Case Digest of Kasilag vs. RodriguezKASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ [ 69 P 217] - F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA). The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. 

HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874. xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.

The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and

may be the basis of GF. The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties. 

Noveras vs Noveras

SHORT FACTS: David and Leticia are (former Filipino) US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

ISSUE(S): Whether facts in the case give ground to grant a decree of judicial separation of property of the spouses.

HELD: YES. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

RATIO:

1. As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18 Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of

administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.

2. The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated: Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.

3. In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19 Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

4. The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. 20  Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.

5. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted. The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus: Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.

6. Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties. We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise: Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount ofP120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of P1,040,000.00. x x x x Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the

penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. 

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way

Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.

FACTS:

The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.

ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.

ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

RULING: YES.

There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t think I can find the details regarding it in the case… I just saw the one regarding “acknowledgement” between admu and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.

The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one (there no such thing as a judicial easement)

Fabie v. DavidG.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945Ozaeta, J.

FACTS:

Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of Santo Cristo property is the respondent Juan Grey. Litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the owner of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the administration of the houses mentioned in clause 9 of the will referred to above.

In June 1945 Josefa Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer against Ngo Boo Soo (who says that his correct name is Ngo Soo), alleging that the defendant is occupying the premises located at 372-376 Santo Cristo on a month-to month rental payable in advance not later than the 5th of each month; that she is the administratrix and usufructuary of said premises; that the defendant offered to pay P300 monthly rent payable in advance not later than the 5th of every month, beginning the month of April 1945, for the said of premises including the one door which said defendant, without plaintiff’s consent and contrary to their agreement, had subleased to another Chinese, but plaintiff refused, based on the fact that the plaintiff very badly needs the said house to live in, as her house was burned by the Japanese on the occasion of the entry of the American liberators in the City; that defendant was duly notified to leave the said premises, but he refused; and she prayed for judgment of eviction and for unpaid rentals.

The defendant answered alleging that he was and since 1908 had been a tenant of the premises in question, which he was using and had always used principally as a store and secondarily for living quarters; that he was renting it from its owner and administrator Juan Grey; that plaintiff is merely the usufructuary of the income therefrom, and by agreement between her and said owner, her only right as usufructuary of the income is to receive the whole of such income; that she has no right or authority to eject tenants, such right being in the owner and administrator of the house, Juan Grey; that plaintiff has never had possession of said property; that defendant’s lease contract with the owner of the house is for 5-year period, with renewal option at the end of each period, and that his present lease due to expire on December 31, 1945; that on June 1, 1945, defendant made a written offer to plaintiff to compromise and settle the question of the amount of rent to be paid by defendant but said plaintiff rejected the same for no valid reason whatever and instituted the present action; that the reason plaintiff desires to eject defendant from the property is that she wishes to lease the same to other persons

for a higher rent, ignoring the fact that as usufructuary of the income of the property she has no right to lease the property.

ISSUE:

Who is entitled to administer the property subject matter of this case and who should be the tenant?

HELD:

The usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. All the acts of administration — to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums thereon — were by court judgment vested in the usufructuary. The pretension of the respondent Juan Grey that he is the administrator of the property with the right to choose the tenants and to dictate the conditions of the lease is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause of the will, the stipulation of the parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot manage or administer the property after all the acts of management and administration have been vested by the court, with his consent, in the usufructuary. He admitted that before said judgment he had been collecting the rents as agent of the usufructuary under an agreement with the latter. As long as the property is properly conserved and insured he can have no cause for complaint, and his right in that regard is fully protected by the terms of the stipulation and the judgment of the court above mentioned. To permit him to arrogate to himself the privilege to choose the tenant, to dictate the conditions of the lease, and to sue when the lessee fails to comply therewith, would be to place the usufructuary entirely at his mercy. It would place her in the absurd situation of having a certain indisputable right without the power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it.

TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro FraganteCITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal.  His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.  The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant.  Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”.  It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death.  One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”.Kalaw v. RelovaG.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.

2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.

BARTOLOME VS SSSG.R. No. 192531, 12 November 2014

Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome initiated a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, over the death of her son John Colcol (John), who she gave up for adoption, and alleged that she was the sole remaining beneficiary. Previously, John was employed as electrician by Defendant Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. He was covered by the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met an accident on board the vessel wherein steel plates fell on him resulting in his death.

When petitioner filed her claim, the SSS denied it stating that she was no longer the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner herself. On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS ruling through a decision dated 17 March 17 2010 citing Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.

HELD: Petitioner was entitled to receive the claim for death benefits. “Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.

The ECC Rule limiting death benefit claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law. “Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended…” Hence, it was held that “Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase ‘dependent parents’ to refer to ‘legitimate parents.'”

As the law does not define “dependent parents”, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope. Thus, “the term ‘parents’ in the phrase ‘dependent parents’ in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to ‘legitimate parents’ as what the ECC did. The phrase ‘dependent parents’ should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, ‘dependent parents’ are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.

“Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase ‘dependent parents’ to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that ‘in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries.’ Had the lawmakers contemplated ‘dependent parents’ to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not ‘legitimate descendants.’ The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase ‘dependent parents’ was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.”

The law is clear that “the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.”

As a result, it was held that “Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.”

“Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the ‘Social Security Law.’ While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act

of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary – effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.”

In sum, “the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary

Edroso vs. Sablan

1. The reservista’s right over the reserved property is one of ownership.2. The ownership is subject to a resolutory condition, i.e. the existence of reservatarios at the time of the reservista’s death.3. The right of ownership is alienable, but subject to the same resolutory condition.4. The reservista’s right of ownership is registrable.

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy

Constancio SIENES, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.Fidel ESPARCIA, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-12597, March 24, 1961

FACTS:

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando,

Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, an OCT covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco.

Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument and sold the property in question to appellants in consideration of the sum of P800.00. Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952. Said vendees demanded from Paulina and her husband, the surrender of the OCT which was in their possession, the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral, which was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso.

RULING:

As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property.

In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees did not appeal therefrom

FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO

FATS: In 1980 Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his ten children and his widow as heirs. Apolonio III received in partition of the subject property. When the latter died, the said property were inherited by his mother severina, who latter died leaving a will instituting her daughter as her universal heir. The appellants demands from the daughter to deliver their corresponding share in the reservable property but the daughter refused.

HELD: Even if Severina left in her will said property together with her own property to her only daughter, nevertheless, this property had not lost their reservable nature in as much as it originated from the common ancestor of herein appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was transmitted by operation of law to his mother. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property while there are living with the 3rd degree relative of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or fiduciary of the reservable property received. But if afterwards all of such relative die, the said property become free property by operation of law, and is hereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legal succession.

Del Carmen v Spouses Sabordo

FACTS: Sometime in 1961, the spouses Toribio and Eufrocina Suico (Suico spouses), along with several business partners, entered into a business venture by establishing a rice and corn mill at Mandaue City, Cebu. As part of their capital, they obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and to secure the said loan, four parcels of land owned by the Suico spouses, denominated as Lots 506, 512, 513 and 514, and another lot owned by their business partner, Juliana Del Rosario, were mortgaged. Subsequently, the Suico spouses and their business partners failed to pay their loan obligations forcing DBP to foreclose the mortgage. After the Suico spouses and their partners failed to redeem the foreclosed properties, DBP consolidated its ownership over the same. Nonetheless, DBP later allowed the Suico spouses and Reginald and Beatriz Flores (Flores spouses), as substitutes for Juliana Del Rosario, to repurchase the subject lots by way of a conditional sale for the sum of P240,571.00. The Suico and Flores spouses were able to pay the downpayment and the first monthly amortization, but no monthly installments were made thereafter. Threatened with the cancellation of the conditional sale, the Suico and Flores spouses sold their rights over the said properties to herein respondents Restituto and Mima Sabordo, subject to the condition that the latter shall pay the balance of the sale price. On September 3, 1974, respondents and the Suico and Flores spouses executed a supplemental agreement whereby they affirmed that what was actually sold to respondents were Lots 512 and 513, while Lots 506 and 514 were given to them as usufructuaries. DBP approved the sale of rights of the Suico and Flores spouses in favor of herein respondents. Subsequently, respondents were able to repurchase the foreclosed properties of the Suico and Flores spouses.

ISSUE: Whether the judicial deposit complied with the provisions of Art 1256 and 1257

HELD: Petitioner's main contention is that the consignation which she and her co-heirs made was a judicial deposit based on a final judgment and, as such, does not require compliance with the requirements of Articles 125611 and 125712 of the Civil

Code.

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court quotes with approval the discussion of the CA regarding the definition and nature of consignation, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

… consignation [is] the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment, and itgenerally requires a prior tender of payment. It should be distinguished from tender of payment which is the manifestation by the debtor to the creditor of his desire to comply with his obligation, with the offer of immediate performance. Tender is the antecedent of consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the consignation, which is the principal, and from which are derived the immediate consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to make a private settlement before proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. Tender and consignation, where validly made, produces the effect of payment and extinguishes the obligation.13

In the case of  Arzaga v. Rumbaoa,14 which was cited by petitioner in support of his contention, this Court ruled that the deposit made with the court by the plaintiff-appellee in the said case is considered a valid payment of the amount adjudged, even without a prior tender of payment thereof to the defendants-appellants, because the plaintiff-appellee, upon making such deposit, expressly petitioned the court that the defendants-appellees be notified to receive the tender of payment. This Court held that while “[t]he deposit, by itself alone, may not have been sufficient, but with the express terms of the petition, there was full and complete offer of payment made directly to defendants-appellants.”15 In the instant case, however, petitioner and her co-heirs, upon making the deposit with the RTC, did not ask the trial court that respondents be notified to receive the amount that they have deposited. In fact, there was no tender of payment. Instead, what petitioner and her co-heirs prayed for is that respondents and RPB be directed to interplead with one another to determine their alleged respective rights over the consigned amount; that respondents be  likewise directed to substitute the subject lots with other real properties as collateral for their loan with RPB and that RPB be also directed to accept the substitute real properties as collateral for the said loan. Nonetheless, the trial court correctly ruled that interpleader is not the proper remedy because RPB did not make any claim whatsoever over the amount consigned by petitioner and her co-heirs with the court.

In the cases of Del Rosario v. Sandico16 and Salvante v. Cruz,17 likewise cited as authority by petitioner, this Court held that, for a consignation or deposit with the court of an amount due on a judgment to be considered as payment, there must be prior tender  to the judgment creditor who refuses to accept it. The same principle was reiterated in the later case of Pabugais v. Sahijwani.[18  As stated above, tender of payment involves a positive and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal tender currency as payment to the obligee for the former’s obligation and

demanding that the latter accept the same.19 In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA and the RTC that petitioner and her co-heirs failed to make a prior valid tender of payment to respondents.

It is settled that  compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is mandatory.20 Failure to comply strictly with any of the requisites will render the consignation void. One of these requisites is a valid prior tender of payment.21cralawred

Under Article 1256, the only instances where prior tender of payment is excused are: (1) when the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment; (2) when the creditor is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due; (3) when, without just cause, the creditor refuses to give a receipt; (4) when two or more persons claim the same right to collect; and (5) when the title of the obligation has been lost. None of these instances are present in the instant case.  Hence, the fact that the subject lots are in danger of being foreclosed does not excuse petitioner and her co-heirs from tendering payment to respondents, as directed by the court.