Colleagues in conflict - Biology Learning Center at the University of

Colleagues in Conflict: An 'In Vivo' Analysis of theSociobiology Controversy

ULLICA SEGERSTRALE

Department of Sociology and AnthropologySmith CollegeNorthampton, MA 01063, U.S.A.

ABSTRACT: Edward 0. Wilson's forays into human sociobiology have been the target ofpersistent, vehement attack by his Harvard colleague in evolutionary biology, Richard C.Lewontin. Through examination of existing "documents in the case", together with in-depthpersonal interviews of Wilson, Lewontin, and other biologists, the reasons for Wilson'sstance and Lewontin's criticisms are uncovered. It is argued that the dispute is not primarilypersonally or politically motivated, but involves a conflict between long-term scientific-cum-moral agendas, with the "reductionist program" as a key issue. It is concluded that it isin the interest of both disputants to keep the controversy alive.

KEYWORDS: E. O. Wilson, R. C. Lewontin, sociobiology.

In the early summer of 1975, the distinguished Harvard entomologistEdward O. Wilson published a very large tome, Sociobiology: The NewSynthesis, in which he offered a full-scale discussion of the biologicalevolution of animal social behavior. Among animal species Wilson ex-plicitly included our own species Homo sapiens, and the final chapter ofhis work looked exclusively at humans. In this final chapter, Wilsonsuggested that human sex role divisions, aggressiveness, moral concerns,religious beliefs, and much more, could be connected to our evolutionaryheritage, as it is represented today in our underlying genetic dispositions.

In October 1975, a group called the Sociobiology Study Group,' com-posed of professors, students, researchers and others from the Boston arealaunched an attack on Wilson's Sociobiology, which by then had receivedwidespread publicity and positive reviews. The first public statement bythis group was a letter in the New York Review of Books, in response to theevolutionist C. H. Waddington's sympathetic account of Wilson's book inan earlier issue.2 The dramatic nature of this letter lay not only in its stronglanguage, but also in the fact that among the co-signers could be found thenames of some of Wilson's colleagues, working in the same department atHarvard.3 The most distinguished was the population geneticist, Richard C.Lewontin.

The hostile tone of the letter was evident: Wilson's attempt to include thehuman species as a legitimate object of analysis in terms of the concepts of

Biology and Philosophy I (1986) 53-87.© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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the newly developed discipline sociobiology was linked to former "biologi-cal determinist" theories which had lent themselves to abuse for politicalreasons, including Hitler's genocide. Wilson himself was presented as agenetic determinist and ideologue supporting the status quo, because of hisinterest in establishing the central traits of a genetically controlled humannature.

Predictably, Wilson's response was that the letter's co-signers hadutterly distorted the content of his message, and that their accusations wereall false. He provided examples of how he had been quoted out of contextso that his true meaning had been distorted, and he invited the readers tocheck for themselves. Equally predictably, his critics were not persuaded,and wrote a longer position paper with detailed criticism, which in turnwas rebutted by Wilson.4 From here the sociobiology controversy soonescalated, polarizing the academic community in much the same way as theIQ controversy some five years earlier. 5 Before long the dispute hadbecome a media event, with coverage on the front page of Time magazine.

Nevertheless, while the public's fantasy was early on captured by thefact that the author of Sociobiology and his chief opponent were bothevolutionary biologists, even located in the same building at Harvard, it isincorrect to describe the controversy as a "clash among titans" (Wade,1976), or as motivated or sustained by disagreements of a personal nature.It is also erroneous to see this controversy as primarily a politicallymotivated "nature-nurture" conflict.6 I will demonstrate that Wilson andLewontin were on countercourse already before the beginning of thesociobiology controversy, and that the sociobiology debate should rather beseen as a clash between their larger personal agendas than between person-alities as such. I will show how for both Lewontin and Wilson, their largeragendas involve a coupling of scientific and moral interests, and how thedifferent nature of these scientific-cum-moral agendas made a clash in1975 inevitable. 7 I will argue also that both these biologists have continuedto pursue their different long-range aims. This will be done through anexamination of factors surrounding one of Wilson's more recent publica-tions, Genes, Mind, and Culture.

Hence, the sociobiology controversy would be misconstrued if it wereseem as merely "an in-house quarrel between Harvard professors",whether politically motivated or not. Such a labelling would prevent realunderstanding of what the sociobiology controversy is, in fact, about. Itwould obscure also the true differences and similarities between Wilsonand Lewontin, and the serious scientific and meta-scientific issues involved.I will demonstrate that the debate has to do primarily with larger viewsabout the nature of science and the social role of the scientist, and that thefundamental differences between Wilson and Lewontin thus lie in theepistemological and moral realms.8

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COLLEAGUES IN CONFLICT

THE WILSONIAN PROGRAM

Sociobiology: The New Synthesis is a large, ambitious book. There is littledoubt that through it, Wilson saw himself as creating (or solidifying) a new"paradigm". Theoretical ideas and empirical studies from the last fewdecades are drawn together in one huge construction, by which animalsocial behavior is viewed as genetically controlled and evolving throughnatural selection.

In writing Sociobiology, Wilson specifically used modern populationbiology, for he saw this as the theoretical underpinning of any claims aboutthe evolution of social behavior. As a modern biologist, Wilson wasespecially interested in employing the mathematical formulas of populationgenetics, through which evolution by natural selection could be expressedas a change in the gene frequencies of traits.

At once, we start to see the seeds for controversy between Wilson andLewontin, for just the year before (in 1974) Lewontin, a populationgeneticist, had published a major book of his own, criticizing most of thecurrent claims made in his particular field. In this work, The Genetic Basisof Evolutionary Change, Lewontin spelled out the problems faced by hisfield in view of certain new scientific findings, and suggested that funda-mental theoretical revisions would have to be made within that field for itto produce valid predictive statements. Lewontin's point, especially, wasthat simple older formulas used for calculation in population genetics wereincorrect, because they did not consider recently detected complex inter-actions between individual genes. Still, erroneously, genes were beingtreated akin to separate beans within a bag (the individual organism).9

In Sociobiology Wilson did not ignore the kinds of criticisms raised byLewontin. In fact, he approvingly discussed Lewontin's points (op. cit., p.70).1° Nevertheless, Wilson explicitly decided to go ahead and use existingformulas provisionally, waiting for better ones to be developed. As I willshow below, this was because, for Wilson, population biology was a meansto a larger goal; for Lewontin it was an end in itself. Wilson saw nothingwrong with making do with what existed; Lewontin believed one shouldcategorically discard the available formulas, except for the limited caseswhere they were known to be applicable.

But, although significant, the usefulness of population genetic formulasas provisional tools would have been a rather strange issue to form a basisfor a serious controversy. After all, Wilson and Lewontin were not indisagreement about the theoretical correctness of Lewontin's criticism. It isonly when matters are put in the context of the larger agendas of these twoscientists that it becomes clear that this decision of Wilson's, while boostinghis own scientific and moral goals, came effectively to undermine those ofLewontin.

What was the larger scientific agenda influencing Wilson in his 1975

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book? Not surprisingly, here it is necessary to introduce Wilson's academicbackground. After completing his undergraduate work and an M.S. inbiology at the University of Alabama, Wilson came to Harvard as agraduate student in the early 1950's, became a Junior Fellow in Harvard'sprestigious Society of Fellows, joined the Harvard Faculty in 1958, risingto professor of Zoology in 1964 and the Frank Baird, Jr. professorship ofScience in 1976. While at Harvard, Wilson came to "inherit" the grandscientific ambitions of L. J. Henderson and W. M. Wheeler: the former theinfluential founder of the Harvard Society of Fellows, and the latter theeminent Harvard entomologist and popularizer of the "superorganism"concept." The great scientific dream of these two men was to integrate thesocial and natural sciences on the basis of equilibrium theory. Wilsoncarried on with this mission, and hence, central to him was the comparisonof social behavior in different species, thus contributing to the formulationof an integrated theory. Indeed, in a major work on social insects, TheInsect Societies, published in 1971, Wilson made the construction of suchan integrated theory paramount. For him, the new developments in cyber-netics and especially optimization theory would provide the tools neededfor this enterprise. 2

But with the scientific agenda, Wilson also inherited a cognitiveapproach: the coupling of scientific and moral notions. Already, Wheeler,(who was a socialist), saw the cooperation in insects as a good model forhuman society.'3 For this reason, in developing "sociobiology", the syste-matic study of the biology of social behavior, Wilson made the problem of"altruism" absolutely central. And, this is why he presented various modelsfor the solution of this problem, including suggestions which were not at allin vogue among mainstream sociobiologists at that time. Thus he came tointegrate knowledge into an idiosyncratic synthesis, in many respectsdifferent from the work of the other students of animal behavior. Forinstance, Wilson inherited his mentors' fondness for holistic explanations,substituting the old metaphysical holism with a "new holism" based oncommunication theory (cf. Wilson, 1975a, p. 7), and treated "group selec-tion" explanation much more kindly than did some of his English col-leagues (like Richard Dawkins, author of The Selfish Gene). 14

Hence, undoubtedly, Wilson took over a basic philosophy - one thatunfortunately initially made him unaware of the fact that in mixing scienceand social concerns, he was skating across dangerously thin philosophicalice. In particular, he cheerfully blundered through the barrier separatingfacts from values. Brazenly, he started Sociobiology: The New Synthesis asfollows:

Camus said that the only serious philosophical question is suicide. That is wrong even inthe strict sense intended. The biologist, who is concerned with questions of physiologyand evolutionary history, realizes that self-knowledge is constrained and shaped by theemotional control centers in the hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain. These

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centers flood our consciousness with all the emotions - hate, love, guilt, fear, and others- that are consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of goodand evil. What, we are then compelled to ask, made the hypothalamus and limbicsystem? They evolved by natural selection. That simple biological statement must bepursued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemolo-gists, at all depths. (p. 1)

And in the last chapter, he suggested that "a genetically accurate and hencecompletely fair code of ethics" must wait for further contributions of evolu-tionary sociobiology (op. cit., p. 575). As one can imagine, this kind ofmove created immediate suspicion among his critics, and incredulityamong many of his colleagues (see, e.g., Maynard Smith's generally sympa-thetic review of Sociobiology in 1975). Lewontin, in interview, suggestedthat Wilson ought to read Hume, "it would be good for him", and specu-lated that some friend or critic must have pointed out this problem toWilson, causing the latter to retract his position already before the start ofthe controversy (Wilson 1975b).15

But this is to underestimate an even stronger force driving Wilson: hispersonal moral agenda. Wilson's zeal in making sociobiology a trulypredictive science, encompassing all of social behavior, was intimately tiedto an old desire of his: to prove the (Christian) theologians wrong. Hewanted to make sure that there cannot exist a separate realm of meaningand ethics, which would allow the theologians to impose arbitrary moralcodes which would lead to unnecessary human suffering. He believed thatthere must exist a natural ethics for humans and was on the lookout for it.For Wilson, any new scientific knowledge which can allow human beingsincreased control over their lives is power away from the theologians whowant to run other people's lives.' 6

To explain such an ambition, we have to go back to the deeply religiousenvironment of Wilson's childhood and adolescence. Raised as a funda-mentalist Southern Baptist, he went through a conversion experience at arevival meeting at the age of 15 and was "born again" by being baptized.(Interview No. 3; cf. Wilson, 1985). He had a sense of religious awe, but, inretrospect, this was "more of a blind emotional acceptance ... a rite oftransition ... a special form of allegiance to the tribe in front of theshaman" (Interview No. 3). And very soon he got reconverted and becamea free thinker. The reason for this was partly "the fraudulent activity of theChurch," partly his own discovery of evolution (Interview No. 3):

When I was 17, I saw that a lot of things that had inspired me earlier were reallytheatrical staging. And then I had been exposed to evolution, and because I haddiscovered that what I most loved on the planet, which was life on the planet, madesense only in terms of evolution and the idea of natural selection, and that this was a farmore interesting, richer and more powerful explanation than the teachings of the NewTestament. That was not difficult to arrive at (ibid.)

From this on, Wilson devoted himself fully to his favorite subject: the study

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of ants.'7 But he retained an important thing from the evangelical preach-ers: "the love of language ... to be able to talk, to move people withlanguage" (ibid.)'8

However, the lesson that Wilson had derived from this experience wasthat religion could not claim to possess privileged knowledge of correctethical values for humankind, and had better be kept on a leash by mate-rialist science. Thus, it is really religion, not culture per se, that Wilson istalking about when he says that "the genes hold culture on a leash" - aquotation which has now become somewhat notorious (from On HumanNature, the 1978 work that Wilson devoted to humans). This is clear alsofrom the full context:

But to the extent that principles are chosen by knowledge and reason remote frombiology, they can at least in principle be non-Darwinian. This leads us ineluctably backto the second great spiritual dilemma. The philosophical question of interest that itgenerates is the following: Can the cultural evolution of higher ethical values gain adirection and momentum of its own and completely replace genetic revolution? I thinknot. The genes hold culture on a leash. The leash is very long, but inevitably values willbe constrained in accordance with their effects on the human gene pool. The brain is aproduct of evolution. Human behavior - like the deepest capacities for emotionalresponse which drive and guide it - is the circuitous technique by which human geneticmaterial has been and will be kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable ultimatefunction. (Wilson, op. cit., p. 167)

Thus, it was this wish of Wilson's to make scientific materialism triumphover irrational religious dogma that made him state his case strongly, evento the point of exaggerating the power of evolutionary biology, especiallyas it pertains to social behavior. In this way he ended up presenting thisfield as a "harder" scientific one than it is at present.?'

The best foundation Wilson could find to achieve his moral aim of aquantitative explanation of all aspects of human social behavior, as well asprediction of mankind's future (to substitute divine prophecy, see Wilson,1980), was population genetics, which he regarded as the "hardest" branchof evolutionary biology. Unlike many other sociobiologists (e.g., Dawkinsin The Selfish Gene), Wilson could not really "afford" to leave the culturalrealm as a separate one, sitting on top of the genetic one, even if he enter-tained this as a theoretical possibility: materialism had to be guaranteed.This was done by arguing that sociobiology is the ready extension oforthodox population biology, to the realm of social interactions. But hereWilson encountered a severe problem: how to account for rapid culturalchange in human populations on the basis of changes in gene frequencieswhich according to prevailing theory require much longer time spans.Provisionally, he postulated a "multiplier effect" which would speed up theprocess, and argued for its viability invoking some animal studies (Wilson,1975a, pp. 11-13). 2 0

For Wilson, then, the "coupling" of his moral and scientific interests was

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a long-term project: his scientific work was eventually aimed at moralimplications, but in order to achieve this it had to be shown to come asclose to the "hard" science ideal as possible.

THE LEWONTINIAN CRITIQUE

Just as the key to understanding Wilson is his strong devotion to his viewof evolutionary theory as a total explanatory scheme, so the key to under-standing Lewontin is the latter's equally strong devotion to his version ofMarxism.

For Lewontin, Marxism is both a philosophical and sociopoliticalprogram.21 But it is important to note that Lewontin's philosophical pre-occupation with Marxism is strongly linked to a more general criticalmeta-scientific interest of his: the correct depiction of reality in theory andmodels (see, e.g., his 1974 book). While for Wilson the criterion for a goodtheory is testability (which is quite compatible with a form of instrumental-ism), for Lewontin a theory in addition to being testable has to be a trueaccount of an underlying process in the real (i.e., material) world. This iswhy Lewontin is against the "reductionist program" for natural and socialscience (e.g., Lewontin 1976, 1979, 1981a, 1983), which on the contraryWilson explicitly endorses (e.g., Wilson 1971a, p. 319, 1971b, 1977), andalso against statistical calculations and constructs, for the reason that thesedo not have a real basis in nature or, alternatively, presume a stochasticuniverse without proper causal laws.

It is in this light one has to see his criticism of, e.g., the analysis ofvariance (Lewontin, 1974b), the calculation of "average genetic fitness" byfollowers of the Fisher school in population genetics (e.g., his opposition toDawkins; Lewontin, 1977a), stochastic models in ecology (Levins andLewontin, 1980) and his more recent discussion of the "reification" of IQ(Lewontin, 1982a). Finally, while Wilson considers parsimony a funda-mental scientific principle, and believes that deliberate oversimplification iscrucial for theory formation (e.g., Wilson, 1971b), for Lewontin a theoryrather ought to be made more complex in order to accurately capturereality (Levins and Lewontin, 1980). This is also the reason why Lewontinhas been systematically attacking the "adaptationist program" and optimi-zation theory in modern biology as based on non-permissible generaliza-tions about the natural world (e.g., Lewontin, 1972a, 1976, 1977a, 1978,1979, 1982b; Gould and Lewontin, 1979).

Thus, Lewontin is concerned with "correct" epistemology, methodologyand ontology. This is because, for him, incorrect approaches prevent usfrom finding out the underlying truth about the world. Reductionism is inprinciple a wrong-headed foundation for science (even though he admitsthat it has seemingly led to steady progress in most of natural science;

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Lewontin, 1981b). This is, then, why Lewontin is interested in trying todevelop a more complex Marxist dialectical approach to science, whichwould be able to capture accurately especially those interaction pheno-mena that reductionist methodology is unable to cope with. In 1976, heand Richard Levins described their efforts as follows:

As working scientists in the field of evolutionary genetics and ecology, we have beenattempting with some success to guide our own research by a conscious application ofMarxist philosophy. (Lewontin and Levins, 1976, p. 35)22

It is not difficult to see why Wilson's explicit choice of a reductionistapproach in Sociobiology on many accounts was absolute anathema toLewontin's meta-scientific convictions in general, but even more so becauseWilson chose to include human society and thereby came to invokeassumptions about human nature and society, thus addressing the socio-political dimension of Lewontin's Marxism as well.

But there is a paradoxical feature in Lewontin's position: while he isferociously attacking the "Cartesian program," which he, in turn, links to"bourgeois science", his own research interests involve an ever-moredetailed understanding of the molecular bases of genetic change - interestswhich are about as "reductionistic" as it is possible to be. The followinginterview with John Maynard Smith, himself an eminent evolutionist (andformer Marxist), throws some light on the situation:

Q: I have tried to find these things (i.e. scientific Marxist approaches) in Lewontin, buthe is harder to pinpoint, because he is actually dealing with a kind of reductionistic -A: (Interrupts) Dick Lewontin is an old-fashioned mechanistic reductionist, who wasbrought up that way!Q: But he would like to be a Marxist.A: That's right!Q: So what does one do?A: Well - when he goes to heaven he can be a Marxist! (laugh). Dick started trying tobe a Marxist too late, really, to internalize that way of thinking, I think, and while he hasundoubtedly learnt something from Marxism, his classical - I don't know what one callsit - "western science" kind of approach was so deep in his thinking by the time he wasforty, that his thinking is still fundamentally that when he is thinking about science.(Interview No. 41)

(Lewontin's relatively recent conversion may also explain why his socio-political views seem to be permeated with individualistic moralism inaddition to more abstract Marxist arguments, as we will see below).2 3

But Lewontin's devotion to Marxism in practice often works as a"coupled" scientific-cum-moral agenda, and it is this coupled agenda thatin effect comes to clash with the Wilsonian one. This will be examinedmore closely below.

Unlike the case of Wilson, when it comes to Lewontin there are fewcomprehensive moral statements - one has to tease out Lewontin's criticalprogram from his general writings and his attacks on others. However,

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clues are there to be found. It appears that Lewontin is convinced (as aremany other scientists) that "good science" is unproblematic, but "badscience" in need of explanation. But additionally it seems that he is con-vinced that it is the political bias of scientists that is the cause of "badscience", at least in fields that have serious sociopolitical implications.Therefore he sees his specific task as twofold: (1) to demonstrate the"scientific error" of scientists with "incorrect" political belief, and (2) tounmask this belief in their scientific text and show how the latter "error"leads to the former one. Lewontin's general strategy as a critic (later on tobe seen, e.g., in his attack on Wilson) is especially clearly spelled out in hiscriticism of Jensen in 1970:

I shall try, in this article, to display Professor Jensen's argument, to show how thestructure of his argument is designed to make his point and to reveal what appear to bedeeply embedded assumptions derived from a particular world view, leading him toerroneous conclusions. (Lewontin, 1970)

Later on, Lewontin follows up in a review of research in cognitiveabilities (Lewontin, 1975a), where he attacks the "carelessness, shabbinessand intellectual dishonesty" in this field. He continues by demonstratingwhy it "cannot" be a genuine scientific desire that is motivating the studentsof IQ (because, according to Lewontin, the only truly scientifically inter-esting questions about cognitive traits can be asked at the molecular level),and why it therefore "must" be their underlying sociopolitical bias that isdriving them to bad research. But he does not remain content with simplydemonstrating how ideological bias leads to scientific error, which could beregarded as one type of Marxist analysis. For Lewontin, there is a moralissue involved as well (cf. "dishonesty"). Thus, Lewontin refuses to take theposition that the sociopolitical bias of a scientist may have an unconsciouseffect on the results. This would, e.g., be the standpoint of his colleagueStephen J. Gould. But Lewontin is quite explicit about how he disagreeswith Gould in a book review of the latter's The Mismeasure of Man (1981):

Like Kamin, I am, myself rather more harsh in my view. Scientists, like others.sometimes tell deliberate lies because they believe that small lies can serve big truths.(Lewontin 1981b)

An illustration of his position that scientists producing "bad science" insociopolitically relevant fields should be held morally responsible forholding incorrect scientific belief is the following excerpt from a NOVAprogram transcript in February 1975. Here we can see a (for a Marxist)surprisingly ahistorical standard (modern science) being used to prove thatthe nineteenth century Swiss-American biologist, Louis Agassiz, was adeliberate liar:

In the late 19th century. such eminent zoologists for example as Louis Agassiz. thefounder of the Agassiz Museum at Harvard. said. with no basis in fact. he knew there

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was no basis in fact, and therefore you can only say he must have been telling a lie, thatthe skulls of negroes hardened up and closed earlier.... And that was the reason whyone shouldn't try to teach black people things. Now, Louis Agassiz knew that was nottrue, or at least he could, had no evidence that it was true, and we know now that it isnot true, that the sutures of blacks and whites close at about the same time.... We alsoknow that brain size has nothing to do with intelligence: that your brain doesn't swell asyou learn. But Louis Agassiz put out this pap, and as one of the great zoologists of the19th century, of course, people believed him. (Lewontin, 1975b)24

In what ways exactly did Wilson's Sociobiology now incur Lewontin'sire? Prima facie, both intellectually and socially, there are reasons tobelieve that Wilson would have expected a different kind of response.The sociobiology controversy has obscured the point that Wilson andLewontin, in fact, share many beliefs about evolutionary mechanisms, aswell as many concerns about evolutionary biology as a field.2 5 This isbecause they have a partially common history. It was Wilson who broughtLewontin to Harvard in the early 1970's, hoping that they could continuetheir common interest in creating necessary new theory in evolutionarybiology - theory of a "holistic" kind. Both Wilson and Lewontin were partof a small group of radical young evolutionary biologists 26 who, in thebeginning of the 60's, attempted to break with the prevalent tradition anddevelop something new:

In the early 60's we gathered at [RobertJ MacArthur's place in Vermont. We were abouta half dozen people, all the same age. We formed a little group, a self-conscious littlegroup in the early 60's.... We talked deliberately about how one would create a newpopulation biology based on modeling and how one would go into these areas that wereunformed and make order for the first time.... (Wilson, Interview No. 2)

(Other members of this small group included Richard Levins, RobertMacArthur, and L. B. Slobodkin.)

The situation in evolutionary biology at this time was, according toWilson, one of stagnation (1975a, p. 64). What unified the evolutionarybiologists in the "new phase" was among others a "holistic" interest inevolutionary ecology, i.e., in the actual evolutionary history of a species inits (changing) environment.27 At the end of the 60's, both Lewontin(1968), Levins (1968) and MacArthur and Wilson (1967) had contributedto the development of the new theory (Wilson, 1971b). Lewontin's theore-tical approach at this point was game theory, while his above-mentionedconcern with the molecular underpinnings of genetics had led him toseminal discoveries of the variation which exists in virtually every popula-tion of organisms (Lewontin and Hubby, 1966).

Wilson and MacArthur, meanwhile, had been working on island bio-geography. This subject was "terribly messy", it was "a major unformedfield, full of various fragments of information, just like the social sciencestoday; it had no structure like population genetics . . ." (Wilson, InterviewNo. 2). Exactly for this reason, Wilson felt the challenge to go into this field

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and provide it with structure, and his collaboration with MacArthur wasmost fruitful - Wilson "knew what the real world was like" and MacArthurwas a sophisticated modeler. And equally important: both of them were"visionaries", according to Wilson (ibid.). Once the field of biogeographywas structured, it was only natural for Wilson to be on the lookout forother "messy fields". Social behavior was a clear candidate. But forrigorous structuring, he would be needing the help of topnotch populationgeneticists. Therefore, it is no wonder that Wilson was interested inbringing Lewontin to Harvard from Chicago ("he was the best", InterviewNo. 2), hoping for a concentration of efforts in the development of newtheory in evolutionary biology. And, with the help of Ernst Mayr, thedoyen among evolutionists, Wilson was successful. He even took pains toconvince Harvard that Lewontin, who he knew had become a Marxistunder Levins' tutelage, would be able to keep politics and science separateat Harvard (Interview No. 3).

Why then did Lewontin feel obliged, almost literally, to bite the handthat fed him? This can only be attributed to the development of his owncritical agenda at that time. While he was not in principle against anattempt to create an integrated sociobiology (see Lewontin, 1976),28 it washis own changed attitudes to large-scale model-building in conjunctionwith his concern with "correct" epistemology, methodology and ontologythat made him opposed to Wilson's synthesis. Rather soon after his game-theoretical efforts, Lewontin's reductionist interests in the molecular basisof genetics took over, and his position henceforth was that "God is in thedetails" (cf. Lewontin, 1982b), i.e., good science is based on carefullyestablished facts, not on ambitious models. But in addition Sociobiologyhappened to emerge at a time when the fight against racism triggered bythe Jensen and Herrnstein controversies was still going on, albeit at a lowerlevel of intensity, and in which Lewontin had high stakes as a scientificand moral/political critic. 29 In other words, Wilson got caught both onLewontin's inbred despite-himself reductionism, and on Lewontin's newmoral concerns!

Already at Chicago, Lewontin had taken upon himself to reveal "racist"research, and in 1973 he was the first signer of a petition published as anadvertisement in the New York Times (September 28, 1973), urging for astop to "racist" research. (This advertisement acquired over 1000 signa-tures.) His attitude in the 1975 article criticizing research in cognitiveabilities (Lewontin, 1975a) is essentially alike. But at the same time,Lewontin had contributed research which could be used to dismiss sugges-tions, such as the one by Arthur Jensen, that there may be a genetic basisfor cognitive differences between different racial groups. One of Lewon-tin's major discoveries in the 1960's had been of the variation within andwithout groups and the fact that most variation crosses group boundaries.For humans, Lewontin (1972b) found that the same was true at least for

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blood group data. In turn, this came to be accepted by liberals and left-wing academics as definitive counter-evidence to any biological basis fordifferences between races.

Now, consistent with his moral/political agenda, Lewontin in theNOVA program on Public Television in February 1975 took earlier andcontemporary scientists to task for "lying" about genetic differences whileposing as experts. And, in this program, Lewontin warned the publicagainst a new racism raging in academia, and told them to watch outfor "experts" attempting to legitimize the status quo. This explains whyWilson's book, Sociobiology, appearing when it did, depending as it did onpopulation genetics, and full of claims about humankind, was Lewontin'snatural next target for critical examination of political messages and racistimplications.

But just how did Sociobiology now feed into Lewontin's anti-racistagenda? Wilson prides himself on being a fairly liberal thinker - the sortof person who naturally falls to the left of center politically. There is noovert racism in Sociobiology.3 0 And, indeed, it is difficult to see howWilson, in stressing population genetics which is expressly based onindividual variation, could be construed as a racist, emphasizing groupdifferences, especially since Wilson explicitly quotes Lewontin's 1972paper dealing with blood group data, adding:

There is no a priori reason for supposing that this sample of genes possesses a dis-tribution much different from those of other, less accessible systems affecting behavior.(Wilson, 1975a, p. 550)31

Lewontin drew a connection by association. What he said when inter-viewed in the Harvard Crimson in December 1975 was the following:"Sociobiology is not a racist doctrine, but any kind of genetic determinismcan and does feed other kinds, including the belief that some races aresuperior to others." This was enough reason why sociobiology had to bestopped. Starting with the New York Review of Books, a stream of articlesand addresses, with and without co-thinkers, Lewontin anathematized theWilsonian program.

Where did Lewontin's specific logic of critique come from? Again, wemust return to origins. Like Wilson, Lewontin inherited a scientific-cum-moral agenda from his mentor, in this case the eminent Russian-Americangeneticist, Theodosius Dobzhansky. And like Wilson, Lewontin also"transformed" the original agenda. For Dobzhansky, "population thinking"was both a scientific and a moral/political issue. Scientifically, it had to dowith the accurate depiction of evolutionary processes on the basis ofMendelian genetics. Morally/politically, an emphasis of the importance ofvariation within a population, i.e., individual genetic differences instead ofgroup averages or "types", would combat easy stereotyping and racism.Additionally, Dobzhansky had a social vision based on science: increased

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knowledge of individual genetic differences would help both individualsand society maximize their potential (e.g., Dobzhansky, 1968, 1974).

Lewontin, however, took over only part of his thinking: the oppositionto typological thinking and group averages in science, and the oppositionto racism in society. What he did not accept, because of his new ideologicalcommitments, was the necessary counterpart to this view: the stress onindividual genetic differences. Any significant influence of the genes, withinor without the group, would be bad, and therefore had to be discounted asa significant causal factor. No doubt, one reason for this was precisely theease with which the "innocent layman" and academics alike might still becaught in typological thinking, or like Jensen, feel free to extrapolate fromindividual differences to group differences - a scientific error with socialimplications. Ironically, therefore, apart from Wilson, the prime targets ofLewontin's attacks as a critic have been exactly such scientists who haveexplicitly voiced Dobzhansky-style beliefs about the social value of identi-fying individual genetically based talent.32

But for Lewontin, typological thinking has to do with more than racedifferences: it is applicable to any assertion about inherent differencesbetween human groups, be these based on race, sex, class or ethnicity. Thefight against typological thinking has been expanded into a fight against"biological determinism" in general (cf. Lewontin, 1977b). According toLewontin, the pronouncements by American academics about inherentdifferences between groups have always served to uphold the social statusquo. In the United States, the groups typically discriminated against havebeen blacks and southern and eastern European immigrants, so it is notsurprising that "the academic science produced by white northern Euro-pean culture has consistently shown the racial superiority of white northernEuropeans" (Lewontin, 1977b). Lewontin continues his demonstration byholding the early American IQ testers responsible for the ethnic quotasestablished in the notorious Immigration Act of 1924, using Kamin (1974)as his reference.3 3

Thus, for Lewontin, the fight against typological thinking in generalmeans not only an attack on research explicitly intended to establish aninnate basis for group differences, but also an attack on any research ondifferences in innate ability between individuals, because of the ease withwhich such differences might be correlated with some social category, likerace, sex, ethnic group or class, and thereby be used as ground fordiscriminatory social practices in the service of the social power holders.

Therefore, while Wilson's sociobiological program, for it to be amenableto the formulas of population genetics, was dependent exactly on a postu-lated available genetic variation in human behavioral traits, it was preciselythis feature of the program that Lewontin, in order to combat racism and"biological determinism", would have to oppose. And while Wilson'sscientific-cum-moral agenda motivated him to accept the existing research

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in human behavioral genetics at face value, Lewontin's critical agendamade him dismiss most of the research in this field as not meetingminimum scientific standards (cf. Lewontin, 1975a).3 4

One further feature of Lewontin's specific logic has to be emphasized. Itseems that for him "good science" is modern science and "bad science" isold-fashioned science. But, in addition, good science is defined as the typeof science Lewontin does himself in his laboratory. I quote once more fromthe NOVA program: Stating that recently the old attitudes of Americanacademics, especially racist geneticists and psychologists, have come to thefore again, he concludes:

So we have the same old story, untrue statements, facts which are not facts, logic whichis not logic, to prove that there are important genetic differences between races. Yeteverything that modern genetics, the kind of genetics that goes on in our lab, forexample, tells us is that Darwin was right in the first place. That most of the geneticvariation that occurs in the human species and indeed in most species, is betweenindividuals within any group, and rather little of it is between groups.

We can now see why it was "necessary" for Lewontin (and the other critics)to describe Wilson as an old-fashioned and bad scientist in the New YorkReview of Books letter and the ensuing longer criticism in 1976,35 and aspresenting facts that were not facts. Like in the Agassiz case, Lewontindiscounted the possibility that Wilson may have himself believed in theplausibility of the behavioral genetic evidence on scientific grounds.3 6 Theaim here was the same as in Lewontin's criticism of Jensen some five yearsearlier: to show how ideological assumptions lead to "bad science". Acorollary of Lewontin's position is also worth noting: it appears that hebelieves that modern science - his own science - would be immune fromthe influence of ideology, or at least, that he himself, because of hisideological awareness, would be beyond moral criticism for disseminating"facts that are not facts". As I will argue below, such a precarious positionmay well have backfired and contributed to the clash between Lewontinand Wilson in conjunction with Genes, Mind, and Culture.

Thus, while Lewontin has genuine meta-scientific disagreements withWilson, he was here forced by his own logic and critical strategy as well asby his commitment to the public in the NOVA program to look forscientific and moral "errors" in his colleague. This is why Wilson was saidto have "old-fashioned" views of genes and not to be aware of the currentproblems of, e.g., adaptation, while he in fact discussed these matters atlength in his book (while explicitly choosing, for heuristical reasons,particular theories as building blocks for his program).

Parenthetically, not surprisingly, it was these charges which really struckhome. It was especially hurtful for Wilson to be thus described as a badscientist. He wished the critics had acknowledged his general scholarshipand then said that he had gone too far in speculating about humans

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(Interview No. 2). No doubt, it was at least partially because of the slighton his professional abilities that Wilson was spurred on in his theorizingabout human sociobiology, a matter to which we shall turn now.

GENES, MIND,AND CULTURE

We have before us two men acknowledged as leading evolutionists,former partners in the aim to take over and reform their discipline, butnow fundamentally divided over epistemological strategies, moral con-cerns, and their evaluation of worthwhile science. Moreover, in addition tothe scientific and moral interests involved, one has to allow for genuinedifferences in "cognitive style", which border on the esthetic conceptions ofthese two scientists. Lewontin pays more attention to "keeping it clean",while Wilson is especially attracted to "unformed" areas in evolutionarybiology, where he can bring about order. In this context, it is interesting tonote that Wilson considers himself the scientifically radical and Lewontinthe scientifically conservative:

Lewontin had always struck me as being the conservative in that little group. He was in afield that was already highly developed, he adored Theodosius Dobzhansky, his teacher,he took pride in the advanced and sophisticated nature of the field he was in, populationgenetics, which is the best developed ... while the rest of us were talking about fieldswhich had not been formulated yet. ... Lewontin always struck me as not being avisionary. He never said "we are going to create new ways of thinking". He was always,even in the 60's, sitting in the safe domain, questioning and so on. He is very IQ bright,he is not creative-bright.... I think that is what he meant when he once said that Levinsis brighter than him ... he cannot conceive of new ways of thinking the way Levins andMacArthur did.... Although, I don't want to do him an injustice - he has done someextremely ingenious things - but I always had the feeling that, even before his radicaldays, he was always hugging the coast.... (Wilson, Interview No. 2)

Thus, the situation could be described as an opposition between apurist, critical, logical view with slightly negativistic overtones (Lewontin),and a practically oriented, opportunistic, speculative and generally "posi-tive" model-building approach, where judgment is postponed until later(Wilson).3 7 From the protagonists' own perspectives, the first approach is"serious science" (Lewontin) or "too safe" (Wilson), while the latter one iseither "creative and risky" (Wilson) or "not serious" (Lewontin). It isobvious that the scientists' self-perceptions play a role here: they are either"constructors" or "cleaners", "planters" or "weeders", depending on howthey see themselves as contributing to the progress of science. Moreover,"planting" and "weeding" here not only have to do with the production andcriticism of knowledge. Lewontin's emphasis on the need for "correct"facts makes it an additional moral/political obligation for him to weed out"bad science." The importance of having correct facts, again, is tied to his

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view that true knowledge does not lend itself to abuse.3 8 For Wilson, thesituation is less problematic: science, rather than "unaided intuition" oughtto guide our social progress and ethical choices; science can be objective ifscientists try hard enough, and the democratic process will lead to sensiblechoices in the application of results (e.g., Wilson, 1978b). There is, thus, afundamentally different conception of the moral role of the scientist tied inwith Wilson's and Lewontin's meta-scientific concerns.

I want now to follow through the controversy about sociobiology,especially human sociobiology, centering on the work Genes, Mind, andCulture, which Wilson published in 1981, co-authored by a youngCanadian physicist, Charles Lumsden. I hope thereby to confirm what hasbeen said already about the various factors entering into the Wilson/Lewontin clash, and also to explain how the earlier conflict between theirscientific-cum-moral agendas came to a head with this new book.

After Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Wilson expanded his finalchapter dealing with Homo sapiens into a full-length work, On HumanNature (Wilson, 1978a). But, although Wilson here took the opportunity torespond to some of the criticism of Sociobiology, it was essentially adevelopment of earlier ideas. Wilson's next significant conceptual movescame through collaboration with Lumsden, who had joined Wilson's lab asa post-doctoral student.39 In thus working with one who had considerablemathematical talents, the naturalist Wilson followed a familiar pattern, forhe had previously worked with similarly formally gifted thinkers (Mac-Arthur on biogeography and George Oster on caste in the hymenoptera).4 0

Genes, Mind, and Culture, the major fruit of the Wilson/Lumsdenpartnership, draws on highly abstract mathematical models (developed inphysics) and attempts to put human sociobiology on the firm theoretical,quantitative basis that the critics had found lacking in Wilson's earlierwork. In particular, the authors met head-on a criticism often made byLewontin and others:

Population genetics makes quantitative predictions about the rates of change of geneticcomposition with time and also provides actual data on the quantitative geneticdifferences in gene frequencies in present-day human groups. Both kinds of numbers aretoo small to fit sociobiological theory. Only 100 generations have passed since theRoman Republic and this time span is far too short for there to have been any majorchange in gene frequencies. Yet human social institutions have undergone an extra-ordinary change in those few generations. In a mere 30 generations, Islam rose fromnothing to be the greatest culture of the Western World and then declined again intopowerlessness. How can one compare the social institutions of the modern British withthe political, social and economic institutions of Roman Britain? Moreover, at least 85per cent of known human genetic variation exists, at present, within any local nationalpopulation and at least 95 per cent within any modern major race. How are we toexplain, on a genetic basis, the immense cultural differences between present daypopulations? The sociobiologists have the answer. It is the "multiplier effect".(Lewontin, 1976)

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Using ideas introduced in Wilson's earlier works, Lumsden and Wilsonargue that even small genetic differences and changes can explode up intosignificant cultural differences and changes; that there can be feedback,from cultural change to genetic change. But, whereas in previous worksthis had been little more than an unsubstantiated suggestion (and criticizedby Lewontin and others), now the claim was that the "multiplier effect" hadbeen made fully scientifically respectable.

It cannot be denied that, in respects, Genes, Mind, and Culture wassomething of a rush job. Wilson admitted this himself, as he and Lumsdenwere pressed for time, knowing about other possibly competing workers,particularly Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman and their simultaneous effort toproduce models of cultural change (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981)(Interview No. 2). But on the other hand, Wilson was in 1981 very proudof his and Lumsden's achievement and believed that Genes, Mind, andCulture had won the race:

We produced the first theory! We are the only game in town! We are the only ones whohave a theory which takes what is known about cognitive psychology, development, andso on, and ties this together in a series of models and conceptual schemes. (ibid.)

At the very outset of Genes, Mind, and Culture, Lumsden and Wilsonare quite explicit about how they differ from earlier views on humansociobiology:

For mankind at least, these postulates are radically incorrect. Behavior is not explicit inthe genes, and mind cannot be treated as a mere replica of behavioral traits. In this bookwe propose a very different view in which the genes prescribe a set of biologicalprocesses, which we call epigenetic rules, that direct the assembly of the mind ....(C)ulture is the translation of the epigenetic rules into mass patterns of mental activityand behavior.... Genes are indeed linked to culture, but in a deep and subtle manner.(op. cit., p. 2)

Here we have, then, a realization of Wilson's basic scientific-cum-moralagenda. He has now found a way of integrating social and natural science,applying evolutionary biology to the most central concerns of the socialsciences, by demonstrating that it is indeed possible to derive patterns ofcultural diversity from what he calls "biological ground rules". At the sametime, he is now able to satisfy his metaphysical urge to eliminate traditionaltheology by a view based on materialism and evolution.

The reason why Wilson feels he is approaching his goal is tied in withhis epistemological conviction that something has been explained if wehave been able to create a model of it. He is most explicit about this pointin an address to a conference about science and religion in 1979, where hewarns the theologians that if he succeeds in recreating "all nuances ofhuman behavior", including religious faith, in vitro,41 he would haveexplained away any divine influences.4 2 He admits, however, that "God is

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still a viable hypothesis", but suggests that the creation of a synthetic godwould constitute the ultimate refutation of that view (Wilson, 1980). WhenI asked Wilson in interview whether he really believed this, he answeredthat he classifies himself as an "expansionist" in the Loren Graham (1981)sense, i.e., he sees no limits to science:

I just believe, to put it as simply as possible, that science should be able to go in arelatively few decades to the point of producing a humanoid robot which would walkthrough that door. The first robot would think and talk like a Southern Baptist minister,and the second robot would talk like John Rawls. In other words, somehow I believethat we can reconstitute, recreate, the most mysterious features of human mental activ-ity. That's an article of faith but it has to do with expansionism. That's expansionism.(Wilson, Interview No. 3)

At the same time, Genes, Mind, and Culture is the final explication ofthe "multiplier effect" and a demonstration of how it is possible, after all, forthe genes to hold culture (read: religion) on a leash. In fact, the authorsthemselves state in the Introduction to their book:

The epigenetic rules will ... tend to channel cognitive development toward certainculturgens as opposed to others. We refer to this relation informally as the 'leash prin-ciple' in order to make it metaphorically more vivid: genetic natural selection operates insuch a way as to keep culture on a leash. (Op. cit., p. 13)

One of the chief criticisms of sociobiology has been that it is nottestable, or deliberately unfalsifiable.4 3 Here we now have a deliberateattempt to put the sociobiology argument in explicit mathematical form.How is testability related to the models in Genes, Mind, and Culture?Wilson rejects the accusation that the sociobiology of Genes, Mind, andCulture is non-testable:

I believe that what most people mean when they say: . . . "sociobiology is all-explanatoryand therefore explains nothing", is: they are referring specifically to natural selectionhypotheses concerning human behavior, and even that is completely wrong, becausethere are again in the explanation of human behavior with the aid of sociobiology awhole range of specific explanatory schemes dealing with different phenomena frombrother-sister incest to territorial behavior, the shaping of color vocabulary amongcultures ... and if those sets of explanations fail, then the general conception ofevolution by natural selection and sociobiology would be in trouble ... There are plentyof ways to put it into trouble ... if human societies were known in which the brother-sister incest taboo were negated or reversed, it would be in trouble; if situations werefound in which special unilateral care of closest relatives were abrogated in favor ofmore distant related people at cousin level, or even more, of strangers - and so ondown the list of virtually every one of the main entries and modes of analysis.

... Furthermore, now that we are entering cognition and incorporating that into theory

... we are no longer talking about general tendencies such as incest, territorial behaviorand the like, we are talking about culturalpatterns, and so ... we expect certain patternsof cultural diversity to originate and not others, and that would put in jeopardy a wholerange of the theory. (Interview No. 4)

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In other words, Wilson is convinced that, methodologically, sociobiology isnow (in Genes, Mind, and Culture) on safe ground. Wilson has, thus, goneahead with his program, answered his critics, and created explicit, testablemathematical models for his claims. More specifically, he has coped withthe criticism of the mysterious "multiplier effect", which had been undersuspicion ever since the critics' first letter in the New York Review ofBooks. As we saw earlier, Lewontin in his 1976 PSA paper considered the"multiplier effect" one of the chief problems of Wilson's sociobiologicalprogram.

What is, then, Lewontin's reaction to Wilson's efforts in 1981? In hisreview of Genes, Mind, and Culture (entitled 'Sleight of Hand') in TheSciences (Lewontin, 1981a), Lewontin, far from being appeased, delivershis heaviest blow so far against the efforts of his colleague. He callsLumsden and Wilson's central claim 'absurd',4 4 their model equally'absurd', their assumptions of the nature of mind and culture 'vulgarreductionist' and their mathematical models based on some 'curiouschoices'. Lewontin's bottom line is that the authors have tried to 'save'sociobiology by demonstrating that the multiplier effect works, after all.Thus, far from redeeming himself in Lewontin's eyes for having made alegitimate (if flawed) attempt to put human sociobiology on a properfoundation and for having offered a more plausible account of the opera-tion of the multiplier effect, Wilson is almost explicitly accused of aconspiracy:

The argument is now complete. A small difference in natural selection will cause a smallchange in gene frequencies, the small change in gene frequencies will cause a smallchange in "epigenetic rules," and a small change in epigenetic rules will lead to a hugechange in the culturgen frequency in different populations. So, the multiplier effectworks after all, and sociobiology is saved. The only trouble is that each step of themodel-building process is carefully designed to achieve that end. The authors have triedto cover their tracks by dusting their path with epsilons and deltas, but the plan is clear.(Lewontin, 1981a)

OUTSIDE REACTION

To understand why Lewontin's review had a systematically negative tone,we have to go back to his long-range scientific-cum-moral agenda and seehow Genes, Mind, and Culture in fact became antithetical to some of hismost deeply felt convictions. But it is instructive first to discuss otherreviews of this book, especially a review that a serious critic might havebeen expected to write. Such a review is the one by the English biologistJohn Maynard Smith and anthropologist Neil Warren in Evolution in1982.

While some of the initial reviews of Genes, Mind, and Culture werepositive, many were very negative, accusing Lurnsden and Wilson of such

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things as "mathematical puffery" and neologisms.4 5 The anthropologistEdmund Leach wrote a particularly slashing review in Nature, suggestingthe book came very close to a parody (Leach, 1981). A common feature ofsome of the negative reviews was also that they regarded it as an error touse a particularistic view of mind and culture. But none of the initialreviews dealt seriously with the mathematics involved, despite the fact thatthe central claims of the book were supposedly derived just from itsmathematical models. If this was indeed the case, then criticism of otheraspects of the book could be seen as reactions having to do with moreextraneous things, such as, e.g., a particular critic's personal taste. Theproblem was only that no one seemed willing to deal with the mathematicsin the detail necessary to either substantiate or refute the authors' claims.46

Maynard Smith and Warren redress the balance, although as it happens,while commending Wilson for spelling out in clear mathematical form thedifferent models and thus improve the testability of sociobiological hypo-theses, they end up taking a rather negative view of Genes, Mind, andCulture. But, what is interesting is the background to this review. In July1981 when Maynard Smith was interviewed, he was just in the process ofreading the Lumsden and Wilson book in order to review it for Evolution.He explained that it was very frustrating reading and that it was going totake one month or more of his life, but that he felt that someone who wascompetent in mathematics simply had to examine the models and theirassumptions. Exactly because of the anticipated labor, he had consistentlyrefused to review this book. However, after seeing the reviews of others(especially the one by Leach) he felt that the book had to be "properly"criticized and that would mean going to the most fundamental models inthe book to see if they were sound. At the time of the interview, he saidthat he had absolutely no idea how the review would come out, because alldepended on the mathematics. To clarify obscure points, he engagedhimself in a lengthy correspondence with Charles Lumsden, asking him forexplanations, especially regarding the mathematics involved in the deriva-tion of the "counter-intuitive" result that culture speeds up genetic change(see Maynard Smith and Warren, 1982, p. 626). It is also worth noting thatMaynard Smith invited the anthropologist Neil Warren as a co-reviewerexactly to counterbalance any possible bias that he himself might have(personal communication).

For Maynard Smith and Warren, it was crucial to study the mathematicsinvolved in Lumsden's and Wilson's models in order to assess the bookcorrectly. Why was this, when the authors themselves repeatedly say thatthe book can be read without the mathematics? The answer can best beseen in relation to another book on models simultaneously reviewed,Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's Cultural Transmission and Evolution (1981).According to the reviewers:

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The crucial difference between CF and LW, therefore, is that the former present alogical structure, the conclusions from which depend on empirical data which theauthors consider to be still largely lacking, whereas the latter are making importantassertions about the nature of man and society. For this reason, it was clear to us beforewe tackled the models in LW that we must decide whether the models do in fact justifythe assertions made. Further, since the models will inevitably be opaque to manyreaders, we ask whether the predictions of the models are in any sense counter-intuitive,or whether they are of a kind which can readily be understood without elaboratemathematical calculations. (Maynard Smith and Warren, 1982, p. 622, italics added.)

What is the conclusion of Maynard Smith and Warren after theirlengthy work? (It took several months, not just one). Like many reviewers(and, indeed, Lumsden and Wilson themselves, op. cit., p. 296), theyconsider it one of the central claims of the book to be that the "thousandyear rule", according to which the genetic basis of human cultural behavioris likely to change in the order of one thousand years, is deducible from themodel. If this conclusion holds, then the already-seen criticism of someonelike Lewontin, objecting to sociobiology (as science) on the grounds of thespeed of cultural change, is answered. Maynard Smith and Warren say thisabout the rule:

There is no sense in which the thousand year rule follows from the model. It followsfrom the assumptions of strong selection and high heritability.... Our conclusion, then,is that little that is not self-evident emerges from the models, and that the results whichLW regard as important, like the "thousand year rule", do not depend on the culturalcomponents of the model. Our complaint is not that genetic and cultural processes havenot interacted during human evolution, but that the models in LW do not do much toilluminate the interaction. (Op. cit., pp. 624-625)

Maynard Smith and Wilson also note Lumsden and Wilson's dismissalof models like those of Piaget, Levi-Strauss and Chomsky with the argu-ment that these are not experimentally based, but comment that strictrequirements for experimental design would simultaneously disqualifynearly all the evidence Lumsden and Wilson themselves consider (ibid.).Additionally they observe omissions and "cavalierly sampled" data.

We must not assume simply that the reviewers are set against anyattempt at putting human sociobiology on a firm basis. Indeed, it isimportant in this context that Maynard Smith considers human socio-biology quite legitimate, and in an interview said that the anthropologistMildred Dickeman especially had convinced him about the applicability ofsociobiological models to humans (Interview No. 41). Furthermore, thereviewers take a strong public stance against other critics like Leach:"Ridicule is not an alternative to criticism." And as to criticisms that thebook's models are reductionist, they retort: "It is not obviously true that anatomistic analysis of society is doomed to failure." Finally, Maynard Smith,while a friend of Lewontin's, has systematically been defending Wilson'swork against political accusations (Maynard Smith, 1975, 1978a).

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But the negative conclusions of Maynard Smith and Warren are not ofcentral concern here. The importance of their review lies not so much inthe conclusions themselves, but in the way the review throws light on ourtwo main characters, Wilson and Lewontin. On the one hand, as alreadynoted, the review is undoubtedly a model of what one might have expectedfrom serious critics of Genes, Mind, and Culture, and thus serves as a foilfor Lewontin's review to be discussed next. Wilson is faulted on purelyscientific grounds. On the other hand, the review surely underlines thepowerful extra-scientific factors which drive Wilson into areas where hisfellows will not follow.

BAD FAITH?

Turning now to Lewontin's reaction to Genes, Mind, and Culture, weencounter an altogether different tone and approach. As we saw, Wilsonand Lumsden are almost explicitly accused of bad faith, at least of verysharp practice.

Is then the attempt of Lumsden and Wilson to mathematically justify themultiplier effect in itself a "crime" of some sort from Lewontin's point ofview? No, says Lewontin, this was something that any scientist, includinghimself, would have done, because after all, both he and others haverepeatedly criticized Wilson and said that sociobiology must be able toexplain the big difference between human cultures:

And that is a very, very serious criticism of this theory, and that has to be met. And so,my assertion is that Genes, Mind, and Culture is a concrete attempt to develop a modelwhich will meet that criticism. It's a perfectly valid thing to do. I mean, if I make a theoryand people say: yes, but, ah, the theory has a hole in it!, what do I do next? I sit downand patch the hole, showing that it is plausible that even under my theory these thingswill happen. So there is nothing bad, or evil (laugh), or dishonest about trying to create amodel which patches a hole in a theory! ... What was nasty in my review was that giventhat the book was written for that purpose it was written dishonestly - I said that.Q: You did?A: Well, I didn't use the word "dishonest", but I used all kinds of nasty kinds of words... "covering the tracks with epsilons and deltas"....Q: So you were aware that it sounded nasty?A: I meant it to sound nasty! I meant the review to be a nasty review! The one thing thatwasn't nasty - I am just trying to be very careful here: the review was a nasty review,and I meant it to be a nasty review - it is a nasty book! - but the one thing that is notnasty in the review is the assertion that the reason the book is written is to cover aprevious hole in the theory! (Interview No. 8)

So then why was the review written in a nasty tone, if Lewontin contendsthat Lumsden's and Wilson's behavior is indeed scientifically defensible?Lewontin's answer is:

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I don't really think we are engaged primarily in an intellectual issue. I do not think thatwhat he has been doing for the last ten years has been primarily motivated by a genuinedesire to find out something true about the world, and therefore I don't think it isserious. One of the reasons my book review of Lumsden and Wilson had a kind ofsneering tone is that it is the way I genuinely feel about the project, namely that it is nota serious, intellectual project. Because I have only two possibilities open to me. Either itis a serious intellectual project, and Ed Wilson can't think, or he can think, but it is not aserious project and therefore he is making all the mistakes he can - he does. If it is areally deep serious project, then he simply lowers himself in my opinion as an intellec-tual. ... It is a question of what kind of intellectual work you have to do to meet acertain intellectual pretension to explanation about the world. If I am going to sit downand write a theory about how all of human culture is explained by biology, I have a lotof epistemological groundwork to learn, I mean, a fantastic amount. . . . I mean, theseguys have just jumped feet first into a kind of naive and vulgar kind of biological expla-nation of the world, and the consequence is a failure. It is a failure as a system of expla-nation because they haven't done their homework.... I have to honestly say that mychief feeling - I'll be honest about my chief feeling when I consider all this stuff - it'sone of disdain. I don't know what to say, I mean, it's cheap! (Lewontin, Interview No. 8)

So Lewontin sees Wilson as spurred primarily by career or other baseambitions, and as "not doing his homework".

The meta-scientific level of Lewontin's critique is strongly highlighted bythe indignant response of Wilson to this charge. According to Wilson ininterview, in-depth preparation is exactly what he has got behind himself,because he believes that he has correctly presented both the newestdevelopments and the consensus in the different fields on which he reliesin Genes, Mind, and Culture:

Even in cognitive psychology, which is not my field, we checked a lot of the recentliterature and consulted with a couple of cognitive psychologists about what is the latest

Q: Does this mean you would claim that you are on top of the consensus in cognitivepsychology?A: Precisely! Of course, everyone trying to cover such a broad field is subject to critic-ism, but I would suggest we are less than most, because we put in an enormous amountof work. You see all those boxes points to a room-length of file boxes] - those areprimary references ... that's what I do! Note that in the field of population geneticswhere we present a consensus we were not opposed by anyone of the populationgeneticists, not Lewontin, not Hartl, not Maynard Smith - none of them said that wehad misrepresented in any way the latest views ... that is true about Dawkins, but that isnot true about us. (Interview No. 3)47

The same view is reflected in an unpublished letter written by Wilsonand Lumsden to the editors of Nature in response to Leach's (1981)slashing review of the book:

In his May 21 review of our book Genes, Mind, and Culture, Edmund Leach presentshimself as a professional anthropologist and us as amateurs whose statements in thefield are sufficiently error-filled to be dismissible. But in the examples cited it is he who

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is in error. He appears not to have analyzed the recent relevant literature of anthro-pology, whereas we made a conscientious attempt to do so in preparing our monograph.

Thus, "homework" for Wilson means finding the most recent primaryreferences and taking them at face value, while homework for Lewontinmeans critical scrutiny of the various elements going into larger model-building. Their views about homework are obviously linked to their viewsabout scientific progress. This can be seen among others in Wilson'sanswer to the question whether Lewontin's main criticism might not derivefrom his view of science as based on certified knowledge:

A: He might believe it himself, but if he does, he is overlooking most of the historyof science, which shows that the boldest advances are often due to those conceptualleaps -Q: Which were not proven at the time?A: Yes, that's right! (Interview No. 2)

Here it becomes clear that Wilson has a dual approach to modeling. Headmits that he is telling a story but he also believes that it will eventually beproven true (Interview No. 2). He is expecting other scientists to fill in themissing conceptual links following the developments in different relevantfields (ibid.). This in turn is based on his view of science as proceeding inbold leaps and and his view of the "tractability" of an area.

Asked whether he does not perceive the danger that the models mayhave nothing to do with reality (Lewontin's main point, in his 1974 book),Wilson answered:

It has happened in some fields, such as population genetics, it makes this field arid. Onthe other hand, because of the ebullience of scientific research and creativity, wheneverconceptual expansion is possible in addition to mathematical modeling, experiments andso on, it gets done. Increasing aridity in a field - as everyone agrees happened intheoretical population genetics - is usually not so much the capture of the field by themathematicians or the ossification of the thinking of a few key individuals, although thiscontributes; it is usually because the area turns out to be less tractable than they thought.Whenever an area is even moderately tractable, approachable, doable, it gets done.(Interview No. 2)

There is no question, then, that for Wilson modeling is the key to scientificprogress.

We have seen that, in the 1960's, Wilson and Lewontin had a commoninterest in creating new models in evolutionary biology and shared manyconvictions about the evolutionary process. Indeed, Lewontin himself (e.g.Lewontin, 1961) tried to create game-theoretical models, which would givestrong predictive results. But, Lewontin's point is now that that was"evolutionary theory on the cheap" and that God is in the details" (cf.Lewontin, 1982b). In interview he even mentioned that he sometimesblushes when he thinks about his former large-scale attempts. Thus, at one

76


level, it is probably enough to explain the tone of Lewontin's review ofGenes, Mind, and Culture on the basis that, according to him, Wilson hadproduced evolutionary theory "on the cheap". But considering that Lewon-tin has abandoned large-scale modeling himself for philosophical reasons,he is not really in direct competition with Wilson in the sense of who hasthe better theory. Hence, even at this level, the disagreement is rather inthe realm of the nature of good science in general and biological theory inparticular, i.e., on a meta-scientific level.

But there is another reason why Genes, Mind, and Culture drivesWilson's and Lewontin's different conception of scientific modeling to ahead-on collision: this is the first case where Wilson is attemption to modelnot ecological systems but human beings and human societies. FromLewontin's point of view, Wilson's assumptions about individuals andsociety are both methodologically and ontologically erroneous, while Wil-son defends his reductionistic view as correct on both accounts.4 8 Further-more, Wilson is not only engaging himself in "incorrect" modeling ofhuman beings, he is also trying to sell his reductionist program to the socialsciences, thus undermining their struggling efforts toward "correct" holistictheory formation.

Yet, the dispute cuts still more deeply, and just as we had to refer backto explain Wilson's efforts, so also we must refer back to explainLewontin's critique. From Lewontin's point of view, it is blatantly obviousthat if the overall thesis of Genes, Mind, and Culture is granted or notopposed, then this is a further driving in of the wedge of "biologicaldeterminism" that was first inserted by Sociobiology: The New Synthesis(and, immediately before that by the arguments of such people as Jensenand Herrnstein). Thus, the controversy about Genes, Mind, and Cultureshould be seen as a culmination of the conflict between Wilson's andLewontin's scientific-cum-moral agendas.

In this context, two factors in particular should be emphasized. First,Genes, Mind, and Culture is the point where Wilson, with Lumsden's help,most explicitly uses population genetics, Lewontin's field, to suit his ownpurposes (i.e., to prove that it is at least theoretically possible for genes tohold culture on a leash). Second, there is an even more irritating matter. Forthe multiplier effect to operate, Wilson needs at least some genetic varia-tion between groups. What is his evidence for this? None other than thesmall genetic differences between human groups that Lewontin discoveredusing molecular techniques. As we have seen, from the already given quoteby Lewontin, these differences are slight - only 15% of the variationwithin human blood types exists between groups, whereas 85% of the var-iation is shared across groups. Wilson argues nevertheless that this smallamount is enough for the multiplier effect to take action. Thus, Wilsonturns on their head those very differences which have become the basis forthe liberal and left-wing argument against racism!

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Lewontin is therefore put in the uncomfortable situation of havingproduced research that may be used, after the fashion of Genes, Mind, andCulture, to support the argument for "innate cultural differences". At thesame time he is well aware that among the left the "multiplier effect" hasfrom the very beginning been considered politically suspect, and thatgroups such as CAR (Committee Against Racism) have consistentlyattacked Wilson as racist, among others on this ground.4 9 But this, then,would mean that Lewontin has indirectly contributed to the abuse ofbiological theory, quite contrary to his intentions to provide "good modernscience" as against "bad old science" (see, e.g., the NOVA program in1975)! Lewontin's deliberate scientific effort to dispel racism has thus beencast in dubious light by Wilson and Lumsden. The Genes, Mind, and Cul-ture theory "must" be wrong, because otherwise Lewontin is in trouble.

This may therefore be part of the reason why Lewontin in his reviewpresents Wilson's model-building not only as scientifically unacceptablebut as overall suspect, and as having ulterior (though unspecified) motives.There is a moral question at issue here, with Wilson's work threateningLewontin's own integrity as an ideologically unimpeachable Marxist in theeyes of his left-wing audience. The readers that Lewontin cares about willknow what he means when he begins and ends his review with the state-ment: "Nothing makes sense except in the light of history."

THE USES OF CONTROVERSY

It is ironical that in the case where Lewontin most clearly spells out hisepistemological, methodological and ontological objections to modeling ofthe Wilson and Lumsden type, his "coupled" agenda, with its obligatoryconspiracy setup and occasional Marxist puns, de facto prevents him fromreaching Wilson at the desired meta-scientific level. What happens insteadis that Wilson can choose to get offended by his tone and refuse to takehim seriously.5 0 Thus, in their reply to Lewontin's attact, the authors ofGenes, Mind, and Culture (Lumsden and Wilson, 198 lb) turn his criticismto their own advantage, stating that Lewontin has not addressed the"issue", which for them is the content of their book and the factual evi-dence, not an issue of a meta-scientific nature. This reply also producesWilson's first direct attack on Lewontin as a Marxist: Wilson definesLewontin's opposition to sociobiology as "political, not scientific", andpresents him as in principle opposed to "the very idea of an analyticalprogram of research on human society".5 Thus, far from being rebutted atthe level of his serious meta-scientific intent, Lewontin is simply told by theauthors to "fish or cut bait".52 Once more, the controversy between Wilsonand Lewontin has been reconfirmed in the public realm as a personal onewith a political basis, and once more the possibility of a serious meta-scientific communication between Lewontin and Wilson is short-circuited.

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But by now, it would be naive to believe that we have simply a case ofcognitive differences, depending on two differently made up scientific-cum-moral agendas. Once the sociobiology controversy began, strategicinterests came into play on both sides. As the debate evolved, it was inneither party's interest to straighten out misunderstandings - instead thepoint became to develop one's own position while dismissing the oppo-nent's one as "extrascientifically" motivated. This way Lewontin let Wilsongraduate to a leader first of the "adaptationist" and later of the "reduction-ist" program, while Wilson chose to retain Lewontin as a useful strawmanfor tabula rasa "Marxist" environmentalism.53 Thus, what Lewontin andWilson were really doing, while strategically defending their own newmoves in the sociobiology debate and in each particular case making theopponent a caricature of positions they wanted to attack, was using thesociobiology controversy to further their long-range scientific-cum-moralagendas. Wilson became a grateful target for Lewontin's expanding "crit-ical" program while Lewontin's political objections served Wilson well inhis ambition to promote his own "positive" program as beyond seriousscientific criticism.

Thus, paradoxically, one could describe the situation between these twoopponents in the sociobiology controversy as really one of symbiosis. It isin both parties' interest to keep the controversy going, not to clear upmisunderstandings, and not to introspect too much about where the realdifferences lie. This shows that the terms of a scientific debate,while set bythe protagonists, may not be a true representation of what the conflict is, infact, about.

In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate that Wilson and Lewontin areboth engaged in long-term agendas based on fundamentally different meta-scientific convictions strongly "coupled" to their moral self-images asscientists - agendas that were objectively on countercourse already beforethe beginning of the sociobiology controversy. In particular, the issue atstake was the "reductionist program". For Wilson, the "reductionist pro-gram" represented the tool which would help him combat metaphysicalholism and irrational religious dogma, while Lewontin felt compelled byhis more recent Marxist ambitions to criticize reductionism and especiallyreductionist claims about humans as both scientifically incorrect andpolitically suspect. And this despite (or rather, because of) Wilson's ownholistic yearnings, and Lewontin's implicit reductionism.

What I have attempted here is, in effect, an in vivo analysis and recon-struction of the sociobiology controversy. It remains to be seen whethersuch an in vivo attempt will match those of future in vitro studies.

NOTES

This group was spontaneously formed after the "announcement of Wilson's book as an'event' on the front page of The New York Times in May, 1975" (Hubbard, Interview No.

79

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25). Later this group associated itself with Science for the People. For information aboutSFTP, see, e.g., Walsh (1976).2 Waddington's review, the critics' letter and the subsequent interchanges between themand Wilson are reprinted in Caplan (1978).3 The other colleagues were Stephen J. Gould and Ruth Hubbard.4 This exchange was published in BioScience 16 (No. 3), 1976. Lewontin was, in fact, thechief author of the longer critical position paper on which the BioScience article was based(Lewontin, Interview No. 7). For more details about the early stages of the controversy, seeSegerstrale (1983), Appendix A.5 According to Ernst Mayr (Interview No. 12), the politicization of the criticism ofsociobiology caused at least three scientists who had prepared "good criticical reviews" tosimply tear them up. Mayr also thought that Wilson's critics weakened their position byusing political arguments when they had perfectly good scientific criticism. As a model forhow the critics should have criticized Wilson, both Mayr and Wilson (Interview No. 2) heldup Lewontin's later paper, 'Sociobiology as an Adaptationist Program' (Lewontin, 1979).6 For representative analyses of the sociobiology controversy making this point, see Albury(1980) and Midgley (1980). It is, of course, neither logically necessary nor historically truethat a "hereditarian" position is associated with conservatism and an "environmentalist"one with progressive thought, even though the critics never bring up this fact. Many "hered-itarians" were actually socialist reformers. Examples are among others the, left-wingbiologists in Britain in the 1930's (see, e.g., Werskey 1978) and early eugenicists inGermany and the Soviet Union (see Graham, 1977). Wilson (1975c) points out the interestof, e.g., Noam Chomsky and Herbert Marcuse in the biological basis of human nature. Itshould therefore be considered an empirical question whether or not a specific "hereditar-ian" stands politically to the right or to the left. An answer as to the situation amongmodern sociobiologists is provided by van den Berghe (1980):

Actually, a review of the politics of leading sociobiologists would lend more credence tothe contention that sociobiology is a Communist conspiracy: J. B. S. Haldane, who isgenerally credited for having first hit on the notion of kin selection - a theoreticalcornerstone of sociobiology - was a leading member of the British Communist Party; sowas John Maynard Smith. E. O. Wilson and most other leading sociobiologists are left-of-center liberals or social democrats. "Racist" Trivers is even married to a Jamaicanand is heavily involved in radical black politics.

7 For a more detailed examination of Wilson's and Lewontin's agendas, see Segerstrale(1983), Appendices B and C.8 To show this, I will be drawing on both written material and on interviews with theprotagonists and their colleagues. In other words, I am attempting an analysis andreconstruction of this controversy in vivo. In this paper, I am focusing on Wilson andLewontin, while my Ph.D. thesis expands to the larger debate about sociobiology.9 Such an approach is typical of the Fisher school of genetics, which many British socio-biologists are followers of. "Gene thinking" of the Hamilton, Maynard Smith and Dawkinskind has not caught on among their more "holistically" inclined Harvard colleagues inevolutionary biology. In fact, both Lewontin (1977a), Gould (1977), Mayr (Interview No.12) and Wilson (Interview No. 2) have been critical of Dawkins' The Selfish Gene (1976)for this reason.10 Despite Wilson's agreement with Lewontin's views in 1974, he has later taken a differentoutlook. Thus, in Genes, Mind, and Culture he states (with Lumsden) that the problems arenot nearly as difficult as "the more naive arithmetic exercises" would lead one to believeand that surprisingly few genetic loci are in fact involved in many phenomena (Lumsdenand Wilson, 1981a, pp. 199-200). According to Wilson, "Lewontin will have to comearound", or he will be out of the mainstream of population genetics (Interview No. 3). (Foran update of these problems, see, e.g., Lewin, 1981 b.)

COLLEAGUES IN CONFLICT 81

" Wilson was rather a "second generation" student of Wheeler's, i.e., a student ofWheeler's student F. M. Carpenter. For a discussion of the intellectual climate of theSociety of Fellows, see Russett (1966).12 For an excellent analysis of Wilson's conceptual development under the influence ofpost World War II cybernetic theory, see Haraway (1981-1982).13 See Ghiselin (1974) for a discussion of Wheeler's influence on Wilson. Cf. Wilson(197 lb) for an explicit endorsement of insect societies as a model for human societies.14 Wilson, in fact, made kin selection part of group selection in his book. Wilson is thus notspecifically promoting kin selection as the cornerstone of the new conceptual revolution asto animal social behavior and Dawkins (1979) criticizes Wilson for this. But Wilson neverwas "converted" to kin selection. In fact, when he wrote Sociobiology, he was still a groupselectionist. That book, while synthesizing recent studies, may well have remained groupselectionist, had not Robert Trivers read the manuscript and persuaded Wilson to pay moreattention to the new developments in British sociobiology (DeVore, Interview No. 19).Even now Wilson remains convinced about the reality of group selection (Interview No. 2).The same is true of Levins (Interview No. 11); while Lewontin takes more of a mainstreamposition, believing it is possible, but unlikely (Interview No. 8).15 But later Wilson retreated to his initial position. In 1979 he told the Star Islandsymposium on science and religion that the criticism of the naturalistic fallacy has "lost agreat deal of its force in the last few years" (Wilson, 1980).16 Cf. Wilson's chapter on sex in On Human Nature (Wilson, 1978a), where he says thatthe Church's theory is in error and that the laws it addresses are really written by biology.He then goes on to say that our genetic history in fact argues for a more liberal sexualmorality (op. cit., pp. 141-142).17 The reason why exactly ants became the chosen species for Wilson, the naturalist, wasthat this species suited his unique eyesight best. While "birds fly too fast", Wilson is ableboth to spot ants and study their behavior in more detail than most people (Interview No.2).18 This may explain his persuasive tone and occasional moves from what is to what mightbe in the last chapter of Sociobiology.9 Wilson goes as far as describing the evolutionary epic as "the core of scientific material-ism" (Wilson, 1980).20 Wilson has already earlier been preoccupied with the problem of genetically based rapidcultural change and argued for the possibility of a partially genetic basis for contemporaryhuman groups, provided they have been separated for at least a thousand years (Wilson,1971c, partially reintroduced in his 1975a, pp. 145-151).21 In this sense, Lewontin can be described as a "total Marxist". For a Marxist, who is ascientist, it is in principle possible to adopt a variety of positions, e.g., to be a politicalMarxist while a "traditional" scientist. It is not necessary either to combine one's role as ascientist with one's role as a political activist. All this needs pointing out, because of theadoption of all the above positions by, e.g., Lewontin, Gould and Levins; while, e.g., apolitical activist like Salvador Luria (Interview No. 34) feels that he can be a Marxist poli-tically, while a reductionist scientifically. (I have benefitted from discussions of this matterwith John Maynard Smith).22 Wilson spontaneously suggested in interview that the claim of Lewontin and Levins tohave developed a Marxist model in ecology is "quite false". This is because what they referto in this same article, when they say:

A major success of a complex systems analysis which derives, in part, from a consciousapplication of a Marxist world view, is the theory of community ecology, with itsemphasis on the community matrix and on species interactions

is nothing else than Levins' 1968 book, whose models Wilson enthusiastically endorsed inSociobiology. According to Wilson, Levins is here deriving community properties from

82 ULLICA SEGERSTRALE

pairwise interactions in a very standard way, and he wondered what is Marxist about that: ifthat is Marxist, then he himself is more Marxist than the authors (Interview No. 3). Levins'reply to Wilson's challenge was that it is the intent that is Marxist (Levins, Interview No.

11).23 In turn, this may be a product of the peculiar brand of American academic Marxism. SeeBouchier (1977) for an analysis of the differences between the activist American Marxismthat grew out of the subjective experiences of the members of the 60's movement, and themore theoretical class analysis typical for European Marxists.24 In order to assess whether or not Agassiz was lying, one would need to know whetherAgassiz, in fact, knew the skull suture argument to be false. Does Lewontin possess suchevidence? This is, in effect, what a former colleague of Lewontin's asked him in a letter,after having watched the NOVA program. From Lewontin's answer, it appears thatLewontin does not see a compelling need for evidence of this type in the case of Agassiz:

He was a liar because lying can involve two things. One is saying something which youknow not to be true; the other, especially for a scientist, is to claim something as amatter of fact when you know that there has never been one particle of empiricalevidence offered in its favor. I do not know which of these two categories of liars Mr.Agassiz falls into, but he certainly falls in one of them, since there never was and nevercan be a demonstration that the skull sutures of blacks close before the skull sutures ofwhites since the reverse is true, although there is no significant difference.

Thus, Lewontin basically reiterates what he already said, and uses later knowledge toattribute moral guilt to earlier scientists (cf. Lewontin 1977b, p. 10). I thank Lisa Lloyd forpointing out the need for this clarification.25 Both Wilson and Lewontin have confirmed this in interviews.26 In these days, Lewontin was still a "jacket and tie" type, according to Slobodkin(personal communication).27 Cf. Note 22 above.28 Lewontin (1976) said:

It is undoubtedly true that human behavior like human anatomy is not impervious tonatural selection and that some aspects of human social existence owe their historicalmanifestations to limitations and initial conditions placed upon them by our evolution-ary history.

However, he then went on to claim that sociobiology inadequately handles these facts.Wilson never saw this paper, which is something of a prototype for Lewontin's 1979 paper,'Sociobiology as an Adaptationist Program' which Wilson considers "good criticism".29 While Jensen (1969) had argued that one cannot exclude the possibility of a geneticexplanation for the 15 point IQ difference between whites and blacks, Herrnstein hadsuggested that increased equality of opportunity and assortative mating might give rise to anew class society, stratified on the basis of IQ (Herrnstein, 1973).3) And Wilson goes out of his way to play down the role of IQ for determining socialsuccess, thus in direct opposition to his Harvard colleague Herrnstein's views (Wilson,1975a, pp. 554-555).31 I has to be noted that the generalizability of blood group data to more complex humantraits is entirely based on a plausibility argument. While Wilson is willing to go alongwith this, others, e.g., Freedman (1975, pp. 161-162), consider such an extrapolationunwarranted.32 Such as, e.g., Bernard Davis (1975, 1980). Lewontin even goes as far as implying thatDavis, who is eager to locate innate individual talent, is a racist. (See an overview of theDavis controversy in Harvard MedicalAlumni Bulletin, July/August 1976).33 No doubt, this was given a special edge by the fact that many American leftists tracetheir origins to Eastern European Jewry, and thus had personal reasons for fighting all


theses about innate differences between people. The Immigration Act of 1924 looms largein left-wing writings, ever since Kamin's (1974) book. Gould, in his treatment of this matter,goes as far as holding the early IQ testers in America responsible for preventing Jews fromescaping Hitler, because of their alleged role in the establishment of immigrant quotas(Gould 1981, p. 233). But the role of the testers for the quotas is grossly overestimated,according to others, e.g., Samelson (1982). Lewontin, interestingly, in 1975 accused thegeneticists and psychologists at that time not for testifying in court but on the contrary forkeeping silent when "lies" were being told (Lewontin, 1975b).34 The available evidence concerning cognitive abilities and human behavioral genetics isbased on twin studies, which are full of methodological problems. In his (1975) paper,Lewontin dismisses available studies as methodologically unacceptable (others would bemore lenient; see, e.g., Thoday, 1981). But Lewontin still outlines the criteria for a "good"adoption study of twins. Here it appears that he is not categorically opposed to research ininnate differences between individuals. It seems that he becomes more negative in contextswhere he is addressing himself to the general public, than when he is addressing scientists.Thus, a clue to understanding Lewontin is that his positions may be context-dependent (andalso changing over time). I thank Evelyn Fox Keller for useful discussion of this point.35 Of which Lewontin, as earlier mentioned, was the chief author.36 Cf. Note 24 above.37 Such a conflict in perception about the "proper" scientific research style, strongly tied toesthetic views, in fact has precedents in history of science. A case in point is the differencebetween the theoretical purist Pierre Duhem, on the one hand, and the empirical modellersMaxwell and Kelvin, on the other (see Wartofsky, 1979).38 It appears that a special reason why Lewontin is preoccupied with "good science" or"correct facts" about human behavior is that he sees a link between "bad" or "pseudo-science" and the possibility or inevitability of social abuse. The link between "bad" scienceand social abuse is a taken-for-granted one by the co-signers of the first letter attackingWilson (Allen et al., 1975). Lewontin seems to adhere to the same view, in the earliermentioned NOVA program and in a 1977 article where he demonstrates how earlier"biological determinist" theories are both erroneous and have been abused (Lewontin,1977b). But his stronger position that "bad" or "pseudo" science will be misused, while"serious truths" will not, is perhaps best reflected in the following interview in the HarvardGazette (Jan. 16, 1976). Asked whether he believed that investigations into the geneticfoundation of human nature must inevitably strengthen the status quo, Lewontin answered:

Yes. At present our ignorance of this question is so enormous, our investigatorytechniques so primitive and weak, our theoretical concepts so unformed, that it isunimaginable to me that lasting, serious truths about human nature are possible. On theother hand the need of the socially powerful to exonerate their institutions of respon-sibility for the problems they have created is extremely strong. Under these circum-stances any investigations into the genetic control of human behaviors is bound toproduce a pseudo-science that will inevitably be misused.

Thus, Lewontin takes a black-and-white view. The alternative position, which would bethat any piece of science, including "good" science, can be abused is voiced by, e.g., Davis(1978). Stent (1978) goes as far as suggesting that there may even exist scientific lies withuseful social functions. I thank John Beatty and Diane Paul for constructive disagreementwith my interpretation of Lewontin.3Y Lumsden, in fact, came to Wilson's lab as a post-doctoral student to model ants. He wasturned down first, but persisted and was accepted. Once at Harvard, Lumsden's interest incognitive studies made them abandon their original plans and "opportunistically" (Wilson'sdescription) collaborate on the human end of the sociobiological enterprise (Wilson,Interview No. 2; Lumsden, Interview No. 6).4 Wilson likes to compare Lumsden's and his teamwork to that of Watson and Crick.

ULLICA SEGERSTRALE

Lumsden's comment to that was that he sometimes wonders who is Watson and who isCrick (Interview No. 6).41 Cf. Wilson (1971a), p. 319.42 As Mackintosh (1979) points out, Wilson believes that an evolutionary explanation is"deeper" than other types of explanations, and therefore he does not consider coexistingexplanations at many different levels.43 See, e.g., Allen et al. (1975), Lewontin (1976) and The Sociobiology Study Group (read:Lewontin) in 1976. A conspiracy setup is implied in most of these critical scenarios; cf., e.g.,"The entire theory is so constructed that no tests are possible." (SSG, 1976)44 Is, then, the model necessarily intuitively 'absurd' to biologists? In the summer of 1981 Iasked a few of the participants in the international Ethology Conference in Oxford for theirgut reactions to ideas such as the "thousand year rule" and the coevolutionary circuit, and atleast some believed the overall claim of the book was plausible.45 E.g., Medawar (1981), Leach (1981).46 Lewontin suggested (personal communication) that there were at least two well-qualifiedscientists highly critical of Genes, Mind, and Culture who had not publicly voiced theirviews. See also Lewin's (1981 la) preliminary survey of reactions to this book.47 Here Wilson refers to the peer reviews of his and Lumsden's book in Behavior andBrain Sciences 5 (1982), 1-37.48 Wilson is a methodological reductionist but an ontological holist in relation to insectsocieties. However, in relation to human societies he is much more reductionistic in regardboth to his methodology and his ontology, i.e., he sees human societies as made up ofindividuals (Interview No. 3). The reason he gave for this metaphysical reductionism wassimple naturalistic observation: "I have seen so many societies all over the world; I knowwhat they are like." (ibid.)49 CAR was demonstrating outside the Science Center at Harvard, where Wilson wasgiving a popular lecture based on his new book, on February 10, 1982.50 Wilson is extremely sensitive to tone. This is shown among others by the fact that heapproved of Hampshire's (1978) critical review of the philosophical basis of On HumanNature and suggested that I interview Hampshire. Lewontin found the criticism devastating,and suggested the same thing. Indeed, Hampshire's critique represented many of Lewontin'sbasic meta-scientific objections to sociobiology. Thus, one might idly speculate whetherLewontin and Wilson could after all have been able to confront each other at a meta-scientific level if Wilson had been able to read, e.g., Lewontin's 1976 philosophicalcriticism.51 This is incorrect. But Wilson had never seen a politically "uncontaminated" criticism byLewontin until 1979.52 Here Wilson is explicitly challenging Lewontin to develop a Marxist program. But it isnot mere rhetoric. It appears that Wilson really would be quite interested in the results of aMarxist holistic approach, and has always admired Levins (Interview No. 2). The DialecticalBiologist (Levins and Lewontin, 1985) could perhaps be seen as the first step towardsmeeting Wilson's challenge.53 It is, of course, not especially Marxist to be environmentalist: it all depends on what textof Marx one is referring to. While the Sociobiology Study Group adopted a neo-Marxistposition of a socially molded and continuously changing human nature, other traditionalMarx readings are concerned with the human "species being", obviously a fixed entity.These different interpretations of the nature of human nature caused consternation betweenLewontin and the invited guest Noam Chomsky at one of the Sociobiology Study Groupmeetings (May 10, 1976), where I was present as an observer. For Wilson, the critics'choice of the neo-Marxist view of human nature came as a godsend, because againstextreme environmentalist claims his own approach would sound more reasonable.

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