Labor1 Digest Part 2

7/29/2019 Labor1 Digest Part 2

1/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 37 - DisiniDMA SHIPPING PHILS INC V CABILLAR

452 SCRA 551CALLEJO, SR; February 28, 2005

NATUREPetition for Review

FACTS- Henry Cabillar was hired by Monsoon, through DMA Shipping,as Chief Officer of the M/V Eagle Moon.- After three (3) months, Cabillar wrote the manager ofMonsoon, requesting for an early repatriation and for hisreliever grounded on the failure of DMA Shipping to give thepromised additional allowance. Monsoon approved an increasein Cabillars wage and the latter withdrew his request forrepatriation.- While the vessel was docked in India, the gantry craneoperators refused to work and demanded for an increase intheir allowance. The master of the M/V Eagle Moon instructedCabillar to talk to the crew members under his immediatesupervision to convince them not to proceed with the intendedstrike and have the matter discussed with the managementwhen the vessel returns to Singapore.

- Instead of talking to the crew members, Cabillar himself joinedthe strike. Monsoon expressed its displeasure on Cabillar forjoining the strike. Nevertheless, Monsoon agreed to thedemands of the striking crew members to avert any furtherlosses.- When the vessel arrived at Singapore, officers of Monsooninformed Cabillar that he has been separated from hisemployment because of the incident in Calcutta.- Cabillar filed a complaint with the POEA against DMA andMonsoon seeking payment for the unexpired portion of hiscontract.- The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor ofCabillar declaring his dismissal as illegal. The NLRC and theCourt of Appeals affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUES1. WON the respondent was dismissed by the petitioner

Monsoon and2. If so, WON his dismissal was for a valid cause3. WON the respondent is entitled to backwages, damages andattorneys fees

HELD1.Petitioner was dismissed.RatioWON the respondent was dismissed or that he resignedas chief officer of the vessel is a question of fact. The laborarbiter ruled that the respondent was dismissed. The NLRC andthe Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners failed to make a clearshowingthat the findings were are arbitrary and bereft of any rationalbasis.Reasoning- The entry in the logbook of the vessel shows that the ship

captain, for and in behalf of the petitioners, dismissed therespondent for joining the strike.- The petitioners failed to adduce documentary evidence toprove their allegation that (1) they and the respondent agreedthat in consideration for the respondents resignation, theywould give him a very good rating (2) they defrayed his planefare back to the Philippines (3) they paid for his hotel bills inSingapore.2. Respondent was dismissed for just cause.RatioUnder their employment contracts, the crew and officersof the vessel bound themselves to follow certain procedures fortheir grievances.Reasoning- The crew and the respondent refused to follow the procedureand stop the strike.

- They may have a valid grievance against the petitioners butthey are bound to follow the procedures set forth in theicontracts of employment to address said grievances.3.Petitioners are to pay indemnity.RatioThe petitioners themselves violated their contracts oemployment with the respondent and the crew because thecaptain of the vessel failed to comply with the disciplinaryprocedures.Reasoning- The respondent was not furnished with any written notice ofany charges against him.- There was no formal investigation of the charges.- Respondent was not furnished with a copy of the writtennotice of the penalty imposed on him.- For such violation, petitioners are liable for moral damages ofor indemnity of P30,000, if the respondent fails to prove suchmoral damages.1 In this case, the respondent failed to provesuch moral damages.Disposition AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners are

ordered to pay P30,000by way of indemnity. The awards for other damages and

attorneys fees are deleted.

UY V BUENO484 SCRA 628

PUNO; March 14, 2006

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

FACTS- Amalia Bueno was the Manager of Countrywide Rural Bank oLa Carota, Inc. (bank hereafter) Marbel Branch. She waverbally and summarily dismissed by Atty. Andrea Uy, interimPresident and Corporate Secretary of the bank, during adepositors' meeting.- Bueno filed a case for illegal dismissal and prayed foreinstatement with full backwages and damages.

ISSUEWON Uy is an officer of the bank, making her soldarily liablewith the corporation for illegal dismissal

HELDNO- The minutes of the depositors' meeting clearly showed that Uywas a mere depositor of the bank. She was only elected asofficer of the Interim Board of Directors craeted by theassociation of depositors with the sole task of rehabilitating thebank (which is under receivership).- There is no evidence that the association of depositors thaelected the interim board was recognized by BSP. Hence, it hadno legal authority to act for the bank.- The act of dismissing Bueno by Uy cannot be deemed as anact as an officer of the bank. Consequently, it cannot be held

that there existed an employer-employee relationship betweenUy and Bueno.- The requirement of employer-employee relationship is

jurisdictional for the provisions of the Labor Code on Postemployment to apply. Since such relationship was noestablished, the labor arbiter never acquired jurisdiction oveUy.Disposition CA decision finding Uy solidarily liable with thebank reversed

CABRERA V NLRC (NATIONAL SERVICECORPORATION, VILLAMOR)

198 SCRA 573

1Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, 442 SCRA 573, Nov. 17, 2004.


2/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 38 - DisiniCRUZ; June 27, 1991

NATUREAppeal from the decision of the NLRC dismissing the complaintfor illegal dismissal by the petitioners on the ground that it iswithout jurisdiction.

FACTS- Dismissed by the National Service Corporation, the petitionerscomplained to the Ministry of Labor and Employment onSeptember 17, 1980. After considering the position papers ofthe parties, the Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioners'reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and the paymentto them of two years back wages and other benefits. 3 Thedecision was appealed to and affirmed by the First Division ofthe NLRC on December 9, 1985, and in due time, the petitionersmoved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This was opposedby NASECO on the ground that it had not been furnished with acopy of the decision, but the opposition was rejected and thepetition was granted. Reconsideration of the order having beendenied, the NASECO appealed to the NLRC, which, through its

Third Division this time, declared itself without jurisdiction anddismissed the case on August 18, 1987. 4 Citing the NHA case,the public respondent held that the NASECO was not covered bythe Labor Code but by Civil Service rules and regulations, beinga government-owned or controlled corporation.

ISSUEWON the National Service Corporation is covered by the LaborCode

HELDYES- The decision in National Housing Corporation v. Juco wasalready overturned by the decision in National ServiceCorporation v. NLRC. The NLRC erred in dismissing thepetitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rulenow is that only government-owned or controlled corporationswith original charters come under the Civil Service. The NASECOhaving been organized under the Corporation Law and not by

virtue of a special legislative charter, its relations with itspersonnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the

jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

GAMUGAMO V PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORTCORP

381 SCRA742DAVIDE JR; May 7, 2002

NATURESpecial Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

FACTS- On January 23,1963, petitioner Cayo Gamogamo wasemployed with the Department of Health as Dental Aide

(wherein he was also promoted to the position of Dentist 1). Heremained employed at the DOH for 14 years until he resignedon November 2, 1977.- On November 9, 1977, petitioner was hired as a companydentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO).Subsequently, respondent PNOC Shipping and Transport Corpacquired and took over the shipping business of LUSTEVECO.Petitioner was among those who opted to be absorbed by therespondent. He continued to work as a company dentist.- ON June 10,1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued amemorandum approving the privatization of PNOC subsidiaries,including respondent pursuant to the provisions of Section III (B)of the Guidelines and Regulations to implement E.O. No. 37.Respondent implemented a Manpower Reduction Program togovern employees whose respective positions have beenclassified as redundant (respondent decreased its operations

and downsized its organization due to lay up and sale of itsvessels.- Sometime in 1995, petitioner requested to be included in thenext retrenchment schedule. However, his request was turneddown because: 1.) he was holding a permanent position 2.) hewas already due for mandatory retirement in April 1995 underhis retirement plan. Eventually petitioner retired after servingrespondent for 17 years and 4 mos. He received a retirementpay which is equivalent to one month pay for every year ofservice and other benefits (P512,524.15)- On August 30,1995, respondents president died and wareplaced by Nemesio Prudente who implemented significancost-saving measures. He ordered that a study on the cost-effect of the retrenchment of employees be conducted (uponmotion of 2 other employees, Dr. Rogelio Buena (companydoctor) and Mrs. Luz C. Reyes (telephone operator) who wereholding permanent/non-redundant positions. These 2employees were retrenched and paid a 2-month separation payfor every year of service under Respondents ManpoweReduction Program.- In view of the action taken by respondent in the retrenchmentof the said 2 employees, petitioner filed a complaint at theNLRC for the full payment of his retirement benefits. Petitioneargued that his service with the DOH should have been included

in the computation of his years of service. Hence, with anaccumulated service of 32 years he should have been paid a 2month pay for every year of service per the retirement plan(and thus should have received at least P1,833,920)- The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioners complaint. On appeahowever, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbite(considering the 14 years of his service to DOH)- Respondent filed with the CA a special civil action focertiorari. CA set aside the judgment of the NLRC. Hencepetitioner filed this petition alleging that 1.) his years of servicewith the DOH must be considered as creditable service for thepurpose of computing his retirement pay 2.) he wasdiscriminated against in the application of the ManpoweReduction Program.

ISSUE

WON, for the purpose of computing an employees retirementpay, prior service rendered in a government agency can betacked in and added to the creditable service later acquired in agovernment-owned and controlled corporation without originacharter.

HELDNO- Petition denied and the appealed decision in CA is affirmed (infavor of respondent)Ratio The Court cannot uphold petitioners contention that his14 years of service with the DOH should be considered becausehis last 2 employers were government-owned and controlledcorporations and fall under the Civil Service Law. Article IX (B)Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states: The civiservice embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalitiesand agencies of the Government, including government owned

or controlled corporations with original charters. Whilerespondent and LUSTEVECO are government-owned andcontrolled corporations, they have no original charters; hencethey are not under the Civil Service LawReasoning- totalization of service credits is only resorted to when theretiree does not qualify for benefits in either of both systems. Inthis case, petitioner is qualified to receive benefits granted bythe GSIS, if such right has not yet been exercised.- It may also be pointed out that upon his receipt of the amountof P512,524.15 from respondent as retirement benefit pursuanto its retirement scheme, petitioner signed and delivered torespondent a release and undertaking wherein he waives alactions, causes of actions, debts, dues, monies and accounts inconnection with his employment with respondent. This


3/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 39 - Disiniquitclaim releases respondent from any other obligation in favorof petitioner.

LIGHT RAILWAY TRANSIT AUTHORITY V VENUS485 SCRA 301

PUNO; March 24, 2006

FACTS- consolidated petitions of Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA)and Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO), seeking thereversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals directing themto reinstate private respondent workers to their formerpositions without loss of seniority and other rights andprivileges, and ordering them to jointly and severally pay thelatter their full back wages, benefits, and moral damages. TheLRTA and METRO were also ordered to jointly and severally payattorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the totalmoney judgment.- Petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlledcorporation created by Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980,as amended, to construct and maintain a light rail transitsystem and provide the commuting public with an efficient,economical, dependable and safe transportation. Petitioner

METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization, Inc., was aqualified transportation corporation duly organized inaccordance with the provisions of the Corporation Code,registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, andexisting under Philippine laws. petitioner LRTA, after a biddingprocess, entered into a ten (10)-year Agreement for theManagement and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail

Transit System from June 8, 1984 until June 8, 1994 withpetitioner METRO.- The Agreement provided, among others, that

4. METRO shall be free to employ such employees andofficers as it shall deem necessary in order to carry out therequirements of [the] Agreement. Such employees andofficers shall be the employees of METRO and not of theAUTHORITY [LRTA]. METRO shall prepare a compensationschedule and the corresponding salaries and fringe benefits

of [its] personnel in consultation with the AUTHORITY [LRTA][par. 3.05];- On July 25, 2000, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with theNational Conciliation and Mediation Board National CapitalRegion against petitioner METRO on account of a deadlock inthe collective bargaining negotiation. On the same day, theUnion struck. They completely paralyzed the operations of theentire light rail transit system. As the strike adversely affectedthe mobility of the commuting public, then Secretary of LaborBienvenido E. Laguesma issued on that same day anassumption of jurisdiction order [3] directing all the strikingemployees to return to work immediately upon receipt of thisOrder and for the Company to accept them back under thesame terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior tothe strike- Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of theassumption of jurisdiction and return to work order, the Unionofficers and members failed to return to work. Thus, effective

July 27, 2000, private respondents, were considered dismissedfrom employment- Workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On October 1,2001, Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores rendered a consolidated

judgment in favor of the private respondent workers- On May 29, 2002, on appeal, the NLRC found that the strikingworkers failed to heed the return to work order and reversedand set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. The suit againstLRTA was dismissed since LRTA is a government-owned andcontrolled corporation created by virtue of Executive Order No.603 with an original charter and it ha[d] no participationwhatsoever with the termination of complainantsemployment. In fine, the cases against the LRTA and METRO

were dismissed, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction and for lackof merit.- On a petition for certiorari however, the Court of Appealsreversed the NLRC and reinstated the Decision rendered by theLabor Arbiter. Public respondent appellate court declared theworkers dismissal as illegal, pierced the veil of separatecorporate personality and held the LRTA and METRO as jointlyliable for back wages.

ISSUEWON LRTA should be held liable for the illegal dismissal oemployees

HELDNO- petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employer-employeerelationship with private respondent workers as they were hiredby petitioner METRO alone pursuant to its ten (10)-yeaAgreement for the Management and Operation of the MetroManila Light Rail Transit System with petitioner METRO. Piercingthe corporate veil of METRO was unwarranted, as there was nocompetent and convincing evidence of any wrongful, fraudulenor unlawful act on the part of METRO, and, more so, on the partof LRTA.

- Petitioner LRTA further contends that it is a governmentowned and controlled corporation with an original charterExecutive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as amended, and thusunder the exclusive jurisdiction only of the Civil ServiceCommission, not the NLRC.- We agree with petitioner LRTA. Section 2 (1), Article IX B1987 Constitution, expressly provides that [t]he civil serviceembraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, andagencies of the Government, including government-owned ocontrolled corporations with original charters. Corporationswith original charters are those which have been created byspecial law and not through the general corporation law.- In Philippine National Oil Company EnergyDevelopment Corporation v. Hon. Leogrado- under thepresent state of the law, the test in determining whether agovernment-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the

Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such thagovernment corporations created by special charter are subjecto its provisions while those incorporated under the generaCorporation Law are not within its coverage.- There should be no dispute then that employment in petitioneLRTA should be governed only by civil service rules, and not theLabor Code and beyond the reach of the Department of Laboand Employment, since petitioner LRTA is a government-ownedand controlled corporation with an original charter, ExecutiveOrder No. 603, Series of 1980- In contrast, petitioner METRO is covered by the Labor Codedespite its later acquisition by petitioner LRTA. In Lumanta vNational Labor Relations Commission, this Court ruled thalabor law claims against government-owned and controlledcorporations without original charter fall within the jurisdictionof the Department of Labor and Employment and not the CiviService Commission

- We therefore hold that the employees of petitioner METROcannot be considered as employees of petitioner LRTA. Theemployees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code andare under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor andEmployment, whereas the employees of petitioner LRTA, agovernment-owned and controlled corporation with originacharter, are covered by civil service rules. Herein privaterespondent workers cannot have the best of two worlds, e.g., beconsidered government employees of petitioner LRTA, yeallowed to strike as private employees under our labor laws.

EBRO III V NLRC (INTERNATIONAL CATHOLICMIGRATION COMMISSION)


4/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 40 - Disini261 SCRA 399

MENDOZA; September 4, 1996

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari to set aside the order datedOctober 13, 1992 and the resolution dated March 3, 1993 of theNational Labor Relations Commission.

FACTS- Private respondent International Catholic MigrationCommission (ICMC) is a non-profit agency engaged ininternational humanitarian and voluntary work. It is dulyregistered with the United National Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. It wasone of the agencies accredited by the Philippine Government tooperate the refugee processing center at Sabang, Morong,Bataan.- On June 24, 1985, private respondent ICMC employedpetitioner Jose G. Ebro III to teach "English as a SecondLanguage and Cultural Orientation Training Program" at therefugee processing center. The employment contract providedin pertinent part:

Salary: Your monthly salary for the first 6 months

probationary period is P3,155.00 inclusive of cost of livingallowance. Upon being made regular after successfulcompletion of the six (6) months probationary period yourmonthly salary will be adjusted to P3,445.00 inclusive of costof living allowanceIf either party wishes to terminate employment, a notice oftwo (2) weeks should be given in writing to the party.

- After six months, ICMC notified petitioner that effectiveDecember 21, 1985, the latter's services were terminated forhis failure to meet the requirements of "1. classroomperformance . . . up to the standards set in the Guide forInstruction; 2. regular attendance in the mandated teachertraining, and in the schedule team meetings, one-on-oneconferences with the supervisor, etc.; and 3. compliance withICMC and PRPC policies and procedures."- On February 4, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint for illegaldismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages,

accrued leave pay, 14th month pay, damages, attorney's fees,and expenses of litigation. Petitioner alleged that there was noobjective evaluation of his performance to warrant his dismissaland that he should have been considered a regular employeefrom the start because ICMC failed to acquaint him with thestandards under which he must qualify as such. He prayed forreinstatement with backwages; P3,155.00 for probationary andP3,445.00 for regular salary adjustments; value of lodging ordormitory privileges; cost of insurance coverage for group life,medical, death, dismemberment and disability benefits; moral,and exemplary, and nominal damages plus interest on theabove claims with attorney's fees.- Answering the complaint, ICMC claimed that petitioner failedto quality for regular employment because he showed nointerest in improving his professional performance both in andout of the classroom after he had been periodically evaluated;

that petitioner was paid his salary up to December 31, 1985,two weeks pay in lieu of notice, and 14th month pay pro-rata;and that his accrued leave balance already been converted tocash.- After the parties had formally offered their evidence, privaterespondents submitted their memorandum on July 31, 1989 inwhich, among other things, they invoked ICMC's diplomaticimmunity on the basis of the Memorandum of Agreementsigned on July 15, 1988 between the Philippines governmentand ICMC.- The Labor Arbiter held that ICMC's legal immunity under theMemorandum could not be given retroactive effect since "[thatwould] deprive complainant's property right without dueprocess and impair the obligation of contract of employment."He also expressed doubt on the ground that it was provided forby agreement and not through an act of Congress. Accordingly,

the Labor Arbiter ordered ICMC to reinstate petitioner asregular teacher without loss of seniority rights and to pay himone year backwages, other benefits, and ten percent attorney'sfees for a total sum of P70,944.85.- Both parties appealed to the NLRC. On August 13, 1990petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's appeabecause of the latter's failure to post a cash/surety bond. In itsorder of October 13, 1992, however, the NLRC ordered the casedismissed on the ground that, under the Memorandum oAgreement between the Philippine government and ICMC, thelatter was immune from suit.

ISSUEWON the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July 15, 1988granted ICMC immunity from suit

HELDYESRatioThe grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC . . is clearly necessitated by their international character andrespective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger opartiality and interference by the host country in their internaworkings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department oLabor in these instances would defeat the very purpose o

immunity, which is to shield the affairs of internationaorganizations, in accordance with international practice, frompolitical pressure or control by the host country to the prejudiceof member State of the organization, and to ensure theunhampered performance of their functions. (InternationaCatholic Migration Commission v. Calleja)Reasoning- The grant of immunity to ICMC is in virtue of the Conventionon the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of theUnited Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly onNovember 21, 1947, and concurred in by the Philippine Senateon May 17, 1949. This Convention has the force and effect olaw, considering that under the Constitution, the Philippineadopts the generally accepted principles of international law aspart of the law of the land.- The scope of immunity of the ICMC contained in the

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations is instructive. Art. III, 4 of theConvention provides for immunity from "every form of legaprocess." Thus, even if private respondents had been servedsummons and subpoenas prior to the execution of theMemorandum, they, as officers of ICMC, can claim immunityunder the same in order to prevent enforcement of an adverse

judgment, since a writ of execution is "a legal process" withinthe meaning of Article III, 4.- Art III 4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities othe Specialized Agencies of the United Nations requires that thewaiver of the privilege must be express. There was no suchwaiver of immunity in this case. Nor can ICMC be estopped fromclaiming diplomatic immunity since estoppel does not operateto confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause ofaction.- Finally, neither can it be said that recognition of ICMC'

immunity from suit deprives petitioner of due process. Aspointed out in ICMC v. Calleja, petitioner is not exactly withoutremedy for whatever violation of rights it may have suffered fothe following reason:Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides tha"each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriatemodes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts oother disputes of private character to which the specializedagency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of theMemorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the PhilippineGovernment, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMCthe Government is free to withdraw the privileges andimmunities accorded.Disposition Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.


5/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 41 - DisiniNATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION V

SAN ILDEFONSO COLLEGE

CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE V CA (NLRC,CALAYLAY, AQUINO, GACUTAN, BELO)

437 SCRA 171

DAVIDE, JR; August 24, 2004

FACTS- In 1992, Ms. Diana Belo, a teacher of Chiang Kai Shek Collegesince 1977, applied for a leave of absence for the school year1992-1993. Upon submitting her application, she was informedof the school policy that if she takes a leave of absence, she isnot assured of a teaching load upon her return. She waslikewise informed that only teachers in active service may enjoythe privilege and benefits provided by the school, such as freetuition for the teachers children.- Ms. Belo, nonetheless, took her leave of absence. In May 1993,she attempted to return to CKSC and signified her readiness toteach for the coming school year. However, she was not allowedto return. Hence, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,among others, against CKSC.

- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but the NLRCdisagreed. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRCs ruling.Hence, this petition.

ISSUEWON private respondent was constructively dismissed

HELDYES- Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, for aprivate school teacher to acquire a permanent status ofemployment and, therefore, be entitled to a security oftenure, the following requisites must concur: (a) theteacher is a full-time teacher; (b) the teacher must haverendered three consecutive years of service; and (c)such service must have been satisfactory. Since Ms. Belohas measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoyssecurity of tenure.- Constructive dismissal is defined as a cessation from workbecause continued employment is rendered impossible,unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or adiminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination,insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable tothe employee.- Ms. Belo was constructively dismissed when the petitioners, inimplementing their policies, effectively barred her fromteaching for the school year 1993-1994. The three policies are(1) the non-assurance of a teaching load to a teacher who tooka leave of absence; (2) the hiring of non-permanent teachers inApril to whom teaching loads were already assigned when Ms.Belo signified in May 1993 her intention to teach; and (3) thenon-applicability to children of teachers on leave of the freetuition fee benefits extended to children of teachers in service.

- Ms. Belo was definitely singled out in the implementation of afuture policy (i.e., the policy that employees not in service arenot entitled to any benefit extended by the school). Thepetitioners did not take heed of the principle enshrined in ourlabor laws that policies should be adequately known to theemployees and uniformly implemented to the body ofemployees as a whole and not in isolation.- The continued employment of Ms. Belo was also renderedunlikely by the insistence of the petitioners in implementing thealleged policy that a teacher who goes on leave for one year isnot assured of a teaching load. While this alleged policy wasmentioned in Mr. Chiens letter of 9 June 1992, it was notincluded in the schools written statement of policies dated 13March 1992. Hence, it was then a non-existent policy. When anon-existent policy is implemented and, in this case, only to Ms.Belo, it constitutes a clear case of discrimination.

- Petitioners invocation of the third policy that of givingteaching assignments to probationary teachers in April to

justify their refusal to provide Ms. Belo a teaching load is a lameexcuse that rings of untruth and dishonesty. Patently clear isthe illegal manner by which the petitioners eased out Ms. Belofrom the teaching corps.- Likewise, we do not find merit in petitioners assertion that theCourt of Appeals should not have passed upon the illegality ofthe school policy of non-assurance of a teaching load, since thealleged illegality was never raised as an issue before therespondent court or in the forums below. As pointed out by theprivate respondent, that policy was part of the defense invokedby the petitioners in the Arbiter level, in the NLRC, and in therespondent court to the charge of illegal dismissal; and, henceit must necessarily be passed upon and scrutinized. Besidesthat policy is intimately intertwined with the main issue owhether Ms. Belo was illegally dismissed.- This case is an exception to the general rule that the factuafindings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are accordedweight and respect on appeal, and even finality. For one thingthe findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contrary toeach other; hence, the reviewing court may delve into therecords and examine for itself the questioned findings.Disposition The Petition is DENIED.

AUSTRIA V NLRC (CENTRAL PHIL. UNION MISSIONCORP. OF THE 7TH-DAY ADVENTIST)

312 SCRA 410KAPUNAN; August 16, 1999

FACTS- Pastor Dionisio Austria worked with the Central PhilippineUnion Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDAfor 28 years from 1963 to 1991. He began his work with theSDA on 15 July 1963 as a literature evangelist, selling literatureof the SDA over the island of Negros. From then on, he workedhis way up the ladder and got promoted several times. In

January, 1968, he became the Assistant Publishing Director inthe West Visayan Mission. In July, 1972, he was elevated to the

position of Pastor covering the island of Panay, and theprovinces of Romblon and Guimaras. He held the same positionup to 1988. Finally, in 1989, he was promoted as District Pastorof the Negros Mission of the SDA and was assigned at Sagay,Balintawak and Toboso, Negros Occidental, with 12 churchesunder his jurisdiction. In January, 1991, he was transferred toBacolod City. He held the position of district pastor until hisservices were terminated on 31 October 1991.- On various occasions from August up to October, 1991Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asked himto admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithesand offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in hisdistrict which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the sameto the Negros Mission. Petitioner reasoned out that he shouldnot be made accountable for the unremitted collections since itwas Pastor Gideon Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to

collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do thecollecting at that time.- On 16 October 1991, petitioner went to the office of PastoBuhat, the president of the Negros Mission. During said callpetitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene theExecutive Committee for the purpose of settling the disputebetween him and Pastor David Rodrigo. The dispute betweenDavid Rodrigo and petitioner arose from an incident in whichpetitioner assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect fromPastor Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the latter'smotor vehicle which he failed to pay to Diamada. Due to theassistance of petitioner in collecting Pastor Rodrigo's debt, thelatter harbored ill-feelings against petitioner. When newreached petitioner that Pastor Rodrigo was about to file acomplaint against him with the Negros Mission, he immediatelyproceeded to the office of Pastor Buhat and asked the latter to


6/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 42 - Disiniconvene the Executive Committee. Pastor Buhat denied therequest of petitioner since some committee members were outof town and there was no quorum. Thereafter, the twoexchanged heated arguments. Petitioner then left the office ofPastor Buhat. While on his way out, petitioner overheard PastorBuhat saying "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pastor you aretalking tough)." Irked by such remark, petitioner returned to theoffice of Pastor Buhat, and tried to overturn the latter's table,though unsuccessfully, since it was heavy. Thereafter,petitioner banged the attache case of Pastor Buhat on the table,scattered the books in his office, and threw the phone.Fortunately, Pastors Yonillo Leopoldo and Claudio Montao werearound and they pacified both.- On 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter inviting himand his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting. FromOctober 21 to 22, the fact-finding committee conducted aninvestigation. Petitioner immediately wrote Pastor RuebenMoralde, president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-findingcommittee, requesting that certain members of the fact-findingcommittee be excluded in the investigation and resolution ofthe case. Out of the 6 members requested to inhibit themselvesfrom the investigation and decision-making, only 2 wereactually excluded: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo.Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing

misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach oftrust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties,and commission of an offense against the person of employer'sduly authorized representative, as grounds for the terminationof his services.

ISSUES1. WON the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try anddecide the complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA2. WON the termination of the services of petitioner is anecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation ofchurch and state3. WON such termination is valid

HELD1. YES and 2. NO [Resolved jointly since they are related]

Ratio An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine,creed or form or worship of the church, or the adoption andenforcement within a religious association of needful laws andregulations for the government of the membership, and thepower of excluding from such associations those deemedunworthy of membership.Reasoning- Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves therelationship between the church and its members and relate tomatters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance ofthe congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-calledecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle areproceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religiousministers, administration of sacraments and other activitieswhich attached religious significance. The case at bar does noteven remotely concern any of the above cited examples. Whilethe matter at hand relates to the church and its religious

minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religioussignificance. Simply stated, what is involved here is therelationship of the church as an employer and the minister asan employee. It is purely secular and has no relationwhatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines ofthe church. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated orexpelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminatedfrom employment.- Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification issued by itsofficer, Ibesate, that petitioner has been its employee for 28years. SDA even registered petitioner with the SSS as itsemployee. The worker's records of petitioner have beensubmitted by private respondents as part of their exhibits. Fromall of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated theservices of petitioner, it was merely exercising its management

prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be unfit forthe job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and theNLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case.- Finally, private respondents are estopped from raising theissue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. Theactive participation of a party coupled with his failure to objecto the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body istantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and awillingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will basaid party from later on impugning the court or body's

jurisdiction.3. NO.Reasoning- The issue being the legality of petitioner's dismissal, the samemust be measured against the requisites for a valid dismissalnamely: (a) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., hemust be given an opportunity to be heard and to defendhimself, and; (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause asprovided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Without theconcurrence of these twin requirements, the termination wouldin the eyes of the law, be illegal.As to Due Process- Article 277(b) of the Labor Code further require the employeto furnish the employee with 2 written notices, to wit: (a) a

written notice served on the employee specifying the ground ogrounds for termination, and giving to said employeereasonable opportunity within which to explain his side, and, (ba written notice of termination served on the employeeindicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstancesgrounds have been established to justify his termination.- The first notice, which may be considered as the propecharge, serves to apprise the employee of the particular acts oomissions for which his dismissal is sought. The second noticeon the other hand seeks to inform the employee of theemployer's decision to dismiss him. This decision, howevermust come only after the employee is given a reasonableperiod from receipt of the first notice within which to answer thecharge and ample opportunity to be heard and defend himselfwith the assistance of a representative, if he so desires. Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are

conditions sine quo non before dismissal may be validlyeffected.- SDA failed to substantially comply with the aboverequirements. With regard to the first notice, the letter dated 17October 1991, which notified petitioner and his wife to attendthe meeting on 21 October 1991, cannot be construed as thewritten charge required by law. A perusal of the said lettereveals that it never categorically stated the particular acts oomissions on which his impending termination was grounded. Infact, the letter never even mentioned that he would be subjectto investigation. The letter merely mentioned that he and hiswife were invited to a meeting wherein what would bediscussed were the alleged unremitted church tithes and theevents that transpired on 16 October 1991. For this reason, icannot be said that petitioner was given enough opportunity toproperly prepare for his defense. While admittedly, SDAcomplied with the second requirement, the notice o

termination, this does not cure the initial defect of lack of theproper written charge required by law.As to Just Cause- Private respondents allege that they have lost their confidencein petitioner for his failure, despite demands, to remit the tithesand offerings which were collected in his district. Settled is therule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the breach oftrust must be willful. A breach is willful if it is done intentionallyknowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, asdistinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlesslyheedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial groundsand not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices orsuspicion, otherwise, the employee would eternally remain athe mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and nosimulated. This ground has never been intended to afford an


7/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 43 - Disinioccasion for abuse, because of its subjective nature. Therecords show that there were only 6 instances when petitionerpersonally collected and received from the church treasurersthe tithes, collections, and donations for the church. Thetestimony of Naomi Geniebla, the Negros Mission ChurchAuditor and a witness for private respondents, show that PastorAustria was able to remit all his collections to the treasurer ofthe Negros Mission. Private respondents try to pin on petitionerthe alleged non-remittance of the tithes collected by his wife. Inthe absence of conspiracy and collusion, which privaterespondents failed to demonstrate, between petitioner and hiswife, he cannot be made accountable for the alleged infractioncommitted by his wife. After all, they still have separate anddistinct personalities. Thus, the allegation of breach of trust hasno leg to stand on.- Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. Itis the transgression of some established and definite rule ofaction, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Formisconduct to be considered serious it must be of such graveand aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.Based on this standard, we believe that the act of petitioner inbanging the attache case on the table, throwing the telephoneand scattering the books in the office of Pastor Buhat, although

improper, cannot be considered as grave enough to beconsidered as serious misconduct. After all, as correctlyobserved by the Labor Arbiter, though petitioner committeddamage to property, he did not physically assault Pastor Buhator any other pastor present during the incident of 16 October1991. In fact, the alleged offense committed upon the person ofthe employer's representatives was never really established orproven by private respondents. Hence, there is no basis for theallegation that petitioner's act constituted serious misconductor that the same was an offense against the person of theemployer's duly authorized representative.- The final ground alleged by private respondents, gross andhabitual neglect of duties, does not requires an exhaustivediscussion. All private respondents had were allegations but notproof. Aside from merely citing the said ground, privaterespondents failed to prove culpability. In fact, the evidence on

record shows otherwise. Petitioner's rise from the ranks provesthat he was actually a hard-worker. Private respondents'evidence, which consisted of petitioner's Worker's Reports,revealed how petitioner travelled to different churches to attendto the faithful under his care. Indeed, he labored hard for theSDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a dismissal from theservice for a non-existent cause.Disposition Finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner wasterminated from service without just or lawful cause isSUSTAINED. Petitioner is entitled to reinstatement without lossof seniority right and the payment of full back-wages withoutany deduction corresponding to the period from his illegaldismissal up to the actual reinstatement. Challenged Resolutionof NLRC is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

PEARANDA V BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORP

[PAGE 1]

CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION V CLAVE141 SCRA 9

DE LA FUENTE; January 7, 1986

NATUREPetition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside thedecision of the respondent Presidential Executive Assistant

FACTS- Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Unionlodged a complaint with the Department of Labor, againstComtrust Bank for non-payment of the holiday pay benefits

provided for under Art 95 of the Labor Code in relation to RuleX, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LaboCode.- Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation levelthe parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntaryarbitration. The issue presented was: "Whether the permanentemployees of the Bank within the collective bargaining unit paidon a monthly basis are entitled to holiday pay effectiveNovember 1, 1974, pursuant to Article 95 (now Article 94) ofthe Labor Code, as amended and Rule X (now Rule IV), Book IIof the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. "- In addition, the disputants signed a Submission Agreemenstipulating as final, unappealable and executory the decision othe Arbitrator, including subsequent issuances for clarificatoryand/or relief purposes, notwithstanding Article 262 of the LaboCode.- In the course of the hearing, the Arbitrator apprised theparties of an interpretative bulletin on "holiday pay" about to beissued by the Department of Labor.- The Union filed a Manifestation stating that in the event thasaid Interpretative Bulletin regarding holiday pay would beadverse to the present claim union respectfully reserves theright to take such action as may be appropriate to protect itsinterests, a question of law being involved. An Interpretative

Bulletin which was inexistent at the time the said commitmentwas made and which may be contrary to the law itself shouldnot bar the right of the union to claim for its holiday paybenefits- Voluntary Arbitrator stated that, there is more reason tobelieve that, if the Bank has never made any deduction from itsmonthly-paid employees for unworked Saturdays, Sundayslegal and special holidays, it is because there is really nothingto deduct properly since the monthly, salary never reallyincluded pay for such unworked days-and which give credenceto the conclusion that the divisor '250' is the proper one to usein computing the equivalent daily rate of the monthly-paidemployees; that both the decree itself and the Rulesmentioned enumerated the excepted workers. It is a basic ruleof statutory construction that putting an exception limits omodifies the enumeration or meaning made in the law.It is thus

easy to see that a mere reading ofthe Decree and of the Ruleswould show that the monthly-paid employees of the Bank arenot expressly included in the enumeration of the exception.- Voluntary Arbitrator directed the bank to pay its monthly paidemployees their legal holiday pay.- The next day, the Department of Labor released PolicyInstructions No. 9 which clarifies controversies on theentitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determiningrule is this: If the monthly paid employee is receiving not lessthan P 240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and himonthly pay is uniform from January to December, he ispresumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidaysHowever, if deductions are made from his monthly salary onaccount of holidays in months where they occur, then he is stilentitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.- Bank appealed to NLRC but appeal was dismissed because itwas filed way beyond the ten-day period for perfecting an

appeal and because it contravened the agreement that theaward shall be final and unappealable.- Acting Secretary of Labor reversed NLRC decision and ruledthat the appeal was filed on time and that a review of the casewas inevitable as the money claim exceeded P100,000.00.- Presidential Executive Assistant affirmed DOJ ruling, relyingheavily on the Manifestation and Policy Instructions No. 9.Petitioners Claim

The legal presumption established in Section 2, Rule IV, Book1112, of the Rules and Regulations implementing particularly

2SECTION 2. Status of employees paid by the month -Employees who are uniformly

paid by the month, irrespective of the number of' working days therein with a salaryof not less than the statutory or established minimum wage, shall be presumed to bepaid for all days in the month whether worked or not.For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutoryminimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve.


8/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 44 - DisiniArticle 94 (formerly Article 208) of the Labor Code, is merely adisputable presumptionRespondents Comments- The Bank maintains that, since its inception or start ofoperations in 1954, all monthly-paid employees in the Bank arepaid their monthly salaries without any deduction for unworkedSaturdays, Sundays, legals and special holidays. On the otherhand, it also maintains that, as a matter of fact, 'alwaysconscious of its employee who has to work, on respondent'srest days of Saturdays and Sundays or on a legal holiday, anemployee who works overtime on any of said days is paid oneaddition regular pay for the day plus 50% of said regular pay- The Bank further maintains that the holiday pay is intendedonly for daily-paid workers.- The question submitted for arbitration is now moot andacademic.

ISSUEWON the permanent employees of the bank are entitled toholiday pay

HELDYES- In excluding the union members of herein petitioner from the

benefits of the holiday pay law, public respondent predicatedhis ruling on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules toimplement Article 94 of the labor Code promulgated by the thenSecretary of labor and Policy Instructions No. 9.- In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union(IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 7 this Court's Second Division, speakingthrough former Justice Makasiar, expressed the view anddeclared that the aforementioned section and interpretativebulletin are null and void, having been promulgated by the thenSecretary of Labor in excess of his rule-making authority. Itwas pointed out, inter alia, that in the guise of clarifying theprovisions on holiday pay, said rule and policy instructions ineffect amended the law by enlarging the scope of theexclusions.- The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the IntegratedRules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another

excluded group, namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid bythe month'. While the additional exclusion is only in the form ofa presumption that all monthly paid employees have alreadybeen paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or adeprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. Anadministrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits oflabor more than what the statute delimits or withholds isobviously ultra vires.Disposition The questioned decision set aside and the awardof the arbitrator reinstated.

SONZA V ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION431 SCRA 587

CARPIO; June 10, 2004

NATURE

Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS- ABS-CBN signed Agreement with Mel and Jay Management andDevt Corp (MJMDC), which agreed to provide Sonzas servicesexclusively to the network as talent for radio and TV.- Sonza resigned and complained that network didnt pay hissalaries, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, etc. ABSfiled Motion to Dismiss because there was no employer-employee relationship. ABS continued to remit Sonzas monthlytalent fees.- Labor Arbiter dismissed complaint because of lack of

jurisdiction. NLRC affirmed Arbiters decision. Sonza filedcertiorari action with CA, which dismissed the case. Hence thispetition.

ISSUEWON there was an employer-employee relationship betweenABS-CBN and Sonza

HELDNO- This is the first Court resolution on nature of relationshipbetween a station and a talent.- There are 4 elements of employer-employee relationship:1. Selection of employee

- if Sonza didnt possess his skills, talents and celebritystatus, ABS-CBN would not have entered into agreementwith him but would have hired him through personnedepartment

2. Payment of wages- whatever Sonza received arose from the contract and notfrom the employer-employee relation- the talent fee is so huge that it indicates more acontractual than an employment relationship

3. Power to dismiss- ABS-CBN coulnt retrench Sonza because it is obligated topay talent fees for duration of contract

4. Control on employee on means and methods

- also called control test; most impt to determinerelationship

- Sonza contends ABS exercised control over means andmethods of his work. Court said ABS merely reserved theright to modify the program format and airtime scheduleIts sole concern was the quality of the show and theratings. How Sonza appeared, sounded, etc. is outsidecontrol of ABS.- Sonza contends that ABS exercised control in providingequipment and crew. Court said these are not toolneeded by Sonza. What he needed were his talent, skillscostume.- Sonza contends that ABS subjected him to rules andstandards. Court said that the rules are the TV and RadioCode of the Kapisanan ng Broadcaster sa Pilipinas, merelyadopted by ABS as its code of ethics. It applies to

broadcasters, not just to ABS employees. Besides, theserules are merely guidelines.- Sonza said his exclusivity is a form of control by ABSCourt said exclusivity is a widespread practice inentertainment industry, as protection of investment inbuilding up a talent. Besides, the huge talent fees of anexclusive talent compensates for exclusivity.

- Arbiter ruled that as talent of MJMDC, Sonza is not anemployee of ABS. Sonza insists that MJMDC is a labor-onlycontractor and ABS is his employer. In labor-only contractthere are 3 parties the contractor, employee and the principa(deemed the real employer). Under this, the contractor is theagent of the principal. If Sonzas argument was true, thenMJMDC turns to be the agent of both Sonza and ABS. Besidesin the Agreement, there were only two parties mentioned Sonza and ABS, with MJMDC as Sonzas agent.- Sonza argues Policy Instruction No. 40 by Minister of Labo

said the types of employees in broadcast are the station andprogram employees. Court said this instruction is a mereexecutive issuance not binding on the Court.- Court also said that Arbiter can decide a case without a formatrial.- Sonza argues that treating talents as contractors violates righto security of tenure. Court said this right exists only if there isan employer-employee relation. Besides, law also protectrights of talents to contract. Besides, if hosts were employeesmanagers can dictate what hosts will say, and this is noconducive to press freedom.- Difference in tax treatment also showed that theres noemployer-employee relation.- Sonzas claim is based on their agreement. Therefore, actionshould not be based on Labor Code but on breach of contract.


9/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 45 - Disini

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP V NLRC (RUIZ,CORIA)

150 SCRA 565PARAS; May 29, 1987

NATUREPetition for certiorari

FACTS- August, 1977- Coria was hired by Rizal Empire InsuranceGroup(REIG) as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 aday.- January 1, 1978- Coria was made a regular employee, havingbeen appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary ofP300.00.- Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy ofpetitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior andOther Rules and Regulations."- In the same year, without change in his position-designation,he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary wasincreased to P450.00 a month.- 1980- he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and

his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of livingallowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department asfiling clerk.- July, 1983- he was made an inspector of the Fire Division witha monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.- Oct. 15, 1983- Coria was dismissed from work, on the groundsof tardiness and unexcused absences.- Coria filed a complaint with MOLE- March 14, 1985- LA Ruiz reinstated him to his position withback wages.- REIG appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed on the groundthat the same had been filed out of time. Hence this petition.

ISSUEWON it is still within the jurisdiction of the SC

HELDNO- Under the provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decisionappealed from in this case has become final and executory andcan no longer be subject to appeal.Ratio Administrative regulations and policies enacted byadministrative bodies to interpret the law which they areentrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled togreat respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration,137 SCRA 314 [1985])..Reasoning- The record shows that REIG received a copy of the decision ofthe LA on April 1, 1985.- It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum ofAppeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appealon April 22, 1985.- Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC on appeal, providesthat decisions or orders of a LA shall be final and executoryunless appealed to the Commission by any or both of theparties within 10 calendar days from receipt of notice and thatno motion or request for extension of the period within which toperfect an appeal shall be entertained.NLRC correctly dismissed REIGs appeal pursuant to said rules.- The NLRC didnt commit GAD amounting to lack of jurisdictionin arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality.- SC need not interpret the Revised Rules of the NLRC as theyare clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation.- Even on the merits, the ruling of the LA appears to be correct;the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the privaterespondent indicate he must have been a highly efficientworker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in

punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all bedemanded.Disposition Petition DISMISSED.

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO VGLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES INC

438 SCRA 343TINGA; September 17, 2004

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution othe Court of Appeals

FACTS

- Petitioner Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo WellcomePhilippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative after Tecsonhad undergone training and orientation. Thereafter, Tecsonsigned a contract of employment which stipulates, amongothers, that he agrees to study and abide by existing companyrules; to disclose to management any existing or futurerelationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees oemployees of competing drug companies and shouldmanagement find that such relationship poses a possibleconflict of interest, to resign from the company.- The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly providesthat an employee is expected to inform management of anyexisting or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity withco-employees or employees of competing drug companies. Imanagement perceives a conflict of interest or a potentiaconflict between such relationship and the employee

employment with the company, the management and theemployee will explore the possibility of a transfer to anothedepartment in a non-counterchecking position or preparationfor employment outside the company after six months.- Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products inthe Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently

Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, anemployee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor oGlaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. Shesupervised the district managers and medical representativesof her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra inthat area. Even before they got married, Tecson receivedseveral reminders from his District Manager regarding theconflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy mighengender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy.- Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsygave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded

him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them wouldresign from their jobs, although they told him that they wantedto retain him as much as possible because he was performinghis job well.-Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policyagainst entering into a relationship with an employee of acompetitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsysemployer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drugcompany; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancypackage to be offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation fromher company, the potential conflict of interest would beeliminated. At the same time, they would be able to avail of theattractive redundancy package from Astra.- Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem

Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking


10/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 46 - Disinithat since Astra did not have a milk division, the potentialconflict of interest would be eliminated. His application wasdenied in view of Glaxos least-movement-possible policy.Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider itsdecision, but his request was denied.- Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transferand brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo,however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tecson time tocomply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer orderand continued acting as medical representative in theCamarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.- During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecsonwas paid his salary, but was not issued samples of productswhich were competing with similar products manufactured byAstra. He was also not included in product conferencesregarding such products.- Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at thegrievance machinery level, they submitted the matter forvoluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay ofone-half month pay for every year of service, or a total ofP50,000.00 but he declined the offer. The National Conciliationand Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring asvalid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and

persons employed with competitor companies, and affirmingGlaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.- Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court ofAppeals assailing the NCMB Decision.The Court of Appealspromulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on theground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. Theappellate court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting itsemployees from having personal relationships with employeesof competitor companies is a valid exercise of its managementprerogatives.Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of theappellate courts Decision, but the motion was denied by theappellate court.

ISSUES1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policyagainst its employees marrying employees from competitor

companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violatesthe equal protection clause of the Constitution2. WON petitioner was constructively dismissed

HELD1. NO- Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturingformulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programsand information from competitors, especially so that it andAstra are rival companies in the highly competitivepharmaceutical industry.- The prohibition against personal or marital relationships withemployees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees isreasonable under the circumstances because relationships ofthat nature might compromise the interests of the company. Inlaying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims toprotect its interests against the possibility that a competitor

company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.- That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economicinterests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitutionrecognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such apolicy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investmentsand to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavorto give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and theprotection of labor, it does not mean that every labor disputewill be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizesthat management has rights which are also entitled to respectand enforcement in the interest of fair play.- The challenged company policy does not violate the equalprotection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneouslysuggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equalprotection clause are addressed only to the state or those

acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held ina long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equaprotection clause erects no shield against merely privateconduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The onlyexception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations oractions has been found to have become entwined or involved inthe wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, theexception is not present in this case. Significantly, thecompany actually enforced the policy after repeated requests tothe employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the applicationof the policy was made in an impartial and even-handedmanner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.- In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provisionand the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxodoes not impose an absolute prohibition against relationshipsbetween its employees and those of competitor companies. Itsemployees are free to cultivate relationships with and marrypersons of their own choosing. What the company merelyseeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employeeand the company that may arise out of such relationships.- The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailedcompany policy which forms part of respondents EmployeeCode of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, suchas that signed by Tecson, was made known to him prior to his

employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restrictionwhen he signed his employment contract and when he enteredinto a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly andvoluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxothe stipulations therein have the force of law between themand, thus, should be complied with in good faith. He istherefore estopped from questioning said policy.2. NO- Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntaryresignation resorted to when continued employment becomesimpossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotionin rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discriminationinsensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable tothe employee. None of these conditions are present in theinstant case. The record does not show that Tecson wasdemoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such

transfer. Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogativein reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area. When theproblem could not be resolved after several years of waitingGlaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales areadifferent from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, Glaxodid not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassignedhim to another area where his home province, Agusan del Surwas included. In effecting Tecsons transfer, Glaxo evenconsidered the welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly, theforegoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith onthe part of Glaxo.

SALINAS V NLRC (ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO)319 SCRA 54

PURISIMA; November 24, 1999

FACTS- Petitioners were employed with Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co(AG & P):

Salinas: 1983-1988 as carpenter/finishing carpenterAlejandro: 1982-1989 as bulk cement operator, bulk cemenplant/carrier operator & crane driverCortez: 1979-1988 as carpenter/forklift operator


11/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 47 - DisiniSamulde: 1982-1989 as lubeman/stationary operator

- Complaints (separate but consolidated by the LA): illegaldismissal- Petitioners Claim: They had been covered by a number ofcontracts renewed continuously, with periods ranging from five(5) to nine (9) years, and they performed the same kind of workthrough out their employment, and such was usually necessaryand desirable in the trade or business of the respondentcorporation; and their work did not end on a project-to-projectbasis, although the contrary was made to appear by theemployer through the signing of separate employmentcontracts.- LA: Dismissed petitions on the ground that the petitioners areproject employees are project employees whose work contractswith AG & P indicate that they were employed in such category;that they have been assigned to different work projects, not justto one and that their work relation with AG & P, relative totermination, is governed by Policy Instruction No. 20 (rulegoverning project employees).- Appeal to NLRC: Affirmed LAs findings

ISSUES1. WON the petitioners are project employeesProcedural

2. WON this petition for certiorari was proper

HELD1. NO- The petitioners are regular employees.- The mandate in Article 281 of the Labor Code, whichpertinently prescribes that the 'provisions of written agreementto the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oralagreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed tobe regular where the employee has been engaged to performactivities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness or trade of the employer' and that any employee whohas rendered at least one year of service, whether such serviceis continuous or broken shall be considered a regular employeewith respect to the activity in which he is employed and hisemployment shall continue while such actually exists,' should

apply in the case of petitioner.- Failure to report the termination to Public Employment Officeis a clear indication that petitioners were not and are notproject employees. (PI No. 20 requires reports of terminations)- It is basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out andinterpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and itsimplementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should bethe primordial and paramount consideration. The interpretationherein made gives meaning and substance to the liberal andcompassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of LaborCode that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretationof the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementingrules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor".- It is beyond cavil that petitioners had been providing therespondent corporation with continuous and uninterruptedservices, except for a day or so gap in their successiveemployment contracts. Their contracts had been renewed

several times, with the total length of their services rangingfrom five (5) to nine (9) years. Throughout the duration of theircontracts, they had been performing the same kinds of work(e.g., as lubeman, bulk cement operator and carpenter), whichwere usually necessary and desirable in the constructionbusiness of AG & P, its usual trade or business.- Undoubtedly, periods in the present case have been imposedto preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by petitioners,and must be struck down for being contrary to public policy,morals, good customs or public order.2. YES- Anent the issue that the petition should have been broughtunder Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules ofCourt, this rule is not inflexible. In the interest of justice, oftenthe Court has judiciously treated as special civil actions for

certiorari petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for reviewon certiorari.- With regard to the issue on non-exhaustion of administrativeremedies, the Court hold that the failure of petitioners tointerpose a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decisionbefore coming to this Court was not a fatal omission. Theexhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is not a hardand fast rule and does not apply where the issue is purely alegal one. A motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite for thebringing of an action under Rule 65 may be dispensed withwhere the issue is purely of law, as in this case. At all eventsand in the interest of substantial justice, especially in casesinvolving the rights of workers, procedural lapses, if any, maybe disregarded to enable the Court to examine and resolve theconflicting rights and responsibilities of the parties. Thisliberality is warranted in the case at bar, especially since it hasbeen shown that the intervention of the Court is necessary forthe protection of the herein petitioner(s).Disposition The questioned Resolution of the NLRC is SETASIDE and another one is hereby ENTERED ordering therespondent corporation to reinstate petitioners without loss ofseniority and with full backwages.

ABELLA V NLRC (QUITCO, DIONELE)152 SCRA 140

PARAS; July 20, 1987

FACTS- Petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land inPonteverde, Negros Occidental, known as Hacienda DanaoRamona, for a period of ten (10) years, renewable, at heoption, for another ten (10) years. She did renew for anotheten years. During the existence of the lease, she employedprivate respondents. Private respondent Ricardo Dionele, Srhas been a regular farm worker for 33 years while . On theother hand, private respondent Romeo Quitco started workedfor 14 years. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rightspetitioner dismissed private respondents and turned over thehacienda to the owners thereof, who continued the

management, cultivation and operation of the farm

ISSUEWON private respondents are entitled to separation pay

HELDYES- The closing wasnt due to serious losses or financial reverses

The Court cited Article 284 (this should be 283) which says:"Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction opersonnel. The employer may also terminate theemployment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent lossesor the closing or cessation of operation of the establishmentor undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose ocircumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a writtennotice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor andEmployment at least one (1) month before the intended datethereof. In case of termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker affected therebyshall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least hisone (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for everyyear of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchmentto prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation ooperations of establishment or undertaking not due to seriousbusiness losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shalbe equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2)month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. Afraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)whole year."

- Petitioner then contends that the aforequoted provisionviolates the constitutional guarantee against impairment o


12/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 48 - Disiniobligations and contracts, because when she leased HaciendaDanao-Ramona, neither she nor the lessor contemplated thecreation of the obligation to pay separation pay to workers atthe end of the lease. The Court said that this contention bypetitioner is untenable. The law is clear and to permit such anargument would mean that the years of service given by theworkers will mean nothing since there is no agreement herethat the new management will be the one to shoulder theseparation pay. The old management, pertaining to Abella inthis case, should give the payment.- In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation andinterpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and itsimplementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should bethe primordial and paramount consideration. (Volshel LaborUnion v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 43 [1985]). It isthe kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substanceto the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as providedfor in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that `alldoubts in the implementation and interpretation of theprovisions of this Code including its implementing rules andregulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." The policy is toextend the applicability of the decree to a greater number ofemployees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which isin consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give

maximum aid and protection to labor.Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORP V CA (BISIG NG ASIANTRANSMISSION LABOR UNION)

425 SCRA 478CARPIO-MORALES; March 15, 2004

NATUREPetition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the March 28,2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS- The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), throughUndersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an ExplanatoryBulletin dated March 11, 1993, wherein it clarified, thatemployees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9,1993, which, apart from being Good Friday, and, therefore, alegal holiday, is also Araw ng Kagitingan, which is also a legalholiday, even if unworked.- Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday andAraw ng Kagitingan- Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner Asian TransmissionCorporation opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% oftheir basic pay on April 9, 1998.- Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU)protested.- In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of theCollective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between

petitioner and BATLU, the controversy was submitted forvoluntary arbitration.- On July 31, 1998, the Office of the Voluntary Arbitratorrendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its coveredemployees "200% and not just 100% of their regular dailywages for the unworked April 9, 1998

- Subject of interpretation in the case at bar is Article 94 3of theLabor which was amended by Executive Order No. 2034

- In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission LaborUnion (BATLU), the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 ofthe Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regulaholiday, the computation of which is determined by a legaformula which is not changed by the fact that there are twoholidays falling on one day; and that that the law, as amendedenumerates ten regular holidays for every year, and should nobe interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number ofpaid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitinganin certain years, like 1993 and 1998, is also Holy Friday oMaundy Thursday."- The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the VoluntaryArbitrator, holding that the Collective Bargaining Agreemen(CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing therelations between them, clearly recognizes their intent toconsider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, onwhatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legaholidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "there is nocondition, qualification or exception for any variance from theclear intent that all holidays shall be compensated.- The Court of Appeals further held that "in the absence of anexplicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction o

holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day, anydoubt in the interpretation and implementation of theLabor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolvedin favor of labor."- Hence, this petition.

ISSUEWON daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for tworegular holidays which fall on the same day

HELDYES- Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of theConstitutional imperative that the State shall afford protectionto labor. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of themonthly income of the workers on account of work

interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced totake a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his holidaypay."8 It is also intended to enable the worker to participate inthe national celebrations held during the days identified as withgreat historical and cultural significance.- Independence Day (June 12), Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9)National Heroes Day (last Sunday of August), Bonifacio Day(November 30) and Rizal Day (December 30) were declarednational holidays to afford Filipinos with a recurring opportunityto commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people, promotenational identity, and deepen the spirit of patriotism. Labor Day(May 1) is a day traditionally reserved to celebrate thecontributions of the working class to the development of thenation, while the religious holidays designated in ExecutiveOrder No. 203 allow the worker to celebrate his faith with hisfamily.- As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended

affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidaysThe provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employeeis paid on a monthly or daily basis. Unlike a bonus, which is a

3ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily

wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularlemploying less than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require an employee towork on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent totwice his regular rate; and (c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New YearsDay, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth oJune, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth oDecember and the day designated by law for holding a general election4

regular holidays are now:1. New Years Day January 1; 2. Maundy Thursday MovableDate; 3. Good Friday Movable Date; 4. Araw ng Kagitingan April 9 (Bataan andCorregidor Day); 5. Labor Day May 1; 6. Independence Day June 12; 7. NationaHeroes Day Last Sunday of August; 8. Bonifacio Day November 30; 9. Christmas DayDecember 25; 10. Rizal Day December 30


13/74

Labor Law 1 A2010 - 49 - Disinimanagement prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefitdemandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to theenjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that twoholidays fall on the same date should not operate toreduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker isentitled to receive.- It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, thatwhen the language of the law is clear and unequivocal,the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Inthe case at bar, there is nothing in the law whichprovides or indicates that the entitlement to ten days ofholiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidaysfall on the same day.- In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that alldoubts in the implementation and interpretation of itsprovisions, including its implementing rules andregulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For theworking mans welfare should be the primordial andparamount consideration.- Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules toImplement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law orthe rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducingany benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regularholidays as provided in existing individual or collective

agreement or employer practice or policy.- From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by theparties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legalholidays as required by law.Disposition Petition is dismissed.

CLEMENTE V GSIS152 SCRA 500

GUTIERREZ, JR; July 31, 1987

NATUREPetition to review decision of the Employees CompensationCommission (ECC) which affirmed decision of GSIS and deniedClementes claim for death benefits

FACTS- Carolinas husband, Pedro Clemente was for 10 years a janitorin the DOH Dagupan City assigned at the Ilocos Norte SkinClinic.- He was hospitalized for 12 days due to his ailment of nephritis,and was also found to be suffering from Hansens Disease(portal cirrhosis and leprosy). He died on Nov 14, 1976.- Petitioner then filed with GSIS a claim for employeescompensation under the Labor Code. This was denied by GSISon the ground that such ailments are notoccupational diseasestaking into consideration nature of his work. Under Art. 167(L)of the Labor Code and Sec. 1(b) Rule III of the Amended Ruleson Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the resultingdisability or death to be compensable, sickness must be theresult of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of therules; otherwise proof must be shown that the risk ofcontracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.- Petitioner claimed that the ailments were contracted in thecourse of employment and were aggravated by his work sincehe was in direct contact with persons suffering from differentskin diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and otherdirt.- ECC also dismissed the claim since there was no substantialevidence of causal connection and there was evidence thatdeceased had already contracted the Hansens beforeemployment.

ISSUEWON petitioner is entitled to the compensation

HELDYES

Ratio Strict rules of evidence are NOT applicable in claims focompensation. The degree of proof required is merelysubstantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as areasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation.- Doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee.

Reasoning- The major ailments of the deceased could be traced tobacterial and viral infections. For instance, in the case oleprosy, it is known that the source of infection is dischargefrom lesions of persons with active cases.- Petitoners husband worked in a skin clinic and was exposed todifferent carriers of diseases. As janitor, he was the employeemost exposed to the dangerous concentration of infectedmaterial, and not being a med practitioner, least likely to knowhow to avoid them.- GSISs conservative stand is not consistent with the liberainterpretation of the Labor Code and the social justiceguarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of workers.Disposition Decision appealed from is set aside and GSIS isordered to pay petitioner P12T as death benefits and P1,200 asattorneys fees.

ACUAV CA[PAGE 12]

BONIFACIO V GSIS146 SCRA 276

FERNAN; December 15, 1986

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS- Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to thedistrict of Bagamanoc, Division of Catanduanes, from August1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast withmetastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which causedher death on Oct. 5, 1978.- Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, asamended, was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. The same washowev

Documents

Labor1 Digest Part 2