian concerns but also differ in certain respects. They both fear that U.S. BMD systems threaten to weaken their nuclear deterrents and undermine one of their main tools for constraining U.S. foreign policy by shielding the United States from their retaliation. The strong U.S. offensive capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, exacerbate these concerns since they increase the U.S. potential for successfully pre-empting Russian and Chinese nuclear missiles before they have been launched. Although U.S. BMD systems would find coping with a full-scale Russian and Chinese nuclear strike difficult, they would have an easier task if their nuclear retaliatory capacity had been severely weakened by a U.S. first strike that had destroyed many missiles in their silos and disrupted the strategic command-and-control systems. Even if the United States attained the theoretical capacity to preemptively destroy their strategic nuclear forces in a first strike, Russian and Chinese policy makers still might not anticipate a nuclear war with the United States, but they could reasonably worry that U.S. policy makers might presume that, with an effective missile shield, they could then intervene in other countries without having to heed to Moscow’s and Beijing’s objections. When launching the most recent Russian campaign against U.S. missile defenses at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin explicitly warned that, unless deterred by the Soviet nuclear force, the U.S. military “hyperpower” would be free to impose its unilateral will on other countries without fear of effective military retaliation. Major General Chen Zhou, of the PLA Academy of Military Science, claims that “the US has been using missile defense systems as one of its effective measures to break the global strategic balance” by undermining a key source of China’s power. Both Beijing and Moscow fear that the United States is using missile defenses to widen and deepen security alliances designed to contain China’s and Russia’s influence. Russians oppose U.S. BMD deployments in eastern Europe and perhaps the South Caucasus, seeing them as a way of strengthening and extending NATO, while Chinese oppose U.S. BMD cooperation with Japan and potentiallly South Korea and Taiwan, seeing them as a means for Washington to strengthen cross-links between its bilateral alliances. In order to decrease the vulnerability of its ballistic missiles to a U.S. first strike, Russia and China have expended considerable resources to develop and deploy mobile missiles as well as submarine-launched missiles. These passive defenses can decrease the ability of the United States to destroy Russia’s and China’s missiles before they have been launched, but these systems would become vulnerable to effective adversary BMD systems. The Chinese media has explicitly argued that Beijing should learn from what Moscow has been doing to oppose U.S. BMD deployments in Europe. A 2010 Guanghzou Daily article quotes Ni Lexiong, an expert on military

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issues at the Shanghai Institute of Political Science and Law, that, "The US anti-missile system in China's neighborhood is a replica of its strategy in Eastern Europe against Russia.” But the Chinese also see U.S. missile defenses as at least partly designed to negate the PLA’s anti-access/area denial strategy. China’s missiles, armed with conventional warheads, are designed to to keep the U.S. military from intervening in a conflict between China and one of its neighbors. Unlike Moscow, Beijing has adamantly refused to constrain its missile arsenal by, for example, rejecting suggestions that China accede to the Russia-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which exclusively prohibits these two countries from having ballistic or cruise missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers. The PLA’s missiles include short-range systems to discourage Taiwan’s independence and deter U.S. and other adversary militaries near China; medium-range missiles to consolidate Beijing’s influence in East Asia; and long-range missiles to deter the United States from interfering in Chinese efforts to achieve these first two objectives. In addition, China continues to rely on its missile technology exports to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and other states to gain money and diplomatic influence. Conversely, Beijing has adopted a much less threatening tone in its response to U.S. BMD initiatives than Moscow. The Chinese may have benefitted by seeing how shrill Russian threats to launch preemptive strikes against Poland, Ukraine, and other countries hosting U.S. BMD sites have only alarmed Russia’s neighbors into tightening their mutual defense ties. In contrast, Chinese officials have not threatened to attack Japan, India, or South Korea to discourage them from supporting Washington’s BMD policies, which could drive these countries closer to the United States and increase the risks of collective containment of Beijing. Unlike in Europe, where the U.S. BMD program has been adopted by NATO as a collective alliance initiative, the U.S. BMD initiatives in Asia (and the Middle East) are proceeding thus far almost exclusively on a bilateral basis. Furthermore, the Chinese seem more optimistic than their Russian counterparts that they can develop their own sophisticated BMD-penetration aids or missile defenses. Unlike Russian officials who characterize all national missile defense programs as potentially destabilizing, the Chinese simply urge caution in the development and deployment of BMD systems, suggesting that Beijing wants to defend its own incipient missile defense program. Although China’s nuclear arsenal could more easily be neutralized by emerging U.S. missile defense systems than Russia’s larger fleet of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, PRC officials have declined to pursue Russian probes about greater cooperation in this area. Chinese and Russian representatives have thus far largely limited their BMD efforts to issuing joint declarations, though Russia has in principle decided to sell advanced S-400 air defense systems to China that have some missile defense capacities. Chinese analysts have informally explained that they are weighing the value of working with Russia, but are concerned that Moscow might, as Beijing believes occured in 2001, abandon China to reach a separate agreement with the United States on the issue. They also worry that, unlike Russia, China lacks any missile defense assets they could offer the United States in return for BMD cooperation. Whether in collaboration with Russia or alone, China is likely to continue to seek its own BMD capabilities. Beijing followed Washington and Moscow in developing its own nuclear weapons in the1960s, an anti-satellite

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weapon in the past decade, and most recently claims to have tested its own incipient BMD system in 2010. Chinese experts have confirmed that they are debating whether to develop BMD systems as well. Analysis of PRC technical writings show extensive interest in developing passive and active countermeasures to BMD as well as more recently China’s own anti-satellite and BMD capabilities. But more cooperative BMD collaboration between China and the United States (and Russia) is also possible. Like their Russian counterparts, China’s authoritarian leaders can more easily overcome domestic or legislative objections to making major concessions on the missile defense issue than can President Obama. PRC analysts should recognize that China’s expanding offensive nuclear capabilities are making it more difficult for Russia and the United States to agree to further reduce their own strategic forces, which can inflict much more damage on China than any U.S. missile shield. Similarly, the Chinese military buildup is encouraging influential Japanese, South Koreans, and Taiwanese to develop their own matching long-range strike weapons as well as more advanced defensive systems.

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DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia) August 27, 2012 UMBRELLA FROM CHINA: Polina Khimshiashvili, Alexei Nikolsky Source: Vedomosti, 24.08.2012, p. 2 The Pentagon intends to deploy a missile-defense system in Asia, in fact aimed against China. This may revive the Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation. According to 'The Wall Street Journal' citing U.S. officials, the United States are planning to expand missile-defense system in Asia to counter the threat from China. They are planning to install two X-band radars. One of the radars may be installed in several months on an island in the South of Japan. The place for the second one is still under consideration, one of the sites in the Philippines is discussed. According to the edition, the strengthening of the ABM system in the Asia-Pacific region is a part of the strategy of the Obama administration announced by the military doctrine of 2010. Military strategists, writes the WSJ, are concerned about threats from North Korea, as well as the growing aggression of China to its neighbors with which Beijing has territorial disputes.(...) The Chinese Ministry of defense does not comment directly on these plans of the United States. However, it issued a cautionary note on Thursday in which it called on any of the players not to violate the global strategic stability. A x-band radar was already installed in the North of Japan in 2006. According to current and former U.S. officials, the planned system of radars will review not only the whole territory of North Korea but also look deep into China. In addition to the new radar, the United States are also planning to increase the number of Marines at the base in Okinawa from 15 000 to 19 000-strong, as well as to increase the warships of the US Navy with ABM on board in this region by almost half the number. Jeffrey Lewis of the Monterey Institute of International Studies indicates that the addition of new radars will allow the US to take control of the air-space over Taiwan. This cannot but stir concern in China. Hildreth said that the United States are laying the foundations for a regional ABM system which can be a combination of the American system with the systems of Japan, South Korea and Australia. China has a huge arsenal of medium and shorter-range ballistic missiles, says Vasily Kashin from the Centre for analysis of strategies and technologies. These missiles are regarded by the Chinese as an asymmetrical response to the American technological superiority and play an extremely important role in Chinese military strategy. Yesterday the ISH Jane's Defence Weekly reported on the June successful Chinese testing of the DF-41 missiles which are capable of reaching any point on the territory of the United States. The need for an efficient means of suppression of the missile-defense system may cause activation of the cooperation of China with Russia on subjects of strike aircraft and aircraft high-precision means of destruction, believes Kashin.

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