Communist Leadership in Indonesia

Institute of Pacific Relations

Communist Leadership in IndonesiaAuthor(s): George McT. KahinSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 18, No. 16 (Aug. 10, 1949), pp. 188-189Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3024424 .Accessed: 04/12/2014 09:45

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Communist Leadership in Indonesia

Many veteran leaders have been executed, but their places may be filled by

young nationalists who feel the Republican government has betrayed them.

BY GEORGE McT. KAHIN

l ecent Dutch hostilities against the Republic of Indonesia have had a very great impact on the

leadership of the Indonesian Communist movements. In-

directly they have resulted in the death of some of the ablest remaining Communist leaders. At the same time

they have brought about a situation in which a number of able young intellectuals having a high leadership potential^ formerly opposed to Communism, are being at- tracted toward it and are almost certain to join one of the two Indonesian Communist groups if the present anti-Communist leaders of the Republic are forced to make more concessions to the Dutch. Thus although Indonesian Communism has sustained a very serious loss in leadership during the past six months, the pos? sibility exists that it may recoup its losses.

Although Republican military commanders had or? ders to evacuate their 30,000 Communist prisoners with them if they were forced to retire in the face of a Dutch attack, they were in most cases unable to exe- cute these orders because of the blitz nature of the war begun by the Dutch on December 19, 1948. Only a few of those alleged to have participated in the Com? munist rebellion of 1948 had as yet been tried and sen- tenced. It was known that a large number of those

awaiting trial had either been forced to join the rebelling Communist organization, the Indonesian Communist

Party (P.K.I.), or had been completely misguided by its propaganda. Thus with the approach of Dutch

troops the tendency was frequently to give these peo? ple the benefit of the doubt and to throw open the doors of their jails and internment camps.

Communist Leaders Executed The jailed leaders of the Communist rebellion did

not receive this treatment. A few important ones such as Setiadjit, Abdul Madjid and Tan Ling-djie did man-

age to escape in the confusion. However, Colonel Gatot

Subroto, Military Governor of Surakarta, upon evacu-

ating that city took with him all important Communist leaders jailed there. The following day, December 20, at a small town near by he ordered all eleven of these Communist leaders shot. Together they comprised at least two-thirds of the top-level P.K.I. Communist lead-

Mr. Kahin recently returned from Indonesia, where he observed current developments as a fellow of the Social Science Re? search Council and correspondent for Overseas News Agency.

ers not killed in the Madiun rebellion. They included such top-ranking men as Amir Sjarifuddin, Suripno, Maruto Darusman, Harjono and Oei Gee-hwat. At

Magelang jail a large number of second echelon P.K.I. leaders were executed.

Organizational and operational leadership among the P.K.I. Communists is now in the able hands of Setiad-

jit and Abdul Madjid, while the party's theorist is Tan Ling-djie. Their followers have been able to re- cover some arms from those of its old caches which the Republican government had not found. It is not clear whether they have as yet done any fighting against the Dutch but in a number of instances they have at- tacked Republican Army units just as the latter re- tired to rest up after a heavy engagement with Dutch

troops. These attacks have netted them some Republi? can equipment, but have increased the hatred of regu? lar government troops for them. This hatred appears now to have spread to include all Communists, includ?

ing the non-Stalinist nationalistic Communists who have followed Tan Malaka.

Fate of Tan Malaka Tan Malaka's group has consistently opposed the

P.K.I. and did not join it in its rebellion against the Government. During the last months before the Dutch attack they had organized themselves as the Proletarian

Party (Partai Murbah) and worked legally, above

ground, and within the democratic channels provided by the political system that operated in the Republic. Just after the Dutch attack Tan Malaka joined Major Sabaruddin, an ideological follower of his, and one of the battalion commanders of General Sungkono, top Republican military officer in East Java. Sabaruddin had established a record as one of the most able of the

Republican commanders employed in suppressing the P.K.I. Communist rebellion as well as one of the most ruthless exterminators of such Communists. As such he

enjoyed the confidence of his commander, Sungkono. However, a few days after the Dutch attack, Tan Mal? aka made a speech over Kediri radio without permis- sion of either General Sungkono or Dr. Murdjani, Re?

publican Governor of East Java, who were both out of town at the time. This speech was a violent attack

against President Sukarno and Prime Minister Hatta and was generally interpreted as an appeal to the peo? ple to repudiate them and follow Tan Malaka. This

greatly angered General Sungkono, who up to that

188 FAR EASTERN SURVEY


time had not been sure where Tan Malaka stood. Tan Malaka thenceforth stayed clear of Sungkono. He con- tinued, however, to receive Sabaruddin's protection.

In late March or early April 19495 both Sabaruddin and Tan Malaka were arrested on orders of General Sungkono and placed under house arrest at Njandjoek, a town near Madiun. During a Dutch attack they both escaped but Tan Malaka was rearrested shortly afterward at Blitar and on April 16 was executed on orders of Sungkono. Tan Malaka was the foremost figure in the nationalist Communist coalition. His lead? ership, nationalist sentiment, and hatred of the pro- Stalinist P.K.I. Communists were the three things that bound its constituent groups together. It is doubtful whether any of the present leaders of the nationalist Communists can ever attain the preeminent position of Tan Malaka, whose extensive writings will continue to influence the policy of his successors. It seems likely that leadership may fall to two close associates of Tan Malaka, both in their middle thirties, Sukarni and Maruto Nitimihardjo, who were respectively chairman and vice-chairman of the Partai Murbah.

Frustrated Nationalism Both of these men were a few years ago moderate

socialists and followers of Sjahrir. They became Com? munists not because of their Marxism but because of their nationalism. Frustration of their nationalist hopes, and specifically what they termed "appeasement of the Dutch'5 by the leaders of the Republican Government, were the factors which turned them to nationalist Com- munism.

To understand this is to understand a great deal about the political potential of Communism in Indo? nesia. That potential is strong, particularly among young intellectuals, in direct proportion to the frus? tration of hopes for real national independence. Wheth? er this frustration drives them toward the nationalist Communism of Tan Malaka, or the Stalinist variety of the P.K.I., depends upon whether they feel that genuine colonial emancipation can be achieved only after Soviet Russia has defeated America (as do most adherents of the P.K.I.), or whether they believe with the nationalist Communists that independence can be attained by Indonesia's own efforts, particularly that of her guerrillas, and that Communism must be devel- oped in Indonesia free of any interference by Soviet Russia.1 But the gravitation in either direction is aided by the same powerful force, frustrated nationalism.

The Rum-van Royen Agreement of May 7 was wide-

1 In this connection, Tan Malaka had cautioned that in the struggle for independence Indonesians must not substi? tute a new colonial relationship with Russia for the old one with the Netherlands.

ly hailed in the American press as an important step toward a solution of the Netherlands Indonesian prob? lem. In Indonesia it was generally regarded, rightly or

wrongly, as a serious defeat for the Republican cause, engineered by strong American pressure on the Repub? lic' s leaders. Most educated Indonesians strongly oppose the agreement and criticize their leaders for having accepted it. Many of them maintain that the terms of the agreement call for a surrender of Indonesian inter? ests which, when coupled with past concessions made

by the same leaders under UN and particularly Amer? ican pressure, adds up to such a total capitulation to the Dutch as to discredit completely the present pro- American, anti-Communist leaders of the Republic.

Many Indonesians have, since then, been looking else- where for leadership. A few have already drifted toward one or the other of the two Communist camps, and many more would have done so had not an alternate channel of protest against the Government's policy been opened up. This occurred when Soetan Sjahrir, former Prime Minister of the Republic, and probably the most influ- ential leader among young Indonesian intellectuals, went into strong opposition against the May 7 agree? ment. Indonesians were thus given a chance to oppose the agreement and the policy it represents without join? ing the Communists.

Sjahrir's Alternative But this safety-valve cannot long divert the forces of

frustrated nationalism from flowing into the channel of opposition offered by the Communists. For Sjahrir's action was one of loyal opposition to the Republican Government. He has not opposed the leaders of the

Government, only their policies. If the leaders of the

Republic of Indonesia are further discredited, if their trust in the impartiality of American policy is be? lieved by their followers to have been futile, Sjahrir will be unable to provide an alternative to Communist

leadership by a policy of loyal opposition. To compete with the Communists for leadership of those who have lost faith in Sukarno, Hatta and other pro-American, anti-Communist leaders, Sjahrir will have to repudiate these leaders as well as their policies, and he will be forced to compete with the Communists in denouncing the United States. In such a contest the Communists would have an advantage over Sjahrir and over such men as Mohamed Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawirane-

gara (leaders of the progressive wing of the Masjumi, a Mohammedan political organization which was the

largest political party in the Republic). Under such cir- cumstances both Communist groups would doubtless be able to recruit new leadership material which would more than compensate them for the losses they have recently sustained.

AUGUST 10, I 949 189


Article Contentsp. 188p. 189

Issue Table of ContentsFar Eastern Survey, Vol. 18, No. 16 (Aug. 10, 1949), pp. 181-192Labor and Politics in India [pp. 181-187]Communist Leadership in Indonesia [pp. 188-189]Books on the Pacific AreaReview: untitled [pp. 190]Review: untitled [pp. 190-191]Review: untitled [pp. 191]Review: untitled [pp. 191]Review: untitled [pp. 191]Review: untitled [pp. 192]

News Chronology [pp. 192]

Documents

Communist Leadership in Indonesia