Civ 2 Notes- Atty. Uribe

8/21/2019 Civ 2 Notes- Atty. Uribe

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Amen | Compiled Notes

Civil Law Review 2

NOTES

I. OBLIGATIONS

A. In General

1. Definition

Art. 1156. An obliation

is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.

Note!"

What is the definition of an obliation# It is best defined by Arias Ramos which reads as

follows, “an OBLIGATION i! a $%ri&i'al relation w(ereb) a *er!on +'alle& t(e 're&itor,

-a) &e-an& fro- anot(er +'alle& t(e &ebtor, t(e ob!ervan'e of a &eter-inate 'on&%'t

an& in 'a!e of brea'( -a) obtain !ati!fa'tion fro- t(e a!!et! of t(e latter/. This meansthat where there is a right or power to demand, there is a correlative obligation or animposition upon a person of a definite conduct.

What are the elements of obligation? It has four definite elements as follows:

1. an active subject, who has the power to demand the prestation, known as theoblige or creditor;

2. a passive subject, who is bound to perform the prestation, known as the obligor or debtor;

a. These two, the active and passive subjects are considered as the personalelements of an obligation.

b. They could be an individual person or juridical persons.

c. They must be determinable in some manner. Exceptions are the following

examples !"# negotiable instrument payable to bearer, !$# promise of a pri%e or a reward for anyone performing a certain act.

3. an object or the prestation;a. This may pertain not to a thing but to a particular conduct of the debtor&

hence, a prestation which may consist in ivin (prestation consists in thedelivery of a movable or immovable thing) or &oin (all kinds of services)

or not &oin (abstaining from some act, may include not to give)

something, e.g. it is not the thing which the vendor must deliver, but the

necessary conduct to produce the effects of the sale that is the obect!

"! the efficient cause or the juridical tie (vinculum juris) between the two subjects b

reason of which the debtor is bound in favor of the creditor to perform the prestation!

a. This pertains to the juridical or legal tie, which is the vinculum, that may

either be a relation established by the followingi! 'aw !relation to give support)

ii! (ilateral acts (contracts giving rise to obligation)iii! )nilateral acts (crimes and #uasi$delict)

** All the above + elements are agreed upon by commentators as essential elements. Thefollowing two are being debated.

!i# ausa debendi- obligationes !astan# This is what ma/es the obligation demandable. This

is the proximate why of an obligation.

!ii# 0orm 1 This is controversial. This is acceptable only if form means some manifestation ofthe intent of the parties.

What are the re2uisites of a prestation?%! must be possible, physically and juridically&&! must be determinable or at least determinable according to pre1established elements or

criteria& and

'! must have a possible e2uivalent in money (need not be for one of the parties becauseit could be for the benefit of third persons t(e 'riterion to &eter-ine w(et(er t(e

obliation (a! a *e'%niar) val%e i! not li-ite& to t(e ob$e't or *re!tation t(ereof

b%t e0ten&! to t(e !an'tion w(i'( 'orre!*on&! to t(e $%ri&i'al &%t) this is

differentiated with creditors interest because the latter need not be economic or

patrimonial since it may be sentimental or ideal but the obect of prestation must have

an economic value or in case of nonfulfillment, be susceptible of substitution in money

or something of patrimonial value)

3ow will you distinguish an obliation from nat%ral obliation!# *ince the definition aboveonly refers to the civil obligation or those which give a right of action to compel their

performance, the same will not include the natural obligation, which are those which cannot beenforced by court action but which are binding on the party who makes them, in conscience and

according to e#uity and natural ustice! The differences between the two include the following%! !ivil obligations derive their binding force from positive law while "atural

obligations derive their binding effect from e#uity and natural ustice&! !ivil obligations can be enforced by court action or the coercive power of public

authority while the fulfillment of "atural obligations cannot be compelled by court action but depends e+clusively f rom conscience!

A''or&in to Balane (oo/ 45 starts w- an inaccuracy. 4t gives the impression that obligations6 contracts are of the same status, w-c they are not. A contract is only one of the sources of

obligations. (oo/ 45 should have been simply titled 78bligations.7Et)-olo) two 'atin words, ligare, meaning 7to bind7

6 ob w-c is a proposition used to intensify a verb.'iterally obligare means 7to bin& !e'%rel).73ence, a better definition would be that, An obligation is a uridical relation (because there are& parties) whereby a person should engage or refrain fr! engaging in a certain activity for the

satisfaction of the private interests of another, who in case of non$fulfillment of such duty may

obtain from the patrimony of the former through proper udicial proceedings the very prestation

due or in default thereof, the economic e#uivalent (damages) that it represents! (#ia$ %iero)

haracteristics of an 8bligation". 4t represents an exclusively private interest

$. 4t creates ties that are by nature transitory9. 4t involves the power to ma/e the juridical tie effective in case of non1fulfillment

through an economic e2uivalent obtained from the debtor:s patrimony.

E!!ential Ele-ent! of an Obliation"

+1, &ctive 'ubject This refers to the creditor or the obligee.


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A 're&itor generally used in an obligation to give

while obliee is used in an obligation to do

+2, %assive 'ubject This refers to the debtor or the obligor. &ebtor is used in an obligation to give

while oblior is used in an obligation to do

The first two elements must be &eter-inate or &eter-inable. The following are possiblecombinations

(oth parties are determined at the time of the execution of the obligation.

one party is determined at the constitution of the obligation 6 the other to be

determined subse2uently in accordance with a criteria that is previously

established. the subject is determined in accordance with his relation to a thing 6 therefore it

changes where the thing passes from one person to another. This is a *ro*ert)3

lin4e& obliation.

+, bject of the obligation $ the conduct or activity that must be observed by the debtor, this isalways an activity or conduct, the *re!tation.

Re%i!ite! of an ob$e't"

4t must be licit.

4t must be possible.

4t must be determinate or determinable.

4t must have pecuniary value so that if not performed it is converted into damages.

+7, inculum juris1 the legal tie, whereby upon default or refusal of the debtor to perform, the

creditor can go to court. When a person says 74 promise to pay you when 4 li/e to,7 there is no

obligation here because there is no vinculum uris! 8%ri&i'al tie the efficient cause established by the various sources of

OBLIGATIONS ; by virtue of which the debtor is bound in favor of the creditor to performthe prestation.

Effi'ient 'a%!e 9 vinculum may either be relation established by". 'aw !e.g. marital relation giving rise to OBLIGATION for support&$. (ilateral acts !e.g. contracts give rise to the OBLIGATION! stipulated

therein#9. )nilateral acts !e.g. crimes and 2uasi1delicts#

** All the above 9-+ elements are agreed upon by commentators as essential elements. Thefollowing two are being debated.

+i, !ausa debendi* obligationes +Ca!tan, This is what ma/es the obligationdemandable. This is the proximate why of an obligation.

+ii, +orm 1 This is controversial. This is acceptable only if form means somemanifestation of the intent of the parties.

TOLENTINO"

OBLIGATION :to ive/ prestation consists in the delivery of a movable or an immovable

thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for possession, or to returnto its owner& e.g. OBLIGATION to deliver the thing in a contract of sale, deposit, lease,antichresis, pledge and donation.

OBLIGATION :to &o/ including all /inds of wor4 or !ervi'e!. E.g. contract of

employment or professional services.

OBLIGATION :not to &o/ consists in abstaining from some act, e.g. duty not to create anuisance&

Re%i!ite! of a *re!tation"

". it must be possible, physically and juridically

$. it must be determinate, or at least determinable& and9. it must have a positive e2uivalent in money. !susceptible of pecuniary appreciation#

;o!itive Law valid legal laws enacted by the legislative department&

Nat%ral OBLIGATION not sanctioned by any action but have a relative juridicaleffect&

do not grant the right of action to enforce their performance but after

voluntary fulfillment by their obligor, they authori%e the retention of what

has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof !Arti'le 172#&

2. EN=ORCEABILIT?

+a, NAT@RAL OBLIGATIONS

!Arts. "+$9 "+9


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@atio (ecause a minor at such age is deemed to have sufficient mental and moral developmentto be aware of his debt of conscience. This is basically independent on the next provision on

Arti'le 172 below.

Ill%!tration!"

". A filed an action to compel ( to fulfill the latters obligation to the former, will the action

prosper? =ot necessarily because in natural obligations no court action can compel

performance because it is an action based on e2uity, conscience and natural justice. =atural

obligations are midway between civil obligations and the purely moral obligations. 4n order

that there may be a natural obligation, there must exist a juridical tie !vinculum juris# which

is not prohibited by law and which in itself could give a cause of action, but because of some

special circumstances is actually without such legal sanction or means of enforcing

compliance by invo/ing the intervention of the court.

asis: Art! %"&' -bligations are civil or natural! .ivil obligations give a right of action to

compel their performance! /atural obligations, not being based on positive law but on e#uity

performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authori0e the retention of

what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof! *ome natural obligations are set

forth in the following articles!

Arti'le 172. When a minor between " and $" years of age, who has entered into a contract without the

consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillmentof the obligation, there shall be no ri(t to re'over t(e !a-e fro- t(e obliee w(o (a! !*ent or 'on!%-e&it in oo& fait(.

Note" 4t is not the voluntary payment that prevents recovery under this article, but the fact thatthe obligee has consumed or spent the thing or money in B88C 0A4T3. Although it is true that

the contract can be annulled, but until it is so annulled, it e0i!t! a! a 'ivil obliation.Beneral rule )pon the annulment of the contract, the party who contracted with the minor mustreturn whatever he may have received under the contract.Exception 4f the payment was made although by the minor, but the thing or money paid was

consumed or spent in good faith (belief that the debtor has the capacity to deliver the obectmust e+ist at the time that the thing was consumed or money was spent can be recovered still by

the debtor if the good faith, even if it e+isted at the time of the delivery, has ceased to e+ist at the

time of consumption or spending).

4s the thing here always have to be consummable? /o, because although non$consummable, thedebtor cannot recover, if the think is no longer in the possession of the creditor who has acted in

good faith, either he has alienated it or it has been lost, without his fault!

Arti'le 172. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed, the defendant voluntarily performsthe obligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the payment of the value of theservice he has rendered.

Arti'le 172. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding the value of the property which he received by will or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the deceased, the paymentis valid 6 cannot be rescinded by the payer.

Arti'le 17. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance with the formali1ties re2uired by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the deceased, pays alegacy in compliance with a clause in the defective will, the payment is effective 6 irrevocable.

Note" This article includes ever licit obligation which is unenforceable because of the lac/ of proper formalities.

&rticle 1-! If the borrower pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of this.ode concerning solutio indebiti, or natural obligations, shall be applied, as the case may be!

&rticle 1/- ! /o interest shall be due unless it has been e+pressly stipulated in writing!

Why would this =atural 8bligation be allowed in our jurisdiction? Itr It is because e#uality,morality and natural ustice as the foundations of a positive law makes wisdom to this

obligation so as the so$called moral obligation!

What is the basis of natural obligation? It is from the nature of man and of things, as well as from law and reason, there arises a natural law, which is immutable and independent of all

human regulations as sometimes called as rational law.What are the types of obligations?

In uridical science, four tpes of which include the following:". 1oral obligation$ duties of conscience completely outside of the field of law$. /atural obligation$ not sanctioned by any action but have relative juridical effect

9. .ivil obligation$ juridical obligations which apparently in conformity with positivelaw but are contrary to juridical principles and susceptible of being annulled

+. 1i+ed obligation$ have full juridical effect 2owever, urisprudence makes only two classifications, as follows:

%! /atural obligation

&! .ivil obligation

Re%i!ite! of Nat%ral OBLIGATION"

%! there is a juridical tie between two persons !distinguishes it from moral obligation)&! the tie is not given effect by law (distinguishes it from civil obligation)

an OBLIGATION without a sanction, susceptible of voluntary

performance, but not through compulsion by legal means.

Fol%ntar) f%lfill-ent may be understood as spontaneous, free from fraud or coercion or it may be understood as meaning without /nowledge or free from error&

1with /nowledge that he cannot be compelled to pay OBLIGATIONRATIO" Dreputation !clan#

3this is being distinguished from payment by mista/e ! solution indebiti) whichconstitutes 2uasi1contract because payment by mista/e is not voluntary and hence may

be recovered.

3 payment here is voluntary when the debtor /new of the obligation to be a natural one.

Ca!e" An!a) v!. National Develo*-ent Co-*an)

=a't!" 8n Fuly $G, "HGI, appellants filed against appellees in the ourt of 0irst 4nstance of Janila acomplaint praying for a $


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t is thus readil seen that an element of natural obligation bef ore it can be cogni$able b the court isvoluntar fulfillment b the obligor. !ertainl retention can be ordered but onl after there has been

voluntar performance. ut here there has been no voluntar performance. n fact, the court cannot order the performance.

At this point, we would li/e to reiterate what we said in the case of 3hilippine 4ducation .o! vs! .IR and the 5nion of 3hilippine 4ducation .o!, 4mployees (/56) !H$ Lhil., 9"& + 8ff. Ba%., G$M# N x x x x x x x x x=ro- t(e leal *oint of view a bon%! i! not a &e-an&able an& enfor'eable obliation. It i! !o w(en it

i! -a&e a *art of t(e wae or !alar) 'o-*en!ation.

And while it is true that the subse2uent case of 2! 4! 2eacock vs! /ational 6abor 5nion, et al!, 78 3hil!,

88' 89 -ff! a0!, "&8', we stated that ven if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salar or compensation of anemploee, the same ma nevertheless, be granted on e4uitable consideration as when it was given in the

past, though withheld in succeeding two ears from low salaried emploees due to salar increases.

still the facts in said ea'o'4 'a!e are not t(e !a-e a! in t(e in!tant one , and hence the ruling appliedin said case cannot be considered in the present action.

What are imperfect and perfect obligations? %erfect obligation is one where there is adetermination of the creditor, debtor and the nature and value of the obligation while

imperfect obligation has no determination of those above!What is its implication to natural obligation? 3erfect obligation is natural obligation in a

sense that all those elements have been determined and it is only the performance that is left to the will of the debtor!

Nat%ral OBLIGATION v!. oral OBLIGATION"Nat%ral

OBLIGATION

oral

OBLIGATION

8%ri&i'al tie Exists =one

;erfor-an'e b)

&ebtor

legal fulfillment of an OBLIGATION

act of pureliberality whichsprings from blood,affection or

benevolence

Ba!i! of e0i!ten'e

of OBLIGATION

Within the domainof law

entirely domain of morals

Enfor'eabilit) The juridical tieitself produces

certain civileffects& True

OBLIGATION

but for certaincauses cannot beenforced by law

moral duty isinexistent in the

juridical point of view

E0a-*le! of nat%ral OBLIGATIONS"

• >upport of a natural child

• 4ndemnification of a woman seduced

• >upport of relatives, by consanguinity or affinity

Ca!e" Fillaroel v!. E!tra&a

=a't!" 8n Jay H, "H"$, Alexandra 0. allao, mother of defendant Fohn 0. 5illarroel, obtained from thespouses Jariano Estrada and >everina a loan of L", everina died too, leaving as theonly heir to the plaintiff (ernardino Estrada. 8n August H, "H9 effe't0rom positive law

from e2uity andnatural justice

Enfor'eabilit)

can be enforced bycourt action or the

coercive power of public authority

cannot be compelled by court action but

depends upon good

conscience of thedebtor

When can you convert a natural obligation to civil one? ;his can made through (%) novation:

(&) confirmation or ratification unless contrary to law, morals or public order!

an you guarantee a natural obligation? In principle, no! because the liability of the guarantor presupposes that there must be a prior e+haustion of the property of the principal debtor, and

that the guarantor after paying can recover from the principal debtor


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!. Example: Dated eb.1 1$$% & promise to pa' ( the amount o 1M signed b' ). To this da' not a single centavo has beenpaid. *hat +ind o obligation is the promissor' note" It may beconsidered as a civil obligation when & demanded in writing thepayment from ' before the action prescribes because written demandwill toll the running of prescription of the obligation. (owever, if therewas no demand, since the obligation is a pure obligation, therefore,demandable at once, the prescriptive period begins to run on feb.),*++, *- years has already lapsed, the action already prescribed, theobligation becomes a natural obligation. &s this promissor' note apure obligation" 'es. hy/ 0ecause there is no period stated in thepromissory note. ,ecause no period is stated in the promissor'note it is a pure obligation" 0y e$press provision of the law, 1ustbecause the parties failed to state the period in the promissory note,does not necessarily mean that it pertains to a pure obligation,because from the circumstances it can be inferred that the parties shall2$ the period, if this is promissory note is a contract of loan it ispossible that there is a period. *hat possible contract ma' thepromissor' note be that indeed this ma' pertain to a pureobligation" A contract of sale. -o having said that i thispromissor' note pertains to an obligation ith a periodthereore toda' the obligation in this promissor' note i no

demand as made a natural obligation" Not necessarily, theperiod of prescription shall be counted from the due date where theobligation must be paid. 0ecause if this is with a period, and theagreement is that the obligation should be paid after 2ve years, todaythis is still a civil obligation, the prescriptive period shallcommence to run rom the time the cause o action accrues.

%. &- /ET&- T T3E E(M4E 5 T3E 3E&/ *3 4&D T3EDE,T 5 T3E 5T3E/: ( died his heirs are ,6 ,6 paid to ) 10M 7ve da's ater (8s death ater 9 months thereater theheirs are tr'ing to recover claiming that the estate is onl' !Mcan the heirs recover the value rom )" hey cannot recover if thepayment is voluntary. In natural obligation, if the payer voluntarily

paid, the creditor has the right to retain what has been paid. Theuestion here is that hether or not the pa'ment is voluntar'"&ncidentall' in natural obligation i the pa'er paid ithoutraud threat or an' vitiation being emplo'ed upon the heirsthe pa'ment is voluntar' pa'ment correct" Not necessarily.*hen ill there be pa'ment ithout vitiation 'et the pa'mentis not voluntar'" *hat constitutes voluntar' pa'ment innatural obligation" he payer 3new that he is not compelled to paybut the payer paid, it is a voluntary payment. The more reasonableuestion here is that is there such a person ho is cra;'enough to pa' even i he has no obligation to pa'" 'es, h'ould he do that" Conscience. 4recisely because the obligation isbased on 1ustice 5but this is not possible here in the 4hilippines6. he

more reasonable answer is reputation. ,ut under the acts thepa'ment is voluntar'" Not really, because when they paid it wasonly 7 days after the death of &, by that time normally, they do not3now the estate of the decedent.


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A. Mentioned as one o the essential reuisites is the prestationalso +non as hat" he ob1ect. Thereore it pertains to athing" No. ,ecause" he ob1ect pertains to conduct.

$. nother essential reuisite is the @uridical tie also +non asad vinculum @uris or legal tie or eBcient cause. *hen ouldthere be a @uridical tie hat is its purpose" It binds the party tothe obligation; there is a 1uridical tie when one of the sources of obligation is present. hese sources of obligations, anyone of thembinds the parties. =i3e for instance, law, it is the law that will bind theparties. *hat obligation has no @uridical tie" "oral obligations.

;RESCRI;TION O= ACTIONS

What is Dprescription of actions means? It is also known as the limitation of actions whichrefers to the time within which an action may be brought, or some act done, to preserve a

right!

What are D>tatutes of 'imitation? ;hese are the acts limiting the time within which actions

shall be brought! ;hey do not confer any right of action but are enacted to restrict the period

within which the right might be asserted! ;hey can be available as defenses but not matters of

substantive right! ;he purpose is to protect the diligent and vigilant not those who sleep on

their rights! ;hey are statutes of repose, the obect of which is to suppress fraudulent and stale

claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost or the facts have become

obscure from the lapse of time or the defect memory or death or removal of witnesses! ;hese

contemplate civil actions not criminal actions!

What is the difference between laches and prescription? 6aches is concerned with the effect of

delay while prescription is concerned with the fact of delay! 6aches is principally the #uestion

of ine#uity of permitting a claim to be enforced while prescription is a matter of time! 6aches

applies to e#uity while prescription is statutory=law!

Arti'le 11. Actions prescribed by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.

Note" 0or example, in computing the prescriptive period if it is a leap year, 0ebruary $ and$H are two separate days.

What is the effect of lapse of time? It has the effect of e+tinguishing the action! 2owever, thisto be availed of as a defense should be pleaded in the answer! T(e ri(t of *re!'ri*tion

(owever 'an be waive& or reno%n'e&. 4t is deemed waived if not timely raised or pleaded before or during trial. Exception if it is apparent in the pleading itself.

Ca!e" Develo*-ent Ban4 of t (e ;(ili**ine! v!. S*o%!e! ;atri'io Confe!!or

=a't!" 8n 0ebruary "here, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises to pay it after the same has

prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the benefit of prescription! T(i! i! not a -ere 'a!e of a'4nowle&-ent of a &ebt t(at (a! *re!'ribe& b%t a new *ro-i!e to *a) t(e

&ebt. T(e 'on!i&eration of t(e new *ro-i!!or) note i! t(e *re3e0i!tin obliation %n&er t(e fir!t

*ro-i!!or) note. T(e !tat%tor) li-itation bar! t(e re-e&) b%t &oe! not &i!'(are t(e &ebt.

A new e+press promise to pay a debt barred !!! will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does

not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a ? pre$e+isting debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new the new promise upon this sufficient

consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action!

... 4t is this new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an ac/nowledgement as a legalimplication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the remedy!which by lapse of time had become extinct# and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his originalcontract.)nder Article "IG of the ivil ode, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As suchadministrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conugal

partnership, are chargeable to the conugal partnership! G=o doubt, in this case, respondent onfesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 3ence the conjugal

partnership is liable for this obligation.

Arti'le 117. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe years from the time the possession thereof islost, unless the possessor has ac2uired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to Article""9$ and without prejudice to Articles GGH, "G


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Note" The fact that the mortgage is registered does not ma/e its action to forecloseimprescriptible.

Arti'le 117. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this ode, are not e5tinguished b prescription

". To demand a right of way, regulated in Article I+H&$. To bring action to abate a public or private nuisance.

Note" Also included in the list is that provided for in Article +H+ of the ivil ode whichallows no prescription to run in favor of a co1owner or co1heir against co1owners or co1heirs

so long as he expressly or impliedly recogni%e the co1ownership because the possession of each of the co$owner or co$heir is in the nature of a subsisting trust and considered to be in

the name of the other!

Exception 4t will prescribe if the co1owner or co1heir has possessed the property as exclusiveowner for a period sufficient to ac2uire the property by prescription.

8ther imprescriptible actions

%! Action by the government or a governmental entity&

&! Action for mandamus&'! Action to enforce an express trust as long as the trustee does not repudiate the trust&"! Action to 2uiet title of the property in ones possession&

8! Action or defense to declare a contract or judgment void ab initio@! Action of the registered owner to recover his land.

Arti'le 1177. The following actions must be brought within "< years from the time the right of actionaccrues

". )pon a written contract&$. )pon an obligation created by law& and9. )pon a judgment.

Note" @emember that the action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes

in "< years from the issuance of the title! (ut is fraud has been committed, and this is the basisof action, not implied trust, the action will be barred after four years from the discovery of the

fraudulent act!

Arti'le 1175. The following actions must be commenced within I years". )pon an oral contract&$. )pon a 2uasi1contract.

Arti'le 1176. The following actions must be instituted within + years". )pon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff&$. )pon a tort or 2uasi1delict.*An action based on fraud.

Note" Example of inury to the rights of the plaintiff is when there is an unjustified separationfrom employment. Example of actions of tort or 2uasi1delict is& where real property belongs in

ownership to and over which he was and has always been in possession but by mistake of

the cadastral clerk came to be titled in %7'8 in the name of 6, who had never claimed it and

knew all along that he was not the owner but only had a paper title thereto, never bothered to

disturb the possession of until %7"B when he sought to do so, thereafter filing hisreinvindicatory action to recover the land from in %7"7, the counterclaim for reconveyance

contained in the answer of has been filed within the period to recover on a #uasi$delict!

Arti'le 117. The following actions must be filed within one year". 0or forcible entry and detainer&$. 0or defamation.

Arti'le 117. The limitations of actions mentioned in Articles ""+< to ""+$ and ""++ and ""+M are without prejudice to those specified in other parts of this ode, in the ode of ommerce, and in special laws.

Arti'le 117. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this ode or in other laws must be broughtwithin G years from the time the r ight of action accrues.

Note" The right to collect taxes is imprescriptible.Arti'le 115. The time for prescription for all 4in&! of a'tion!, when there is no special provision whichordains otherwise, shall be counted from the da the ma be brought.

Note" 4t is to be computed from the day on which the corresponding action could have beeninstituted. 4t is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determined the starting point for the computation of the period. T(e *erio& !(o%l& not be -a&e to retroa't to t(e &ate of e0e'%tion of 'ontra't.

The commencement of cause of actions%! losing of windows1 the period of prescription for the action to close must be counted

from the day they were opened.

&! 8bligation to pay upon receipt of an inheritance by the debtor1 from the date of suchreceipt because when the obligation is subect to a suspensive condition, prescriptionbegins to run from the happening of the condition!

'! 8bligation without maturity date or note payable on demand1 from the date of the noteor obligation =8T from demand.

"! )npaid balance of a subscription to shares of a corporation1 from the date of call or demand.

8! Layment of money within a year but with privilege of extension1 from the end of thefirst year.

@! Action based on fraud1 from the discovery of fraud.C! Ouasi1delict1 from the day the 2uasi1delict accrued or was committed.B! Action for partition and reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust1 from the

date of issuance of the original certificate of title because registration is notice to theworld.

7! Leriod to claim inheritance1 until a 9rd person claims a right under such instrument.%9! To set aside simulated written deed of pacto de retro sale1 when the alleged vendees

made /nown their intention by overt acts not to abide by the true agreement =8T fromthe date of execution of contract.

Arti'le 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the enforcement of obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or of theinterest.

Note" This is applicable only when the principal debt is already due. (ut where there exist a past

due mortgage which was recogni%ed by payments of interest, prescription ran only from the past payment of interest.

Arti'le 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a

judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.


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Note" Fudgment will only become final upon the expiration of the period for appeal in the trialcourt. (ut in the > or A, the true judgment is that entered by the .lerk of that .ourt

pursuant to the dispositive portion of its decision! T(e *erio& i! 1 )ear! fro- !%'( entr) or

*erio& %n&er Arti'le 1177.

Arti'le 115. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs fro- t(e &a) t(e *er!on!w(o !(o%l& ren&er t(e !a-e 'ea!e in t(eir f%n'tion!. The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting runs fro- t(e &ate w(en !ai& re!%lt wa! re'oniHe& b) aree-ent of t(e intere!te&*artie!.

Note" The period of prescription begins to run in an action to compel an accounting by a joint

account partner, from the date of the retirement of the members. 0or accounts, the followingrules apply

". 0or mutual current accounts, it begins to run on the date of the last item, no matter how far bac/ the account commenced.

$. 0or simple current open accounts, it begins to run from the date of each particular

item.9. urrent account guaranteed by mortgage executed in a public instrument, it begins

to run from the date of the last payment.+. When the accounting has been made between the parties in their current account

dealings, the right of action, and prescription begins to run on the date when the last balance of prescription was struc/ and =8T when the business relations terminated.

Arti'le 1157. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing hisright is not rec/oned against him.

Note" There is only interruption of the running of prescription when the courts cannot be /ept

open and are not within the reach of the people. The >tatute of 'imitations does not operateagainst the Bovernment. An example of interruption is the destruction of records of the case.

Arti'le 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted +1, w(en t(e) are file& before t(e 'o%rt +2,w(en t(ere i! written e0tra3$%&i'ial &e-an& b) t(e 're&itor! an& +, w(en t(ere i! an) written

a'4nowle&-ent of t(e &ebt b) t(e &ebtor.

Note" 0or the first interruption, it lasts during the pendency of the action and runs anew after the dismissal of the first action to revive judgment. When interruption of action is legallycommenced? It is from the time the complaint is docketed in .ourt! 3ow about if the

prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand? ;he full period for the prescription must bereckoned from the cessation of the interruption!

When there is no suspension in filing of action in court?

%! >hen the plaintiff desist

&! Amendment of the complaint with new or different cause of action

'! /ew or additional defendants

0or the second interruption, it is so because since the extinctive prescription is based on presumed abandonment of a right, it is obvious that the running of the period should be

interrupted when a demand is made by the creditor upon the debtor before the lapse of the period fixed by law, with the burden of proof on the former. 4t must also be written.

0or the third interruption, it is so if the ac/nowledgment is in writing. Coes it always have to be express? /ot so because it can be implied therein, provided it is written and must apply to a particular or specific debt! Examples are the following

". A promise to pay a debt.$. 'isting of mortgage indebtedness by the debtor in his schedule of liabilities filed in

insolvency proceedings.9. >tatement by one of the ma/er of a L= that he supposed he would have to pay it, if the

amount could not be gotten out of the estate of other drawer.+. =otation in the handwriting of the ma/er to the effect that such note was renewed.

* an be made even by a legal representative.4nstances that there is no ac/nowledgment of debt

". Jere offer to compromise a suit upon a supposed debt.

$. Cebtor ac/nowledging receipt of a statement of account but declines to recogni%e thecorrectness of the account being exorbitant.

9. Ac/nowledgment of the obligation after it has already prescribed. There must be anew and positive promise to pay in order to nullify prescription.

+. Lart payment of debt.G. The death of the debtor.

I. The transfer of right to another.M. The institution of criminal action cannot have the effect of interruption the institution

of civil action based on 2uasi1delict.. 8rder to stay execution of judgment.H. onfinement in jail.

What is the effect of ac/nowledgment? It will renew the obligation of the debtor and interrupts

the prescription and make it run only from such acknowledgment! Example, if the decedentma/es a will but invalid as to its form but in there he ac/nowledge the debt in favor of A, the

prescription runs against the claim from the date of the ma/ing of invalid will and =8T from thedate of death.

+b, CIFIL OBLIGATIONS"

Arti'le 115. 8bligations arise from!"# 'aw& !8('4BAT48=> e+ lege#!$# ontracts&!9# Ouasi1contracts&!+# Acts or omissions punished by law& and!G# Ouasi1delicts.

>8)@E> 80 OBLIGATIONS"

1. LA"Arti'le 115. 8bligations derived from law are not presumed. 8nly those expressly determinedin this ode or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the lawwhich establishes them& and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this (oo/.

an aree-ent i! not ne'e!!ar) in or&er t(at a *art) -a) &e-an& fro-

anot(er t(e f%lfill-ent of an OBLIGATION arising from the application

of a law in the circumstances&

Balane" Law a! a !o%r'e of obliation 4t is my opinion that there is an overlap in theenumeration because all obligations arise from law. 'aw is the only source of obligation, in the

ultimate sense. (ut, as a proximate source, there are five sources of obligations. 'aw is both theultimate 6 a proximate source of obligations.

So%r'e! of Obliation! a''or&in to San'(eH Ro-an.

'aw 6 Acts. The latter are further classified, as follows


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(%) licit acts created by concurrence of wills (contracts)

(&) licit acts either voluntary or involuntary without concurrence of wills (#uasi$contract)

(') illicit acts of civil character which are not punishable, voluntary or involuntary (torts D all

damages arising from delay)

(") illicit acts which are voluntary D are punishable by law (crimes)

aviera When the source of the obligation is 'aw, there is no need for an act or omission for theobligation to arise.

A>E Sara&a Or&en De ;re&i'a&ore! Del Santi!-o Ro!ario De =ili*ina! v!. National Co'on%tCor*oration Fune 9A, the same was entrustedto Alien Lroperty ustodian, AL by the )> government. AL too/ possession, control and custody under the Trading with the Enemy Act. AL allowed opra Export Janagement o. to occupy the property for afee. @L (Republic of the 3hilippines# later made representation with AL to use the same property withwarehouse which was repaired by =A88 ! /ational .oconut .orp!) and was leased to Cioscoro >arile.The latter failed to pay rentals on the property. 4n an action to recover possession of the property, the courtnullified the sale to Taiwan Te//osho and cancelled its TT and ordered reversion of title to plaintiff, andright of recovery from =A88 of rentals to the property.ISS@E" W8= =A88 is liable to pay bac/ rentals?ELD" 4f defendant1appellant is liable at all, its obligations must arise from any of the + sources of obligations, namely, law, contract or 2uasi contract, crime, or negligence. !Article "o, aralestopped using Cove 6 started using Tide. 3e was able to consume all 9< wrappers on 0eb. $H,"HHI. 3e then went to Lroctor 6 Bamble !L 6 B# to exchange the 9< Tide wrappers for a

tumbler. (ut L 6 B told arale that their tumblers run out of stoc/. arale contracted a s/inallergy as a result of using Tide in ta/ing a bath. The 2uestion is Coes L 6 B have any obligation

to arale. 4f we loo/ at Article ""GM, this situation does not fall in any of the five sources. >o, we/now have a problem. The Berman ivil ode !(B(# covers this situation. The (B( has a sixthsource of obligation, the Auslobung , which means a %nilateral offer.

2. CONTRACTS"

Article ""GH. 8bligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting

parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Article "9E ;eo*leK! Car In'. v!. Co--an&o Se'%rit) Servi'e Aen') Jay $$, "HM9, 8. Tee(an4ee.=a't!" 8n April G, "HMecurity >ervice Agencys security guard on duty at the premises of Leoples ar 4nc., without authority, consent, approval, /nowledge or orders from Leoples ar and-or ommando >ecurity brought out from the compound a car belonging to a customer and drove said car for a

place or places un/nown, abandoning his post as such security guard, and while so driving, lost control of saidcar, causing the same to fall into a ditch. The customer, Foseph 'uy had to rent another car. Leoples ar incurred actual damages of L, +H."ecurity for reimbursement.I!!%e" W8= ommando security is liable to damages in accordance with provisions of contractel&" ?ES. Llaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer:s car, which had

been entrusted into its custody. Llaintiff therefore was in law justified in ma/ing good such damages andrelying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had

been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant:s security guard in breach of theircontract. As ordained in Article ""GH, ivil ode, 7obligations arising from contracts have the force of law

between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.7Llaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court:s view, that 7under the Buard >erviceontract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant7 N since the customer could not hold defendantto account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant. >uch an approach of telling theadverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency amongothers, could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff:s business, in the same way that defendant:s baselessattempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be expected to have brought itmore business. Worse, the administration of justice is prejudiced, since the court doc/ets are unduly

burdened with unnecessary litigation. %aragraph 0 of the contract, which limits defendant7s liabilit for the amount of loss or damage to an propert of plaintiff to 8%1,. per guard post,8 is b its own terms applicable onl for loss or damage

7through the negligence of its guards ... during the watch hours7 provided that the same is duly reported b y plaintiff within $+ hours of the occurrence and the guard:s negligence is verified after proper investigationwith the attendance of both contracting parties. >aid paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulatedfacts of record, which involve neither property of plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its premises normere negligence of defendant:s security guard on duty.3ere, instead of defendant, through its assigned security guards, complying with its contractual underta/ing7to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, robber, vandalism and all otherunlawful acts of an person or persons,8 defendant:s own guard on duty unlawfully and wrongfully drove


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out of plaintiffs premises a customer:s car, lost control of it on the highway causing it to fall into a ditch,thereby directly causing plaintiff to incur actual damages in the total amount of L,+H."


11/19


among other remedies, that the defendant 8rense be compelled to execute a deed for the transfer andconveyance to the plaintiff company of all the right, title and interest with 8rense had in the property sold,and to pay to the same the rental of the property due from 0ebruary "+, "H"".I!!%e" Whether or not 8rense can be compelled to deliver the property to 3ermanos as premised above.el&" ?ES. 4t having been proven at the trial that he gave his consent to the said sale, it follows that thedefendant conferred verbal, or at least implied, power of agency upon his nephew Curan, who accepted itin the same way by selling the said property. The principal must therefore fulfill all the obligationscontracted by the agent, who acted within the scope of his authority. !ivil ode, arts. "M


12/19


=a't!" 0eli%a A%ul owns a parcel of land. >he married twice in her lifetime& the first, with one (ernabe Adillewith whom she had as an only child, herein defendant @ustico Adille& in her second marriage with one Lrocopio Asejo,her children were herein plaintiffs. >ometime in "H9H, said 0elisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 9rd persons, period of repurchase being 9 years, but she died in "H+$ without being able to redeem and after her death, butduring the period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra1judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother 0elisa with the conse2uence thathe was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that 8T. =o. $""9M in the name of his mother was transferred to hisname, that was in "HGG& that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half1brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs +T(e A!e$o !iblin!,, filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trusteeon an implied trust when he redeemed,1and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, EmeteriaAsejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that.

I!!%e" Whether or not Adille can ac2uire exclusive ownership over the land.el&" NO. 4t is the view of the respondent ourt that the petitioner, in ta/ing over the property, did soeither on behalf of his co1heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under &rticle 2100 of the !ivil !ode, or for his e5clusive benefit, in which case, he is guilt of fraud, andmust act as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, unde r the &rticle 10/- . Theevidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusiveownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co1heirs. e 'annot t(erefore be !ai& to(ave a!!%-e t(e -ere -anae-ent of t(e *ro*ert) aban&one& b) (i! 'o3(eir! t(e !it%ation Arti'le

2177 of t(e Co&e 'onte-*late!. 4n any case, as the respondent ourt itself affirms, the result would bethe same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Lrivate respondents, hisco1heirs.

'. 'olutio indebiti

Arti'le 2157. 4f something is received when there is no right to demand it , and it was unduly

delivered through mista/e, the obligation to return it arises.

SOL@TIO INDEBITI juridical relation which arise whenever person unduly

delivers a thing through or by mista/e of another who has no right to demand it.

ase Do-etila An&re! doing business under the name and stle A IRENEKS EARING A;;AREL/ v!.an%fa't%rer! anover > Tr%!t Cor*oration CA >eptember "G, "HH, 8. Corte!.=a't!" Letitioner, using the business name 74rene:s Wearing Apparel,7 was engaged in the manufacture of ladiesgarments, children:s wear, men:s apparel and linens for local and foreign buyers. Among its foreign buyers was 0acets0unwear, 4nc. !hereinafter referred to as 0AET># of the )nited >tates. 4n the course of the business transaction betweenthe two, 0AET> from time to time remitted certain amounts of money to petitioner in payment for the items it had purchased. >ometime in August "H instructed the 0irst =ational >tate (an/ of =ew Fersey, =ewar/, =ewFersey, ).>.A. !hereinafter referred to as 0=>(# to transfer S" Son! In'. v!. Cit) of anila an& ar'elo Sar-iento a! Cit) Trea!%rer April 9ons, 4nc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling all /inds of furnitureat its factory in Janila. Lursuant to 8rdinance =o. 99I+, Janila assessed from Luyat retail dealers tax whichthe latter paid without protest in the erroneous belief that it was liable therefore. Luyat subse2uently found that itwas exempt from said taxes as provided under 8rdinance =o. 9"I, Luyat claimed for refund.I!!%e" Whether the taxes paid without protest are refundable.el&" ?ES. Appellants do not dispute the fact that appellee1companyis exempted from the payment of thetax in 2uestion.This is manifest from the reply of appellant ity Treasurer stating that sales of manufactured

products at the factory site are not taxable either under the Wholesalers 8rdinance or under the @etailers:8rdinance. With this admission, it would seem clear that the taxes collected from appellee were paid, thru anerror or mista/e, which places said act of payment within the pale of the new ivil ode provision on

solutio indebiti. The appellant ity of Janila, at the very start, notwithstanding the 8rdinance imposing the@etailer:s Tax, had no right to demand payment thereof..7 f something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was undul delivered throughmistake, the obligationto retun it arises8 !Art. $"G+, =#..


13/19


A**elle 'ateori'all) !tate& t(at t(e *a)-ent wa! not vol%ntaril) -a&e +a fa't fo%n& al!o b) t(e

lower 'o%rt,b%t on t(e errono%e! belief t(at t(e) were &%e. @n&er t(i! 'ir'%-!tan'e t(e a-o%nt

*ai& even wit(o%t *rote!t i! re'overable. MIf t(e *a)er wa! in &o%bt w(et(er t(e &ebt wa! &%e (e

-a) re'over if (e *rove! t(at it wa! not &%eM +Art. 2156 NCC,. A**ellee (a& &%l) *rove& t(at ta0e!

were not lawf%ll) &%e. There is, therefore, no doubt that the provisions of solutio indebtiti, the new ivilode, apply to the admitted facts of the case.With all, appellant 2uoted Janresa as saying 7x x x Ce la misma opinion son el >r. >anche% @oman y el>r. Balcon, et cual afirma 2ue si la paga se hi%o por error de derecho, ni existe el cuasi1contrato ni estaobligado a la restitucion el 2ue cobro, aun2ue no se debiera lo 2ue se pago7 !Janresa, Tomo "$, paginasI""1I"$#. This opinion, however, has already lost its persuasiveness, in view of the provisions of the ivil

ode, recogni%ing 7error de derecho7 as a basis for the 2uasi1contract, of solutio indebiti. .8%ament b reason of a mistake in the contruction or application of a doubtful or difficult 4uestion oflaw ma come within the scope of the preceding article8 !Art. $"GGG#..There is no gainsaying the fact that the payments made by appellee was due to a mista/e in theconstruction of a doubtful 2uestion of law.

7. ACTS OR OISSIONS ;@NISED B? LA +DELICT or CRIES but not

Eelony which is limited only to those punished under R3.)

Arti'le 116. 4f a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed athis cost. This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of theobligation. 0urthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.

Balane Cri-e a! a !o%r'e of obliation There are many crimes from which, civil liability

arises in their commission, in addition to the criminal penalty attached to them. This underlinesthe two aspects in a crime one, as an offen!e aain!t t(e !tate, 6 two as an offen!e aain!tt(e vi'ti-. 4t is in the latter case that civil liability is recoverable.

A! far a! 'ri-e i! 'on'erne& 'ivil law i! not 'on'erne& wit( t(e *enal liabilit) b%t

onl) wit( t(e 'ivil liabilit).

;erfor-an'e at &ebtorK! 'o!t non1compliance with 8('4BAT48= to do, creditor may do

it himself or get a 9 rd person at the expense of the debtor&

when 8('4BAT48= to do can only be performed by debtor he cannot compelled to

do so by force, the only remedy is damages&

Arti'le 21. @esponsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirelyseparate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Lenal ode. (utthe plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

TITLE F 3 Civil Liabilit) R;C" CA;TER ONE 3 ;er!on! Civill) Liable for =elonie!

Arti'le 1. .ivil liability of a person guilty of felony! $ Every person criminally liable for afelony is also civilly liable.

CA;TER 2 R;C" (at Civil Liabilit) In'l%&e!P

Arti'le 17. :hat is included in civil liabilit! ? The civil liability established in articles "


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Arti'le 216. :hoever b act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pa for the damage done. 'uch fault or negligence, if there is no

pre>e5isting contractual relation between the parties, is called a 4uasi>delict and is governed b the provisions of this !hapter. (memori$eD)

Arti'le 1162. Obliation! &erive& fro- %a!i3&eli't! !(all be overne& b) t(e *rovi!ion!of C(a*ter 2 Title FII of t(i! Boo4 an& b) !*e'ial law!.

F ;orts is seldom used by *. in this urisdiction, it is broader term for actionable wrong which

may not be negligence, may be malicious tortuous act which is not anymore Guasi elict!

J@ASI3DELICTS the fault or negligence of a person who, by his act or omission

connected or not with, but independent from any contractual relation, causes damageto another person&

The omission to do something which ordinarily reasonable men guided by those

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do& or doing something which prudent and reasonable men would not do.

'iability on Ouasi Celict is based on e2uity, man is responsible not only for acts

conscious and intentional acts but also for his lac/ of foresight, care and diligencewhich may cause harm to another.

ELEENTS"

(%) A duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the inury of

which the latter complains

(&) A failure to perform that duty, and

(') An inury to the plaintiff through such failure!

TEST O= NEGLIGENCE" Would a prudent man, in the position of the person on

who negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonableconse2uence of the course about to be pursued?

contractual , or nelien'e as asource of 8('4BAT48=, J@ASI3DELICT &

Boverned by Arts. $"MI1$"H+

=8 contractual relation at all

!$# !ulpa contractual, or negligence in the performance of a contractual

8('4BAT48=. Boverned by Article 11 !common carrier#, 6 all on contracts

LE@>8=> '4A('E !4JL)TEC-vicarious '4A(4'4TR, $"


15/19


presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, ='%"#&6 '9%==E , which can berebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. !presumption uris tantum,rebuttable#. 4mputed liability in = is not applicable to obliation! ari!in e5 contractu, but only toextra1contractual obligations, or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpaa%iliana and not to culpa contractual .

Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra1contractual or contractual. E0tra3'ontra't%alobliation (a! it! !o%r'e in t(e brea'( or o-i!!ion of t(o!e -%t%al &%tie! w(i'( 'iviliHe& !o'iet)

i-*o!e! %*on it -e-ber!, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of cer tain membersof society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract,

rests upon the fact that in cases of non1contractual obligation it i! t(e wronf%l or nelient a't oro-i!!ion it!elf w(i'( 'reate! t(e vinculum juris whereas in contractual relations the vinculum existsindependently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into thecontractual relation.T(e 'ontra't of &efen&ant to tran!*ort *laintiff 'arrie& wit( it b) i-*li'ation t(e &%t) to 'arr)

(i- in !afet) an& to *rovi&e !afe -ean! of enterin an& leavin it! train! !contract of carriage#. Thatduty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non1performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant:s servants. The railroad company:s defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligentconduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractualobligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, t(e &ire't an& *ro0i-ate 'a%!eof t(e in$%r) !%ffere& b) *laintiff wa! (i! own 'ontrib%tor) nelien'e in failing to wait until the trainhad come to a complete stop before alighting !Do'trine of 'o-*arative nelien'e, Rakes doctrine#. 4f the accident was caused by plaintiff:s own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant:s negligenceand plaintiff:s negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. 4t is,

therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. T(e te!t b) w(i'( to &eter-ine w(et(er t(e *a!!ener (a! been %ilt) of nelien'e

in atte-*tin to ali(t fro- a -ovin railwa) train i! t(at of or&inar) or rea!onable

'are. 4t is to be considered w(et(er an or&inaril) *r%&ent *er!on of t(e ae !e0 an&'on&ition of t(e *a!!ener wo%l& (ave a'te& a! t(e *a!!ener a'te& %n&er t(e

'ir'%-!tan'e! &i!'lo!e& b) t(e evi&en'e. This care has been defined to be, not the care whichmay or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary

prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.7 !Thompson, ommentarieson =egligence, vol. 9, sec. 9 said that the driver can be sued under culpacontractual. This is wrong. The driver cannot be sued as he has no privity of contract with the

passenger.U

CASE DOCTRINE" >here there could still be Guasi elict even when there is contract of

carriage!

A>E Nar'i!o G%tierreH v!. Bonifa'io G%tierreH et al. >eptember $9, "H9", 8. al'ol-.=ACTS 8n 0ebruary $, "H9outh @oad in the municipality of 'asLias, Lrovince of @i%al. The truc/ was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo 5elasco, and was owned by>aturnino orte%. The automobile was being operated by (onifacio Butierre%, a lad " years of age, and wasowned by (onifacio:s father and mother, Jr. and Jrs. Januel Butierre%. At the time of the collision, thefather was not in the car, but the mother, together will several other members of the Butierre% family, sevenin all, were accommodated therein. A passenger in the autobus, by the name of =arc iso Butierre%, was enroute from >an Lablo, 'aguna, to Janila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in

=arciso Butierre% suffering a fracture right leg which re2uired medical attendance for a considerable periodof time, and which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed properly.I!!%e" Whether or not (onifacios father, not present during the incident could be held liable for damages to

=arciso.ELD" The court found both drivers negligent. The owner of the truc/ was made liable for culpa contractual ,under the contract of carriage. The owner of the car was made liable under Article $"tateCri-inal Intent not needed =ecessary

Leal Ba!i! for (road penal law necessary


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liabilit)

Liabilit) for Da-ae! every OC gives rise toliability for damages

there are crimes without civilliability

=or- of Re&re!! reparation for injurysuffered-indemnification-compensation

punishment-fine-imprisonment

J%ant%- of Evi&en'e Lreponderance (eyond reasonable doubt

Co-*ro-i!e can be compromised criminal li ab il ity can never becompromised

REJ@ISITES =OR LIABILIT?" +onus)!"# Wrongful act or omission imputable to the defendant by reason of his fault or

negligence&

!$# Camage or injury proven by the person claiming recovery&!9# A direct causal connection between the negligent act and the injury.

DOCTRINE O= ;ROIATE CA@SE is that which, in natural and continuous

se2uence, unbro/en by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which theresult would not have occurred.

The exemplification by the ourt in one case is simple and explicit& vi% 7!T#he *ro0i-ate

leal 'a%!e is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close

causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediatelyaffecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted under such

circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudentand intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or defaultthat an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.7

Ill%!tration!"1. ?ources o obligations: **7!: re there other sources o

obligations aside rom those provided b' la" No. Art. **7! ise$clusive based on the case of agrada.

2. *ho ma' be considered priv' to the contract" (eirs, successorsin interest.

!. here are certain facts which need not be proven, there is no need toallege such facts because the law presumes the e$istence of a rightand presumes the e$istence of a fact, hence, it is not always true thatwhoever alleges the fact must prove the e$istence of such fact.

%. 6ontracts: 3o ould 'ou +no i there are obligations arisingrom a contract" 0y considering the terms and conditions of contract,by reading the terms and conditions of the contract, you will determinewhether or not there is an obligation arising from such contract.Incidentally, does it mean that there is no stipulation thereorean agreement is not part o the contract" Not necessarily, anobligation may arise even without a stipulation li3e warranty against

eviction. limitation provided b' la as to terms andconditions" It must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy. ,utbeore an obligation arises hat transpires" Negotiation.

-egotiation is initiated b' hat" 89er. During the negotiationthe oferor ithdre the ofer ill there be an obligation" 'es.*hat source" It depends if there is bad faith, if there is negligence onthe part of the o9eror in not communicating as soon as possible thesame is uasiCdelict. If bad faith, Art. *+, )-, and )* I which is la butthe ?6 generall' ould consider the source o obligation as tort.

delict because in negotiorum gestiothere must be abandonment or neglect of the property. Another reasonwhy this is not negotiorum gestio, this falls under the other quasi>contracts. n obligation arising rom uasiCcontract even i theobligor as not un@ustl' enriched or is it reuired that he mustbe un@ustl' enriched i he ill not perorm an obligation underuasiCcontract" ?espite )*), is it possible that in a uasiCcontract there ill be no un@ust enrichment" 'es, read the

provisions on negotiorum gestio, e$pressly provided by law, even if theowner is not enriched or un1ustly enriched, if he has an obligation. &t illappear thereore that the principles behind uasiCcontracts arenot reall' the principle o un@ust enrichment. Thus in othercountries the principle behind this obligations is li+e in the .?.la and uasiCcontracts are considered to all under one sourceonl' implied contracts rom that alone the basis is consentgiven b' the obligor.

#. bought a sac+ o rice rom , 492


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circumstance, such as minority, so i there is exemptingcircumstance there is civil liabilit'" 'es. those enumeratedgenerall' is there civil liabilit'" 'es, hen ill there be no civilliabilit' and hat ill be the basis thereo" uasi>delict, h'not delict" 0ecause there is no conviction. If there is no conviction,there is no civil liability under delict. &n @usti'ing circumstance canthere be civil liabilit'" As a rule no civil liability, e$cept paragraph .

10. Torts culpa acuiliana culpa extra contractual uasi delict:

nder 21#9 is simpl' 5ault or -egligence is there adiference" 'es. 6ulpa extra contractual is a good name oruasi delict" his is outside of the contract, if CBC, quasi delict/ hisdoes not seem right, culpa e$tra contractual, outside of the contract,outside of the contract there are how many sources of obligations,four, necessarily quasi delict/ -o. Can there be negligence in theperformance of an obligation arising from law, 'es, can a gestor benegligent, 'es, but is that negligence quasi delict/ - because it illall under uasiCcontract. The use o the ord torts is critici;edbecause" torts is not the same as quasi>delict, torts is a much broaderterm that quasi delict, because torts include intentional, malicious,while quasi>delict includes negligence only, is this correct" )*! 2rstarticle in quasi>delict, it provides for fault or negligence, it did not

mention negligence only. he ne$t article )*!!, from this article, mayan act be the basis of liability under two sources of obligation, )es. theonl' obligation provided b' la is" (e cannot recover twice. ?o i as able to recover rom one case he ill not have the rightto recover in an' other case correct" )es he upreme Courtheld that he can recover the di9erence if the second award is greaterfor instance in case * *--D Case ) *7-D, he has the right to recover7-D, but not 2


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Balane

• 0rom the time the obligation arises, the creditor has a *er!onal ri(t against the

debtor as to the fruits. (ut he has no real right over them %ntil a't%al &eliver).

• Real ri(t i! a ri(t w(i'( i! enfor'eable aain!t t(e w(ole worl&. 3e has only

the personal right against the debtor with regard to the undelivered fruits.

• This is because of the principle "on nudis pactis, sed traditione, dominia rerum

transferentur !4t is not by mere agreement, but by delivery, is ownershiptransferred.#

• Lersonal right arises from the time the obligation to deliver arises whereas the real

right does not arise until actual delivery.Arti'le! 1165 1163 Re-e&ie! Available to t(e Cre&itor !specific performance, substitute

performance, e2uivalent performance.#

A. In obliation! to give

". A &eter-inate thinga. >pecific performance

b. E2uivalent performance$. A eneri' thing, all remedies are available

B. In an obliation to do -a4e a &i!tin'tion"

4n obligation to do, which is purely personal only e2uivalent performance is available

4n an obligation to do which is not personala. substitute performance

b. e2uivalent performance

Note" In obliation! to &o !*e'ifi' *erfor-an'e i! not available. The reason for this is

that specific performance will give rise to involuntary servitude.

C. Obliation not to do". substitute performance$. e2uivalent performance.

4n all these cases, the creditor has the option of re!ol%tion or re!'i!!ion %n&er Arti'le

111. 4n addition, he can also claim &a-ae!.Arti'le 1277. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one,although the latter may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.4n obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance cannot be substituted by another act or forbearance against the obligee:s will.Arti'le 1275. Dation in *a)-ent, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales.Arti'le 1276. When the obligation consists in the delivery of an indeterminate or generic thing,whose 2uality and circumstances have not been stated, the creditor cannot demand a thing of superior 2uality. =either can the debtor deliver a thing of inferior 2uality. The purpose of theobligation and other circumstances shall be ta/en into consideration.Arti'le 176. A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated or physical segregatedfrom all others of the same class.The re2uisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into, thething is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement

between the partiesArti'le 772. Nat%ral fr%it! are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other

products of animals.

In&%!trial fr%it! are those produced by lands of any /ind through cultivation or labor.Civil fr%it! are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amountof perpetual or life annuities or other similar income

NAT@RE AND E==ECTS O= OBLIGATIONS

OB8ECT O= TE OBLIGATION"

1. to give real OBLIGATION &eter-inate +!*e'ifi', or in&eter-inate +eneri',

2. to &o

. not to &o *er!onal OBLIGATION *o!itive +to &o, or neative +not to &o,

REAL OBLIGATION"

a. DETERINATE OBLIGATION particularly designated from a particular class&;RINCI;AL OBLIGATION to give !to deliver# a determinate thing&ACCESSOR? OBLIGATION exists even when not expressly stipulated&

+1, Arti'le 116 to ta/e care of the thing with proper diligence of a good

father of the family&+2, Arti'le 1167 to deliver the fruits&

!++"# natural - industrial - civil

the 8('4BAT48= to deliver arises only if the creditor is

entitled&+, Arti'le 1166 delivery of the accessions and of the accessories !Art

++E5E@A' things& does not have designation nor physical segregation& @ule re 0ortuitousEvents still apply.

DETERINATION O= DILIGENCE REJ@IRED"

+1, LA e.g. extra ordinary diligence re2uired in ommon carriers

+2, Sti*%lation of ;artie!

+, ;re!%-e&" diligence of a Bood father of the 0amily if none is specified-expressed by lawor agreement.

REAL RIGT is the power by a person over a specific thing, susceptible of being exercised

against the whole world.;ERSONAL RIGT belongs to a person who may demand from another, as a definite

passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation. 0rom the moment the 8('4BAT48= to deliver a determinate thing arises, the

creditors earns a personal right over the thing and its fruits, but only &eliver) ortra&ition transfers ownership that is a real right over the thing against the wholeworld.

0or failure to deliver, the creditors remedy is not reivindicacion but specific

performance.

CA;TER 2" Ri(t of A''e!!ion GENERAL ;ROFISIONSP


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Arti'le 77. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

Documents

Civ 2 Notes- Atty. Uribe